case digests consti 2 ch 5

8/13/2019 Case Digests Consti 2 CH 5

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Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez

onNovember 22, 2010

Constitutional Law Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise ofPolice Power

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of

business opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. Forsome time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the localmarket in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the RetailTrade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right toengage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Acton the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which,according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He saidthat as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helpsin the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generallyaccepted principles.HELD:Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In thiscase, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and withRA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause does not demand absolute equalityamongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under likecircumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced;and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies onlyto those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons withinsuch class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those whofall within such class and those who do not.

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflictwith a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise ofthe police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrenderedthrough the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right tooperate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

Lutz vs. AranetaGR L-7859, 22 December 1955First Division, Reyes JBL (J): 8 concur

Facts:AWalter Lutz, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma,sought torecover the sum of P14,6666.40 paid by the estate as taxes f rom theCommissioner under Section e ofCommonwealth Act 567 (the Sugar Adjustment Act),alleging that such tax is unconstitutional as it levied forthe aid and support of the sugar industryexclusively, which is in his opinion not a public purpose.Issue:Whether the tax is valid in supporting an industry.


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Held:The tax is levied with a regulatory prupose, i.e. to provide means for the rehabilitation andstabilizationof the threatened sugar industry. The act is primarily an exercise of police power,and is not a pure exercise oftaxing power. As sugar production is one of the great industries ofthe Philippines; and that its promotion,protec tion and advancement redounds greatl y to

the general welfare, the legislature found that the generalwelfare demanded that theindustry should be stabilized, and provided that the distribution of benefits therefrombe readjusted among its component to enable it to resist the added strain of the increase in taxthat ithad to sustain . Further, it cannot be said that the devotion of tax money toexperimental stat ions to seek increase of efficiency in sugar production, utilization of by-products, etc., as well as to the improvement ofliving and working conditions in sugar millsand plantations, without any part of such money being channeleddiectly to private persons,constitute expenditure of tax money for private purposes.The tax is valid.

TIO vs. VRB151 SCRA 208GR No. L-75697, June 18, 1987"The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislatureto impose the tax was to favor one industry over another."

FACTS: The petitioner assails the validity of PD 1987 entitled an "Act creating the VideogramRegulatory Board," citing especially Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on thegross receipts payable to the local government. Petitioner contends that aside from its being a

rider and not germane to the subject matter thereof, and such imposition was being harsh,confiscatory, oppressive and/or unlawfully restraints trade in violation of the due process clauseof the Constitution.

ISSUE: Is PD 1987 a valid exercise of taxing power of the state?

HELD: Yes. It is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because itregulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. The power to impose taxes isone so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare

that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as those rest in the discretion of the

authority which exercises it. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is,in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation.

The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need

for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrantviolation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. Andwhile it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains avalid imposition.


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The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislatureto impose the tax was to favor one industry over another.

OSMEA vs. ORBOS220 SCRA 703GR No. 99886, March 31, 1993

" To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of the power to tax, there must be a standard whichimplies that the legislature determines matter of principle and lays down fundamental policy."

FACTS: Senator John Osmea assails the constitutionality of paragraph 1c of PD 1956, asamended by EO 137, empowering the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve the increaseof fuel prices or impose additional amounts on petroleum products which proceeds shall accrueto the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) established for the reimbursement to ailing oil

companies in the event of sudden price increases. The petitioner avers that the collection on oilproducts establishments is an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power to tax. Further,the petitioner points out that since a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxingpower of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to thespecial purpose/objective for which it was created. It thus appears that the challenge posed by thepetitioner is premised primarily on the view that the powers granted to the ERB under P.D. 1956,as amended, partake of the nature of the taxation power of the State.

ISSUE: Is there an undue delegation of the legislative power of taxation?

HELD: None. It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are

exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF as a specialfund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the generalfund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fundnonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied thatthese measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special fund." With regard tothe alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the provision conferringthe authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides asufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general policy ofthe law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, P.D.1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment the resources of theFund.

Taxicab Operators v. The Board of Transportation [GR L-59234, 30 September 1982]

Facts:

Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab

operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of


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Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Ace Transportation Corporation

and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such

certificate of public convenience.

On 10 October 1977, Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular 77-42 which phases

out old and dilapidated taxis; refusing registration to taxi units within the National Capitol Region having

year models over 6 years old. Pursuant to the above BOT circular, Director of the Bureau of Land

Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular 52, dated 15 August 1980, instructing the Regional

Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the NCR, to implement said Circular,

and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as

public conveyances. In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year

1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981.

On 27 January 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT (Case 80-7553), seeking to nullify MC 77-42

or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of

taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the

time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. On 16 February 1981, petitioners filed

before the BOT a Manifestation and Urgent Motion, praying for an early hearing of their petition. The

case was heard on 20 February 1981. On 28 November 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a

Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition praying that the case be

resolved or decided not later than 10 December 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of

whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of their interests before their 1975

model cabs are phased-out on 1 January 1982. Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made

personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the records of the case could not be

located. On 29 December 1981, the present Petition was instituted.

The Supreme Court denied the writs prayed for and dismissed the petition; without costs.

1. Rationale behind exercise of police power

The overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by

old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to

promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit

all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. The

necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate

even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

Velasco vs. Villegas [G.R. No. L-24153

(120 SCRA), February 14, 1983]
http://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/02/velasco-vs-villegas-gr-no-l-24153-120.htmlhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/02/velasco-vs-villegas-gr-no-l-24153-120.htmlhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/02/velasco-vs-villegas-gr-no-l-24153-120.htmlhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/02/velasco-vs-villegas-gr-no-l-24153-120.html


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Facts: Petitioners herein are members of the Sta. Cruz

Barbershop Association. This is an appeal from the lower

court's(LC) order dismissing their suit for declatory relief.

They are challenging the constitutionality of Ord. No.4964. They contend that it amounts to deprivation of

properties and their means of livelihood without due

process of law.

The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be

prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to

conduct the business of massaging customers or otherpersons in any adjacent room or rooms of said

barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same

building where the barber shop is located as long as the

operator of the barber shop and the room

where massaging is conducted is the same person."

Respondent in its reply, said that the Ordinance No. 4964is constitutional and such is just an exercise of the state's

inherent power (police power).

Issue: Whether or not the assailed Ordinance violated the

petitioner's right to property and their means of livelihood.

Held: Ordinance is Constitutional. Petition is dismissed,

LC decision affirmed.


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Enactment of such (Ordinance) is a valid exercise of

Police Power.

The objectives of the Ordinance are:

(1) To impose payment of license fees for engaging in the

business of massage clinics, and;

(2) To forestall possible immorality which might grow from

the construction of a separate room

for massaging customers.

This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances

based on the general welfare clause. And for that reason,

the petitioners rights were not violated and they are not

deprived of the due process of law.

Pollution Adjudication Board vs. CA et al.

G.R. No. 93891, 11 March 1991

Third Division, Feliciano (J), 4 concur

FACTS:Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation was involved in

bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater being directlydischarged into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan- Tinerejos River.

Petitioner Board, an agency of the Government charged with the task of

determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment

comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory

provisions, have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the
http://xyckriz.blogspot.com/2010/11/pollution-adjudication-board-v-ca-et-al.htmlhttp://xyckriz.blogspot.com/2010/11/pollution-adjudication-board-v-ca-et-al.html


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applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very

casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into

the river. Petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar

immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution

source installations. Solar, however, with preliminary injunction against theBoard, went to the Regional Trial Court on petition for certiorari, but it was

dismissed upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not certiorari from the

questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the

proper remedy, and that the Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to

operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and academic.

Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals, which reversed

the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that court

for further proceedings. In addition, the Court of Appeals declared the Writof Execution null and void. At the same time, the CA said that certiorari was

a proper remedy since the Orders of petitioner Board may result in great

and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the case might be moot and

academic, "larger issues" demanded that the question of due process be

settled. Petitioner Board moved for reconsideration, without success.

Arguing that that the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution were issued

in accordance with law and were not violative of the requirements of dueprocess; and the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the

proper subjects of a petition for certiorari, Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon

Clio L. Borre for petitioner asked the Supreme Court to review the Decision

and Resolution promulgated by the Court of Appeals entitled "Solar Textile

Finishing Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board," which reversed an

order of the Regional Trial Court. In addition, petitioner Board claims that

under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte

orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is primafacie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or

wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible

standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends

that the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the

River provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the


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1982 Effluent Code. Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the

Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the

effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety

or welfare, or to animal and plant life." In the instant case, according to

Solar, the inspection reports before the Board made no finding that Solar'swastewater discharged posed such a threat.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial

court on the ground that Solar had been denied due process by the Board.

HELD:The Court found that the Order and Writ of Execution were entirely

within the lawful authority of petitioner Board. Ex parte cease and desist

orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like here. Therelevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were

enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign

power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the

public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly

designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the

ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of

protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the

exercise of police power. Hence, the trial court did not err when it

dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy

was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in

fact appeal. The Court gave due course on the Petition for Review and the

Decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution were set aside. The

Order of petitioner Board and the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision

of the trial court were reinstated, without prejudice to the right of Solar to

contest the correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of

Execution at a public hearing before the Board.

Tablarin vs. Gutierrez [G.R. No. 78164,

July 31, 1987]
http://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/02/tablarin-vs-gutierrez-gr-no-78164-july.htmlhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/02/tablarin-vs-gutierrez-gr-no-78164-july.htmlhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/02/tablarin-vs-gutierrez-gr-no-78164-july.htmlhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/02/tablarin-vs-gutierrez-gr-no-78164-july.html


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Facts: The petitioners seek admission into colleges or

schools of medicine. However the petitioners either did not

take or did not successfully take the National

Medical Admission Test (NMAT). Republic Act 2382 asamended by R.A. 4224 and 5946, known as the Medical

Act of 1959 created, among others, the Board of Medical

Education (BME) whose functions include "to determine

and prescribe requirements for admission into a

recognized college of medicine" (Sec. 5 (a). Section 7 of

the same Act requires from applicants to presenta certificate of eligibility for entrance (cea) to medical

school from the BME. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985,

issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and

Sports, established a uniform admission test called

National Medical Admission Test as

additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of

eligibility.

Petitioners then filed with the RTC a petition for

Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer

Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction

seeking to enjoin the Sec. of educ, BME from enforcing

Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no. 2 andfrom requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as

condition for securing (cea).

Issue:Whether or not Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and


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MECS Order no. 2 violate the constitution as they

prescribe an unfair, unreasonable and inequitable

requirement

Held: The legislative and administrative provisions

impugned in this case constitute a valid exercise of the

police power of the state.

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is

whether there is some reasonable relation between theprescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition

for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the

securing of the health and safety of the general

community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps

most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation

of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long

been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting

the health and safety of the public. That the power to

regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the

power to regulate admission to the ranks of those

authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized.

Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring

those who wish to practice medicine first to take and passmedical board examinations have long ago been

recognized as valid exercises of governmental power.

Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical

educational requirements-i.e., the completion of


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prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-

for admission to the medical profession, has also been

sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory

authority of the state. What we have before us in theinstant case is closely related: the regulation of access to

medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, articulates

the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of

the professional and technical quality of the graduates of

medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those

admitted to the student body of the medical schools. Thatupgrading is sought by selectivity in the process

of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of

limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required

degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for

medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties

of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools

in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current

state of our social and economic development, are widely

known.

The Court believes that the government is entitled to

prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means of

achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection ofapplicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improving

the quality of medical education in the country."


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Balacuit v CFI G.R. No. L-38429

June 30, 1988

J. Gancayo

Facts:

Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality

of Ordinance No. 640 passed by theMunicipal Board of the City

of Butuan on April 21, 1969. This called for a reduction to of the

ticket price given to minors from 7-12 years old. There was a fine from200-600 pesos or a 2-6 month imprisonment

The complaint was issued in the trial court. A TRO was then issued to

prevent the law from being enforced. The respondent court entered

its decision declaring the law valid.

Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No.

640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise

ofpolicepower. Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not

within the power of' the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in

Section 15(n) of Republic Act No. 523 where it states that the

Muncipal board can only fix license fees for theaters and not

admission rates.

The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by

invoking the general welfare clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the

cited law.

Issue:


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Does this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the

fixing of prices of admission to these places of exhibition and

amusement whether under its generalgrantof power or under the

general welfare clause as invoked by the City?

Held: The ordinance is under neither and thus unconstitutional.

Petition granted.

Ratio:

1. Kwong Sing v. City of Manila- the word "regulate" was interpreted to

include the power to control, to govern and to restrain, it would seem

that under its power to regulate places of exhibitions and amusement,

the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan could make

properpoliceregulations as to the mode in which the business shall be

exercised.

In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters,

cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are subject to

regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of

delegatedpolicepower by thelocal government.

People v. Chan- an ordinance of the City of Manila prohibiting first run

cinematographs from selling tickets beyond their seating capacity was

upheld as constitutional for being a valid exercise ofpolicepower.

The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority toenact the ordinance in question under its power to regulate embodied

in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power as delegated to it

under the general welfare clause to justify the enactment of

said ordinance


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To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that

the interest of the public generally requires an interference with private

rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the

accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive uponindividuals.

The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public

interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual

and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words,

the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is

not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.

Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due processclause of the Constitution for being oppressive, unfair, unjust,

confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade, and violative of the right

of persons to enter into contracts, considering that the theater owners

are bound under a contract with the film owners for

just admission prices for general admission, balcony and lodge.

Homeowners Association- the exercise ofpolicepower is necessarily

subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by theregard, the respect and the obedience due to the prescriptions of the

fundamental law

The court agreed with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by

any necessity for the public interest. Thepolicepower legislation must

be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable

relation must exist between purposes and means.

The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of

cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same amount of

money for the admission of their children, as they would for

themselves. A reduction in the price of admission would mean

corresponding savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are


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the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. Theordinance does

not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise

penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners

point out, there will be difficulty in its implementation because asalready experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of

theordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age

as below 12 years in order to avail of the benefit of the ordinance.

The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable

practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests

that birth certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the

age of children. This is, however, not at all practicable. We can see

that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressiveupon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible

relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health,

safety, morals and the general welfare.

Respondent further alleges that by charging the full price, the children

are being exploited by movie house operators. We fail to see how the

children are exploited if they pay the full price ofadmission. They are

treated with the same quality of entertainment as the adults.

Moreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie house

and theater operators will be discouraged from exhibiting wholesome

movies for general patronage, much less children's pictures if only to

avoid compliance with the ordinance and still earn profits for

themselves.

A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license,revocable at the will of the proprietor of the theater or it may be

evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable consideration, the

purchaser has acquired the right to enter the theater and observe the

performance on condition that he behaves properly. Such ticket,

therefore, represents a right, Positive or conditional, as the case may


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be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale. This right is

clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that right is

also, necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner thereof, in

the absence of any condition to the contrary in the contract by whichhe obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to

whom he pleases and at such price as he can obtain.

In no sense could theaters be considered public utilities. The State

has not found it appropriate as a national policy to interfere with

the admission prices to these performances. This does not mean

however, that theaters and exhibitions are not affected with public

interest even to a certain degree. Motion pictures have beenconsidered important both as a medium for the communication of

Ideas and expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the

perceptions by our people of issues and public officials or public

figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits are considerable.

While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that

such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the

regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot beoppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or

calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not,

under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by

the exercise ofpolicepower.

Apolicemeasure for the regulation of the conduct, control and

operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and

lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. 34 The right ofthe owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is

an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the

protection of the due process clause.


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Although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or

reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must

nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness

appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by properevidence.

Dela Cruz v ParasG.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983Fernando , CJ:

Facts:

1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs. Petitioners

contended that the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid ofpower to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging

that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses

previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.

2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act GrantingMunicipal or City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance

and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial

Jurisdictions.'

The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have

the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night

clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools,

and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction:

On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate,

but likewise "Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA

938.

3. Asthus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may goas far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not

changed one bit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that

of regulation, not prohibition.

4. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give riseto a constitutional question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of

Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorariby way of appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid


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NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory

power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.

1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressedin the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not

prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality ofBocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise

of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, and

improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to

all "the great public needs.

2. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between twopossible interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the

other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would

save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself.

3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operationof night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It

would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that

petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal

to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial

correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued

existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel

petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount

to no more than a temporary termination of their business.

4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but anexercise of an assumed power to prohibit.

City Government of QC vs JudgeEricta & Himlayang Pilipino

Police Power Not Validly Exercised

Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING

THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE

MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE

JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE

VIOLATION THEREOF. The law basically provides that at least six (6)


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percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside

for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been

residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be

determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking

police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.

HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is

no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent

of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of

deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety,or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking

without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit

paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building

or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the

burden to private cemeteries.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-31249 August 19, 1986

SALVADOR VILLACORTA as City Engineer of DagupanCity, and JUAN S. CAGUIOA as Register of Deeds of

Dagupan City,petitioners,-versus-

GREGORIO BERNARDO and HON. MACARIO


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OFILADA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of

Pangasinan respondents.

Victor T. Llamas, Jr. for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari against a decision of the Court ofFirst Instance of Pangasinan annulling an ordinance adopted bythe municipal board of Dagupan City.

The ordinance reads in full as follows:

ORDINANCE 22

AN ORDINANCE REGULATING SUBDIVISIONPLANS OVER PARCELS OF LAND IN THE CITYOF DAGUPAN.

Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of DagupanCity in session assembled:

Section 1. Every proposed subdivision plan over anylot in the City of Dagupan, shalt before the same issubmitted for approval and/or verification by theBureau of Lands and/or the Land Registration

Commission, be previously submitted to the CityEngineer of the City who shall see to it that noencroachment is made on any portion of the publicdomain, that the zoning ordinance and all otherpertinent rules and regulations are observed.


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Section 2. As service fee thereof, an amountequivalent to P0.30 per square meter of every lotresulting or win result from such subdivision shall be

charged by the City Engineer's Office.Section 3. It shall be unlawful for the Register ofDeeds of Dagupan City to allow the registration of asubdivision plan unless there is prior writtencertification issued by the City Engineer that such planhas already been submitted to his office and that thesame is in order.

Section 4. Any violation of this ordinance shall bepunished by a fine not exceeding two hundred(P200.00) pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6)months or both in the discretion of the judge.

Section 5. This ordinance shall take effectimmediately upon approval.

In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court aquodeclared:

From the above-recited requirements, there is noshowing that would justify the enactment of thequestioned ordinance. Section 1 of said ordinanceclearly conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because

the latter law does not require subdivision plans to besubmitted to the City Engineer before the same issubmitted for approval to and verification by theGeneral Land Registration Office or by the Director ofLands as provided for in Section 58 of said Act.


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Section 2 of the same ordinance also contravenes theprovisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the latter beingsilent on a service fee of PO.03 per square meter of

every lot subject of such subdivision application;Section 3 of the ordinance in question also conflictswith Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter lawdoes not mention of a certification to be made by theCity Engineer before the Register of Deeds allowsregistration of the subdivision plan; and the lastsection of said ordinance imposes a penalty for itsviolation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does not

impose. In other words, Ordinance 22 of the City ofDagupan imposes upon a subdivision owner additionalconditions.

xxx xxx xxx

The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of theordinance in bringing to a halt the surreptitious

registration of lands belonging to the government. Butas already intimidated above, the powers of the boardin enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot be heldvalid when it shall impede the exercise of rightsgranted in a general law and/or make a general lawsubordinated to a local ordinance.

We affirm.

To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates toother ordinances amending and so violating national laws in theguise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passedimposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage


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licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, tominimize carnaping; the execution of contracts, to forestallfraud; the validation of passports, to deter imposture; the

exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on.The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid,would be ultra vires.

So many excesses are attempted in the name of the police powerthat it is time, we feel, for a brief admonition.

Regulation is a fact of life in any well-ordered community. As

society becomes more and more complex, the police powerbecomes correspondingly ubiquitous. This has to be so for theindividual must subordinate his interests to the common good,on the time honored justification of Salus populi est supremalex.

In this prolix age, practically everything a person does and ownsaffects the public interest directly or at least vicariously,

unavoidably drawing him within the embrace of the policepower. Increasingly, he is hemmed in by all manner of statutory,administrative and municipal requirements and restrictions thathe may find officious and even oppressive.

It is necessary to stress that unless the creeping interference ofthe government in essentially private matters is moderated, it islikely to destroy that prized and peculiar virtue of the free

society: individualism.

Every member of society, while paying proper deference to thegeneral welfare, must not be deprived of the right to be leftalone or, in the Idiom of the day, "to do his thing." As long as he


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does not prejudice others, his freedom as an individual must notbe unduly curtailed.

We therefore urge that proper care attend the exercise of the

police power lest it deteriorate into an unreasonable intrusioninto the purely private affairs of the individual. The so-called"general welfare" is too amorphous and convenient an excusefor official arbitrariness.

Let it always be remembered that in the truly democratic state,protecting the rights of the individual is as important as, if not

more so than, protecting the rights of the public.This advice is especially addressed to the local governmentswhich exercise the police power only by virtue of a validdelegation from the national legislature under the generalwelfare clause. In the instant case, Ordinance No. 22 suffersfrom the additional defect of violating this authority forlegislation in contravention of the national law by adding to its

requirements.WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court annulling thechallenged ordinance is AFFIRMED, without anypronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera and Paras, JJ.,

concur.

TATEL VS. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC [207SCRA 157; G.R. No. 40243; 11 Mar 1992]
http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/tatel-vs-municipality-of-virac-207-scra.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/tatel-vs-municipality-of-virac-207-scra.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/tatel-vs-municipality-of-virac-207-scra.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/tatel-vs-municipality-of-virac-207-scra.html


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Facts: Petitioner Celestino Tatel ownsa warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality ofVirac. Complaints were received by

themunicipality concerning the disturbance causedby the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside

petitionerswarehouse. A committee was thenappointed by the municipal council, and it noted fromitsinvestigation on the matter that an accidental firewithin thewarehouse of the petitioner created adanger to the lives and properties of the people in the

neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed bythe Municipal council declaring said warehouse as apublic nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of theNew Civil Code. According to

respondent municipal officials,petitionerswarehouse was constructed in violation

of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting theconstruction of warehouses near a block of houses

either in the poblacion or barrios without maintainingthe necessary distance of 200 meters from said blockof houses to avoid loss of lives and properties byaccidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends

that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not petitionerswarehouse is anuisance within the meaning Article 694 of the CivilCode


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(2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952of the Municipalityof Virac is unconstitutional andvoid.

Held:The storage of abaca and copra inpetitionerswarehouse is a nuisance under theprovisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the

same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed bythe Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its

police power. It is valid because it meetsthe criteria for a valid municipal ordinance: 1) mustnot contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2)must not be unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be

partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but mayregulate trade, 5) must be general and consistentwith public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable.

The purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the lossof property and life in case of fire which is one of theprimordial obligation of government. The lower court

did not err in its decision.

case digests consti 2 ch 5

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