LEONARD W. RICHARDS, Complainant

vs.

PATRICIO A. ASOY, Respondent

A.C. No. 2655, October 11,2010

FACTS: Respondent Asoy received from Complainant Richards, his client, compensation to handle his case in the trial court, but the same was dismissed for lack of interest and failure to prosecute. Asoy abandoned his client in violation of his contract ignoring the most elementary principles of professional ethics. Furthermore, Asoy ignored the processes of this Court and it was only after he was suspended from the practice of law of that he surfaced. On July 9, 1987, the Court resolved to DISBAR him and order him to reimburse Richards the sum of P16,300 within 30 days from notice. On November 11,1987, the Court received a letter dated November 3,1987, complained that respondent had not reimbursed him the P16,300. Hence, the Court issued a resolution requiring Asoy to show cause why he failed to reimburse, however, Asoy still failed to comply. Complainant filed another letter informing the Court that Asoy still failed to comply with the order of reimbursement.

Thirteen years after the promulgation, Asoy filed a Petition for “readmission to the practice of law” stating, among other things, that on January 2,1996 or about nine years after his disbarment and directive to reimbursement complainant made, he effected payment of P16,300 via consignation with the Court’s Office of the Cashier. The Court denied the petition for lack of merit.

On August 2, 2010, Asoy filed another petition for “Reinstatement to the Bar” stating that he effected payment of P16,300 before the Office of the Cashier of the Supreme Court as complainant could no longer be found or located; that he had already suffered and agonized shortcomings; and that as “positive evidence of his repentance and rehabilitation” he attached testimonials of “credible institutions and personalities”.

ISSUE: Whether or not Asoy violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: Yes. Respondent Asoy violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 10 states that “A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.” Respondent denigrated the dignity of his calling by displaying a lack of candor towards this Court. By taking his sweet time to effect reimbursement –and through consignation with this Court at that—he sent out a strong message that the legal processes and orders of this Court could be treated with disdain or impunity. Respondent’s consignation could not even be deemed compliance with the Court’s directive to reimburse because the Court does not represent the complainant; the latter’s address was readily ascertainable had respondent wished to communicate with the complainant for the purpose of making amends. Hence, respondent’s petition for reinstatements in the Roll of Attorneys is DENIED.

Respondent’s justification for his 9-year belated “compliance” with the order for him to

reimburse complainant glaringly speaks of his lack of candor, of his dishonesty, if not defiance of

Court orders, qualities that do not endear him to the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers. The solemn

oath which all lawyers take upon admission to the bar to dedicate their lives to the pursuit of justice is neither

a mere formality nor hollow words meant to be taken lightly, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and

keep inviolable at all times.[8] The lack of any sufficient justification or explanation for the nine-year

delay in complying with the Court’s July 9, 1987 and March 15, 1988 Resolutions to reimburse

complainant betrays a clear and contumacious disregard for the lawful orders of this Court. Such

disrespect on the part of respondent constitutes a clear violation of the lawyer’s Code of Professional

Responsibility which maintains that:

 

CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

. . . . . .

CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

 

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

 Respondent denigrates the dignity of his calling by displaying a lack of candor towards this Court. By

taking his sweet time to effect reimbursement of the P16,300.00 – and through consignation with this Court

at that - he sent out a strong message that the legal processes and orders of this Court could be treated with

disdain or impunity.

 

          Parenthetically, respondent’s consignation could not even be deemed compliance with the Court’s

directive to reimburse. The Court does not represent complainant; the latter’s postal address was readily

ascertainable from the records had respondent wished to communicate with complainant for the purpose of

making amends. The records are bereft of proof that respondent had actually resorted to reimbursing the

complainant directly. In short, evidence of atonement for respondent’s misdeeds is sorely wanting.

 

WHEREFORE, respondent Patricio A. Asoy’s petition for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys

is DENIED.

YOUNG VS. BATAUEGAS

Atty. Walter T. Young filed a Verified Affidavit-Complaint for disbarment against Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino and Franklin Q. Susa for allegedly committing deliberate falsehood in court and violating the lawyer’s oath.

Complainant is the private prosecutor in Criminal Case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. On December 13, 2000, respondents Batuegas and Llantino, as counsel for accused, filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail, alleging that the “accused has voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority.  As such, he is now under detention.” Upon personal verification with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where accused Arana allegedly surrendered, complainant learned that he surrendered only on December 14, 2000, thereafter, Respondent Susa, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC of Manila, Branch 27, calendared the motion on December 15, 2000 despite the foregoing irregularity and other formal defects, namely, the lack of notice of hearing to the private complainant, violation of the three-day notice rule, and the failure to attach the Certificate of Detention.

Respondents filed their respective comments, declaring that on December 13, 2000, upon learning that a warrant of arrest was issued against their client, they filed the Manifestation with Motion for Bail with the trial court.  Then they immediately fetched the accused in Cavite and brought him to the NBI to voluntarily surrender.  However, due to heavy traffic, they arrived at the NBI at 2:00 a.m. the next day; hence, the certificate of detention indicated that the accused surrendered on December 14, 2000.  They argued that there was neither unethical conduct nor falsehood in the subject pleading as their client has voluntarily surrendered and was detained at the NBI.  As regards the lack of notice of hearing, they contend that complainant, as private prosecutor, was not entitled to any notice.  Nevertheless, they furnished the State and City prosecutors copies of the motion with notice of hearing thereof. Moreover, the hearing of a motion on shorter notice is allowed under Rule 15, Sec. 4(2) of the Rules of Court.

For his part, respondent Susa argues in his comment that he was no longer in court when his co-respondents filed the Manifestation with Motion for Bail.  Ms. Teofila A. Peña, Clerk III, received the said Motion and noticed that it was set for hearing on December 15, 2000 and the Certificate of Detention was not attached.  However, the presiding judge instructed her to receive the Motion subject to the presentation of the Certificate of Detention before the hearing.  Thus, the inclusion of the Motion in the court’s calendar on December 15, 2000 was authorized by the presiding judge and, thus, was done by respondent Susa in faithful performance of his ministerial duty.

The instant case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation or decision.

 Atty. Batuegas and Atty. Llantino are hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.  The complaint against Atty. Susa is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.[6]

We agree with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner.  Respondents Batuegas and Llantino are guilty of deliberate falsehood.

A lawyer must be a disciple of truth.[7]  He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will “do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court” and he shall “conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.”[8]  He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion.[9] The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them.[10] While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client’s rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his client’s cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth.[11]

The Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.[12]

Evidently, respondent lawyers fell short of the duties and responsibilities expected from them as members of the bar.  Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court if it found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused, they craftily concealed the truth by alleging that accused had voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and was under detention.  Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the court and thereby contribute to injustice.  To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn.  They violated their oath when they resorted to deception.

Respondents contend that their allegation of the accused’s detention was merely a statement of an ultimate fact which still had to be proved by evidence at the hearing of the Motion. That they were able to show that their client was already under the custody of the NBI at the hearing held on December 15, 2000 does not exonerate them.  The fact remains that the allegation that the accused was in the custody of the NBI on December 13, 2000 was false.

In Comia vs. Antona, we held:

It is of no moment that the accused eventually surrendered to the police authorities on the same date “tentatively” scheduled for the hearing of the application for bail.  To our mind, such supervening event is of no bearing and immaterial; it does not absolve respondent judge from administrative liability considering that he should not have accorded recognition to the application for bail filed on behalf of persons who, at that point, were devoid of personality to ask such specific affirmative relief from the court.[13]

In the case at bar, the prosecution was served with notice of hearing of the motion for bail two days prior to the scheduled date.  Although a motion may be heard on short notice, respondents failed to show any good cause to justify the non-observance of the three-day notice rule.  Verily, as lawyers, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.[15]

Finally, we are in accord with the Investigating Commissioner that respondent clerk of court should not be made administratively liable for including the Motion in the calendar of the trial court, considering that it was authorized by the presiding judge.  However, he is reminded that his administrative functions, although not involving the discretion or judgment of a judge, are vital to the prompt and sound administration of justice. [16] Thus, he should not hesitate to inform the judge if he should find any act or conduct on the part of lawyers which are contrary to the established rules of procedure.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino are found guilty of committing deliberate falsehood.  Accordingly, they are SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas and Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

UP

Allegations of this intellectual offense were hurled by Atty. Harry L.  Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel R. Bagares against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010.  In said case, the Court denied the petition for certiorari filed by Filipino comfort women to compel certain officers of the executive department [2] to espouse their claims for reparation and demand apology from the Japanese government for the abuses committed against them by the Japanese soldiers during World War II.  Attys. Roque and Bagares represent the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, which is presently the subject of a motion for reconsideration.

          The authors and their purportedly plagiarized articles are: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent from their article, “A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens” published in 2009 in the Yale Journal of International Law; (2) Christian J. Tams from his book, “Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law” published by the Cambridge University Press in 2005; and (3) Mark Ellis from his article, “Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime” published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law in 2006.  The allegations of plagiarism centered on Justice Del Castillo’s discussion of the principles of jus cogens and erga omnes.

On August 9, 2010, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul V. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva, and Dina D. Lucenario, members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law published a statement on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the Court’s decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary.  Essentially, the faculty of the UP College of Law, headed by its dean, Atty. Marvic M.V.F.

Leonen, calls for the resignation of Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo in the face of allegations of plagiarism in his work.

Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth.  In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.

Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court.  The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead.  It reads:

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war.

          The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.  The authors also not only assumed that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism, they went further by directly accusing the Court of perpetrating extraordinary injustice by dismissing the petition of the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary.  They further attempt to educate this Court on how to go about the review of the case. 

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of “polluted sources,” the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.  Paragraph 9 of their published statement reads,

But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its resolution for almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners seeking justice from the Court.When it dismissed

the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the Court decided this case based on polluted sources. By doing so, the Supreme Court added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its “power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false sympathy and nonchalance, belies (sic) [betrays] a more alarming lack of concern for even the most basic values of decency and respect. (Emphasis supplied).

The publication of a statement by the faculty of the UP College of Law regarding the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced vigilance.  Of public knowledge is the ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth of such allegations.  More importantly, the motion for reconsideration of the decision alleged to contain plagiarized materials is still pending before the Court.  We made it clear in the case of In re Kelly[3]that any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable.        

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far.  Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks.  These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary.[4]  The court must “insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice.”[5]

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration.  As if the case on the comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision.  This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which

they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.[6]  Their actions likewise constitute violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13[7] and Rules 1.02 and 11.05[8] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[9]    

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul V. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva, and Dina D. Lucenario, members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law, are directed to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

LEDA vs. Tabang

Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang's good moral character, in two Complaints she had filed against him, one docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January 1982, and the present Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for Disbarment, filed on 14 February 1983.

It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted marriage at Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan, was performed under Article 76 of the Civil Code.

The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had finished his law studies (began in l977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981), allegedly to ensure a stable future for them.Complainant admits, though, that they had not lived together as husband and wife.

Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar.  In his application, he declared that he was "single." He then passed the examinations but Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No. 78,  claiming that Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his application and, thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer's Oath for lack of good moral character. Complainant also alleged that after Respondent's law studies, he became aloof and "abandoned" her 

 Therein, he admitted that he was "legally married" to Complainant on 3 October 1976 but that the marriage "was not as yet made and declared public" so that he could proceed with his law studies and until after he could take the Bar examinations "in order to keep stable our future." He also admitted having indicated that he was "single" in his application to take the Bar "for reason that to my honest belief, I have still to declare my status as single since my marriage with the complainant was not as yet made and declared public." He further averred that he and Complainant had reconciled as shown by her conformity to the "Explanation," for which reason he prayed that the Complaint be dismissed.

Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was Complainant's Affidavit of Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out of a misunderstanding and communication gap and that she was refraining from pursuing her Complaint against Respondent.

Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78 and allowed Respondent to take his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1982.

Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and unsigned letter addressed to Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent after he had already taken his Oath stating, among others, that while he was grateful for Complainant's help, he "could not force myself to be yours," did not love her anymore and considered her only a friend.  Their marriage contract was actually void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code, among them the minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before the celebration of the marriage, an affidavit to that effect by the solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age, which they were not as they were both only twenty years old at the time. He advised Complainant not to do anything more so as not to put her family name "in shame." As for him, he had "attain(ed) my goal as a full-pledge (sic) professional and there is nothing you can do for it to take away from me even (sic) you go to any court." According to Complainant, although the letter was unsigned, Respondent's initials appear on the upper left-hand corner of the airmail envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").

Respondent denied emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it is  Complainant who has been indulging in fantasy and fabrications.

In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and Complainant had covenanted not to disclose the marriage not because he wanted to finish his studies and take the Bar first but for the reason that said marriage was void from the beginning in the absence of the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code that the contracting parties shall have lived together as husband and wife for at least five (5) years before the date of the marriage and that said parties shall state the same in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. He could not have abandoned Complainant because they had never lived together as husband and wife. When he applied for the 1981 Bar examinations, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single.

On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General submitted his Report, with the recommendation that Respondent be exonerated from the charges against him since Complainant failed to attend the hearings and to substantiate her charges but that he be reprimanded for making inconsistent and conflicting statements in the various pleadings he had filed before this Court.

On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General's Report to the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report and recommendation. In an undated Report, the latter recommended the indefinite suspension of Respondent until the status of his marriage is settled.

Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we find Respondent's lack of good moral character sufficiently established.

Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified him outright  from taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character.

Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status as "single" not only because of his pact with Complainant to keep the marriage under wraps but also because that marriage to the Complainant was void from the beginning, are mere afterthoughts absolutely wanting of merit. Respondent can not assume that his marriage to Complainant is void.  The presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of a marriage of an exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code have been met and that the Judge's official duty in connection therewith has been regularly performed.

Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various pleadings submitted in Bar Matter No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and deplorable.

The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an "Explanation," in paragraph 1, page 1 of which he admits having been "legally married" to Complainant. Yet, during the hearings before the Solicitor General, he denied under oath that he had submitted any such pleading (t.s.n., p. 21) contending instead that it is only the second page where his signature appears that he meant to admit and not the averments on the first page which were merely of Complainant's own making (ibid., pp. 59-60). However, in his Comment in this Administrative Case, he admits and makes reference to such "Explanation" (pars. 3[f]) and [g]; 4[b]).

Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to Complainant (par. 1), in this case, however, he denies the legality of the marriage and, instead, harps on its being void ab initio. He even denies his signature in the marriage contract.

In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not to be made public so as to allow him to finish his studies and take the Bar. In this case, however, he contends that the reason it was kept a secret was because it was "not in order from the beginning."

Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned letter (Annex "F," Petition) to Complainant. However, its very tenor coincides with the reasons that he advances in his Comment why the marriage is void from the beginning, that is, for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code.

Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Respondent had reconciled with Complainant and admitted the marriage to put a quick finish to Bar Matter No. 78 to enable him to take the lawyer's Oath, which otherwise he would have been unable to do. But after he had done so and had become a "full-pledge (sic) lawyer," he again refused to honor his marriage to Complainant.

Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to conflicting submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose.In so doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA 10). Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court.

It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent toadmission to the practice of law; its continued possession is  also essential for remaining in the practice of law(People v. Tuanda, Adm.  Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As so aptly put by Mr. JusticeGeorge A. Malcolm: "As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney and served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator who shall circulate the same to all Courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

IN RE:  PUBLISHED ALLEGED THREATS AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE COURT IN THE PLUNDER LAW CASE HURLED BY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA

D E C I S I O N

KAPUNAN, J.:

On December 11, 2001, the court En Banc issued the following Resolution directing respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to explain why he should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for uttering some allegedly contemptuous statements in relation to the case involving the constitutionality of the Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080) [1] which was then pending resolution:

The court resolved to direct Atty. Leonard De Vera to explain within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice why he should not be punished for contempt of court.

In his Answer, respondent admitted the report in the November 6, 2002 issue of the Inquirer that he “suggested that the Court must take steps to dispel once and for all these ugly rumors and reports” that “the Court would vote in favor of or against the validity of the Plunder Law” to protect the credibility of the Court.

Respondent admitted further to “having appealed to the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition by [former President Joseph] Estrada’s lawyers to declare the plunder [law] unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness” because he and his group were “greatly disturbed” by such rumors.[5]

Anent the November 19, 2001 report in the Inquirer quoting respondent as having said that the people were “getting dangerously passionate...emotionally charged,” pending the court’s resolution on the petition filed by former President Estrada assailing the validity of the Plunder Law, respondent claimed that such statement was “factually accurate.”[6] He also argued that he was merely exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech when he said that a decision by the Court declaring the Plunder Law unconstitutional “would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to People Power II.

Furthermore, respondent justified his statement and said that “the people wouldn’t just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong” as an expression of his opinion and as “historically correct,” citing the ouster of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos through people power in 1986, and the resignation of former President Estrada from office as a result of pressure from the people who gathered at EDSA to demand the impeachment process be stopped for being a farce, and that Estrada step down because he no longer had the mandate of the Filipino people

While he admitted to having uttered the aforecited statements, respondent denied having made the same to degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute.

After a careful consideration of respondent’s arguments, the Court finds his explanation unsatisfactory and hereby finds him guilty of indirect contempt of court for uttering statements aimed at influencing and threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law.

The judiciary, as the branch of government tasked to administer justice, to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving enforceable and demandable rights, and to afford redress of wrongs for the violation of said rights [10] must be allowed to decide cases independently, free of outside influence or pressure.  An independent judiciary is essential to the maintenance of democracy, as well as of peace and order in society.  Further, maintaining the dignity of courts and enforcing the duty of citizens to respect them are necessary adjuncts to the administration of justice.[11]

Thus, Rule 71, Section 3 (d) of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes the courts to hold liable for criminal contempt a person guilty of conduct that is directed against the dignity or authority of the court, or of an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.[12]

Respondent cannot justify his contemptuous statements--asking the Court to dispel rumors that it would declare the Plunder Law unconstitutional, and stating that a decision declaring it as such was basically wrong and would not be accepted by the people—as utterances protected by his right to freedom of speech.

Indeed, freedom of speech includes the right to know and discuss judicial proceedings, but such right does not cover statements aimed at undermining the Court’s integrity and authority, and interfering with the administration of justice.  Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must occasionally be balanced with the requirements of equally important public interests, such as the maintenance of the integrity of the courts and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.[13]

It is respondent’s duty as an officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice [20] and in the Supreme Court as the last bulwark of justice and democracy.  Respondent’s utterances as quoted above, while the case of Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan was pending consideration by this Court, belies his protestation of good faith but were clearly made to mobilize public opinion and bring pressure on the Court.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Leonard De Vera is found GUILTY of indirect contempt of court and is hereby FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be paid within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

Nestle Philippines vs. Sanchez [GR 75209, 30 September 1987]; Kimberly Independent Labor

Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia [GR 78791]

En Banc, Per Curiam: 13 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: During the period July 8-10, 1987, Union of Filipro Employees, and Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia, intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since 17 June 1981 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loudspeakers. These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fernan as Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order that the pickets might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the pickets were maintained. Thus, on 10 July 1987, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring Messrs. Tony Avelino, Lito Payabyab, Eugene San Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson Centeno, union leaders of Union of Filipro Employees in the Nestle case and their counsel of record, Atty. Jose C. Espinas; and Messrs. Ernesto Facundo, Fausto Gapuz, Jr.

and Antonio Gonzales, union leaders of Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia in the Kimberly case to appear before the Court on 14 July 1987 at 10:30 a.m. and then and there to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with. On the appointed date and time, the individuals appeared before the Court, represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, in the absence of Atty. Potenciano Flores, who was still recuperating from an operation. Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court for the acts, together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He likewise manifested to the Court that he had explained to the picketers why their actions were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted under the circumstances. He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Timog Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about 75 unions in the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly Independent Labor Union. To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the reason for the citation and that they will abide by their promise that said incident will not be repeated, the Court required the

respondents to submit a written manifestation to this effect, which respondents complied with on 17 July 1987.

Issue: Whether the respondents should be cited for contempt for their continued picketing at the Supreme Court’s premises.

Held: The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments. However, such right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies." Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or interference." The acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of the Court, but equally a violation of the right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large.

Still, the individuals cited, who are non-lawyers, are not knowledgeable in the intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. The duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. The incident should therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program for their members.

A.M. No. RTJ-90-580. April 27, 1993.

EDUARDO R. BALAOING, complainant, vs.JUDGE LEOPOLDO CALDERON, respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-676. April 27, 1993.

EDUARDO R. BALAOING, complainant, vs.HON. SANTIAGO MALIWANAG, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM p:

This is the latest of the several administrative complaints filed by Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing against different judges of Olongapo City and Zambales.

The first complaint was dated February 17, 1989, entitled "Atty. Balaoing vs. Hon. Jaime Dojillo as Judge of Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Olongapo City, et al." Said complaint was dismissed for lack of merit through this Court's Resolution dated September 18, 1990. Further, Atty. Balaoing was required to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for having suppressed certain material facts of which he was charged with knowledge, and for having engaged in forum shopping. On September 26, 1990, Atty. Balaoing submitted his "Explanation and Motion for Reconsideration." In a Resolution 1 of the Court En Banc, said motion for reconsideration was DENIED, his explanation was DECLARED UNSATISFACTORY and he was SEVERELY CENSURED for having instituted a patently unfounded and frivolous administrative action, and WARNED that the commission by him of the same or similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely.

The second administrative complaint filed by Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing was against Judge Santiago Maliwanag, RTC, Branch 71, Iba, Zambales, charging them with grave misconduct for their alleged failure and refusal to issue the corresponding writ of execution (pending appeal) prayed for by complainant in his motion filed in Civil Case No. 983-1 (CA-G.R. No. 01234), entitled "TEOFILO ZABALA, et al. vs. EUGENIO BUENO". The Court was disturbed by complainant Balaoing's unrestrained use of unsavory, even defamatory and offensive language against respondent Judge. One glaring example narrates: ". . . It is well to advise Judge Maliwanag not to be wearing his brief (short) while in his chamber during office hours; it is downright undignified, especially so when his body has traces of fungus, which was have been afflicted during his 26 years as Assistant City Fiscal of Olongapo City, a dirty city." (This was vehemently denied by respondent Judge.) The Court, in a Resolution 2 resolved to dismissed the complaint, suspend the complaint and fine him.

Notwithstanding the above warnings, censure and suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year, Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing is again before this Court with more administrative complaints filed against not only one, but two judges, the Honorable Leopoldo T. Calderon, Jr. and the Honorable Santiago Maliwanag, of Olongapo City and Zambales, respectively.

On September 25, 1990, Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing filed a sworn letter-complaint 3 against Judge Leopoldo T. Calderon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75, Olongapo City, for misconduct,

grave abuse of authority and malicious delay in the administration of justice, allegedly committed as follows:

"Complainant alleges that in the matter of implementing the Supreme Court Circular mandating continuous trial, there is no way for it to succeed in so far as respondent Judge is concerned since the latter does not follow the Circular and merely treats it as directory; that at the start of court sessions, it has been the practice of respondent Judge to automatically grant postponements and deferments of the hearing of cases to a later hour whenever his OIC, Leonor Maniago, makes a manifestation in open court that a certain lawyer or party called up requesting that his/her case be postponed or be called later in the day; that respondent Judge drinks a lot with lawyers close to Mayor Gordon and fraternizes with them openly; that with respect to respondent's personal driver, the latter receives his salary both from Mayor Gordon as a casual employee and from the Supreme Court as a judicial aide; and, that respondent Judge sanctions the set up of having his legal researcher, Jaime Dojildo, Jr., to work under the supervision of an OIC who, according to complainant, is grossly inefficient and a notorious swindler with no background in law.

Complainant further alleges that respondent Judge has been maliciously delaying the disposition of several cases pending in his sala.

A second letter-complaint 5 dated October 5, 1990, was again filed by Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing against the same Judge Leopoldo T. Calderon, Jr. and his Officer-in-Charge (OIC) Leonor Maniago charging them both with misconduct, grave abuse of authority and malicious delay in the administration of justice relative to Civil Case No. 201-0-89, entitled "Eduardo R. Balaoing vs. Santiago Maliwanag and Romeo Enriquez." Complainant Balaoing, who is the plaintiff in both cases, alleges that respondent Judge abused his authority by refusing to declare in default the defendants in the above-entitled cases despite their repeated failure to attend the pre-trial conferences and to submit their pre-trial briefs. Complainant further avers that at the scheduled hearing, on October 5, 1990, respondent Judge did not call complainant's case, and was told only three (3) hours later that the reason was because of the motion filed by him for respondent Judge's inhibition, which the latter allegedly refused to resolve.

With respect to the other respondent OIC Leonor Maniago, complainant Balaoing alleges that when he came out of the courtroom, he was castigated by the former for allegedly calling her notorious, swindler, insane, etc.

Respondent Judge Leopoldo T. Calderon, Jr. filed his Comment 6 on November 13, 1991. He asserts that the present administrative complaint filed against him by complainant Balaoing was precipitated by incidents in Civil Case No. 190-0-89 entitled "Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing vs. Eliseo Gavilan, et al." for Damages, wherein defendant Gavilan defaulted. All the other cases mentioned in the letter-complaint were allegedly included to merely embellish the charges.

The factual backdrop of the Gavilan case shows that complainant Balaoing won in a foreclosure case against one Eliseo Gavilan. After the foreclosed properties (a house and lot) were sold in a public auction, where complainant Balaoing was the highest bidder, a Certificate of Sale was issued and the same was registered. Respondent Judge, however, allegedly prevented the implementation of the writ of possession, to the prejudice of complainant Balaoing. In his Comment, respondent Judge explained that the reason why he quashed the writ of possession he earlier issued in favor of complainant Balaoing was due to the fact that Gavilan's widow, Alice, and her children, were residing in the foreclosed properties and, more importantly, the period to redeem the said properties had not yet expired.

When the redemption period in the Gavilan case had expired without the heirs redeeming the property, respondent Judge issued a writ of possession in favor of complainant Balaoing. But up to the present time, complainant Balaoing has not yet taken possession of the same, showing thereby his apparent disinterest.

As to the application of complainant Balaoing for a writ of injunction and restraining order in Civil Case No. 253-0-90, respondent Judge explains that before he could finish hearing the evidence of the parties in support of and in opposition to the petition for issuance of the ancillary writ prayed for, complainant Balaoing filed another Motion for Inhibition of respondent Judge to hear his cases. Nevertheless, respondent Judge denied the motion for the issuance of the writ prayed for failure of complainant Balaoing to show a clear right over the property and that irreparable injury would visit him if the writ would not be issued.

Other respondent OIC Leonor Maniago adopted the allegations in respondent Judge's Comment, and alleged further that she has "faithfully performed her duties and obligations under the law to administer justice in accordance with her authority and without any impartiality, (sic) whatsoever." 8

Consolidated with this administrative case is A.M. No. R-676-RTJ, entitled "Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing vs. Hon. Santiago Maliwanag," wherein the former charges the latter with gross ignorance of the law for allegedly issuing a patently unjust order.

Respondent Judge Maliwanag, in his Comment dated September 2, 1986, denied the charge and alleged among others, that his order was issued based on jurisprudence, equity and justice, in order to prevent an unjust and inequitable execution of the judgment and an injustice perpetrated by a lawyer on the unlearned and poor couple from the barrio.

In a Memorandum to then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, dated September 12, 1990, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of Atty. Balaoing's complaint against Judge Maliwanag on the ground that the same failed "to specifically show and prove the facts constituting the charge of gross ignorance of the law. The allegation of the complainant are not only laconic and general but they are also based on mere and personal, interpretations of the complainant on the law instead of material allegations of facts." 9

As shown above, complainant Balaoing has a penchant for filing administrative charges against judges, in whose sala he has pending cases, whenever the latter render decisions or issue orders adverse to him and/or his clients

Held:

LEGAL ETHICS; COUNSEL'S WANTON DISREGARD OF COURT'S STERN WARNING NOT TO AGAIN FILE BASELESS AND FRIVOLOUS ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS AND HIS ADAMANT REFUSAL TO ABIDE BY CANON 11, RULE 11.03 AND RULE 11.04, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IS GROUND FOR DISBARMENT. — Complainant Balaoing went out of bounds when he filed his baseless and frivolous administrative complaints against respondent Judges Calderon and Maliwanag, with no other plain and clear purpose than to harass respondent Judges, and thus, exact vengeance on them for rendering adverse judgments against him and his clients. These acts of complainant Balaoing run counter to the explicit mandate of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: CANON 11 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS . . . Rule 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,

offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case. We have painstakingly reviewed the records of these cases and find the present administrative complaints of Atty. Balaoing against Judge Calderon, Jr. and his OIC Leonor Maniago, and against Judge Maliwanag, just as frivolous and baseless as the previous ones. Like before, his present complaints are based on his personal interpretation of the law and not on material allegations of fact, substantiated by solid evidence. This We cannot countenance. Complainant Balaoing's wanton disregard of Our stern warning not to again file baseless and frivolous complaints which only clog the already full dockets of this Court instead of serve the ends of justice, and his adamant refusal to abide by the above-quoted provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility which serve to regulate a lawyer's conduct in this jurisdiction, have shown complainant Balaoing's unfitness to hold the license to practice law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the administrative complaints are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Complainant Eduardo R. Balaoing is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal records of complainant. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ ., concur.

ROXAS vs Zuzuerequi

In a Resolution[1] dated 26 September 2006, the Court En Banc ordered Atty. Romeo G. Roxas to explain in writing why he should not be held in contempt of court and subjected to disciplinary action when he, in a letter[2] dated 13 September 2006 addressed to Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario with copies thereof furnished the Chief Justice and all the other Associate Justices, intimated that Justice Nazario decided G.R. No. 152072 and No. 152104 on considerations other than the pure merits of the case, and called the Supreme Court a “dispenser of injustice.”

The decision referred to in the letter is the Court’s decision[3] in these consolidated cases where Attys. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor were ordered to return, among others, to Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr., et al. the amount of P17,073,224.84.

           CANON 11 -- A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS 

x x x x Rule 11.03. – A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive and

menacing language or behavior before the Courts. Rule 11.04. – A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by

the record or have no materiality to the case.      

          It is the duty of a lawyer as an officer of the court to uphold the dignity and authority of the

courts and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice and in the Supreme Court as the

last bulwark of justice and democracy.[31]  Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the

judicial institution.  Without such guarantee, the institution would be resting on a very shaky

foundation.[32]  When confronted with actions and statements, from lawyers and non-lawyers alike,

that tend to promote distrust and undermine public confidence in the judiciary, this Court will

not hesitate to wield its inherent power to cite any person in contempt.  In so doing, it

preserves its honor and dignity and safeguards the morals and ethics of the legal profession.[33]

 

          WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Romeo G. Roxas is found GUILTY of indirect contempt of

court.  He is hereby FINED the amount of P30,000.00 to be paid within ten (10) days from receipt of this

Resolution and WARNED that a repetition of a similar act will warrant a more severe penalty.

PABLO R. OLIVARES and/or OLIVARES REALTY CORPORATION, Complainants,

vs.

ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR., Respondent.

Facts: This is a complaint1 for disbarment and suspension against respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. by Pablo R. Olivares and/or Olivares Realty Corporation for violation of Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the rule on forum shopping.

In his complaint, Olivares alleged that respondent’s client, Sarah Divina Morales Al-Rasheed, repeatedly sued him for violations of the lease contract which they executed over a commercial apartment in Olivares Building in Parañaque.

In 1993, Al-Rasheed filed an action for damages and prohibition with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case was dismissed for improper venue.

Six years later, on July 1, 1999, Al-Rasheed filed an action for breach of contract with damages in the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 274. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-0233, was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Al-Rasheed, through counsel Atty. Villalon, sought a review of the order dismissing Civil Case No. 99-0233 but the Court of Appeals did not give due course to her appeal. The subsequent petition for review on certiorari filed in the Supreme Court was likewise denied.

On January 29, 2004, Al-Rasheed re-filed the 1999 suit in the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 274 where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 0J-04-009. It was dismissed on the grounds of res judicata and prescription.

Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that he was only performing his legal obligation as a lawyer to protect and prosecute the interests of his client. He denied that he was forum shopping as his client, in her certificate of non-forum shopping, disclosed the two previous cases involving the same cause of action which had been filed and dismissed. Respondent further claims he could not refuse his client’s request to file a new case because Al-Rasheed was the "oppressed party" in the transaction.

The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP found that respondent assisted Al-Rasheed in repeatedly suing Olivares for the same cause of action and subject matter. It opined that respondent should have noted that the 1999 case was dismissed for lack of interest to prosecute. Under Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, such dismissal had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. The CBD recommended the suspension of respondent for six months with a warning that any similar infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely.

The IBP adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the proscription on forum shopping. It, however, modified the recommended penalty to reprimand.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the rule on forum shopping.

Held: We adopt the findings of the IBP except its recommendation as to the penalty. All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither mere words nor an empty formality. When they take their oath as lawyers, they dedicate their lives to the pursuit of justice. They accept the sacred trust to uphold the laws of the land. As the first Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility states, "[a] lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." Moreover, according to the lawyer’s oath they took, lawyers should "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same."

With all this in mind, respondent should have refrained from filing the second complaint against Olivares. He ought to have known that the previous dismissal was with prejudice since it had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. There was no excuse not to know this elementary principle of procedural law.

The facts of this case reveal that Atty. Villalon purposely filed the second complaint. Respondent appealed the 1999 case to the Court of Appeals and subsequently to this Court. Both actions were dismissed for lack of merit, not on mere technicality. The certificate of non-forum shopping attached to the 2004 complaint disclosed that Al-Rasheed previously sued Olivares for violating their lease contract. As if such disclosure was a sufficient justification, Atty. Villalon unapologetically reproduced his 1999 arguments and assertions in the 2004 complaint. Respondent obviously knew the law and tried to go around it. This Court therefore concludes that respondent willfully violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 which provides that:

A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.

Furthermore, he violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

A lawyer’s fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and justice. Lawyers have the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Filing multiple actions constitutes an abuse of the Court’s processes. It constitutes improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade justice. Those who file multiple or repetitive actions subject themselves to disciplinary action for incompetence or willful violation of their duties as attorneys to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions that appear to be just and consistent with truth and honor.

Everything considered, this Court finds that a reprimand is insufficient and rules instead that CBD ’s recommendation for a six-month suspension from the practice of law to be more commensurate to the violation committed. However, in view of respondent’s death on September 27, 2006, the penalty can no longer be imposed on him. This development has, in effect, rendered this disciplinary case moot and academic.

SOLEDAD NUÑEZ, Represented by ANANIAS B. CO, Attorney-in-Fact for Complainant, petitioner, vs. ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT, respondent.

Facts: This is an administrative complaint filed on 21 April 1999 by Soledad Nuñez, a septuagenarian represented by her attorney-in-fact Ananias B. Co, Jr., seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort on the ground of grave misconduct.

From the documents submitted by the complainant, it appears that sometime in October 1982 she authorized respondent to sell her two parcels of land located in Legazpi City for P40,000. She agreed to give respondent 10 percent of the price as commission. Respondent succeeded in selling the lots, but despite complainant’s repeated demands, he did not turn over to her the proceeds of the sale. This forced complainant to file against respondent and his wife an action for a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

In her Report and Recommendation dated 12 September 2000, Investigating Commissioner Atty. Milagros V. San Juan concluded that respondent had no intention to “honor” the money judgment against him in Civil Case No. Q-93-15052 as can be gleaned from his (1) issuance of postdated checks; (2) closing of the account against which said checks were drawn; and (3) continued failure to make good the amounts of the checks. She then recommends that respondent be declared “guilty of misconduct in his dealings with complainant” and be suspended from the practice of law for at least one year and pay the amount of the checks issued to the complainant.

The court concur with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted and approved by the Board of Governors of the IBP, that respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with complainant. Indeed, the record shows respondent’s grave misconduct and notorious dishonesty.

Resondent gravely abused the confidence that complainant reposed in him and committed dishonesty when he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale of her property. Worse, with palpable bad faith, he compelled the complainant to go to court for the recovery of the proceeds of the sale and, in the process, to spend money, time and energy therefor. Then, despite his deliberate failure to answer the complaint resulting in his having been declared in default, he appealed from the judgment to the Court of Appeals. Again, bad faith attended such a step because he did not pay the docket fee despite notice. Needless to state, respondent wanted to prolong the travails and agony of the complainant and to enjoy the fruits of what rightfully belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already unjustly and unlawfully done to complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution. But, remaining unrepentant of what he had done and in continued pursuit of a clearly malicious plan not to pay complainant of what had been validly and lawfully adjudged by the court against him, respondent closed the account against which the checks were

drawn. There was deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of paying his obligation as proved by the fact that despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did not pay the obligation.

Held: All the foregoing constituted grave and gross misconduct in blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

Respondent’s claim of good faith in closing his account because he thought complainant has already encashed all checks is preposterous. The account was closed on or before 26 February 1996. He knew that there were still other checks due on 29 February 1996 and 15 March 1996 which could not be encashed before their maturity dates.

By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent diminished public confidence in the law and the lawyers (Busiños v. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 [1997]; Ducat v. Villalon, 337 SCRA 622 [2000]). Instead of promoting such confidence and respect, he miserably failed to live up to the standards of the legal profession (Gonato v. Adaza, 328 SCRA 694 [2000]; Ducat v. Villalon, supra).

Respondent’s act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money judgment rendered by the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good the checks despite demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance of judicial processes, which he, as an officer of the court, was under continuing duty to uphold.

To further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes, respondent even had the temerity of making a mockery of our generosity to him. We granted his three motions for extension of time to file his comment on the complaint in this case. Yet, not only did he fail to file the comment, he as well did not even bother to explain such failure notwithstanding our resolution declaring him as having waived the filing of the comment. To the Highest Court of the land, respondent openly showed a high degree of irresponsibility amounting to willful disobedience to its lawful orders (Thermochem Incorporated v. Naval, 344 SCRA 76, 82 [2000]; Sipin-Nabor v. Atty. Baterina, Adm. Case No. 4073, 28 June 2001).

Respondent then knowingly and willfully violated Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide that lawyers should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes; and that lawyers, after

obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, should not let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for their failure to do so.

Coupled with his palpable bad faith and dishonesty in his dealings with the complainant, respondent deserves a graver penalty. That graver penalty is indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is hereby INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED from the practice of law, and is directed to pay complainant Soledad Nuñez the amount of P13,800 within ten (10) days from notice of this resolution.

BELLEZA VS MACASA

FACTS

On November 10, 2004, complainant went to see respondent on referral of their mutual friend, Joe Chua. Complainant wanted to avail of respondent’s legal services in connection with the case of her son, Francis John Belleza, who was arrested by policemen of Bacolod City earlier that day for alleged violation of Republic Act (RA) 9165. Respondent agreed to handle the case for P30,000.

The following day, complainant made a partial payment of P15,000 to respondent thru their mutual friend Chua. On November 17, 2004, she gave him an additional P10,000. She paid the P5,000 balance on November 18, 2004. Both payments were also made thru Chua. On all three occasions, respondent did not issue any receipt.

On November 21, 2004, respondent received P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her (complainant’s) son. Again, respondent did not issue any receipt. When complainant went to the court the next day, she found out that respondent did not remit the amount to the court.

Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent on several occasions but respondent ignored her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case of complainant’s son and complainant was forced to avail of the services of the Public Attorney’s Office for her son’s defense.

Thereafter, complainant filed a verified complaint for disbarment against respondent in the Negros Occidental chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

In an order dated July 13, 2005, the CBD required respondent to submit his answer within 15 days from receipt thereof. Respondent, in an urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer dated August 10, 2005, simply brushed aside the complaint for being "baseless, groundless and malicious" without, however, offering any explanation. He also prayed that he be given until September 4, 2005 to submit his answer.

Respondent subsequently filed urgent motions for second and third extensions of time praying to be given until November 4, 2005 to submit his answer. He never did.

Issue: Whether or not he violate canon 12

HELD : Respondent was given more than enough opportunity to answer the

charges against him. Yet, he showed indifference to the orders of the CBD for him

to answer and refute the accusations of professional misconduct against him. In

doing so, he failed to observe Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility:

 Rule 12.03 – A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.

 

Respondent also ignored the CBD’s directive for him to file his position

paper. His propensity to flout the orders of the CBD showed his lack of concern

and disrespect for the proceedings of the CBD. He disregarded the oath he took

when he was accepted to the legal profession “to obey the laws and the legal orders

of the duly constituted legal authorities.” He displayed insolence not only to the

CBD but also to this Court which is the source of the CBD’s authority.   

Respondent’s unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of the CBD was not

only irresponsible but also constituted utter disrespect for the judiciary and his

fellow lawyers.[13] His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to

obey court orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in complying

with court directives as an officer of the court.[14] Respondent should have known

that the orders of the CBD (as the investigating arm of the Court in administrative

cases against lawyers) were not mere requests but directives which should have

been complied with promptly and completely.[15]

Que vs. Revilla Facts: In a complaint for disbarment Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla Jr. (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP Committee on Bar Discipline or CBD) of committing the following violations of the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Complainant alleged the respondent’s commission of forum-shopping by filing the subject cases in order to impede, obstruct, and frustrate the efficient administration of justice for his own personal gain and to defeat the right of the complainant and his siblings to execute the MeTC and RTC judgments in the unlawful detainer case.

In his Answer, the respondent declared that he is a member of the Kalayaan Development Cooperative (KDC) that handles pro bono cases for the underprivileged, the less fortunate, the homeless and those marginalized sector in Metro Manila. He agreed to take over the cases formerly handled by other KDC members. Investigating Commissioner ruled that the act of the respondent in filing two petitions for annulment of title, a petition for annulment of judgment and later on a petition for declaratory relief were all done to prevent the execution of the final judgment in the unlawful detainer case and constituted prohibited forum-shopping.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of forum shopping

Held: YES. Respondent is guilty of forum shopping. Respondent violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the rule against forum shopping, both of which are directed against the filing of multiple actions to attain the same objective. Both violations constitute abuse of court processes they tend to degrade the administration of justice; wreak havoc on orderly judicial procedure; and add to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts. While the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the lower courts’ jurisdiction may be a procedurally legitimate (but substantively erroneous) move, the respondent’s subsequent petitions involving the same property and the same parties not only demonstrate his attempts to secure favorable ruling using different fora, but his obvious objective as well of preventing the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case against his clients. This intent is most obvious with respect to the petitions for annulment of judgment and declaratory relief, both geared towards preventing the execution of the unlawful detainer decision, long after this decision had become final. Hence, Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyer’s Oath and Canons of Professional Responsibility and should be disbarred from the practice of law.

SAA vs

INTEGRATED BAR OF THEPHILIPPINES, COMMISSIONON BAR DISCIPLINE, BOARDOF GOVERNORS, PASIG CITYand ATTY. FREDDIE A. VENIDA,                                    Respondents.                 Promulgated:                                                                  

September 3, 2009 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 

R E S O L U T I O NCORONA, J.:

  

Petitioner Rolanda Saa filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent

Atty. Freddie A. Venida on December 27, 1991 in this Court. In his complaint, Saa

stated that Atty. Venida’s act of filing two cases [1] against him was oppressive and

constituted unethical practice.[2]

 

In a resolution dated February 17, 1992,[3]  Atty. Venida was required to

comment on the complaint against him. In his belated and partial

compliance[4] with the February 17, 1992 resolution, Atty. Venida averred that Saa

did not specifically allege his supposed infractions. He asked to be furnished a

copy of the complaint. He also prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. 

Despite receipt of a copy of the complaint,[5] Atty. Venida still did not file

his complete comment within 10 days as required in the February 17, 1992

resolution. Consequently, we issued the June 14, 1995 resolution[6] requiring Atty.

Venida to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in

contempt for failure to comply with the February 17, 1992 resolution. 

Finally, Atty. Venida filed his full comment[7] on September 4, 1995 which,

without doubt, was a mere reiteration of his partial comment. Atty. Venida also

added that he was merely performing his duty as counsel of Saa’s adversaries.[8]

The matter was thereafter referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In a report dated August 14,

1997, Commissioner George S. Briones recommended the dismissal of the

complaint for lack of merit.[9] It found no evidence that the two cases filed by Atty.

Venida against Saa were acts of oppression or unethical practice.[10]

 

The Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve the

investigating commissioner’s report and dismissed the complaint.[11] Saa filed a

motion for reconsideration but was denied.[12]

 

Saa now questions the resolution of the IBP in this petition for certiorari.[13] He ascribes grave abuse of discretion to the IBP when it adopted and affirmed

the report of the investigating commissioner dismissing his complaint. According

to him, the investigating commissioner’s report did not at all mention the dismissal

of OMB 1-90-1118 and A.C. P-90-513, even if the existence of both cases was

admitted by the parties. The dismissal of his complaint for disbarment was

therefore grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures. 

We disagree. 

Grave abuse of discretion refers to a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or

despotic exercise of judgment by reason of passion or personal hostility as is

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[14] It must be so patent and gross as to amount to

an evasion or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in

contemplation of law.[15] A decision is not deemed tainted with grave abuse of

discretion simply because a party affected disagrees with it. 

There was no grave abuse of discretion in this case. There was in fact a

dearth of evidence showing oppressive or unethical behavior on the part of Atty.

Venida. Without convincing proof that Atty. Venida was motivated by a desire to

file baseless legal actions, the findings of the IBP stand. 

Nonetheless, we strongly disapprove of Atty. Venida’s blatant refusal to

comply with various court directives. As a lawyer, he had the responsibility to

follow legal orders and processes.[16] Yet, he disregarded this very important canon

of legal ethics when he filed only a partial comment on January 26, 1993 or 11

months after being directed to do so in the February 17, 1992 resolution. Worse, he

filed his complete comment only on June 14, 1995 or a little over three years after

due date. In both instances, he managed to delay the resolution of the case, a clear

violation of Canon 12[17] and Rules 1.03[18] and 12.04[19] of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. 

Yet again, Atty. Venida failed to file a memorandum within the period

required in our May 17, 2004 resolution.[20] Despite the 30-day deadline to file his

memorandum,[21] he still did not comply. As if taunting authority, he continually

ignored our directives for him to show cause and comply with the May 17, 2004

resolution.[22]

 

Atty. Venida apologized for the late filing of both his partial and full

comments. But tried to exculpate himself by saying he inadvertently misplaced the

complaint and had a heavy workload (for his partial comment). He even had the

temerity to blame a strong typhoon for the loss of all his files, the complaint

included (for his full comment). His excuses tax the imagination. Nevertheless, his

apologies notwithstanding, we find his conduct utterly unacceptable for a member

of the legal profession. He must not be allowed to evade accountability for his

omissions. 

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an

attorney for violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the

legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.[23] We

reiterate our ruling in Catu v. Atty. Rellosa:[24]

 Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing,

he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

 Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the

irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.

 

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART.  The charge of oppressive or unethical

behavior against respondent is dismissed. However, for violation of Canons 1 and 12 and Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the lawyer’s oath, Atty. Freddie A. Venida is

hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, effective immediately from receipt of this

resolution. He is further STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with

more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of

respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida.  The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of

the land for their information and guidance.

Alonso vs

DECISION  PERALTA, J.:

 Before us is a Complaint[1] dated October 13, 2005 for disciplinary action

against respondent Atty. Ibaro B. Relamida, Jr. filed by Attys. Josabeth V. Alonso and Shalimar P. Lazatin, counsel of Servier Philippines, Incorporated for violating the rules on forum shopping and res judicata.

 The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: In March 2001, Jennifer Ebanen filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal

against Servier Philippines, Incorporated (Servier) docketed as NLRC-NCR-Case No. 30-03-01583-01, alleging constructive dismissal with prayer for reinstatement or payment of separation pay, backwages, moral and exemplary damages.

 On July 5, 2002, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Servier.[2]  It held that

Ebanen voluntarily resigned from Servier and was, therefore, not illegally dismissed.

 Ebanen appealed at the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On

March 31, 2003, the NLRC-Third Division affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.[3]

 Thus, Ebanen moved for reconsideration.  However, the NLRC denied the

same in a Resolution[4] dated May 5, 2003. Unsatisfied, Ebanen filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of

Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 77968.  In a Decision[5] dated January 16, 2004, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the findings of the NLRC

that Ebanen voluntarily resigned and that there was no constructive dismissal. Ebanen moved anew for reconsideration, but was denied in a Resolution[6] dated April 30, 2004.

 Unrelenting, Ebanen filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme

Court.  However, in a Resolution[7] dated August 4, 2004, the Court found no reversible error on the part of the CA, thus, denied said petition. Ebanen filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied with finality in a Resolution [8] dated October 11, 2004.

 Ebanen filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Second Motion for

Reconsideration of the Resolutions dated August 4, 2004 and October 11, 2004, respectively.  On January 19, 2005, the Court denied her motion.[9]

 Persistent, Ebanen filed a Motion to Admit a Third Motion for

Reconsideration of the Resolution dated January 19, 2005. On April 20, 2005, the Court denied her motion for being a prohibited pleading and noted without action Ebanen’s third motion for reconsideration.[10]

 On July 27, 2005, the Second Division of the Supreme Court noted without

action Ebanen’s Motion for Leave to Admit Supplemental Third Motion for Reconsideration dated June 1, 2005, in view of the entry of judgment on February 17, 2005.[11]

 On February 17, 2005, the Court’s Resolution dated August 4, 2004 has

already become final and executory; thus, a corresponding Entry of Judgment[12] has been issued.

However, despite said entry of judgment, Ebanen, thru her counsel, Atty. Relamida, filed  a second complaint on August 5, 2005 for illegal dismissal based on the same cause of action of constructive dismissal against Servier, now docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-08-07222-05.

 Thus, on October 13, 2005, Servier, thru counsel, filed a letter-complaint

addressed to the then Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., praying that respondents be disciplinary sanctioned for violation of the rules on forum shopping and res judicata.

 Subsequently, in a Resolution[13] dated November 15, 2005, the Court

required both Ebanen and Atty. Relamida to comment on the letter-complaint against them.

 On January 16, 2006, respondents filed their Comments.[14] Both respondents

admitted the filing of the second complaint against Servier. They claimed that the judgment rendered by the Labor Arbiter was null and void for want of due process, since the motion for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum for the production of vital documents filed by the complainant was ignored by the Labor Arbiter. They opined that the dismissal did not amount to res judicata, since the decision was null and void for lack of due process.  As a result, they claimed that there was also no violation of the rule on forum shopping.[15]

 On February 7, 2006, the Court referred the instant bar matter to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[16]

On January 22, 2007, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the second complaint on the grounds of res judicata and forum shopping.  It further reiterated that Ebanen voluntarily resigned from employment and was not constructively dismissed.

 On March 14, 2008, during the mandatory conference before the IBP,

complainants failed to appear.  Ebanen manifested that she is not a lawyer. Both parties were required to submit their respective position papers. Atty. Relamida reiterated that Ebanen is not a lawyer and that she is the

daughter of Atty. Leonardo Aurelio (Atty. Aurelio), the senior partner of A.M. Sison Jr. and Partners Law Offices where he is employed as associate lawyer.

 He narrated that on March 28, 2001, Ebanen filed a Complaint for illegal

dismissal against Servier. He claimed that in the beginning, Atty. Aurelio was the one who prepared and reviewed all the pleadings and it was Atty. Lapulapu Osoteo who stood as counsel for Ebanen in the said labor case. Atty. Relamida admitted, however, that during the filing of the second complaint he took over as counsel of Ebanen, as requested by Atty. Aurelio.[17]  He also admitted that during the

pendency of the first complaint, he occasionally examined pleadings and signed as counsel for Ebanen.[18]

 Atty. Relamida reasoned out that as a courtesy to Atty. Aurelio and Ebanen,

he had no choice but to represent the latter. Moreover, he stressed that his client was denied of her right to due process due to the denial of her motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum.  He then argued that the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void; thus, there was no res judicata.[19]  He maintained that he did not violate the lawyer’s oath by serving the interest of his client.

 Servier, on the other hand, argued that the filing of the second complaint is a

violation of the rights of Servier, since the issue has already attained finality. It contended that Atty. Relamida violated the rules on forum shopping for the same act of filing a second complaint. As a consequence, they are being made to defend themselves in a case that has been settled before the labor tribunals and courts.  Likewise, Servier insisted that the filing of the second complaint was also a blatant violation of the rule on res judicata.  Hence, Servier prayed that Atty. Relamida be disciplinary dealt with due to his abuse of the processes of the courts.

           On April 19, 2008, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) recommended that respondent Atty. Relamida be suspended from  the practice of law for six (6) months.  It imposed no sanction on Ebanen for being a non-lawyer.           In its Report, the IBP found that by filing the second complaint, Atty. Relamida was guilty of violating the rules on res judicata and forum shopping. It concluded that Atty. Relamida abused his right of recourse to the courts by filing a complaint for a cause that had been previously rejected by the courts.           On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification as to penalty the report of the IBP-CBD.  Instead, it recommended that Atty. Relamida be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month for his violation of the rules on res judicata and forum shopping.          On December 7, 2009, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative case against Atty. Relamida. 

We sustain the findings of the IBP-CBD. All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither mere words nor an

empty formality.  When they take their oath as lawyers, they dedicate their lives to the pursuit of justice.  They accept the sacred trust to uphold the laws of the land.  As the first Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility states, "[a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." Moreover, according to the lawyer’s oath they took, lawyers should "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same."[20]

 In the instant case, it is clear that Atty. Relamida is guilty of forum shopping

and violation of the rule on res judicata. Atty. Relamida should have refrained from filing the second complaint against Servier.  He ought to have known that the previous dismissal was with prejudice, since it had the effect of an adjudication on the merits.  He was aware of all the proceedings which the first complaint went through as by his own admission, he participated in the preparation of the pleadings and even signed as counsel of Ebanen occasionally.[21] He knew that the decision in the subject case had already attained finality. Atty. Relamida was well aware that when he filed the second complaint, it involved the same parties and same cause of action, albeit, he justified the same on the ground of nullity of the previous dismissal.

His allegation that he was not the original counsel of Ebanen and that his intention was only to protect the rights of his clients whom he believed were not properly addressed in the prior complaint deserves scant consideration.  He should know that once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest. The prevailing party is entitled to enjoy the fruits of his victory, while the other party is obliged to respect the court’s verdict and to comply with it.[22]

 The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the

same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision. An important factor in

determining its existence is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.  Thus, the following requisites should concur:[23]

 x x x (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.  A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of

truth and the administration of justice. The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the court’s processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor.[24]

 The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation

of the doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.  By his actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04 of the Code, as well as a lawyer’s mandate "to delay no man for money or malice."[25]

 The Court has, time and again, warned lawyers not to resort to forum

shopping for this practice clogs the court dockets. Their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice.  Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes such lawyer’s duty.[26]  This we will not tolerate.

 In cases of similar nature,[27] the penalty imposed by this Court was six (6)

months suspension from the practice of law. Thus, consistent with the existing jurisprudence, we find that, in this case, the suspension of six (6) months from practice of law is proper.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-286, dated June 5, 2008, of the IBP, which found respondent Atty. Ibaro B. Relamida, Jr. guilty of violating the Rules on Res Judicata and Forum Shopping, is AFFIRMED. Atty. Relaminda is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.           Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of Atty. Relamida as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.                   This Decision shall be immediately executory.

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: ASTATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGEOF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THESUPREME COURT"

Facts: On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Justice Del Castillo in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary was promulgated. Subsequently, the counsel for Vinuya et al., or “Malaya Lolas”, Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares, filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, where they posited for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds to reconsider the decision. They also claimed that evidence bears out the fact not only of extensive plagiarism but also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying the Petition.

On that same day, some journalists posted an article, entitled "SC justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women," on the Newsbreak website. The same article appeared on the GMA News TV website also. Thereafter, Atty. Roque’s column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted," appeared in the Manila Standard Today. In the said column, Atty. Roque claimed one of the authors purportedly not properly acknowledged in the Vinuya decision confirmed that his work had been plagiarized.

On even date, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the Court in reply to the charge of plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. Meanwhile, another purportedly plagiarized author in the Vinuya decision, Dr. Mark Ellis, wrote the Court expressing his dismay.

The Court, then, formed the Ethics Committee and referred the letter of Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics Committee. The Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and Bagares to comment on the letter of Justice Del Castillo.

Afterwards, a statement dated entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" was posted in Newsbreak’s website and on Atty. Roque’s blog. A report regarding the statement also appeared on various on-line news sites on the same date. The statement was likewise posted at the University of the Philippines College of Law’s bulletin board and at said college’s website. Dean Leonen of UP submitted a copy of the Statement to the Court.

During the hearing of the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, the Ethics Committee directed Atty. Roque to present the signed copy of the said Statement within three days from said hearing. Indubitable from the actual signed copy of the Statement was that only 37 of the 81 faculty members appeared to have signed the same.

The Ethics Committee referred the matter to the Court en banc the latter made the following observations that while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated

such allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.

Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks.The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.Issue: Should the respondents be reprimanded for their scornful remarks against the esteemedCourt? Thus this constitute a violation of CANON 13?

Held: YES. The Court ruled that no matter how firm a lawyer’s conviction in the righteousness of his cause there is simply no excuse for denigrating the courts and engaging in public behavior that tends to put the courts and the legal profession into disrepute. That humiliating the Court into reconsidering the Vinuya Decision in favor of the Malaya Lolas was one of the objectives of the Statement. It is also proposed that the choice of language in the Statement was intended for effective speech; that speech must be "forceful enough to make the intended recipients listen." One wonders what sort of effect respondents were hoping for in branding this Court as, among others, callous, dishonest and lacking in concern for the basic values of decency and respect.

The Court fails to see how it can ennoble the profession if they allow respondents to send a signal to their students that the only way to effectively plead their cases and persuade others to their point of view is to be offensive.

As for the claim that the respondents’ noble intention is to spur the Court to take "constructive action" on the plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts as to its veracity. For if the Statement was primarily meant for this Court’s consideration, why was the same published and reported in the media first before it was submitted to this Court? It is more plausible that the Statement was prepared for consumption by the general public and designed to capture media attention as part of the effort to generate interest in the most controversial ground in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed in the Vinuya case by Atty. Roque, who is respondents’ colleague on the UP Law faculty.

In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity and due respect to the Court, particularly when respondents knew fully well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the merits of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statement’s issuance, were still both pending final disposition of the Court. These facts have been widely publicized.

If it is true that the respondents’ outrage was fueled by their perception of indifference on the part of the Court then, when it became known that the Court did intend to take action, there was nothing to prevent respondents from recalibrating the Statement to take this supervening event into account in the interest of fairness.

Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, the Court finds no merit in the respondents’ reliance on various news reports and commentaries in the print media and the internet as proof that they are being unfairly "singled out." On the contrary, these same annexes to the Common Compliance show that it is not enough for one to criticize the Court to warrant the institution of disciplinary or contempt action. The Court takes into account the nature of the criticism and weighs the possible repercussions of the same on the Judiciary.

When the criticism comes from persons outside the profession who may not have a full grasp of legal issues or from individuals whose personal or other interests in making the criticism are obvious, the Court may perhaps tolerate or ignore them. However, when law professors are the ones who appear to have lost sight of the boundaries of fair commentary and worse, would justify the same as an exercise of civil liberties, the Court cannot remain silent for such silence would have a grave implication on legal education in our country.

With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance, considering that this appears to be the first time these respondents have been involved in disciplinary proceedings of this sort, the Court is willing to give them the benefit of the doubt that they were for the most part well-intentioned in the issuance of the Statement. However, it is established in jurisprudence that where the excessive and contumacious language used is plain and undeniable, then good intent can only be mitigating. As the Court expounded where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced.

IN RE: USE BY ATTY. RENERIO G. PAAS AS AN OFFICE IN HIS PRIVATE PRACTICE OF HIS PROFESSION THE OFFICE OF HIS WIFE, PASAY CITY METC

JUDGE ESTRELLITA M. PAAS.

Facts:

Judge Estrellita M. Paas charged Court Utility Worker Edgar E. Almarvez with discourtesy, disrespect, insubordination, neglect in performing his duties, disloyalty, solicitation of monetary consideration and gross violation of the Civil Service Law.

Judge Paas alleged that Almarvez is:

1. discourteous to his co-employees, lawyers and party litigants 2. insubordination- because he and failed to maintain the cleanliness in the court although

he was ordered to do so 3. Neglect in performing his duty- because he was habitually absent from work and made it

appear that he reported for work by signing the logbook in the morning only to stay out of the office the whole day

4. solicitation of monetary consideration- when he asked from detention prisoners P100.00 to P200.00 before he released to them their Release Orders and even failed to mail printed matter once and has given confidential information to litigants in advance of its authorized release date for a monetary consideration, thus giving undue advantage or favor to the paying party, in violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

The clerk of Court and the post man testified on behalf of Atty. Paas as well as the jail escort and the jail officer.

Almarvez denied the allegations and contended that the real reason why Judge Paas filed the case against him was because she suspected him of helping her husband, Atty. Renerio G. Paas,

conceal his marital indiscretions and since she failed to obtain any information from him, she called him names and other forms of harassment and even forced him to prepare a resignation letter.

Because of what happened, Almarvez reported the incidents to Executive Judge Maria Erum who told him to report it too the Office of the Clerk of Court but he was advised to try to talk the matter over with her who then told him that they should forget all about it.

Almarvez also claimed that the judge ordered him to undergo a drug test even if he had no history of drug abuse on a periodic or continuous basis.

It was also revealed that Judge Paas' husband, private practitioner Atty. Paas, was using his wife's office as his office address in his law practice which she denied and contended that the latter was using Room 203 of the Pasay City Hall of Justice as his office address, they claiming that Atty. Paas actually holds office at 410 Natividad Building, Escolta, Manila with his partner Atty. Herenio Martinez; Atty. Paas would visit his wife at her office only when he has a hearing before the Pasay City courts or Prosecutor's Office, or when he lunches with or fetches her, or when he is a guest during special occasions such as Christmas party and her birthday which are celebrated therein; and Judge Paas would never consent nor tolerate the use of the court for any personal activities.

With regard to the charges against Almarvez, it was recommended by the OCA for the dismissal of the case and that that he be penalized for inefficiency in the performance of his official duties with One Month suspension without pay while the charges against Judge Paas, it was also recommended that the case be dismissed. However it was found that she had used her administrative power supervision and control over court personnel for her personal pride, prejudice and pettiness when she ordered Almarvez to undergo a drug test after she had already filed an administrative case against him. It can be concluded that the purpose of Judge Paas in ordering Almarvez to undergo a drug test was to fish for evidence to support the administrative case she had already filed against him.

ISSUE: WON Atty Paas violated the CPR?

Hel: Yes

Judge Paas' order for Almarvez to undergo a drug test is not an unlawful order. Public employees are required to undergo a drug test prior to employment to determine if they are drug-free. To be drug-free is not merely a pre-employment prerequisite but is a continuing requirement to ensure the highest degree of productivity of the civil service. However, considering that the order was issued after Judge Paas filed the administrative case against Almarvez, it elicits the suspicion that it was only a fishing expedition against him. This is conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary, for which Judge Paas should be duly reprimanded.

With regard to the matter that her husband Atty. Paas was using her office to receive court notices and orders in a case, it could be interpreted as a subtle way of sending a message that

Atty. Paas is the husband of a judge in the same building and should be given special treatment by other judges or court personnel.

It was stated under Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct that "A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities." Specifically, Rule 2.03 thereof provides that:

Rule 2.03. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.

By allowing her husband to use the address of her court in pleadings before other courts, Judge Paas indeed allowed her husband to ride on her prestige for purposes of advancing his private interest, in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

On his part, Atty. Paas was guilty of using a fraudulent, misleading, and deceptive address that had no purpose other than to try to impress either the court in which his cases are lodged, or his client, that he has close ties to a member of the juiciary, in violation of the following rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 3 — A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

CANON 13 — A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT.

CANON 15 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

Rule 15.06. A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.

The need for relying on the merits of a lawyer's case, instead of banking on his relationship with a member of the bench which tends to influence or gives the appearance of influencing the court, cannot be overemphasized. It is unprofessional and dishonorable, to say the least, to misuse a public office to enhance a lawyer's prestige. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by such reprehensible and improper conduct.

RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING JUSTICE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, JR. ON CA-G.R. SP NO. 103692 [Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.]

Facts:

Justice Reyes filed an application for leave, with Justice Mendoza designated by the Raffle Committee as Acting Chairman of the Ninth Division during the absence of Justice Reyes. Justice Mendoza was authorized to act on all cases submitted to the Ninth Division for final resolution and/or appropriate action.

The officers, directors and/or representatives of Meralco filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against the Securities and Exchange Commission. Justice Mendoza informed Justice Roxas through a letter that he was inhibiting from the case on the ground that he used to be a lawyer of the Meralco.

Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. was assigned as Acting Chairman of the Ninth Division by raffle, in lieu of Justice Mendoza. Justice Sabio received call from his older brother, Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG. Chairman Sabio informed his brother that he (Justice Sabio) had been named the "third member" of the division to which the MERALCO-GSIS case had been raffled. Justice Sabio was surprised as he had not yet been "officially informed" about the matter. Chairman Sabio then tried to convince Justice Sabio "of the rightness of the stand of the GSIS and the SEC," and asked his brother to help the GSIS. Justice Sabio told his brother that he would "vote according to [his] conscience.”

GSIS filed an urgent ex-parte motion to inhibit Justice Roxas, because reports have reached GSIS that the latter has been in contact with certain lawyers of MERALCO and has already prepared a draft resolution granting the TRO without affording respondents a summary hearing. It turned out that Justice Roxas had not yet been officially notified that the case was raffled to him. Moreover, Justice Roxas had no hand in the raffle proceeding, which was handled with the use of a "fool-proof Las Vegas tambiolo.”

Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Sabio the TRO to be signed, which he had prepared, already signed by himself and Justice Dimaranan-Vidal. Convinced of its urgency, Justice Sabio signed it on condition that the case will be set for oral arguments. Afterwards, the Special Ninth Division composed of Justices Sabio, Roxas, and Dimaranan-Vidal, issued the Resolution granting the TRO. Justice Roxas did not act on the Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order and To Hold Its Enforcement in Abeyance filed by the GSIS because he did not consider it meritorious.

Justice Sabio received a cellular phone call from Mr. Francis De Borja, a person he had lost contact with for almost a year. Mr. De Borja greeted him with: "Mabuhay ka, Justice." When Justice Sabio, Jr. asked Mr. De Borja why he said that, Mr. De Borja told him that the Makati Business Club was happy with his having signed the TRO, to which Justice Sabio retorted, "I voted according to my conscience."

When Justice Reyes reported back to work, the Division Clerk of Court delivered to Justice Reyes the cartilla of the Meralco case, and informed him of a hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. However, on the same day, the Division Clerk of Court came back to retrieve the cartilla upon instructions of Justice Sabio. Justice Reyes instructed his staff to return the cartilla and when he asked the Division Clerk of Court why she was retrieving it, she said that Justice Sabio "demanded" that it be returned back to him. "Personally affronted" by the "domineering and superior stance" of Justice Sabio, Justice Reyes "read and re-read Secs. 1, 2(d) & 5, Rule VI (Process of Adjudication)" until he was satisfied that he should sit as Division Chairman in the Meralco case.

Justice Roxas asked Justice Sabio whether Justice Reyes would preside over the hearing. Justice Sabio explained the reason why he, not Justice Reyes, should preside. Justice Roxas promised to instruct the Division Clerk of Court to send the rollo over to Justice Sabio. The next day, the Division Clerk of Court told Justice Sabio that the rollo was with Justice Reyes. When the rollo was eventually transmitted to Justice Sabio, the Division Clerk of Court asked him whether the rollo should be with Justice Reyes. Justice Sabio explained why the rollo should be with him.

Justice Reyes decided to consult the Presiding Justice Conrado Vasquez "to avoid an ugly confrontation" with the Justices on the "highly politicized case involving giants of the Philippine society." He explained to the Presiding Justice his understanding of the relevant IRCA rules and "the actual practice in similar situations in the past." The Presiding Justice promised to talk with Justice Sabio and, "for the sake of transparency and future reference," Justice Reyes requested permission to write an inquiry on the matter.

Presiding Justice Vasquez "did not do anything anymore" to prevent an "unpalatable" situation, notwithstanding the "conflicting opinions" of Justices Reyes and Sabio. The "personal view" of the Presiding Justice was at the time contrary to Justice Sabio but Justice Sabio had a "different interpretation." He felt that it would be "better" if Justices Reyes and Sabio "could settle it between themselves." The Presiding Justice was seeing the Justices "practically" everyday because he did not want "these things to blow up."

Mr. De Borja again called up Justice Sabio, seeking to meet with him for an "important" matter. Because Justice Sabio had 6-8 p.m. classes at the Ateneo Law School, they agreed to meet after his classes. De Borja asked Justicer Sabio to help the Lopezes, and he showed awareness of the issue between Justice Reyes and Justice Sabio. Afterwards, De Borja offered Justice Sabio P10 Million to give way to Justice Reyes.

Justice Sabio that informed Presiding Justice Vasquez that he (Justice Sabio) was offered a bribe (which he rejected) to have him ousted from the Meralco case. The news allegedly shocked the Presiding Justice. Justice Sabio did not tell them who the "offeror" was. Although Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice that the offer of P10 million to a Justice was, in the words of Justice Sabio, bastusan na, and he knew that bribing a Justice is a criminal act, the Presiding Justice did nothing because he could not "advise a fellow Justice on what to do" - the Justice would know what he should do.

Justice Reyes went to see Justice Sabio. Justice Reyes then said he did not know of those pending motions. He also said that he has no interest in the matter and he doesn’t want to be charged with non-feasance for failing to do my duty. For his part, Justice Reyes kept on repeating: "Wala talaga ako dito, wala akong interest kung di yun lang hindi ako ma non-feasance. Justice Sabio thought otherwise.

Meanwhile, Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal "the final decision on the MERALCO case" bearing his signature, which he gave to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for "concurrence/dissent." According to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal, Justice Roxas explained to her the "rationale for his conclusion." Justice Roxas went out for a while and returned "with an expensive looking travelling bag" from where he pulled out the "purported final decision." Before the close of office hours, Justice Roxas returned to the

chambers of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal to check if he (Justice Roxas) had signed his decision. Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed the decision notwithstanding that the Court of Appeals had been reorganized because she believed that the Special Ninth Division was still existing on account of its having issued the TRO.

However, Justice Roxas denied that the decision he gave to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was the final decision. He denied that he gave it to her for her signature. He said it was only for her to read because she asked to read it. He said it was a mere draft as "everything was unofficial" - there was no rollo or logbook with it, it was not placed in an envelope, and it did not have the "special seal" of Justice Roxas. It allegedly "was thrown in the garbage can."

Issue:

Whether or not the said Justices are culpable or innocent with respect to the said controversy Whether or not the Justices exhibited conduct which failed to conform to the canons of judicial ethics, upholding integrity, independence, impartiality, competence and propriety in the performance of official functions

Court’s Ruling:

(1) Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas is found guilty of multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, grave misconduct, dishonesty, undue interest and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and is DISMISSED from the service, with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued leave credits if any, with prejudice to his re-employment in any branch or service of the government including government-owned and controlled corporations;

(2) Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. is found guilty of simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice of the Court of Appeals and is SUSPENDED for two (2) months without pay, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;

(3) Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. is SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for his failure to act promptly and decisively in order to avert the incidents that damaged the image of the Court of Appeals, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;

(4) Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes is found guilty of simple misconduct with mitigating circumstance and is REPRIMANDED, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;

(5) Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal is found guilty of conduct unbecoming a Justice of the Court of Appeals and is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the discharge of her judicial duties.

(6) PCGG Chairman Camilo L. Sabio’s act to influence the judgment of a member of the Judiciary in a pending case is hereby referred to the Bar Confidant for appropriate action;

(7) Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.’s charge against Mr. Francis R. De Borja for attempted bribery of a member of the Judiciary is hereby referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.

Rationale:

The Judiciary, which is acclaimed as the firmest pillar of our democratic institutions, is vested by the Constitution with the power to settle disputes between parties and to determine their rights and obligations under the law. For judicial decisions, which form part of the law of the land, to be credible instruments in the peaceful and democratic resolution of conflicts, our courts must be perceived to be and, in fact be, impartial, independent, competent and just. To accomplish this end, it is imperative that members of the Judiciary from its highest magistrates to its humblest employees adhere to the strictest code of ethics and the highest standards of propriety and decorum.

Justice Roxas inexcusably failed to act on a number of motions of the parties prior to the promulgation of the Decision. These motions include GSIS’ "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Inhibit" Justice Roxas. As the motion raised a prejudicial question, Justice Roxas should have resolved it before issuing the TRO sought by Meralco, but he never did. Justice Roxas was also dishonest and untruthful. Justice Roxas admitted that the "Transcript of Final Decision," which is supposed to be a transcript of the deliberation on the final decision in the Meralco case was not a true "transcript" of the minutes of the meeting, but purely a "transcript from memory" because no notes were taken, no stenographer was present, and no tape recorder was used. Justice Roxas’ testimony that when he brought the Meralco decision to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal, it was only a draft for her to read, because she asked if she may read it, not for her to sign it, is completely false. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service. Dishonesty has no place in the judiciary.

Justice Sabio likewise committed improprieties in relation to the Meralco case. The circumstances of the telephone call of Chairman Sabio to his brother Justice Sabio showed that Justice Sabio failed to uphold the standard of independence and propriety expected of him as a magistrate of the appellate court, the same constituting a violation of Canon 13 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers, which provides that "[a] lawyer shall x x x refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the Court."

Justice Sabio also violated Sections 1, 4, and 5, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which provide that -

Sec. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently x x x free from extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.

Sec. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.

Justice Reyes is guilty of simple misconduct, which is mitigated by the fact that he repeatedly asked Presiding Justice Vasquez to act on his request to rule on the conflicting interpretation of the IRCA. However, Justice Reyes should be reprimanded for taking part in the decision of the subject case without awaiting the ruling of the Presiding Justice.

Justice Dimaranan-Vidal deviated from the IRCA when she allowed herself to be rushed by Justice Roxas to sign the Meralco decision, without reading the parties’ memoranda and without the deliberation among members of the Division required by the IRCA. She knew that the TRO would not expire until some three (3) weeks away - yet she allowed herself to believe Justice Roxas’ misrepresentation that signing the decision was urgent. Her compliance with certain dissembling practices of other justices of the Court, in violation of the IRCA, showed weakness and lack of independence on her part.

Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. 

          In the Report, the Panel found that Justice Sabio likewise committed improprieties in

relation to the Meralco case.

 The circumstances of the telephone call of Chairman Sabio to his brother Justice Sabio showed that Justice Sabio failed to uphold the standard of independence and propriety expected of him as a magistrate of the appellate court.

 

In his testimony before the Panel, Chairman Sabio admits that he called up Justice

Sabio on May 30, 2008 from Davao City, in response to a resquest for help from a member

of the Board of Trustees of Meralco. Notwithstanding the fact that Chairman Sabio called to

relay to Justice Sabio the “rightness” of the GSIS’ cause and asked him “to help GSIS” and

that Justice Sabio allegedly told his brother that he would act in accordance with his

conscience, the same still constituted a violation of Canon 13 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility for lawyers, which provides that:“A lawyer shall x x x refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the Court.”

 

As they were both members of the Bar, it is incomprehensible to this Court how the

brothers can justify their improper conversation regarding the Meralco case. As the Panel

observed in its Report:

 Ironically, both of them found nothing wrong with brother Camilo’s

effort to influence his younger brother’s action in the Meralco case, because both believe that our Filipino culture allows brother-to-brother conversation, even if the purpose of one is to influence the other, provided the latter does not agree to do something illegal.[137]

RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER SENIOR STATEPROSECUTOR.

Facts: This administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings of a criminal case(People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza) presided by Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City.

The case was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Buyser. Judge Buyser declared that the evidence thus presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide and not the charge of murder. Consequently, the counsel for the defense filed a Motion toFix the Amount of Bail Bond.

Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor and the deputized prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on the ground that the original charge of murder, punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not subject to bail under the Rules of Court. Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying the case. The case was transferred to Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan. Judge Tan favorably resolved the Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of the bond. Respondent moved to reconsider which was denied for lack of merit. Respondent appealed.

Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of an article regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The article was entitled "Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out." Bagabuyo said he would contest Tan's decision before the Court of Appeals and would file criminal and administrative charges of certiorari against the judge. Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by Judge Tan. He said that this is the only way that the public would know that there are judges there who are displaying judicial arrogance.Issue: Should the respondent be reprimanded or sanctioned by the Court for his contemptuous remark against the court thus violating CANON 13, Rule 13.02 of the CPR?

Held: YES. Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations.

Respondent's statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still pending in court, violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party. As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have set the example of observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers. It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude. As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation. The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect for the institution must always be maintained.