Comprehend the Challenger accident

Comprehend the Columbia accident

The Space Shuttle Program:Challenger and Columbia Accidents

Lesson OverviewThe Challenger accidentThe Columbia accident

The Challenger AccidentOn 28 January 1986 the space

shuttle Challenger blew upAll seven crew members

perished The Rogers Commission released

its report on 6 June 1986 The failure of the joint between

the two lower parts of the right solid-fuel rocket caused the accident

How Weather’s Effect on the Solid Rocket Boosters Caused the Accident

An O-ring is made of a resilient material - one capable of bouncing back to its original shape after being compressed

O-ring material wasn’t resilient at low temperatures

As scientists prepared Challenger, the temperature hovered around the freezing mark: 32 degrees F

How NASA Management Contributed to the Accident Rogers Commission found

failures in communication Conflict between engineering

data and management judgments

Management structure allowed flight-safety questions to bypass key shuttle managers

Changes NASA Made to Reduce the Possibility of Another Accident NASA redesigned the solid rocket

booster: O-rings were replaced NASA reorganized the management

structure; also strengthened its support for safety staff

Ordered improved communication among managers

Strengthened the flight readiness review

Committed to “criticality review and hazard analysis”

Developed new systems to allow astronauts to escape in the case of another faulty liftoff; improved the orbiter’s landing systems

Columbia AccidentOn 1 February 2003 Columbia broke up

on reentry into Earth’s atmosphereAll seven of the crew perishedPhysical cause of the Columbia disaster

was a breach in the thermal protection system

A chunk of insulating foam from the pressurized fuel cell hit and structurally damaged the reinforced carbon wing leading edge

The damage to the wing ultimately melted the wing’s thin aluminum spar – or structured support

How Damage to the Thermal Protection System

Caused the Accident Many times chunks of insulating

foam broke off at launch and dinged the thermal protection system

NASA had observed it so many times on orbiters that did return safely, they didn’t consider it a serious problem

How NASA Management Contributed to the Accident CAIB faulted NASA for its overly

ambitious flight schedule Too many people had responsibility

for both sticking to the flight schedule and maintaining safety

CAIB also touched on NASA’s organizational culture - the values, norms, and shared experiences of an organization

Changes NASA Made to Reduce the Possibility of Another Accident Efforts to reduce “foam

shedding” and strengthen the orbiter’s heat shield

Improved inspection routines before launches

Improved imaging of the shuttle, both at launch and during orbit

Establishment of a Technical Engineering Authority

Marking Period 3 ProjectAs you plan your concept of

operations this marking period consider:Design safetyTesting regimen and processContingency Plans: “What if it

does not go as planned”Communications and Control:

“Who is doing what?”

Comprehend the Challenger accident

Comprehend the Columbia accident

The Space Shuttle Program:Challenger and Columbia Accidents