consti 2 digests 1 - revised 1 (2)

8/21/2019 Consti 2 Digests 1 - Revised 1 (2)

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LAMBINO VS COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153

TOPIC: AMENDMENT AND REVISION

FACTS:- February 2006: petitioners Raul L. Lambino and company (Lambino Group)

gathered signatures for an initiative to change the 1987 Constitution by shifting the

present Bic ameral-Presidential System into a Unicam eral-Parliamentary System(through modifications of sections of Art VI (Legislative Dept) and Art VII (ExecutiveDept)).

- On August of the same year, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold aplebiscite to ratify their initiative petition under Section 5 (b, c) and Sec. 7 of R.A.No. 6735 (Initiative and Referendum Act )

- Peititioners alleged that the their initiative petition had the support of 6.3 millionindividuals, consisting of at least 12% of all registered voters, and each legislativedistrict represented by at least 3%.

- The proposition in said petition reads as follows: DO YOU APPROVE THEAMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-

PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, ANDPROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLYSHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?

- The COMELEC denied the petition, citing the decision in Santiago v s COMELECwherein RA 6735 was delcared inadequate to implement the initative clause onproposals to amend the Constitution

- CONTENTION OF PETITIONERS: Lambino Group alleged that the COMELECcommitted grave abuse of discretion in denying their petition and claimed thatSantiago is not a binding precedent binds only the parties to that case. They alsoclaimed that their petition deserves cognizance because it is the will of thesovereign people.

- Other groups and individuals sought intervention, with some alleging that the nature

of the changes sought by the petitionerss are revisions and not mere amendementsas provided under Sec. 2, Art XVII of the 1987 Cons titut ion.

ISSUES:1. W/N the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Sec. 2, Art. XVII of

the Constitution on amendements to the Constitution through a peoplesinitative.

2. W/N this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions toimplement the initative clause on proposals to amende the Constitution

3. W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying duecourse to the Lambino Groups petition

RULING:- THE PETITION HAS NO MERIT. The Lambino Group failed to comply with the basic

requirements of the Constitution in conducting a peoples initiative. The Courtdeclared that there is no need to revis i t the Santiago decis ionbecause the saidfailure of the petitioners alone is enough to constitute a ground for dismissal.

1. The Init iat ive Petit ion does n ot comply with Sec. 2, Art XVII of theConst i tu t ion


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o Sec. 2 provides that Amendements to this Constitution may likewisebe direct ly prop osed by the people through init iat ive upon apeti t ion

o The Court consulted the deliberations of the ConstitutionalCommission on the phrase directly propsoed by the people throughinitative upon a petition. The deliberations provided that the phrase

means that the draft of the proposed ch anges must b e ready andshow n to the people before they sign.

o The full text must be shown to the people before they affix theirsignatures on the petition. Otherwise, this constitutes a form of fraudor deception.

o NOT A SINGLE WORD, PHRASE, OR SENTENCEOF THECHANGES PROPOSED BY THE PETITIONERS APPEARED ON

THE SIGNATURE SHEET. Petitioners alleged that they printed100,000 copies of the full text for distribution but even so, the amountis not sufficient to inform the number of people necessary forratification.

2. The init iat ive violates Sec 2, Art XVII of the Con sti tut ion Disal lowing

Revis ion thro ugh Init iat ives.o Sec. 1 of Art XVII provides that Amendements and revis ionsmay be

proposed by Congress or a constitutional conventions. Sec. 2provides that amendementsmay likewise be proposed by the peoplethrough initiative. Thiis reflects a clear intention of the framers to makea distinction between the modes of amendement and revision, limitingpeoples initiative only to the former.

o The SC took into consideration a two-part test established byCalifornia courts to determine whether a change is a revision or anamendment the quantitative test (whether the change is soextensive that it changes the constitution in its entirety) and qualitativetest (whether the change will accomplish such far reaching changes in

the nature of the basic government plan). The Court ruled that thechanges propsoed by the Lambino group amounts to a revis ionsince shifting the form of government from bicameral to unicameralwould radically alter the framework of the government set by theConstitution. Therefore, the mode peoples initative cannot beused to enact such changes sinc e said mo de is l imited only to

amendments .

3. A revis i t t o the Santiago case is not n ecessary.o An affirmation or reversal of the Santiago case will not change the

outcome of the present petition.o Assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement amendments of the

Constitution, this will not change the result because the petitionersfailed to comply with the basic requirements set forth in theConstitution.

4. The COMELEC did not comm it grave abuse of discret ion in dism issingthe petitioners Inititative.

o The COMELEC en banc merely followed the SCs previous rulings inSantiago and Peoples Initiative for Reform, Modernization and


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Ac tion (PIRMA) v. COMELEC and no grave abuse of discretion isattributable.

____________________________________________________________________________

SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC

TOPIC: STAGES OF AMENDMENT AND REVISIONPROPOSAL STAGE

FACTS- Dec. 6, 1996: private respondent Atty Jesus S. Delfin filed with the COMELEC a

Petition to amend the Constitution, to lift term limits of elective officials, by PeoplesInititative (DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALLELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSESECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?). Delfin alleged thathe is a member of the Movement for Peoples Inititative, a group intending toexercise the power to directly proposed amendments under Sec. 2, Ar t, XVII of t heConst i tu t ion.

- The exercise of peoples initiative shall be conducted under the control andsupervision of the COMELEC. COMELEC Resolutio n No. 2300 (to govern t heconduct of init iat ive on the Consti tut ion and on national and local laws)requires that signature stations shall be established all over the country with theassistance of municipal election registrars, whi shall verify the signatures.

- According to Delfin, the Petition for Initiative will be first submitted to the people,signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, then formallysubmitted to the COMELEC.

- The COMELEC issued an order: (a) directing Delfin to cause the publication of thepetition (including the proposed amendment) and the publication of the notice ofhearing in three (3) newspapers of general circulation not later than Dec. 9, 1996, (b)setting the hearing on Dec. 12, 1996, 10 AM.

- During the said hearing, Senator Raul S. Roco, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petitionon the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by theCOMELEC

- Dec. 18, 1996: petitioners (Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla,Maria Isabel Ongpin) filed a special civil action for prohibition based on the followingarguments:

a. The Constitutional Provision on peoples initiative to amend it requires anenabling law. No such law has been passed (Senate Bill No. 1290 An

Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitutional Amendments by PeoplesInitiativefiled by Santiago herself, was still pending at the time)

b. RA 6735 provides fo r 3 systems of init iat ive on the Consti tut io n,on st atutes, on loc al legis lat ion. But the law fai ls to pro vide for any

subti t le on the first one. The deliberate omission indicates that thematter was left to some future law. I t fai ls to state the pro per part ieswho may fi le the peit i ton, the appropriate agency w ho m ay receive

such, the contents of the peti t ion and on its pub l icat ion, the ways

and m eans o f sign ature gathering, the role of the COMELEC, etc.c. RA 6735 provides for the effectivity of a law after publication. This must

mean it does not include constitutional amendments because they takeeffect upon ratification and not publication


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d. COMELEC Resolution 2300 is ultra vires since only Congress isauthorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law on initiativeto amend.

e. The proposed change constitutes a revision and peoples initiative islimited only to amendment (invoked statement of Fr. Joaquin Bernas: itwould involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited

tenure)f. No funds have been appropriated or realigned for the purposeg. ALSO: re-registration of voters would amount to expenses of from the

treasury of at least P180 million. Hence, the issue is of transcendentalimportance and the petition should be settled promptly

h. Contention of Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol and Konstitusyon (DIK) andMovement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc.(MABINI):

- The private respondents argueda. All expenses are for the account of respondent Delfin and his volunteersb. The pending petition before the COMELEC is only on the signature

gathering, which by law, COMELEC is duty-bound to supervise closely

(Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs COMELEC). The petition is only onthe Initiatory Pleading and not yet for the actual Petition for Initiative

c. RA 6735 is an enabling law that implements the power of peoplesinitiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. Subtitles are notrequirements for the validity of a law.

d. COMELEC RESOLUTION No. 2300 was upheld in the case of Subic BayMetropolitan Authority vs COMELEC. It is not ultra viresbecause Sec 2,

Art IX-C of the Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to enforceand administer all laws and regulations related to contests, plebiscites,in i tat ive, referendum, and recall. Sec. 20 of RA 6735 also empowers theCOMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the

Acts purposes

e. Even Senate Bill No. 1290 contains provisions delegating to theCOMELEC the power to promulgate rules and regulations necessary tocarry out the acts purposes

f. The proposed changes (extension of term limits)are only an amendmentsince they change only a few specific provisions.

ISSUES1) W/N RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on

amendments to the constitution and, if so, whether it is adequate enoughto cover such system.

RULING- Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution provides that amendmentds may be directly

proposed by the people, but that Congress shal l provid e for the implementation

of the exercise of this right. Fr. Joaquin Bernas also stated that withoutimplementing legislation, Section 2 cannot operate.Hence, the provision is not self-exercutory and an enabling law is necessary

- The SC also consultd the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, whichclearly reflected that the framers intended Peoples Initiative to be limited only toamendments and that the implementation (inc lud ing i ts procedure)was left to thelegislature.

- RA 6735 is NOT in com pliance with the pow er and du ty of Cong ress to prov idefor the implementation of the exercise of Peoples Initiative:


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a. Sec. 2 of said act states that the people have the power to directly propose,enact, approve or reject, In whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,ordinances, or resolutions. It is clear that Constitution was added only asan afterthought because the people cannot propose, enact, approve, orreject the fundamental law, only the last three of the enumeration.

b. Sec. 5(c0 provides for the contents of a petition for a law sought to be

enacted, approved, rejected, amended, repealed. While no similar provisionexists under the initiative on Constitution.

c. The lack of subtitle provided for initiative on the Constitution indicates that themain thrust of the act is initiative and referendum of national and local laws. IfCongress had intended to include initiative on the Constitution, anappropriate subtitle would have been included.

- RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms andcondit ions insofar as init iat ive on amendments to the Consti tut ion is

concerned

____________________________________________________________________________

SANIDAD VS. COMELEC

TOPIC: AMENDMENT AND REVISIONJUDICIAL REVIEW

FACTS:- September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. No. 991, calling for a

national referendum on October of the same year for the Citizens Assemblies(barangays to resolve issues of: (a) martial law, (b) the interim assembly and itsreplacement, (d) the replacements powers, period of existence, and (e) the lengthfor the exercise by the President and his present powers.

- September 22, 1976, issuance of P.D. No. 1031, amending the previous Decree,declaring that the provisions of P.D. No. 229 will be applicable to the nationalreferendum-plebiscite previouslt mentioned

- September 22, 1976: P.D. 1033 was issued, stating the questions to be included inthe referendum-plebiscite (First, whether the people want martial law to be continuedand second, if they approve of the list of amendments attached, replacing the interimNational Assembly with an interim Batasang Pambansa and declaring theincum bent President as Prime Minister with legis lat ive powers unti l m art ial law

is l i f ted).- CONTENTION OF PETITIONERS: September 27, 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and

Pablito V. Sanidad (father and son) filed for a Prohibition with Preliminary Injuctionenjoining the COMELEC from holding the referendum-plebiscite. Their contentionwas that under th e 1935 and 1973 Consti tu t ions, there is no grant to theincumbent President to exercise the consti tuent power to propose

amendments to the Consti tut io n.

- CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT: The Solicitor General, on behalf of theCOMELEC, maintained that: (a) petitio ners have no standi ng to sue, (b) theissue is p ol i t ical in nature, and (c) at this s tage of the transit ion period, only

the President can exercise consti tu ent power.

ISSUES1. W/N the case may be subjected to judicial review/ W/N the issue constitutes a

political question and, therefore is beyond cognizance of the courts2. W/N Marcos, the incumbent president, can validly propose amendments to the

Constitution.


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RULING:- THE PETITIONS ARE DEVOID OF MERIT

a. Jusiciability of the question raisedo The petitioners Sanidad possess legal standing (locus standi).

Statutes may be contested by those who will sustain direct injury as a

result of their enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, lawsproviding for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined. In thiscase, P.D. No. 991 appropriates Php5,000,000 for its purposes, whileP.D. No. 1031 appropriates Php8,000,000. The interest of thepetitioners in the lawful expenditure ofpublic money sufficiently clothesthem with personality as litigants.

o The amendin g proc ess both as to pro posal and rati f ication raisesa judic ial question, especially in this case where the power normallyexercised by one branch (legislative) is exercised by another(executive). Under Sec. 15, Art XVI of the 1973 Constitution, thepower to propose amendments resides in the interim National

Assembly during the period of transition. The fact that the current

circumstances deviate from said provision raises an issue ofconstitutionality of the Presidential Decrees, thus making the issue onthat may be recognized by the courts.

b. May the President validly propose amendments to the Constitutiono Concentraion of government powers in the President during times of

national crisis is a valid act. Sec. 3 (pars. 1, 2) of the TransitoryProvisions provide that the President shall continue to exercise thepowers cested in the Presidene tna dht eprime Minister until he callsupon the interim National Assembly to elect the interim President andinterim Prime Minister.

o In the same article, the discretion of when to call the initial convening

ot the interim National Assembly lies in the President. Also, the peoplealready rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly throughreferendums. With only the executive and Judicial branches inoperation, it it imperative of the President to act as an agent of thepeople (since the SC does not have the power to legislate).

o The referendum-plebiscite also serves as a resounding call to thepeople to exercise their soverign power.

__________________________________________________________________________

OSMENA VS. COMELEC (1998)

TOPIC: REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEWACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY

FACTS- Petition for prohibition, seeking a reexamination of the validity ofSec. 11(b) of RA

6646 (Electoral Reform s Law of 1987), which prohibits mass media from selling orgiving free of charge print space/air time for campaigning and other politicalpurposes, except to the COMELEC.

- Petitioner Emilio M.R. Osmena is a candidate for President of the Philippines andfellow petitioner, Pablo P. Garcia is a governor of Cebu province, seeking reelection.


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Petitioners are questioning the val id i ty of the decis ion in National Press Club v.COMELEC (1992)

- NPC v. COMELEC upheld the validity of the questioned provision against claims thatit abridged freedom of speech and of the press. Petitioners claim that the ruling, inthe five years since the decision, has had undesirable effects and worked to thedisadvantage of the poor candidates who cannot afford other mediums of

campaigning in contrast to the more affluent opponents.- Petitioners had no empirical data to support their claim.

ISSUES- W/N there is an actual controversy for the Supreme Court to decide.

RULING- PETITION DISMISSED. THERE IS NO CASE OR CONTROVERSY TO DECIDE,

ONLY AN ACADEMIC DISCUSSION TO HOLD.- Argumentation was made at the theoretical and not the practical level. They

were unable to show proof on the events that they claimed to have invalidated thedecision in the NPC case. They do not complain that they have been disadvantagedbecause of the law.

- The NPC case was, however, revisited by the SC. There is no ad ban. It prohibits

the sale and donation of print space and air time, but also mandates the COMELECto procure and itself allocate to the candidates the space and time in the media (thisis in accordance and harmonized with the Omnubus Election Code provisions whichmandate the COMELEC to allocate newspaper space and radio and television timefor candidiates).

___________________________________________________________________________

A. Case TitleAtty. Romulo B. Macalintal, Petitioner,vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, Respondent.(2010, Nachura, J.)

B. TopicIntroduction; The Constitution and the Courts; Requisites of Judicial Review; Proper

Party (Locus Standi); Taxpayer suitrequisitesC. Facts of the Case

A petition filed by Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal (Atty. Macalintal), that questions theconstitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progenyof Section 4,Article VII of the Constitution:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to theelection, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgateits rules for the purpose.

Respondents Contention (through OSG):The OSG crystallizes the following issues for resolution of the Court:

Whether petitioner has locus standi to file the instant case.

Whether the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional for being a

violation of paragraph 7, Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Whether the designation of members of the Supreme Court as members of the

Presidential Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional for being a violation of Section 12,Article VIII of the !987 Constitution.

Petitioners Contention:In his Reply,7petitioner maintains that:

1. He has legal standing to file the petition given his averment of transcendentalimportance of the issues raised therein;
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2. The creation of the PET, a separate tribunal from the Supreme Court, violates Section4, Article VII of the Constitution; and

3. The PET, being a separate tribunal, exercises quasi-judicial functions contrary toSection 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.D. Issue

Whether or not the petitioner has the locus standi to file instant petition?

E. RulingNo.On more than one occasion we have characterized a proper party as one who has

sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complainedof.9The dust has long settled on the test laid down in Baker v. Carr:10"whether the party hasalleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concreteadverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largelydepends for illumination of difficult questions."11Until and unless such actual or threatenedinjury is established, the complainant is not clothed with legal personality to raise theconstitutional question.

Although there are recognized exceptions to this requisite, we find none in this instance.Petitioner is unmistakably estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before whichtribunal he had ubiquitously appeared and had acknowledged its jurisdiction in 2004. His failure

to raise a seasonable constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with his unconditionalacceptance of the Tribunals authority over the case he was defending, translates to the clearabsence of an indispensable requisite for the proper invocation of this Courts power of judicialreview. Even on this score alone, the petition ought to be dismissed outright.

Petition dismissed.F. Note:

By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by thisCourt. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue,provided that the following requirements are met:

(1) cases involve constitutional issues;(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the

tax measure is unconstitutional;

(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the electionlaw in question;

(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are oftranscendental importance which must be settled early; and

(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringesupon their prerogatives as legislators.

Contrary to the well-settled actual and direct injury test, petitioner has simply alleged ageneralized interest in the outcome of this case, and succeeds only in muddling the issues.Paragraph 2 of the petition reads:

2. x x x Since the creation and continued operation of the PET involves the use of publicfunds and the issue raised herein is of transcendental importance, it is petitionershumble submission that, as a citizen, a taxpayer and a member of the BAR, he has the

legal standing to file this petition.But even if his submission is valid, petitioners standing is still imperiled by the white elephant inthe petition, i.e., his appearance as counsel for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo(Macapagal-Arroyo) in the election protest filed by 2004 presidential candidate Fernando Poe,Jr. before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,13because judicial inquiry, as mentioned above,requires that the constitutional question be raised at the earliest possible opportunity.14Suchappearance as counsel before the Tribunal, to our mind, would have been the first opportunityto challenge the constitutionality of the Tribunals constitution.
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A. Case TitleBlas F. Ople, Petitioner,vs. Ruben D. Torres, et. al, Respondents (1998, Puno, J.)

B. TopicIntroduction; The Constitution and the Courts; Requisites of Judicial Review; Proper

Party (Locus Standi); Taxpayer suitrequisitesC. Facts of the Case

A petition to review a decision of the Executive Secretary and the Members of the Intro-Agency Creating Committee.

President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order (A.O.) 308 on December 12, 1996entitled Adoption of National Computerized Identification Reference System or commonlyknown as National ID System.

Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition before the Supreme Court questioning theconstitutionality of the said executive issuance on two important grounds, viz: one, it is ausurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on ourcitizenry's protected zone of privacy.

We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitionerneed stronger barriers against further erosion.

A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22,

1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition againstrespondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the governmentagencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with theimplementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining orderenjoining its implementation.

D. IssueWhether or not the petitioner has the locus standi to assail the validity of Administrative

Order 308.E. Ruling:

YES. As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating tothe standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically,

respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rulesof A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. These submissions do not deserve oursympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator,petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuanceof A.O.No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.

As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitionercan also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS fundsto implement A.O. No. 308. The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected bythe fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Opleassails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature forthe rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondentsthemselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As

early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication ofa notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent ExecutiveSecretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS havecompleted the guidelines for the national identification system. All signals from the respondentsshow their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality ofthe rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that wetighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle animportant constitutional principle and a fundamental right.

Petition is granted and A.O. 308 is declared null and void for being unconstitutional.


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A. Case TitleLouis "Barok" C. Biraogo,Petitioner, vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of2010,Respondent (2010, Mendoza, J.)

B. Topic

Introduction; The Constitution and the Courts; Requisites of Judicial Review; ProperParty (Locus Standi); Taxpayer suitrequisitesC. Facts of the Case

At the dawn of his administration, President Noynoy signed Executive Order No. 1establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).The Philippine TruthCommission (PTC) is created to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during theadministration of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and thereafter to submit its finding andrecommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Barely a month after theissuance of EO No. 1, two cases were filed before the SC assailing the validity andconstitutionality of the said EO.

The first case is a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo

in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for beingviolative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as itusurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriatefunds therefor. Biraogo argues that EO No. 1 is unconstitutional because there is no provision inthe Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth commission

The second case is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitionersEdcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr.(petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives. Petitioners-Legislators argue that the said Order is unconstitutional because the creation of a public officelies within the province of Congress and not with the executive branch of government.

The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the creation by thePresident of a fact-finding body such as a truth commission. Pointing to numerous offices

created by past presidents, it argues that the authority of the President to create public officeswithin the Office of the President Proper has long been recognized. According to the OSG, theExecutive, just like the other two branches of government, possesses the inherent authority tocreate fact-finding committees to assist it in the performance of its constitutionally mandatedfunctions and in the exercise of its administrative functions.

The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita, where it was held that thePresident has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department inline with his constitutionally granted power of control and by virtue of a valid delegation of thelegislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. The OSG concludesthat the power of control necessarily includes the power to create offices.

D. Issue

Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitionsand question Executive Order No. 1E. Ruling:

Yes. Petitioners-legislators petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of theCongress as a body to which they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve totake the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation oftheir power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court.


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To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each memberthereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of thatinstitution.

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative butnonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such acase, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.

Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers andprivileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed toquestion the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives aslegislators.

With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing toquestion the creation of the PTC and the budget for its operations. It emphasizes that the fundsto be used for the creation and operation of the commission are to be taken from those fundsalready appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and disbursement of funds for thecommission will not entail congressional action but will simply be an exercise of the Presidentspower over contingent funds.

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is indanger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of

Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may justify hisclamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential issuancesin defense of the Constitution.

The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers mattersof transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There areconstitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of theirseriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental andparamount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should beresolved for the guidance of all. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due tooverwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but becausethe Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversieswith overreaching significance to society.

Petit ion is granted.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Nachura, J.I agree with the ponencia that, given our liberal approach in David v. Arroyo 2and

subsequent cases, petitioners have locus standi to raise the question of constitutionality of theTruth Commissions creation.

Dissenting Opinion of Carpio-Morales, J.Petitioners in G.R. No. 193036, with legal standing as legislators, cannot properly assert

the equal protection claim of the previous administration.While legislators havelocus standiincertain cases, their legal standingas suchis recognized only insofar as the assailed issuanceaffects their functions as legislators. In the absence of a claim that the issuance in question

violated the rights of petitioner-legislators or impermissibly intruded into the domain of theLegislature, they have no legal standing to institute the present action in their capacity asmembers of Congress.8

No doubt, legislators are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action upona claim of usurpation of legislative power.9That is why, not every time that a Senator or aRepresentative invokes the power of judicial review, the Court automatically clothes themwithlocus standi.10The Court examines first, as theponenciadid, if the petitioner raises anissue pertaining to an injury to Congress as an institution or a derivative injury to membersthereof,11before proceeding to resolve that particular issue.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_192935_2010.html#fnt2nhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_192935_2010.html#fnt2nhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_192935_2010.html#fnt8cmhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_192935_2010.html#fnt8cmhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_192935_2010.html#fnt8cmhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_192935_2010.html#fnt9cmhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_192935_2010.html#fnt9cmhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_192935_2010.html#fnt9cmhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_192935_2010.html#fnt10cmhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_192935_2010.html#fnt10cmhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_192935_2010.html#fnt10cmhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_192935_2010.html#fnt11cmhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_192935_2010.html#fnt11cmhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_192935_2010.html#fnt11cmhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_192935_2010.html#fnt11cmhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_192935_2010.html#fnt10cmhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_192935_2010.html#fnt9cmhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_192935_2010.html#fnt8cmhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_192935_2010.html#fnt2n


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The peculiarity of thelocus standiof legislators necessarily confines the adjudication of theirpetition only on matters that tend to impair the exercise of their official functions

Breach of the equal protection clause, as presently raised by petitioner-legislatorsonbehalf ofthe Executive Department of the immediate past administration, has nothing to do withthe impairment of the powers of Congress.

A. Case Title

Francisco Zandueta,petitioner, vs. Sixto De La Costa,respondent (1938, Villa-Real, J.)B. Topic

Introduction; The Constitution and the Courts; Requisite of Judicial Review; EarliestOpportunityC. Facts of the Case

This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable Francisco Zandueta againstthe Honorable Sixto de la Costa to obtain from this court a judgment declaring the respondent tobe illegally occupying the office of Judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance ofManila, Fourth Judicial District, ousting him from said office, and holding that the petitioner is

entitled to continue occupying the office in question by placing him in possession thereof, withcosts to said respondent.

Francis Zandueta was presiding over a 5thBranch of Courts of First Instance of Manila.He received a new ad interim appointment issued (Commonwealth Act No. 145) to

discharge the Office of Judge in the Court of First Instance of the 4 thJudicial District with theauthority to preside over the Court of First Instance of Manila and Palawan.

The ad interim appointment of the petitioner was disapproved by the Commission onAppointments of the National Assembly.

The President of the Philippines appointed Sixto Dela Costa (respondent), judge of 4 thJudicial District, with authority to preside over the Court of First Instance of Manila and Palawan.

Dela Costas appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments of theNational Assembly.

Petitioner questioned the validity of the appointment alleging that C.A. No. 145 isunconstitutional.D. Issue

Whether or not Zandueta may question the constitutionality of C.A. No. 145 by which thenew ad interim appointment of judge of first instance of the 4thJudicial District, to preside overthe Court of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, was issued in his favor.E. Ruling

No. Zandueta is estopped by his own act questioning the constitutionality of C.A. No.145. When a judge of first instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of a

judicial district by virtue of a legal and valid appointment, accepts another appointment topreside over the same branch of the same Court of First Instance, in addition to another court ofthe same category, both of which belong to a new judicial district formed by the addition of

another Court of First Instance to the old one, enters into the discharge of the functions ofhis new office and receives the corresponding salary, he abandons his old office andcannot claim to be to repossess it or question the constitutionality of the law by virtue ofwhich his new appointment has been issued; and, said new appointment having beendisapproved by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, neither can heclaim to continue occupying the office conferred upon him by said new appointment, having ipso

jureceased in the discharge of the functions thereof.The peti t ion for q uo warranto inst i tuted is denied and the same is dismiss ed.


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____________________________________________________________________________

A. Case TitleManila Motor Company, Inc.,plaintiff-appellee, vs. Manuel T. Flores, defendant-appellant (1956, Bengzon, J.)

B. Topic (based on the syllabus)

Introduction; The Constitution and the Courts; Declaration of Unconstitutionality; Effects;Orthodox View v. Modern ViewC. Facts of the Case

An appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of ManilaIn May 1954, Manila Motor Company filed in the Municipal Court of Manila a complaint to

recover from Manuel T. Flores the amount of P1,047.98 as chattel mortgage installments whichfell due in September 1941.

Defendant pleaded prescription: 1941 to 1954.The com plaint was dismissed.On Appeal, the Court of First Instance saw differently, sustaining plaintiff's contention that

the moratorium laws had interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, and that deductingthe time during which said laws were in operation three years and eight months1the ten

year term had not yet elapsed when complainant sued for collection in May 1954.Wherefore said court ordered the return of the case to the municipal judge for trial on

the merits.Defendant appealed, arguing principally that the moratorium laws did not have the effect of

suspending the period of limitations, because they were unconstitutional. He cites jurisprudenceholding that when a statute is adjudged unconstitutional it is as inoperative as if it had neverbeen passed, and no rights can be built upon it.D. Issue

Whether or not a statute adjudged as unconstitutional is inoperative as if it had neverbeen passed and no rights can be built upon it.E. Ruling

No.At any rate, although the general rule is that an unconstitutional statute confers no right,

create no office, affords no protection and justifies no acts performed under it, there are severalinstances wherein courts, out of equity, have relaxed its operation or qualified its effects "sincethe actual existence of a statute prior to such declaration is an operative fact, and may haveconsequences which cannot justly be ignored.

Judgment affirmed.

Province of Camarines Sur v.s The Court of Appeals

Facts:On December 22, 1988, the SangguniangPanlalawigan of the Province of Camarines

Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase

or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farmfor non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincialgovernment employees.

Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon.Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquinand Efren N. San Joaquin, docketed as Special Civil Action Nos. P-17-89 and P-19-89 of theRegional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur, presided by the Hon. Benjamin V. Panga.

The Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance of writ of possession. TheSan Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion.The San Joaquins moved to dismiss


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the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. In an orderdated December 6, 1989, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized theProvince of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk ofCourt of the amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer fordamages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do notprosper.

In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that ResolutionNo. 129, Series of 1988 of the SangguniangPanlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that thecomplaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order dated December 6, 1989 (i)denying the motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to takepossession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990,denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside.

In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has theauthority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local GovernmentCode (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose.

Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor Generalstated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no needfor the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the SangguniangPanlalawigan

of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that theProvince of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reformof the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.

The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province ofCamarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying theadmission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend theexpropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted therequisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of theproperty of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.

Issue(s):1. Whether or not the contention and decision of the Court of Appeals to set aside the

trial courts order allowing the Province of Camarines Surs expropriation of privatelands is valid.

2. Whether or not the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units issubject, to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, as theimplementer of the agrarian reform program.

Held:

1. No, the Court of Appeals decision to set aside the order of the trial that allows theProvince to expropriate private lands is untenable.

2. No, the expropriation of agricultural lands by LGUs do not require the prior approval ofthe Secretary of Agrarian Reform (of DAR).

The expropriation of the property authorized by the Province is ultimately for a publicpurpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the directbenefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur.Once operational,the center would make available to the community invaluable information and technology onagriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermenand craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purposerequirement of the Constitution.


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What does public use mean? There has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretationof "public purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised.The old concept was that the condemned property must actually be used by the general public(e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutionalrequirement of "public use". Under the new concept, "public use" means public advantage,convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of

the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project.In terms of expropriation and the power of eminent domain: it is the submission of the Provinceof Camarines Sur that its exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot be restricted bythe provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657), particularlySection 65 thereof, which requires the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform before aparcel of land can be reclassified from an agricultural to a non-agricultural land.

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not contend thatthe local government units must first secure theapproval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise,there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expresslysubjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to the control

of the Department of Agrarian Reform.

National Housing Authority v.s. Honorable Pastor P. Reyes

Facts:The controversy started with the filing of a complaint with the then Court of Agrarian

Relations, Seventh Regional District, Branch II, Cavite City, against private respondents, for theexpropriation, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 757, of a parcel of land, with an area of25,000 square meters, owned and registered in the name of respondent Quirino Austria, andneeded for the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project.

Thereafter, private respondent Quirino Austria filed a Motion to Withdraw Deposit in the

amount of P6,600.00, a sum which was equivalent to the value of the property assessed fortaxation purposes and which was deposited by petitioner pursuant to Presidential Decree No.42 .

There was an Opposition to the Motion to Withdraw Deposit by petitioner, citing Section92 of Presidential Decree No. 464 which states: "Basis for payment of just compensation inexpropriation proceedings. In determining such compensation when private property is acquiredby the government for public use, the same shall not exceed the market value declared by theowner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value asdetermined by the assessor, whichever is lower." Petitioner's submission is that the owner'sdeclaration at P1,400.00 which is lower than the assessor's assessment, is the justcompensation for the respondents' property, respondents thus being precluded fromwithdrawing any amount more than P1,400.00.

Respondent Judge, however, issued an order dated July 13, 1978 which, according topetitioner, is clearly contrary to the letter and spirit of the aforecited laws.

The Court issued the following resolution wherein the Court Resolved without giving duecourse to the petition to require the respondents to comment, not to file a motion to dismiss,within ten (10) days from notice. The Court further Resolved to issue a temporary restrainingorder, effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by the Court. Thecomment was thereafter submitted by private respondents Quirino Austria and Luciano Austria.

Private respondents stress that while there may be basis for the allegation thatrespondent Judge did not follow Presidential Decree No. 76the matter is still subject to his


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final disposition, he having been vested with the original and competent authority to exercise hisjudicial discretion in the light of the constitutional provisions.

Issue(s):1. Whether or not the decision and contention of Justice Reyes incontravening the

petition of NHA regarding their interpretation of just compensation is valid.

Held:

1. No, the decision and contention of Justice Reyes in contravening the petition of theNHA regarding their interpretation of just compensation is NOT valid.

The courts should recognize that the rule introduced by P.D. No. 76 and reiterated insubsequent decrees does not upset the established concepts of justice or the constitutionalprovision on just compensation for, precisely, the owner is allowed to make his own valuation ofhis property. Whatever is stipulated in the provisions of the presidential decree regarding justcompensation, if couched in clear and unequivocal terms, must be applied and interpreted bythe Court as it is. The function of the judiciary in matters of just compensation should be the

application of the clear provisions. The decree having spoken so clearly and unequivocally, callsfor obedience. It is repeating a common place to state that on a matter where the applicable lawspeaks in no uncertain language, the Court has no choice except to yield to its command.

Therefore, Justice Reyes cannot claim validly that the rule on just compensation has beengrossly taken out of context, for the provision is clear in matters of its definite meaning.

In view of the urgency of the housing problem the various decrees mentioned earlier wereissued for the purpose of assuring that the government would be in a financial position to copewith such basic human need which in the Philippines, under the welfare state concept, andaccording to the express language of the Constitution, is an obligation cast upon the State.

1.REPUBLIC vs. CA (Just Compensation)

G.R. No. 146587 July 2, 2002

FACTS:

Petitioner (PIA) instituted expropriation proceedings covering a total of 544,980 square meters

of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for thecontinued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the Voice of thePhilippines project.

Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonablevalue of the property. On 26 February 1979, or more than 9 years after the institution of theexpropriation proceedings, the trial court issued this order condemning the property andordering the plaintiff to pay thedefendants the just compensation for the property.


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It would appear that the National Government failed to pay the respondents the justcompensation pursuant to the foregoing decision. The respondents then filed a manifestationwith a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. In response, the court issued awrit of execution for the implementation thereof.

Meanwhile, Pres. Estrada issued Proc. No. 22 transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated landto the Bulacan State University.

Despite the courts order, the Santos heirs remained unpaid and no action was on their caseuntil petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amountP4,664,000 by way of just compensation.

The Santos heirs submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6/sq.m. as

previously fixed to its current zonal value of P5,000/sq.m. or to cause the return of theexpropriated property.

The RTC Bulacan ruled in favor of the Santos heirs declaring its 26 February 1979 Decision tobe unenforceable on the ground of prescription in accordance with Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the1964/1997 ROC which states that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed onmotion within 5 years from the date of its entry. RTC denied petitioners Motion to PermitDeposit and ordered the return of the expropriated property to the heirs of Santos.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioner may appropriate the property

2. WON the respondents are entitled to the return of the property in question

HELD:

1. The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereignpower to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose.

Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by theConstitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and asbeing regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, thepower is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in manyrespects. It reaches to every form of property the State needs for public use and, as an old caseso puts it, all separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit agreement orimplied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of theproperty whenever the public interest so requires it.


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The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriationproceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for thecondemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, byfiling the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title andpossession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to

prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.

Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: first, the taking must be for public use,and second, that just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property. Thesetwin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving balancebetween the State interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the other hand, byeffectively restraining the former and affording protection to the latter. In determining publicuse, two approaches are utilized - the first is public employment or the actual use by the public,and the second is public advantage or benefit. It is also useful to view the matter as beingsubject to constant growth, which is to say that as society advances, its demands upon theindividual so increases, and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual

may be devoted.

The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, asignificant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of thefacilities of the Bulacan StateUniversity and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with therequirements of public purpose. Respondents question the public nature of the utilization bypetitioner of the condemned property, pointing out that its present use differs from the purposeoriginally contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings. The argument is of no moment.The property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as thecondemnor and as the owner of the property, is well within its rights to alter and decide the useof that property, the only limitation being that it be for public use, which, decidedly, it is.

2. NO. In insisting on the return of the expropriated property, respondents would exhort on thepronouncement in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya where the unpaidlandowners were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in question. Itmight be borne in mind that the case involved the municipal government of Sorsogon, to whichthe power of eminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and of limited application.The grant of the power of eminent domainto local governments under Republic Act No. 7160cannot be understood as being the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in thelegislative branch of government. For local governments to be able to wield the power, it must,by enabling law, be delegated to it by the national legislature, but even then, this delegated

power of eminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of eminent, but only of inferior,domain or only as broad or confined as the real authority would want it to be.

Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Republic where the private landowners had remained unpaid ten yearsafter the termination of the expropriation proceedings, this Court ruled -

The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if so, in what amount.


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Said lots have been the subject of expropriation proceedings. By final and executory judgmentin said proceedings, they were condemned for public use, as part of an airport, and ordered soldto the government. x x x It follows that both by virtue of the judgment, long final, in theexpropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitledto recover possession of their expropriated lots - which are still devoted to the public use forwhich they were expropriated - but only to demand the fair market value of the same.

"Said relief may be granted under plaintiffs' prayer for: `such other remedies, which may bedeemed just and equitable under the premises'."

The Court proceeded to reiterate its pronouncement in Alfonso vs. Pasay City where therecovery of possession of property taken for public use prayed for by the unpaid landowner wasdenied even while no requisite expropriation proceedings were first instituted. The landownerwas merely given the relief of recoveringcompensation for his property computed at its marketvalue at the time it was taken and appropriated by the State.

The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the expropriation proceedings providesnot only for the payment of just compensation to herein respondents but likewise adjudges theproperty condemned in favor of petitioner over which parties, as well as their privies, are bound.Petitioner has occupied, utilized and, for all intents and purposes, exercised dominion over theproperty pursuant to the judgment. The exercise of such rights vested to it as the condemneeindeed has amounted to at least a partial compliance or satisfaction of the 1979 judgment,thereby preempting any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of non-execution. In arguing forthe return of their property on the basis of non-payment, respondents ignore the fact that theright of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to whichthe remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in rem proceeding, condemnation acts uponthe property. After condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and

independent title; thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnationproceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may beobtained by voluntary conveyance.

Respondents, in arguing laches against petitioner did not take into account that the sameargument could likewise apply against them. Respondents first instituted proceedings forpayment against petitioner on 09 May 1984, or five years after the 1979 judgment had becomefinal. The unusually long delay in bringing the action to compel payment against hereinpetitioner would militate against them. Consistently with the rule that one should take good careof his own concern, respondents should have commenced the proper action upon the finality ofthe judgment which, indeed, resulted in a permanent deprivation of their ownership and

possession of the property.

The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to themarket valueof the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open marketin the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the propertyas between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actualtaking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation isdeposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include


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interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time whencompensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of theproperty and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a positionas good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.

The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interests on the zonal valueof the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedingsand took the property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found tobe the value of the property as of the time of the taking computed, being an effectiveforbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation andinflation of the value of the currency over time. Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, incase of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of the currency at the time of theestablishment of the obligation shall be the basis for the payment when no agreement to thecontrary is stipulated, has strict application only to contractual obligations. In other words, acontractual agreement is needed for the effects of extraordinary inflation to be taken intoaccount to alter the value of the currency.

All given, the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000, vacating itsdecision of 26 February 1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only authority left to itbeing to order its execution. Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the return of theexpropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of justcompensation already fixed by final judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 atP6.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the dateof "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due amount shall have been fullypaid.

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2. Republic v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620 (Private Property) - 1969

Facts:

PLDT and RCA Communications Inc (which is not a party to this case but has contractualrelations with e parties) entered into an agreement where telephone messages, coming from theUS and received by RCA's domestic station could automatically be transferred to the lines ofPLDT and vice versa.

The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System (GTS) byrenting the trunk lines of PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. One of themany rules prohibits the use of the service for his private use.

Republic of the Philippines entered into an agreement with RCA for a joint overseas telephoneservice where the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls received by the RCA'sstation to and from local residents.


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PLDT complained that the Bureau was violating the conditions for using the trunk lines not onlyfor the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public. PLDTgave a notice that if violations were not stopped, PLDT would sever the connections -whichPLDT did.

Republic sued PLDT commanding PLDT to execute a contract, through the Bureau, for the useof the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines under such termsand conditions as the court finds it reasonable.

Issue:

Whether or not Republic can command PLDT to execute the contract to continue the usage oftheir private property for government use.

Held:

No. The Bureau was created in pursuance of a state policy reorganizing the government officesto meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of a free Gov't of the Phil.

However, when the Bureau subscribed to the trunk lines, defendant knew or should have knownthat their use by the subscriber was more or less public and all embracing in nature. Theacceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledge that the plaintiffhad extended the use of the trunk lines to commercial purposes, implies assent by thedefendant to such extended use. Since this relationship has been maintained for a long time

and the public has patronized both telephone systems, and their interconnection is to the publicconvenience, it is too late for the defendant to claim misuse of its facilities, and it is not now atliberty to unilaterally sever the physical connection of the trunk lines.

Alunan vs MirasolGR No. 108399 July 31, 1997

Facts:LGC of 1991 provided foran SK in every barangay to be composed of a chairman, 7members,a secretary and a treasurer, and provided that the first SK elections wereto be held 30 daysafter the next local elections. The Local Government Code wasenacted January 1, 1992.The first elections underthe code were held May of 1992. August 1992, COMELECprovided

guidelines for the holding of the general elections for the SK on Sept. 30,1992, which alsoplaced the SK elections under the direct control and supervision of DILG, with the technicalassistance of COMELEC. After postponements, they wereheld December 4, 1992.Registration in6 districts of Manila was conducted. 152,363 people aged 15-21registered,15,749 of them filing certificated of candidacy. The City Council passedthe necessaryappropriations for the elections.September 18, 1992 The DILG, through Alunan, issued a letter-resolutionexempting Manilafrom holding SK elections because the elections previously held onMay 26, 1990 were tobe considered the first SK elections under the new LGC. DILGacted on a letter by Santiago,


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acting President of the KB (Kabataang Barangay) CityFederation of Manila and a member of theCity Council of Manila, which stated thatelections for the Kabataang Barangay were heldon May 26, 1990. In this resolution,DILG stated that the LGC intended to exempt thosebarangay chapters whichconducted their KB elections from January 1, 1998 to January 1,1992 from theforthcoming SK elections. The terms of those elected would be extended tocoincidewith the terms of those elected in the SK elections

Private respondents, claiming torepresent 24,000 members of the Katipunan ngKabataan, fileda petition for certiorari and mandamus, arguing that the DILG had nopower to amend theresolutions of the COMELEC calling for general elections for SKs,and that DILG denied themequal protection of laws.RTC issued an injunction and ordered petitioners to desist from implementing theorder ofthe DILG Secretary, and ordered them to perform the specified pre-electionactivities in order toimplement the general elections. The case was reraffled to adifferent branch of the same court,and the new judge held that DILG had no powerto exempt Manila from holding SK elections,because that power rests solely inCOMELEC, and that COMELEC already determined that Manila has notpreviously heldelections for KB by calling for a general election, and that the exemption ofManilaviolated the equal protection clause because of the 5,000 barangays that previouslyheldelections, only in Manila, 897 barangay, were there no elections

.Issue:Whether COMELEC can validly vest the DILG with the power of direct control andsupervisionover the SK elections with the technical assistance of COMELECWhether DILG canexempt an LGU from holding SK electionsHeld:

Despite the holding of SK elections in 1996, thecase is not moot; it is capable of repetition, yetevading review.DILG had the authority to determine whether Manila would be required to hold SKelections.oCOMELEC vesting DILG with such powers is not unconstitutional. Election forSK officers arenot subject to the supervision of COMELEC in the same waythat contests involving elections ofSK officials do not fall within the jurisdiction of COMELEC.

o Justice Davide, in Mercado vs Board of Election Supervisors, stated that theprovision in theOmnibus Election Code that states that COMELEC shall haveexclusive appellate jurisdictionover contest involving elective barangayofficials only refer to elective barangay officials underthe laws in force at thetime the Code was enacted, which was the old LGC.oMoreover, DILG was only acting or performing tasks in accordance to theframework of detailedand comprehensive rules embodied in a resolution of COMELEC. Although it is argued that nobarangays were named in theresolution, DILG was not given discretionary powers because theymerelyused the time period set by COMELEC as a reference in designating exemptedbarangays.Likewise, the LGC of 1991 was held to be curative, and thusshould be given retroactive effect, giving themayor the authority to callelections; thus, the 1990 KB elections were not null and voidfor beingconducted without authority.

o The contention of violation of the equal protection clause could not bedetermined from therecords of this case. The mere showing that there wereother barangays that held KB electionsduring the set period but were notexempted from the 1992 SK elections is not sufficient to provethat violation.An article in manila Bulletin stated that barangays in Bulacan did not haveelectionsin 1992 because they held elections on January 1, 1988.


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____________________________________________________________________________

KILUSANG MAYO UNO VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL., April 19,

2006 & June 20, 2006

LAS F. OPLE

v.

RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO

HABITO,ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO

VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEADOF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and

CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDITFacts:

The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the

shrinking of the rightto privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most

comprehensive of rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that

we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled"Adoption of a National Computerized

Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds,

viz

:(1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and(2)it impermissibly intrudes on our

citizenry's protected zone of privacy.We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated

by the petitioner need stronger barriers against furthererosion.A.O. No. 308 was published in

four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January

24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary

Ruben Torresand the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency

Coordinating Committee, arecharged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997,

we issued a temporary restraining orderenjoining its implementation.

Issue:

WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308

Ruling:

YES

Rationale:

As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the

standing to sue of thepetitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically,

respondents aver that petitioner has no legalinterest to uphold and that the implementing rules

of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. These submissions do not deserve our


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sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. Asa Senator,

petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance

of A.O.No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.

4

As taxpayer and member of the Government Service InsuranceSystem (GSIS), petitioner can

also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSISfunds to

implement A.O. No. 308. The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by

the fact that the implementing rules of A.O.No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople

assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid

per se

and as infirmed on itsface. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated

cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, therespondents themselves have started the

implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997,

respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid forthemanufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres

has publicly announcedthat representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the

guidelines for the national identificationsystem.All signals from the respondents show their

unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait forthe formality of the rules to

pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that wetighten the

rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an

importantconstitutional principle and a fundamental right.

LIDASAN v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSGR NO. L-280892Petioner: BARA

LIDASANRespondent: COMELECFACTS

On June 18, 1966, Chief Executive signed into law House Bill (HB) 1247, now known as

Republic Act (RA) 4790 An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanaodel Sury. The new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur includes: Kapatagan, Bongabong,

Aipang,Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung.It also includes:

barrios of Togaig and Madalum (both situated inBuldon, Cotabato) and barriosof Bayanga,

Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tangabao, Bara Lidasan, resident and

taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato affected by the implementation of RA

4790, questions the constitutionality of RA 4790.


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ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790 is valid?

RULING

RA 4790 declared a NULL and VOID Constitutional requirement aforestated that no bill which

may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the

title of the billConstitutional provision contains DUAL LIMITATIONS upon legislative power:

1. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogenoussubjects.

2.The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify thelegislators and the

public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. It violates the

constitutional requirement that the subject of the bill be expressed in its title.

It did not inform the Congress the full impact of the Law. Moreover,

It did not inform thecitizens of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato that part of their territory is beingtaken awayfrom their towns and municipalities and that such will be added to the Province of

Lanaodel Sur.o

The subject was the creation of the municipality of Dianaton. Hence, it makes the titlemisleading

and deceptive

Even upon removing the barrios of Cotabato included in the municipality of Dianaton, itis still

unconstitutional because the valid part is not independent of the invalid portion.

Thus, it is indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its

totality


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ORTIGAS & CO. LTD., VS COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 126102, December 4, 2000

Topic: POLICE POWER

FACTS:

This petition seeks to reverse the decision of Court of Appeals, dated March 25, 1996, in

CAG.R. SP No. 39193, which nullified the write of the write of preliminary injunction

issued by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Bramch 261, in Civil Case No. 64931.

On August 25, 1976, petitioner Ortigas & Company sold to Emilia Hermoso, a parcel of

land known as Lot 1, Block 21, Psd-66759, with an area of 1,508 square meters, located

in Greenhills Subdivision IV, San Juan, Metro Manila, and covered by Transfer

Certificate of Title No. 0737. The contract of sale provided that the lot:

a. Be used exclusively for residential purposes only, and not more than one single-

family residential building will be constructed thereon.

b. The BUYER shall not erect any sign or billboard on the roof for advertising

purposes.

c. No single-family residential building shall be erected until the building plans,

specification have been approved by the seller.

d. Restrictions shall run with the land and shall be construed as real covenants until

December 31, 2025 when they shall cease and terminate

These and the other conditions were duly annotated on the certificate of

title issued to Emilia.

In 1981, the Metropolitan Manila Commission (now Metropolitan Manila DevelopmentAuthority) enacted MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, also known as the Comprehensive

Zoning Area for the National Capital Region. The ordinance reclassified as a commercial

area a portion of Ortigas Avenue from Madison to Roosevelt Streets of Greenhills

Subdivision where the lot is located.

On June 8, 1984, private respondent Ismael Mathay III leased the lot from Emilia

Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp. The lease contract did not specify the

purposes of the lease. Thereupon, private respondent constructed a single story

commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.

On June 16, 1995, the trial court issued the writ of preliminary injunction. On June 29,

1995, Mathay III moved to set aside the injunctive order, but the trial court denied themotion.

Mathay III then filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari,

docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 39193, ascribing to the trial court grave abuse of discretion

in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction. He claimed that MMC Ordinance No. 81-01

classified the area where the lot was located as commercial area and said ordinance

must be read into the August 25, 1976 Deed of Sale as a concrete exercise of police

power.


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Ortigas and Company averred that inasmuch as the restrictions on the use of the lot

were duly annotated on the title it issued to Emilia Hermoso, said restrictions must

prevail over the ordinance, specially since these restrictions were agreed upon before

the passage of MMC Ordinance No. 81-01.

ISSUE/S:

W/N the CA properly exercised police power

RULING:

Yes, the Court held that, in issuing the disputed writ of preliminary injunction, the trial

court observed that the contract of sale was entered into in August 1976, while the zoning

ordinance was enacted only in March 1981. The trial court reasoned that since private

respondent had failed to show that MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 had retroactive effect, said

ordinance should be given prospective application only citing Co vs. Intermediate Appellate

Court, 162 SCRA 390 (1988).

Laws are to be construed as having only prospective operation. Lex prospic i t , non

respic i t. Equally settled, only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are

applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have

retroactive effect.

But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One involves police power.

A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or

transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or

contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to

those already in existence. Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the

court held that, MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 as a legitimate police power measure.

The trial courts reliance on theCo vs. IAC, is misplaced. In Co, the disputed area was

agricultural and Ordinance No. 81-01 did not specifically provide that it shall have

retroactive effect so as to discontinue all rights previously acquired over lands located within

the zone which are neither residential nor light industrial in nature, and stated with respect

to agricultural areas covered that the zoning ordinance should be given prospective

operation only. The area in this case involves not agricultural but urban residential land.

Ordinance No. 81-01 retroactively affected the operation of the zoning ordinance in

Greenhills by reclassifying certain locations therein as commercial.

The instant petition is DENIED. The challenged decision of the Court of Appeals datedMarch 25, 1996, as well as the assailed resolution of August 13, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No.

39193 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Term:

Lex prosp ic i t , non respic i t- The law looks forward, not backward.


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TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC. vs. BOARD OF TRANSPORTATIONG.R. No. L- 59234 September 30, 1982Topic: Test of Valid Exercise

Facts: Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporationcomposed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to

operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible tovehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two ofthe members of TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of publicconvenience.

On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued MemorandumCircular No. 77-42 which reads:

SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis

WHEREAS, it is the polic

consti 2 digests 1 - revised 1 (2)

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