Daza v. Singson G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989

Cruz, J.

Facts: The House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally

resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and

correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members. On the basis of this

development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on

Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-

formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives

consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis

C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP. The petitioner came to the Supreme Court

to challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his

seat by the respondent. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with

preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary restraining order that same day to prevent both

the petitioner and the respondent from serving in the Commission on Appointments. Briefly

stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the Commission on

Appointments because his election thereto is permanent. His claim is that the reorganization of

the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment

because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political

stability.

Issue: whether the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

Held: No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved is not a

discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is

political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that

chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments. The term political

question connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of

policy. In other words, it refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be

decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary

authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is

concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. Even

if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still

not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now

covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution

clearly provides: Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in

such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts

of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and

enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the

Government.

G.R. No. L-28790             April 29, 1968 (Noblejas v Teehankee)

Facts

Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land

Registration, a position created by Republic Act No. 1151. By the terms of section 2 of said

Act, the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and

privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.”

On March 7, 1968, the respondent, Claudio Teehankee sent a letter which requires him to

explain why no disciplinary action must be taken against him for "approving or recommending

approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas

greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles." Noblejas then answered that he

could be only suspended and investigated in the same way as a Judge of first instance and

therefore, all these actions must be submitted to the Supreme Court, conformably to section 67

of the Judiciary act (R.A. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

March 17, 1968 he received a communication from the executive secretary which states that

he is suspended and has a pending investigation for his gross negligence and conduct

prejudicial to the public interest.

March 18, 1968, the petitioner applied to the court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his

letter to the Secretary of Justice claiming the lacking of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion on

the letter.

Issues

Whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme

Court, in view of the conferment upon him by the Statutes heretofore mentioned Rep. Act

1151 and Appropriation Laws of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First

Instance.

Ruling

It is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is

a District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary at all.

In the second place, petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First

Instance" includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and

to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same

right being possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had

indiscriminately conferred the same privileges.

Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor General,

another appointee of the President, could not be removed by the latter, since the Appropriation

Acts confer upon the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of

Appeals, and these Justices are only removable by the Legislature, through the process of

impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).

Such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it granted

these executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges of First Instance. It is thereby shown

that where the legislative design is to make the suspension or removal procedure prescribed

for Judges of First Instance applicable to other officers, provision to that effect is made in

plain and unequivocal language.

But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the

Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and

privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme

Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such

grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine

of separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory

control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief

Executive over such officials.

WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are denied, and the petition

is ordered dismissed. No costs.

G.R. Nos. 177857-58. January 24, 2012

Philippine Coconut, Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), Manuel V. Del Rosario,

Domingo P. Espina, Salvador P. Ballares, Joselito A. Moraleda, Paz M. Yason, Vicente A.

Cadiz, Cesaria De Luna Titular, and Raymundo C. De Villa, Petitioners, vs. Republic of

the Philippines, respondent.

Facts:

In 1971, R.A. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company to administer

the Coconut Investment Fund. The declaration of martial law in September 1972 saw the

issuance of several presidential decrees purportedly designed to improve the coconut industry

through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund. In G.R. Nos. 177857-58, class action

petitioners COCOFED and a group of purported coconut farmers and COCOFED members,

hereinafter “COCOFED et al.” collectively seek the reversal of the judgments and resolutions

of the anti-graft court insofar as these issuances are adverse to their interests. As a procedural

issue, COCOFED, et al. and Ursua contends that in the course of almost 20 years that the

cases have been with the anti-graft court, they have repeatedly sought leave to adduce

evidence (prior to respondent’s complete presentation of evidence) to prove the coco

farmers’  actual and beneficial ownership of the sequestered shares.  The Sandiganbayan,

however, had repeatedly and continuously disallowed such requests, thus depriving them of

their constitutional right to be heard.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not petitioners COCOFED et al. were not deprived of their right to be heard;

(2) Whether or not the right to speedy trial was violated.

Ruling:

(1)  No, petitioner COCOFED’s right to be heard had not been violated by the mere issuance of

PSJ-A and PSJ-F before they can adduce their evidence. As it were, petitioners COCOFED et

al. were able to present documentary evidence in conjunction with its “Class Action Omnibus

Motion” dated February 23, 2001 where they appended around four hundred (400) documents

including affidavits of alleged farmers. These petitioners manifested that said documents

comprise their evidence to prove the farmers’ ownership of the UCPB shares, which were

distributed in accordance with valid and existing laws. Lastly, COCOFED et al. even filed

their own Motion for Separate Summary Judgment, an event reflective of their admission that

there are no more factual issues left to be determined at the level of the Sandiganbayan.  This

act of filing a motion for summary judgment is a judicial admission against COCOFED under

Section 26, Rule 130 which declares that the “act, declaration or omission of a party as to a

relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.”

(2) No. As a matter of settled jurisprudence, but subject to equally settled exception, an issue not

raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.  The sporting idea

forbidding one from pulling surprises underpins this rule. For these reasons, the instant case

cannot be dismissed for the alleged violation of petitioners’ right to a speedy disposition of the

case. It must be clarified right off that the right to a speedy disposition of case and the

accused’s right to a speedy trial are distinct, albeit kindred, guarantees, the most obvious

difference being that a speedy disposition of cases, as provided in Article III, Section 16 of the

Constitution.  In fine, the right to a speedy trial is available only to an accused and is a

peculiarly criminal law concept, while the broader right to a speedy disposition of cases may

be tapped in any proceedings conducted by state agencies.

Aytona vs Castillo G.R. No. L-19313 Jan. 19, 1962

Facts:

On December 29, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia appointed Dominador R. Aytona as ad

interim Governor of the Central Bank. On the same day, the latter took the corresponding oath.

On December 30, 1961, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on

December 31, 1961, he issued Administrative Order No. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and

cancelling all ad interim appointment made by President Garcia after December 13, 1961,

(date when he, Macapagal, had been proclaimed elected by the Congress). On January 1, 1962,

President Macapagal appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank,

and the latter qualified immediately.

In revoking the appointments, President Macapagal is said to have acted for these and other

reasons: (1) the outgoing President should have refrained from filling vacancies to give the

new President opportunity to consider names in the light of his new policies, which were

approved by the electorate in the last elections; (2) these scandalously hurried appointments in

mass do not fall within the intent and spirit of the constitutional provision authorizing the

issuance of ad interim appointments; (3) the appointments were irregular, immoral and unjust,

because they were issued only upon the condition that the appointee would immediately

qualify obviously to prevent a recall or revocation by the incoming President, with the result

that those deserving of promotion or appointment who preferred to be named by the new

President declined and were by-passed; and (4) the abnormal conditions surrounding the

appointment and qualifications evinced a desire on the part of the outgoing President merely

subvert the policies of the incoming administration.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the midnight appointments of President Carlos P. Garcia are valid

2. Whether or not President Diosdado Macapagal has the power to cancel all the ad interim

appointments made by President Carlos P. Garcia

Ruling:

1. After the proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as president, President Garcia is no more

than a “care-taker” administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of

authority the incoming President, and he should not do acts which he ought to know, would

embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor.

2. Normally, when the President makes appointments the consent of the Commission on

Appointments, he has benefit of their advice. When he makes ad interim appointments, he

exercises a special prerogative and is bound to be prudent to insure approval of his selection

either previous consultation with the members of the Commission or by thereafter explaining

to them the reason such selection. Where, however, as in this case, the Commission on

Appointments that will consider the appointees is different from that existing at the time of the

appointment and where the names are to be submitted by successor, who may not wholly

approve of the selections, the President should be doubly careful in extending such

appointments. Now, it is hard to believe that in signing 350 appointments in one night,

President Garcia exercised such "double care" which was required and expected of him; and

therefore, there seems to be force to the contention that these appointments fall beyond the

intent and spirit of the constitutional provision granting to the Executive authority to issue ad

interim appointments.

Under the circumstances above described, what with the separation of powers, this Court

resolves that it must decline to disregard the Presidential Administrative Order No. 2,

cancelling such "midnight" or "last-minute" appointments.

December 9, 1977

Dela Llana v. Commission on Elections

Facts:

                On December 17, 1977,  a referendum  was conducted throughout the Philippines on

the question, “Do you vote that President Ferdinand E. Marcos continue in office as incumbent

President and be Prime Minister after the organization of the Interim Batasang Pambansa as

provided for in Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 Amendments to the Constitution?”, as ordered

by the Presidential Decree No. 1229.  The COMELEC was the one authorized to promulgate

the rules and regulations for the proper of the said decree.

                If the people vote “Yes”, Amendment No. 3 will merely be reaffirmed and

reinforced. If the people vote “No”, then the incumbent President, as he announced, will

resign. It shows that he will be heeding the will of the people.  

                G. Dela Llana, the petitioner, filed a “Petition for Prohibtion or Declaratory Relief”

against the respondents holding the said referendum.

Issue:

1.       whether or not the Referendum Question, “Do you vote that President Ferdinand E. Marcos

continue in office as incumbent President and be Prime Minister after the organization of the

Interim Batasang Pambansa as provided for in Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 Amendments to

the Constitution? will result to indirect amendment to Amendment No. 3 to the constitution

2.       whether or not the holding of the December 17, 1977 referendum is unnecessary is believed

to be a political and not a justiciable question

3.       whether or not the call for referendum is explicitly authorized by the Amendment No. 7 of

the Constitution

Held:

1.       The referendum question in neither in the nature nor form of an amendment. It will not

result in an indirect amendment to Amendment No. 3 to the constitution which provides

that “The incumbent President of the Ph shall be the Prime Minister and he shall continue to

exercise powers” vested upon him as the President and the Prime Minister under the

Constitution. Thus, the referendum in question will not suffer from any constitutional

infirmity because it will not alter the Constitution. 

2.       The court ruled that matter of whether or not holding of the December 17, 1977

referendum is unnecessary because it was observed from several occasions that the people

approved the incumbent President’s continuance in the office as well as his programs (Marcos)

and as the holding of the referendum. It is then a political question as it involves the wisdom

of the decision to call for a referendum. Also, the power to determine when a referendum

should be called and what matter is important for referral to the people is vested in the

legislative department, and not in the judicial department.

3.       The call for referendum is explicitly authorized by the Amendment No. 7 of the

Constitution which provides that “referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the

supervision of the COMELEC may be called at any time the government deems it necessary to

ascertain the will of the people re. any important matter of whether of national or local

interest.”

                 If the President want to pursue this grant of power, he may do so as what he already

did, to consult with the people and submit himself to the vote of confidence in a referendum

because he deems it important and necessary. Such act of the President (Marcos) is

constitutional and it is also in full accord with the spirit of Section 1, Art XIII of the

Constitution which stipulates that “public office is a public trust and that public officers shall

remain accountable to the people.”

 

“It is clear from the above that the petition does not pose any question of sufficient

importance or significance to warrant the further intention of the Court.

 

The courts ruled that they will not give due course to the petition and dismiss the same.

 

Note: Yung RED, explanation part lang. Then, mukha lang mahaba pero dahil yun sa mga

direct quotation of provisions and others.  :D

No. L-4221 August 30, 1952

Montenegro vs. Castañeda

Facts: In October 1950, Montenegro’s son was arrested by Military Intelligence Service of the

AFP, for complicity with a communistic organization in the commission of acts of rebellion,

insurrection or sedition. Three days after the arrest, Proclamation No. 210 was proclaimed

suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Montenegro then filed before the court

to have his son be set free for his arrest was w/o cause and that the said Proclamation should

not be applied retroactively to his son for it would then constitute a violation of the

constitutional prohibition against bill of attainders or ex post facto law. Montenegro then filed

a petition for the writ of habeas corpus seeking the release of his son.

 Issue: Whether or not Proclamation No. 210 suspending the privilege of writ of habeas

corpus is valid

 Ruling: Yes. The stay of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, ordered in Proclamation

No. 210, is in accordance with the powers expressly vested in the legislation and execution by

the Constitution and the decision is final and conclusive upon the Judicial department and

upon all persons. The President has the power to suspend such writ when public safety

requires it, in cases of (1) invasion, (2) insurrection, (3) rebellion or (4) imminent danger

thereof. On the other hand, there is no doubt it was erroneous to include those accused of

sedition among the persons as to whom suspension of the writ is decreed. Under the

Constitution the only grounds for suspension of the privilege writ are ‘invasion, insurrection,

rebellion, or imminent danger”. Obviously, however, the inclusion of sedition does not

invalidate the entire proclamation; and it is immaterial in this case, inasmuch as the

petitioner’s descendant is confined in jail not only for sedition, but for the grave offense of

rebellion and insurrection. The Constitutional authority may not correctly be placed in doubt.

In Re Patterson

Facts:

The 15th day of October, 1901, Act 265 of the Legislative Commission of the Philippines was

promulgated; about the 23d of November following a British subject, Thomas Toye Patterson,

arrived at the port of Manila from abroad on board the steamer Yuensang. It appeared in the

course of these proceedings that Patterson was a justice of the peace under the Australian

Government, and had not lost his official character notwithstanding his residence of ten

months in the United States, from whence he had gone to the British colony of Hongkong, and

from the latter point proceeded to the port of Manila. Upon being arrested by the Collector of

Customs of the Philippine Archipelago twenty-four hours after landing he sued out a writ

of habeas corpus, the object of the present decision, to which Mr. W. Morgan Shuster, as such

Collector of Customs of the Philippine Archipelago, made return that he had arrested said

Patterson because he had reasonable grounds to believe him guilty of some or all of the

offenses specified in said law. 

Issue:

Whether or not the arrest made was valid

Held:

Under these circumstances the Government exercising in a sovereign and efficacious manner

this attribute of executive power has authorized an administrative officer to prevent the

entrance into the country of persons from abroad whom he has reasonable grounds to believe

guilty of having aided, abetted, or instigated insurrection, or whom he suspects of coming to

the Philippines with that purpose. The power conferred in these terms upon this executive

officer is discretional. Hence, his act is presumed to be based upon reasonable grounds for

believing certain persons guilty of the acts or of an intention to commit the acts defined by the

law.

VERA V. AVELINO

FACTS:

Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress of the

Philippines a report regarding the national elections held the previous month. It stated that by

reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in the province of Pampanga, Nueva

Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the true and free expression

of the popular will. During the session, when the senate convened on May 25, 1946, a

pendatum resolution was approved referring to the report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon

Diokno and Jose E. Romero – who had been included among the 16 candidates for senator

receiving the highest number of votes, proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections – shall

not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber, pending the termination of the of the

protest lodged against their election. Petitioners thus immediately instituted an action against

their colleagues responsible for the resolution, praying for an order to annul it and compelling

respondents to permit them to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial prerogative.

They also allege that only the Electoral Tribunal had jurisdiction over contests relating to their

election, returns and qualifications. Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution.

ISSUES:

1.Whether the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes

cast in the said provinces are valid.

2.Whether administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose

Romero should be deferred pending hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their

elections.

RULING: The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of

powers, holding that the case was not a “contest”, and affirmed the inherent right of the

legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership. Following the powers

assigned by the Constitution, the question raised was political in nature and therefore not

under the juridical review of the courts

TANADA v. ANGARA

272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997

 Facts :

This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization

(WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their

capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the

reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus,

provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with

exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in

the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and

impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of

the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

 

Issue :

Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.

 

Held:

In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally

accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy

of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine

of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law,

which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda – international

agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but

creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.

Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute

because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines

joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the “concept

of sovereignty as autolimitation.” What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to

determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial

inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as

WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also,

it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only

viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of

international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction.

Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.

Tanada vs. Cuenco

FACTS: After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly

occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who

belonged to the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial

candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET).

But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET

should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme

Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since

there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the

minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So

did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be  dominated by NP senators then

he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest.

Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot

take cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to

choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada and

Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar

of public opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD: NO. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable

question. The term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a

question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided

by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has

been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with

issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Respondents assail jurisdiction to entertain the petition, upon the ground that the power to

choose six (6) Senators as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been expressly

conferred by the Constitution upon the Senate, despite the fact that the draft submitted to the

constitutional convention gave to the respective political parties the right to elect their

respective representatives in the Electoral Commission provided for in the original

Constitution of the Philippines, and that the only remedy available to petitioners herein "is not

in the judicial forum", but "to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion."

We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. To begin

with, unlike the cases of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil.,

192) — relied upon by the respondents — this is not an action against the Senate, and it does

not seek to compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform

their duties as members of said House. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate

shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part

neither of Congress nor of the Senate. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139;

Suanes vs. Chief Accountant, 81 Phil., 818; 46 Off. Gaz., 462.)

Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the

Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has

prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. As the author of a very

enlightening study on judicial self-limitation has aptly put it: "The courts are called upon to

say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall be exercised, and on the other hand, to

determine whether the powers thus possessed have been validly exercised. In performing the

latter function, they do not encroach upon the powers of a coordinate branch of the

government, since the determination of the validity of an act is not the same thing as the

performance of the act. In the one case we are seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves the

duty of the particular service. In the other case we are merely seeking to determine whether

the Constitution has been violated by anything done or attempted by either an executive

official or the legislative." (Judicial Self-Limitation by Finkelstein, pp. 221, 224, 244, Harvard

Law Review, Vol. 39; emphasis supplied.) Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative

power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from

the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress And, since

judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two

Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity

of an act of one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be

determined in the proper actions.

Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC

GR No. 203766

 

Facts: These consolidated cases were filed against respondent COMELEC after Atong

Paglaum and several other party lists were disqualified from the May 2013 elections. They

were disqualified under the ground that they did not represent marginalized or

underrepresented sectors, as required by Sec 5, Art VI, par 2. Petitioners prayed for the

issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

 

Issue: WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the parties

 

Held: No, COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing

decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May

2013 party-list elections. The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013

party-list elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and

sectoral groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented"

sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector

they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political

or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the

"marginalized and underrepresented."

 

The cases were remanded back to the COMELEC for a new trial, taking into consideration the

new parameters and guidelines set.

 

Three groups that may participate under the partylist system: (1) national parties or

organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

Estrada v. Desierto

GR Nos. 146710-15

 

Facts: Beginning October 2000, numerous issues against then President Joseph Estrada were

brought to light such as his involvement in illegal gambling, bribery, and other forms of

corruption. A number of fellow politicians and people in position came forward to expose

President Estrada on his acts of corruption, leading to a call for his impeachment or for him to

resign. In November, House Speaker Villar transmitted the articles of Impeachment signed by

115 representatives. On November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of

the petitioner. After a long and intense battle for the petitioner’s impeachment or his own

voluntary resignation, on January 20, Supreme Court declared that the position of presidency

was now vacant and at noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to Vice President

Arroyo as President of the Philippines.

 

On the same day, petitioner released a press statement, saying that, though he questions the

legality of Arroyo’s proclamation as president, he shall leave the presidency and Malacanang

Palace for the sake of peace and order in the country.

 

The Ombudsman continued to file cases against the petitioner on his acts of corruption.

Estrada, however, filed a motion compelling the Ombudsman to refrain from probing into the

case until his term expires, stating that he is merely on leave, being unable to fulfil his duties

as president, and that Arroyo is only an acting President.

 

Issue: WON the petitions present a justiciable controversy

*WON Estrada resigned as President

*WON Arroyo is an acting president only

*WON petitioner still enjoys immunity from suit

 

Held: Yes, the case poses a justiciable controversy as it is a justiciable question and not a

political one. Being a justiciable question, it is to be decided based on the legal merits and it is

within the Court’s jurisdiction to decide. This case requires a deliberation on the Constitutional

provisions, particularly those under Article VII.

 

Political questions are defined as "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be

decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary

authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is

concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."

Osmena vs Pendatun

Gr No. L-17144       Oct 28, 1960

 

 Facts:

Congressman Sergio Osmena delivered a speech, on June 23, 1960, entitled “A Message to

Garcia”. In the said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos P. Garcia and his

administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house on July

8, 1960, which creates a Special Committee to investigate the charges made by Osmena during

his speech and that if his allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be

subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.

The Special Committee under House Resolution No. 59, found Representative Sergio Osmena

guilty of serious disorderly behavior for making without basis in truth and in fact, scurrilous,

malicious, reckless and irresponsible charges against the President in his speech, and that the

said charges by petitioner are so vile in character, and thus degraded the dignity of the House

Of Representatives.

Osmena questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court, and he avers

that House Resolution No. 59  violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in

Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendantun filed an answer where he averred that the

Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the matter, and that Congress has the power to

discipline its members.

 Issue:

Whether or not Osmena’s immunity has been violated?

 Ruling:

No. Section 15, Article 6 of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon

members of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a

democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of

being made responsible in criminal and civil actions before the courts or any other forum

outside the Hall Of Congress. HOWEVER, it does not protect him from responsibility before

the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming

of a member therein. Therefore Osmena’s petition is dismissed.

LANSANG V. GARCIA

L-33964

December 11, 1971

 

Garcia – Chief, Philippine Constabulary

 

FACTS:

 

Aug. 21, 1971 (9PM Plaza Miranda, Manila) – Two hand grenades were thrown on to the stage where the Liberal Party was at that moment holding its presentation of candidates for the General Election scheduled for Nov. 8, 1971. Eight people were killed and many more injured, including the candidates for LP. 

 

Aug. 23, 1971 (12NN) – President Marcos issued Proclamation 889 dated Aug. 21, 1971 suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus for the persons detained by virtue of the powers vested in him by Article VII, Sec. 10, Par. (2) of the Constitution to counter the leftist (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist) insurgencies

 

Petitioners detained:

1.      Teodoro Lansang, Rodolfo del Rosario, Bayani Alcala

2.      Rogelio Arienda

3.      Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandang

4.      Luzvimindo David

5.      Dr. Nemesio Prudente

6.      Angelo Delos Reyes

7.      Victor Felipe

8.      Teresito Sison

9.      Gerardo Tomas

10.  Reynaldo Rimando

11.  Sgt. Filomeno de Castro

12.  Mrs. Barcelisa de Castro

13.  Antolin Oreta, Jr.

14.  Gary Olivar

 All are accused of being involved in the conspiracy for the avowed purpose of staging, undertaking and waging an armed insurrection and rebellion in order to overthrow the government.

 

Defense argues:

1.      Petitioners are detained on the basis of the existence of evidence sufficient to prove that they are part of the planned insurgency

2.      Their continued detention is justified due to Proclamation 889

3.      They remain to be detained as preventive measure for public safety, welfare and interest

 

ISSUE:   Did the President have the right to suspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus?

 RULING:

1.      The President did not act arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation 889 and that accordingly it is not unconstitutional.

2.      Dismissing the petitions of Lansang, Alcala, Arienda, Ilao, Carandang, Prudente, Tomas, Rimando, De Castro, De Castro, and Oreta

3.      That David, Felipe, Olivar, de los Reyes, del Rosario and Sison be put under preliminary investigation for charges in violation of the Anti Subversion Act.

 

Forbes vs. Chuoco

Plaintiffs:

Cameron Forbes - Governor General

J.E. Harding-Chief of Police

C.R. Trowbridge                -Secret Service

 

Defendants:

Chuoco Tiaco- Chinese national and a subject of the Chinese Empire

                         -resided in the Philippines for 35years

A.S. Crossfield-Judge of the Court of First Instance

 

Facts:

All parties in this case recided in Manila. Chuoco Tiaco filed in the Court of First Instance

against J.E. Harding and C.R. Trowbridge under the order of the Governer General for

deporting him to China. Concluding with a petition that a preliminary injunction should be

issued against the plaintiffs in this case prohibiting them from deporting the defendant

(Chuoco), and that they be sentenced to pay him P20,000 as an indemnity. The said complaint

having been filed with the defendant A.S. Crossfield, he, granting the petition issued against

the plaintiffs the injunction requested, prohibiting them from deporting Chuoco.

 

                In his defense, Cameron Forbes contends that the said expulsion was carried out in

the public interest of the Government and at the request of the Chinese Government. The

plaintiffs moved to dissolve temporary injunction against them for reasons that:

I.                    The complaint filed against them is insufficient to justify the

issuance of the injuction

II.                  The court is without jurisdiction to issue injuction

 

Issue:

If the Governor General, as Chief Executive, can be sued in a civil action.

Ruling:

As for the Chief of Police and the Secret Service: “They were at the time merely the hands of

the Governor General”. They were not held liable.

As for the Governor General: “In such case, he (Cameron Forbes) acts not as Governor

General, but as a private individual, and, as such, must answer for the consequences of his

act.”

GALICTO V AQUINO III

 

FACTS:

                President Aquino III, the respondent, made public in his first SONA the alleged

excessive allowances, bonuses and other benefits of officers and Members of the BOD of the

Manila Waterworks Sewerage System, a GOCC, which has been unable to meet its standing

obligations. The Senate conducted an inquiry as regards the reported excessive salaries,

allowances and other benefits of GOCCs and GFIs. It was found out that officials and

governing boards of various GOCCs and GFIs have been granting themselves unwarranted

allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options and other benefits. Senate, through Senate

Resolution No. 17, urged the President to order immediate suspension of the excessive

allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the GOCCs and GFIs. Aquino

III then issued Executive Order No. 7 which provided for the guiding principles and

framework to establish a fixed compensation and position classification system for GOCCs

and GFIs. EO 7 ordered a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of

compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI

employees for an indefinite period to be set by the president and a suspension of all

allowances, bonuses and incentives of the Members of the Board of Directors or Trustees until

December 31, 2010. Jelbert Galicto, the petitioner and a PhilHealth employee, challenged the

constitutionality of EO 7 claiming that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting

to lack or excess of jurisdiction and seek to declare null and void the moratorium on the

increase in salaries, incentives and other forms of compensation of all GOCC and GFI

employees. Respondents contended that the petition be dismissed due to procedural defects

such as petitioner lacks locus standi, certiorari is not applicable to this case, etc. They also

claimed that the President exercises control over the governing boards of the GOCCs and

GFIs, thus, he can fix their compensation packages. Congress also enacted GOCC

Government Act of 2011 (RA 10149) which expressly authorizes the President to fix

compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition assailing the constitutionality of EO 7 be dismissed

because of its procedural defects

HELD:  Yes. Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and prohibition are availed of

to question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an EO is not

judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an

incorrect remedy. The proper recourse to assail the validity of EO 7 is a petition for

declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the RTC.

                With regard to the petitioner’s locus standi to assail EO 7, the Court is not convinced

that the petitioner has demonstrated that he has a personal stake or material interest in the

outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is speculative and based on a mere expectancy.

In this case, the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be

characterized as contingent events or expectancies. The petitioner has no vested rights to

salary increases and the absence of such right deprives him of legal standing to assail EO 7.

NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE

 ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITYG.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

 

FACTS:

On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered

into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of

equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of

U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the

People’s Republic of China.

The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007

hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers

were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.

Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He

appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted

that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the

NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt

and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.

However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner

refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the

questions on:

(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,

(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and

(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.

He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that

the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid

down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and

an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his

testimony.

ISSUE: WON the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation of the Senate

Committee are beyond the reach of the Court.

HELD: No. Respondent Committees contend that their Rules of Procedure Governing

Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (the "Rules") are beyond the reach of this Court. While it is true

that this Court must refrain from reviewing the internal processes of Congress, as a co-equal

branch of government, however, when a constitutional requirement exists, the Court has the

duty to look into Congress’ compliance therewith. We cannot turn a blind eye to possible

violations of the Constitution simply out of courtesy. In this regard, the pronouncement in

Arroyo v. De Venecia is enlightening, thus:

"Cases both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power

to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with

its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision

or the rights of private individuals.

United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., the rule was stated thus: ‘The Constitution empowers

each House to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore

constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable

relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result

which is sought to be attained."

In the present case, the Court’s exercise of its power of judicial review is warranted because

there appears to be a clear abuse of the power of contempt on the part of respondent

Committees. Section 18 of the Rules provides that:

"The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may punish for contempt any

witness before it who disobey any order of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify

or to answer proper questions by the Committee or any of its members." (Emphasis supplied)

In the assailed Decision, we said that there is a cloud of doubt as to the validity of the

contempt order because during the deliberation of the three (3) respondent Committees, only

seven (7) Senators were present. This number could hardly fulfill the majority requirement

needed by respondent Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations

which has a membership of seventeen (17) Senators and respondent Committee on National

Defense and Security which has a membership of eighteen (18) Senators. With respect to

respondent Committee on Trade and Commerce which has a membership of nine (9) Senators,

only three (3) members were present. These facts prompted us to quote in the Decision the

exchanges between Senators Alan Peter Cayetano and Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. whereby the

former raised the issue of lack of the required majority to deliberate and vote on the contempt

order.

When asked about such voting during the March 4, 2008 hearing before this Court, Senator

Francis Pangilinan stated that any defect in the committee voting had been cured because two-

thirds of the Senators effectively signed for the Senate in plenary session.58

Obviously the deliberation of the respondent Committees that led to the issuance of the

contempt order is flawed. Instead of being submitted to a full debate by all the members of the

respondent Committees, the contempt order was prepared and thereafter presented to the other

members for signing. As a result, the contempt order which was issued on January 30, 2008

was not a faithful representation of the proceedings that took place on said date. Records

clearly show that not all of those who signed the contempt order were present during the

January 30, 2008 deliberation when the matter was taken up.

Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct

inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The

rights of person appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

All the limitations embodied in the foregoing provision form part of the witness’ settled

expectation. If the limitations are not observed, the witness’ settled expectation is shattered.

Here, how could there be a majority vote when the members in attendance are not enough to

arrive at such majority? Petitioner has the right to expect that he can be cited in contempt only

through a majority vote in a proceeding in which the matter has been fully deliberated upon.

There is a greater measure of protection for the witness when the concerns and objections of

the members are fully articulated in such proceeding. We do not believe that respondent

Committees have the discretion to set aside their rules anytime they wish. This is especially

true here where what is involved is the contempt power. It must be stressed that the Rules are

not promulgated for their benefit. More than anybody else, it is the witness who has the

highest stake in the proper observance of the Rules.

ARNAULT VS. BALAGTAS

G.R. No. L-6749

JEAN L. ARNAULT v. EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS 

FACTS:

 This an appeal from judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch,

Honorable Jose F. Flores presiding, in habeas corpus proceeding, declaring that the continued

detention and confinement of Jean L. Arnault in the new Bilibid Prison, in pursuance of

Senate Resolution No. 114, dated November 8, 1952, is illegal, for the reason that the

Senate of the Philippines committed a clear abuse of discretion in considering his answer

naming one Jess D. Santos as the person to whom delivery of the sum of P440,000 was

made in the sale of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estate, as a refusal to answer the

question directed by the Senate committee to him, and on the further ground that said Jean L.

Arnault, by his answer has purged himself of contempt and is consequently entitled to be

released and discharged.

 ISSUES:

(1) Did the Senate Special Committee believe the statement of the petitioner-appellee that the

person to whom he gave the P440,000 is one by the name of Jess D. Santos and if it did not,

may the court review said finding?

(2) If the Senate did not believe the statement, is the continued confinement and detention of

the petitioner-appellee, as ordered in Senate Resolution of November 8, 1952, valid?

 HELD:

(1)  No.

-          The Senate found as a fact that petitioner "has failed and refused, and

continues to fail and refuse, to reveal the person to whom he gave the amount

of P440,000" and that the situation of petitioner "has not materially charged

since he was committed to prison." In the first resolution of the Senate Special

Committee of May 15, 1950, it found that petitioner "refused to reveal the

name of the persons to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as to answer other

pertinent questions related to said amount." It is clear and evident that the

Senate Committee did not believe petitioner's statement that the person to

whom he delivered the abovementioned amount is one by the name of Jess D.

Santos.

-          There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action that the

lower court followed. It assumed that courts have the right to review the

findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of the prerogative of legislation, or

interfere with their proceedings or their discretion in what is known as the

legislative process.

-          All that the courts may do, in relation to the proceedings taken against

petitioner prior to his incarceration, is to determine if the constitutional

guarantee of due process has been accorded him before his incarceration by

legislative order, and this because of the mandate of the Supreme Law of the

land that no man shall be deprived life, liberty or property without due process

of law. In the case at bar such right has fully been extended the petitioner, he

having been given the opportunity to be heard personally and by counsel in all

the proceedings prior to the approval of the Resolution ordering his continued

confinement.

-          Arnault was given due process

(2)  YES, IT IS VALID

-          A study of the text of the resolution readily shows that the Senate found that

the petitioner-appellee did not disclose, by the mere giving of the name Jess D.

Santos, the identity of the person to whom the sum of P440, 000 was delivered,

and, in addition thereto that petitioner withheld said identity arrogantly and

contumaciously in continued affront of the Senate's authority and dignity.

Although the resolution studiously avoids saying that the confinement is a

punishment, but merely seeks to coerce the petitioner into telling the truth, the

intention is evident that the continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in fact

partly unitive.

-          American legislative bodies, after which our own is patterned, have the

power to punish for contempt if the contempt has had the effect of obstructing

the exercise by the legislature of, or deterring or preventing it from exercising,

its legitimate functions

-          The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish

recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be

considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or

necessary to effectuate said power.

-          The last resolution of November 8, 1952 is also of a coersive nature, in the sense that the Senate Committee still demands and requires the disclosure of the fact which the petitioner had obstinately refused to divulge. While the Philippine Senate has not given up hope that the petitioner may ultimately disclose the record, it is improper for the courts to declare that the continued confinement is an abuse of the legislative power and thereby interfere in the exercise of the legislative discretion.

The judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is, reversed, and the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus denied. The order of the court allowing the petitioner to give bail is declared null and void and the petitioner is hereby ordered to be recommitted to the custody of the respondent. With cost against the petitioner-appellee.

 

Romulo v Yniguez

G.R. No. 71908 February 4, 1986 Patajo, J.:

Facts:

1. Petitioners, representing more than one-fifth of all members of the Batasan in 1985,

filed with the Batasan Resolution No. 644 and complaint calling for the

impeachment of President Marcos. Said resolution and complaint were referred by

the Speaker to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government. The

Committee found the complaint not sufficient in form and substance to warrant its

further consideration and disapproved and dismissed all the charges contained in the

complaint attached. It then submitted its report which was duly noted by the Batasan

and sent to the archives.

2. 2. On August 14, 1985, MP Ramon V. Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion praying

for the recall from the archives of Resolution No. 644 and the verified complaint

attached thereto. Said motion was disapproved by the Batasan.

3. Hence, this petition for prohibition to restrain respondents from enforcing Sections

4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Batasan Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings and

mandamus to compel the Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good

Government to recall from the archives and report out the resolution together with

the verified complaint for the impeachment of the President of the Philippines.

Petitioner contend that said provisions are unconstitutional because they amend Sec.

3 of Article XI I of the 1973 Constitution, without complying with the mandatory

amendatory process provided for under Article XVI of the Constitution, by

empowering a smaller body to supplant and overrule the complaint to impeach

endorsed by the requisite 1/5 of all the members of the Batasan Pambansa and that

said questioned provisions derail the impeachment proceedings at various stages by

vesting the Committee on Justice, etc. the power to impeach or not to impeach,

when such prerogative belongs solely to Batasan Pambansa as a collegiate body.

4. Petitioners further contend that Section 8 of the Rules is unconstitutional because it

imposes an unconstitutional and illegal condition precedent in order that the

complaint for impeachment can proceed to trial before the Batasan. By requiring a

majority vote of all the members of the Batasan for the approval of the resolution

setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, the Rules impose a condition not required

by the Constitution for all that Section 3, Article XIII requires is the endorsement of

at least one-fifth of all The members of the Batasan for the initiation of

impeachment proceedings or for the impeachment trial to proceed. 5. Respondents

Speaker and the Members of the Committee on Justice of the Batasan Pambansa

contend that that the petition should be dismissed because (1) it is a suit against the

Batasan itself over which this Court has no jurisdiction; (2) it raises questions which

are political in nature; (3) the Impeachment Rules are strictly in consonance with the

Constitution and even supposing without admitting that the Rules are invalid, their

invalidity would not nullify the dismissal of the complaint for impeachment for the

Batasan as a body sovereign within its own sphere has the power to dismiss the

impeachment complaint even without the benefit of said Rules; and (4) the Court

cannot by mandamus compel the Batasan to give due course to the impeachment

complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court can interfere with the Batasan’s power of impeachment

HELD:

1. The dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan of the impeachment

proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body in the exercise of powers that have

been vested upon it by the Constitution beyond the power of this Court to review.

This Court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial prayed for

by petitioners. A dismissal by the Batasan itself as a body of the resolution and

complaint for impeachment makes irrelevant under what authority the Committee on

Justice, Human Rights and Good Government had acted.

2. 2. Aside from the fact that said Committee cannot recall from the Archives said

resolution and complaint for impeachment without revoking or rescinding the action

of the Batasan denying MP Mitra's motion for recall (which of course it had no

authority to do and, therefore, said Committee is in no position to comply with any

order from the Court for said recall) such an order addressed to the Committee

would actually be a direct order to the Batasan itself.

3. The Court held that if it has no authority to control the Philippine Senate, then it

does not have the authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting

under the direction of the Senate. The secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and disbursing

officer of the Senate are mere agents of the Senate who cannot act independently of

the will of that body. Should the Court do as requested, there will be the spectacle

presented of the court ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the

disbursing officer of the Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the Philippine Senate

ordering them to do another thing.

4. The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the person

to whom it is directed has the absolute power to execute it.

Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

DOCTRINE OF SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION

FACTS:

        In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro

Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of

the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas.

        On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect

of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. And on November

15, 1935 the petitioner took his oath of office.

        On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed

the last date to file election protests.

On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against

Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the

National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified.

        On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last

day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9.  Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to

restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest.

He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral

Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the

Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

 ISSUES:

        Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and

the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,

 

          Whether or not the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in

taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the

previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

Held :

        In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a

conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on one hand, and

the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be

interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that

it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not

subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of

the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law

between departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by

the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases.

        The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the

present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the

constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to

the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

2.     The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers previously

exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an

independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging of that power in

the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National

Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express

prohibition in the Constitution.

        Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper

exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and

qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary

implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

        and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election

protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935,

confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission

had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized.

        While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of

the election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was

still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as

depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be

"the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.

        The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional

prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua

against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the

National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest

against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor

prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might

prescribe.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby denied, with

cost against the petitioner. 

GARCIA PADILLA vs. ENRILE

G.R. No. L-61388 19 July 1985

FACTS:

This is a case about the validity of the arrest of the detainees and their being

continually held as detainees pursuant to the Presidential Commitment Order (PCO), pursuant

to LOI 1211, in relation to Presidential Proclamation No. 2045.

In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a

house in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, were arrested. The raid of the house was authorized by

a search warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina, opposed the arrest averring that no warrant of

arrest was issued but rather it was just a warrant of search hence the arrest of Padilla and the

others was w/o just cause. Padilla and companions together with 4 others were later

transferred to a place not known to petitioner. Josefina petitioned the court for the issuance of

the writ of habeas corpus.

The detainees were allegedly accused of engaging in subversive activities as

members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and were caught in the raid above

mentioned on the undertaking of a conference as members of the CPP. There were documents

found including a plan on how they would infiltrate the youth and student sector, there were

also firearms which were altogether seized by the authorities.

The court ruled that such arrest and continuity of being detained of the detainees

were in pursuant to the PCO, wherein such PCO provides for the validation of such detention,

with the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus along with the right to bail, covered by

Proclamation No. 2045, for such detention was for the interest of the public.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that the right to bail is

still to be recognized even with the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE:

          Whether or not the detention of the detainees shall be recognized as a valid arrest?

HELD:

          The court ruled in answer to the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner, the PCO

that was previously in virtue in the arrest of the detainees was replaced by Preventive

Detention Action (PDA), pursuant to P.D. No. 1877, wherein it provided that detentions made

in the like of the nature done to the detainees herein, shall not exceed one year.

          The respondents thereafter, released the detainees that were arrested in pursuant to the

PDA. The petition was then declared moot and academic by the court.

Barcelon v. Baker et al

FACTS:

Fred C. Fisher and Charles C. Cohn on behalf of Felix Barcelon filed a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus because the latter was detained and allegedly restrained of his liberty at the

town of Batangas, in the province of Batangas, Philippines Islands. It was said that John Doe

Thompson, the captain of the Philippines Constabulary, acting under in pursuance of the

orders of David J. Baker Jr., colonel of the Philippines Constabulary were the people who

detained and restrained the petitioner's liberty. It is also claimed that the petitioner is detained

without legal authority therefor. And that there has not existed during any of the times in this

petition mentioned, there does not now exist, in the said province of Batangas or any part

thereof, rebellion, insurrection, or invasion, nor any of them, in any form or degree. On the 3rd

day of August 1905, the court ordered David. J. Baker Jr., and John Doe Thompson to appear

before the court the next day at 9 o'clock a.m. to show cause why the writ of habeas corpus

should not be granted in accordance with the prayer of the petitioner. The next day, the

respondents through George R. Harvey, Attorney-General of the Philippines Islands filed their

answer to the foregoing petition. They claimed that the writ of habeas corpus should not be

issued because the court is without jurisdiction or authority to grant the privilege of writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to the issuance of the Governor-General's resolution and request of the

Philippines Commission to suspend the said writ in the Provinces of Cavite and Batangas. It is

a resolution of the Philippines Commission dated January 30, 1905 declaring that because

there is an insurrection in the Provinces of Cavite and Batangas, the said writ shall be

suspended. This is also in line wit the issuance of EO No. 6 of the President on the same day.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Judicial Department may investigate the facts upon which the legislative

and executive branches of the Government acted in providing for the suspension and in

actually suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in said provinces.

HELD:

No. It is held that it is the duty of the legislative branch to make laws and regulations as will

effectually conserve peace and order and protect the lives and property of the citizens. It is the

duty of the Governor-General to take such steps as he deems wise and necessary for the

purpose of enforcing such laws. Under the form of Government established in the Philippine

Islands, one department of the Government has no power to inquire the acts of another, which

acts are performed within the discretion of the other department. It was held that the

Governor-General and the Philippine Commission has the right to suspend the privilege of the

writ of habeas corpus under the conditions therein named on the paragraph of section 5 of the

act of the Congress on July 1, 1902. Furthermore, by the virtue of the said act of the Congress,

together with the said resolution of the Philippine Commission, the Governor-General had

authority to issue the said EO of January 31, 1905, suspending the privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus. Also, one branch of the United States Government in the Philippines Islands

has no right to interfere or inquire into, for the purpose of nullifying the same, the

discretionary acts of another independent department of the Government. The authority to

suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus is vested upon the legislative and executive

department and their decision is final and conclusive upon the Judicial Department of the

Government and upon all persons. It is there, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

G. R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012

Emilio Gonzales III (Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Enforcement

Offices) / MOLEO) v Office of the President

Facts:

In August 23, 2010, Former Police Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza hijacked a bus packed

with tourists and killed most pf its passengers in a 10-hour hostage drama. The brother of the

hijacker said that his brother was upset over a dismissal from the police force, without due

process, no hearing, and no complaint. In the aftemath of the hostage taking, IIRC / Incident

Investigation and Review Committee was created to determine accountability for the incident

through the conduct of public hearing and executive sessions. However petitioner refused to

participate inisisting that the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent constitutional body.

Nevertheless, IIRC found that the Petitioner committed serious and inexcusable negligence

and gross violation of their own rules by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to

languish for more than 9 months in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rule to resolve

motion for reconsiderations for administrative disciplinary cases within 5 days from

submission. Inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged

inaction precipitated the desperated resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner was dismissed from

office through Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770. Petitioner seeks to declare Section 8(2) of RA No.

6770 "Ombudsman Act" which gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy

Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman unconstitutional.

Issues:

1) whether or not the Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is constitutional

2) whether or not the administrative action of removal taken against Gonzales is valid

Held:

Constitutional. The power of the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special

Prosecutor is implied from his poeer to appoint. In giving the President the power to remove a

Deputy Ombudsman or Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an

authority that is alrdy implied from the President's constitutional authority to appointthe

afpresaid officials in the Offi of the Ombudsman. Invalid. The motion for reconsideration

which remained prolonged for nine months cannot be simply taken as evidence of petitioner's

undue interest in the case considering the lack of any evidence of personal grudge, social ties,

or business affiliation with any parties to the case that could have impelled him to act as he

did. The Office of the President's pronouncement of administrative accountability against

petitioner and imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed

and set aside as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in the office do not amount to

betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President while he may be vested the authority, he cannot

order the removal of the petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional

wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting a betrayal of public trust.