Garcia vs. Comelec

Issue: Does an exercise of local initiative includes as subject a resolution and not just an ordinance?

Held: Sec. 32, Art. VI of the Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative. The term “act” found therein includes resolution. Thus, Sec. 3 of R.A. 6735 expressly stated the term “resolution” in the definition of initiative on local legislation.

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc vs POEA

Facts: Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund.

The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant.

The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker.

Issue: Whether or not POEA has jurisdiction

Held: The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen."The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment.

But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."

The petition is dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.

Tablarin vs. Gutierrez

Issue: Does standard have to be written as part of the law? Held: Standard may be expressed or implied from policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole.

Free Telephone Workers Union vs. Minister of Labor

Issue: Does authority conferred on Minister of Labor partake of legislative power? (authority to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes and decide on them) Held: No. SC had more liberal approach to interpretation of non-delegatablity of legislative power. Power should be delegated when task cannot be performed by legislature because issues are highly technical or require continuous decision.

Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co v. Secretary Drilon

Issue: Can implementing orders of the DOLE provide for prohibitions not included in the law it is implementing? Held: Administrative regulations should be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and cannot amend or add to the law.

Tatad v. Secretary of Energy

Issue: Is delegation of legislative power to the President and Secretary of Energy valid? Did Congress provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry?Held: YES. Oil deregulation law passed both the completeness and sufficient standard tests. Delegation of legislative power has become an inevitability in the light of the increasing complexity of the task of government. Thus, courts will bend as far back as possible to sustain the constitutionality of laws which are assailed as unduly delegating legislative powers.

People vs. Dacuycuy (G.R. No. L-45127, May 5, 1989)

Facts: Sec. 32 of R. A. No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers) provides: "Sec. 32. Penal Provision. - A person who shall wilfully interfere with, restrain or coerce any teacher in the exercise of his rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall in any other manner commit any act to defeat any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.“

Issue: Is this a valid delegation of legislative power?

Held: It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been provided by the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the length of service of a term of imprisonment which must be encompassed within specific or designated limits provided by law, the absence of which will constitute such exercise as an undue delegation. Thus, the penalty of imprisonment should be, as it hereby, declared unconstitutional.

Employees Confederation v. National Wages Commission

Issue: Is NWC allowed to fix minimum wage?

Held: YES. Congress delegated this power to the NWC, within the limits set by law and the Constitution.

Social Justice Society vs.DDB & PDEA

Facts: On December 23, 2003, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 6486, requiring the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. The said resolution was issued in order to implement Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides that “All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.”

Issue: Is the said provision of R.A. 9165 constitutional?

Held: Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification not stated in Sec. 3, Art. VI and the COMELEC is also without such power.

Veterans Federation Party, et al vs. COMELEC

20% allocation: Not all seats must be filled (limit on maximum) 2% threshold: guarantees winners have sufficient number of constituents deserving representation 3-seat limit: absolute Method of allocating additional seats: Congress is vested with the power to define the mechanics of the party list system.

Ang Bagong Bayani, et al v. COMELEC

Issue: Can political parties participate in the party-list election?

Held: YES if it represents a marginalized sector. Intent of the law is not to allow all associations to participate indiscriminately, but to limit participation to organizations representing the marginalized and underprivileged. Even the nominees must comply with this requirement. All 50 seats are reserved for the marginalized sectors, not just for 3 terms but forever.

Ang Bagong Bayani OFW vs. COMELEC

Facts: Akbayan and Ang Bagong Bayani filed their MOTIONS before Comelec to have some party-list groups DELETED FROM THE OFFICIAL LIST OF PARTIES. (for the 2001 elections)

They contend that there are SOME POLITICAL PARTIES (PMP, LAKAS-NUCD, NPC, LDP, AKSYON DEMOCRATICO, PDP-LABAN, NATIONALISTA) included in the party- list system. The argue that the party-list system is for the marginalized and underrepresented.

Issue: Whether Comelec was correct in including some of these political parties in the Party-List Election.

Held: THEY ARE QUALIFIED. These political parties cannot be disqualified from the party-list election merely on the ground that they are political parties. The Constitution provides that the members of the House may be elected through a party list system of REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS.Under the Party List Law RA 7941, a PARTY is defined as either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. A political party is also defined as a group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles, and policies for the general conduct of government, and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. Thus, political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-list elections.

While RA 7941 mentions the labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, ICCs, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, OFWs and professionals as marginalized and underrepresented, they ENUMERATION IS NOT EXCLUSIVE.Looking into the Policy behind RA 7941, it is not enough for a candidate to claim representation among these enumerated groups because representation is easy to claim and feign. The party list group (even political parties) must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented.Again, the POLICY OF THE LAW: To enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and

underrepresented sectors who lack well defined political constituencies but who could contribute to legislation.

Supreme Court: Case remanded to COMELEC to determine qualifications of these political parties.

- Guidelines: (1) party must truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors (2) major political parties allowed but they must still represent the marginalized (3) religious sector may not be represented but a religious leader may be a nominee (4) must not be disqualified under Sec 6 RA 7941 (5) must be independent from the government (not adjunct, not funded, not assisted) (6) nominees must themselves be qualified (age, residence, citizenship) (7) nominees must belong to the marginalized/underrep (8) nominee must be able to contribute to appropriate legislation

BANAT vs. Comelec

“xxx in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives. We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”

Mariano Jr vs. COMELEC

Issue: Is law that created Makati City unconstitutional because it increased Makati’s legislative districts even if total population is only 450,000?

Held: Cities with a population of 250,000 can have at least 1 representative.

Montejo vs. COMELEC

Issue: Can COMELEC move municipalities from one district to another?

Held: NO. By the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, COMELEC has the power to make minor adjustments to the reapportionment of districts. COMELEC may adjust the members apportioned to a province out of which a new one was created. It cannot transfer one municipality from the district it is located in.

Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC

Facts: A representative of the city of Cagayan de Oro file and sponsored a bill (HB No.5859) which later became a law (RA No. 9371). The said law increased the citys legislative district from one to two. COMELEC promulgated a resolution implementing the said law for election purposes.

Herein petitioner, filed a petition against COMELEC arguing that it cannot implement the law without the commencement of a plebiscite of which is indispensable for the division and conversion of a local government unit. In relation to this, petitioner prayed for a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction. Both were not granted, and the National and Local elections proceeded.

Issue: Whether or not the law, of which pertains to the legislative apportionment of a city, involve the division and conversion of a local government unit

Held: Petition DISSMISED for lack of merit.

Ratio: Creation, division, merger, abolition, and alteration of boundaries under Art. X Sec. 10 requires the commencement of a plebiscite, while legislative apportionment or reapportionment under Art. VI, Sec.5 need not. They are related but are different from each other.

Both provisions mentioned above are within the vested authority of the legislature. The Legislature undertakes the apportionment and reapportionment of legislative districts, and likewise acts on local government units by setting standards for their creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries and by actually creating, dividing, merging, abolishing local government units and altering their boundaries through legislation. Other than this, not much commonality exists between the two provisions since they are inherently different although they interface and relate with one another.

In the case at bar, no division of CDO city takes place or is mandated. CDO city politically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided along territorial line. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only the addition of another legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of representation in the House of Representatives. Thus, Art. X, Sec.10 of the Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro into two districts.

Gallego v. VerraResidence is DOMICILE:

1. intention to reside in a fixed place 2. personal presence in that place and conduct indicative of such intention To acquire a

domicile by choice:a. residence or bodily presence in new locality b. intention to remain there c. intention to abandon the old domicile

Animus non revertendi and animus manendi – the meaning of residence as found in the election law under the 1935 Constitution has been retained. Intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer.

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

DOMICILE: a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent

RESIDENCE: implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country.

RESIDENCE FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

ELEMENTS OF CHANGE OF DOMICILE: 1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

Facts: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, providing information that she is a resident of seven months in the constituency where she seeks to be elected immediately preceding the election. Subsequently, private respondent Montejo filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification, alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency (must have been a resident for not less than one year). Petitioner thus amended her COC, changing “seven” months to “since childhood.” This amendment was refused admittance for reason that it was filed out of time, so Petitioner filed her amended COC with COMELEC in division.

The COMELEC in division found the petition for disqualification meritorious and struck off the amended as well as original COCs. In ruling thus, COMELEC in division found that when petitioner chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile. The COMELEC en banc affirmed this ruling.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections

Held:

Meaning of “Residence”

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, we laid this distinction quite clearly:

Residence vs. Domicile

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously

with domicile.

In Nuval vs. Guray, the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." Larena vs. Teves reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

Did Petitioner satisfy the residency requirement?

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided.

Did Petitioner abandon her domicile of origin (Tacloban, Leyte)?

In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes.

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881).

How Domicile is Lost/Acquired

Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.

First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing

a new one; and3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated.

Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.

Aquino vs. ComelecFacts: Butz Aquino, after his stint in the Senate, decided to run for Congress in Makati. He resided in Makati by renting a condo unit. But Butz Aquino was born in Concepcion, Tarlac and

this is his domicile of origin while he was in the Senate. In 1995, he filed his certificate of candidacy for Congress in the 2nd district of Makati.

Issue: Is Butz qualified to represent Makati in Congress?

Held: No, Aquino is not considered a resident of Makati. There is no proof that he has abandon his domicile of origin which is Tarlac. He has no intention to establish a new domicile in Makati. His act of just leasing a condo unit does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s original domicile.

Domino vs. Comelec

Facts: Juan Domino resides in Quezon City but he also rented a house in Alabel Sarangani. He registered as a voter in Quezon City. However, the MeTC of Quezon City in an exclusion proceedings declared that Domino is not a resident of Quezon City but he is a resident of Sarangani. Domino ran for Congress in Sarangani.

Issue: Is he qualified to run for Congress in Sarangani?

Held: No, he is not a resident of Sarangani but he is a resident of Quezon City. The determination of the MeTC of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings as to the right of Domino to be included in the list of voters does not preclude the Comelec in determining Domino’s qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance with the residency requirement. In short, the findings of the MeTC is not conclusive or binding on the Comelec.

Co vs. HRET

Facts: Jose Ong, Jr. was born in 1948 in Samar of a Chinese father and a Filipina mother. When he was 9 years old, his father had been naturalized. In 1987, he ran for Congress in the 2nd district of Northern Samar.

Issue: Is he a natural-born Filipino and thus, qualified to run for Congress?

Held: Yes. Since his mother is a Filipino, he would be considered a natural born if he elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. However, since his father became a naturalized Filipino when he was still 9 years old, the effect of this is that it was the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for him. Besides, his exercise of his right to suffrage constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.

Bengzon vs. Cruz

Facts: Teodoro Cruz was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, he was enlisted in the US Marine and thus, he lost his Philippine citizenship. In 1994, he reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under R.A. 2630. In 1998, he ran for Congress in Pangasinan and won against his rival Bengzon.

Issue: Is he a natural born Filipino?

Held: Yes. His repatriation results in the recovery of his original nationality. Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of Filipino parents.

Valles vs. COMELEC

Principle of jus sanguinis

How Philippine citizenship is acquired Effect of filing certificate of candidacy: express renunciation of other citizenship

Facts: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is an Australian.

Issue: Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino

Held: The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

Codilla vs. de Venecia

If the validity of the proclamation is the core issue of the disqualification case, the proclamation of the candidate cannot divest Comelec en banc of its jurisdiction to review its validity

Ministerial duty of the House to administer oath of office to the winning candidate

Facts: Codilla, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Locsin, the incumbent Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. A petition for disqualification was filed against Codilla for violating Sec. 68(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, alleging that he used the equipment and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.

At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was still pending so Codilla’s name remained in the list of candidates and was voted for. In fact, he garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation as winner was suspended by order of the Comelec. After hearing of his disqualification case, he was found guilty and ordered disqualified.

Codilla’s votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly elected Representative and subsequently took her oath of office. Codilla then filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec and also sought the annulment of Locsin’s proclamation.

Issue: (1) Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction to annul the proclamation of a Representative; (2) Whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the House to recognize Codilla as the legally elected Representative

Held:

First. The validity of the respondent’s proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner.

xxxSince the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.

Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in the instant case.

xxx

(a) The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc.

To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.

In Puzon vs. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the “doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the House of Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves.” This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.

(b) The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent Locsin.

xxxA petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office.

A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in question at

the time of such proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.

Ministerial duty of the House to administer the oath of office of a winning but nevertheless unproclaimed candidate

Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified petition for mandamus “when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.

In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory.

In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.

Tolentino vs. COMELEC

Facts: After PGMA succeeded the presidency in January, 2001, she nominated Sen. Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President. When Guingona ultimately assumed the vice-presidency, it created a vacancy in the Senate. In the May, 2001 elections, the Comelec proclaimed Gringo Honasan, the 13th placer in the senatorial race as the one to serve the unexpired term of Sen. Guingona.

Issue: Was there a valid special election for the Senate vacant seat?

Held: The calling of an election, that is, the giving of notice of the time and place of its occurrence is indispensable to the election’s validity. Sec. 2, R.A. 6645 provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding election. Thus, the law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory

notice and the Comelec’s failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it.

Dimaporo v. Mitra

Issue: Can the term of a Congressman be shortened?

Held: Tenure, not term, is shortened based on the Omnibus Election code which provided that any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one he is holding (except for the President and Vice President) shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.Dimaporo’s tenure was shortened based on his filing of candidacy for the position of Governor of the ARMM. SC held the law seeks to ensure that public officials serve out their term by discouraging them from running for another office.

People vs. Jalosjos

Facts: Congressman Jalosjos (first district Zamboanga del Norte) was confined at the national penitentiary while his case for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal.

He filed a MOTION THAT HE BE ALLOWED TO FULLY DISCHARGE THE DUTIES of a Congressman, including ATTENDANCE AT SESSIONS AND COMMITTEE HEARINGS, despite his conviction for a non-bailable offense.

He claims that his re-election as congressman proves as an EXPRESSION OF THE POPULAR WILL, and cannot be rendered inutile. (he claims he has the MANDATE OF THE SOVEREIGN WILL)end sessions. He also relies on the case of AGUINALDO, were the court said that a public officer should not be removed from office for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be depriving the right of the people to elect their officers.

Issue: May Jalosjos attend sessions despite his imprisonment for a non-bailable offense, which he committed prior to his present term?

Held: Under the Constitution, privilege to be free from arrest applies only if the offense is punishable by less than 6 years of imprisonment. The accused has not shown any reason why he should be exempted from this. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the ABSENCE IS A LEGITIMATE ONE. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a non-bailable offense (more than 6 years) is certainly authorized by law, and has constitutional foundations. The RATIONALE behind confinement is PUBLIC SELF-DEFENSE. Society must protect itself, and serves as an example and warning to others. A person is taken into custody for purpose of the administration of justice. It is the injury to the public which the State seeks to redress in criminal cases.The Aguinaldo case also does not apply. It refers only to administrative removals and NOT TO IMPRISONMENT ARISING FROM THE ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL LAW.

ELECTION TO HIGH GOVERNMENT OFFICE DOES NOT FREE THE ACCUSED FROM THE COMMON RESTRAINTS OF GENERAL LAW.

What he is seeking is not mere emergency or temporary leaves from imprisonment. He is seeking to attend congressional session and meetings for 5 days or more in a week. THIS WOULD VIRTUALLY MAKE HIM A FREE MAN.

As to POPULAR MANDATE: the voters of the district elected Jalosjos with the full awareness of the limitations of his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could discharge legislative functions within the confines of prison only.

As to EQUAL PROTECTION: the performance of legitimate and even essential duties of a public offer has never been an excuse to free a person VALIDLY IN PRISON. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one of its members. Criminal Law Enforcement prevails.

Jimenez vs. Cabangbang

Facts: Bartolome Cabangbang, a congressman from Bohol caused the publication of an open letter to the President of the Philippines in several newspapers. The persons who claimed to have been maligned by the letter filed an action for damages against the congressman.Issue: Whether or not the publication is privileged?

Held: The publication of such communication is not privileged. The phrase “speech or debate therein” refers to utterances made by congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session. In causing the communication to be published, the congressman was not performing his official duty.

Antonino v. ValenciaCharges made by a Senator with Senate Committees covered by privilege of speech.

Liban vs. Gordon

Facts: Senator Richard Gordon, during his term as Senator, was elected as chairman of the board of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC).

Issue: Did Gordon forfeit his Senate seat upon his acceptance to the PNRC Chairmanship post?

Held: No. PNRC is a private organization merely performing public functions and that the PNRC Chairman is not a government official or employee. Not being a government office, the PNRC Chairmanship may be held by any individual, including a Senator or Member of the House of Congress. PNRC is autonomous, neutral and independent of the Philippine Government. It is a voluntary organization that does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is not a part of any of the government branches. PNRC is neither owned nor controlled by the Government. The PNRC Charter provides that “The President has no control in the decisions nor actions of the PNRC Chairman.” The lack of Presidential supervision proves that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive Branch or any of the remaining branches of the government, but rather, a private official.

Puyat vs. De Guzman, Jr.

Facts: An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI), a private corporation, was held. A quo warranto proceeding was subsequently instituted with the SEC, wherein Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, appeared as counsel for respondent Acero. Puyat objected on constitutional ground than an assemblyman cannot appear as counsel before any administrative body, like SEC. Thus, Fernandez withdrew his appearance, but later, he purchased ten IPI shares and then filed a motion for intervention on the basis that he is a shareholder in said corporation.

Issue: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC case

Held: Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the

protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and respected counsel.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.

Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naiveté. He would still appear as counsel indirectly.

A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.

In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747 falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Avelino vs. Cuenco

Facts: 18 February 1949 – Senator Tanada requested his right to speak on the floor to

formulate charges against Senate President Avelino be reserved. Request approved. 21 February 1949 hours before the opening of session, Senator Tanada filed a

resolution enumerating the charges against the Senate President and ordering an investigation. Senate President Avelino refused to open the session at 10am. He delayed appearance at session hall until 11:35am. He read the charges against him in public. At around 12 pm, due to the insistent demands of Senators Sanidad and Cuenco, the session was finally called to order. Sanidad, however, moved that the roll call be dispensed with. They wanted that the roll be called in an obvious conspiracy to prevent Senator Tanada from delivering his speech. The roll was called. Senator Tanada repeatedly stood up so that he could deliver his speech but was continuously ignored by Avelino. Avelino even threatened to arrest any talking senator. Disorder broke out in the gallery of the Senate. Senator David, moved for the adjournment of session but Sanidad still opposed. Suddenly Avelino banged the gavel and walked out of the session hall (along with David, Tirona and Francisco). The pro-Tanada senators remained. Senate President Pro-Tempore Arranz, suggested that Cuenco take over and preside over the session. Cuenco did and took the Chair. Senator Tanada was able to deliver his speech. The position of Senate President was declared vacant by a unanimous resolution (#68), by those who were still there. Cuenco became Acting Senate President, he took an oath and was recognized by the President of the Philippines the day after. Avelino now filed a QUO WARRANTO proceeding to declare him as the rightful Senate President.

Issues: (1) does the court have jurisdiction; (2) was the resolution making Cuenco acting president validly approved ? WAS THERE MAJORITY TO TRANSACT BUSINESS IN THE SENATE?; (3) can Avelino reclaim his position?

Held: (1) COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION. In view of the separation of powers, and the political nature of the controversy, the Constitution grants the Senate the power to elect its own president. It cannot be interfered with, nor taken over, by the Judiciary. The selection of the senate president affects only the senators themselves who are at liberty to choose at any time their officers. The remedy thus lies in the Senate Session Hall, not in the Supreme Court. (THIS IS THE ISSUE RELEVANT UNDER SECTION 16)

(2) ASSUMING THAT SC HAS JURISDICTION, the session under Senate President Pro-Tempore Arranz was VALID. It was merely a continuation of the morning session and that a MINORITY OF 10 SENATORS may not, by leaving the Session hall, prevent the MAJORITY OF 12 OTHER SENATORS from passing a resolution with their unanimous consent. The House and the members of the senate (23), constitutes constitutional majority for the purpose of a quorum to do business. The office of the Senate President is one that essentially depends on the will of the majority of the senators. Hence, Cuenco is the new Senate President. (Note: 23 was the total number because Senator Tomas Confessor was absent as he was out of the country. Majority of 23 = 12.)

Arroyo et al v De Venecia

What is alleged to have been violated in the passing of RA 8240 imposing sin taxes are merely internal rules of procedure of the House and not the constitutional requirements for enacting a law (Art 6, Sec 26-27)

Santiago vs. Guingona, Jr.

While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate President and House Speaker

Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to

revocation, modification and waiver by the body adopting them

Facts: During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was declared the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the “minority.” However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus, also a minority – had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this case for quo warranto.

Issue: (1) Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of respondent as Senate minority leader; (2) Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of legislative procedure

Held: The petition fails.

The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority

The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply “means the number greater than half or more than half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the “majority,” much less the “minority,” in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.

In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

xxx

Majority may also refer to “the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,” not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is “a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority.” Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be identified by the Comelec as the “dominant minority party” for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.

Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate President and House Speaker

While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that “[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power “to determine the rules of its proceedings.” xxx

Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature

Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not

within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.

Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to revocation, modification and waiver by the body adopting them

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they “are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.” Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.

In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty that justifies the Court’s being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.

To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the petition would easily fail.

Osmena vs. Pendatun

Facts: Osmena (in his privileged speech) charged President Garcia for extending pardon for a price. This prompted the creation of a special committee to investigate the accusations against Garcia. A House Resolution #59 was passed, requiring Osmena to substantiate his charges against President Garcia). Osmena submitted a petition for injunction against Pendatun, etc who are member of the Special Committee created by the House through Res#59. Osmena wants to annul that Resolution on the ground that it INFRINGES HIS PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY. He also claims that the statements he made were no actionable. Nevertheless, OSMENA was FOUND GUILTY OF SERIOUS DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR. suspended for 15 months. The Special Committee invoked the Power of Congress to Discipline Its Members.Osmena argues further: that the House can no longer take action against him because before Res59 had been approved, the House had taken up other business.

Issue: Can Osmena be held liable for his speech?

Held: The Constitution provides that the speech or debates in Congress shall not be questioned in any other place. They are privileged speech. However, the provision has always been understood to mean that although EXEMPT FROM PROSECUTION OR CIVIL ACTIONS for the words uttered in Congress, THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS MAY NEVERTHELESS BE QUESTIONED IN CONGRESS ITSELF.

Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression before the courts or any other forum. BUT this is only OUTSIDE THECONGRESSIONAL HALLS. It does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.On the question of whether the speech constitutes disorderly conduct, the House is the sole judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour. These are matters dependent on factual circumstances which the House knows best and cannot be presented in black and white before

the Courts. If the court would review the act of the House, then it is tantamount to giving appellate jurisdiction to a co-equal branch of the government. House Resolution 59 remains VALID. The house has exclusive power to discipline, the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere. It is inherent legislative prerogative to suspend.

Paredes Jr. v SandiganbayanIssue: Can the Sandiganbayan order the preventive suspension of a Congressman due to acts committed before his term? Held: Section 16 only provides immunity for acts committed as a member of Congress.

US vs. PONS

Facts: An information was filed against Pons for illegal importation of opium (in violation of ACT 2381). He was found guilty and was sentenced to 2 years in Bilibid.

Pons appealed arguing that the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature was on FEB 28. He contends that ACT 2338 was passed only on MARCH 1, NOT FEB 28. Hence he cannot be prosecuted.

According to the PUBLISHED JOURNAL OF THE ASSEMBLY, (which records all the proceedings), the Assembly adjourned on Feb 28, 1914 at midnight. The journal shows, with absolute certainty, that the Legislature adjourned SINE DIE at 12 midnight on Feb 28.

Pons wants the admission of extraneous evidence to prove that it was really on March 1 when the Assembly adjourned. Pons insists that it is of public knowledge determination of all other pending matters. The HANDS OF THE CLOCK WERE STAYED, in order to enable the Assembly to effect an adjournment within the time fixed for a special session.Pons argues that by stopping the clock, a resultant evil might result because it alters the probative force and character of legislative records.

On the other hand, the government asserts that the contents of legislative journals are conclusive evidence as to the date of adjournment.

Issue: What is the real date of adjournment of the assembly? Can Courts take judicial notice thereof, or is extraneous evidence allowed to prove otherwise?

Held: From their very nature and object, of the records of the Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary, and to INQUIRE INTO THE VERACITY OF THE JOURNALS OF LEGISLATURE, WHEN THEY ARE ALREADY CLEAR AND EXPLICIT, WOULD BE TO VIOLATE THE ORGANIC LAWS OF THE GOVERNMENT, TO INVADE A COORDINATE AND CO-EQUAL BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT, and TO INTERFERE WITH THE LEGITIMATE FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE LEGISLATURE.Since the journals clearly stated the actual time of adjournment (12 midnight Feb 28 1914), this settles the question and the court cannot go behind these journals.

Courts CAN take judicial notice of Legislative Journals: Courts are bound to take judicial notice of what the law is and to enable them to determine whether the legal requisites to the validity of a statute have been complied with. It is their RIGHT AND DUTY. COURTS cannot go behind the journals (cannot accept testimonial evidence) as a matter of public policy and to ensure stability. THEY ARE CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE AS TO THE DATE OF ADJOURNMENT. Extraneous evidence (such as the stopping of the clock) cannot be admitted.

Casco vs. Gimenez

Facts: This is a review of the decision of the Auditor General denying the claim for refund by Casco.Pursuant to the FOREX Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank issued a circular fixing a uniform

MARGIN FEE OF 25% on FOREX TRNSX.

Casco, in order to import Urea and Formaldehyde for its business, bought FOREX and paid MARGIN FEES.However, it later claimed that Urea and Formaldehyde are exempt from the Margin Fees, hence they now seek a refund of the margin fees paid.

This was denied by the AG because it says that only UREA FORMALDEHYDE (the finished product) is exempt and that URE materials) are not.

Casco claims however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the intended these raw materials to be exempt.

Issue: Are the raw materials UREA and FORMALDEHYD exempt based on the bill passed in Congress?

Held: NO. It is well-settled that the ENROLLED BILL is CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS as regards the TENOR OF THE MEASURE passed by Congress, and approved by the President.If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill, before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the President (which we cannot speculate now), the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial legislation.

Astorga vs. Villegas

Enrolled Bill Doctrine: As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the Chief Executive, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress.

Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential When courts may turn to the journal: Absent such attestation as a result of the

disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the entries in the journal should be consulted.

Facts: House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives and then sent to the Senate for reading. During discussion at the Senate, Senator Tolentino and Senator Roxas recommended amendments thereto. Despite the fact that it was the Tolentino amendment that was approved and the Roxas amendment not even appearing in the journal, when Senate sent its certification of amendment to the House, only the Roxas amendment was included, not the Tolentino amendment. Nevertheless, the House approved the same. Printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Reps, the Speaker, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President, and sent to the President of the Philippines who thereby approved the same. The Bill thus was passed as RA 4065. However, when the error was discovered, both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures.

Issue: (1) Whether or not RA 4065 was passed into law; (2) Whether or not the entries in the journal should prevail over the enrolled bill

Held:

Rationale of the Enrolled Bill Theory

The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:

The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.

It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.

Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential.

When courts may turn to the journal

Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the

erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.

Angara vs. Electoral Commission

Facts: In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.

On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9.

Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commision and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative, (2) Whether or not the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly

RULING:

On the issue of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a system of government. It obtains not through a single provision but by actual division in our Constitution that each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from that fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely restrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.

In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral and constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectability, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances and subject to the specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument.

The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties

in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.

Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution, but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must respect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of government.

In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting wihtin the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases.

The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

On the issue of jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission

The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain errors of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. The purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal.

The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and exercise of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution.

The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests instructed to its cognizance should be filed. Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized.

While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.

Held: The Electoral Commission is acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against he election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

Abbas vs. SET

Facts: Abbas filed an election contest before the SET, against 22 candidates of LABAN who were earlier proclaimed as senators. Abbas moved for the disqualification / INHIBITION of some senators (who are part of the SET) on the ground that they are all interested parties to the case. He wanted MASS DISQUALIFICATION of the 6 senators who comprised the SET. (JPE, Gonzales, Tito Guingona, Joey Lina, Tamano, Ziga) He argues that such is required by public policy, fair play and due process. Senator JPE in the meantime voluntarily inhibited himself. The contest being decided by only 3 members (the 3 justices Yap, Narvasa, Gutz) Abbas proposes that when more than 4 members are disqualified, the remaining shall constitute a quorum, and that if not less than 3, it may adopt resolutions by majority vote without absention.

Issue: May the senators be disqualified from the SET? Is the Abbas proposal valid?

Held: NO. It seems quite clear that in providing for the SET to be staffed by both SC Justices and Senators, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and legislative components COMMONLY SHARE the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the ERQ of senators.

In fact, the prescribed ratio of Senators to Justices is 2 to 1 an unmistakable indication that the legislative component cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of the contests. The proposed mass disqualification would leave the SET no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge is shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in the SET. Every Senator-Member of the SET may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of the case when he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of objective and impartial judgment.BUT, what we are merely saying is that, the SET cannot legally function as such, absent its ENTIRE MEMBERSHIP OF SENATORS, and that no amendment of its rules can confer on the 3 remaining Justice-Members alone the power of valid adjudicationof senatorial election contest.

Bondoc vs. Pineda

HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction to judge election contests and qualifications concerning members of Congress

For HRET to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction, it must be independent and impartial, a separate body from the legislative

HRET members are entitled to security of tenure regardless of any change in their political affiliations

HRET members cannot be removed for disloyalty to a party

Facts: Pineda and Bondoc were rival candidates as Representatives of the 4th district. Pineda won in the elections, prompting Bondoc to file a protest with the HRET, which decided in favor of the latter. However, before promulgation of the decision, Congressman Camasura’s membership with the HRET was withdrawn on the ground that he was expelled from the LDP. As such, the decision could not be promulgated since without Congressman Camasura’s vote, the deicison lacks the concurrence of 5 members as required by the Rules of the Tribunal.

Issue: (1) Whether or not the House of Representatives can issue a resolution compelling HRET not to promulgate its decision; (2) Whether or not the composition of the HRET may be affected by a change in the political alliance of its members

Held:

HRET is a non-political body

The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives:

Electoral tribunals are independent and impartial

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members.The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the election and qualification of members of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature.

Electoral tribunals as sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the legislative houses

The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as special tribunals to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodies which must be permitted to select their own employees, and to supervise and control them, without any legislative interference. (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)

To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.

The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and though not a power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ; while composed of a majority of members of the legislature it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.xxx xxx xxx

The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose of

determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)Can the House of Representatives compel the HRET not to promulgate its decision?The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would, however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.

Removal of HRET member for disloyalty to a party impairs HRET constitutional prerogative

The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.

To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.

Is disloyalty to a party a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET?

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

HRET members enjoy security of tenure

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.

Guerrero vs. Comelec

Facts: Before May 11, 1998 elections, a petition to disqualify Farinas as candidate for congress was filed with the Comelec. On election eve, Comelec dismissed the case. Farinas came out as

winner in the election and was proclaimed and later, he took his oath of office as member of Congress. A motion for reconsideration was filed with the Comelec but the Comelec denied the motion on the ground that the issue on validity of the certificate of candidacy of Farinas is already within the jurisdiction of the HRET.

Issue: Is the Comelec correct that it has no more jurisdiction over the issue?

Held: Yes. While the Comelec is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation and assumption by Farinas to the position as member of Congress is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the Comelec and the HRET. Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, Comelec’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his elections, returns and qualifications ends and the HRET’s own juridiction begins.

Garcia v. Angping

HRET procedures must be strictly followed if they are to obtain their objective: the speedy and orderly determination of the true will of the electorate. Imperative justice requires the proper observance of technicalities.

Pimentel v. HRET

Issue: Can the SC order House to reconfigure the HRET to include representatives from the party-list organizations?

Held: No. Recourse is with the House. Petition does not show that the House prevented the party-list groups from participating in the election of the members of the HRET and the CA.

Vinzons-Chato vs. COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner Chato and respondent Renato J. Unico were among the candidates for the lone congressional district of Camarines Norte during the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. During the canvassing of the election returns before the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Labo (MBC Labo) Chato raised several objections and pointed to manifest errors or obvious discrepancies in the election returns. Her objections were denied, and PBC stated that pre- proclamation controversy was not allowed for the election of Members of the House.

Then, PBC proclaimed respondent Unico as representative- elect of the lone congressional district of Camarines Norte.Petitioner Chato filed with the COMELEC a Petition alleging manifest errors. Comelec initially ordered the suspension of the effects of the proclamation of respondent Unico. But it afterwards lifted the said order on the ground that respondent Unico’s proclamation and taking of oath of office had not only divested the Commission of any jurisdiction to pass upon his election, returns, and qualifications, but also automatically conferred jurisdiction to another electoral tribunal.

In the assailed Resolution dated March 17, 2006, the COMELEC en banc denied Chato’s MR, ruling that the Commission already lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the fact that Unico had already taken his oath.

Issue: WON Comelec committed grave abuse?

Held: NO. It is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office. Hence, Comelec had already lost jurisdiction over Chato’s petition. The issues raised by petitioner Chato essentially relate to the canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity of respondent Unico’s proclamation. These are matters that are best addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the HRET. Significantly, the allegation that respondent Unico’s

proclamation is null and void does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction.

Further, for the Court to take cognizance of petitioner Chato’s election protest against respondent Unico would be to usurp the constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET. Petitioner Chato’s remedy would have been to file an election protest before the said tribunal, not this petition for certiorari. The special civil action of certiorari is available only if there is concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (1) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to annul or modify the proceeding. There must be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for certiorari to prosper.

Ratio: Taking of oath (not proclamation) is the operative act that vests jurisdiction on HRET. If proclaimed but has not yet taken oath, Comelec still has jurisdiction.

Daza vs. Singson

Facts: Petitioner Daza, a Liberal Party member, was given a seat in the Commission on Appointments. However, after the reorganization of the LDP, which resulted in a political realignment in the House. 24 members of the Liberal Party formally resigned and joined the LDP, thereby welling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members. On the basis of this development, the House revised its representation in the Commission by withdrawing the seat occupied by petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP, who was represented by Respondent Singson.

Issue: Whether or not the reorganization of the House representation in the Commission is based on a permanent political realignment as to warrant petitioner’s removal therein

Held: In the case of Cunanan v. Tan, the Court noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as the Nacionalista defectors had not disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined the new political group. Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party. The reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was invalid because it was not based on the proportional representation of the political parties in the House of Representatives as required by the Constitution. The Court held:

... In other words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even if du to arrangements of a more or less temporary nature, like the one that has led to the formation of the so-called "Allied Majority," does not suffice to authorize a reorganization of the membership of the Commission for said House. Otherwise the Commission on Appointments may have to be reorganized as often as votes shift from one side to another in the House. The framers of our Constitution could not have intended to thus place a constitutional organ, like the Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of each House of Congress.

The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test of time to prove its permanence is not acceptable. Under this theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of the seats in the House of Representatives (or the Senate) would still not be entitled to representation in the Commission on Appointments as long as it was organized only recently and has not yet "aged." The Liberal Party itself would fall in such a category. That party was created in December 1945 by a faction of the Nacionalista Party that seceded therefrom to support Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the Presidency of the Philippines in the election held on April 23, 1946. The Liberal Party won. At that time it was only four months old. Yet no question was raised as to its right to be represented in the Commission on Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status as the majority party in both chambers of the Congress.

The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has 157 members in the House of Representatives and 6 members in the Senate. Its titular head is no less than the President of the Philippines and its President is Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over recently from Speaker Ramon V. Mitra. It is true that there have been, and there still are, some

internal disagreements among its members, but these are to be expected in any political organization, especially if it is democratic in structure. In fact even the monolithic Communist Party in a number of socialist states has undergone similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it surely cannot be considered still temporary because of such discord.

If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House of Representatives would have to be denied representation in the Commission on Appointments and, for that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal. By the same token, the KBL, which the petitioner says is now "history only," should also be written off. The independents also cannot be represented because they belong to no political party. That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only with all of its seventeen members to claim all the twelve seats of the House of Representatives in the Commission on Appointments and the six legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal.

It is noteworthy that when with 41 members the Liberal Party was alloted two of the seats in the Commission on Appointments, it did not express any objection. Inconsistently, the petitioner is now opposed to the withdrawal from it of one seat although its original number has been cut by more than half.

As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, to wit, that the party must survive in a general congressional election, the LDP has doubtless also passed that test, if only vicariously. It may even be said that as it now commands the biggest following in the House of Representatives, the party has not only survived but in fact prevailed. At any rate, that test was never laid down in Cunanan.

Coseteng vs. Mitra

Facts: On the Congressional Elections of 1987, Anna Dominique Coseteng was the only candidate under KAIBA.The members of the CA were also elected, 11 coming from the majority, and 1 from the coalesced Majority.A year later. LDP organized, which led to the reorganization of the representation in the CA.Coseteng wrote to Speaker Mitra that as representative of KAIBA, she should be appointed to the CA. This was supported by 9 other congressmen.

She later filed a petition for quo warranto praying that the election of some LDP congressmen in the CA be nullified on the theory that it violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation because the new majority LDP (158 out of 202), would now be entitled to 9 seat only. She claims that she has the support of the 9 other congressmen as well.She further claims that CA members should have been nominated and elected by their respective political parties.The LDP congressmen opposed and argued that KAIBA is part of the coalesced majority which supports the administration of Cory, and not of the minority, hence she is bound by the choice of the Coalesced majority as to who shall sit in the CA.

Issue: Dose the court have jurisdiction? Whether the congressmen in the CA were chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties?

Held: Court has jurisdiction. Not a political question. As held in Daza vs. Singson, the issue in this case is the manner of filling the CA and not the wisdom. Even if the question were political, the court still has the power to review GADALEJ committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government.

Coseteng loses. The composition of the house membership in the CA was BASED ON A PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES. There are 160 members of the LDP in the house. They represent 80% of the house. 80% of the 12 members in the CA = 9.6 or 10. Hence the LDP is entitled to 10 members in the CA. the remaining 2 were apportioned to the Liberal Party as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority, and the last one to the

KBL as the principal opposition party. There is no doubt that the apportionment in the CA was done on the basis of proportional representation of political parties in the House.Even if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition party, its lone member (Coseteng) represents only 0.4% of the House membership, hence SHE IS NOT ENTITLED TO ONE OF THE 12 SEATS IN THE CA. To be able to claim proportional representation, a political party should represent at least 8.4% of the house membership that is at least 17 congressmen.

The endorsement of 9 other congressmen in favor of Coseteng is inconsequential because they are not members of her party. The claim that the members in the CA should be nominated and elected by their respective political parties is untenable. The members have been nominated and elective by the House (not by their party) as provided for in the Constitution.

Guingona vs. Gonzales

Facts: Based on the rule of proportional representation from political parties, a compromise was reached for the election of members of the CA:

PARTY MEMBERSHIP PROPORTIONAL COMPROMISELDP = 15 7.5 8 NPC= 5 2.5 2Lakas= 3 1.5 1LP= 1 0.5 1

However, Lakas was given only 1 (and not 2) because the 1.5 was not rounded off. The 8 senators from LDP chosen for CA were: Angara, Herrera, Alvarez, Aquino, Mercado, Ople, Sotto and Romulo. Guingona (LAKAS) opposed the nomination of Romulo. Guingona also questioned the appointment of Tanada as lone representative of LP.Based on the mathematical computation of proportional representation, each of the political parties are entitled to additional 0.5 seat, Guingona claims that by the election of Romulo and Tanada, it unduly increased the membership of LDP and the LP, and reduced the membership of Lakas, and NPC.

Issue: What should be done to the 0.5 seat to which each of them is entitled? Must the 12 members in the CA be always filled?

Held: Court has jurisdiction. The legality of the filling up of membership of the CA is a justiciable issue, not a political question. The LDP majority converted its fractional half into a whole number, for an additional th of one senator, enabling it to elect its 8 member, Romulo. In doing so, the other representation in CA to less than their representation in the Senate. This is CLEARLY A VIOLATION OF THE SECTION 18, because it is no longer in compliance with the mandate that MEMBERSHIP IN THE CA SHOULD BE BASED ON THE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES. The election of Romulo gave more representation to the LDP, and reduced the representation of either the Lakas or NPC. By adding together 2 halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will give LDP an added member in the CA, by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation. Section 18 is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate.

GUIDELINES: (1) In the senate, a political party must have at least 2 duly elected senators for every seat in the CA. (2) Where there are more than 2 political parties represented, a political poarty with asingle senator in the Senate cannot claim a seat in the CA.

The constitution does NOT contemplate that the CA must always include 12 senators and 12 congressmen. What the constitution requires is that there be at least a majority of the entire membership. The constitution does NOT require the election and presence of 12 senators and 12 congressmen in order that the CA may function properly. THEY NEED NOT BE FULLY CONSTITUTED (even if the constitution provides for their composition) to perform their functions.

The election of ROMULO (LDP) and TANADA (LP) was clearly a violation of Section 18. Their nomination was done by sheer force of superiority in numbers and was done in grave abuse of discretion. IN SHORT, fractional seats should never be rounded off. The seats should be vacant.

Bengzon vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

Facts: Senator Enrile asks the Senate to look into the matter of the alleged acquisition of the Lopa Group of the properties of Kokoy Romualdez which is a subject of sequestration by the PCGG. Senator Enrile citing probable violations of Republic Act No. 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5.

The petitioners representing Ricardo Lopa who passed away prior the decision of the court issued this petition for prohibition and an issuance a temporary restraining order and/or injuctive relief enjoin the Blue Ribbon committee of compelling them to appear before them.

Issues: Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of the Romualdez corporations is a "purely private transaction" which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process.

Held: The Supreme court granted the petition. The committee investigation wanted by Senator Enrile is not in aid of a legislation, therefore is violative of the separation of powers between the Senate or Congress and that Judiciary. The pending civil case of the petitioners under Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan is where these issues by the Senate should be discussed.

Saying further that the power of the Senate and Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation is not absolute or without limitation.

Sabio vs. Gordon

Facts: President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1, creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Sec. 4(b) of EO1 provides that: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.”

Senator Defensor Santiago introduced Resolution 455, “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Phil. Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.”

Chief of Staff Inocencio, under authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Sabio of the PCGG, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.

Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of EO1. A Subpoena Ad Testificandum was thus issued by the Senate Committee. Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. Senate thus issued an Order directing its Sergeant-At-Arms to place Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners under arrest for contempt Chairman Sabio then filed a petition for habeas corpus.

Issue: WON Sec4(b) of EO1 is repealed by the Constitution?

Held: YES. The 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but also of “any of its committee.” It constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative function are also available to the committees.Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of power to the committees. Father Bernas, in his Commentary on the 1987 Constitution, correctly pointed out its significance: “It should also be noted that the Constitution explicitly recognizes the power of investigation not just of Congress but also of “any of its committees.” This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the means which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative function are also available to the Committees.”

Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress’ power of inquiry. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends “to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class. Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.

One important limitation on the Congress’ power of inquiry is that “the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.” This is just another way of saying that the power of inquiry must be “subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on government action.” As to the right to privacy, it is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. In Morfe v. Mutuc, the Court, in line with Whalen v. Roe, employed the rational basis relationship test when it held that there was no infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail and minimize the opportunities for official corruption, maintain a standard of honesty in public service, and promote morality in public administration. In Valmonte v. Belmonte, the Court remarked that as public figures, the Members of the former Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, and their actions are subject to closer scrutiny. Taking this into consideration, the Court ruled that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern prevails over the right to privacy of financial transactions.

Under the present circumstances, the alleged anomalies in the PHILCOMSAT, PHC and POTC, ranging in millions of pesos, and the conspiratorial participation of the PCGG and its officials are compelling reasons for the Senate to exact vital information from the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations, as well as from Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting the necessary legislation to prevent corruption and formulate remedial measures and policy determination regarding PCGG’s efficacy. There being no reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of those directors and officers over the subject covered by Senate Res. No. 455, it follows that their right to privacy has not been violated by the Senate Committees.

Anent the right against self-incrimination, it must be emphasized that this right maybe invoked by the said directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation only when the incriminating question is being asked, since they have no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them.” That this right may possibly be violated or abused is no ground for denying respondent Senate Committees their power of inquiry. The consolation is that when this power is abused, such issue may be presented before the courts.

Standard Charted Bank Phil vs. Senate

Petition for Prohibition

- With prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunction - Dated and filed Mar 11, 2005. - Purpose: to enjoin respondents from

1. Proceeding with its inquiry pursuant to Phil Senate (PS) No. 166 2. Compelling petitioners (officers of SCB-Phils) to attend and justify before any

hearing to be conducted by respondents particularly set on Mar 15, 2005. enforcing any Hold Departure Order (HDO) and/or putting petitioner on Watch List; Also prays for

3. Annulment of SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM and DUCES TECUM issued to P.

SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM: A process to cause a witness to appear and give testimony, under conditions therein mentioned.

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM: a command to produce documents

Facts: 1. Feb 1 2005. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (VC of R) delivered a privilege speech =

Arrogance of Wealth.a. Based on a letter from Atty. Mark Bacobo denouncing SCB Phils for selling

unregistered securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799)

b. According to letter, P is reported to have a sale of unregistered and high-risk securities by Standard Chartered Bank which resulted in billions of losses to the investing public

c. Urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, aid in legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future.

2. Sen. Francis Pangilinan motioned the speech to be referred to R. PS Resolution was earler been introduced by Sen. Enrile.

3. R invited petitioners and other resource persons to attend hearing. On Feb 28, 2005 when the investigation was commenced, Senator Enrile moved that subpoena be issued to those who did not attend and requested Dept of Justice to issue an HDO against them or include them in the Watch List.

4. P were later served SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM and DUCES TECUM to compel them to attend the next set hearing, thus they filed this petition.

5. The issues raised against SCB Phils regarding the selling of unregistered foreign documents are already foreign securities.

Issue: Did the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee have jurisdiction over the case at bar?

Held: Petition for Prohibition -DENIED, lack of merit. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee has jurisdiction over the matter.

Ratio:

A. Bengzon Jr v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee – does not apply in this case. - The similarity of Bengzon Jr and of this case is only until the presence of cases already

pending in various courts and admin bodies regarding the matter to be investigated. - Bengzon Jr, was not in aid of legislation. The speech therein contained no contemplated

legislation - On the other hand, this case is explicit on the nature of the inquiry, as stated in last 3 WHEREAS clauses in P.S. Resolution No 166.

a. exisiting laws including the Securities Regulation Code seem to be inadequatec. the regulatory intervention by the SEC and BSP likewise appear to be inadequate.d. there is a need for remedial legislation to address the issue.

- Conclusion of Enrile’s privilege speech: conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation.

B. Landmark case: Amault v. Nazareno - The power of inquiry is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative

function. - P cannot claim to have been singled out by R before there are other resource persons

invited to help them in the case. - Purpose of the investigation: quest for remedies, to prevent recurrence - Independent of the judiciary, it can assest its authority and punish non-compliance.

C. Right of privacy – not absolute right. (Sec 21, ART VI of Consti)Sabio v Gordon, Right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest.)

Blue Ribbon Committee v. Judge Majuducon

Facts:• Aug 28, 1998. Senator Blas Ople filed SRN 157.

- directing National Defense and Security, to conduct inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the charges of then Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado that a group of active and retired military officers were organizing a coup d’etat to prevent the administration of then President Joseph Estrada from probing alleged fund irregularities in the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

• Aug 28, 1998. Senator Vicente Sotto III filed SRN 160. - directing appropriate Senate Committee to conduct inquiry, in aid of legislation, into

alleged mismanagement of funds and investment portfolio of AFP-RSBS (Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits System)

• Senate President referred SRNs to: a. Committee on Accountability of Public officers and Investigations [Blue Ribbon Committee] b. Committee on National Defense and Security

• In public hearing of Blue Ribbon Committee, appeared that AFP-RSBS purchased lot in GenSan {LOT X MR-1160} for Php10,000/sqm. In Deed of Sale, Registry of Deeds, purchase price: Php 3000/sqm. Blue Ribbon Committee services SUBPOENA to Atty. Flaviano, directing him to appear and testify in Court under penalty for failure to do so. Atty. Flaviano refused. He filed a petition for prohibition and

SUBPOENA: a writ commanding person to attend preliminary injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order with the RTC of General Santos City, Branch 23, {docketed as SP Civil Case No. 496}• Oct 21, 1998. RTC issued Temporary Restraining Order direction Committee to stop from proceeding with inquiry and sending subpoenas to witnesses from Region XI, specifically GenSan.

• Nov 5, 1998. The Committee filed motion to dismiss the petition.When Committee served subpoena, it acted in pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid for legislation. (Art VI, Sec 21, Constitution)

Respondent cited Bengzon v. Blue Ribbono “Preliminary injunction may be issued in cases pending before

administrative bodies such as the Ombudsman or Office of the Persecutor as long as the right to self-incrimination guaranteed by the Bill of Rights is in danger.”

Bengzon does not apply in this case. This case NO intended legislation involved; Offshoot of a speech by Senator Enrile. Clear legislative purpose indicated in SRN 160.

Subject matter of inquiry was more within the province of the courts than the legislative. Subpoena was served pursuant to its authority to conductinquiries in aid for legislation. (Art VI, Sec 21,

Consti) Issue has already been preempted before Committee came in.

Still pending with Office of Ombudsman.

Therefore, no court has acquired jurisdiction. B. Sen. Pimentel was not guilty of indirect contempt of court. The reasons for conviction were as follows:

Causing the publication in Phil Star though it was sub judice.o Grounds:

lack of jurisdiction failure to state valid cause of action.

Argued that Temporary Restraining Order= invalid, violated the rule against ex-parte issuance thereof, and it was unenforceable beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

Nov 11, 1998. RTC denied petition and granted writ or preliminary injunction.

WRIT of PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION: a court order that commands or prohibits an act that the court regards as essential to justice. Purpose – prevent dissolution of plaintiff’s rights, seek to prevent threatened wrong, further injury and irreparable harm and injustice. Phil. Star published a commentary regarding the action made by the Judge on this case.

Issue: (1) Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion by Judge - when he dismissed motion to dismiss the petition for prohibition, and issued a writ of preliminary injunction. (2) Whether or not Judge erred in convicting Sen. Pimentel of indirect Contempt of Court

Held: There is grave abuse of discretion as when the assailed order is bereft from legal justification. No legal basis for issuing the resolution. Sen. Pimentel is not guilty of indirect contempt of court.

Ratio:A. There was no legal basis for the issuance of the resolution by the Judge.

a. Principles of Separation of Powers Congress --- legislation b. Executive --- executionc. Judicial --- settlement of legal controversies

B. Making derogatory remarks. The derogatory statement was that he showed “gross ignorance of rules of law and procedure.” not improper conduct. Does not impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. Necessary description to support a petition seeking the annulment of the order of the Judge.

a. Spouses Bacar v. Judge De Guzman Jr. “When law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if a judge does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

b. Sen. Pimentel did not malign the trial court, rather expressed the violation of the basic principles of separation of powers.

Nazareno v. Barnes – purpose of court to punish for contempt: should not be personal.C. For making it appear than an admin case was filed against Judge for gross ignorance of

lawa. Without legal basis. No complaint was instituted separate from petition for

certiorari.

Senate vs. Ermita

Facts: In September 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Rail Project. The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged

overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project.

The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations to officials of the AFP on another matter.

Thereafter, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a letter requesting postponement of the hearing but Drilon wrote back that it was too late to postpone it.

The President then issued E.O. 464, containing the ff provisions: SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In accordance

with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.

SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. – (a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conductand Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest. Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order, including:

o Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order;

o Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be divulged;

o Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements;

o Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings;

o Matters affecting national security and public order.

(b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by this executive order: o Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the

department heads are covered by the executive privilege; o Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such

other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;

o Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;

o Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and

o Such other officers as may be determined by the President.

SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. – All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.

Hence, Drilon received from Ermita a copy of E.O. 464, and another letter informing him “that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the hearing will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to E.O. 464” and that “said officials have not secured the required consent from the President.”Despite the communications received from Ermita and Gen. Senga, the investigation scheduled by the Committee on National Defense and Security pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings.All the petitions pray for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents from implementing, enforcing, and observing E.O. 464.

Issue: Whether E.O. 464 is constitutional?

Held: SECTION 1 IS CONSTITUTIONAL. Section 1 of EO 464 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through the challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads’ possession of any information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-à-vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is “in aid of legislation” under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, and members of the Supreme Court.

Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in Section 22 of Article VI. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face.

SECTION 3 AND SECTION 2[B] ARE UNCONSTITUIONAL. Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all senior officials of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices designated in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are “covered by the executive privilege.”

The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the President. In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged, and that the President has not reversed such determination. Such declaration, however, even without mentioning the term “executive privilege,” amounts to an implied claim that the information is being withheld by the executive branch, by authority of the President, on the basis

of executive privilege. Verily, there is an implied claim of privilege.

By its very nature, the implied claim authorized by Section 3 of E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof (e.g., whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.). While Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered by the privilege under the challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is being referred to by the executive. The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is included in the phrase “confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order.”Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected. The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead ofproviding precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress. In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.

SECTION 2[A] IS CONSTITUTIONAL. No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines, binding only on the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on the other branches of government. It may thus be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the President regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege.

AS TO WHO MAY INVOKE PRIVILEGE: Petitioners, however, assert as another ground for invalidating the challenged order the alleged unlawful delegation of authority to the heads of offices in Section 2(b). Petitioner Senate of the Philippines claims that only the President can assert executive privilege to withhold information from Congress.Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege.In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is “By order of the President,” which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score.

SECTION 21 SECTION 22Power of Inquiry Oversight Function

Who may be summoned? Anyone except the president and SC justices.

Who may be called? Only members of the executive branch – department heads.

Mandatory Mere request by Congress

Excuse: executive privilege Excuse: executive privilege

Neri vs. Senate

Legislative Inquiry in Aid of Legislation vs. Legislative Inquiry during Question Hour Elements of Presidential Communications Privilege Exception to Executive Privilege

Facts: This is regarding the contract entered into by DOTC with ZTE for the supply of equipment and services for the NBN Project. In connection with this NBN Project, Senate passed various Resolutions and pending bills, which it then used as basis for initiating an investigation.

One of the cabinet officials invited to appear before the Senate during the investigation was Petitioner, who was Director General of NEDA at the time. During the 11-hour questioning, Petitioner invoked executive privilege and refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.

In view of his refusal, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee issued a subpoena ad testificandum, to which Petitioner replied that he was willing to testify to other matters besides those three questions covered by “executive privilege” and that he wanted to be furnished beforehand matters to be taken up during the inquiry so that he may adequately prepare therefor. Executive Secretary Ermita also sent a letter to the Blue Ribbon, affirming that indeed those three questions mentioned were covered by “executive privilege” because such information if disclosed might impair diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. As such, the Office of the President has ordered Petitioner not to answer those questions.

Nevertheless, the Blue Ribbon issued a show cause Letter and a contempt Order against Petitioner. Thus, this case.

Issue: Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?

Held:

IN AID OF LEGISLATION: Scope and Limitations --

The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected.

The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through a valid claim of executive privilege.

Is there recognized claim of executive privilege despite revocation of E.O. 464? At this juncture, it must be stressed that the revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish our concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.

ELEMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE:

1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”

2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Respondent Committees failed to show a compelling or critical need: xxx presidential communications are presumptively privileged and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to conversations xxxx Here, the record is bereft of any categorical explanation from respondent Committees to show a compelling or critical need for the answers to the three (3) questions in the enactment of a law. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function under Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21 of the same Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that “the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.” It is conceded that it is difficult to draw the line between an inquiry in aid of legislation and an inquiry in the exercise of oversight function of Congress. In this regard, much will depend on the content of the questions and the manner of inquiry is conducted.

EXCEPTION TO EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: “Demonstrated, specific need for evidence in pending criminal trial” (US v. Nixon) does not apply --

In Nixon, there is a pending criminal proceeding where the information is requested and it is the demands of due process of law and the fair administration of criminal justice that the information be disclosed. This is the reason why the US Court was quick to “limit the scope of its decision.” It stressed that it is “not concerned here with the balance between the President’s generalized interest in confidentiality xxx and congressional demands for information.” Unlike in Nixon, the information here is elicited, not in a criminal proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In this regard, Senate v. Ermita stressed that the validity of the claim of executive privilege depends not only on the ground invoked but, also, on the procedural setting or the context in which the claim is made. Furthermore, in Nixon, the President did not interpose any claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets. In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita categorically claims executive privilege on the grounds of presidential communications privilege in relation to her executive and policy decision-making process and diplomatic secrets.

Executive Privilege vis-a-vis Right of the People to Information on Matters of Public Concern

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. The provision (Section 7, Article III) itself provides the limitations, i.e. as may be provided by law. Some of these laws

are Sec. 7, RA 6713, Art. 229, RPC, Sec. 3(k), RA 3019, and Sec. 24(e), Rule 130, ROC. These are in addition to what our body of jurisprudence clarifies as confidential and what our Constitution considers as belonging to the larger concept of executive privilege. Clearly, there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of certain information. We find the information subject of this case belonging to such kind.

Legislative Inquiry in Aid of Legislation vis-a-vis Right of the People to Information on Matters of Public Concern: More than anything else, though, the right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people’s right to public information. The former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people’s right to information. xxx

The members of respondent Committees should not invoke as justification in their exercise of power a right properly belonging to the people in general. This is because when they discharge their power, they do so as public officials and members of Congress. Be that as it may, the right to information must be balanced with and should give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional precepts particularly those pertaining to delicate interplay of executive-legislative powers and privileges which is the subject of careful review by numerous decided cases.

Garcia vs. Mata

Facts: Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who was reversed to inactive status. He filed an action for mandamus to compel the DND and AFP to reinstate him to active service and readjust his rank and pay emoluments.Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is violation of RA 1600 which prohibits the reversion of officers with at least 10 years of service.On the other hand, the AFP and DND contend that the said provision of RA 1600 has no relevance or pertinence to the budget in question or to any appropriation item therein. (RA 1600 was an appropriation law for 1956-57).

Issue: Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill?

Held: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the relevance to any appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the operation of government while Section 11 refers to a fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP.

Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in violation of the constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the GAA.

It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed in the title of the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are void, inoperative and without effect.

SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.

Demetria vs. Alba

Facts: Assailed here is the constitutionality of Section 44 of the Budget Reform Decree of 1977.alleging that Sec 44 authorizes the ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEY. Section 44 grants the PRESIDENT THE AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER ANY FUND APPROPRIATED FOR DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS TO ANY PROGRAM, PROJECT OF ANY DEPARTMENT.

Issue: Does Sec 44 violate the constitutional provision on appropriations?

Held: YES. NULL AND VOID. The prohibition to transfer an appropriation from one item to another is explicit and categorical under the Constitution. However a leeway was granted to afford heads of the difference branches of government CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY in the use of public funds. The Constitution thus allowed transfer of funds for purposes of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation.

Sec 44 unduly extended this privilege. It empower the President to indiscriminately transfer funds WITHOUT REGARD AS WHETHER THE FUNDS TO BE TRANSFERRED ARE ACTUALLY SAVINGS in the item from which the same are to be taken, and WITHOUT REGARDS AS TO WHETHER THE TRANSFER IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF AUGMENTING the item to which said transfer is to be made.

It goes beyond the tenor of the standards set forth by the Constitution. Sec 44 is null and void.

Tio VS. VRB

Facts: Tio assails constitutionality of PD 1987, Section 10 of the law provides for the imposition of tax of 30% on gross receipts, payable to the local government. The petitioners claim that section 10 is a rider, and not germane to the subject matter of the decree. He claims that it violates the rule that every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

Issue: Is section 10 a rider?

Held: NOT A RIDER. The constitutional provision is complied with as long as the title is COMPREHENSIVE ENOUGH TO INCLUDE THE GENERAL PURPOSE WHICH A STATUTE SEEKS TO ACHIEVE. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end. The requirement is satisfied if 1) all the parts of the statute are RELATED, 2) ARE GERMANE TO THE SUBJECT MATTER EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE, or as long as 3) they are NOT INCONSISTENT with or foreign to the general subject and title, even if they contain any number of provisions no matter how diverse. 4) as long as it may be considered in furtherance of the subject by PROVIDING THE METHOD AND MEANS of carrying out the general subject.The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of the bill should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should be given a PRACTICAL, RATHER THAN TECHNICAL construction.LAW VALID. Not a rider.

Phil Judges Assoc vs. Prado

Facts: Sec 35 of RA 7354 implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation withdraws the FRANKING PRIVILEGES of judges. They assail the constitutionality of the law, saying that their official functions will be prejudiced by the withdrawal of the privilege.

They contend that RA 7354 embraces more than one subject and does not express its purpose.Functions, Responsibilities, Regulation, and For Other Purposes Connected They claim that the repeal of the franking privilege is not included in the original version of the house or senate, and was a product only of the Bicam ConferenceReport

Issue: Whether it sufficiently complies with Sec 26(1)?

Held: YES. LAW VALID. The purposes of the rule that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof are: 1) to prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation 2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature, by means of provisions in bill of which the title gives no intimation (which might be overlooked and unintentionally adopted) 3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of the subject of legislation.

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE with the requirement.

To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actual render legislation impossible.Here, the WITHDRAWAL OF FRANKING PRIVILEGES IS GERMANE to the accomplishment of the principal objective of the law THE CREATION OF A MORE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE POSTAL SYSTEM.

The repeal of a statute on a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject.When a statute repeals a former law, such REPEAL IS MERELY THE EFFECT, NOT THE SUBJECT OF THE STATUTE.What is required by the constitution is that the SUBJECT be expressed in the title. The consti does not require that the EFFECT be expressed in the title.

Farinas vs. Executive Secretary

Facts: Sec. 14 of RA 9006 expressly repeals Sec. 67 of BP 881. The petitioners questioned the constitutionality of RA 9006. They argued that Sec. 67 of BP 881 is a good law since it is based on the principle of accountability of public officers. Thus, the repeal of this law is a bad policy.

Issue: Is RA 9006, the repealing law unconstitutional?

Held: No. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature.

Tan v. Del RosarioArticle 6, Section 26 (1) has been envisioned to - prevent log-rolling legislation intended to unite the members of the legislature who favor any one of unrelated subjects in the support of the whole act - avoid surprises and fraud upon the legislature - fairly apprise the people of the subjects of legislation

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance

Facts: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E-VAT law (RA 7716). Although they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House of Representatives where it passed three readings and that afterward it was sent to the Senate where after first reading it was referred to the Senate Ways and Means Committee, they complain that the Senate did not pass it on second and third readings. Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630) which it approved on May 24, 1994.

There was also an argument by Tolentino that the Senate Bill 1630 did not pass the 2nd and 3rd READINGS ON SEPARATE DAYS, as required by the Constitution because the 2nd and 3rd readings were done on the same day. March 24, 1994.

Held: This was because on Feb 24 and March 22, the President had certified S Bill as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of the reading of the bill on separate days. bill has passed 3 readings on separate days, 2) it has

been printed in its final form and distributed 3 days prior to its final approval.

THE PRESIDENT'S CERTIFICATION. The fallacy in thinking that House Bill 11197 and Senate Bill 1630 are distinct and unrelated measures also accounts for the petitioners' (Kilosbayan's and PAL's) contention that because the President separately certified to the need for the immediate enactment of these measures, his certification was ineffectual and void. The certification had to be made of the version of the same revenue bill which at the moment was being considered. Otherwise, to follow petitioners' theory, it would be necessary for the President to certify as many bills as are presented in a house of Congress even though the bills are merely versions of the bill he has already certified. It is enough that he certifies the bill which, at the time he makes the certification, is under consideration. Since on March 22, 1994 the Senate was considering S. No. 1630, it was that bill which had to be certified. For that matter on June 1, 1993 the President had earlier certified H. No. 92 10 for immediate enactment because it was the one which at that time was being considered by the House. This bill was later substituted, together with other bills, by H. No. 11197.

As to what Presidential certification can accomplish, we have already explained in the main decision that the phrase 44 except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, § 26 (2) qualifies not only the requirement that "printed copies [of a bill] in its final form [must be] distributed to the members three days before its passage" but also the requirement that before a bill can become a law it must have passed "three readings on separate days." There is not only textual support for such construction but historical basis as well.

The exception is based on the prudential consideration that if in all cases three readings on separate days are required and a bill has to be printed in final form before it can be passed, the need for a law may be rendered academic by the occurrence of the very emergency or public calamity which it is meant to address.

Petitioners further contend that a "growing budget deficit" is not an emergency, especially in a country like the Philippines where budget deficit is a chronic condition. Even if this were the case, an enormous budget deficit does not make the need for R.A. No. 7716 any less urgent or the situation calling for its enactment any less an emergency.

Apparently, the members of the Senate (including some of the petitioners inthese cases) believed that there was an urgent need for consideration of S. No. 1630, because they responded to the call of the President by voting on the bill on second and third readings on the same day. While the judicial department is not bound by the Senate's acceptance of the President's certification, the respect due coequal departments of the government in matters committed to them by the Constitution and the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion caution a stay of the Judicial hand.

At any rate, we are satisfied that S. No. 1630 received thorough consideration in the Senate where it was discussed for six days. Only its distribution in advance in its final printed form was actually dispensed with by holding the voting on second and third readings on the same day (March 24, 1994). Otherwise, sufficient time between the submission of the bill on February 8, 1994 on second reading and its approval on March 24, 1994 elapsed before it was finally voted on by the Senate on third reading.

The purpose for which three readings on separate days is required is said to be two-fold- (1) to inform the members of Congress of what. they must vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is progressing through the enacting process- thus enabling them and others interested in the measure to prepare their positions with reference to it. ( J. G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 10.04, p. 282 [1972]) These purposes were substantially achieved in the case of R.A. No. 7716.

Tobias vs Abalos

Facts: Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of the RA 7675 with title An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Same bill is now in question at to its constitutionality by the petitioners by invoking their right as tax payers and residents of Mandaluyong.

With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to for the the conversion of Mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city ratifying RA 7675 and making it in effect.

Issues: WON RA 7675 is in:

1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill rule".

2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of members of the Congress to 250 and reappropriating the legislative districts.

Held: Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of constitutionality pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."

As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was enforced justifying the act of the legislature to increase the number of the members of the congress.

Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which drafted the bill reapportioning the legislative district.

In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals

Issue: Court upheld President’s veto of item in Omnibus tax law imposing tax on restaurants located in hotels, motels, or rest houses. Item does not refer to the whole section, but only to a subject and rate of tax.

Gonzales vs. Macaraig Facts: Congress passed the General Appropriations Bill 1989. It eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget as submitted by the president.

When presented to the President for her signature, it was signed but 7 SPECIAL PROVISIONS and Sec 55 (General Provision) were VETOED. No item of appropriation recommended by the President in the Budget which has been disapproved or reduced shall be restored or increased by the use of appropriations authorized for other purposes by augmentation. An item for appropriation for any purpose recommended by the President shall be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no corresponding appropriation for the specific. The reason why the President vetoed the provision was: that it violates Section 25(5) nullifying the power of the President to augment any item from savings in other items.

Gonzales et al claim that the Pre -Veto in appropriation bills is limited to items and does not cover provisions.They claim that Cory exceeded her authority when she vetoed Sec 55 which are PROVISIONS, such that when the President objects to a PROVISION of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the ITEM-VETO POWER but should veto the entire bill. They further claim that the Item-Veto Power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation. Lastly they claim that Sec 25(5) of the Constitution (which provides for the

has to be provided for by law thus Congress has the prerogative to limit the exercise of

the same.

On the other hand the Solgen claims that Sec 55 is actually a rider because it is extraneous to an appropriation act, therefore the President validly vetoed it. Solgen further claims that the constitution empowers the President to veto PROVISIONS or other distinct and severable parts of an Appropriations Bill

Issue: Did the President exceeded the item-veto power? Can the President veto PROVISIONS of an appropriations bill? What is the scope of item-veto?

Held: VETO WAS VALID. CORY WAS CORRECT. Sec 27 of the Constitution Paragraph 1 = refers to the general veto power of the President. If exercised, it would result to the veto of the ENTIRE BILL. Sec 27 of the Constitution Paragraph 2 = refers to the ITEM VETO power or LINE VETO. It allows the exercise of veto over particular items in an APPROPRIATION, REVENUE OR TARIFF BILL. The power given to the President to disapprove any item in an Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item. The terms ITEM and PROVISION are different. An ITEM = refers to the particulars, details, the distinct and severable parts of the bill. It is the indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose. It obviously means an item which in itself is a SPECIFIC APPROPRIATION of money, not some general provision of law, which just happens to be put in an appropriation bill.

The claim of the petitioners that the President may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be subject of a separate veto, but also overlooks the constitutional mandate that any PROVISION in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular provision therein, and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.In short, A PROVISION in an appropriation bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation, and DOES NOT RELATE TO THE ENTIRE BILL. (The President may veto provisions.)

Even assuming that provisions are beyond veto powers, Sec 55 may still be vetoed following the DOCTRINE OF INAPPROPRIATE PROVISIONS. Sec 55: 1) is a provision that does not relate to any particular appropriation (violates Sec25) 2) the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found on the face of the bill 3) the vetoed sections are more an expression of Congressional policy regarding augmentation powers rather than a true budgetary appropriation.Sec 55 is thus an inappropriate provision that should be treated as ITEMS FOR PURPOSES OF VETO POWERS.As to the claim that Congress should be allowed to impose restrictions or conditions in an appropriations bill (which they claim is beyond veto-powers) It cannot be denied that Legislature has the power to provide qualifications and conditions in Appropriation Bills as to limit how the money shall be spend, etc. Also, it cannot be denied that the Executive is not allowed to veto a condition or qualification but allowing the appropriation itself to stand.

HOWEVER, for these to apply, THE RESTRICTIONS SHOULD BE SUCH IN THE REAL SENSE OF THE TERM, not some matters which are more properly dealt with in a separate legislation. Restrictions or Conditions must exhibit a CONNECTION WITH MONEY ITEMS IN A BUDGETARY SENSE IN THE SCHEDULE OF EXPENDITURES.Thus the test is one of APPROPRIATENESS. Sec 55 appears to be a condition but actually they are GENERAL LAW MEASURES MORE APPROPRIATE FOR a substantive, separate legislation.

Philconsa vs. Enriquez

Facts: Petitioners assail validity of RA 7663: The General Appropriations Act for 1994. The GAA contains a special provision applicable to Congress. It allowed any member of congress the REALIGNMENT OF ALLOCATION FOR OPERATIONAL EXPENSES, provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded.

Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker are the ones authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of Congress themselves. Later, President FVR signed the law, but VETOED certain provisions of the law and imposed certain conditions: That the AFP-Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the pension funds under the Retirement and Separation Benefits System of the AFP.

Issue: Whether RA 7663 is violative of Section 25 Art 6. Whether the enumeration is exclusive?

Held: YES. Under the special provision applicable to Congress, the members of Congressare given the power to determine the necessity of realignment of the savings in the allotment for their operating expenses. They are in the best position to do so because hey are the ones who know whether there are savings, or deficiencies in appropriation. HOWEVER, ONLY THE SENATE PRESIDENT AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE ARE ALLOWED TO APPROVE THE REALIGNMENT.

Further, 2 conditions must be met: (1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings, and (2) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer is to be made. As to the special provision given to the AFP-Chief of Staff, it is also VOID. The list of those who may be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive. The AFP-Chief of Staff may not be given such authority.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia

Facts: Joker Arroyo brought a suit against Speaker JDV, etc for the violation of the Rules of House. They are challenging also the passage of RA 8240 (which amended the NIRC by imposing sin-taxes on beer and cigarettes, rdThe bill originated from the House, it was approved on 3 reading and was transmitted to the Senate.The Bicameral Conference Committee submitted its report to the House; Congressman Javier, Chair of the ways and means comte, delivered his sponsorship speech.

During interpellation, JOKER ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS GOING TO QUESTION THE QUORUM, ALTHOUGH UNTIL THE END OF HIS INTERPELLATION, HE NEVER DID.

Joker challenged RA8240 arguing that is was passed in violation of the rules of the House, which rules embody the Constitutional mandate in Sec 16(3). He argues that a violation of the House rules is a violation of the Consti itself.

Specifically, he alleges that: - The yeas or nays were not asked, but was simply approved only to prevent him from

questioning the presence of a quorum. - The Chairman deliberately ignored his questioning. - The Chairman refused to recognize him and instead proceeded to act on - The Chairman suspended the session without first ruling on his questioning o That the

session was hastily adjourned to prevent him from formally challenging the existing of a quorum.

Issue: Was there GADALEJ when Congress enacted RA 8240?

Held: NO. LAW REMAINS VALID. What is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of RA 8240 are MERELY INTERNAL RULES OF PROCEDURE of the House rather than the Constitutional requirements for the enactment of law. Joker does not claim that there was no quorum, but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the House rules, he was prevented from questioning the presence of quorum. Joker claims that the violation of house rules is a violation of the constitution itself. NO. The rules adopted by deliberative bodies (such as the House) are subject to revocation, modification, or waiver by the body adopting them.

PARLIAMENTARY RULES ARE MERELY PROCEDURAL, AND WITH THEIR OBSERVANCE, THE COURT HAS NO CONCERN. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will NOT invalidate the action, when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, and ABSOLUTELY BEYOND THE CHALLENGE OF ANY OTHER BODY.

The failure to regard the rule is NOT a subject matter of judicial inquiry. A legislative act will not be declared invalid for non compliance with internal rules. No court has ever declared an act of the legislature void just because of non-compliance with rules of procedure made by itself.In this case, there is NO RULE IN THE HOUSE which specifically requires that in approving the Bicam Conference Committee Report, the Chair must restate motion and conduct nominal voting. The manner by which the report was approved has a BASIS IN LEGISLATIVE PRACTICE. The Constitution does NOT require that the yeas and nays of the Members be taken every time the House has to vote.

Only in the following instances were yeas and nays are mandatory: (1) last and 3 reading of a bill (2) request of 1/5 of the members present (3) repassing of a bill over the veto of the President.

Also, while it is true that Albano moved for adjournment, Joker could have at least objected if there was anything he wanted to say. THE FACT HOWEVER IS THAT HE DID NOT SAY ANYTHING!! The question he raised was not a point of order nor a question of privilege entitled to precedence. As to the QUORUM, the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of a quorum cannot be raised repeatedly, especially when the quorum is obviously present.LAW VALID.

Gerochi vs. DENR

Facts: Congress enacted the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) on June 8, 2001; on June 26, 2001, it took effect.

National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) filed with respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) a petition for the availment from the Universal Charge of its share for Missionary Electrification.NPC filed another petition with ERC, docketed as ERC Case No. 2002-194, praying that the proposed share from the Universal Charge for the Environmental charge of P0.0025 per kilowatt-hour (/kWh), or a total of P119,488,847.59, be approved for withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund (STF) managed by respondent Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Group (PSALM) for the rehabilitation and management of watershed areas.

ERC then issued an Order in ERC Case No. 2002-165 provisionally approving the computed amount of P0.0168/kWh as the share of the NPC-SPUG from the Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification and authorizing the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) and Distribution Utilities to collect the same from its end-users on a monthly basis.On the basis of the said ERC decisions, respondent Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO) charged petitioner Romeo P. Gerochi and all other end-users with the Universal Charge as reflected in their respective electric bills starting from the month of July 2003.

Issues/Held: (1) WON the Universal Charge under the EPIRA is a tax? NO. The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency that is to pay it. It is based on the principle that taxes are the lifeblood of the government, and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious need. Thus, the theory behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity; without

taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and well-being of the people.

On the other hand, police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most demanding of the three fundamental powers of the State. The justification is found in the Latin maxims salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your property as not to injure the property of others). As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually extends to all public needs, police power grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the State, as parens patriae, gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers.We have held that the power to "regulate" means the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control, with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons.

The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two powers rests in the purpose for which the charge is made. If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax.

In exacting the assailed Universal Charge through Sec. 34 of the EPIRA, the State's police power, particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked. Such can be deduced from Sec. 34 which enumerates the purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed and which can be amply discerned as regulatory in character.

(2) Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC?All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.Under the 1st test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The 2nd test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.The Court finds that the EPIRA is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards. As to the second test, provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, “to ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power” and “watershed rehabilitation and management” meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERC’s power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.

Garcia v. Executive SecretaryIssue: Can the President impose additional ad-valorem taxes on all imported articles? Held: YES. There is explicit constitutional permission for Congress to authorize the President “subject to limitations and restrictions” to fix within specific limits tariff rates and other duties or imposts. The relevant Law is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines.

Systems Plus Computer College v. Caloocan CityGrant of exemption from taxation rests upon the theory that an exemption will benefit the body of people, and not upon any idea of lessening the burden of an individual or corporate owner.

Central Mindanao University v. DARThe meaning of “exclusively”, which covers not just what is indispensable but also what is incidental and reasonably necessary, affects the meaning of the words “actually” and “directly”. The SC took into account future land needs of the University in exempting its area from CARP.

BIR Commissioner v. YMCA

Court will always apply the doctrine of strict interpretation in construing tax exemptions because taxes are the lifeblood of the nation.

BIR Commissioner v. SantosIt is inherent in the power to tax that the state be free to select the subjects of taxation and it has been repeatedly held that inequalities infringe no constitutional limitation.

John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition v. Victor Lim, et al Tax exemption cannot be granted by Executive Order. Neither can a tax exemption granted by law to one area be extended to another by EO

Guingona vs. Carague

Facts: Appropriation for a public purpose. Guingona et al questions the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget, pursuant to PD 81. They contend that the GAA appropriated P94B for debt service, while only P27B for education, contrary to the constitutional provision assigning the highest budgetary priority to education.They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation, otherwise it is undue delegation of legislative power to the President who would have power to determine in advance the amount appropriated for debt service.

They contend that the PDs issued by then President Marcos did not state specific amounts to be paid.

Issue: Is the law valid?

Held: VALID. The legislative intention is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic to pay the principal, interest and taxes on the loans or indebtedness incurred, as they fall due, so that there would be no need to enact a separate law appropriating funds. The purpose of the law is to enable the government to make prompt payment or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the country.

Even if the PDS do not state specific amounts to be paid, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by legislative parameters provided for in the decrees. The executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges, and as when they shall become due. NO UNCERTAINTY ARISES in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts shown in the books of the Treasury.

The automatic appropriation provides the FLEXIBILITY for the effective execution of debt management policies. Also, they amount needed to cover the payment of principal, interests and taxes should be made available as they fall due, without necessity of periodic enactments of separate laws, SINCE BOTH THE PERIOD AND NECESSITIES ARE INCAPABLE OF DETERMINATION IN ADVANCE.

able turn of market conditions, by redeeming high-interest securities and borrowing at lower rates, or to shift from STD to LTD, enter into debt-to-equity or debt-to-asset swaps. Also, this automatic appropriation obviates the serious difficulties in debt servicing arising from any deviation from what has been previously programmed.

Osmena v Orbos (OPSF Trust Account)

What is involved here is not so much the power of taxation as police power. Although the provision authorizing the ERB to impose additional amounts could be construed to refer to the power of taxation, the overriding consideration is not to raise the revenue but to enable the ERB to act quickly to carry out the objectives of the law and protect consumers form the constant fluctuation of oil prices (police power).

Fabian v. Desierto

RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the Supreme Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. This violates Sec. 30.