complete legal ethics digest

7/30/2019 Complete Legal Ethics Digest

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L E G A L E T H I C SDIGESTS

ATENEO CENTRAL BAR OPERATIONS 2001

A. LAWYER

1. Duty to the Court/Negligence of a Lawyer

In Re: Vicente Y. BayaniA.C. No. 5307. August 9, 2000

Facts: Atty. Vicente Bayani was the lawyer for the appellant in a criminal case. He failed tosubmit his proof of service in his appellant's brief which subsequently caused the inability of theappellee to file his own brief. The IBP was order to investigate on the matter and despiterepeated notices, Bayani failed to submit the proof of service and his answer to the IBP's query.Hence, this administrative complaint.

Held: GUILTY. Atty. Bayani's failure to submit proof of service of appellant's brief and his failureto submit the required comment manifest willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the

Supreme Court, a clear violation of the canons of professional ethics. It appears that Atty.Bayani has fallen short of the circumspection required of a member of the Bar. A counsel mustalways remember that his actions or omissions are binding on his clients. A lawyer owes hisclient the exercise of utmost prudence and capability in that representation. Further, lawyers areexpected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure and anyone who dealswith them has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning andcompetence but also a whole-hearted fealty to his client's cause. Having been remiss in his dutyto the Court and to the Bar, Atty. Bayani was suspended from the practice of law for 3 monthsand until the time he complies with the Order of the Supreme Court to submit the required proofof service.

2. Duty to Client/Accounting of Clients Money/Negligence

Teodulfo B. Basas vs. Atty. Miguel I. IcawatA.C. No. 4282. August 24, 2000

Facts: Atty. Miguel Icawat was the lawyer for Teodulfo Basas and some other laborers in theircomplaint against their employer. The NLRC rendered an adverse decision. Basas and hisfellow workers, however, insisted that they appeal the decision. Atty. Icawat, however, failed tofile the required memorandum of appeal. Basas filed an administrative complaint, also allegingthat Atty. Icawat issued a receipt for an amount less than that which they had paid him.

Held: GUILTY. Respondent's failure to file the memorandum of appeal required by the NLRCRules of Procedure reveals his poor grasp of labor law. Respondent practically admitted that he

did not file the memorandum. His failure to file the memorandum clearly prejudiced the interestsof his clients. Respondent manifestly fell short of the diligence required of his profession, inviolation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that a lawyershall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 further provides that a lawyershall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewithshall render him liable. For his failure to issue the proper receipt for the money he received fromhis clients, respondent also violated Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility whichstates that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from theclient. The Court fined Atty. Icawat in the amount of PhP 500, with a warning that a repetition ofthe same offense or a similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely.

3. Duty of Lawyer to Client/Proper Conduct

Teodoro R. Rivera vs. Atty. Sergio AngelesA.C. No. 2519. August 29, 2000

Facts: Atty. Sergio Angeles was the legal counsel of Teodoro Rivera and 2 others in a civil case.Rivera and his 2 co-plaintiffs received a favorable decision. Atty. Angeles received almost PhP50,000 from one of the defendants in the case as partial fulfillment of the judgement against thelatter. Atty. Angeles, however, never told his clients of the amount he had received and never

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remitted the same to him, leaving them to discover such fact on their own. Rivera and his co-plaintiffs filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Angeles.

Held: GUILTY. Atty. Angeles was not disbarred but the Court ruled that his act amounted toserious misconduct. The Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity and goodmoral character as part of a lawyers equipment in the practice of his profession. For it cannotbe denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever amember of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. The Court is not oblivious of the right of alawyer to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his client but such right should not beexercised whimsically by appropriating to himself the money intended for his clients. Thereshould never be an instance where the victor in litigation loses everything he won to the fees ofhis own lawyer. For deceit in dealing with his client, Atty. Angeles was suspended from thepractice of law for 1 year.

Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Attys. Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon

A.C. No. 4690. August 29, 2000

Facts: Attys. Antonio Llorente and Ligaya Salayon were election officers of the COMELEC andheld the position of Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively for the Pasig City Board ofCandidates. The respondents helped conduct and oversee the 1995 elections. Then Senatorialcandidate Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. alleged that the respondents tampered with the votes receivedby them by either adding more votes for particular candidates in their Statement of Votes (SoV)or reducing the number of votes of particular candidates in their SoV. Pimentel filed anadministrative complaint for their disbarment. Respondents argued that the discrepancies weredue to honest mistake, oversight and fatigue. Respondents also argued that the IBP Board ofGovernors had already exonerated them from any offense and that the motion forreconsideration filed by Pimentel was not filed in time.

Held: GUILTY. Respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended thecanvassing of the Pasig City election returns. The only explanation they could offer for suchirregularities is that the same could be due to honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue onthe part of the members of the canvassing committees who prepared the SoVs. There is a limit,we believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, in theperformance of official duty. The sheer magnitude of the error renders the defense of honestmistake or oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and simply unacceptable. Indeed, what isinvolved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per precinct asreflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of the erroneous figures in one or twoSoVs but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the expenseof the petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election returns. A lawyer who

holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct inthe discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if the misconduct also constitutesa violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyers oath or is of such characteras to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such individualmay be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct. Here, by certifying as true andcorrect the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code whichstipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service.In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to do no falsehood. The Courtfound the respondents guilty of misconduct and fined them PhP 10,000 each and issued a sternwarning that similar conduct in the future will be severely punished.

4. Misrepresentation and Non-payment of IBP Dues

Soliman M. Santos, Jr. v. Atty. Francisco R. LlamasA.C. No. 4749. January 20, 2000

Facts: Complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues. It appearsthat Atty. Llamas, who for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBPOR Nos. and data in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated IBP Rizal 259060 but he has

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been using this for at least 3 years already. On the other hand, respondent, who is now of age,averred that he is only engaged in a limited practice of law and under RA 7432, as a seniorcitizen, he is exempted from payment of income taxes and included in this exemption is the

payment of membership dues.

Held: GUILTY. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annualdues and default thereof for six months shall warrant suspension of membership and ifnonpayment covers a period of 1-year, default shall be a ground for removal of the delinquentsname from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not respondent is only engagedin limited practice of law. Moreover, the exemption invoked by respondent does not includeexemption from payment of membership or association dues.

In addition, by indicating IBP Rizal 259060 in his pleadings and therebymisprepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the RizalChpater, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility whichprovides: Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful

conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A lawyer shall not do anyfalsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misledby any artifice.

Lawyer was suspended for 1 year or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.

B. JUDGES

1. Gross Ignorance of the Law

Improper Imposition of the Punishment of Contempt

Flaviano B. Cortes v. Judge Felina BangalanA.M. No. MTJ-97-1129. January 19, 2000

Facts: Complainant was one of the co-accused in an adultery case filed before the sala ofrespondent Judge Bangalan. In a letter-complaint, he moved for the voluntary inhibition ofrespondent judge on the ground that the latter cannot be impartial over the criminal casebecause complainant previously filed an opposition to the appointment of respondent as RTC

judge.For this, respondent judge issued an order citing Complainant in direct contempt of

court, averring further that his pleading contained derogatory, offensive or malicious statements"equivalent to misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as tointerrupt the proceedings before the same within the meaning of Rule 71. When complainantappealed said order in the same court, after posting a notice of appeal, respondent judgeordered him to submit a record on appeal. Upon failure to do so, respondent judge issued a

warrant of arrest against Complainant for which he was arrested and jailed for 1 day with a fineof P10.00.Thus, Complainant charges respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law,

oppressive conduct and abuse of authority when the latter held him in contempt of court onaccount of the statements he made in his letter-complaint which statements, complainantinsists, are absolutely privileged in nature. Complainant further alleges that he filed a notice ofappeal from the order of contempt but respondent directed him to submit a record on appealdespite the fact that the same is not required under the rules.

Held: GUILTY. Judge B was fined in the amount equivalent to 1-month salary with a sternwarning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more seriously. The Court said thatwhile it is true that the complainant attached the administrative letter-complaint in his letter for

respondent judge to inhibit in the criminal case, it was used merely to support his contention inhis motion for inhibition. A judge is bound never to consider lightly a motion for his inhibition thatquestions or puts to doubt, however insignificant, his supposed predilection to a case pendingbefore him. Furthermore, the alleged offensive and contemptuous language contained in theletter-complaint was not directed to the respondent court.

A judge may not hold a party in contempt of court for expressing concern on hisimpartiality even if the judge may have been insulted therein. While the power to punish incontempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold

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the due administration of justice, judges, however, should exercise their contempt powersjudiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing theircontempt powers for correction and preservation not for retaliation or vindication.

Anent the charge of gross ignorance of the law in requiring complainant to submit arecord on appeal, we find the respondent judge's order to be not it accord with the establishedrule on the matter. Contempt proceedings is not one of those instances where a record onappeal is required to perfect an appeal. Thus, when the law is elementary, so elementary, not toknow it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

Payment of Docket Fees in Election Cases

Alfredo B. Enojas v. Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr.A.M. No. RTJ-99-1513. January 19, 2000

Facts: Judge Gacott is being administratively charged in this case with serious misconduct,inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law. This complaint arose when respondent Judge

dismissed an election case on the ground of non-payment of docket fees, although the casewas had been previously admitted and was deemed properly filed by the original Judge(inhibited himself due to relationship to ones of the parties) whom Judge Gacott replaced.Jugde G issued the dismissal order relying on a case (Manchester vs. CA) which states that - acase is deemed commenced only upon the payment of the proper docket fees. To his opinion,the required fees in this case was not yet paid by the protestant. Hence, this complaint charginghim primarily with gross ignorance of the law.

Held: GUILTY. Based on the facts and circumstances attendant to the case, the election protestwas properly filed. In fact, the original Judge already made an order that from the deposit givenby the protestant for the expenses of reopening the questioned ballots, an amount shall beallocated for the payment of the required fees. More importantly, the Court held that the

Manchester ruling relied upon by respondent Judge does not apply to election cases. In a lattercase ( Pahilan), the evil sought to be avoided in the Manchester case does not exist in electioncases. Truth is, the filing fee in an election case is fixed and the claim for damages, to which thedocket fees shall be made to apply, is merely ancillary to main cause of action and is not evendeterminative of the courts jurisdiction.

While it is true that not every error or mistake of a judge renders him administrativelyliable, in this case, it is clear that the respondent judge was in utter disregard of establishedrules amounting to gross ignorance of the law. The Pahilan case was decided long before therespondent made a ruling on the election case. Thus, the respondent judge was duty bound toadhere to, and apply the recent ruling, and he cannot feign ignorance thereof, because theCode of Judicial Ethics requires him to be an embodiment of, among other things, judicialcompetence. On e of the principal duties of a judge is to be abreast with law and jurisprudence

since the administration of justice requires continuous study of the law and jurisprudence. Aperusal of the challenge order reveals that respondent judge failed to live up to what is expectedof him as a dispenser of justice.

Granting of Bail

Romulo Tolentino v. Judge Policarpio S. Camano, Jr.A.M. RTJ-00-1522 January 20, 2000

Facts: Respondent Judge is being charged with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse ofdiscretion, grave abuse of authority, violation of Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the Canons of JudicialEthics and incompetence in connection with granting bail to the accused in a criminal case forchild abuse.

The complaint alleges that respondent Judge granted bail while pending the holding of apreliminary investigation. The defense moved to quash the information against the accused onthe alleged absence of a preliminary investigation. Consequently, respondent Judge orderedthat a preliminary investigation be had by the state prosecutor. During the pendency of this, hegranted bail in favor of the defendant after several notices of hearing to the state prosecutor towhich the latter failed to appear. After such grant, complainant herein now accuses respondentof denying the prosecution the chance to adduce evidence to show that the guilt of the accusedwas strong and that bail should not have been granted in his favor.

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Held: NOT GUILTY. There was no denial of due process. It was not necessary to hold hearingso that the prosecution could show that evidence of guilt of the accused was strong since a

preliminary investigation had been ordered by the court. At that point, bail was still a matter ofright. Respondent judge, knowing that bail was indeed a matter of right at that stage,nevertheless set the hearing for the petition for bail four times. However, complainant failed toappear and present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused was strong. It thus appearsthat complainant is actually the one who was remiss in the performance of his duties.Considering that the case was referred to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for preliminaryinvestigation, the accused could be considered as entitled to bail as a matter of right. Thus,respondent judges decision granting bail to the accused was proper and in accordance with lawand jurisprudence.

Issuance of an Order of Release

Jesusa Santiago vs. Judge Eduardo Jovellanos

Margarita Sanchez vs. Judge Eduardo JovellanosA.M. No. MTJ-00-1289. August 1, 2000

Facts: Jesusa Santiago and Margarita Sanchez were complainants in two different criminalcases before the MTC of San Ildefonso, Bulacan and the RTC of Rosales, Pampanga,respectively. The suspects in each of the criminal cases were caught by authorities anddetained. However, both suspects were released by order of Judge Eduardo Jovellanos,presiding judge of the MCTC of Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan. The complainants questioned bothOrders for Release issued by Judge Jovellanos, alleging that the requirements for the bailbondhad not been fulfilled and that the said judge had no jurisdiction to order the release.

Held: GUILTY. There are two defects in the Orders for Release signed by Judge Jovellanos.

First, in both cases, the detainees had not registered the bailbond in accordance with the Rulesof Criminal Procedure. One may not be given provisional liberty if the bailbond is not registeredwith the proper office. Secondly, Judge Jovellanos did not have jurisdiction to order the releaseof the detainees. The Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that when a suspect is arrestedoutside of the province, city or municipality where his case is pending, he may either apply forbail with the court where his case is pending or with any RTC in the province, city or municipalitywhere he was arrested. If a RTC judge is not available, he may apply for bail with any MTC orMCTC in the place where he was arrested. In this case, Judge Jovellanos entertained motionsfor bail and ordered release for suspects whose cases were not pending in his court nor werethey arrested within his jurisdiction. As an advocate of justice and a visible representation of thelaw, a judge is expected to keep abreast with and be proficient in the interpretation of our laws.

A judge should be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with statutes and

procedural rules. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence which goesagainst Canon 3, specifically Rule 3.01, of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Having accepted theexalted position of a judge, Judge Jovellanos owes the public and the court he sits in proficiencyin the law. He must have the basic rules at the palm of his hands as he is expected to maintainprofessional competence at all times. Judge Jovellanos was suspended for 1 year without payissued the warning that similar conduct in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Grant of a Motion for Reconsideration

Gloria Lucas v. Judge Amelia A. FabrosA.M. No. MTJ-99-1226. January 31, 2000

Facts : Complainant Lucas was the defendant in an ejectment case pending before respondent

judge. She alleges that Judge Fabros granted the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration after thecase had been dismissed the case for failure of plaintiff and her counsel to appear at thePreliminary Conference. She averred that it is elementary, under Section 19(c) of the Rules ofSummary Procedure, that a motion for reconsideration is prohibited, but respondent judge, inviolation of the rule, granted the motion for reconsideration. She added that, notwithstanding thefact that the respondent herself had pointed out in open court that the case is governed by theRules on Summary Procedure, the judge ordered the revival of the case out of malice, partiality

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and with intent to cause an injury to complainant. Thus, the instant complaint, chargingrespondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion

Held: NOT GUILTY. The SC held that respondent judge not guilty of gross ignorance of thelaw and grave abuse of discretion.

As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of theRevised Rule on Summary Procedure. This rule, however, applies only where the judgmentsought to be reconsidered is one rendered on the merits. Here, the order of dismissal issued byrespondent judge due to failure of a party to appear during the preliminary conference isobviously not a judgment on the merits after trial of the case. Hence, a motion for thereconsideration of such order is not the prohibited pleading contemplated under Section 19 (c)of the present Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent judge committed no grave abuseof discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance of the law, in giving due course to the motion forreconsideration subject of the present

Imposition of Proper Penalty

Felicidad Dadizon vs. Judge Aniceto LiriosA.M. No. MTJ-00-1295. August 1, 2000

Facts: Felicidad Dadizon was the complainant in a prosecution for Falsification of a PublicDocument (Art. 172, RPC) which was tried and decided by Judge Aniceto Lirios of the MTC ofNaval, Biliran. Judge Lirios convicted the accused, Pablo Suzon, and sentenced him to astraight penalty of 7 months imprisonment and imposed a PhP 1,000 fine. Dadizon questionedthe punishment meted by the said judge, alleging that the straight penalty of 7 months is waybelow the penalty provided by law. Judge Lirios defended his decision, stating that he had toappreciate the mitigating circumstance that Suzon was already 70 years of age.

Held: GUILTY. As judge of thirty-three (33) years, respondent should have known that theIndeterminate Sentence Law provides for the imposition of a prison sentence in the minimumand maximum term for offenses punishable by the Revised Penal Code or the special laws. Theoffense committed was Falsification by a Private Individual and Use of Falsified Documentpunishable under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code which provides for a penalty ofimprisonment of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (ranging from 2 years,4 months and 1 days to 6 years) and a fine of not more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).Respondent Judge appreciated one (1) mitigating circumstance (old age), which is merely anordinary mitigating circumstance. The imposition of a straight penalty of seven (7) months byrespondent Judge is clearly erroneous. While a judge may not always be subjected todisciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he renders, that relative immunity is nota license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. It

is true that a judge may err in fixing the minimum and maximum terms of an indeterminatesentence. However, the unawareness of or unfamiliarity with the application of theIndeterminate Sentence Law and duration and graduation of penalties merit disciplinary actionfrom reprimand to removal. Every judge should know that in applying the IndeterminateSentence Law for offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, the indeterminatesentence should have a fixed minimum and maximum. And when the law is so elementary, notto know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judge

Aniceto Lirios was fined in the amount of PhP 5,000 and issued stern warning that a repetitionof the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely by the Court.

Application of Rules of Procedure

Alfonso C. Ortiz vs. Judge Alex L. Quiroz

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1259 August 4, 2000

Facts: Alfonso Ortiz initiated a criminal complaint against Inocencia Hernandez for maliciousmischeif and grave threats. The case was assigned to Judge Alex Quiroz, presiding judge ofBranch 69 of the MTC of Pasig City. Before trial, however, Judge Quiroz ruled that the casewould be governed by ordinary rules of procedure rather than the summary rules of criminalprocedure because the case fell within the exceptions in P.D. 1508. Ortiz filed an administrative

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complaint against Judge Quiroz, arguing that the summary rules not the ordinary rules shouldbe followed for his case.

Held: GUILTY. Under the Revised Penal Code, grave threats is penalized with imprisonment of1 month and 1 day to 6 months (arresto mayor) and a fine not exceeding PhP 500, if the threatis not subject to a condition (Article 282). Malicious mischief, on the other hand, is penalizedwith imprisonment of 2 months and 1 day to 6 months (arresto mayor in its medium andmaximum periods) if the value of the damage caused exceeds PhP 1,000 (Article 329). In thiscase, the alleged damage to complainant was estimated to be PhP 50,000. Thus, the subjectcriminal cases should have been tried under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure,considering that such rule is applicable to criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by lawfor the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding PhP1,000 or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise or of the civilliability arising therefrom [Section 1 B(4), Revised Rule on Summary Procedure]. Respondent

judge, therefore, erred in applying the ordinary rules of procedure instead of the rules of

summary procedure. A judge has a duty to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance withthe statutes and procedural rules. In fact, the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that judgesmust be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. He must have the basic rulesat the palm of his hand and be proficient in the interpretation of laws and procedural rules.Judge Quiroz was reprimanded, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar actwould be dealt with more severely.

Issuance of a Writ of Execution

Teresita Jason vs. Judge Briccio YganaA.M. No. RTJ-00-1543. August 4, 2000

Facts: Teresita Jason was the defendant in an ejectment case before the MTC of Pasig City.

Having received an adverse judgement, Jason appealed the decision to Branch 153 of the RTCof Pasig City, presided by Judge Briccio Ygana. Respondent judge affirmed the decision of theMTC and subsequently issued a Writ of Execution for the judgement. The Sheriff of Branch 153executed upon some personal properties of Jason and gave a Notice to Vacate. Jason filed anadministrative complaint against Judge Ygana, arguing that the Writ of Execution should havebeen issued by the court of origin and not the appellate court.

Held: GUILTY. The case should have been remanded back to the MTC for execution. The ruleis that if the judgment of the metropolitan trial court is appealed the regional trial court and thedecision of the latter is itself elevated to the Court of Appeals, whose decision thereafterbecome final, the case should be remanded through the regional trial court to the metropolitantrial court for execution. The only exception is the execution pending appeal which is not evident

from the records of this case. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursoryacquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant withbasic legal principles. Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that the judge shouldbe studious of the principles of law. Canon 18 mandates that he should administer his officewith due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not adepository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law. Judge Ygana was finedPhP 10,000 for gross ignorance of the law.

Conducting Hearings for Probation

Carlos B. Creer vs. Judge Concordio FabillarA.M. No. MTJ-99-1218. August 14, 2000

Facts: Respondent Judge Concordio Fabillar, acting presiding judge of the 9th MCTC ofGiporlos-Quinapundan, Eastern Samar, convicted Carlos Creer of grave coercion. Creerappealed the conviction to the RTC where it was affirmed. Creer subsequently filed a Motion forReconsideration. Creer was then apprehended and jailed by order of Judge Fabillar. Creeralleged that respondent judge made him sign an application for probation which the said judgedenied. The RTC subsequently reversed the conviction of Creer and ordered his release. Creerfiled an administrative complaint against Judge Fabillar, charging the latter with gross ignoranceof the law for conducting hearings for probation despite his pending appeal.

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Held: GUILTY. The rule is that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if thedefendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. At the time complainant

applied for probation, an appeal had already been perfected. Although respondent Judgeeventually denied the application, the fact still remained that he had acted on it by asking theprobation officer to conduct a post-sentence investigation instead of outrightly denying the sameas so explicitly mandated by the law. Observance of the law, which he is bound to know andsworn to uphold, is required of every judge. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it tohis office to know and to simply apply it; anything less than that would be constitutive of grossignorance of the law. Judge Fabillar was suspended from service for 6 months without pay andordered to pay a PhP 20,000 fine. He was further warned with the most severe penalty foranother infraction by him.

Order of Acquittal

Fredesminda Dayawon v. Judge Maximino A. Badilla

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1309. September 6, 2000

Facts: Ms. Fredesminda Dayawon charged Judge Maximino A. Badilla of the Municipal TrialCourt of Pili, Camarines Sur, with "Gross Ignorance of the Law and Incompetence" relative toCriminal Case for estafa.

Complainant averred that respondent Judge acquitted the accused and declared her toonly be liable civilly, despite Alamos admittance in open court that she had received the subjectgoods from complainant to be sold on commission basis with the obligation to remit theproceeds of the sale or to return the items, if unsold, but had failed to comply seasonablytherewith despite demand. Complainant stressed that these admissions, together with thefinding that the accused had acted in bad faith, were clearly sufficient to convict the accused ofthe crime of estafa.

Held: GUILTY. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance withstatutes and procedural rules; so long as he remains on the bench, it is imperative that hecontinues to be conversant with the basic law and maintain the desired professionalcompetence.The Court finds it fit, however, to reduce the recommended fine of P5,000.00 to P2,000.00considering that no nefarious motive on the part of respondents judge has been shown.

Issuance of Hold Departure Order

Re: Hold-Departure Order Dated August 9, 1999 Issued by Judge Salvador B. Mendoza,MCTC, Poro-San Francisco-Tedela-Pilar, Poro, Cebu Office of the Court Administrator v.Judge Salvador B. Mendoza

A.M. No. 00-1281-MTJ. September 14, 2000

Facts: MTC Judge Mendoza issued a Hold Departure Order in Criminal Case No. T-1806,entitled "People of the Philippines v. Arnie Pena Osabel." pending before him in the MunicipalCircuit Trial Court, Poro-San Francisco-Tedela-Pilar, Poro, Cebu. The Secretary urged theCourt Administrator to look into the fact that the order in question was issued in violation ofSupreme Court Circular No. 39-97 dated June 19, 1997.

Held: GUILTY. Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to theRegional Trial Courts in criminal cases within their exclusive jurisdiction.

Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges to be "faithful to thelaw and maintain professional competence." The Court has not been remised in reminding

judges to exert diligent efforts in keeping abreast with developments in law and jurisprudence.Needless to state, the process of learning the law and the legal system is a never-endingendeavor, hence, judges should always be vigilant in their quest for knowledge so they coulddischarge their duties and responsibilities with zeal and fervor.

2. Habitual Tardiness

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Antonio Yu-Asensi vs. Judge Francisco D. VillanuevaA.M. No. MTJ-00-1245. January 19, 2000

Facts: Complainant charges Judge Villanueva for serious misconduct and/or inefficiencyparticularly violating the Canons of Judicial Ethics on promptness and punctuality. Judge Vhad been consistently late for 45 minutes to 1 1/2 hours during scheduled hearings, thusdelaying the cause of complainant where he was the plaintiff in a reckless imprudence case.Due to his tardiness, C's lawyer had also been compelled to extend trial even beyond theprescribed period provided for by law.

Held: GUILTY. Habitual tardiness amounts to serious misconduct and inefficiency in violation ofthe Canons of Judicial Ethics. Several SC Circulars have been issued which enjoin judges to bepunctual in the performance of their judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants,witnesses, and attorneys are of value, and that if the judge is not punctual in his habits, he setsa bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction in the administration of justice.

Furthermore, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates: "A judge shall dispose ofthe court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods."

3. Gross Inefficiency and Duty/Liability over Court Personnel

Atty. Martin Pantaleon v. Judge Teofilo GuadizA.M. No. RTJ-00-1525 January 25, 2000

Facts: In this case, respondent Judge is charged with Gross Inefficiency, Neglect and Delay inElevating the Records of Civil Case No. 88-2187, to which the complainant was the plaintiffscounsel. After receiving an adverse decision, complainant filed a Notice of Appeal within thereglementary period and consequently, respondent Judge issued an order for the transmittal of

the records of the case to the appellate court. However, despite constant follow-up by counsel,three years have passed and the records of the case have not been transmitted.In his Answer, respondent judge contends that the court stenographer misplaced the

transcript of the testimony of one of the witnesses, hence the record could not be transmitted tothe Court of Appeals. He further averred that complainant should have invited his attention byfiling the proper motion or by writing a personal letter informing him of the non-transmittal of therecords within three months from the date of his order of transmittal.

Held: GUILTY. A judge cannot hide behind the incompetence of his subordinates. He should bethe master of his own domain and take responsibility for the mistakes of his subjects.

The non-transmission of the records by reason of inefficiency of the staff cannotexonerate respondent judge from administrative liability. As administrative officer of the court, a

judge is expected to keep a watchful eye on the level of performance and conduct of the courtpersonnel under his immediate supervision who are primarily employed to aid in theadministration of justice as required by Canon 3, Rule 3.09 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In the case ofRe: Judge Fernando Agdamag, the Court stated: he (judge) sits not onlyto judge litigated cases with the least possible delay but that his responsibilities include being aneffective manager of the court and its personnel. He is presumed to be cognizant of hisresponsibilities as a worthy minister of the law. At the very least, he is expected to keep abreastwith his docket.

Certainly, a delay of three years in the transmission of court records to the appellatecourt, where only a period of 30 days is required, is inexcusable.

Acting Judge Reynaldo B. Bellosilo v. Dante dela Cruz Rivera, Sheriff III, Branch 34,Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon CityA.M. No. P-00-1424. September 25, 2000Dante dela Cruz Rivera, Sheriff III, Branch 34, Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City vs.Acting Judge Reynaldo B. Bellosilo, Branch 34, Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City.A.M. No. MTJ-00-1316. September 25, 2000

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Facts: Sheriff Dante Rivera allegedly falsified his Personal Data Sheet. For this, respondentJudge accused him of dishonesty and subsequently prevented him from reporting for work.

Afterwhich, respodent Judge filed an administrative complaint against the sheriff.

Held: GUILTY. A judge has no authority or power to prevent an employee from reporting forwork. If indeed complainant Rivera committed falsification in the accomplishment of his personaldata sheet, the most that Judge Bellosillo could have done was to file an administrative chargeagainst complainant Rivera, which he later on did but after the complainant Rivera filed anadministrative charge against him (Judge Bellosillo) for conduct unbecoming.

While a judge may have supervision over his employees, he should not however exercisehis authority over them in an oppressive or despotic manner. Judge Bellosillo should haverealized that it is the Supreme Court which has the authority to discipline/dismiss hissubordinate. The most that he can do is merely to file an administrative complaint against theerring employee.

4. Impartiality and Impropriety of a Judge

Issuance of Conflicting Orders

Daniel & Suprema Dumo v. Judge Romeo V. PerezA.M. No. MTJ-00-1242 January 20, 2000

Facts: Spouses Dumo filed this administrative complaint against respondent Judge Perez forgross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion and patent partiality.

Respondent MTC Judge issued a Writ of Execution to enforce the decision of a caseinvolving quieting of title and recovery of ownership of real property. However, said writ wasreturned unsatisfied because the herein complainants was the actual owners and occupants ofthe questioned property without being impleaded in the original case. Subsequently, respondent

Judge issued an order stating that complainants shall not be affected by said writ because theywere not made parties to the case. Despite such order, he moved on to issue a Writ ofPossession in favor of the original plaintiff (Espinas). As a consequence, Espinas used suchWrit of Possession against the herein complainants in order to eject them from their propertyand deprived them from the enjoyment of the same.

The crux of this controversy therefore is the issuance of respondent Judge of conflictingorders, which according to complainants, showed patent partiality over Espinas, the originalplaintiff in the case for quieting of title.

Held: GUILTY. First of all, respondent Judge is guilty of ignorance of the law. As a municipaltrial court judge, he obviously had no jurisdiction over the action for quieting of title and recoveryof ownership filed by Espinas against the original defendants. It must be stressed that the case

was NOT for ejectment over which MTCs have original jurisdiction, but for quieting of titleand/or ownership falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts. The question ofjurisdiction if so basic and elementary a matter that a judges ignorance of it is simplyinexcusable.

Secondly, the judges act of issuing conflicting orders is likewise inexcusable. Afterdeclaring that the Writ of Execution cannot be made enforceable against herein complainants asthey were not made parties to the case, he reversed himself nevertheless by issuing the Writ ofPossession. Under said writ of possession, it was patent that he was contradicting his previousruling by ordering therein to eject all adverse occupants, which of course, was so broad toaffect all persons including herein complainants. The issuance of said writ gave rise to thesuspicion of partiality or bias in favor of Espinas.

The presumptions of regularity and good faith in the performance of judicial functions on

respondents part are negated by the circumstances of record. While a judge cannot be madeliable for any criminal, civil, or administrative charge for an erroneous decision rendered in goodfaith and in the absence of fraud, it is imperative that he should have basic knowledge of thelaw. Judges must keep abreast of the laws and jurisprudence to be able to render justice andmaintain public confidence in our legal system.

More importantly, judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial.Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that: a judge should also avoid impropriety

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and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. A judge should so behave at all times as topromote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. (Rule 2.01, Canon 2).

Leopoldo G. Dacera, Jr. vs. Judge Teodoro A. DizonA.M. No. RTJ-00-1573. August 2, 2000

Facts: Leopoldo Dacera, Jr. was the complainant in a prosecution for Qualified Theft filed withBranch 37 of the RTC of General Santos City with Judge Teodoro Dizon presiding. Theprosecutor later filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Dacera had executed and signedan Affidavit of Desistance from pursuing the prosecution. Dacera, however, opposed the Motionto Dismiss, alleging that Judge Dizon had unduly influenced him to sign the Affidavit ofDesistance and that he had not been fully appraised of the consequences of his actions in doingso. The Supreme Court assigned an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals to investigateinto the matter.

Held: NOT GUILTY. The investigation did not find any conclusive evidence that Judge Dizonwas personally biased in favor of either party in the disposition of the case in question. It mustbe noted that respondent judge did not actually dismiss the case upon motion of the prosecutorand even voluntarily inhibited himself upon motion of Dacera to disqualify him. However, theinvestigation did reveal that Judge Dizon had made telephone calls to Dacera and even haddiscussions with him inside his chambers in order to verify the truth about the Affidavit ofDesistance. While there is no clear proof of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations,the acts of respondent in calling and meeting with the complainant still leave much to be desiredand are deserving of reprimand. A judge is not only required to be impartial; he must alsoappear to be impartial. Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. Canon II of theCode of Judicial Conduct basically provides that judges should avoid impropriety and theappearance of impropriety in all activities and should so behave at all times as to promote public

confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. It is clear that the acts of therespondent judge have been less than circumspect. He should have kept himself free from anyappearance of impropriety and should have endeavored to distance himself from any act liableto create an impression of indecorum. The complaint filed by Dacera against Judge Dizon, Jr.,was dismissed for lack of merit. However, respondent Judge was admonished to refrain frommaking calls to any parties-litigant and/or counsel with cases pending in his sala and sternlywarned that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.

William R. Adan vs. Judge Anita Abucejo-LuzanoA.M. No. MTJ-00-1298. August 3, 2000

Facts: William Adan was the complainant in 2 criminal cases for Grave Oral Defamation tried

and decided by Judge Anita Abucejo-Luzano of the MCTC of Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental.Respondent judge convicted the accused and sentenced them accordingly. Upon Motion forReconsideration, however, respondent judge reversed her decision and rendered a judgementfor acquittal. Adan questioned the reversal of the conviction, alleging that Judge Abucejo-Luzano had modified her judgement because having received new information from theaccused, she conducted a personal ocular inspection of the place where the crime wascommitted without the presence of the parties involved.

Held: GUILTY. Respondent Judge should have known that an ex-parte ocular inspection withoutnotice to nor presence of the parties and after the case had already been decided was highlyimproper. If respondent Judge had entertained doubts that she wished to clarify after the trialhad already terminated, she should have ordered motu proprio the reopening of the trial for thepurpose, with due notice to the parties, whose participation therein is essential to due process.Thus, it is error for the judge to go alone to the place where the crime was committed and makean inspection without previous knowledge or consent of the parties. The conduct of the ex-parteinspection, the result of which apparently influenced her to reconsider her earlier decision, washighly improper as she, in effect, admitted additional evidence without giving the prosecution achance to object to its introduction or to controvert the same. Her actions show an ignorance ofthe law and proper procedure to be followed for a situation such as this. Furthermore,respondent judge has opened herself to charges of partiality and bias by meeting with the

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accused privately. No matter how noble her intentions may have been, it was improper forrespondent judge to meet the accused without the presence of complainant. Respondent Judgehas failed to live up to the norm that judges should not only be impartial but should also appear

impartial. She thus violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that ajudge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. JudgeAbucejo-Luzano was fined PhP 10,000 and issued a stern warning that any similar act in thefuture will be dealt with more severely.

5. Gross Misconduct amounting to Violation of a Constitutional Right/ Serious/GraveMisconduct

Atty. NapoleonS. Valenzuela v. Judge Reynaldo BellosilloA.M. No. MTJ-00-1241 January 20, 2000

Facts: Respondent Judge is being charged with gross violation of the constitutional right of

subject accused to assistance by counsel of her own choice, gross misconduct, oppression,partiality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics.In a BP 22 case, Judge allegedly granted bail to the accused despite not being

accompanied and represented by her counsel at that time. It appears that Judge granted bailwithout the assistance of the counsel of record, Atty. Valenzuela and he even suggested thatthe latter should be replaced by another counsel. Aghast by such decision, Atty. V filed hisNotice of Withdrawal, in conformity with his clients decision, Meriam Colapo. Subsequently, hefiled the instant administrative complaint against respondent Judge. To support his position, heattached an Affidavit allegedly executed by his client Colapo. However, during the hearing of thecase, he failed to present Colapo as Witness as she was allegedly out of the country althoughshe was willing to testify at that time.

Held: NOT GUILTY. On the issue of granting bail without the assistance of counsel, the Courtheld that it was valid and sufficiently based on the Manifestation filed by Atty. Valenzuela. Withregard to the alleged act of respondent Judge suggesting to the accused that she shouldchange her counsel (complainant Atty. V) and recommending a different lawyer, the Court foundthat the evidence adduced by the complainant was insufficient to substantiate the chargesagainst him. The only evidence offered by complainant was the Affidavit of his client MeriamColapo, and it cannot be the basis of a finding of guilt even in an administrative case. Thecomplainants failure to present his principal witness, in the absence of other evidence to provehis charges was fatal and said Affidavit cannot be given credence and is inadmissible withoutthe said affiant being placed on the witness stand.

The employment or profession of a person is a property right within the constitutionalguaranty of due process of law. This applies also to Judges. Respondent judge cannot therefore

be adjudged guilty of the charges against him without affording him a chance to confront thesaid witness, Meriam Colapo. Otherwise, his right to due process would be infringed.

Erlinda Sy vs. Danilo NorberteA.M. No. 00-1398-P. August 1, 2000

Facts: In her civil case versus Antoinetta Galvez, complainant Erlinda Sy obtained a writ ofpreliminary attachment against all properties of the former. She alleged, however, thatrespondent Danilo Norberte, Sheriff of Branch 125 of the RTC of Kalookan City, tipped offGalvez about the said writ. She further alleged that Norberte actively assisted Galvez in theremoval of her personal property from the latter's residence. Sy filed a complaint with Branch125 of the RTC of Kalookan City which was submitted for investigation.

Held: GUILTY. The investigation revealed that Norberte was positively identified and seen bythe complainant Sy and 2 other witnesses in the act of helping Galvez remove her personalproperty from her residence. Norberte's alibi did not prove to be credible. The offense of seriousor grave misconduct refers to such misconduct that shows the element of corruption, clear intentto violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rules. In tipping off and assisting Galvez,Norberte's actions are an attempt to circumvent a valid court order. Even if Norberte did not tipoff Galvez, his mere presence at the scene is punishable. Being an officer of the Court,

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respondent sheriff should have refrained from actuations though innocent and in good faithwhich may result in suspicion of impropriety and may consequently taint the good image of the

judiciary. The nature and responsibilities of officers of the judiciary are not mere idealistic

sentiments but true working standards and attainable goals that should be matched with actualdeeds. They are expected to serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyaltyand efficiency and to conduct themselves with propriety and decorum at all times. Norberte wassuspended for 1 month without pay and issued the warning that similar conduct in the future willbe punished more severely.

In Re: Procedure adopted by Judge Daniel Liangco(A.M. No. 99-11-158-MTC. August 1, 2000)

Facts: RTC Judge Pedro Sunga of San Fernando, Pampanga received information aboutirregularities in the disposition of jueteng cases before the MTC's of the said region. Uponinvestigation, Judge Sunga discovered that of the 55 jueteng cases filed in July 1999, 53 were

assigned to Branch 1 of the MTC of San Fernando presided by Judge Daniel Liangco. Notingthat statistical improbability that 53 out of 55 jueteng cases should be assigned to only 1Branch, Judge Sunga demanded a written explanation as to how such a situation had comeabout. In his letter, Judge Liangco explained that it has been his practice to automatically takeover all jueteng cases without the need for raffling. The reason he cited is that the accused insuch cases are deprived of their liberty and that by automatically assigning these cases to hisbranch, the accused can file motions for bail and the same can be entertained immediatelywithout waiting for the raffle. In short, because of the need for provisional liberty, all juetengcases are considered to be automatically raffled to his branch so that he may entertain motionsfor bail and the accused can be immediately released upon filing of the bond. The SupremeCourt ordered further investigation of the case and placed Judge Liangco on preventivesuspension.

Held: GUILTY. Judge Liangco clearly violated Supreme Court Circular No. 7 which provides:"All cases filed with the Court in stations or groupings where there are two or more branchesshall be assigned or distributed to the different branches by raffle. No case may be assigned toany branch without being raffled." There is no connection at all between respondents allegeddesire to facilitate the release of such accused on bail and his questionable act of retaining therecords of the cases for direct assignment to his own sala. For after granting bail to theaccused, his alleged purpose of immediately extending provisional liberty to the accused shallalready have been served. There is thus no need or justification to retain the records of thecases and consider them raffled off to his own sala. The questioned acts of respondent JudgeLiangco constitute a clear breach of his duty as a judge. The Code of Judicial Conductmandates that: A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the

integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Respondent judges manner of automatically assigningjueteng cases to its own branch without the benefit of raffle, casts doubt on his integrity as ajudge and erodes the confidence of the people in the judicial system. A judges official conductand his behavior in the performance of judicial duties should be free from the appearance ofimpropriety and must be beyond reproach. Judge Liangco was suspended from service for 6months without pay and issued the warning that similar conduct in the future shall be dealt withmore severely.

6. Neglect of Duty/Abuse of Authority

Zenaida S. Beso v. Judge Juan DagumanA.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000

Facts: In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge JuanJ. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in notretaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local CivilRegistrar.

In his comment, the respondent judge alleged that the marriage of the complainant hadto be solemnized in Calbayog City though outside his territory as municipal Judge of Sta.Margarita, Samar because : 1) physically indisposed and unable to report to his station in Sta.

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Margarita; 2) complainant said she had to fly abroad that same day; 3) that for the parties to goto another town for the marriage would be expensive and would entail serious problems offinding a solemnizing officer and another pair of witnesses or sponsors; 4) if they failed to get

married on August 28, 1997, complainant would be out of the country for a long period and theirmarriage license would lapse and necessitate another publication of notice; 5) if the parties gobeyond their plans for the scheduled marriage, complainant feared it would complicate heremployment abroad.

Held: GUILTY. The authority of a judge to solemnize marriage is only limited to thosemunicipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longer within his area of

jurisdiction. Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the FamilyCode, wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or at a placeother than his sala, and the circumstances of this case do not fall in any of these exceptions.

Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when he failed toregister the marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman. Such duty is entrusted upon him

pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code which provides:

"It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of thecontracting parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificates not later thanfifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where themarriage was solemnized. xxx"

Lastly, a judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of thecases and official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for missingrecords save fortuitous events. The records show that the loss was occasioned by carelessnesson respondent Judges part. This Court reiterates that judges must adopt a system of record

management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch ofbusiness. It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system inhis court because he is after all the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of hisofficial functions.

7. Prompt Disposition of Cases/ Inefficiency/Abuse of Authority

State Prosecutor Romulo Tolentino vs. Judge Nilo MalanyaonA.M. No. RTJ-99-1444. August 3, 2000

Facts: Judge Nilo Malanyaon, presiding judge of Branch 30 of the RTC of Camarines Sur,dismissed 5 separate criminal cases for lack of evidence and also refused to issue warrants of

arrest on the ground of lack of probable cause. Acting State Prosecutor for Camarines SurRomulo Tolentino assailed the orders for dismissal and the refusal to issue the warrants forarrest alleging that Judge Malanyaon had abused his authority and knowingly rendered unjustorders. Tolentino also complained that several motions had been filed before respondent judgeand have yet to be resolved and decided upon.

Issues:(1) Did Judge Malanyaon exercise grave abuse of discretion and act in excess ofjurisdiction in dismissing the criminal cases?

(2) Was Judge Malanyaon guilty of unreasonable delay for failing to act on the motionsfiled by State Prosecutor Tolentino?

Held: (1) NO. The allegations that respondent judge had violated Canons 1, 2 and 3 of theCanons of Judicial Conduct are without merit. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt orimproper consideration are sufficient defenses protecting a judicial officer charged withignorance of the law and promulgation of an unjust decision from being held accountable forerrors of judgment on the premise that no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law inthe administration of justice can be infallible. There is no proof of grave abuse of discretion.These charges were dismissed by the Court.

(2) YES. The motions/incidents were left unacted upon from 3 to 5 months and werestill pending when the administrative complaint was filed against respondent. Respondent

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should be aware of his duties as an arbiter of justice. Under Rule 3.05 of the Code of JudicialConduct, a judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within therequired periods. While the prosecutor in this case is not without fault, the respondent cannot

escape responsibility for his inaction of the pending motions before him. Even assumingarguendo that the various motions filed by the prosecutor were considered to be mere scraps ofpaper or without merit, the judge must nevertheless resolve on those matters promptly bygranting or denying them. It is the duty of the judge to rule upon the motions filed before himeven if his actions are merely to deny them. Respondent judge was found guilty for his failure toresolve pending motions and/or incidents and, accordingly, a penalty of reprimand was imposedupon him with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar violation will be dealt with amore severe penalty by the Court.

Juan Luzarraga vs. Hon. Amaro M. MeteoroA.M. No. 00-1572. August 3, 2000

Facts: Juan Luzarraga was the plaintiff in a civil case assigned to Branch 41 of the RTC ofCamarines Norte. After the said plaintiff had rested his case and presented his evidence, thecase was transferred to the newly-created Branch 64 of the RTC of Camarines Norte, presidedby Judge Amaro Meteoro. It was only 2 years later that Judge Meteoro proceeded with thepresentation of the defendant's evidence. The case was finally submitted for decision a yearlater. After an elapse of more than 7 months without a decision on the case, Luzarraga filed anadministrative complaint against Judge Meteoro. Respondent judge pleaded for theunderstanding and compassion of the Court, citing that his branch had more than 300 casespending before it, that he had trouble recruiting and training competent personnel and that hehad suffered a stroke.

Held: GUILTY. More than one year had already elapsed since the submission of the case and

respondent Judge has not decided the same despite the Motion for Early decision filed thecomplainant. The Court has consistently held that the failure of a judge to decide a case withinthe required period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency and non-observance ofsaid rule is a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge. Rule 3.05 ofCanon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct admonishes all judges to dispose of the court'sbusiness promptly and to decide cases within the periods fixed by law. The failure to render adecision within the 90-day period constitutes serious misconduct in derogation of the speedyadministration of justice. When circumstances arise that would prevent the judge from disposinga case within the reglementary period, all that he has to do is to file an application with the Courtasking for a reasonable extension of time within which to resolve the case. However, the recordof this administrative matter does not show that respondent made an attempt to make such arequest. Instead, he preferred to keep the case pending, thereby inviting suspicion that

something sinister or corrupt is afoot. That he was burdened with a heavy case load and is astroke victim, serve only to mitigate the penalty, not to exonerate him. Judge Meteoro was finedP20,000 with the warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely. Hewas further directed to decide the subject case within a non-extendible period of 30 days fromreceipt of resolution, and to submit to the Office of the Court Administrator a copy of his decisionwithin 10 days from promulgation thereof.

Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branches 87 and 98, Quezon CityA.M. No. 99-11-423-RTC. August 16, 2000

Facts: On September 15 to 17, 1999, the Office of the Court Administrator conducted an auditand physical inventory of pending cases in Branches 87 and 98 of the Regional Trial Court ofQuezon City, presided over by Judge Elsie Ligot-Telan and Judge Justo M. Sultan, respectively.The audit team reported that Judge Ligot-Telan had a well-managed docket. Judge Sultan,however, was a different story. Of the 57 cases submitted for decision, 34 were already beyondthe reglementary period, some of which involve detention prisoners. It was observed that thesaid branch gave the least preference to cases submitted for decision, and it has no effectivedocket system and recording of cases. In fact, the Branch Clerk of Court had not submitted therequired docket and inventory of cases for a number of years. Records did not show that Judge

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Sultan ever requested for an extension of time within which to decide the cases submittedbefore him.

Held: GUILTY. The Court reiterates that failure to decide cases within the required period isinexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency which is a ground for administrative sanctionagainst the defaulting judge, either by a fine or suspension from the service, depending onfactors that tend to aggravate or mitigate his liability. This is in accordance with the mandatethat the judge shall dispose of the business of the court promptly and decide cases within theprescribed periods. Conformably, the rules require the courts to decide cases ready for decisionwithin 3 months from date of submission. The Court is not unmindful of the Herculean task trial

judges are faced with the perennial clogged dockets of the lower courts. However, this shouldnot be an excuse for them to abdicate their duty to dispense justice. Judges must adopt asystem of record management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt andefficient dispatch of business. Furthermore, if the caseload of the judge prevents the dispositionof cases within the reglementary periods, he should ask this Court for a reasonable extension of

time to dispose of the cases involved. This is to avoid or dispel any suspicion that somethingsinister is going on. The Court fined Judge Sultan PhP 20,000 to be taken from his retirementbenefits.

Dominga D. Quillal-Lan vs. Judge Alicia L. Delos SantosA.M. No. MTJ-00-1269. August 24, 2000

Facts: The daughter of complainant Dominga Quillal-Lan was the defendant in a Forcible Entrycase before Judge Alicia Delos Santos of the MTC of Digos, Davao del Sur. The complainantalleges that respondent judge failed to decide the case within the mandatory 30-day period asprovided by the Rules on Summary Procedure. Judge Delos Santos avers that she was on sickleave and therefore could not be expected to decide upon the case within the said period.

Held: GUILTY. There is no doubt that a case of Forcible Entry falls within the Rules of SummaryProcedure and as stated therein, must be decided within 30-days. Respondent should haverendered judgment in the forcible entry case before she went on leave. Delay in the dispositionof cases covered by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure defeats the very purpose of saidrule, which is the expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases. Failure to decide suchcases on time renders the rationale for the rule meaningless and inutile. Respondent appears tobe remiss in her duties as judge when she failed to render judgment in the case as mandated bythe rules. Under Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, she is required to dispose of thecourts business promptly and to decide cases within the required time frame. We have time andagain reminded judges to comply with the rules regarding the period to decide cases, inpursuance of the Courts oft-repeated policy of speedy disposition of quality justice for all. Judge

Delos Santos was fined PhP 1,000 and issued a warning that similar conduct in the future willbe dealt with more severely.

Cob C. Dela Cruz v. Judge Rodolfo M. SerranoA.M. No. RTJ-00-1582. September 4, 2000

Facts: Complainant contends, among others, that it took one (1) year and five (5) monthsinstead of three months to render a decision in civil case. The civil case was submitted fordecision on April 1996, but the decision thereon was only promulgated on October 8, 1997.

Held: GUILTY. It is not disputed that it took respondent Judge one (1) year and five (5) months,after Civil Case No. 908 was submitted for decision, to decide it which is way beyond the three-month period mandated by the Constitution.

Section 15 (1) of Article VIII of the Constitution provides that all cases filed before the lowercourts must be decided or resolved within three (3) months from date of submission. The Codeof Judicial Conduct likewise provides that a judge should administer justice impartially andwithout delay [Rule 1.02.] and directs a judge to dispose of the courts business promptly anddecide cases within the required periods. [Rule 3.05.]

It is an oft-repeated maxim that justice delayed is often justice denied. Thus, any delay inthe administration of justice may result in depriving the litigant of his right to a speedy

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disposition of his case and will ultimately affect the image of the judiciary. A delay in thedisposition of cases amounts to a denial of justice, brings the court into disrepute and ultimatelyerodes public faith and confidence in the judiciary.

Rolando Sulla v. Hon. Rodolfo C. RamosA.M No. MTJ-00-1319. September 27, 2000

Facts: Dr. Rolando A. Sulla charging respondent Judge Rodolfo C. Ramos, presiding judge ofthe Municipal Trial Court of Jaro, Leyte, with unreasonable delay or refusal to render a decisionin criminal Case No. 8121. The case was submitted for decision in April 1997. But as of May21, 1999, date of complainants letter, and despite constant requests for its early resolution,respondent Judge Ramos has not rendered any decision in the said case.

Held: GUILTY. This Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide casespromptly and expeditiously pursuant to Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and

Section 15(1) and (2), Article VIII of the Constitution. Judges are presumed to be aware of Rule3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which calls for a judge to be faithful to the law and maintainprofessional competence. Rule 3.05 admonishes all judges to dispose of the courts businesspromptly and decide cases within the period fixed by law.

8. Negligence/Incompetence of a Judge

Norma Esguerra vs. Judge Guillermo LojaA.M. No. RTJ-00-1523. August 15, 2000

Facts: Norma Esguerra was the complainant in a criminal case for Falsification of a PublicDocument tried before Judge Guillermo Loja of Branch 26 of the RTC of Manila. Complainant

alleged that Judge Loja failed to decide the case within the 90-day reglementary period andfurther accused him of falsifying his certificate of service in order to make it appear that he haddecided the case. Judge Loja countered by stating that he had indeed decided upon the casebut rather, the decision was just not dated.

Held: GUILTY. A careful study of the facts shows that Judge Loja is guilty only of SIMPLENEGLIGENCE and not of the administrative complaint filed against him. There is no clear proofthat the respondent judge falsified his certificate of service simply because his decision wasdated. Even assuming that there was a slight delay in deciding the case, it must be taken intoconsideration that Judge Loja has a heavy case load (almost 800 cases pending) and that thisis the first offense by a judge who provided long and consistent service to the Judiciary. TheCourt fined Judge Loja PhP 2,000 and issued a warning that similar conduct in the future will be

more severely punished.

9. Duty of Court Employees

Marta Bucatcat v. Edgar Bucatcat and Gene JaroA.M. No. P-93-985. January 28, 2000

Facts:Marta T.Bucatcat (complainant) charged her husband, Edgar Y. Bucatcat, and Gene S.Jaro (respondents), Court Interpreter respectively, of the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court ofGandara, Samar, with immorality. Complainant avers that she is the legal wife of respondentBucatcat. She claims that respondents are having an illicit relationship with each other.Moreover, respondents allegedly have two (2) children together and that respondent Jaro, at thetime of the filing of the letter-complaint, was pregnant with their third child.

Held: GUILTY. There is sufficient evidence to hold respondents liable for immorality formaintaining an illicit relationship with each other. Every employee of the judiciary shouldbe an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant, he must exhibit

the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of his official duties butin his personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve the courts good name andstanding. It cannot be overstressed that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the

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conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowestof its personnel. Court employees have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards ofmorality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good

name and integrity of courts of justice.Respondents DISMISSED from service.

JUNE 1998-1999

A. JUDGES

1. Good Faith in Rendering Decisions

Atty. Antonio T. Guerrero v. Hon. Adriano Villamor (296 SCRA 88)

Facts: Carlos and his counsel, Guerrero, charged respondent with gross ignorance of the law

and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment after they lost a civil and a criminal case tried byrespondent. They were also thwarted on appeal. However, in the pleadings before the CA,they used abusive language in describing the respondents acts, hence, respondent judge citedthem for direct contempt, which was later set aside by the SC.

Held: Case dismissed. The order of direct contempt may only be considered as an error ofjudgment. A judge may not be administratively charged for mere errors of judgment, in theabsence of showing of any bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. Moreover, judges cannot beheld to account criminally, civilly, or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered by themin good faith.

Impartiality

Re: Inhibition of Judge Eddie R. Rojas (292 SCRA 306)

Facts: Atty. Rojas was appointed a judge. One of the criminal cases he inherited was one inwhich he acted as prosecutor. He explained that his delay in inhibiting himself from presidingon that case was because it was only after the belated transcription of the stenographic notesthat he remembered that he handled that case. He also says that the counsels did not objectand he never held full-blown hearings anyway.

Held: Judge is filed & reprimanded. The Rules of Court prevent judges from trying cases wherethey acted as counsel without the consent of the parties. This prevents not only a conflict ofinterest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge should take nopart in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. He should

administer justice impartially & without delay. The prohibition does not only cover hearings butall judicial acts (e.g. orders, resolutions) some of which Judge Rojas did make.

Carlito D. Lazo v. Judge Antonio V. Tiong (300 SCRA 214)

Facts: Judge Tiong was accused of failing to inhibit himself in a criminal case because he wasrelated within the fourth degree of affinity to the accused. The judge claims he did so in thehopes that his presence would allow the parties to settle amicably.

Held: Judge reprimanded. A judge should take no part in a proceeding where his impartialitymight reasonably be questioned. Also, Rule 137, Rules of Court, provides that no judge or

judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, inter alia, is related to either party within the sixth

degree pf consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree computed according tothe rules of the civil law. Under this provision, the Presiding Judge is mandated to disqualifyhimself from sitting in a case. He cannot exercise his discretion whether to inhibit himself or not.

2. Speedy Administration of Justice

Baltazar D. Amion v. Judge Roberto S. Chiongson (301 SCRA 614)

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Facts: A is a policeman charged with murder. During the trial, J ordered that he be representedby counsel de officio because As attorney was ill. A then charged J with ignorance of the law &oppression because the fact that the counsel de officio did not know the particulars of the case

meant that A would be denied due process.

Held: Complaint dismissed. The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shouldadminister justice impartially and without delay. A judge should always be imbued with a highsense of duty & responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly administer justice. Inthis case, the reason J appointed a FLAG lawyer was because As lawyer had postponedseveral hearings because he was ill or out of town. Also, A had various lawyers during the saidcase who always postponed the hearings for various reasons such as illness, lack of knowledgeof the case or unavailability for trial. These are all legal but clearly dilatory means used by thecomplainant to delay the case for 4 years. J should be commended for his efforts to expeditethe case.

Fe T. Bernardo v. Judge Amelia A. Fabros (307 SCRA 28)

Facts: B accused F of inaction in an unlawful detainer case for 7 months when the rules onsummary procedure call for a decision in 30 days. F does not deny the inaction but says B hasno standing as she is only the attorney-in-fact of the plaintiffs to the civil case.

Held: FINED. Judges must decide cases expeditiously, especially in summary proceedings. Sheshould either ask for additional time to decide or devise an efficient filing system to expeditedecision. Finally, standing or personal interest of the complainant is immaterial in administrativecases which involves the public good.

Dolores Gomez v. Judge Rodolfo A. Gatdula (293 SCRA 433)

Facts: Gomez is the complainant in 2 different criminal cases before Judge Gatdula. When shepetitioned the SC to change the venue of 1 of the cases, Respondent suspended the scheduledhearings in both cases. When required by the SC to show cause why disciplinary action shouldnot be taken against him, he delayed his comment thereto. He eventually explained that thesuspension of hearing was made because the request for change of venue was pending in theSC.

Held: Judge Gatdula acted vindictively & oppressively, apparently irked by the request ofpetitioner. He need not have suspended both hearings as the change of venue only involvedone case. His delay in commenting on the change of venue also effectively delayed both casesby 5 months. His acts are not free from the appearance of impropriety, let alone beyond

reproach, as required by Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

Re: Cases Left Undecided by Judge Narciso M. Bumanlag, Jr. (306 SCRA 50)

Facts: Upon retirement, B left 7 criminal and 3 civil cases undecided within the 90-day periodrequired by section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution. He said his failure was due to a seriousillness.

Held: FINED. Members of the bench have a duty to administer justice without undue delay.Failure to do so within the reglementary period constitutes a neglect of duty warrantingadministrative penalties. If hindered by illness, a judge should inform the Office of Court

Administrator and ask for additional time to decide in order to avoid the sanctions. However, ifthere is no malice or bad faith, and the judge is prevented by factors beyond his control, thepenalty will be mitigated.

Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court Branch 24, Ipil,Zamboanga del Sur; Branch 2, Isabela, Basilan; and Municipal Circuit Trial Court,Labason, Zamboanga del Norte (303 SCRA 208)

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Facts: Judge Apostol had a backlog of 280 cases. Also, there had been no actions on 268 othercases assigned to him. Judge says he has constant medical problems and no legal researchersto help him. These and the peace and order problems in his locality prevent him from

expediting.

Held: Fined for gross neglect of duty. The Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge shouldadminister justice without delay and dispose of the courts business promptly and decide caseswithin the reglementary periods. If his health problems were preventing him from doing his duty,he should have retired early so a healthier successor could act on the case load.

Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 68 of Camilang, Tarlac(305 SCRA 61)

Facts: Judge R was due for compulsory retirement. The OCA found that he had many pendingcases, some of which were undecided beyond the 90-day period.

Held: FINED but penalty mitigated. Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 enjoins all judges to attend promptly tothe business of the court and decide cases within the time fixed by law. A judge is mandated torender judgment not more than ninety (90) days from the time the case is submitted fordecision. Failure to render the decision within the prescribed period of ninety (90) days fromsubmission of a case for decision constitutes serious misconduct and gross inefficiency.However, since after being reminded of this, Judge R cleared most of his docket (even thosenot overdue for decision) before retiring, the fine is mitigated.

Atty. Raula A. Sanchez v. Judge Augustine A. Vestil (298 SCRA 1)

Facts: Complainant charged RTC Judge Vestil with falsifying his monthly certificate of service

submitted to the SC by stating that he has no pending case submitted for decision or resolutionthat has gone beyond the NINETY (90) day period allowed by law when in fact there werenumerous civil & criminal cases which the respondent failed to resolve within the said period.Respondents say most of the cases were either inherited & substantially heard by other judges,or that they require further study or whose stenographic notes were yet to be transcribed andthese are excepted from being included the certificate by a proviso contained therein.

Held: Respondent Judge suspended and fined. Judges are mandated to decide casesseasonably. Judges who cannot comply with such mandate should ask for additional time,explaining in their request the reasons for the delay. Neither the proviso nor the fact that notesare to be transcribed is a valid defense for not deciding within the required time. The SC hasconsistently held that the failure of a judge to decide a case within the required period is not

excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency & the non-observance of said rule is ground foradministrative sanction against the defaulting judge.

B. LAWYERS

1. Assisting in the Speedy Administration of Justice

Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (293 SCRA 622)

Facts: Judgment was rendered against the petitioner ordering it to reconvey the cemetery tothe rightful owners. Despite the final decision of the SC, petitioner was able to prevent theexecution for 17 years, and thus render the judgment ineffectual. They filed several petitionsand motions for reconsideration with the trial court and the CA despite the fact that it wouldnever prosper as the trial courts decision had long become final before the said petitions werefiled.

Held: Petition denied. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of the client andzeal in the defense of their clients right, they are also officers of the court, bound to exert everyeffort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They should not misuse the

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rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution ofa judgment or misuse court processes. The facts and the law should advise them that a casesuch as this should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial

dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations thatfor sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.

Duty to Protect Clients Interest

Development Bank of the Philippines and Asset Privitization Trust v. Court of Appealsand Continental Cement Corporation (302 SCRA 362)

Facts: CCC filed an injunction suit to prevent the DBP and APT from foreclosing on itsmortgages. During trial, DBP & APT were unable to appear for cross-examining CCCswitnesses because the respective counsels were unprepared, unavailable or ill. The lower courtdecided this as a waiver, hence judgment was rendered for CCC. DBP & APT filed this petitionalleging denial of due process.

Held: Petition denied. There can be no denial of due process where a party had the opportunityto participate in the proceedings but did not do so. Counsel for APT was absent on severaloccasions because of withdrawal of previous counsel, unreadiness to conduct the cross-examinations and serious illness. The withdrawal of APTs previous counsel in the thick of theproceedings would be a reasonable ground to seek postponement of the hearing. However,such necessitates a duty on the part of the new counsel to prepare himself for the nextscheduled hearing. The excuse that it was due to the former counsels failure to turn over therecords of the case to APT, shows the negligence of the new counsel to actively recover therecords of the case. Counsel should have taken adequate steps to fully protect the interest ofhis client, rather than pass the blame on the previous counsel. A motion to postpone trial on theground that counsel is unprepared for trial demonstrates indifference and disregard of his

clients interest. A new counsel who appears in a case in midstream is presumed and obliged toacquaint himself with all the antecedent processes and proceedings that have transpired prior tohis takeover. Also, even if counsel had been ill with dengue, he chose not to notify his co-counsels who could have conducted the cross-examination.

2. Falsehood/Forum-shopping/Dilatory Tactics

Ban Hua U. Flores v. Atty. Enrique S. Chua (306 SCRA 465)

Facts: Chua was charged with many offenses. The evidence was found to support the chargesthat he notarized a forged deed of sale, that he caused to be published an advertisement of aSEC decision in order to bring ridicule and shame upon a corporation, that he filed a civil case

knowing that the reliefs he prayed for were probably granted in the SEC case thus belying hiscertification against forum shopping. He has a

complete legal ethics digest

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