art 2 consti digests script

7/24/2019 Art 2 Consti Digests Script

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Arcilla, Alexandra Myrna S. Atty Gallant Soriano - Case Digests (After Midterms)

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Article II:

A. DECLARATION OF STATE PRINCIPLES

Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all

government authority emanates from them.

1. Zacarias Villavicencio v Justo LukbanG.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919.

Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of

about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were

shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the

houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.

That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those

women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have

produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by

affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court;

or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the

right to be present.

Issue: WON the courts should permit a government of men or a government of laws to be established in the

Philippine Islands.

Held:

The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos

for nominal damage due to contempt of court.

Ratio: The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus. The writ

of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful

restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties

are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.

Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally

take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to

defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and

that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.

We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it

in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be

compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a

person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the

chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao,

the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The

respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by

forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has

lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted

principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,

justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.


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Some generally accepted principles of international law:! right of an alien to be released on bail while awaiting deportation when his failure to leave the country

is due to the fact that no country will accept him.! The right of a country to establish military commissions to try war criminals.! The duty to protect the premises of embassies and legations.

2. Shigenori Kuroda v Maj Gen Rafael JalandoniG.R. No. L-2662. March 26, 1949

A Military commission was empaneled under the authority of Executive Order 68 of the President of the

Philippines, which was issued on July 29, 1947. This is an act establishing a national war crimes office and

prescribing rules and regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals. Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a

Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces

in The Philippines from 1943-1944, is charged before a military commission convened by the Chief of Staff ofthe Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as

such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant

civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war". Melville

Hussey and Robert Port, American lawyers, were appointed prosecutors in behalf of USA. Kuroda challenges

the legality of the EO No. 68 and the personality as prosecutors of Hussey and Port. Kurodas arguments

were: (1)EO No. is illegal on the gound that violates not only the provisions of our constitutional law but also

our local laws; (2) Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try him for acts committed in violation of the

Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and

signed the second only in 1947 and, therefore, he is charged with crime not based on law, national or

international; and (3) Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecutors in this case because they are not

qualified to practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and the appointment of said

attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty.

Issues/Held:

(1) WON EO No. 68 is valid and constitutional? [Yes it is a valid

because it is based on the generally accepted principles of international law which form part of our laws.]

(2) WON rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions form part of the law of the nation even if

Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them? [Yes, they form part of our laws.](3) WON the American lawyers could participate in the prosecution of this case? [Yes, they can.]

Ratio:

1. The order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that- The

Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of

international law as part of the nation. In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law

of the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of

international jurisprudence established by the United Nation, all those person military or civilian who have

been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and

offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity andcivilization are held accountable therefo. Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution

Order No. 68, the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and

policies of international law which are part of our Constitution. The promulgation of said executive order is an

exercise by the President of his power as Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court

in the case of Yamashita vs. Styer. Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to

consummate this unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the

issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.

2. Rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly based on the

generally accepted principals of international law. In fact, these rules and principles were accepted by the two


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belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who were signatories to the two Conventions. Such rule and

principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the

conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope

and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to

which our government may have been or shall be a signatory. Furthermore when the crimes charged against

petitioner were allegedly committed the Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we

were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in

the treaties between the belligerent countries.

3. There is nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel appearing before said commission

must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court.

Respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special law and not by the Rules

of court which govern ordinary civil court. Secondly, the appointment of the two American attorneys is not

violative of our nation sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that United States, which has submitted thevindication of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation, should be allowed

representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment of sovereignty it has not

been by our government but by the United States.

3. Lao Ichong vs Jaime HernandezG.R. No. L-7995. May 31, 1957.

The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons

who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the peoples economic life.

1. a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital ofwhich are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade

2. aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business,unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In

case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term.

Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act. provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on

nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade,

commerce and industry.

provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business ofadditional stores or branches of retail business

Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships affected by

the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons: it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and

property without due process the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title the Act violates international and treaty obligations the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary

succession

Issue : WON it violates international treaties and obligations?

Held: No. the court denied the petition.

Ratio: The law does not violate international treaties and obligations. The United Nations Charter imposes no

strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their and the Declaration of Human Rights

contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for all peoples

and all nations. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of

April 18, 1947 guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the

nationals of any other country". But the nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of

all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are


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all Prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said

treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may

never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State.

4. Secretary of Justice v Hon. Ralph Lantion

G.R. No. 139465. January 18, 2000.

On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing

the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country." The Decree

is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression

of crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped; the

extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to enter into similar

treaties with other interested countries;

On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty

Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of

America"

The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also

expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting some paragraphs

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note

Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United

States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S.

District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition.

Crimes committed by Mark.

Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; Attempt to evade or defeat tax Fraud by wire, radio, or television; False statement or entries Election contributions in name of another

During the pending evaluation respondent requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S.

Government, as well as all documents and papers and be given ample time to file a comment. DOJ gave a

reply dated July 1, 199 but was received by the other party August 4, 1999.

Premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and supporting documents from the

United States Government, pending evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of the

extradition. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States

enumerates the documentary requirements and establishes the procedures under which the

documents submitted shall be received and admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements under

our domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069.

It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be

furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and extradition documents and this

Department will not pose any objection to a request for ample time to evaluate said documents.

Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request.

Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a party provides that " [E]very

treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." Extradition is a

tool of criminal law enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or

convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.


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This Court orders the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the

National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or representatives to maintain the status quo by

refraining from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further proceedings in

connection with the request of the United States Government for the extradition of the petitioner;

from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from performing any act

directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty (20) days

from service on respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary injunction, as agreed upon by

the counsels for the parties herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. The

respondents are, likewise, ordered to file their written comment and/or opposition to the issuance of

a Preliminary Injunction on or before said date.

WON PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THEEXTRADITION TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW

Held: Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Ratio: The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law,

requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's

legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that

"[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles

of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,

freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations."

Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further

legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere. The doctrine of

incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which

there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or

statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since

it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles

of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision. In a

situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of

international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the

municipal for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in allcircumstances

The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and

the prospective extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements

of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is

thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine whether or not the extradition should

be effected. That is the role of the court. The body's power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the

extradition petition can be filed in court.

The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply theprimacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of

incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing

with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat

priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the

constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties

may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution

In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic

twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither

the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extradites. Similarly, American


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jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition

proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition

documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes

a demandable right

5. In Re Arturo GarciaUNAV. August 15, 1961.

Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the

required bar examinations. he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City. that he had taken and finished in

Spain, the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified for admission to the

Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating there as "Licenciado En

Derecho"; he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the provisions of the Treaty

on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and theSpanish state, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the

required bar examinations.

Issue: WON he is entitled under the treaty on Academic Degrees?

Held: No. His petition was denied

Ratio: Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the

citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring

to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is

not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines.

Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is

the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity

of the national territory.

6. Rizal Alih v Maj. Gen. Delfin GastroG.R. No. L-69401. June 23, 1987.

On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred Philippine marines and elements of the home

defense forces raided the compound occupied by the petitioners at Zamboanga City, in search of loose

firearms, ammunition and other explosives. The military operation was commonly known and dreaded as a

"zona,". The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the invasion with a burst of

gunfire. No one was hurt as presumably the purpose was merely to warn the intruders and deter them from

entering. the situation aggravated soon enough. The soldiers returned fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued,

resulting in a number of casualties The besieged compound surrendered the following morning, and sixteen

male occupants w ere arrested, later to be finger-printed, paraffin tested and photographed over their

objection. The military also inventoried and confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades, and

several rounds of ammunition found in the premises.

On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court in a petition for prohibition and mandamus with

preliminary injunction and restraining order. Their purpose was to recover the articles seized from them, to

prevent these from being used as evidence against them, and to challenge their finger-printing,

photographing and paraffin testing as violative of their right against self- incrimination. The petitioners

demand the return of the arms and ammunition on the ground that they were taken without a search

warrant as required by the Bill of Rights.

WON The petitioners can invoke


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Held: Yes. The search of the petitioners' premises on November 25, 1984, is hereby declared ILLEGAL and all

the articles seized as a result thereof are inadmissible in evidence against the petitioners in any proceedings.

However, the said articles shall remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of the criminal cases that have

been or may later be filed against the petitioners.

Ratio:

Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution

The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against

unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated,

and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined

by the judge

Article IV, Section 4(2)

Sec. 4(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for

any purpose in any proceeding."

"Superior orders" cannot countermand the Constitution. The fact that the petitioners were suspected of the

Climaco killing did not excuse the constitutional short-cuts the respondents took. State of lawlessness in

Zamboanga City at the time in question certainly did not excuse the non-observance of the constitutional

guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. There was no state of hostilities in the area to justify

the repressions committed against the petitioners. The record does not disclose that the petitioners were

wanted criminals or fugitives from justice. At the time of the "zona," they were merely suspected of the

mayor's slaying and had not in fact even been investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were presumed

innocent and not guilty as summarily pronounced by the military. The respondents cannot even plead the

urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had every

opportunity to get a search warrant before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the

compound would be spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive

measure. There was absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the orderly processes required by

the Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all the

menace of a military invasion.

7. Integrated Bar of the Philippines v Hon. Ronaldo Zamora

G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000.

The President Joseph Estrada, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility

patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the

PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000

(the "LOI") which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would

be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President

directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and

utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The

President also declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in

nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the instant petition to annul LOI and to declare thedeployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that the deployment of

marines in Metro Manila is violative of the Constitution because no emergency situation obtains in Metro

Manila as would justify, even only remotely, the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work; hence, said

deployment in derogation of Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution.

Issue: WON the deployment is valid?

Held: Yes.

Ratio: The Supreme Court found no merit in the petition. When the President calls the armed forces to

prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power


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solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution

itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President's wisdom or substitute its own. It does

not, however, prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional

limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the

constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out

the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of

factual basis. The petition failed to discharge such heavy burden as there was no evidence to support the

assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces nor was grave abuse committed

because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian

supremacy over the military. In the performance of the Court's duty of "purposeful hesitation" before

declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly

shown shall the Court interfere with the President's judgment and to doubt is to sustain. The Court also ruled

that the calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law

enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriatelycircumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which

sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines' authority. It is noteworthy that the local police

forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP.

Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their

responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the

necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. It cannot be properly

argued then that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the

Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to

an "insidious incursion" of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of

the Constitution.

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call

upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under

conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service.

8. People v Tranquilino Lagman & Primitivo de SosaG.R. No. 45892. July 13, 1938 ; G.R. No. 45893. July 13, 1938.

Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth ActNo. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having

reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service

between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so.

The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to appear

before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service in accordance with law, and that the said

appellants, in spite of these notices, had not registered up to the date of filing of the information.

Issue: WON National Defense Law is constitutional?

Held: Yes . Court ruled in favor of the People of the PhilippinesRatio: The National Defense Law establishes compulsory military service, does not go against section 2, Article

II of the Philippine Constitution. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except

through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty

of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. The

circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse them from their duty to

present themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstances exists, the can ask for

deferment in complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to

attend to these family responsibilities


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Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of

the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

B. STATE POLICIES

Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the

paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to

self-determination.

9. Arthur Lim v Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 151445. April 11, 2002.

January 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao

to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in "Balikatan 02-1. A simulation of joint military

maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, 1 a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the

Philippines and the United States in 1951. The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately

rooted in the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush reaction to the

tragic events that occurred on September 11, 2001. On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and

Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint

exercise.2 They were joined subsequently by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-list

organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention on February 11, 2002. Lim and Ersando filed suit in theircapacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers. SANLAKAS and PARTIDO, on the other hand, aver that certain

members of their organization are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be directly affected by

the operations being conducted in Mindanao. They likewise pray for a relaxation on the rules relative to locus

standi citing the unprecedented importance of the issue involved.

Issue: Balikatan-02-1 inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution

Held: No. Court denied the petition of the petitioners

Ratio: The MDT has been described as the "core" of the defense relationship between the Philippines and its

traditional ally with the US. Its aim is to enhance the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed

forces through joint training with its American counterparts; the "Balikatan" is the largest such training

exercise directly supporting the MDT's objectives. It is this treaty to which the VFA adverts and the obligations

thereunder which it seeks to reaffirm. VFA provides the "regulatory mechanism" by which "United States

military and civilian personnel [may visit] temporarily in the Philippines in connection with activities approved

by the Philippine Government."

It is the VFA which gives continued relevance to the MDT despite the passage of years. Its primary goal is to

facilitate the promotion of optimal cooperation between American and Philippine military forces in the event

of an attack by a common foe. The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent

basis, in "activities," The joint exercises may include training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to

protect the nation's marine resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress, disaster

relief operations, civic action projects such as the building of school houses, medical and humanitarian

missions, and the like. It is only logical to assume that "Balikatan 02-1," a "mutual anti-terrorism advising,

assisting and training exercise," falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of

the agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion

that combat-related activities as opposed to combat itself such as the one subject of the instant petition,

are indeed authorized.


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Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws

and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively

secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the

people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the

competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the

interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally

justifiable, or extra- constitutionally , through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all

governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, must be founded on

the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the

protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and

economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health,

comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

11. Justa Guido v Rural Progress AdministrationGR No: L-2089. October 31, 1949

Petition for prohibition to prevent the Rural Progress Administration and Judge Oscar Castelo of the Court of

First Instance of Rizal from proceeding with the expropriation of petitioner Justa G. Guido's land, two adjoining

lots, part commercial, with a combined area of 22,655 square meters, situated in Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal

1. RPA (Rural Progress Administration) acted without jurisdiction or corporate power in filing theexpropriation complaint and has no authority

2. land sought to be expropriated is commercial and therefore excluded within the purview of the

provisions of Act 539.

3. majority of the tenants have entered with the petitioner valid contracts for lease, or option to buy atan agreed price, and expropriation would impair those existing obligation of contract.

4. Judge erred in fixing the provisional value of the land at P118,780 only and in ordering its delivery tothe respondent RPA."

SECTION 1. The President of the Philippines is authorized to acquire private lands or any interest therein,

through purchase or expropriation, and to subdivide the same into home lots or small farms for resale at

reasonable prices

"SEC. 2. The President may designate any department, bureau, office, or instrumentality of the National

Government, or he may organize a new agency

WON The land is excluded from Act 539?

Act No. 539 should be construed in a manner consonant with that intention. It is to be presumed that the

National Assembly did not intend to go beyond the constitutional scope of its powers. It would be in

derogation of individual rights and the time-honored constitutional guarantee that no private property shall

be taken for private use without due process of law. The taking of private property for private use relieves the

owner of his property without due process of law; and the prohibition that "private property should not be

taken for public use without just compensation". The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being andeconomic security of all the people should be the concern of the state," is a declaration, with which the former

should be reconciled, that "the Philippines is a Republican state" created to secure to the Filipino people "the

blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy." Democracy, as a way of life

enshrined in the Constitution, embraces as its necessary components freedom of conscience, freedom of

expression, and freedom in the pursuit of happiness. Along with these freedoms are included economic

freedom and freedom of enterprise within reasonable bounds and under proper control. In paving the way for

the breaking up of existing large estates, trusts in perpetuity, feudalism, and their concomitant evils, the

Constitution did not propose to destroy or undermine property rights, or to advocate equal distribution of

wealth, or to authorize the taking of what is in excess of one's personal needs and the giving of it to another.


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Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.

12. Hon. Isisdro Carino (DepEd) v Commission on Human RightsG.R. No. 96681. December 2, 1991.

Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of MPSTA and ACT undertook "mass concerted

actions" after the protest rally without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the

granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted

in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assembly.

Secretary of Education issued a return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal and a memorandum directing the

DECS officials and to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply. After failure to heed

the order, the CHR complainant (private respondents) were administratively charged and preventively

suspended for 90 days. The private respondents moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings

pending resolution by the Supreme Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary

restraining order. The motion was denied. The respondent staged a walkout. The case was eventually decided

ordering the dismissal of Esber and suspension of others. The petition for certiorari in RTC was dismissed.

Petition for Certiorari to the Supreme Court was also denied.

Respondent complainant filed a complaint on the Commission of Human Rights alleging they were denied due

process and dismissed without due notice. The Commission issued an order to Cario to appear and enlighten

the commission so that they can be accordingly guided in its investigation and resolution of the matter.

Cario filed a petition to Supreme Court for certiorari and prohibition whether the Commission has the

jurisdiction to try and decide on the issue regarding denial of due process and whether or not grievances

justify their mass action or strike.

Issue: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations

Held: No. The Court ruled to annul the case and prohibit CHR to hear the case.

Ratio: The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character of

finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of

Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the

teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on said matter, if still timely. The threshold question is whether

or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice or even a

quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear

and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political

rights.

The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law to be

another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the

latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may

investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations

involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial

function of a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and

ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be

considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be

accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the

controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes

of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. Hence it is that

the CHR having merely the power to investigate, cannot and not try and resolve on the merits (adjudicate)

the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and

cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers

in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been

transgressed.


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Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a

basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn

from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic

efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

13. Meyer v Nebraska

Mere knowledge of the German language cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful. Granted, the state of

Nebraska enacted this law to promote civic development by inhibiting training and education of the

immature in foreign tongues and ideals before they could learn English and acquire American ideals because

they are being reared in the US. However, the law infringes upon ones fundamental rights and is, therefore,

not justified. The protection of the Constitution extends to all to those born with English on the tongue and

those who speak other languages as well. A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means. The

statute, as applied, is arbitrary & w/o reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the state. It is

well known that proficiency in a foreign language is not injurious to the health, morals or understanding of

the ordinary child.

14. Pierce v Society Sisters

The Compulsory Education Act unreasonably interferes w/ the liberty of parents/guardians to direct the

upbringing & education of children under their control. Rights guaranteed in the Constitution may not be

abridged by legislation w/c has no reasonable relation to some purpose w/in the competency of the state.

The respondents as corporations have business & property for w/c they can claim protection. These are

threatened w/ destruction through the unwarranted compulsion w/c the appellants are exercising over

present & prospective patrons of their schools. Appellees asked protection against arbitrary, unreasonable,

and unlawful interference with their patrons and the consequent destruction of their business and property.

The suits were not premature. Their interest is clear and immediate and injury was not a mere possibility in

the remote future. The inevitable result of enforcing the act would be the destruction of appellees' primary

schools, and perhaps all other private primary schools in the state of Oregon. In addition, they are engaged in

undertakings that are useful and meritorious and there is also nothing that indicates that they have failed to

discharge their obligations to patrons, students, or the state.

15.

Department of Education Culture and Sports v Roberto Rey San DiegoG.R. No. 89572. December 21, 1989.

Roberto Rey San Diego graduated from UE with a degree of Zoology he claims that he took the NMAT three

times and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application

on the basis of the rule that a person can only take the NMAT 3x max. He then went to the Regional Trial

Court of Valenzuela. In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to

academic freedom and quality education. San Diego was allowed to take the NMAT. After which he filed

another case challenging the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12. The additional grounds raised were due

process and equal protection. The Judges of the RTC granted his petition.

WON the RTC Judge was correct?

Held: NO. SC reversed the ruling of the RTC

Ratio: Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical

schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education.

The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the

intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does

not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right

to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic

requirements." The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a

guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise.


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The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it

is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.

16. Francisco Virtouso v. Municipal JudgeG.R. No. L-47841. March 21, 1978.

Francisco Virtouso filed an application for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court on the grounds that the

preliminary investigation conducted by respondent Judge which led to the issuance of a warrant for his arrest

was constitutionally deficient, and that the bail recommended was excessive (P16,000.00, the alleged robbery

of a TV set). During the oral argument it was ascertained that petitioner was a 17 years old minor entitled to

the protection and the benefits of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, the provision affording youthful

offenders the opportunity to be provisionally released on recognizance at the discretion of the Court.

Issue: WON he should be granted a habeas corpus?

Held: Yes. Court ruled in favor of Virtouso.

Ratio: This Court should, whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code, which is

an implementation of this specific constitutional mandate: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in

nation-building and shall promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being." The Supreme Court

without passing upon the issue of whether or not the preliminary investigation conducted w as

constitutionally deficient resolved to release petitioner on recognizance pursuant to the provision of the Child

and Youth Welfare Code without prejudice to further proceedings of his pending criminal case.

Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protecttheir physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and

nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental

equality before the law of women and men.

17. Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company v National Labor Relations CommissionGR No: 118979. May 23, 1997

PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically asSupernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever

for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina

F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8,

1991. On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where

probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under civil

status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner

learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum

requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder about the companys

policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from the company effective

January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitionerillegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was

apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of

company policies.

ISSUE:Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an

employee.

Held: NO. Court ruled for reinstating De Guzman with reimbursement of salary.

Ratio: Petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who

contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers


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19. Teofisto Guingona Jr & Aquilino Pimentel v Hon. Guillermo CaragueG.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991.

1990 budget had a total of 233.5B where P98.4B (P86.8B for debt services) was allocated for the automatic

appropriation and P155.3B under RA 6831 or the General Appropriations Act while DECS has 27, 017,813,

000.00 Automatic Appropriation for debt services is authorized under PD No 81 Amending Certain Provisions

of RA 4860 and PD No 1177 Revising the Budget Process in Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the

New Society PD 1967 An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the PH

on its contingent liabilities arising out of relent and guaranteed loans by appropriating funds for the

purpose.

Petitioners argue that the automatic appropriations under the decrees of then President Marcos became

functus oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986; the legislative power was restored to Congress when

the Constitution was ratified and there is a need for a new legislation but Congress, has not approved any

law; and the said P86.8 Billion automatic appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that restson no law, and thus, it cannot be enforced. They argue that assuming arguendo on P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177

and P.D. No. 1967 did not expire Marcos, after the adoption of the 1987 Constitution.

The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D.

No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget

pursuant to said decrees.

Issue: WON it is unconstitutional?

Held: No. Case was dismissed in favor of the respondents (Carague)

Ratio: There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words orreligious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be

made by law, such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential

decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but

subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present

Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional

authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of

laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the

questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly

appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in

the present.

The Government budgetary process has 4 major phases

(1) Budget preparation where the executive branch estimation of government revenues and thedetermination of budgetary priorities and activities. It starts with the budget call by the Department

of budget and management. Where each agency is required to submit agency budget estimates

consistent with the general ceilings set by the Department Budget Coordinating Council (DBCC).

Upon issuance of the budget call the Bureau of Treasury computes for the interest and principal

payments for the year.

(2) Legislative Authorization Congress deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President andCongress formulates an appropriation act following the process established by the Constitution

**(Debt service is not included in the General Appropriations Act since there is RA 4860 and 245 as

amended and PD 1967)

(3) Budget Execution: Executive department establishes the obligation authority ceilings, evaluation ofwork and financial plans for individual activities and the continuing review of government fiscal

position, regulation of fund release and implementation of cash payment schedules.

** (The releases of debt services fund are by request of the Bureau of treasury one quarter in

advance of paying schedule.)

(4) Budget accountability: Evaluation of actual performance and initially approved work targets,


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obligations incurred, personnel hired and work accomplishment are being compared with the targets

at the time the budgets were approved.

The Court ruled that PD NO 81, section 31 of PD 1177 and PD 1967 and RA 4860 are constitutional

unless repealed or amended by Congress.

Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers

and promote their welfare.

20. Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) v Hon. Franklin DrilonG.R. No. 81958. June 30, 1988.

Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the

recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional

validity of Department Order No. 1 of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of"GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND

HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for

"discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic

helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an

invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. PASEI

invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-

making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law."

Issue: WON Department order 1 is valid?

Held: No. The Court ruled to dismiss the petition in favor of Drilon

Ratio:

State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote

the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in

order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in

general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no

question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not mean an

undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution

does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided

that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.

What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing

class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or

group of persons. Deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is

subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." Department

Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to

labor,"

Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by

Filipinos.

21. Wigberto Tanada v Edgardo AngaraG.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997

This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)

Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators

via signing the said agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of

tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the


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service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are

the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market

espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine

economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for

granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.

Held: Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit

Ratio: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted

principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,

justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country isbound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our

own laws. Pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a

mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.

Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a

regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it

consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as auto limitation. What Senate

did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is

outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative

restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it

should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for

multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is

isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected

officers, make their free choice.

Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise,

and provides incentives to needed investments.

Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.

22. Association of Small Landowners v Secretary of Agrarian ReformG.R. No. 78742. July 14, 1989.

The Association of Small Landowners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to

owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to

cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who

are actually cultivating such lands.

According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:

No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from

his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant-farmers and the landowner shall have

been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.

They ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to make Secretary of Agrarian Reform to issue the implementing

rules required.

Department of Agrarian reform argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of

retention from persons w ho own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands

used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for

their family. The regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued thru a Memorandum.


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ASL insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than

seven hectares and that the said measures are nevertheless not in force because they have not been

published as required by law and the ruling of this Court in Taada v. Tuvera. As for LOI 474, the same is

ineffective for the additional reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential

decree.

The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because

they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer

tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law

Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or

indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors

governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil

fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in

no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awardedto each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen

(15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided,

That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to

keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or

direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act

shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.

Issue: Whether or not PD 27 is constitutional?

Held: The court ruled that the tenant-farmers rights under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention

rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.

Ratio: The Court observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by whatever name it

was called, had the force and effect of law because it came from President Marcos. Such are the ways of

despots. Hence, it is futile to argue, as the petitioners do in G.R. No. 79744, that LOI 474 could not have

repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was only a letter of instruction. The important thing is that it was

issued by President Marcos, whose word was law during that time.

According to Justice Holmes: Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police

power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the

State of rights in property without making compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health,

safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in question is merely the

prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner. The state does

not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely prevents the owner from making a use which

interferes with paramount rights of the public. Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious as it may

because of further changes in local or social conditions the restriction will have to be removed and the

owner will again be free to enjoy his property as heretofore.

23. Luz Farms v Secretary of Agrarian ReformG.R. No. 86889. December 4, 1990.

June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock,

poultry and swine in its coverage. January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the

Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit S haring as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of

R.A. No. 6657.

Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business stands to be affected by the

enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657


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otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing

Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657

Petitioners are invoking their right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not

exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective

lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.

Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its entirety. However, argued that

Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution, in including land devoted

to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop

or tree farming

Issue: Whether or not Congress exceeded in including raising of lifestock?

Held: The court granted their petition. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 including the raising of

livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in

accordance therewith, are hereby declared null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary

injunction issued is hereby made permanent.

Ratio: The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the

word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include

livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of

the Government.

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section 11 of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural

lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is

invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian

reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage

of agrarian reform.

Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the

framework of national unity and development.

Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that

promote the welfare of the nation.

Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-building.

Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

24. Humberto Basco v PAGCORG.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991

The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated

January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish,operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines."

Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation

(PAGCOR) Charter PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order. Petitioners

claim that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that

the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is in violation of the principle of local autonomy. Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of

any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether

National or Local."


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Issue:

Does the local Government of Manila have the power to impose taxes on PAGCOR?

Held: No, the court rules that The City government of Manila has no power to impose taxes on PAGCOR.

Reason: The principle of Local autonomy does not make local governments sovereign within the state; the

principle of local autonomy within the constitution simply means decentralization. It cannot be an Imperium

in imperio it can only act intra sovereign, or as an arm of the National Government. PAGCOR has a dual role,

to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental,

which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality

of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. The power of local

government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law.

Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987

Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local

governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with theprinciple of local autonomy.

25. Hon. MTC Judge Mercedes Dadole v COAG.R. No. 125350. December 3, 2002.

In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly allowances through the yearly

appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the said city. In 1991, Mandaue City

increased the amount to P1,500 for each judge. On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and

Management (DBM) issued the disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that such

additional allowances in the form of honorarium at rates shall be granted but it shall not exceed P1,000.00 inprovinces and cities and P700.00 in municipalities subject to the following conditions:

a. That the grant is not mandatory on the part of the LGUs;b. That all contractual and statutory obligations of the LGU including the implementation of R.A.

6758 shall have been fully provided in the budget;

c. That the budgetary requirements/limitations under Section 324 and 325 of R.A. 7160 should besatisfied and/or complied with; and

d. That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of functions/personnel in accordance withR.A. 7160.

Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to petitioners.

Beginning October, 1994, the additional monthly allowances of the petitioner judges were reduced to P1,000

each. They were also asked to reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1,000 from April to

September, 1994. The petitioner judges filed with the Office of the City Auditor a protest against the notices

of disallowance. But the City Auditor treated the protest as a motion for reconsideration and indorsed the

same to the COA Regional Office No. 7. In turn, the COA Regional Office referred the motion to the head

office with a recommendation that the same be denied. On November 27, 1995, Executive Judge Mercedes

Gozo-Dadole, for and in behalf of the petitioner judges, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of

the COA. In a resolution dated May 28, 1996, the COA denied the motion. Hence, this petition. Petitioner

judges argue that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City. They also maintainthat said circular is not supported by any law and therefore goes beyond the supervisory powers of the

President. Respondent COA, on the other hand, insists that the constitutional and statutory authority of a city

government to provide allowances to judges stationed therein is not absolute. Congress may set limitations on

the exercise of autonomy. It is for the President, through the DBM, to check whether these legislative

limitations are being followed by the local government units

Issue: WON the City Ordinance of Mandaue which provides a higher rate of allowances to the appellant judges

may prevail over that fixed by the DBM under Local Budget Circular No. 55

Held: No. The court ruled in favor of Dadole.


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The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Nuisance

Candidates wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of

Candidacy. Rationale against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced

a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its

electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the

practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater

the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in

preparation for the election.

** Section 69. Nuisance Candidates. The Commission may, motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an

interested party, refuse to give due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said

certificate has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the

voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which

clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which thecertificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the

electorate.

Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective

measures against graft and corruption.

Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of

full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

27. Ma. Carmen Aquino- Sarmiento v Manuel L. Morato.G.R. No. 92541. November 13, 1991.

In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification

Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's records

pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and

television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or classified accordingly.

She was told by the Records officer that she has to secure prior clearance from respondent Manuel Morato,

as chairman of MTRCB, to gain access to the records sought to be examined. Request was denied on the

ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the

individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely privateand personal. Petitioner argues, that the records she wishes to examine are public in character and other than

providing for reasonable respondents Morato and the classification board have no authority to deny any

citizen seeking examination of the board's records. On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an

executive meeting of the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting,

seventeen (17) members of the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents

which rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter,

respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips. However, it was only much later,

i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential,

private and personal, th

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