David v Arroyo GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006

Facts: As the nation celebrated EDSA¶s 20th anniversary, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and thereby commanded the AFP and PNP to immediately carry out necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. This declaration led to cancellation of all programs and activities related to the EDSA People Power I celebration. Rally permits were revoked and warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including the media, were implemented. Assemblies and rallyists were dispersed. Along with the dispersal, petitioner was arrested without warrant.

A week after PP 1017, PP1021 was issued lifting the state of emergency.

Issue: Whether or not there is an actual controversy or case subject for judicial review.

Whether or not there petition is with legal standing particularly on his qualification to sue.

Ratio Decidendi: The Solicitor General¶s refute that the case has been moot and academic was not upheld by the Court. According to the Supreme Court, courts will decide cases otherwise found moot and academic if: there is grave Constitutional violation, the situation¶s exceptional character and paramount public interest involved, issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public, and lastly it is capable of repetition yet evading review. Petitioner was found to be of legal standing on the grounds that his personal rights were involved. The petitioner qualifies under the direct injury test. The personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury qualifies him to impugn the validity of the statute. To wit some of these direct injuries he sustained are the illegal arrest and unlawful search he experienced. Given this fact, the court entertained his petition as he has adequately shown that he entitled to judicial protection. However, the court does not liberally declare statutes as invalid although they may be abused and misabused and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. The Court ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees, taking into consideration that legislative power is vested only in congress. The Court partly grants the petitions. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it allows the President to call the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence are declared unconstitutional. Such proclamation does not also authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utilities or business affected with public interest without prior legislation. General Order No. 5 is constitutional as it is a standard on how the AFP and PNP would implement PP1017, but portion where ³acts of terrorism´ has not been defined and punishable by congress is held unconstitutional. Furthermore, the following acts of the government were held unconstitutional: warrantless arrest of the petitioner, dispersal and warrantless arrests of rallyists in the absence of proof that said

petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, or violating BP 800; imposition of media standards and any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as warrantless search of the Tribune Offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials.

G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007 KILOSBAYAN VS ERMITA• Only natural-born Filipino citizens may be appointed as justice of the

Supreme Court• Decision of administrative body (Bureau of Immigration) declaring one

a natural-born citizen is not binding upon the courts when there are circumstances that entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings

FACTS:This case arose when respondent Gregory S. Ong was appointed by Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Petitioners contended that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, born on May 25, 1953 to Chinese parents. They further added that even if it were granted that eleven years after respondent Ong's birth, his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born citizen. For his part, respondent Ong contended that he is a natural-born citizen and presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ declaring him to be such.

ISSUE: whether or not the kilosbayan has a locus standi.

Held: First, as to standing. Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as people’s organizations and taxpayers since the matter involves an issue of utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance, namely, the qualification – nay, the citizenship – of a person to be appointed a member of this Court. Standing has been accorded and recognized in similar instances

FERDINAND TOPACIO vs. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY ONG and OFFICE OF SOLICITOR GENERAL Gr. No.179895 December 18, 2008Facts:Ong filed a petititon for correction of an entry in his certificate of birth before the RTC in compliance with the SCdecision in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita on July 3, 2007 enjoining him from accepting appointment to the position of Associate Justice of Supreme Court until have shown through adversarial proceedings that he is a natural born citizen.In the present case, Petitioner Topacio filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to prevent Ong from exercising powers, duties and responsibilities as a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. On September 5, Topacio filed a letter-complaint praying that the Solicitor General to bring in a quo warranto proceeding against Ong in the latter’s capacity as an incumbent Sandiganbayan member. Petitioner invoked par. 1, Sec. 7, Art. VIII of the Constitution and the decision in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita. Ong’s birth certificate and bar records evidenced his Chinese citizenship. Petitioner avers that Ong should immediately vacate his post bearing out his status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. The Solicitor General informed the petitioner that it cannot act favorably on the latter’s request for filing the quo warranto suit until the resolution of the RTC case is decided by final judgment. In his answer, Ong contends that in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, he voluntarily refused to accept theappointment in the Supreme Court and said decision does not annul his appointment but merely enjoined him from accepting the post, there being no definite pronouncement that he is not a natural born citizen. Ong then filed his manifestation and motion to dismiss before the RTC alleging that he was already recognized as a natural born citizen by a court decision. He attached the said decision in his birth certificate. Ong further claims that the present petition is devoid of merit, or at the very least, it must await the final disposition of the RTC case which to him involves a prejudicial issue. Meanwhile, the solicitor general alleges that the present petition is defectively verified.Issues:1) WON the SolGen committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the filing of quo warranto suit2) WON the initiation by the petition for certiorari and prohibition is proper to challenge the title to public office of Justice OngHeld:1) No. There was no grave abuse of discretion in deferring an action on the filing of a quo warranto suit until after the RTC case has been decided with finality. Rule 66 provides that “an action for usurpation of a public office, position orfranchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of Republic of the Philippines against a public officer who does or suffers an act which by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for forfeiture of his office. The Solgen when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof must commence such action. However, the Solgen may suspend or struck

down the institution of action for quo warranto where there are just and valid reasons. He may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in court or he may opt not to file then suit at all. He may do everything within his legal authority but always conformably with the national interest and the policy of the government on the matter at hand. The Solgen noticed the folly of re-litigation on the issue of Ong’s citizenship in the quo warranto case simultaneously with the RTC case. The Solgen merely advised the petitioner to await the outcome of the RTC case.

2) No. SC declared that the proper petition is a quo warranto proceeding, not petition for certiorari and prohibition for the former action seeks to declare null and void. Petitioner claims that Ong’s appointment as an Associate Justice of Sandiganbayan is being unconstitutional. The petition professes to be for certiorari and prohibition but it shows a “quo warranto” aspect of the petition.

As a collateral attack on a public officer’s title, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition must be dismissed. The title of a public office may be contested directly by no less a quo warranto suit. It cannot be invoked collaterally even bymandamus or motion to annul the order. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the title to a contested public office. It isbrought against the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into or unlawfully held or exercised the public office and may be commenced by the Solicitor General as the case may be, or by any person claiming to be entitled to public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. There must be a clear right to the contested office. There was no sufficient proof of a clear franchise to the Office of Associate Justice of Sandiganbayan. The petitioner conceded to that he was neither entitled to the contested office which warrants the termination of the suit. It is the same with rightful authority of a judge in the full exercise of his public function which can not be questionedby merely private suitor or by any other except in the form especially provided by law. To uphold such action would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to courts causing inculpable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of  the governmental machine.The Court declares that Ong may either be a dejure officer who is deemed legally appointed and whose term of  office has not expired or a de facto officer who enjoys certain rights among which is his title to said office may not becontested except directly by a quo warranto.

 

Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines (G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, &183962) (14 October 2008) Facts:On 8 August 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), represented by the GRP Peace Panel and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)Aspect of the previous GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of  2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MOA-AD included, among others, a stipulation thatcreates the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), to which the GRP grants the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and ancestral lands of the Bangsamoro—defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM constituted by Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City, as well as the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. The BJE is then granted the power  to build, develop, and maintain its own institutions. The MOA-AD also described the relationship of the GRP and the BJE as “associative,” characterized by shared authority and responsibility. It further provides that its provisions requiring “amendments to the existing legal framework” shall take effect upon signing of aComprehensive Compact. Before the signing, however, the Province of North Cotabato sought to compel the respondents to disclose and furnish it with complete and official copies of the MOA-AD, as well as to hold a public consultation thereon, invoking its right to information on matters of public concern. A subsequent petition sought to have the City of Zamboanga excluded from the BJE. The Court then issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 4 August 2008, directing the  public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.

.W/N the GRP Peace Panel and the PAPP committedgrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of  jurisdiction.YES. The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by EO No. 3, RA No. 7160, and RA No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary, and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform theduty enjoined.

Francisco vs. House of Representatives

Facts: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Fuentabella, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph Estrada held an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high crimes.”  The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Suplico, Zamora and Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance with Section 3 (2) of Article XI of the Constitution, which provides the substantial rules in initiating impeachment cases.The House on Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint, or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Teodoro, Jr. and Fuentabella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by the abovementioned House Resolution.Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint was unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”On their comments on the petitions, respondent House of Representatives through Speaker De Venecia and/or its co-respondents, submitted a Manifestation asserting the Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases.The Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Drilon, also filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it.Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a “Petition for Leave to Intervene,” questioning the status quo Resolution issued by the Court on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and the Court in a “constitutional deadlock” and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.  Several motions for intervention were filed and were granted thereafter.Issue: Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and whether or not it should be exercised by the Court at this time.Held: The matters will be discussed in seriatim.

1.    Judicial ReviewThe Supreme Court’s power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Sec. 1, Art. VII of our present 1987 Constitution, the second paragraph of which states:“Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.Citing the case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission, the Court expounded on the power of judicial review stating that “…in cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof… when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them…”This “moderating power” to “determine the proper allocation of powers” of the different branches of the government and “to direct the course of government along constitutional channels” is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is “the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.”“The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government… The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government… And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.” (Angara vs. Electoral Commission)Ensuring the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by “any branch or instrumentalities of government,” former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion, in his sponsorship speech, even states that such power “…is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.”2.    Essential Requisites for Judicial ReviewThe court’s power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.a.    StandingLocus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will

sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury.  On the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest and transcendental importance.There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.Standing is a special concern of the constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters who actually sue in the public interest.  Hence, the question is whether such parties have “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”On the other hand, the question as to “real-party-in-interest” is whether he is “the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the ‘party entitled to the avails of the suit.’”While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice.  On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights – as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession – which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have been met have been given standing in this Court.When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal.  He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.  It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.  In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that pubic money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.  Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the

enforcement of the questioned statute or contract.  It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.As for the legislator, the Court allowed him to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.  Indeed a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.An association has legal personality to represent its members, especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests.  In class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit, for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the court.With respect to motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court of an officer thereof.  While intervention is not a matter of right, the courts may permit it when the applicant shows facts that satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.In this case, the Court granted motions to intervene except that of intervenor Soriano, who asserts an interest as a taxpayer but failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer’s suit.  In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners would result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose.  Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.b.    Ripeness and PrematurityFor a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, “it is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture.”  Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate proceeding.The instant petitions raise the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned.  The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e. the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit, has been complied with.c.    JusticiabilityPolitical questions are “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.”  It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Citing Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner: “…The powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judiciary.  Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others.  Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice… courts of justice determine the limits of powers of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers.  The judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction.  This is not only a judicial power but also a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature…” a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of the political law doctrine.The determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.  If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.  This Court thus now applies this standard to the present controversy.The Court held that it has no jurisdiction over the issue that goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint.  More importantly, any discussion of this would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense.  Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.On the other hand, issues regarding the constitutionality of Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, as a result thereof, barring the second impeachment complaint under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution, constitute the very lis mota or crux of the instant controversy.3.    ConclusionThis Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned.  The Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of the judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land.  What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government.  Face-to-face with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Court’s jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.  Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions.  Because it not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.

The Court, therefore, held sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001, are unconstitutional.  Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which was filed on October 23, 2003, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.Personal Observation: This is a very recent case.  Everything I learned regarding jurisdiction is consistent to the principles applied in the case.Generally, if the case is not justiciable, even if the court has the power and authority to hear and decide the case, the court will refuse to decide or exercise its jurisdiction.  To be the subject of control of the court, 3 elements must be present:1.      Actual controversy;2.     A case must be ripe for adjudication;3.      Parties to the case must have legal standing.These three were given and were exhaustively explained in the case above.Also, there are 2 Phases of Judicial Power:1.      Settlement of actual claims between two opposing claims or rights;2.      Duty to check acts of government done with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.The present controversy falls under the second phase since, as the Court explained, it involves a genuine constitutional issue, which this Court has the right and duty to adjudicate.

Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzales and National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008

D E C I S I O N(En Banc)

PUNO, J.:

I.      THE FACTS

As a consequence of the public release of copies of the “Hello Garci” compact disc audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the National Bureau of Investigation to go after media organizations “found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.” 

Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned in a press release all radio stations and TV network owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and permits issued to them by government like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that they shall not use their stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation. The NTC stated that the continuous airing or broadcast of the “Hello Garci” taped conversations by radio and TV stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority.  It warned that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments.

Subsequently, a dialogue was held between the NTC and the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) which resulted in the issuance of a Joint Press Statement which stated, among others, that the supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and handled responsibly.

Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner has the legal standing/ proper party.

HELD: THE PROCEDURAL THRESHOLD: LEGAL STANDING To be sure, the circumstances of this case make the constitutional challenge peculiar. Petitioner, who is not a member of the broadcast media, prays that we strike down the acts and statements made by respondents as violations of

the right to free speech, free expression and a free press. For another, the recipients of the press statements have not come forward—neither intervening nor joining petitioner in this action. Indeed, as a group, they issued a joint statement with respondent NTC that does not complain about restraints on freedom of the press. It would seem, then, that petitioner has not met the requisite legal standing, having failed to allege “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the Court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” [19]         But as early as half a century ago, we have already held that where serious constitutional questions are involved, “the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside if we must, technicalities of procedure.” [20] Subsequently, this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest,[21] in keeping with the Court's duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them.  Thus, in line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi when a case involves an issue of overarching significance to our society,[22] we therefore brush aside technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of this petition,[23] seeing as it involves a challenge to the most exalted of all the civil rights, the freedom of expression. The petition raises other issues like the extent of the right to information of the public. It is fundamental, however, that we need not address all issues but only the most decisive one which in the case at bar is whether the acts of the respondents abridge freedom of speech and of the press. But aside from the primordial issue of determining whether free speech and freedom of the press have been infringed, the case at bar also gives this Court the opportunity: (1) to distill the essence of freedom of speech  and of the press now beclouded by the vagaries of motherhood statements; (2) to clarify the types of speeches and their differing restraints allowed by law; (3) to discuss the core concepts of prior restraint, content-neutral and content-based regulations and their constitutional standard of review; (4) to examine the historical difference in the treatment of restraints between print and broadcast media and stress the standard of review governing both; and (5) to call attention to the ongoing blurring of the lines of distinction between print and broadcast media.

Senate vs. Ermita

G.R. No. 169777, July 14, 2006

• Requisites of Judicial Review• Legislative Inquiry vs. Executive Privilege• Executive Privilege, defined• Kinds of Executive Privilege• Executive Privilege as applied to an official• Constitutionality of EO 464

FACTS:

This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.

The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to “afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation.” Senate refused the request.

On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated that “all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court marshal for such attendance.

Hence, these petitions.

ISSUES:• Whether or not EO 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in

Congress• Whether or not EO 464 violates the right of the people to

information on matters of public concern• Whether or not respondents have committed grave abuse of

discretion when they implemented EO 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation

RULING:

ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:1. there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of

judicial power;

2. the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;

3. the question of constitutionality must be raised as the earliest opportunity; and

4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

LEGAL STANDING

Standing of the Senate

That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public decision-making in a democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation is not disputed. EO 464, however, allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access information that is crucial to law-making. Verily, the Senate, including its individual members, has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to assail the constitutionality of EO 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.

Standing of an ordinary citizen

It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders and other regulations must be direct and personal. In Francisco v. House of Representatives, this Court held that when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

Requisites for transcendental importance: Establish (1) the character of the funds (that it is public) or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, and (3) the lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.

GARCILLANO vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (G.R. No. 170338 , December 23, 2008)

FACTS-Garcillano (in G.R. No. 170338) filed a Petition for Prohibition to restrain the House Representatives Committees from using the tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings. -Ranada and Agcaoili (in G.R. No. 179275), retired justices of the CA, filed a Petition for Prohibition to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution. -Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the resource persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.18

While both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have different objectives–the first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.ISSUES

(1) WON petitioners have legal standing. [YES](2) WON there is an actual case or controversy. [NO: against the House of

Rep. YES: against the Senate]HELD (The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.)LOCUS STANDIGeneral Rule: Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act x x x," thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Exception/Liberal application: However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo articulates that a "liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.Garcillano = direct injury. Ranada and Agcaoili = concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. Intervenor Sagge = alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.

Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due process, they satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all.34

Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge.ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSYVersus House of RepresentativesCourt dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic . Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies. By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale. It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced. The Court notes that the recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members .  There is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees. Having been overtaken by these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.

Versus the SenateAs to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.

ANAK MINDANAO PARTYLIST VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Petitioners Anak Mindanao Party-List Group (AMIN) and Mamalo Descendants Organization, Inc. (MDOI) assail the constitutionality of Executive Order (E.O.) Nos. 364 and 379, both issued in 2004, via the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief.           E.O. No. 364, which President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued on September 27, 2004, reads:  EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 364 TRANSFORMING THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM WHEREAS, one of the five reform packages of the Arroyo administration is Social Justice and Basic [N]eeds; WHEREAS, one of the five anti-poverty measures for social justice is asset reform; WHEREAS, asset reforms covers [sic] agrarian reform, urban land reform, and ancestral domain reform; WHEREAS, urban land reform is a concern of the Presidential Commission [for] the Urban Poor (PCUP) and ancestral domain reform is a concern of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP); WHEREAS, another of the five reform packages of the Arroyo administration is Anti-Corruption and Good Government; WHEREAS, one of the Good Government reforms of the Arroyo administration is rationalizing the bureaucracy by consolidating related functions into one department; WHEREAS, under law and jurisprudence, the President of the Philippines has broad powers to reorganize the offices under her supervision and control; NOW[,] THEREFORE[,] I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, by the powers vested in me as President of the Republic of the Philippines, do hereby order: SECTION 1. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby transformed into the Department of Land Reform.  It shall be responsible for all land reform in the country, including agrarian reform, urban land reform, and ancestral domain reform. SECTION 2. The PCUP is hereby placed under the supervision and control of the Department of Land Reform.  The Chairman of the PCUP shall be ex-officio Undersecretary of the Department of Land Reform for Urban Land Reform. 

SECTION 3.  The NCIP is hereby placed under the supervision and control of the Department of Land Reform.  The Chairman of the NCIP shall be ex-officio Undersecretary of the Department of Land Reform for Ancestral Domain Reform.  SECTION 4. The PCUP and the NCIP shall have access to the services provided by the Department’s Finance, Management and Administrative Office; Policy, Planning and Legal Affairs Office, Field Operations and Support Services Office, and all other offices of the Department of Land Reform. SECTION 5. All previous issuances that conflict with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. SECTION 6. This Executive Order takes effect immediately. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)  E.O. No. 379, which amended E.O. No. 364 a month later or on October 26, 2004, reads: EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 379 AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 364 ENTITLED TRANSFORMING THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM             WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 8371 created the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples;             WHEREAS, pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987, the President has the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the National Government.             NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and existing laws, do hereby order:             Section 1. Amending Section 3 of Executive Order No. 364. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 364, dated September 27, 2004 shall now read as follows: “Section 3. The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall be an attached agency of the Department of Land Reform.”              Section 2. Compensation. The Chairperson shall suffer no diminution in rank and salary.              Section 3. Repealing Clause. All executive issuances, rules and regulations or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby revoked, amended or modified accordingly.

             Section 4. Effectivity.  This Executive Order shall take effect immediately. 

 Held[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct

and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. (Anak Mindanao Party-List Group vs. Executive Secretary, GR 166052, 29August 2007; En Banc, Carpio-Morales J,)

be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance, Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita [G.R.No. 169777, April 20, 2006, 488 SCRA 1] requires that the following elements must be established: (1) the public character of the funds or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of government, and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. [Moreover,] Francisco, Jr. v. Fernando [G.R. No. 166501, November 16, 2006, 507 SCRA 173] more specifically declares that the transcendental importance of the issues raised must relate to the merits of the petition. (Anak Mindanao Party-List Group vs. Executive Secretary, GR 166052, 29 August 2007; En Banc,Carpio-Morales J,

ASEAN Pacific Planters vs City of Urdaneta

FACTS:

The instant petition seeks to set aside the Resolutions[1] dated April 15, 2003 and February 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76170.This case stemmed from a Complaint[2] for annulment of contracts with prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction and temporary restraining order filed by respondent Waldo C. Del Castillo, in his capacity as taxpayer, against respondents City of Urdaneta and Ceferino J. Capalad doing business under the name JJEFWA Builders, and petitioners Asean Pacific Planners (APP) represented by Ronilo G. Goco and Asean Pacific Planners Construction and Development Corporation (APPCDC) represented by Cesar D. Goco.Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City Mayor Rodolfo E. Parayno entered into five contracts for the preliminary design, construction and management of a four-storey twin cinema commercial center and hotel involving a massive expenditure of public funds amounting to P250 million, funded by a loan from the Philippine National Bank (PNB).  For minimal work, the contractor was allegedly paid P95 million.  Del Castillo also claimed that all the contracts are void because the object is outside the commerce of men.  The object is a piece of land belonging to the public domain and which remains devoted to a public purpose as a public elementary school.  Additionally, he claimed that the contracts, from the feasibility study to management and lease of the future building, are also void because they were all awarded solely to the Goco family.In their Answer,[3] APP and APPCDC claimed that the contracts are valid.  Urdaneta City Mayor Amadeo R. Perez, Jr., who filed the city’s Answer,[4] joined in the defense and asserted that the contracts were properly executed by then Mayor Parayno with prior authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod.  Mayor Perez also stated that Del Castillo has no legal capacity to sue and that the complaint states no cause of action.  For respondent Ceferino J. Capalad, Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun filed an Answer[5] with compulsory counterclaim and motion to dismiss on the ground that Del Castillo has no legal standing to sue.Respondents Norberto M. Del Prado, Jesus A. Ordono and Aquilino Maguisa became parties to the case when they jointly filed, also in their capacity as taxpayers, a Complaint-in-Intervention[6] adopting the allegations of Del Castillo.

HELD:On the first point at issue, petitioners argue that a taxpayer may only

sue where the act complained of directly involves illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.  The allegation of respondents Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa that the construction of the project is funded by the PNB loan contradicts the claim regarding illegal disbursement since the funds are not directly derived from taxation. Respondents Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa counter that their personality to sue was not raised by petitioners APP and APPCDC in their Answer and that this issue was not even discussed in the RTC’s assailed orders.Petitioners’ contentions lack merit.  The RTC properly allowed the taxpayers’ suits.  In Public Interest Center, Inc.  v. Roxas,[23] we held:In the case of taxpayers’ suits, the party suing as a taxpayer must prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation.  Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim

that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.x x x xPetitioners’ allegations in their Amended Complaint that the loan contracts entered into by the Republic and NPC are serviced or paid through a disbursement of public funds are not disputed by respondents, hence, they are invested with personality to institute the same.[24]Here, the allegation of taxpayers Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa that P95 million of the P250 million PNB loan had already been paid for minimal work is sufficient allegation of overpayment, of illegal disbursement, that invests them with personality to sue.  Petitioners do not dispute the allegation as they merely insist, albeit erroneously, that public funds are not involved.  Under Article 1953[25] of the Civil Code, the city acquired ownership of the money loaned from PNB, making the money public fund.  The city will have to pay the loan by revenues raised from local taxation or by its internal revenue allotment.In addition, APP and APPCDC’s lack of objection in their Answer on the personality to sue of the four complainants constitutes waiver to raise the objection under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.[26]On the second point, petitioners contend that only the City Prosecutor can represent Urdaneta City and that law and jurisprudence prohibit the appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm as the city’s counsel.The Lazaro Law Firm, as the city’s counsel, counters that the city was inutile defending its cause before the RTC for lack of needed legal advice.   The city has no legal officer and both City Prosecutor and Provincial Legal Officer are busy.  Practical considerations also dictate that the city and Mayor Perez must have the same counsel since he faces related criminal cases.  Citing Mancenido v. Court of Appeals,[27] the law firm states that hiring private counsel is proper where rigid adherence to the law on representation would deprive a party of his right to redress a valid grievance.[28]We cannot agree with the Lazaro Law Firm.  Its appearance as Urdaneta City’s counsel is against the law as it provides expressly who should represent it.  The City Prosecutor should continue to represent the city.Section 481(a)[29] of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991[30] mandates the appointment of a city legal officer.  Under Section 481(b)(3)(i)[31] of the LGC, the city legal officer is supposed to represent the city in all civil actions, as in this case, and special proceedings wherein the city or any of its officials is a party.  In Ramos v. Court of Appeals,[32] we cited that under Section 19[33] of Republic Act No. 5185,[34] city governments may already create the position of city legal officer to whom the function of the city fiscal (now prosecutor) as legal adviser and officer for civil cases of the city shall be transferred.[35]  In the case of Urdaneta City, however, the position of city legal officer is still vacant, although its charter[36] was enacted way back in 1998.Because of such vacancy, the City Prosecutor’s appearance as counsel of Urdaneta City is proper.  The City Prosecutor remains as the city’s legal adviser and officer for civil cases, a function that could not yet be transferred to the city legal officer.  Under the circumstances, the RTC should not have allowed the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm vice the City

Prosecutor.  Notably, the city’s Answer was sworn to before the City Prosecutor by Mayor Perez.  The City Prosecutor prepared the city’s pre-trial brief and represented the city in the pre-trial conference.  No question was raised against the City Prosecutor’s actions until the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance and claimed that the city lacked adequate legal representation.          Moreover, the appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm as counsel for Urdaneta City is against the law.  Section 481(b)(3)(i) of the LGC provides when a special legal officer may be employed, that is, in actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government.  But this case is not between Urdaneta City and the Province of Pangasinan.  And we have consistently held that a local government unit cannot be represented by private counsel[37] as only public officers may act for and in behalf of public entities and public funds should not be spent to hire private lawyers.[38]  Pro bono representation in collaboration with the municipal attorney and prosecutor has not even been allowed.[39]Neither is the law firm’s appearance justified under the instances listed in Mancenido when local government officials can be represented by private counsel, such as when a claim for damages could result in personal liability.  No such claim against said officials was made in this case.  Note that before it joined the complainants, the city was the one sued, not its officials.  That the firm represents Mayor Perez in criminal cases, suits in his personal capacity,[40] is of no moment.

ANAKBAYAN VS AQUINO

Facts:·         Petitioners, as non-government orgs, congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers, filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition seeking to compel

respondents, Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino, et al., to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.·         The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by the Philippines with another country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics which includes trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business environment, and general and final provisions.·         Petitioners emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement violates their right to information on matters of public concern and of public interest. That the non-disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to effective and reasonable participation in all levels of social, political and economic decision making.·         Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the ground that the matter sought involves a diplomatic negotiation then in progress, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full disclosure of matters that are of public concern like the JPEPA -  that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege.Issues:Procedural Issues:1. Do the therein petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus in their capacity as citizens of the Republic, as taxpayers, and as members of the Congress?2. Whether the petition has been entirely rendered moot and academic because of the subsequent event that occurred.

Held/Ratio:(Procedural)1. YES. The right of people to information on matters of public concern is a public right by its very nature so petitioners need not show that they have any legal or special interest in the result. It is enough that they are part of the general public who possess the right. Since in the present position is anchored on the right of information and the petitioners are suing in their capacity as citizens, citizen-groups, petitioner-members of the House of Rep, their standing to file the present suit is grounded on jurisprudence.2. NOT ENTIRELY. The Supreme Court ruled that the principal relief petitioners are praying for is the disclosure of the contents of the JPEPA prior to its finalization between the two States parties,” public disclosure of the text of the JPEPA after its signing by the President, during the pendency of the present petition, has been largely rendered moot and academic. The text of the JPEPA having then been made accessible to the public, the petition has become moot and academic to the extent that it seeks the disclosure of the “full text” thereof. The petition is not entirely moot, however, because petitioners seek to obtain, not merely the text of the JPEPA, but also the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.

Planters Products Inc vs Fertiphil Corp G.R. No. 166006 March 14, 2008FACTS: Petitioner PPI and respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated under Philippine laws, both engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals.Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) 1465, imposing a capital recovery component of Php10.00 per bag of fertilizer. The levy was to continue until

adequate capital was raised to make PPI financially viable. Fertiphil remitted to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), which was then remitted the depository bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from 1985 to 1986.After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amount it remitted, however PPI refused. Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages, questioning the constitutionality of LOI 1465, claiming that it was unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process. PPI argues that Fertiphil has no locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 because it does not have a "personal and substantial interest in the case or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement." It asserts that Fertiphil did not suffer any damage from the imposition because "incidence of the levy fell on the ultimate consumer or the farmers themselves, not on the seller fertilizer company.

ISSUE: Whether or not Fertiphil has locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465.What is the power of taxation?

RULING: Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine of standing is a mere procedural technicality which may be waived.The imposition of the levy was an exercise of the taxation power of the state. While it is true that the power to tax can be used as an implement of police power, the primary purpose of the levy was revenue generation. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax.Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the State. These powers are distinct and have different tests for validity. Police power is the power of the State to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare, while the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes to be used for public purpose. The main purpose of police power is the regulation of a behavior or conduct, while taxation is revenue generation. The "lawful subjects" and "lawful means" tests are used to determine the validity of a law enacted under the police power. The power of taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and constitutional limitations.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque III(Austria-Martinez, October 9, 2007)

Nature: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. CertiorariPetitioner: Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the PhilippinesRespondents: DOH Sec. Francisco Duque III, DOH Undersecretaries Dr. Ethelyn Nieto, Dr. Margarita Galon, Atty. Alexander Padilla and Dr. Jade Del Mundo; and Asst. Secretaries Dr. Mario Villaverde, Dr. David Lozada and Dr. Nemesio Gako

Facts:- Executive Order No. 51 (The Milk Code - TMC) was issued by Pres.

Aquino on Oct. 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to her under the Freedom Constitution.(1) One of the preambular clauses of TMC – the law seeks to give

effect to Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substituttes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the WHA (World Health Assembly) in 1981.

- In 1990, the Philippine ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Art. 24 of the instrument mandates that States should take measure to diminish infant mortality and should ensure that all segments of society are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding.

- From 1982 – 2006, the WHA adopted several resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.

- May 15, 2006 – DOH issues the assailed RIRR (Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of E.O. 51 or A.O. No. 2006-0012) which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. – The RIRR imposes a ban on all advertisements of breastmilk substitutes

- June 28, 2006 – Petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO or Writ of Preliminary injunction.

- August 15, 2006 – the Court issued a Resolution granting the TRO, enjoining the respondents from implementing the assailed RIRR.

- Petitioner assails the RIRR for going beyond the provisions of TMC thereby amending and expanding the coverage of the said law.

- DOH meanwhile contends that the RIRR implements not only TMC but also various international instruments regarding infant and young child nutrition. They posit that the said international instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore may be implemented by the DOH in the RIRR.

ISSU: W/n the petitioner is the real party in interest?

HELD: Yes.- An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of

direct interest of its members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents. (Exec Sec vs CA)

- The Court has rules that an association has the legal personality to represent its members because the results of the case will affect their vital interests. (Purok Bagong Silang Association Inc. vs. Yuipco)

- In the petitioner’s Amended Articles of Incorporation, it states that the association is formed “to represent directly or through approved representatives the pharmaceutical and health care industry before the Philippine Government and any of its agencies, the medical professions and the general public.”

- Therefore, the petitioner, as an organization, has an interest in fulfilling its avowed purpose of representing members who are part of the pharmaceutical and health care industry. Petitioner is duly authorized to bring to the attention of the government agencies and courts any grievance suffered by its members which are directly affected by the assailed RIRR.

- The petitioner, whose legal identity is deemed fused with its members, should be considered as a legal party-in-interest which stands to be benefited or injured by any judgment in the case.

MAMBA VS LARA

The decision to entertain a taxpayer’s suit is discretionary upon the Court.  It can choose to strictly apply the rule or take a liberal stance depending on the controversy involved.  Advocates for a strict application of the rule believe that leniency would open floodgates to numerous suits, which could hamper the

government from performing its job. Such possibility, however, is not only remote but also negligible compared to what is at stake - “the lifeblood of the State”.  For this reason, when the issue hinges on the illegal disbursement of public funds, a liberal approach should be preferred as it is more in keeping with truth and justice.             This Petition for Review on Certiorari with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to set aside the April 27, 2004 Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5, Tuguegarao City, dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Contracts and Injunction with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction,[2] docketed as Civil Case No. 6283.  Likewise assailed in this Petition is the August 20, 2004 Resolution[3] of RTC, Branch 1, Tuguegarao City denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal. Factual Antecedents On November 5, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan passed Resolution No. 2001-272[4] authorizing Governor Edgar R. Lara (Gov. Lara) to engage the services of and appoint Preferred Ventures Corporation as financial advisor or consultant for the issuance and flotation of bonds to fund the priority projects of the governor without cost and commitment. On November 19, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, through Resolution No. 290-2001,[5] ratified the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)[6] entered into by Gov. Lara and Preferred Ventures Corporation. The MOA provided that the provincial government of Cagayan shall pay Preferred Ventures Corporation a one-time fee of 3% of the amount of bonds floated.On February 15, 2002, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved Resolution No. 2002-061-A[7] authorizing Gov. Lara to negotiate, sign and execute contracts or agreements pertinent to the flotation of the bonds of the provincial government in an amount not to exceed P500 million for the construction and improvement of priority projects to be approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. On May 20, 2002, the majority of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan approved Ordinance No. 19-2002,[8] authorizing the bond flotation of the provincial government in an amount not to exceed P500 million to fund the construction and development of the new Cagayan Town Center.  The Resolution likewise granted authority to Gov. Lara to negotiate, sign and execute contracts and agreements necessary and related to the bond flotation subject to the approval and ratification by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. On October 20, 2003, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved Resolution No. 350-2003[9] ratifying the Cagayan Provincial Bond Agreements entered into by the provincial government, represented by Gov. Lara, to wit: 

a.               Trust Indenture with the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) – Trust and Investment Division and Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. (MICO). b.              Deed of Assignment by way of security with the RCBC and the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). c.               Transfer and Paying Agency Agreement with the RCBC – Trust and Investment Division. d.             Guarantee Agreement with the RCBC – Trust and Investment Division and MICO. e.               Underwriting Agreement with RCBC Capital Corporation. On even date, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan also approved Resolution No. 351-2003,[10] ratifying the Agreement for the Planning, Design,  Construction, and Site Development of the New Cagayan Town Center[11] entered into by the provincial government,  represented by Gov. Lara and Asset Builders Corporation,  represented by its President, Mr. Rogelio P. Centeno. On May 20, 2003, Gov. Lara issued the Notice of Award to Asset Builders Corporation, giving to the latter the planning, design, construction and site development of the town center project for a fee of P213,795,732.39.[12] ISSUE: WON the petitioner is a proper party.

Held:A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are

illegally disbursed, or that the public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. A person suing as a taxpayer, however, must show that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. He must also prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury because of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. In other words, for a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites must be met: (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act.In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that contrary to the view of the RTC, a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity. As long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question contracts entered into by the government.In this case, although the construction of the town center would be primarily sourced from the proceeds of the bonds, which respondents insist are not taxpayer’s money, a government support in the amount of P187 million would still be spent for paying the interest of the bonds. In fact, a Deed of Assignment

was executed by the governor in favor of respondent RCBC over the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) and other revenues of the provincial government as payment and/or security for the obligations of the provincial government under the Trust Indenture Agreement dated September 17, 2003. Records also show that on March 4, 2004, the governor requested the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to appropriate an amount of P25 million for the interest of the bond. Clearly, the first requisite has been met.As to the second requisite, the court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent “direct injury test” bearing in mind that locus standi is a procedural technicality. By invoking “transcendental importance”, “paramount public interest”, or “far-reaching implications”, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to sue even if they failed to show direct injury.  In cases where serious legal issues were raised or where public expenditures of millions of pesos were involved, the court did not hesitate to give standing to taxpayers.  Manuel Mamba, et al. vs. Edgar R. Lara, et al., G.R. No. 165109, December 14, 2009.