Legaspi v CSC 150 SCRA 530 (1987) Facts: The petitioner invokes his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern in a special civil action for mandamus against the CSC pertaining to the information of civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. The standing of the petitioner was challenged by the Solicitor General of being devoid of legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of government employees for failure of petitioner to provide actual interest to secure the information sought. Issue: Whether or not petitioner may invoke his constitutional right to information in the case at bar. Held: The court held that when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. The Constitution provides the guarantee of adopting policy of full public disclosure subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law as in regulation in the manner of examining the public records by the government agency in custody thereof. But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security. The court delves into determining whether the information sought for by the petitioner is of public interest. All appointments in the Civil Service Commission are made according to merit and fitness while a public office is a public trust. Public employees therefore are accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities to their positions in the government. The court also noted that the information on the result of the CSC eligibility examination is released to the public therefore the request of petitioner is one that is not unusual or unreasonable. The public, through any citizen, has the right to verify the civil eligibilities of any person occupying government positions.

Aquino-Sarmiento v Morato 203 SCRA 515 (1991) FACTS: At issue in this petition is the citizen's right of access to official records as guaranteed by the constitution. In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or classified accordingly. Acting on the said request, the records officer informed petitioner that she has to secure prior clearance from respondent Manuel Morato, as chairman of MTRCB, to gain access to the records sought to be examined. Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely private and personal. It is the submission of respondents that the individual voting slips is the exclusive property of the member concerned and anybody who wants access thereto must first secure his (the member's) consent, otherwise, a request therefor may be legally denied. Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the records she wishes to examine are public in character and other than providing for reasonable conditions regulating the manner and hours of examination, respondents Morato and the classification board have no authority to deny any citizen seeking examination of the board's records. On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting,seventeen (17) members of the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter, respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips. However, it was only much later,i e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members respondent Morato told the board that he has ordered some deletions on the movie "Mahirap ang Magmahal" notwithstanding the fact that said movie was earlier approved for screening by the Board with classification "R-18 without cuts". He explained that his power to unilaterally change the decision of the Review Committee is authorized by virtue of MTRCB Resolution No. 88-1-25 (dated June 22,1988) which allows the chairman of the board "to downgrade a film (already) reviewed especially those which are controversial." Petitioner informed the Board, however, that respondent Morato possesses no authority to unilaterally reverse a decision of the review committee under PD 1986 (Creating the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board).After the matter was referred by the Deputy Executive Secretary to the Justice Secretary, the latter opined that PD 1896 does not vest respondent Morato any authority to unilaterally

reverse the decision of the review committee but declined to comment on the constitutionality of Res. No. 10-89 on the ground that the resolution thereof is a judicial prerogative Petitioner therefore seeks the nullification of 1) MTRCB Resolution No. 88-1-25 which allows the Chairman of the Board to unilaterally downgrade a film (already)reviewed especially those which are controversial and 2)MTRCB RESOLUTION No. 10-89 (dated July 27,1989) declaring as strictly confidential, private and personal a) the decision of a reviewing committee which previously reviewed a certain film and b) the individual voting slips of the members of the committee that reviewed the film RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Resolution Nos. 10-89 and 88-1-25 issued by the respondent Board are hereby declared null and void.SO ORDERED.As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is character; it is an office created to serve public interest. It being the case,respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties (See Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.,supra. ) There can be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is sought to be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of performing official functions.MTRCB,pertaining to the decisions of the review committee as well as the individual voting slips of its members, as violative of petitioner's constitutional right of access to public records. More specifically, Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution provides that:The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.individual voting slip is their individual vote of conscience on the motion picture or television program and as such, makes the individual voting slip purely private and personal; an exclusive property of the member concerned.The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person, company, or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or community at large".

Valmonte v De Villa 170 SCRA 256 (1989) Facts: On 1/20/87, the NCRDC was activated w/ the mission of conducting security operations w/in its area or responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political dev't of the NCR. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela and MM. Petitioners aver that, bec. of the institution of said checkpoints, the Valenzuela residents are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, w/o a SW and/ or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when Benjamin Parpon, was gaunned down allegedly in cold blood by members of the NCRDC for ignoring and/ or continuing to speed off inspite of warning shots fired in the air. HELD: Petitioner''s concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se, illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners'' rights against unlawful search and seizure of other rights. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those w/c are reasonable are not forbidden. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt, in the interest of public security. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconveninece, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, et al. v. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962, 14 October 2008, EN BANC, (Carpio Morales, J.) While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international law, the government’s act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective. FACTS: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government‘s policy of pursuing peace negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to convince the MILF to continue negotiating with the government. MILF, thereafter, convened its Central Committee and decided to meet with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal peace talks were held in Libya which resulted to the crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) which consists of three (3) aspects: a.) security aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect; and c.) ancestral domain aspect. Various negotiations were held which led to the finalization of the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The said memorandum was set to be signed last August 5, 2008. In its body, it grants ―the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in addition, has the freedom to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relation with foreign countries. ―The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD further provides for the extent of the territory of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.‖ With regard to governance, on the other hand, a shared responsibility and authority between the Central Government and BJE was provided. The relationship was described as ―associative‖. With the formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation and finalization of the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation, as mandated by Executive Order No. 3, and right to information. They further contend that it violates the Constitution and laws. Hence, the filing of the petition.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and right to information

2. Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the Constitution and the laws HELD: 1. The MOA-AD is a public concern and should comply with the constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and right to information The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Intended as a ―splendid symmetry‖ to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution which provides that subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. Moreover, the policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people‘s right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the people. Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for ―reasonable safeguards.‖ The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that the broader right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy.

An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people‘s will. Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms. The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the ―marching orders‖ to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the people‘s participation. One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it ―should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos‖ and ―shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community.‖ Included as a component of the comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and empowerment for peace, which includes ―continuing consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people‘s participation in the peace process. Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate “continuing” consultations, contrary to respondents’ position that plebiscite is “more than sufficient consultation. Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to ―[c]onduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the progress of the comprehensive peace process.‖ E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to be ―the principal forum for the Presidential Adviser on Peace Progress (PAPP) to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives.‖ In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners’ right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure.

2. The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind. Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government. 4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. The nature of the ―associative‖ relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of ―association‖ in international law, and the MOA-AD - by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR- placed itself in an international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term ―associative‖ in the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE‘s capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE‘s participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE‘s right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them.

These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution. No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an ―associative‖ relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD‘s provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X: SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it - which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association -runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the M OA-AD on the

formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that ―[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.‖ The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term ―autonomous region‖ in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite - Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal - are automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE. Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional provision states: ―The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development.‖ An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity. Besides being irreconcilable with the constitution, the MOA-AD is also inconsistent with prevailing statutory law, among which are R.A. 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the

Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process. In Re: Rodolfo Manzano Posted on December 8, 2012 Facts: Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to a Presidential Order. He petitioned that his membership in the Committee will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial region and as a member of judiciary. Issue: What is an administrative agency? Where does it draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned? Ruling: The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the Judiciary to any agency performing Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions (Sec.12,Art.VIII, 1987 Constitution). Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of any Administrative Agency which adjudicates disputes & controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct & affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the

policy of the Legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence. “Administrative functions” as used in Sec. 12 refers to the Government’s executive machinery and its performance of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control. In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez: Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence “we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. A member of the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants-or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.

Angara vs. Electoral Commission Digested Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139 DOCTRINE OF SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION FACTS: In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case. ISSUES: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative, RULING: In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral

Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution. Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby denied, with cost against the petitioner.

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENTADMINISTRATION (POEA)166 SCRA 533, G.R. No. 76633, October 18, 1988Petitioner: Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. Respondents: Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)2. Minister of Labor and Employment3. Abdul Basar (Hearing Officer)4. Kathleen D. Saco Ponente: Cruz, J. Facts: Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan on March 15, 1985.His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Fund Insurance. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favour of the complainant. The petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered. Issue: 1. Whether or not the POEA had jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseasworker.2. Whether or not the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principleof non-delegation of legislative power. Held: 1. Yes. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive OrderNo. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen." These cases, according to the 1985Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include, “claims for death, disability and other benefits” arising out of such employment. The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No.

2, which became effective on February 1,1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment.2. No. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative PowerThere are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislativepower, viz , the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the lawmust be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when itreaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficientstandard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative. The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception. Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to reasonably comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields. Power of Subordinate Legislation The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general

provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of subordinate legislation.” With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in statute by “filling in” the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. Administrative agencies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and quasi- judicial. The first enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and thesecond enables them to interpret and apply such regulations.

Case Digest: Dante O. Casibang vs. Honorable Narciso A. Aquino 20 August 1979 FACTS: Yu was proclaimed on November 1971 as the elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan. Casibang, his only rival, filed a protest against election on the grounds of rampant vote buying, anomalies and irregularities and others. During the proceedings of this case, the 1973 Constitution came into effect. Respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of the petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the new Constitution and the new parliamentary form of government. ISSUES: 1. Whether Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution rendered the protest moot and academic; and

2. Whether Section 2, Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure. RULING: 1. As stated in Santos vs. Castaneda, “the constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest" and that "subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect's right to the contested office.” 2. Section 2 of Article XI does not stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a political color. For simply, that section allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact a local government code "which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority of all its Members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government allocating among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for their qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units" but "... any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose."

Belgica et. Al. v Ochoa, Jr. et. Al. November 19, 2013 G.R. No. 208566 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Local Government – Invalid Delegation Legislative Department – Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power

This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.

The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).

Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:

a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard projects” (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);

b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;

c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.

The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.

Presidential Pork Barrel

The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.

Pork Barrel Scam Controversy

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their prok barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.

Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.

II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.

HELD:

I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:

a. Separation of Powers

As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).

This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the prepossess of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.

Exceptions to the rule are:

(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;

(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.

c. Principle of Checks and Balances

One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”

d. Local Autonomy As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass

or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.

II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.

The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:

No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.

The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:

(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may direct;

(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.

These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

Sanidad v Comelec Facts On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. On 22 September 1976, the President issued another PD 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. The President also issued PD 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976National Referendum-Plebiscite. Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect PD 991, 1033 and 1031. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution. Another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed by Raul M. Gonzales, his son, and Alfredo Salapantan, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees. Issue: W/N the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution. Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention

or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof provides that" Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the approval of such amendment or revision."In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article 16 hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation: period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it.In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it

by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

Daza V. Singson Case: Daza was chosen to be part of the Commission of Appointments andwas listed as representative of the Liberal Party. LDP was reorganized and 24 members from the Liberal Party transferred to LDP. Because of this, the House of Representatives revised its representation by withdrawing the seat given to Daza and giving it to the newly-formedLDP. Singson was chosen to replace Daza, in accordance to proportional representation. Issues 1.Whether the reorganized LDP can be deemed a stable politicalparty 2.Whether it is necessary for the party to be registered to be entitled to proportional representation in the CA Held and Ratio: Both petitioner and respondent invoke the case of Cunanan v. Tan. In the said case, 25 Members of the Nacionalista Party reorganized themselves and formed the Allied Majority. 3 Nacionalista Congressmen, originally chosen, were deprived of their seats by colleagues who joined the Allied Majority. Carlos Cunanan’s ad interim appointment was rejected by the CA. Jorge Tan was designated in his place. Cunanan contended the validity of the rejection. The Court agreed that Allied Majority was merely a temporary combination; officially, they were still part of the Nacionalista Party. Thus, the reorganization of the CA at that time was not based on proportional representation. The Court held that mere shift of votes should not affect the organization of the CA, or else, it would forever be at the mercy of the House of Representatives. The petitioner argues that LDP is not a permanent party and has not yet achieved stability. However, the LDP has already been inexistence for a year. They command the biggest following. They not only survived but prevailed .Regarding being a duly registered party, the LDP was granted its registration as a political party by the COMELEC. Thus, shattering the argument of the petitioner that registration is required

ABAKADA Guro Party List v PurisimaG.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008 FACTS: 1.This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status 2. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Petitioners also assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers, for it permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law. ISSUE:WON the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional HELD: No. It is unconstitutional. In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J. Puno, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (e) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest. The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic

system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch. However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following: (1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation And (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries inaid of legislation. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in thisclass. Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution's diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.

Garcia v Executive Secretary On 27 November 1990, Cory issued Executive Order 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Sec 24 of Art 6 of the Constitution which provides: ” All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.” He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power of issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures. ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional. HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows: “(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.” There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President “subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .”

People V Vera Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power. HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation.

Eastern Shipping Lines v POEA Supra G.R. No. 77828 February 8, 1989 EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER CHERYL AMPIL and MA. LOURDES A. ZARAGOZA, respondents. FELICIANO, J.: This Petition for certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Decision dated 19 March 1987 of the public respondent Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), in POEA Case No. L-86-01-026. The pertinent facts follow: Manuel Zaragoza had been an employee of petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. ("Eastern") for several years, having served as engineer on board several of Eastern's vessels since 1973. At the time of his death on 18 September 1983, Manuel Zaragoza was in Kakogawa, Japan serving as Chief Engineer of the M/V Eastern Meteor, a vessel then owned by Freesia Shipping Company S.A. and chartered by Eastern. A Death Certificate 1issued by Dr. Masayuki Inoue of the Kakogawa Hospital stated that Zaragoza's death had been caused by "myocardial infarction." On 17 December 1985, Manuel Zaragoza's widow, private respondent Ma. Lourdes A. Zaragoza, filed with the public respondent POEA a formal Complaint 2 (docketed as POEA Case No. L-86-01-026) against Eastern, after the latter allegedly had refused to act favorably on the widow's claim for gratuity arising from the death of her husband. Mrs. Zaragoza alleged that the M/V Eastern Meteor having been registered with the Ministerio de Hacienda y Tesoro of the Republic of Panama at the time of her husband's death, she was entitled to receive from Eastern death benefits in the amount of P100,000.00 as provided under Memorandum Circular No. 71 issued on 18 November 1981 by the former National Seamen Board. Moral damages or P50,000.00 and attorney's fees were likewise sought by the widow. In its Answer, 3 Eastern alleged, among other things, that no cause of ac ' petition existed against it as the company had already paid Mrs. Zaragoza a cash benefit of P12,000.00 for the death of her husband and an amount of P5,000.00 for funeral expenses. Eastern further denied having incurred any additional liability under NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, alleging that "[the M/V Eastern Meteor] had been then also considered a vessel of the Philippine registry." Eastern assailed the jurisdiction of the POEA over the complaint, asserting that the company "is not engaged in overseas employment even as [it] admits that [its] vessels are ocean-going vessels." On 19 March 1987, public respondent POEA rendered a Decision 4 requiring petitioner to pay to private respondent Mrs. Zaragoza P88,000.00 as the

unpaid balance of her deceased husband's death benefits, and dismissing the claim for moral damages for want of jurisdiction. From this judgment, Eastern came directly to this Court. We issued a Temporary Restraining Order on 8 April 1987. 5 A preliminary point was raised by the Solicitor General in his Comment 6 on the Petition, that Eastern had failed to exhaust administrative remedies in this case i.e., that petitioner Company did not interpose an appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission before coming to this Court on certiorari. Inasmuch, however, as the petition at bar raises questions essentially legal in nature, we do not consider the same as having been prematurely filed with this Court. 7 We address first the issue of jurisdiction. Petitioner Company does not deny that Manuel Zaragoza was its employee at the time of his death on 18 September 1983. Petitioner would contend, however, that the company had neither been nor acted as an "overseas employer" of Manuel Zaragoza, and that the latter had never been its "overseas employee." Hence, petitioner concludes, private respondent's claim for death benefits should have been filed with the Social Security System, not with the POEA. The argument does not persuade. Applicable here and petitioner admits this in its Petition is Executive Order No. 797 (promulgated 1 May 1982), which abolished the former National Seamen Board and created in its place the present Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. Section 4 (a) of Executive Order No. 797 expressly provides that the POEA "shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen. " This provision is clarified substantially in the Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, Section 1 (d), Rule 1, Book VI of which provides that "claims for death, disability and other benefits arising out of [overseas] employment" fall within the POEA's original and exclusive jurisdiction. The following definitions contained in Section 1, Rule II, Book I of said POEA Rules and Regulations are also useful: g. Contract Worker-means any person working or who has worked overseas under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen. xxx xxx xxx x. Overseas Employment-means employment of a worker outside the Philippines, including employment on board vessels plying international waters, covered by a valid employment contract. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

We note that the statute and the relevant regulations refer to employment of Filipino workers overseas, i.e., outside the Philippines. The statute and regulations do not limit their coverage to non-Filipino employers. Filipinos working overseas share the same risks and burdens whether their employers be Filipino or foreign. Neither party disputes that Manuel Zaragoza, at the time of his death, was covered by an existing contract of employment with Eastern and that the deceased was at that time employed as a seaman (Chief Engineer) on board the M/V Eastern Meteor, which vessel-then chartered by Eastern-was engaged in plying ocean routes, outside Philippine waters and which, at the time of Zaragoza's demise, was berthed in a foreign port (Japan). In addition, the record shows that Eastern submitted its shipping articles to public respondent POEA for processing, formalization and approval, 8 apparently in recognition of POEA!s regulatory authority over overseas employment under Executive Order No. 797. While not in itself conclusive proof of employment by Eastern of people overseas, nevertheless, this latter circumstance strongly suggests that Eastern must have regarded itself as engaged in such employment, otherwise, it would not have found it necessary or useful to submit its shipping articles to the POEA. We hold that the complaint of private respondent widow of Manuel Zaragoza falls well within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of public respondent POEA. 9 We come to the issue regarding the amount of death benefits for which Eastern may be held liable to private respondent. In assessing such amount, the POEA relied upon Memorandum Circular No. 71 (effective 1 December 1981) issued by the now defunct National Seamen Board (NSB): SECTION D. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS DURING THE, TERM OF THE CONTRACT. 1. In case of total and permanent disability or death of the seaman during the term of his contract, the company II pay the ,seaman or his beneficial the amount of: P100,000.00-for masters and Chief Engineers 75,000.00 - for other officers 50,000.00 - for ratings over and above the benefits which are provided for abd are the liabilities of the Philippine government under the Philippine laws. Provided that when the employment of a seaman is also covered by a collective bargaining agreement or death/disability insurance which provides for higher benefits than those enumerated above, in which case, the seaman or his heirs/beneficiaries may elect under what scheme he is they are claiming. Recovery under one scheme is a bar to any farther recovery; except where there is a clear showing in the collective bargaining agreement and/or death/disability insurance that benefits provided for in

the collective bargaining agreement and death/disability insurance are separate and distinct from the abovementioned benefits. The exact amount of insurance that each seaman is covered under this contract are as stipulated in Column J of Appendix 2 of this contract. In addition to the above, the expenses for hospitalization of the seaman shall be borne by the employer. 2. In lieu of paragraph 1 above, the liability of [an] employer of a Philippine registered vessel (exceptforeign- owned vessels bareboat-chartered to a Philippine shipping company) shall be governed by existing Philippine Laws over and above the benefits granted [under] Philippine laws on social security and employees' compensation benefits provided that the Philippine registered vessel and any vessel bareboat- chartered to a Philippine Shipping Company shall be manned by full Filipino crews. (Emphasis and brackets supplied). It is the argument of Eastern here that NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71 collides with the public law principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Eastern also argues that assuming the validity of the Circular, its provisions (specifically paragraph 1) do not cover Eastern. These arguments again do not persuade. Concerning the alleged unconstitutionality of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, Article 20 of the Labor Code before its repeal by Executive Order No. 797, provided in salient part: Art. 20. National Seamen Board.-A National Seamen Board is hereby created which shall develop and maintain a comprehensive program for Filipino seamen employed overseas. It shall have the power and duty: xxx xxx xxx 2. To regulate and supervise the activities of agents or representatives of shipping companies in the hiring of seamen for overseas employment; and secure the best possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers and secure compliance therewith; xxx xxx xxx. (Emphasis supplied) The question of validity of the delegation of quasi-legislative power in favor of NSB's successor, respondent POEA, embodied in the article quoted above, was addressed and resolved in the affirmative by the Court inEastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, et al. 10 On the authority of this case, we hold that NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71 was issued in a valid exercise by the NSB of its "power and duty ... [to] secure the best possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers and [to] secure compliance therewith." We consider next petitioner's argument that it is not covered by the provisions of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71. Eastern submitted in evidence Certificate of Philippine Register Nos. ICGD-78-0428 dated 28

December 197811 and ICGD-84-0288 dated 7 August 1984 12 to show that this M/V Eastern Meteor was registered with the Philippine Coast Guard in 1978 and again in 1984. Eastern further maintained that M/V Eastern Meteor had always been fully manned by a Philippine crew. The record also shows, however, that this vessel was at the same time also registered in the Republic of Panama as evidenced by the Patente Permanente de Navegacion Servicio Internacional Nos. 7708-77 (dated 31 March 1977) 13 and 770877-A (dated 27 February 1987). 14 Petitioner had in fact paid taxes to the Panamanian government in 1978, 1979 1981, 1982 and 1983, 15 presumably because the M/V Eastern Meteor was during those years operating under a valid Panamanian navigation license. It, therefore, appears that at the time of the death of Manuel Zaragoza, the Eastern Meteor was both foreign-owned and foreign-registered on one hand and upon the other band, simultaneously registered in the Philippines. Interpreting Section D of Memorandum Circular No. 71, it appears clear that paragraph 1 covers Philippine seamen working in foreign-registered ships while paragraph 2 applies to Philippine seamen working on Philippine-registered vessels. The parenthetical phrase "except foreign-owned vessels bareboat-chartered to a Philippine shipping company" in paragraph 2 precisely covers the situation of the Eastern Meteor, that is, a foreign-owned vessel registered in a foreign country (Panama), with a second registration in the Philippines; such a vessel is excepted from coverage by paragraph 2, and hence covered by paragraph 1 instead. If the MN Eastern Meteor had been registered only in Panama, there would have been no question that it was covered by paragraph 1 of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71. It is well- known that foreign-owned and foreign-registered vessels have frequently also secured Philippine registration where the interest or convenience of the owners dictated such second or dual registration. The effect of the parenthetical phrase in paragraph 2 is, as already indicated, to bring such dual-registered vessel within the scope not of paragraph 2, but of paragraph 1. The fact that POEA Memorandum Circular No. 6 (Series of 1986) in upgrading death benefits (P250,000.00 for master and chief engineers) specified that such upgraded benefits "shall be applicable to all Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel provided the cause of action occurs on March 1, 1986 and thereafter" suggests to us the correctness of our above reading of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71. The underlying regulatory policy, as we see it, is that Filipino seamen working on ocean-going vessels should receive the same wages and benefits, without regard to the nationality or nationalities of the vessels on which they serve. We hold that the POEA correctly held private respondent Mrs. Zaragoza entitled to the benefits given to Philippine seamen under the provisions of Section D. paragraph 1 of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, i.e. (1) P100,000.00 death benefit, and in addition, (2) death and related benefits provided under applicable ordinary laws of the Philippines administered by the Social Security System.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Decision of the POEA in POEA Case No. L-86-01-026 is hereby AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order of 8 April 1987 is hereby LIFTED. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur. Ynot v IAC There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos. ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid. HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

Tablarin Vs. Gutierrez Case Digest Tablarin Vs. Gutierrez 152 SCRA 730 G.R. No. 78164 July 31, 1987 Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner: "SECTION 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines." The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following: "(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine; x x x (f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;” Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools: "Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any student who has not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.” MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform

admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges. Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional. Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test

like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the

respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary

injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.