CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CLASS COMPILATION 5CONTENTSApplication for adm.Tabasa vs CAJacot vs Dal Co vs HRETFrivaldo vs COMELECDe Guzman vs COMELECMa vs CommissionerAlterajos vs COMELECJapzon vs COMELECRepublic vs Dela RosaBengson vs HRETCordora vs COMELECCo vs Civil RegistrarPetition for leave..Akbayan vs COMELECKilosbayan vs ErmitaLabo vs COMELECPalatino vs COMELECVilando vs HRETDjumantan vs DomingoRumualdez vs RTCAznar vs COMELECMercado vs ManzanoAsistio vs Trinidad-PeValles vs COMELECValles vs COMELECVelasco vs COMELECYu vs SantiagoAASJS vs DatumanongMacalintal vs COMELECNicolas-Lewis vs COMELECRE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR. VICENTE D CHING,digestedBar Matter. No. 914, October 1, 1999(Constitutional Law Citizenship)FACTS: Petitioner, who resided in the Philippines since his birth during the 1935 Constitution, is a legitimate son of a Filipina married to a Chinese citizen. Subsequently, petitioner elected Philippine citizenship 14 years after he reached the age of majority. OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase reasonable period and the allowance of the petitioner to elect Philippine citizenship due to circumstances like petitioner having lived in the Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino.ISSUE: Whether or not a legitimate child under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship 14 years after he has reached the age of majority.HELD: No, despite the special circumstances, Petitioner failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of 14 years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement upon reaching the age of majority. In addition, there was no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship.Co vs HRETFACTS:The respondents father, Jose Ong Chuan, was born in China but was brought to and grew up in the Philippines. He married a native Filipina, who bore eight children including the respondent. In 1955, Jose Ong Chuan was declared a Filipino citizen, and in 1957, he took his Oath of Allegiance and was issued a certificate of naturalization.Jose Jr. was a minor by that time and was finishing his elementary education in Samar. In search for better education, he went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work there. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. The respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent his childhood days.For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and correspondingly, voted there during those elections. After being engaged for several years in the management of their family business, he decided to be of greater service to his province and ran for public office. On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samal was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co, and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent on the following grounds:1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.The HRET decided in favor of the respondent.ISSUE:WON the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that Ong was a resident of Northern Samar and a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

HELD:No, the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion, based on the following premises:

1.On the issue of JurisdictionThe Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members; and so long as the Constitution grants the HRET this power, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by the Supreme Court.The power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review.

2.On the issue of CitizenshipUnder the 1935 Constitution, one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen, while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. However, under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens. The Constitutional provision in question is curative in nature, thus it has to be applied retroactively.The respondent was born in the rural town of Samar. He has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalization when he was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive government agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he does not embrace Philippine customs and values, no acts to show that this country is not his natural homeland.An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien, or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case that Jose Ong, Jr. is a Filipino when he turned 21. Any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the respondent would not only have been unnecessary but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?

3.On the issue of ResidenceThe term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person.The petitioners alleged that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place. The Court ruled that it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run.

MA VS COMMISSIONERFACTS:The petitioners herein were born of a Taiwanese father and a natural-born Filipino mother, under the 1935 Constitution. At that time, those who were born of a Filipino mother but an alien father have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. However, they were all raised, have resided and lived their whole lives in this country. They do not speak nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in Taiwan, and do not know any relative of their father. During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of Registration (ACRs). Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship. Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625.

ISSUE:WON late registration of the acquired Filipino citizenship in the Civil Registry impedes persons to become naturalized citizens of the Philippines.

HELD:No. Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of majority. They timely took their oath of allegiance to the Philippines. This was a serious undertaking. It was commitment and fidelity to the state coupled with a pledge "to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance" to any other state. This was unqualified acceptance of their identity as a Filipino and the complete disavowal of any other nationality.It was only the registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that was belatedly done. The SC ruled that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election. Petitioners have passed decades of their lives in the Philippines as Filipinos. Their present status having been formed by their past, petitioners can no longer have any national identity except that which they chose upon reaching the age of reason. The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both automatically considered as natural-born citizens. This Constitutional provision is curative in nature, and has to be applied retroactively. Thus, while the 1935 Constitution requires that children of Filipino mothers elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching their age of majority, upon the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, they automatically become Filipinos and need not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

REPUBLIC vs DELA ROSA Facts:Frivaldo, in his intent to run as Governor of Sorsogon, filed a petition for naturalization to be re-admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. When the judge set the date of the petition hearing on March, 1992, Frivaldo filed a Motion to Set the Hearing Ahead of Schedule for it to be held on January instead, as the elections will be on May. On February, Judge Dela Rosa vested Frivaldo as a natural-born Filipino by naturalization. Subsequently, Frivaldo ran and won as the Governor of Sorsogon in the May 1992 Elections. Petitioner questioned the validity of Frivaldos citizenship, arguing that his citizenship is still pending at the moment.

Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo is already a Filipino citizen when he ran as Governor of Sorsogon

Ruling: No, Frivaldo is not yet a Filipino citizen when he ran as Governor of Sorsogon. Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be executory until after two years from its promulgation. Therefore, Frivaldo is not yet a Filipino citizen at the time of the elections, as his petition for citizenship can only be made final after two years.

CO vs CIVIL REGISTRARFacts:Hubert and Arlene Co, born in 1974 and 1975 respectively, are children of Co Boon Peng, who applied for naturalization to become a citizen of the Philippines. In 1977, Pengs application was granted and took an oath as a naturalized citizen of the country. In 1998, petitioners filed for correction of entries in their certificate of birth to become Filipino citizens on the ground of their fathers naturalization.

Issue:

Whether or not Pengs naturalization would also grant naturalization to his children

Ruling:xNo, It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate of naturalization of their father, Co Boon Peng, and of his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to entitle them to Philippine citizenship. They are likewise mandated to prove the following material allegations in their petition:

(a) that they are the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng;

(b) that they were born in the Philippines; and,

(c) that they were still minors when Co Boon Peng was naturalized as a Filipino citizen.

KILOSBAYAN vs ErmitaG.R. No. 177721FACTS:May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary Ermita announced an appointment in favor of respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. The appointment was reported the following day, May 17, 2007. However, on the day of the said appointment, it was recalled by the Malacaang in question of Ongs citizenship, and was being validated by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)."

Petitioners contend that the appointment of Ong is patently unconstitutional and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners also claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, as indicated in his birth certificate,which also reveals that at the time of respondents birth on May 25, 1953, his parents were Chinese.

Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after respondent Ongs birth his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen. Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ ofcertioraribe issued annulling the appointment. Subsequently, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to prevent and restrain respondent Executive Secretary from releasing the appointment of respondent Ong. The Court required respondents to Comment on the petition in which Ermita stated that the appointment of respondent Ong was made by the President pursuant to the powers vested in her by Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution.

In support, Ermita submits that 1) The President did not gravely abuse her discretion as she appointed a person, duly nominated by the JBC. 2) Ong is a natural-born citizen as determined by the Bureau of Immigration and affirmed by the Department of Justice. 3) Undisputed evidence disclosed that respondent Ong is a natural-born citizen. 4) Petitioners are not entitled to a temporary restraining order.

Respondent Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition, maintaining that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen; that petitioners have no standing to file the present suit and the petitioners failed to include the President who is an indispensable party as the one who extended the appointment.

Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ a certification and an identification that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution, since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was born.ISSUEWhether or not respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizenRULINGYes, respondent Ong isa naturalized Filipino citizen. On this point, the Court takes judicial notice of the records of Ongs petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar. In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, Ong alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to the Philippine bar because he is a Filipino citizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a minor of eleven years and thus he, too, thereby became a Filipino citizen. It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of naturalization that this Court allowed respondent Ong to take the oath as a lawyer.

It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.

Vilando vs HRETG.R. Nos.192147 & 19214FACTSIn theMay 14, 2007elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.She won over the other contender, Olivia Paras.OnJuly 23, 2007, she assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives. Thereafter, petitions that questioned Limkaichongs citizenship were filed by her detractors: Louis Biraogo,Olivia Parasand Renald F. Vilando.These petitions were consolidated with the petition for certiorari filed by Limkaichong assailing the Joint Resolution issued by the COMELEC which resolved the disqualification cases against her.On April 1, 2009, the Court granted the aforesaid petition of Limkaichong, reversed the Joint Resolution of the Comelec, dismissed the three (3) other petitions, and directed the petitioners to seek relief before the HRET by way of a petition forQuo Warranto.

On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Vilandoas taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as registered voter of the congressional district concerned, filed separate petitions forQuo Warrantoagainst Limkaichong before the HRET. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected. They alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter.

For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.She averred that the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father was regular and in order and had already attained the status ofres judicata.Further, she claimed that the validity of such citizenship could not be assailed through a collateral attack. OnMarch 24, 2010, the HRET dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives. The petitioners sought reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, but it was denied by the HRET in its Resolution datedMay 17, 2010. Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by Vilando.

ISSUEWhether or not HRET erred in favoring the qualification of Limkaichongs citizenship.RULINGNo, the Court is of the view that the HRET committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding that Limkaichong is not disqualified to sit as Member of the House of Representatives.Vilandos argument, that the petition does not operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of Limkaichongs father as the certificate of naturalization is null and void from the beginning, is of no merit.

In this petition, Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen.To prove his point, he makes reference to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichongs father which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father.In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. Vilando asserts that as an incident in determining the eligibility of Limkaichong, the HRET,having the jurisdiction to determine her qualifications,can pass upon the efficacy of the certificate of naturalization.

Records disclose that Limkaichong was born inDumagueteCityonNovember 9, 1959.Indubitably, with Limkaichongs father having been conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino father.

Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent issuance of certificate of naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born to a Filipino mother and having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached majority age.The HRET is, thus, correct in declaring that Limkaichong is a natural-born Filipino citizen.Vilandos assertion thatLimkaichong cannot derive Philippine citizenship from her mother because the latter became a Chinese citizen when she married Julio Sy, as provided for under Section 1 (7) of Commonwealth Act No. 63 in relation to Article 2 (1) Chapter II of the Chinese Revised Nationality Law of February 5, 1959,must likewise fail.

As aptly pointed out by the HRET, Vilando was not able to offer in evidence a duly certified true copy of the alleged Chinese Revised Law of Nationality to prove that Limkaichongs mother indeed lost her Philippine citizenship.Verily, Vilando failed to establish his case through competent and admissible evidence to warrant a reversal of the HRET ruling.

AZNAR VS COMELECFacts:On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections. On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.Private respondent maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965. (pp. 107-108, Rollo)On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes, private respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu. Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.Issue:Whether or not private respondent is an alien. NORuling:Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence.In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being an American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p. 81, Rollo)Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States does not concern Us here. By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.VALLES VS COMELECFacts:Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines. On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the petition. In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before the COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.Issue:Whether or not Rosalind Lopez is an Australian or a Filipino.Ruling:The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973[4] and 1987[5] Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.YU vs SANTIAGOFACTS:Petitioner was issued a Portuguese passport in 1971 valid for 5 years and is renewable after presentment to the proper Portuguese consular officer. Although he became a naturalized Philippine citizen on February 10, 1978, the petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese passport by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo in July 21, 1981. While he was still a citizen of the Philippines, he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents which he signed sometime in April 1980.The Court issued TRO pending hearings with the Board of Special Inquiry, CID. However, the pleadings submitted before the Court clearly showed that the petitioner expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship.ISSUE:Whether the petitioners claim to continued citizenship is still valid as a ground to be released from detention in spite having reacquired Portuguese citizenshipRULING:No, the petitoners motion for the release from detention is denied. Philippine citizenship is not a commodity or were to be displayed when reacquired and suppressed when convenient.TABASA vs CAFACTS:Petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, when he was seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa became a naturalized US citizen. By derivative naturalization (citizenship derived from that of another as from a person who holds citizenship by virtue of naturalization), the petitioner also acquired American citizenship.Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1995 as a balikbayan. He was arrested and detained on May 23, 1996. Records showed that on April 16, 1996, the Consul-General of the U.S. Embassy in Manila, filed a request with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) to apprehend and deport petitioner on the ground that a standing warrant for several charges had been issued against him and that respondents passport had been revoked.

Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order on May 29, 1996. On May 30, 1996, the CA ordered that the Bureau be restrained from summarily deporting him. Meanwhile, Tabasa was temporary released through bail.However, on June 13, 1996, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired Filipino citizenship through repatriation in accordance with RA No. 8171 An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos. He further contended that because of this, he was already a Filipino citizen and therefore cannot be deported or detained by BID. The CA, in its August 7, 1996 Decision, 16 denied Tabasas petition on the ground that he had not legally and successfully acquiredby repatriationhis Filipino citizenship as provided in RA 8171. The court said that although he became an American citizen by derivative naturalization when his father was naturalized in 1968, there is no evidence to show that he lost his Philippine citizenship "on account of political or economic necessity," as explicitly provided in Section 1, RA 8171(note: find further explanation below, after the ruling). The court noted that after petitioner was ordered deported by the BID on May 29, 1996, he successively executed an Affidavit of Repatriation on June 6, 1996 and took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on June 13, 1996more than ten months after his arrival in the country on August 3, 1995.ISSUE: Whether the petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171 RULING: No, the petitioner has no legal and valid reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. RA 8171 provides repatriation to two kinds of persons:(1)Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens(2)Natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity except those provided by Sec 4, CA 63:(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas;(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseasesThis means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. It is clear that Tabasa can no longer claim repatriation under RA 8171 given that only a parent can file for it, the approval of which will only benefit the children by extension. Also, clearly, he lost his citizenship by operation of law and not due to political and economic reasons.Even if the SC concedes that petitioner Tabasa can avail of the benefit of RA 8171, still he failed to follow the procedure for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He has to file his petition for repatriation and submit required documents with the Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN), designated to process petitions for it. Such will which enable the SCN to verify if his reasons indeed qualify him for repatriation under RA 8171.The petitioner is not entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 for he has not shown that his case falls within the coverage of the law.Since Tabasa remains to be an alien and his passport has already been cancelled by the U.S. Embassy, under Immigration Act Sec 10 and 15, the alien automatically loses the privilege to undergo deportation proceedings. A summary judgment of deportation may be issued to take effect immediatelFrivaldo vs Comelec Facts: On March 20, 1995 private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Governor in May, 8, 1995 election. Petitioner Raul Lee another candidate filed a petition with the COMELEC praying that Frivaldo be disqualified from seeking and holding any public office or position by reason of not being a citizen of the Philippines and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. In defense Frivaldo stated that he was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship through Repatriation.The Second Division of COMELEC promulgated a Resolution granting the petition of Lee. The motion for reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted until the May 8, 1995 elections. His candidacy continued and was voted during the elections and he garnered the highest number of votes. The COMELEC affirmed the resolution of the 2nd resolution and directed the Board of Canvassers to reconvene thus Raul Lee was proclaimed the governor of Sorsogon. Issue: Whether or not the Repatriation of Frivaldo was valid and legal and would qualify him to act and hold office of being a Governor in Sorsogon.Ruling:No, the Repatriation of Frivaldo was valid and legal and it will qualify him to hold an office of being a Governor. Under Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. PD 725, was enacted to cure the defect of existing naturalization law in the Philippines after the regime of Marcos. Curative Statutes are retroactive since they are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws and curb certain evils. This was being used by the Petitioner to claim his Citizenship through Repatriation with Naturalization.Section 39 of the Local Government Code it states that the law intended Citizenship to be a qualification distinct from being a voter, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first.Philippine Citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office. Mr. Frivaldo indubitably a Filipino Citizen having taken his oath of allegiance and the candidate being proclaimed, who garnered the highest number of votes and such oath had already cured his previously judicially declared alienage. The law intended citizenship to be a qualification distinct from being a voter, even if being a voter presumes being a Citizen first. Frivaldos status as a registered voter would also be deemed settled. In as much as he is considered having been repatriated, his Filipino Citizenship resolved and his previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed validated. To put all doubts on this issue with repatriation of Frivaldo, it retroacted to the date of the filing of his application. Alterajos vs COMELECFacts:Petitioner was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 local and national election. Private respondents filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify and deny or cancel his candidacy on the grounds that he is not a Filipino citizen and he made false representation on Certificate of Candidacy he was not a permanent resident of the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate. Altarejos answered that he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization in December 17, 1997.Issue:Whether or not the registration of petitioners repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation and he is eligible to run as a Mayor of Masbate.Ruling:Yes. Alterajos registration with Civil Registry is a prerequisite in effecting repatriation. Section 2 RA 8171 The repatriation shall be effected by taking the Oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper Civil Registar under the Bureau of Immigration. Petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance Dec. 12, 1997 but his Certificate of Repatriation was registered in the Civil Registry of Makati City only after 6 years February 18, 2004 and with the Bureau of Immigration March 1, 2004. Petitioner therefore completed all the requirements of repatriation after he filed his Certificate of Candidacy. Petitioners repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application, therefore he is qualified to run for a mayoralty position i the government.

Bengzon v. HRETFACTS: Cruz is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, born of Filipino parents who enlisted in the US Marine Corps in 1985. Taking an oath of allegiance to the USA without expressed consent of the Republic of the Philippines, he lost his Filipino citizenship based on CA No. 63 by rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. Subsequently, petitioner Bengson, filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.ISSUE: Whether or not Cruz can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship to qualify him to become a member of the House of Representatives?RULING: Yes. The court ruled that his Filipino citizenship was valid and thus qualified his position as member of the House of Representatives. He reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which allowed any person who has rendered service to the Armed Forces of the United States to reacquire Philippine citizenship after taking the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry.Also, respondent was still considered a natural-born Filipino as correctly defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows: Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he obtained the requisite of becoming a natural-born Filipino, given that the two requisites are: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.Facts:Petitioner here is a lawyer who migrated to Canada and became a citizen thereof in order to avail Canadas free medical aid program to remedy his ailments.Two years after acquiring his Canadian citizenship, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 and returned to his home country intending to resume his practice in law.Issue: Whether or not the re-acquisition of petitioners citizenship qualifies him to continue his practice in law in the Philippines?Ruling:Yes. The court held that the re-acquisition of petitioners citizenship will qualify him to resume practice in law in the Philippines given some conditions. A Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions (he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice. 18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;(b) the payment of professional tax;(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

Labo v. ComelecFacts:Ramon Labo, Jr. is the respondent in question of his qualification for the position of Mayor of Baguio given the speculation on his Filipino citizenship. He was naturalized as an Australian in 1976, not in accordance to his marriage to an Australian spouse, but by formally taking an Oath of Allegiance to Australia. He used an Australian Visa in coming back to the Philippines in 1980, when he declared before the immigration authorities that he was an alien. He later asked for the change of his status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine citizen and was granted Immigrant certificate.His rival for the Mayoral position, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto against Labo, asserting that he is disqualified on the ground of the invalidity of his Philippine citizenship. Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian when he married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian was later declared void for being bigamous. Issue: Whether or not Labo has re-acquired his Filipino citizenship from an Australian one, thus, qualifying him to assume the position of Mayor of Baguio? Held: No. It was held that Labo has not proven that he re-acquired his Filipino citizenship after he took an Oath of Allegiance to Australia, nor was it proven that he has dual citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725 which requires him to take the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration.It can be concluded that the petitioner is not nor was he on the day of the local elections a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself because of his alienage. He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City under Section 42 of the Local Government Code.Djumantan v. DomingoG.R. No. 99358Facts:Bernard Banez, Marina Cabaels husband, went to Indonesia as a contract worker. On April 1974, he was converted to Islam and married petitioner Djumantan in accordance with Islamic rites. He then returned to the Philippines on January 1979 and petitioner with their two children immediately followed. Banez made it appear that they were just his guests. Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors and lived in the house of Banez and Marina. In 1981, Marina discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner. On March 1982, petitioners immigration status was changed to that of permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 allowing an alien wife of a Philippine citizen to be admitted. However, on September 1990, upon finding that petitioners marriage with Banez was not in accordance with the Philippine laws, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) revoked the status of permanent resident given to petitioner and made pending deportation proceedings. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she was validly married to a Filipino citizen. Issue: Whether the Indonesian wife has the right to stay in the PhilippinesRuling: No. There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines. The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from operation of immigration laws governing admission & exclusion of aliens. Marriage of an alien woman to Filipino citizen does not automatically make her a Filipino citizen & does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon expiration of her extended stay here as alien.Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies for a visitor's visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay. Under Section 13 of the law, an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and "may be admitted" as a permanent resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for permanent residency is the wife or husband of a Philippine citizen (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 13[a]). The entry of aliens into the country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legally married to Filipino citizens.

Mercado vs ManzanoG.R. No. 135083Facts:Petition for disqualification was filed against Eduardo Manzano to hold elective office on the ground that he holds dual citizenship, having been born in the United States whose laws are under the principle of jus soli and of Filipino parents, under the principle of jus sanguinis. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified Manzano for being a dual citizen pursuant to Section 4(d) of RA 7160, stating that those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public position. Issue:Whether the involuntary acquirement of dual citizenship of respondent Manzano is a ground for disqualification to hold or run office in the local positionRuling:No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli, like in the case of respondent Manzano, who as a result was able to acquire dual citizenship without any voluntary act on his part. What is inimical is not dual citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. In the case at bar, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Such act sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Also, by private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and has taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.Cirilo Valles,petitioner vs COMELECFacts: Rosalind Y basco Valles ran for re