1st batch of consti digests

8/13/2019 1st Batch of Consti Digests

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The Constitution of the Philippines

De Leon vs. Esguerra

153 SCRA 602 No. L-78059, August 31, 1987

FACTS: In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was

elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C.

Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion, as Barangay Councilmen of

Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the

Barangay Election Act of 1982. On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a

Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin

Esguerra on February8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain

of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor was "by

authority of the Minister of Local Government. Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OICGovernor signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986 designating respondents Remigio

M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. LacanientaTeodoro V. Medina, Roberto S. Paz and Teresita L. Tolentino as

members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality

ISSUE: Whether the memoranda of Feb 8, 1987 is null and void, thus prohibiting respondents

from taking over the appointed positions

HELD: No, the memoranda have no legal effect.

1. Effectivity of memoranda should be based on the date when it was signed. So, February 8,

1987 and not December 1, 1986.

2. February 8, 1987, is within the prescribed period. But provisional constitution was no longer

in efffect then because 1987 constitution has been ratified and its transitory provision, Article

XVIII, sec. 27 states that all previous constitution were suspended.

3. Constitution was ratified on February 2, 1987. Thus, it was the constitution in effect.

Petitioners now acquired security of tenure until fixed term of office for barangay officials has

been fixed. Barangay election act is not inconsistent with constitution.

Considering Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution which states that All

elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in

office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or

appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period ofone year from February 25,1986, it would seem that the appointment was valid on Feb 8, 1987

since the term of the elective officials would end in Feb 25, 1987. However, since the new

constitution was ratified on Feb 2, 1987 and section 27 states that effectivity is immediate,

thereby superseding the Provisional Constitution. Furthermore, the 1987Constitution under

ensures the autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development and the Presidents

power is for general supervision only which is in line with the barangay election act of 1982.


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Relevantly, on Section 8 states that terms of local officials is 3 years, except of barangay

officials, which means that the 6-year terms as stated in the Barangay Election Act of 1982is still

in effect unless otherwise stated by law


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FRANCISCO v. HOR

FACTS:

NOTE: Read Article XI of the 1987 Constitution

*Following Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution1, the 12th Congress of the House

of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings

(House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House

Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress.

*On July 22, 2002: the HOR adopted a resolution to conduct an investigation on the

manner of disbursements and expenditures by the SC Chief Justice of the Judiciary Development

Fund.

*On June 22, 2003: former President Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (1st

impeachment complaint) against CJ Davide and 7 Assoc. Justices for culpable violation of the

Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes which was endorsed by Rep.

Suplico, Zamora and Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on Aug. 5,

2003 in accordance with Sec 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

* October 13, 2003: the House Committee on Justice ruled on that the first impeachment

complaint was sufficient in form but voted to dismiss the same on Oct 22, 2003 for being

insufficient in substance. The Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House

in plenary.

*October 23, 2003 (four months and three weeks since the filing of the 1st

impeachment

complaint: 2nd

impeachment complaint was filed with the Sec. Gen of the House by

Representative Gilberto Teodoro and William Fuentabella against CJ Davide founded on the

alleged results of the legislative inquiry. The 2nd

impeachment complaint was accompanied by a

Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least 1/3 of all members of the HOR.

Thus, arose 18 instant petitions against the HOR, et. al., most of which petitions contend

that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the

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provision of Sec 5 of Art XI of the Constitutions that no impeachment proceedings shall be

initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

ISSUES:

I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid

impeachable offenses under the Constitution.

II. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th

Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the

Constitution.

III. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the

Constitution.

HELD:

45The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court

has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to

make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a

purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.

Such intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for

impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a

precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission

shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of

public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of

both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the

issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the

scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.


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445The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state

that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House

Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or

(2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the

verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or

endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified

complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus

clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different

from "filing."

4445The second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr is barred

under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

Commissioner Regalado, who eventually became Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, agreed

that the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional

Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he

(Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant

petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act

of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as ittwice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take

initial action on it. The Court then held that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the

impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken

thereon. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another

may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section

3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada

against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on

June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second

impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William

Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition


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Gonzales vs Commission on Elections(BAGTAS)

**I included issue #1kase nakalagay sya sa case itself, and just to be sure and just in case Miss

asks about it, but ang pinaka relevant lang talaga is Issue #2)

FACTS: On 16 March 1967, the Congress passed the following Resolutions:

Resolution of Both Houses (hereafter called RBH) 1:proposing that Sec 5 Art VI of the

Constitution be amended to increase the maximum number of seats in the House of

Representatives from 120 to 180

RBH 2: to call a Constitutional Convention to be composed of 2 elective delegates from each

representative district, to be elected on the general elections on the 2nd

Tuesday of November

1971.

RBH 3: proposing to amend Sec 16 Art VI of the Consti to authorize senators and members of

the House of Representatives to become delegates to the Constitutional Convention without

forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.

Consequently, the Congress passed a bill, which became RA 4913 upon approval of the

President, providing that RBH Nos 1 and 3 be submitted for approval by the people at the

general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967, the same day as the general

elections.

The petitioner, Ramon Gonzales, instituted this class suit, for and in behalf of all citizens,

taxpayers and voters alike. He assailed the constitutionality of RA 4913 and the power of the

Congress to propose amendments, being de facto officers because they have not yet completed

the Constitutional requirement of reapportionment, therefore, rendering its acts null and void. He

also added that constitutional amendments should not be submitted for ratification the same day

as the general elections for this would not provide sufficient opportunity to cast intelligent votes

and the voters therein would only be interested in the personalities in the general elections.

ISSUE: 1.) WON the constitutional amendments had been validly proposed by the

Congress.

2.) WON constitutional amendments can be submitted for ratification the same day as

the general elections


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Imbong vs. Comelec

G.R. No. L-32432

September 11,1970

Facts:

Petitioners Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, both interested in running as candidates

in the 1971 Constitutional convention, filed separate petitions for declaratory relief, impugning

the constitutionality of RA 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as candidates.

Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 2 which called for the

Constitutional Convention to propose Constitutional amendments. After its adoption, Congress,

acting as a legislative body, enacted RA 4914 implementing said resolution, restating entirely the

provisions of said resolution.

Thereafter, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly , passed Resolution No. 4

amending the Resolution No. 2 by providing that xxx any other details relating to the specific

apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of the Constitutional

Convention shall be embodied in an implementing legislation xxx.

Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted RA 6132, implementing Resolution Nos. 2

and 4, and expressly repealing RA 4914.

Issue:

May Congress in acting as a legislative body enact RA 6132 to implement the resolution

passed by it in its capacity as a Constituent Assembly?

Ruling:

Yes. The Court declared that while the authority to call a Constitutional Convention is

vested by the Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a Constitutional

Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details or specifics of the general law does not

exclusively pertain to the congress, the congress in exercising its comprehensive legislative

power( not as a Constitutional Assembly) may pass the necessary implementing law providingfor the details of the Constitutional Conventions, such as the number, qualification, and

compensation of its members.

The reasons cited by the Court in upholding the constitutionality of the enactment of RA

6132 are as follows:


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1. Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Article XV of the

Constitution, has authority to propose constitutional amendments or call a convention

for the purpose by ! votes each house in joint session assembled but voting

separately.

2. Such grant includes all other powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal

power by necessary implication.

3. Implementing details are within the authority of the Congress not only as a

Constituent Assembly but also in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power

which encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn

or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative action so long as it does

not contravene any provision of the Constitution; and

4. Congress as a legislative body may thus enact necessary implementing legislation to

fill in the gaps which Congress as a Constituent Assembly has omitted.


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Tolentino v. Comelec

(G.R. No. L-34150, October 16, 171)

Facts:

The Constitutional Convention of 1971 approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which amends

Section 1 of the Constitution lowering the voting age from 21 to 18.

The amendment lowering the voting age to 18 is only the first amendment in a series of

amendments to be submitted for ratification to the people in a plebiscite. In other words, theproposed amendment will be presented to the people separately from each and all of the other

amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention.

A petition for prohibition was thereafter filed at the Supreme Court which seeks to prevent the

Comelec from conducting a plebiscite because Organic Resolution No. 1 is unconstitutionalbecause it violates Section 1, Article XV of the 1935 Constitution.

2

Issue: Whether Organic Resolution No 1. is unconstitutional for violating Section 1, Article XVof the 1935 Constitution.

Held:Yes.

1. The language of the constitutional provision is clear, which unequivocally says "an election"

which means only one.

(2) When a whole Constitution is submitted to the voters for approval, more or less they canassume its harmony as an integrated whole, and they can either accept or reject it in its entirety.

At the very least, they can examine it before casting their votes and determine for themselves

from a study of the whole document the merits and demerits of all or any of its parts and of thedocument as a whole. And so also, when an amendment is submitted to the people that is to formpart of the existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the proposed

amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and or any of its parts and therebyarrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability. This cannot happen in the case of the

amendment in question. The voter in the proposed plebiscite cannot intelligently determine theeffect of the reduction of the voting age upon the different institutions which the Convention

may establish and of which presently he is not given any idea.

6The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the

House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for

that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes

cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.


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THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)

Facts:

Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms,Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend theConstitution to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, through Peoples Initiative. He based this

petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of thepeople to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution.

The COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the noticeof hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP,

Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ngDemokratikong Pilipino (LABAN) appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a

motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that it is not initiatory party cognizable bythe COMELEC.

After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to filetheir Memoranda and/or Oppositions/Memoranda.

The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed thiscivil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the

Delfin petition raising the several arguments, among others:(1) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an

enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and(2) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the

Constitution. R.A 6735 failed to provide subtitle initiative on the Constitution; the Act coversonly laws and not Constitutional amendments.

(3)The Peoples Initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision

thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside thepower of the peoples initiative.

Issues:

(1)Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing

provision.(2)Whether R.A. 6735 is a sufficient statutory implementation of the said constitutional

provision?(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or

an amendment of the Constitution.

Held:

(1)No. Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, withoutimplementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has

recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does notprovide for its implementation.


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(2)No. R.A 6735 is insufficient and incomplete to fully comply with the power and dutyof the Congress to enact the statutory implementation of Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the

Constitution.(3)The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other

provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the

constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, andprohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative.


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Lambino vs COMELEC

FACTS:

1. On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and

Erico B. Aumentado "Lambino Group", with other groups and individuals, commencedgathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25

August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite

that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)and Section 7of Republic

Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").

2. The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals

constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each

legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters.

The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the

signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

3. The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying

Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII(Executive Department)and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory

Provisions."These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system

to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that

after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following

proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:

DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987

CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT

BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND

PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLYSHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?

4. On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC

indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their

initiative.

ISSUE:

1. WON the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of

the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;

2. WON this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete,inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative

clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and

3. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the

Lambino Group's petition.


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Held:According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for

conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of

discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on

Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time

of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which

renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision

through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and

revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may

propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is

a radical change, therefore it constitutes a revision.3.For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the

Commission on Elections.

Petition is Dismissed


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FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

Police Power

G.R. No. 81958. June 30, 1988

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC.,petitioner,

vs.

HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D.

ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration, respondents.

FACTS:

The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a firm "engagedprincipally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas

placement,"challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of

the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING

THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND

HOUSEHOLD WORKERS."

It is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino

workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of

the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of lawmaking power, police power

being legislative, and not executive, in character. Further, PASEI invokes Section 3, of ArticleXIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making

processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law."

On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8,

1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in some states. In submitting the

validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the

Philippine State. It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power

measure.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Department Order No. 1 is valid under the Constitution.

HELD:

The petition is dismissed.


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The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified.

There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but

it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that

"equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights

among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that:

(1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and

(4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.

The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers rests on

substantial distinctions.

In the case at bar, there is no gainsaying the fact, that Department Order No. 1 implements the

rule-making powers granted by the Labor Code.

The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic

overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers"is not an argument for

unconstitutionality. In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain

women workers, and not the contrary.

Department Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The right to travel is subject, among

other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." The right to

travel is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.

Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid

exercise of legislative power. The Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and

Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof.


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Ichong v. Hernandez G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

(Police Power)

FACTS: Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage

of business opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time

he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay.

The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to

prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the peoples

economic life.

a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the

capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly

in the retail trade

Aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue

their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death

or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the

Act or until the expiration of term.Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.

provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the

laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws

relating to trade, commerce and industry.

provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail

business of additional stores or branches of retail business

Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships

affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:

1. it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their

liberty and property without due process

2. the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title

3. the Act violates international and treaty obligations

4. the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru

hereditary succession

Issue: Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power.

Held: YES. The Supreme Court held that the police power is so far - reaching in scope,

that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very

existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to

be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of

all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under

a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to

almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost

boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-

embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the


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needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive

world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and

through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions

do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the

limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal

protection clause.

Summary:

According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then

provided that police power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a

contract. The Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger

to national economy posed by alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the

said treaty, the latter is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and

the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state.

Other Issue: Whether or not the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the

laws.

Held: No. The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality

among residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like

circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The

classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike.

The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable

classification in the exercise of police power.

Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail

trade. It is this domination and control that is the legislatures target in the enactment of the Act.

The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the

national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the

Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to

the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.

While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the

country, the alien may become the potential enemy of the State.

The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom

he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien

now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nations economy endangering the national security in

times of crisis and emergency.


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Association of Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

GR. No. 78742

July 14, 1989

Facts:

This case constitutes four consolidated cases involving the question of constitutionality of

several measures passed by the government with regard to Comprehensive Agrarian Reform.

Herein petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the following for violating the constitutional

provisions on just compensation, due process, and equal protection: 1) P.D. No. 27, promulgated

along with Martial Law, which provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for

distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners; 2)

E.O. No. 228 promulgated by Pres. Corazon Aquino, declaring full land ownership in favor of

the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered

by the decree as well as the manner of their payment;3)E.O. No. 229, which provides for the

mechanics of the implementation of P.D. no. 131, instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform

Program; and 4) R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law

of 1988.

The first case questions the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229

on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional

limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

Petitioners contend that President Corazon Aquino usurped the legislative power in promulgating

E.O. No. 228 before the Congress convenes. They also argued that such measure is invalid as it

fails to provide for retention limits of small landowners and fails to comply with the requisites of

a valid appropriation.

In the second case, the petitioners seek to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131

and E.O. No. 229. They argued that there is no tenancy problem in the sugar areas that can

justify the application of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program to them. To the extent

that the sugar planters have been lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, although

they are a separate group with problems exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has

been violated. Petitioners further argue that the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial

fund of P50 billion under Sec. 2 of Proclamation No. 131 is invalid and President Aquino had no

authority to fund the agrarian reform program. Thereafter, two separate motions for intervention

were filed arguing that the government failed to provide by clear and convincing evidence the

necessity for the exercise of the powers of eminent domain.

The petitioner on the third case also raised the same arguments as above stated after the

Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform placed his landholding under the coverage of

Operation Land Transfer. The Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the


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private respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to the petitioner. He further

alleged that the legislative power granted to the President under the Transitory Provisions refers

only to emergency measures that may be promulgated in the proper exercise of the police power.

He prayed for the recall and cancellation of Certificate of Land Transfer in favor of private

respondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986, his petition was denied without hearing. On

February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when

E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued. These orders rendered his motion moot and academic

because they directly effected the transfer of his land to the private respondents.

And lastly, the petitioners in the fourth case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D.

No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are

cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory

limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands. They argued that since

they cannot eject their tenants, they are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the

Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under P.D.

No. 316 stating that:

No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be

ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights

of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in

accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.

On the other hand, public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI

474 removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than

7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other

purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the

petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already

been issued, to wit, the Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an

accompanying Retention Guide Table, Memorandum Circular No. 11 or the Implementation

Guidelines of LOI No. 474, Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 or Clarificatory Guidelines on

Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners, and DAR Administrative Order

No. 1, series of 1985 Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or

to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D.

No. 27. For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the

petitioners are now barred from invoking this right.

Issue:

Whether or not the laws promulgated for Comprehensive Agrarian Reform are valid?

Held:


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Yes, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform measures are valid. The Supreme Court held

that R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 in question are

sustained against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions. The Supreme

Court further ruled that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for

landowners; there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in

accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary

to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed,

there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just

compensation is imperative. In other words, the power of eminent domain could also be used as

an implement of the police power. Since the objective of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform

Program is to promote the welfare of the farmers, which is clearly under the ambit of police

power, the law has provided for the expropriation of agricultural lands, subject to maximum

retention limits of landowners, to be distributed among landless farmers. Therefore,

promulgation of CARP law is a valid exercise of police power and eminent domain.


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Lozano vs. Martinez

G.R. No. L-63419

Facts:The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22), popularly known as

the Bouncing Check Law is the sole issue presented by these petitions for decision. The petitions

in the case at bar arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the statute. Thedefendants in those cases moved to quash the charge against them on the ground that the actscharged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were

denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case (G. R. No. 75789) wherein the trialcourt declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The petitioners thus elevate the

case to the Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General commented that it was premature toelevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme

Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash.

BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or forvalue, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the

drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check issubsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have

been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered thebank to stop payment. The language of BP 22 is broad enough to cover all kinds of checks,

whether present dated or postdated, or whether issued in payment of pre-existing obligations orgiven in mutual or simultaneous exchange for something of value. BP 22 is aimed at putting a

stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, such checks that end up beingrejected or dishonored for payment. The practice is proscribed by the state because of the injury

it causes to t public interests.

Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that: (1) it offends the

constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; (2) it impairs freedom of contract; (3)it contravenes the equal protection clause; (4) it unduly delegates legislative and executivepowers; and (5) its enactment is flawed in that during its passage the Interim Batasan violated the

constitutional provision prohibiting amendments to a bill on Third Reading.

Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most serious is the allegedconflict between the statute and the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt.It

is contended that the statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states, "Noperson shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax." Petitioners insist that, since

the offense under BP 22 is consummated only upon the dishonor or non-payment of the checkwhen it is presented to the drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad debt law" rather than a "bad

check law." What it punishes is the non-payment of the check, not the act of issuing it. Thestatute, it is claimed, is nothing more than a veiled device to coerce payment of a debt under the

threat of penal sanction.

Issue:Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power ofthe State.


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Held: BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to theconstitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The offense punished by BP 22 is the act

of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation forpayment and not the non-payment of an obligation. Thus, the law is not intended or designed to

coerce a debtor to pay his debt.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of theparties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large.

The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public.The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a

thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the bankingsystem and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. Moreover, the law

punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. Thethrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and

putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence,not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and

criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its policepower.

In addition, there is also no valid ground to sustain the contention that BP 22 impairs

freedom of contract. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom toenter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Checks

cannot be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem dayand age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and

therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.

Neither there is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal

protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not thepayee. It is contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of thecheck, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check

there would be no crime. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of theclause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals,

who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is nounreasonable or arbitrary.

The allegation that BP 22 constitutes undue or improper delegation of legislative powers,on the theory that the offense is not completed by the sole act of the maker or drawer but is made

to depend on the will of the payee has also no merit. If the payee does not present the check tothe bank for payment but instead keeps it, there would be no crime. The logic of the argument

stretches to absurdity the meaning of "delegation of legislative power." What cannot bedelegated is the power to legislate, or the power to make laws. he power to define the offense

sought to be punished and to prescribe the penalty. By no stretch of logic or imagination can it besaid that the power to define the crime and prescribe the penalty therefor has been in any manner

delegated to the payee. Neither is there any provision in the statute that can be construed, no


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matter how remotely, as undue delegation of executive power. The suggestion that the statuteunlawfully delegates its enforcement to the offended party is farfetched.

An objection has also been raised that Section 9 (2) of Article VII of the 1973

Constitution was violated by the legislative body when it enacted BP 22 into law. A careful

review of the record of the proceedings of the Interim Batasan on this matter shows that, indeed,there was some confusion among Batasan Members on what was the exact text of the paragraphin question which the body approved on Second Reading. However, it is clear from the records

that the text of the second paragraph of Section 1 of BP 22 is the text which was actuallyapproved by the body on Second Reading on February 7, 1979, as reflected in the approved

Minutes for that day. There was an authorized amendment of the bill and the printed copythereof reflects accurately the provision in question as approved on Second Reading.


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necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and

not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

It is the right and indeed the obligation of the State to insure that incompetents towhom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health do not infiltrate the medical

profession. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the

purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to

insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of

those not qualified to be doctors. The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal

protection clause is not well taken. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all

persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. The State needs

to implement decisive steps to regulate system of education by directing students to the course

where he is best suited through initial tests and evaluation. The decision of the respondent judge

was reversed.


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Ynot vs IAC

G.R. No. 74457 20 March 1987

Facts: The Petitioners had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Illolo on

January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of BarotacNuevo, Iloilo for violation of E.O No. 626-A, an amended measure of E.O 626 it doesnt only

prohibit the slaughtering of carabaos but it also bans the movemet of carabaos from inter

provinces and the transport of carabeef. Ynot was charged with violation of such measure. The

carabaos were arbitrarilt confiscated by the police station commander. The measure struck at

once and rounded upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard. Ynot averred EO

626-A as unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot holding that the EO is a valid

exercise of police power in order to promote the welfare of farmers so as to are down the

indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

Issue: WON E.O 626-A is constitutional

Held: No. The measure is not a valid exercise of police power and therefore unconstitutional. To

determine the validity of a police measure there shold be a lawful subject and lawful means

reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose that is not unduly oppressive upon

individuals. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power

because the method employed to converse the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the

purpose of the law, and were unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of

the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in defense and is immediately condemned

and punished.


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The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered bySection 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city

council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and toprovide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial

grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides

in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in suchplace and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city toprovide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public

cemeteries. This has been the law and practice in the past. It continues to the present.Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. "

As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powersof the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their

exercise of power. The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannotstretch it to cover this particular taking.

Petition for review was DISMISSES and the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the

respondent court.


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Power of Eminent Domain

#18 City of Manila (plaintiff-appellant) vs. Chinese Community of Manila (defendants-

appellees)

Facts:

The case is an appeal of the decision in the court of First Instance of Manila. On

December 11, 1916 the plaintiff-appellant city of Manila sent a petition to the Court of First

Instance or CFI praying that certain lots within Block 83 in the Chinese Cemetery in Binondo be

expropriated for the extension project of the Rizal Avenue. The Defendant- Chinese Community

of Manila answered the plaintiffs petition by stating that the expropriation of the lots affected by

the Rizal Avenue project was neither necessary nor expedient. The defendant also stated that the

lots affected hold the remains of their deceased family members and should not be disturbed.

The defendants offered plots of land adjacent to the Chinese Cemetery to the plaintiff for free.

The defendants also added that there would be difficulty if the proposed project is to succeed

since most of the Chinese family own plots of land in the cemetery for generations and that

removal and transfer of the deceased would entail irreparable loss and injury. A defendant

Idelfonso Tambunting answered the petition alleging that the expropriation is not a public

improvement and his plot affected has become quasi-public property. Other defendants like

Feliza Concepcion de Delagado, Jose Maria Delgado also gave the same defense as presented by

the Chinese Community of Manila and Idelfonso Tambunting. The Plaintiff City of Manila

maintained that expropriation was necessary. However the defendants alleged the following: a)

that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery,

which had been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchers and monuments,

and that the same should not be converted into a street for public purposes. The CFI Judge

Honorable Simplicio del Rosario decided in favor of the defendants stating that there was no

necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question. The CFI absolved eachand all of the defendants from all liability under the complaint without any finding as to costs.

The plaintiff then elevated for a case for appeal.

Issue: 1) Whether or not the plaintiff can exercise the right to eminent domain in the case given?


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2) Whether or not the parcels of land owned by the Defendant Chinese Community of

Manila can be expropriated for the extension of Rizal Avenue?

Held:

1) No, the court has the power to inquire whether or not the authority conferred upon

such delegate (plaintiff) has been correct or properly exercised. In determining whether

or not the plaintiff has the authority following requisites must be met: a) there a law or

higher authority exists for the exercise of the eminent domain, and b) the right or

authority is exercised according to law. The plaintiff lacked the requisites. The plaintiff

can only exercise expropriation as stated in its charter if: a) the land is private and b) the

purpose for expropriation must be for the public use. However the land in question is

public land as stated by the defendants. Legislature has given Philippine courts the power

to ascertain upon trial whether the right of eminent domain exists in a case. Section 159

of volume 10 of Ruling Case Law or RCL states that courts have the power to prevent an

abuse of discretion delegated by the legislative which in this case is expropriation via the

power of eminent domain. The taking of private property for any use not required by

necessity or convenience of the people is unreasonable exercise of the right of eminent

domain and is beyond the legislature to delegate. Article 349 of the Civil Code also states

that no one is to be deprived of his/her public property unless by competent authority for

some proven public utility.

2) No because the cemetery is proven to be public property. The Spanish Governor

General granted the land for the use of the Chinese community as gift for their service to

the nation. Also the plaintiff did not mention to the court the plan to disturb the resting

place of the deceased. The Chinese cemetery was specifically a public cemetery. Therewas no substantial proof for the need of converting the cemetery.

The petition of the plaintiff was denied and the higher court affirmed the decision

of the CFI with cost against the plaintiff-appellant.


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Republic vs PLDTGR NO. L- 18841

FACTS: In 1933, the defendant PLDT, and the RCA Communications, Inc. (RCA), entered into

an agreement whereby telephone messages, coming from the US and received by RCAs

domestic station, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, forcalls collected by the PLDT for transmission from the Phil to the US. The arrangement was laterextended to radio-telephone messages to and from European and Asiatic Countries. Their

contract contained a stipulation that either party could terminate it on a 24-month notice to theother. On February 2, 1956, PLDT gave notice to RCA to terminate their contract on Feb 2,

1958.In 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications (BOT) set up its own Government

Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of

the PLDT to enable the government offices to call private parties. The condition of BOTs

application is that it shall abide with the rules and regulations of PLDT which are on file with the

Public Service Commission. One of its rules prohibits the public use of the service furnished the

telephone subscriber for his private use. In 1948, the Bureau extended its services to general

public using the same trunk line rented from PLDT.

On March 5 1958, the plaintiff (BOT), through the Director of Telecommunications,

entered into an agreement with RCA for a joint overseas telephone service whereby the Bureau

would convey radio-telephone overseas calls received by RCAs station to and from local

residents. On April 7 1958, PLDT complained to BOT that said bureau was violating the

conditions under which the Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is interconnected with the PLDTs

facilities, referring to the rented trunk-lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for

the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or general public, in competition

with the business of the PLDT. It warned BOT that if will not stop they will sever the tel.

connections. The trunk lines were later disconnected. The result was the isolation of the Phil, on

tel. services, from the rest of the world, except US. The Bureau had proposed to the PLDT on Jan

8 1958 that both enter into an interconnecting agreement but neither party accepted the proposal.

On April 12 1958, plaintiff RP commenced suit against PLDT in the CFI of Manila seeking for

judgement commanding PLDT to execute a contract with the plaintiff, through the Bureau, for

the use of the facilities of defendants telephone system throughout the Phil. Under such terms

and conditions as the court may consider reasonable. CFI rendered that it cannot compel PLDT

to enter into an agreement with BOT because the parties cannot agree on the terms and

conditions of the interconnection. Both parties appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court can compel PLDT to execute a contract with the plaintiff.

HELD : Yes, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain

require a the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system

and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the

payment of just compensation for the use of PLDTs line and services which is to be determined


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by the court. If under Sec 6, Article XIII of the Constitution, the State may in the interest of

national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there

is no reason why the state may not require a public utility to render services in the general

interest, provided that just compensation is provided therefor. In either case private property is

subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the

interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation

would be for public use.

*NOTES :

PLDT - a public service corporation holding a legislative franchise, to install, operate and

maintain a telephone system throughout the Philippines and to carry on the business of electrical

transmission of messages within the Philippines and between the Philippines and the telephone

systems of other countries.

RCA Communications, Inc.-is an American corporation authorized to transact business in thePhilippines and is the grantee, by assignment, of a legislative franchise to operate a domestic

station for the reception and transmission of long distance wireless messages (Act 2178) and to

operate broadcasting and radio-telephone and radio-telegraphic communications services (Act

3180).


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REPUBLIC VS. CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL. CASE DIGEST (G.R. No.L-20620 August 15, 1974)

FACTS:

This is a case between Republic of the Philippines and Carmen M. Vda. Castellvi over aparcel of land occupied by the AFP. On June 26, 1959, Republic filed a complaint for eminentdomain against Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi, the judicial administrator of the estate of the late

Alfonso de Castellvi located in barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga, alleging that fairmarket value of the disputed land has a total market value of P259,669.10, the republic also

prayed in their complaint that (a) that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259.669.10,(b) court authorizes plaintiff to take immediate possession of the lands upon deposit, (c) court

appoints three commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation, (d) thecourt issues thereafter a final order of condemnation.

Trial court=> On June 29, 1959 the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional value of the

lands at P259,669.10. the defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging that (a) the landunder her administration, being a residential land, had a fair market value of P15.00per square meter, so it had a total market value of P11,389,485.00, (b) the Republic,

through the Armed Forces of the Philippines, , illegally occupying her propertypreventing her from using and disposing of it, thus causing her damages by way of

unrealized profits, the defendant also prayed that Republic be ordered to pay herP15.00 per square meter, or a total of P11,389,485.00, plus interest thereon at 6% per

annum.

On October 22, 1959, Toledo-Gozun, who was also allowed by the court to interveneas a party defendant, in her motion to dismiss allege that her two parcels of land were

residential lands, that the fair market value of said lands was P15.00 per square meter,so they had a total market value of P8,085,675.00; and she prayed that the complaint

be dismissed, or that she be paid the amount of P8,085,675.00, plus interest thereon atthe rate of 6% per annum.

On November 4, 1959, the trial court authorized the Provincial Treasurer of

Pampanga to pay defendant Toledo-Gozun the sum of P107,609.00 as provisionalvalue of her lands.

On May 16, 1960 the trial Court authorized the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga topay defendant Castellvi the amount of P151,859.80 as provisional value of the land

under her administration

Trial Court appointed three commissioners and these an Commissioners submitted

their report and recommendation and had determined that the lands sought to be

expropriated were residential lands, they recommended unanimously that the lowest

price that should be paid was P10.00 per square meter, for both the lands of Castellvi

and Toledo-Gozun and an additional P5,000.00 be paid to Toledo-Gozun for


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improvements found on her land but these reports were objected by all parties in the

case.

On May 26, 1961, the trial court render its decision:

court finds that the unanimous recommendation of thecommissioners of ten (P10.00) pesos per square meter for

the three lots of the defendants subject of this action is fair

and just. With respect to the defendant Castellvi, interest at

6% per annum will also be paid by the plaintiff to defendant

when plaintiff commenced its illegal possession of the

Castellvi land

On June 21, 1961 the Republic filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.

On July 26, 1962 the trial court issued an order, stating that "in the interest of

expediency, the questions raised may be properly and finally determined by the

Supreme Court,"

ISSUE: whether or not the taking of the property in dispute commence from the time the

plaintiff enter into contract of lease with the defendant.

HELD:No, the Supreme Court held that the property would only be considered taken when theproceedings for expropriation or for the just compensation commence. In the case at bar the

republic alleged that the lower court erred in holding that the taking of the properties underexpropriation commenced with the filing of an action over the disputed land which takes place in

1947 through a lease agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, where the former arguesthat through the agreement, they were granted by a right and privileged to buy the property

should the lessor, the latter, wish to terminate the lease. The defendant argues that the "taking" ofproperty under the power of eminent domain requires two essential elements, to wit: (1) entrance

and occupation by condemn or upon the private property for more than a momentary or limitedperiod, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of

all beneficial enjoyment of the property in which did not exist in the case at bar. It is undisputedthat the Republic occupied Castellvi's land from July 1, 1947, by virtue of the contract under the

terms and conditions therein stated. Before the expiration of the contract of lease, the Republicsought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. When the AFP refused to vacate the leased

premises after the termination of the contract, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff, AFP,

informing the latter that the heirs of the property had decided not to continue leasing the propertyin question because they had decided to subdivide the land for sale to the general public,

demanding that the property be vacated within 30 days from receipt of the letter, and premises bereturned in substantially the same condition as before occupancy ). A follow-up letter was sent

on January 12, 1957, demanding the delivery and return of the property within one month fromsaid date. On January 30, 1957, Lieutenant General Alfonso Arellano, Chief of Staff, answered

the letter of Castellvi, saying that it was difficult for the army to vacate the premises in view ofthe permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and


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already established on the property, the acquisition of the property by means of expropriationproceedings would be recommended to the President.

As the plaintiff insist in their argument that taking should commence in 1947, it is right to define

the term taking in eminent domain, in American Jurisprudence, Vol. 26, 2nd edition, Section

157, on the subject of "Eminent Domain, we read the definition of "taking" (in eminent domain)as follows:

entering upon private property for more than amomentary period, and, under the warrant or color of

legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwiseinformally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in

such a way as substantially to oust the owner anddeprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.

A number of circumstances must be present in the "taking" of property for purposes of eminent

domain:

1. The expropriator must enter a private property. This circumstance is present in the instant

case.

2. The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period. The word"momentary" when applied to possession or occupancy of (real) property should be construed

to mean "a limited period", the fact that the Republic constructed some installations of apermanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the land was transitory but It is

claimed that the intention of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as may be inferredfrom the construction of permanent improvements. But this "intention" cannot prevail over the

clear and express terms of the lease contract. It might really have been the intention of theRepublic to expropriate the lands in question at some future time.

3. The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority. Thiscircumstance is present in the instant case.

4. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or

injuriously affected. This circumstance is present in the instant case.

5. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner anddeprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. In this case, the Republic into the

property and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her ofall beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously

recognized as owner by the Republic. Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficialenjoyment of the property, because the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paying,

Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals.

Therefore, it is clear that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain

cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the


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property as lessee. We also find merit in the contention of Castellvi that two essential elements inthe "taking" of property under the power of eminent domain were not present when the Republic

entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.

We also hold that the "taking" of the Castellvi property should not be reckoned as of the year

1947 and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi property should not bedetermined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The lower court did notcommit an error in its decision because under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, 16the

"just compensation" is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.


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Philippine press institute vs. ComelecG.R no.119694 May 22, 1995

Facts:

Respondent COMELEC promolgated Resolution No. 2271 directing newspapers to provide freeComelc space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties andcandidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all

candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issue andtheir platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for

dissemination of vital election information.Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non- profit organization of newspaper and

magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resoulution No. 2772unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the

constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use withoutjust compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the

Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (Police Power) of the Comelecover the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard

and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.

Issue:Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

Held:

The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel printmedia companies to donate "Comelec Space" amounts to taking of private personal property

without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element

of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that thenewspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property forpublic use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also

Resolution No. 772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In thecase at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property

of newspaper or magazine publishers.


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LORENZO SUMULONG and EMILIA VIDANES-BALAOING,petitioners,vs.

HON. BUENAVENTURA GUERRERO and NATIONAL HOUSING

AUTHORITY, respondents.

(G.R. No. L-48685, September 30, 1987)

FACTS:

On December 5, 1997 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint forexpropriation of parcels of land for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Hosing Project to provide

housing facilities to low-salaried government employees, covering approximately twenty five(25) hectares in Antipolo, Rizal. This included the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong (6,667

sq.m.) and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing (3,333 sq.m.). The land sought to be expropriated werevalued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market value fixed by the

provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of propertyin expropriation proceedings.

Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties.

The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Phil. Natl Bank, representing the totalmarket value of the subject 25 ha. of land, pursuant to P.D. No. 1224 which defines the policy

on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of justcompensation.

On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge Buenaventura S. Guerrero issued a writ of

possession of the subject parcels of land. Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsiderationcontending that they had been deprived of the possession of their property without due process of

law but were denied. Hence, this petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge andassailing the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1224, as amended. The petitioners further raised the

following contentions:

1) Respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave

abuse of discretion by issuing the Order of January 17, 1978 without notice andwithout hearing and in issuing the Order dated June 28, 1978 denying the motion

for reconsideration.

2) Pres. Decree l224, as amended, is unconstitutional for being violative of the

due process clause, specifically:

a) The Decree would allow the taking of property regardless of

size and no matter how small the area to be expropriated;b) "Socialized housing" for the purpose of condemnation

proceeding, as defined in said Decree, is not really for a publicpurpose;

c) The Decree violates procedural due process as it allowsimmediate taking of possession, control and disposition of property

without giving the owner his day in court;


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d) The Decree would allow the taking of private property uponpayment of unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by

government assessors;

e) The Decree would deprive the courts of their judicial discretion

to determine what would be the "just compensation" in each and

every raise of expropriation.

the Court then categorized the petitioners contentions into (1) public use; (2) just compensation;and (3) due process for purposes of answering the same.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not socialized housing as defined in P.D. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of

condemnation proceedings is for public use;

(2) Whether or not the National Housing Authority (NHA) has the discretion to determine the

size of the property/properties to be expropriated;

(3) Whether P.D. 1224, as amended, allows unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by

government assessors;

(4) Whether petitioners were denied due process because their parcels of land were immediately

possessed by the NHA by virtue of the writ of possession ordered by the respondent judge.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that "socialized housing" defined in Pres. Decree No. 1224, asamended by Pres. Decree Nos. 1259 and 1313, constitutes "public use" for purposes of

expropriation; that the provisions of such decrees on just compensation are unconstitutional; andthat in the instant case the Court finds that the Orders issued by the respondent judge authorizing

immediate taking without notice and hearing are violative of due process.

RATIO:

The Supreme Court then ruled the following:

1.Public use

a) Socialized Housing

Petitioners contend that "socialized housing" as defined in Pres. Decree No. 1224, as

amended, for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not "public use" since it will benefitonly "a handful of people, bereft of public character."

"Socialized housing" is defined as, "the construction of dwelling units for the middle andlower class members of our society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure

and other facilities" (Pres. Decree No. 1224, par. 1). This definition was later expanded toinclude among others:

a) The construction and/or improvement of dwelling units for the middle andlower income groups of the society, including the construction of the supporting

infrastructure and other facilities;

b) Slum clearance, relocation and resettlement of squatters and slum dwellers as

well as the provision of related facilities and services;


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Manosca vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 106440. January 29, 1996

Facts:

Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have

been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No.

1, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark.

The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the intended

expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, the act would constitute an

application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni

Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987

Constitution.

Issue:

The expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was born, valid and constitutional?

Held:

Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that

a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must

be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not

allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of

eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove

any doubt, determines what public use is. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into

small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this

power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that

at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the

requirement of public use.

Public use should not be restricted to the traditional uses. The taking is for a public use

becauseof the contribution of Felix Manalo to the culture and history of the Philippines.


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EPZA VS DULAY

Facts:

On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation No. 1811,reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu,

Island of Mactan, Cebu and covering a total area of 1,193,669 square meters, more orless, for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing

Zone Authority (EPZA).

The proclamation included, among others, four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate areaof 22,328 square meters owned and registered in the name of the private respondent. The

petitioner, therefore, offered to purchase the parcels of land in accordance with thevaluation set forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended.

The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding sale of the property.

EPZA filed a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ ofpossession in the Court of 1

st instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, stating that P.D. 66

empowers the petitioner to acquire by condemnation proceedings any property in relationto Proclamation 1811.

On October 21, 1980, a writ of possession was issued and on December 23, 1980, theprivate respondent filed its answer.

On February 13, 1981, in the Pre-trial conference the respondent judge issued that theparties have agreed and the only thing to be resolved is the just compensation and he

appointed creation persons as commissioners to ascertain the just compensation for theproperty sought to be expropriated.

On June 19, 1981, the three commissioners submitted their consolidated reportrecommending the amount of P15.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable value ofjust compensation for the properties.

On July 29, 1981, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order ofFebruary 17, 1981 and Objection to Commissioner's Report on the grounds that P.D. No.1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the

ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners; and that the compensationmust not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533. But on November 14, 1981

the court denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

This present petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary restraining order wasfiled by EPZA on February 9, 1982. It was also raised that section 5 to 8 of the Revised

Rules of Court had been amended by P.D. No. 1533 insofar as the appointment ofcommissioners by the court to determine just compensation is concern. The petitioner

argued that the basis of just compensation shall be the fair and current market valuedeclared by the owner or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is

lower.

Prior to the promulgation

1st batch of consti digests

Documents