consti 1 digests

8/13/2019 Consti 1 Digests

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A.M. No. 133-J, May 31, 1982, 114 SCRA 77

FACTS:

On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil Case 3010 which

became final for lack of an appeal. One of the parties in that case was Macariola. On October 16, 1963, a

project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which he approved in an Order dated October 23,

1963, later amended on November 11, 1963.

Lot 1184-E, which is one of the lots involved in the partition, was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Arcadio

Galapon. On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion of the said lot to Judge

Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion.

In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B.

Asuncion of the Court of FirstInstance of Leyte with "acts unbecoming a judge." The complainant alleged

that that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring

by purchase aportion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010

decided by him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated the said provision.

HELD:

The Court finds that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R. Macariola. The

prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject

of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. For the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the

property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property.

When the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil

Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein

filed an appeal within the reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of

the litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's order dated October 23,

1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition

made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long become final for there was no appeal from said

orders. Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly fromthe plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon.

Therefore, the respondent Associate Justice of the Court of Appealsis hereby reminded to be more discreet

in his private and business activities.


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Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS Digested

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS GR 122156, 3 February 1997

WHETHER OR NOT THE COSNTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ARE SELF-EXECUTING

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine

Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to

51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18

September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation,

which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a

Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00

per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the

winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel

matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28

September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which

GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender

of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with

Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-

executing.

RULING:

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987

Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative

without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of

which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is

self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by theconstitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and

there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing

constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly

granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its


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enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination

thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may

supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision

does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a

constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an

indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the

constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in

harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.

Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not,

by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally

drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to

operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of

constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is

expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption

now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as

requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically

nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987

Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further

guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not

require any legislation to put it in operation.

Resolution Cunanan, et. al

18March1954

FACTS OF THE CASE:

In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino

Cunanan et. al petitioners.

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A. 972

popularly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he obtains

a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past few exams

the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations

(1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-195375%).

Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the S.C.,

and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of

a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate

Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto,


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the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The

bill then became law on June 21, 1953

Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who

suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is

contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the

practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the administration of

justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.

An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that should be

developed constantly and maintained firmly.

The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring, and

reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.

The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the

admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the constitution recognizes

continue to reside in this court.

Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to cure are not the rules set in place by

the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is not included in the

power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.

Reasons for Unconstitutionality:

1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.

2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them,

in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.

3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the bar

(since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are

considered the bare minimum.)

4. It is a class legislation

5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and

being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.

HELD:

Under the authority of the court:

1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of the

said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and effect.


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2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955) is

valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952

are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o

getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed whether they have filed

petitions for admissions or not.)

Political LawSufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test

Pelaez v. Auditor General

From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities

this is purportedly in pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that the

President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province,

sub-province, municipality, [township] municipal district or other political subdivision, and increase or

diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovincesThe VP

Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing

funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are unconstitutional. He

said that Sec 68 of the RAC has been impliedly repealed by Sec 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios

may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act of Congress or of

the corresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected and the

recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is

situated. Pelaez argues, accordingly: If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio,

can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of

municipalities? The Auditor General countered that only barrios are barred from being created by the

President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that t a municipality can be created without creating

barrios. Existing barrios can just be placed into the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the

main import of Pelaez argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a

new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several

barrios.

ISSUE:Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of

Sec 68 of the RAC.

HELD:Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the

details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the

principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the

policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of

which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the

performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect,

make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned

standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has

acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.


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In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in character not administrative.

OSMENA VS ORBOS

FACTS

October 10, 1984, President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the General

Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF wasdesigned to reimburse oil

companies for cost increases in crude oil and importedpetroleum products resulting from exchange rate

adjustments and from increases in the

world market prices of crude oil. Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a trustliability account, in

virtue of E.O. 1024,. Now, the petition alleges that the

status of the

OPSF as of March 31, 1991 showed a Terminal Fund Balance deficit of some P12.877billion; 8 that to

abate the worsening deficit, the Energy Regulatory Board . . issued anapproving the increase in pump

prices of petroleum products, and a

t the rate of recoupment, the OPSF deficit should have been fully covered in a span of six (6) months,but

this notwithstanding, the respondents are poised to accept, process and pay claims not authorized under

P.D. 1956." 9

ISSUE

Whether or not the powers granted to the ERB under PD 1956 partake of the nature of thetaxation power of

the state such that the creation of the trust fund violates Section 29(3),Article VI of the Constitution

RULING

It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted inthe exercise of

the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund isplain from the special treatment

given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund;and while it is placed in what the l

aw refers to as a trust liability account, the fund

nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied

that these measures comply with the constitutional description of a special fund. Indeed,the practice is without precedent

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995

CONGRESSMAN JAMES L. CHIONGBIAN (Third District, South Cotobato) ADELBERT W. ANTONINO

(First District, SouthCotobato), WILFREDO G. CAINGLET (Third District, Zamboanga del Norte),

HILARION RAMIRO, JR. (Second Division,Misamis Occidental), ERNESTO S. AMATONG (Second

District, Zamboanga del Norte), ALVIN G. DANS (Lone District,Basilan), ABDULLAH M. DIMAPORO


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(Second District, Lanao del Norte), and CONGRESSWOMAN MARIA CLARA A.LOBREGAT (Lone District,

Zamboanga City)

petitioners,vs.

HON. OSCAR M. ORBOS, Executive Secretary; COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN SEC. FIDEL V. RAMOS,

CABINET OFFICERS FORREGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR REGIONS X AND XII, CHAIRMAN OF THE

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL FORREGION X, CHAIRMAN JESUS V. AYALA, CABINET

OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR REGIONS XI and XII,DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL

GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

SECRETARIAT,PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT STAFF, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, Secretary of the

DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET andMANAGEMENT; and HON. ROSALINA S. CAJUCUM, OIC National

Treasurer,

respondents.

IMMANUEL JALDON,

petitioner,vs.

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR M. ORBOS, HON. FIDEL RAMOS, HON. SECRETARY LUIS

SANTOS, AND HON.NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALINA CAJUCOM,

respondents.

MENDOZA,

J.:

These suits challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao (R.A.No. 6734), authorizing the President of the Philippines to "merge" by administrative

determination the regions remainingafter the establishment of the Autonomous Region, and the Executive

Order issued by the President pursuant to suchauthority, "Providing for the Reorganization of

Administrative Regions in Mindanao." A temporary restraining orderprayed for by the petitioners was issued

by this Court on January 29, 1991, enjoining the respondents from enforcing theExecutive Order and

statute in question.The facts are as follows:Pursuant to Art. X, 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress

passed R.A. No. 6734, the Organic Act for the AutonomousRegion in Muslim Mindanao, calling for

a plebiscite to be held in the provinces of Basilan, Cotobato, Davao del Sur, Lanaodel Norte, Lanao

del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del

Norte,and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan,

Marawi, Pagadian, PuertoPrincesa and Zamboanga. In the ensuing plebiscite held on November 16, 1989,

four provinces voted in favor of creatingan autonomous region. These are the provinces of Lanao del Sur,


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Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. In accordance withthe constitutional provision, these provinces became

the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.On the other hand, with respect to provinces and cities not

voting in favor of the Autonomous Region, Art. XIX, 13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides,That only the provinces

and cities voting favorably in such plebiscites shall be included in theAutonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not votefor inclusion in the Autonomous

Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions.

Provided,however

, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.Pursuant to the

authority granted by this provision, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued on October 12,

1990Executive Order No. 429, "providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in

Region X, will become part of Region IX.(2) Oroquieta City, Tangub City and Ozamiz City, at present parts

of Region X will become parts of Region IX

IN RE: VICENTE CHING

Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999

FACTS:

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a

Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in

the Philippines.

After having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, Ching filed an

application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, he was allowed to take the

Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his

Philippine citizenship. On November 1998, he submitted the important documents in compliance with the

said resolution.

During the 1998 Bar Examinations, Ching was one of the successfulexaminees but he was not allowed to

take the oath because of his questionable citizenship status. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, he

was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor

General (OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the

documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.

In their comment, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever

he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence.


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Ching then filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and

his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999.

ISSUE:

Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time."

HELD:

The Court holds that Ching failed to validly elect Philippinecitizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that

lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect

Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching

the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of

Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious

and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of

Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and

unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and

suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate

right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude.

Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result this golden

privilege slipped away from his grasp. Therefore, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's

application for admission to the Philippine Bar.

RA 7941 the Party list Act (1995)

BANAT V. COMELEC

, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009

Facts:

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)filed before the National

Board of Canvassers(NBC) a petition to proclaim the fullnumber of party list representatives provided by

the Constitution. However, the

recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELECs national board of

canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by theCOMELEC en banc.

BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the resolution of COMELEC to their petition

to proclaim the full number of party listrepresentatives provided by the Constitution.


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The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution proclaimingthirteen (13) parties as winners in

the party-list elections in May 2007. TheCOMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the

party-listresults, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party,organization, or coalition

in accordance with

Veterans Federation Party v.COMELEC formula.

Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action,Cooperation and Harmony

Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) asked theCOMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision

to usethe

Veterans

formula. COMELEC denied the consideration.

Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari with mandamus andprohibition assailing the

resolution of the COMELEC in its decision to use theVeterans formula.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section5(2), Article VI of the

Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling

Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional

Whether or not the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 toqualify for one seat is

constitutional

How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?

Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in theparty-list elections? If not,

can the major political parties be barred from participatingin the party-list elections?

RULING:

The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-listrepresentatives cannot be more

than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.

Socrates vs COMELEC, 391 SCRA 457; G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002 (Local Government, Recall

Election: Exception to the 3 term limit)

Facts: COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates of the City of Puerto

Princesa, and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.


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On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election.

Different petitioners filed their respective petitions, which were consolidated seeking the disqualification of

Hagedorn to run for the recall election and the cancellation of his COC on the ground that the latter is

disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of

the city for three (3) consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995 and 1998 immediately prior to the instant recall

election for the same post.

COMELECs First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of merit. And COMELEC

declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.

Issue: WON one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is qualified to run for mayor

in the recall election.

Held: Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the

Constitution, which states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined

by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive

terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption

in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local

Government Code, which provides:

Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.

Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the

continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.

The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive

terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The

second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the

continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of

time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being

joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for a fourth

term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the

third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the

prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-

election after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary

interruption in the continuity of service.Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution prohibits is

an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however,

does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the re-election is not immediately


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after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third

consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the third term.

Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-election to run in any other

subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is

a consecutive fourth term.

In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate

re-election after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate re-election that

the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001.

People vs. Jalosjos G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at

the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending

appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a

Congressman, includingattendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having

been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the

need for hisconstituents to be represented.

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House ofRepresentatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance,

the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises

from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense.

Theprovision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary

meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec.

11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend

sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged

with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has

constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions

and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the

privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants

status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/people-vs-jalosjos-gr-no-132875-76.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/people-vs-jalosjos-gr-no-132875-76.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/people-vs-jalosjos-gr-no-132875-76.html


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G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998

FACTS:

During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan was declared the duly

elected President of the Senate. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro

tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.

Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other

member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had

voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing

nominee, belonged to the "minority."

During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that

the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering seven (7) and, thus, also

aminority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived

at. The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad

delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve

the issue.

On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a letter signed by the

seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as theminority leader.

By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the

Senate.

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo

warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising

the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator

Tatad.

ISSUES:

1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?

2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?


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3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of

Senate minority leader

4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as

theminority leader?

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE

The Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate President, since it was

deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for

reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumedjurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events

which justify its intervention;" and (2) because the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the

constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session and therein elect a Senate

President(read Avelino vs. Cuenco about the scope of the Court's power of judicial review).

The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the

senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's "full

discretionary authority," but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held that

not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was

also its duty to consider and determine the issue.

SECOND ISSUE

There was no violation. The Court finds that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clearsupport from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper

House. The Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number

constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it however does not provide that the members

who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect

the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically

become the minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President

and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both

chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it

may deem necessary." The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the

exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method

must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.


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THIRD ISSUE

Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without

color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to

determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. The

action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled to

the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercise by another.

In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she has a

clearright to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or

unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present not sufficient proof of a

clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of

discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

FOURTH ISSUE

Grave abuse of discretion - such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack

of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive

duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where

the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.

By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate

President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. To recall, the latter belongs to one

of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of

this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal

recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein

both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.

Therefore, the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of

"an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of theConstitution,

the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or

overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their

competence and authority.

Arroyo v. De VeneciaFacts:


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An amendment to the National Internal Revenue Code was introduced to the House of Representatives

involving taxations on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. This waslater passed accordingly

and brought to the House of Senate. Upon the interpellation on thesecond reading, herein petitioner moved

for adjournment for lack of quorum which isconstitutionally needed to conduct business. Petitioners motion

was defeated and wasrailroaded. The bill was then signed into law by President Fidel Ramos.

Issue:

Whether or not the law was passed on violation on the constitutional mandate.

Held:

There is no rule of the House concerned that quorum shall be determined by viva voce or nominal voting.

The Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the Members betaken every time a House has

to vote, except only on the following instances upon the last andthe third readings of the bill, at the

request of 1/5 of the Members present and in repassing a billover the veto of the President. Second, there

is obviousness on the part of the petitioner to delaythe business of the House, thus eliminating the alleged

skullduggery on part of the accused.Third, the enrolled bill doctrine states that enrolled bills are in itself

conclusive thus legally binding provided it is in harmony with the constitution. Lastly, the court upheld

principle of separation of powers, which herein, is applicable for the legislative branch for it has exercised

its power without grave abuse of discretion resulting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

CASCO Philippines vs Gimenez

Political LawJournalConclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill

Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily

in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which areboth being imported abroad. Pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank

of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign

exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum

establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in same

law. In compliance, Casco paid the fees but later moved for reimbursement as Casco maintained that urea

and formaldehyde are exempted from such fees. The CBP issued the vouchers for refund (pursuant to

Resolution 1529 of the CBP) but the banks auditor refused to honor the vouchers since he maintained that

this is in contrast to the provision of Sec 2, par 18 of RA 2609 which provides: The margin established by

the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of

foreign exchange for the importation of the following:

xxx xxx xxx


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XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the

exclusive use of end-users.

The Auditor General, Gimenez, affirmed the ruling of CBPs auditor. Casco maintains that the term urea

formaldehyde appearing in this provision should be construed as urea and formaldehyde He further

contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction and between the terms

urea and, formaldehyde, and that the members of Congress intended to exempt urea and

formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called urea

formaldehyde, not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the

floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and formaldehyde.

HELD: Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation

product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to

temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with

inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. Urea

formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from urea and

formaldehyde, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as urea

formaldehyde The opinions of any member of Congress does not represent the ent irety of the Congress

itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is well settled that theenrolled bill which uses the term urea formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde is

conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the

President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of

Congress and approved by the Executive on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the

principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the

remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Manila,

petitioner,v.ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, inhis capacity as Mayor of Manila, et. al. respondents.

FACTS: House Bill No. 9266, defining the powers, rights and duties of the Vice Mayor of Manila was

filed in the House of Representatives and then sent to the Senate for reading. Senator Roxas and Senator

Tolentino introduced amendment, but it wasSen. Tolentinos introduced amendments that were approved in

toto by the Senate. Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to theHouse of Representatives that the House Bill

had been passed by the Senate with amendments. And mistakenly attached

thecertification of the amendments recommended by Senator Roxas,

and not of Senator Tolentinos thereafter, the House of Representatives signified their approval. The printed

copies were then certified and attested to by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of

the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. The HouseBill 9266

were then signed by the President of the Philippines. The bill thereupon became Republic Act no. 4065.It


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was later made public by Senator Tolentino that the enrolled copy of House Bill 9266 signed into law by

the President was awrong version of the bill.

that he considered his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. In view of the

circumstances, ThePresident of the Philippines officially withdrawing his signature on House Bill No.

9266.Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065.

Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petitionwith this Court a mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition

with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of Manila.Petitioner

agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory and would not affect the validity of the statute. Hence,

it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and binding. Respondents' position is that the

so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since it was not the billactually passed by the Senate, and

that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution

of theissue.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not RA 4065 remains valid.2. Whether or not the entries in the journal should be

consulted.RULINGS:1.) No, R.A. 4065

is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law.

The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses and the certification

does not add to thevalidity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it

is the approval by Congress and notthe signatures of the presiding officers that is essential

. Because the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is notconclusive proof of a bills due

enactment.

The Supreme Court recognized the withdrawal of the President and the Senate Presidents' signatures from

RA 4065 or House Bill 9266,therefore it did not become a law.

Senate President declared that his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequentclarification

that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the

Senate. Thisdeclaration should be accorded greater respect than the attestation that it invalidated.

Certification that was made by the presidingofficer is merely a mode of authentication. The essential thing

is the approval of congress and not the signature of the presidingofficers. Function of attestation is

not approval because a bill is considered approved after it has passed both houses. Constitutiondoes not

even provide that the presiding officer should sign the bill before it is submitted to the President2.) Yes,

What evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the

entries in the journal should be consulted. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is

no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is truethat the journal is not authenticated and is

subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely

asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passedbyboth Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can resort

to the Senate journal for thepurpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were

introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate butwere not incorporated in the printed text sent to the

President and signed by him


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Morales vs Subido

Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not

possess a bachelors degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police. Morales was the chief of

detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his

career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former

Chief , Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional

appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Subido approved the designation of the petitioner

but rejected his appointment for failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility

requirements for the said position. Instead, the respondent certified other persons as qualified for the post.

Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:

Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency.No person may be appointed chief of a

city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree from a recognized institution of learning and has

served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served

as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with rank of

captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as

officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.

Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person who has served the police department of a city

can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued thatwhen the said act was being deliberated

upon, the approved version was actually the following:

No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree and has

served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police

department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years

or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer of

the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.

Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when

the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of

the phrase or has served as chief of police with exemplary record.Morales went on to support his case by

producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an

employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill being

deliberated upon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to

look searchingly into the matter.

HELD: The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines showsthat Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing.

The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other

branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the

said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast


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in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the

labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The SC is not

of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be

sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of

each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such

matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being

confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to

matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any

discrepancy.

Pimentel, et al. vs. House of Representives Electoral Tribunal

GR 141489

29 November 2002;

also Pimentel, et al. v. Commission on Appointments [GR 141490]

En Banc, Carpio (J): 11 concur, 2 took no part, 1 on leave

Facts:

On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the Party-List

System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote

of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed

winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q.

Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from party-list groups

Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka,

Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens

Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to

send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each. Also

elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties. Subsequently, the House

constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In

practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of House members who are to

occupy seats in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on

Appointments (CA). From available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections theparty-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date

of filing of the present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction,

the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging

to the different political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters


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addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the

Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate

President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to

include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its

meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator

Pimentels letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. On the same day, HRET

Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to House of

Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this

Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary

Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and

Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list

representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. They charge that

the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of

Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8 February 2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of GR

141490 with GR 141489. On 11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend their

petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as

Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted

the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions on the strength of his oath to protect,

defend and uphold the Constitution and in h is capacity as taxpayer and as a member of the CA. He was

joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-

petitioners.

Issue:

[1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional requirement

of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the hret.

[2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list

representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Held:

[1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within

constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those whomay occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the

Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members

those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on

Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the


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power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted

6 seats of each chambers respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in

Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of

the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory

constitutional rule on proportional representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of separation of powers,

the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a

clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be

left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House

may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The

petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from

participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11

May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET

or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time

simply refrained from participating in the election process. The party-list representatives did not designate

their nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not

consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the

party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, the Court cannot resolve the issues

presented by petitioners at this time.

[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the

letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their

internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.

Raul Daza vs Luis Singson

The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a political realignment in the

lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew the

seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber

elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of the original members except Daza who

was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned such replacement.

ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the composition of

the Commission on Appointments.

HELD:As provided in the constitution, there should be a Commission on Appointments consisting of

twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected by each House respectively

on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein, this necessarily connotes theauthority of each house of Congress to see to it that the requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it

may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also

subsequently thereto NOT the court.


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Teofisto Guingona vs Neptali Gonzales

HRETs Composition Rounding Off

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3

LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must

have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a

political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5

members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-

LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded

off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also

pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the

CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a

member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against

proportional representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys representation in the CoA.

HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on

the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of

Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to

do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate

converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to

7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membership was correspondingly

reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their

proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in

compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional

representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP

and reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party

should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more

than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat.

In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional

representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party.


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FRANKLIN M. DRILON, et al. v. HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, et al

594 SCRA 743 (2009), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

Issues involving the deprivation of a seat in the Commission on Appointments should be lodged before the

respective Houses of Congress and not with the Supreme Court.

FACTS: The Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective contingents to the

Commission on Appointments (CA). In the second week of August 2007, Franklin Drilon et al. went to

respondent then Speaker Jose de Venecia to ask for one seat for the Liberal Party in the CA. However, no

report or recommendation was proffered by the Legal Department, drawing Representative Taada to

request a report or recommendation on the matter within three days. Hence spawned the filing by Drilon (in

representation of the Liberal Party), et al., alleging that the liberal party with at least twenty (20) members

who signed herein, is constitutionally entitled to one (1) seat in the CA.

Meantime, Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal of PDP-Laban wrote a letter claiming that the

Senate contingent in the CA violated the constitutional requirement of proportional representation. The

Senator avers that political parties PMP and KAMPI were given more seats than they were entitled to in the

CA and the political party PRP and other Independents cannot be represented in the CA.

The CA, speaking through its Ex-Officio Chairman Manny Villar, advised Senator Madrigal that CA has

neither the power nor the discretion to reject a member who is elected by either House, and that any

complaints about the election of a member or members should be addressed to the body that elected

them.Villar further explained that instructions have been given to transmit the original copies of Senator

Madrigals letters to the Senate Secretary for their immediate inclusion in the Order of Business of the

Session of the Senate.

Madrigal, not satisfied with the CAs action, filed a petition with the Supreme Court for prohibition and

mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction

against Senator Villar as Senate President and Ex-Officio Chairman of the CA.

The Court consolidated the petitions filed by Drilon et al. and Madrigal et al.

ISSUES: Whether or not the petition before the Supreme Court is proper

HELD: The first petition, G.R. No. 180055, has thus indeed been rendered moot with the designation of a

Liberal Party member of the House contingent to the CA, hence, as prayed for, the petition is withdrawn.


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As for the second petition, G.R. No. 183055, it fails. Senator Madrigal failed to show that she sustained

direct injury as a result of the act complained of. Her petition does not in fact allege that she or her political

party PDP-Laban was deprived of a seat in the CA, or that she or PDP-Laban possesses personal and

substantial interest to confer on her/it locus standi.

Senator Madrigals primary recourse rests with the respective Houses of Congress and not with this Court.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictates that prior recourse to the House is necessary before she may

bring her petition to court. Senator Villars invocation of said doctrine is thus well-taken.

Aquilino Pimentel vs Executive Secretary Ermita

Political LawAd Interim Appointments

While Congress was in session, GMA appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective

departments. They were appointed in acting capacities only. Pimentel together w/ 7 other senators filed a

complaint against the appointment of Yap et al. During pendency, Congress adjourned and GMA re-issued

ad interim appointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity. Pimentel argues that

GMA should not have appointed Yap et al as acting secretaries because in case of a vacancy in the Office

of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary. Pimentel further

asserts that while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a

vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the CoA, without first having obtained its consent; GMA

cannot issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries while Congress is in session

because the law does not give the President such power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.

HELD: Ermita, in behalf of the other respondents, argued that GMA is allowed under Sec. 16, Art 7 of the

Constitution to make such appointments. Pursuant to the Constitution, the President shall have the power

to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such

appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the CoA or until the next adjournment of the

Congress. Ermita also pointed out EO 292 which allows such an appointment with the exception that such

temporary designation shall not exceed one year. Sec 17, Chap 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that

[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other

competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may

even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President

deems that person competent. Also, Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the

obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether

temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise ofprescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.

What Bernas Says


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Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are

effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress,

whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim

appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting

appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of

temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for

confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

** The SC finds no abuse in what GMA did. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from GMAs issuance

of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse

of one year.

Armault vs. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950)

1.WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the

person towhom he gave the P440,000.2.WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a

term beyond its period of legislative session,which ended on May 18, 1950.3.WON the privilege against

self incrimination protects the petitioner from being questioned.HELD:1. YES.Once an inquiry is admitted or

established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating

committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of

course to hisconstitutional right against self-incrimination.The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of

the legislative body to make, must be material or

necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as

to legislate, or to expel a Member; and everyquestion which the investigator is empowered to coerce a

witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation.The materiality

of the question must be determined by i

ts direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by itsindirect relation to any proposed or possible

legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislativeaction and the form and

character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as aresult of

the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.2. NOSenate is a

continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the

House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in

cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.Senate will not be disposed

to exert the power beyond its proper bounds, i.e. abuse their power and keep the witness in


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prison for life. If proper limitations are disregarded, Court isalways open to those whose rights might thus

be transgressed.3. NOCourt is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, which

is the name of that person to whom

witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he

should reveal thename he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover,

it is unbelievable that he gaveP440,000 to a person to him unknown. "Testimony which is obviously false or

evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testifyand is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify

would be so punishable.

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC

INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY,

INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL

REFORMS

G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,

vs.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER

AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 179275 December 23, 2008

SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners,

vs.

THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE

PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M.

LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES,

respondents-intervenors

Facts: During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new controversy arises. During the 2007 election the

conversation of President Arroyo and the herein petitioner Virgilio Garciliano, COMELEC regional director,

regarding the desire of the president to have a favourable outcome in terms of his senatoriables. Such

conversation was recorded and was played during the house of representative investigation. Because of


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such turn of events, a petition was filed before the court praying that such playing of the illegally seized

communication was in violation of RA 4200 or the anti-wire tapping law. Also such petition for injunction

prays that the Senate committee be prevented from further conducting such investigation for the basic

reason that there was no proper publication of the senate rules, empowering them to make such

investigation of the unlawfully seized documents.

Issue: Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to empower the senate to further

proceed with their investigation?

Held: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:

The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without

duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the Senate or the House of

Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in

accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended

to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of

injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no

notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the

Civil Code, which provides that "laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their

publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the

rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available

to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page.

The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates defiance

of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law

instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in

accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these

rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules

prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,otherwise known as the ElectronicCommerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more

incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional

equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.In other words, the law merely recognizes

the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic


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documents.It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the

Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The

conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the

publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of

procedure."

Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation cannot proceed for the reason that the

rules that they will observe was not properly published as provided by the Fundamental Law of the land.

Such inquiry if allowed without observance of the required publication will put a persons life, liberty and

property at stake without due process of law. Also, the further assertion of the senate that they already

published such rules through their web page, in observance of the RA 8792 or the Electronic Commerce

Act was only viewed by the court as matter of evidence and still does not conforme with what the

constitution propounded.

In this regard the high court granted the petition for injunction preventing the senate to conduct such inquiry

in aid of legislation.

De La Paz vs The Senate Committee

Inquiry in Aid of LegislationJurisdiction and Publication

In October 2008, Gen. De La Paz, a senior officer of the PNP, headed a delegation of 8 to attend an

Interpol GA. De La Paz brought with him his wife and 3 days after the scheduled GA, de la Paz is also

scheduled to retire. After the GA, De La Paz was apprehended in the departure area for he was carrying

with him 105,000.00 (P6,930,000.00). He was also carrying with him 45,000.00 (P2,970,000.00). He

failed to declare in writing that he is carrying such an amount and this is in violation of the United Nations

Convention Against Corruption and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.

De La Paz and his group was later released but the s were confiscated by the Russians. Upon arrival to

the Philippines, De La Paz was issued a subpoena by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for the

investigation it was to conduct involving the Moscow incident. De La Paz averred that the said committee

does not have jurisdiction of the case. De La Paz argued that the Committee is devoid of any jurisdiction to

investigate the Moscow incident as the matter does not involve state to state relations as provided in

paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure (Senate Rules). They further claim

that respondent Committee violated the same Senate Rules when it issued the warrant of arrest without the

required signatures of the majority of the members of respondent Committee. They likewise assail the verysame Senate Rules because the same were not published as required by the Constitution, and thus,

cannot be used as the basis of any investigation involving them relative to the Moscow incident.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said Committee has jurisdiction over the matter.


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HELD: The SC ruled against De La Paz. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states:Each

House shall determine the rules of its proceedings. This provision has been traditionally construed as a

grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation

of its own rules. The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, raised by

petitioner in the case at bench, in effect, asks this Court to inquire into a matter that is within the full

discretion of the Senate. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question. Also, the signatures were

properly obtained as evidenced by the approval of the Senate president and it is shown that the gathering

of the signatures is in accordance with the Rules. It is also shown that the Rules of Procedure Governing

Inquiries in Aid of Legislation were also published in two newspapers of general circulation.

Senate of the Philippines vs Executive Secretary Ermita

Question HourEO 464

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes

consti 1 digests

Documents