consti 1 - converted

GERRYMANDERING – IS THE ARRANGEMENT OF DISTRICTS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO FAVOR THE ELECTION OF PREFERRED CANDIDATE (USUALLY RE-ELECTIONISTS) THROUGH THE INCLUSION THEREIN ONLY OF THOSE AREAS WHERE THEY EXPECT TO WIN, REGARDLESS OF THE RESULTANT SHAPE OF SUCH DISTRICTS. (*****)

2. QUALIFICATIONS (*****)

SEC. 6, ART. VI – NO PERSON SHALL BE A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REP UNLESS HE 1) IS A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHIL, 2) ON THE DAY OF ELECTION, IS AT LEAST 25 YEARS OLD, 3) IS ABLE TO READ AND WRITE, AND 4) EXCEPT THE PARTY-LIST REP, MUST BE A REGISTERED VOTER IN THE DISTRICT IN WHICH HE SHALL BE ELECTED, AND 5) A RESIDENT THEREOF FOR A PERIOD OF NOT LESS THAN ONE YEAR IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE DAY OF THE ELECTION.

□ CHAPTER 8LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:3. TERM *****SEC. 7, ART. VI – “THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE

OF REP SHALL BE ELECTED FOR A TERM OF 3 YEARS WHICH SHALL BEGIN, UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, AT NOON ON THE 30TH DAY OF JUNE FOLLOWING THEIR ELECTION.

NO MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REP SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN 3 CONSECUTIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF HIS SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.”

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: (*****)SEC. 11, ART. VI – “A SENATOR OR MEMBER OF

THE HOUSE OF REP SHALL, IN ALL OFFENSES PUNISHABLE BY NOT MORE THAN 6 YEARS IMPRISONMENT, BE PRIVILEGED FROM ARREST WHILE THE CONGRESS IS IN SESSION. NO MEMBER SHALL BE QUESTIONED NOR BE HELD LIABLE IN ANY OTHER PLACE FOR ANY SPEECH OR DEBATE IN THE CONGRESS OR IN ANY COMMITTEE THEREOF.”

SECTION COVERS: 1) PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST 2) PRIVILEGE OF

SPEECH AND DEBATE


D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:

1. PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST (*****)THE 1935 CONSTITUTION ON PARLIAMENTARY

IMMUNITY FROM ARREST EXCEPTED ALL CRIMINAL OFFENSES REGARDLESS OF DEGREE, WITH THE RESULT THAT THE LEGISLATOR COULD CLAIM SAME ONLY AGAINST CIVIL ARRESTS. FOR ANY CRIMINAL OFFENSE, HE WAS SUBJECTED TO ARREST AT ANY TIME, EVEN DURING THE SESSIONS.


D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:

2. PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH AND DEBATE (*****)

2.1 COFFIN V. COFFIN (A MASS. 1) – THESE CONDITIONS WERE FIRST LAID DOWN IN THIS LEADING CASE WHERE THE PRIVILEGE WAS DENIED A LEGISLATOR WHO UTTERED SLANDEROUS REMARKS IN THE COURSE OF A PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH A CONSTITUENT DURING A LULL IN THE SESSION.


D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:4. INCOMPATIBLE AND FORBIDDEN

OFFICES (*****)

SEC. 13, ART. VI – “NO SENATOR OR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REP MAY HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT IN THE GOV’T, OR ANY SUBDIVISION, AGENCY, OR INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUDING GOCC OR THEIR SUBSIDIARIES, DURING HIS TERM WITHOUT FORFEITING HIS SEAT. NEITHER SHALL HE BE APPOINTED TO ANY OFFICE WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN CREATED OR THE EMOLUMENTS THEREOF INCREASED DURING THE TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.”



OFFICES (*****)

THE FIRST PART IS CALLED INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE; WHILE THE SECOND PART IS CALLED FORBIDDEN OFFICE.

NOTE: DISTINGUISH BETWEEN TERM AND TENURE (FETALINO V. COMELEC, 686 SCRA 813, 12/4/2012) – TERM – THE TIME DURING WHICH THE OFFICER MAY CLAIM TO THE OFFICE AS A MATTER OF RIGHT (IT’S THE PERIOD INDICATED IN THE CONSTITUTION OR LAW); TENURE – THE ACTUAL PERIOD THE OFFICER HELD THE OFFICE WHICH CAN BE SHORTER THAN THE TERM IN A CASE.



OFFICES (*****)4.1 ADAZA V. PACANA (135 SCRA 431) - IN

THIS CASE, THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT WERE ELECTED GOVERNOR AND VICE-GOVERNOR, RESPECTIVELY, OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL. BOTH

SUBSEQUENTLY RAN FOR THE BATASAN PAMBANSA, BUT ONLY THE PETITIONER WON. ADAZA THEN QUALIFIED AS MEMBER OF THE LAWMAKING BODY, WHEREUPON, PACANA ASSUMED THE GOVERNORSHIP AS STATUTORY SUCCESSOR. ADAZA CHALLENGED PACANA’S TAKEOVER, CONTENDING THAT UNDER THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM A LEGISLATOR COULD CONCURRENTLY SERVE AS GOVERNOR; HENCE,



OFFICES (*****)

4.1 ADAZA V. PACANA (135 SCRA 431) (CON’T):

THERE WAS NO VACANCY IN THE GOVERNORSHIP THAT PACANA COULD FILL. THE SC UNANIMOUSLY REJECTED THIS ARGUMENT AND HELD THAT ADAZA AUTOMATICALLY FORFEITED THE GOVERNORSHIP THE MOMENT HE TOOK HIS OATH AS A MEMBER OF THE BATASANG PAMBANSA.



OFFICES (*****)

4.2 CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION NOT EVERY OTHER OFFICE IS TO BE REGARDED

AS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE LEGISLATIVE POSITION. FOR EXAMPLE, MEMBERSHIP IN THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS (SET & HET) IS PERMITTED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.



OFFICES (*****)

4.3 EX-OFFICIO MEMBERS – MOREOVER, IF IT BE SHOWN THAT THE SECOND OFFICE IS AN EXTENSION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POSITION OR IS IN AID OF LEGISLATIVE DUTIES, THE HOLDING THEREOF WILL NOT RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE LEGISLATOR’S SEAT IN CONGRESS.

ACCORDINGLY, THE CHAIRMEN OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REP ON EDUCATION RETAIN THEIR SEATS IN CONGRESS WHILE SITTING CONCURRENTLY AS EX-OFFICIO MEMBERS IN THE UP BOARD OF REGENTS.



OFFICES (*****)

4.4 FORBIDDEN OFFICE EVEN IF THE MEMBER OF CONGRESS IS WILLING

TO FORFEIT HIS LEGISLATIVE SEAT THEREIN, HE MAY NOT BE APPOINTED TO ANY OFFICE IN THE GOVERNMENT THAT HAS BEEN: 1) CREATED, OR 2) EMOLUMENTS THEREOF HAVE BEEN INCREASED, DURING HIS TERM.

EXAMPLE: A SENATOR WITH 6-YEAR TERM, PROPOSED THE CREATION OF A NEW AGENCY; BEFORE IT IS FINALLY PASSED INTO LAW, HE RESIGNED. CAN HE BE APPOINTED TO HEAD THE NEW AGENCY? IF HE WAS NOT THE PROPONENT, AND HE RESIGNED, CAN HE BE APPOINTED?


F. QUORUM:3. DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA V. SENATE

OF THE PHL (659 SCRA 270, 10/18/2011) RE: SEC. 1, ART. XVII OF RA NO. 9054 (PROMULGATED 3/31/2001) ACT TO STRENGTHEN AND EXPAND THE ORGANIC ACT OF THE ARMM, AMENDING RA NO. 6734 (ARMM ACT): ******

SEC. 1, ART. XVII OF RA 9054 – “CO NSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION(?), THIS ORGANIC ACT MAY BE REAMENDED OR REVISED BY CONGRESS OF THE PHL UPON A VOTE OF 2/3 OF THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REP AND THE SENATE VOTING SEPARATELY.”


F. QUORUM:

3. DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA V. SENATE OF THE PHL, 659 SCRA 270, 10/18/2011) *****

IN THIS CASE, THE SC NULLIFIED A LAW REQUIRING WHAT

IT REFERRED TO AS A “SUPERMAJORITY VOTE” OF 2/3 OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FOR PURPOSES OF AMENDING OR REPEALING THE SAME, STATING THAT SAID PROVISION GAVE SAID LAW “THE CHARACTER OF AN IRREPEALABLE LAW BY REQUIRING MORE THAN WHAT THE CONSTITUTION DEMANDS.” NOTE: RA 6734 REQUIRES ONLY MAJORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.

LANDMARK CASES:1. DAZA V. SINGSON, 180 SCRA 4962. CUNANAN V. TAN, 5 SCRA 1

□ CHAPTER 8LEGISLATIVE DEPT.QUESTIONAIRES:1. WHAT COMPOSES THE CONGRESS OF

THEPHILIPPINES?

□ CHAPTER 8LEGISLATIVE DEPT.2. SHOULD MANNY PACQUIAO DECIDES

TO RUN FOR THE SENATE AS SUGGESTED BY SOME PEOPLE, WHAT QUALIFICATIONS MUST HE POSSESS?


3. SHOULD JINKY PACQUIAO

DECIDES TO RUN FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO REPRESENT THE PROVINCE OF

SARANGANI, WHAT QUALIFICATIONS MUST HE POSSESS?


4. WHO ARE CONSIDERED “NATURAL-BORN CITIZENS? 5. ARE PERSONS BORN OF FOREIGN MOTHERS WHO ELECTED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTION AND LAW, CONSIDERED “NATURAL-BORN CITIZENS”?

□ CHAPTER 8LEGISLATIVE DEPT.6. WHAT DO YOU UNDERSTAND BY THE

TERM “RESIDENCE”?o ANIMUS MANENDIo ANIMUS REVERTENDIo ANIMUS NON-REVERTENDI

NOTA BENE: MUST READ CASES:A. LIM v. PELAEZ, ELECTORAL

CASE NO. 36, HET.

B. BRILLANTE v. REYES, ELECTORAL CASE NO. 31, HET (1988)


7. WHAT DO YOU UNDERSTAND BY THE TERM “THE DAY OF THE ELECTION”?

NOTA BENE: MUST READ CASE:ESPINOSA v. AQUINO, ELECTORAL CASE NO. 9,

SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUTANL.

□ CHAPTER 8LEGISLATIVE DEPT.8. WHAT IS GERRYMANDERING?9. WHAT IS THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF

THIS TERM?


10. WHAT ARE THE TERMS OF OFFICE OF:A. MEMBERS OF THE SENATE?B. MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE

OF REPRESENTATIVES?□ CHAPETER 8

LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

11. CAN A MEMBER OF CONGRESS BE ARRESTED FOR THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME WHILE CONGRESS IS IN SESSION?

12. WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AVAILMENT OF THE PRIVILEGE FROM

ARREST?□ CHAPTER 8

LEGISLATIVE DEPT.13. CAN A MEMBER OF CONGRESS BE

QUES- TIONED OR HELD LIABLE IN ANY OTHER PLACE FOR ANY SPEECH OR DEBATE IN CONGRESS OR IN ANY COMMITTEE HEAR- ING THEREOF?14. WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR

THE AVAILMENT OF THE PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH AND DEBATE?MUST READ CASE: OSMENA v. PENDATUN, GR L-17144, OCTOBER 28, 1960.


15. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY “LEGISLATURE OR LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE IS FUNCTIONING OR IN SESSION”?

16. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY “FINAL ADJOURN- MENT”?

NOTA BENE: MUST READ CASE:A. LOPEZ v. DELOS REYES, 55 PHIL.

205B. JIMENEZ v. CABANGBANG, 17

SCRA 876□ CHAPTER 8

LEGISLATIVE DEPT.17. CAN A MEMBER OF CONGRESS

HOLD OTHER OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY OF ITS AGENCY DURING HIS TERM OF OFFICE?

18. CONGRESS CREATED AN OFFICE NAMED NATIONAL ARTISTS DEVELOPMENT AGENCY.

CAN A MEMBER OF SUCH CONGRESS WHO CREATED THIS OFFICE QUALIFY TO HEAD IT AFTER THE TERM OF HIS OFFICE?


19. CAN A MEMBER OF CONGRESS APPEAR PERSONALLY AS COUNSEL BEFORE ANY COURT, ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, QUASI-JUDICIAL OR ANY OTHER ADMINISTRA- TIVE BODIES? MUST READ CASE:

PUYAT v. DE GUZMAN, 113 SCRA 23□ CHAPTER 8

LEGISLATIVE DEPT.20. MANNY POQUIAO WAS ELECTED

CONGRESS- MAN FOR THE IST DISTRICT OF KIG. BEFORE HIS ELECTION HE TRANSFERRED HIS SHARES

IN THE FAMILY CORPORATION TO HIS SON. QUESTION: CAN HIS SON ENTER INTO A

GOVT CONTRACT DURING HIS TERM OF OFFICE?□ CHAPTER 8

LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

21. WHAT IS THE COMPOSITION OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL? WHAT IS ITS FUNCTION?


22. WHAT IS THE COMPOSITION OF THECOMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS?

WHAT IS ITS FUNCTION?GOOD LUCK

□

CHAPTER 9POWERS OFCONGRESS

CLASSIFICATION OF POWERS OF CONGRESS: (*****)1. LEGISLATIVE POWER;2. NON-LEGISLATIVE POWER;3. IMPLIED POWER;4. INHERENT POWER.

□

CHAPTER 9POWERS OFCONGRESS

CLASSIFICATION OF POWERS OF CONGRESS. (*****)1. LEGISLATIVE POWER. - IS THE

AUTHORITY TO MAKE LAWS AND TO ALTER AND REPEAL THEM.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION:THE LEGISLATIVE POWER SHALL BE VESTED IN

THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES WHICH WILL CONSIST OF A SENATE AND A HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT RESERVED TO THE PEOPLE BY THE PROVISION ON INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM (Section 1, Article VI, Constitution).

a. NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER: (*****)

□ POWERS OF

CONGRESSa.1) IT IS A DERIVATIVE AND DELEGATED

POWER: (*****) AS VESTED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN

CONGRESS, IT IS DERIVATIVE AND DELEGATED POWER. “THE CONSTITUTION IS THE WORK OR WILL OF THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, IN THEIR ORIGINAL, SOVEREIGN, AND UNLIMITED CAPACITY. LAW IS THE WORK OR WILL OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THEIR DERIVATIVE AND SUBORDINATE CAPACITY. THE ONE (FORMER) IS THE WORK OF THE CREATOR, AND THE OTHER (LATTER) OF THE CREATURE. THE CONSTITUTION FIXES LIMITS TO THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY, AND PRESCRIBES THE ORBIT WITHIN WHICH IT MUST MOVE” (Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dall, 304, 308 [U.S.1795]).

SIMPLY PUT, LEGISLATIVE POWER IS ONE DERIVED FROM, AND DELEGATED BY, THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE TO CONGRESS THROUGH THE CONSTITUTION. *****

□ POWERS OF CONGRESSa.2) IT IS A PLENARY LEGISLATIVE POWER:

(*****)

UNLIKE THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WHICH CONTAINS ONLY A GRANT OF ENUMERATED LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE FEDERAL CONGRESS (“ALL LEGISLATIVE POWERS HEREIN GRANTED” . . . Sec. 1, Art. 1, US Constitution), THE 1987, LIKE THE 1973 AND 1935 CONSTITUTIONS, EMBODIES A GRANT OF PLENARY LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE PHIL. LEGISLATURE. THUS, “ANY POWER, DEEMED TO BE LEGISLATIVE BY USAGE AND TRADITION, IS NECESSARILY POSSESSED BY CONGRESS, UNLESS THE ORGANIC ACT HAS LODGED IT ELSEWHERE” (Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 [1946]). AND IN FACT, SEC. 1, ART. VI OF THE 1987 ORGANIC LAW HAS ALSO GIVEN LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE ELECTORATE THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF “INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM” AS SET DOWN IN SEC. 32, ART. VI.

□ POWERS OF CONGRESSAS COROLLARY TO THIS PLENARY GRANT OF

LEGISLATIVE POWER, IT FOLLOWS:a. THAT THE CONGRESS ALONE CAN

MAKE LAWS AND CONGRESS MAY NOT DELEGATE ITS LAW MAKING POWER. THIS IS THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.

b. THAT CONGRESS CANNOT PASS IRREPEALABLE LAWS.

SIMPLY PUT, A PLENARY LEGISLATIVE POWER IS THE POWER TO ENACT LAWS COVERING ANY MATTER SUBJECT ONLY TO THE PROHIBITIONS AND LIMITATIONS EMBODIED IN THE CONSTITUTION. *****

□ POWERS OF CONGRESSa.3) IN SUMMARY: *****

LEGISLATIVE POWER IS A PLENARY POWER TO ENACT LAWS COVERING ALL SUBJECT

MATTER, DERIVED FROM, AND DELEGATED BY, THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE TO CONGRESS THROUGH THE CONSTITUTION.

□ POWERSOF CONGRESS

b. LIMITATIONS ON LEGISLATIVE POWER: (*****)SPEAKING OF THE POWERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE

DEPT. OF GOVERNMENT UNDER THE AMERICAN FLAG, AN EARLY CASE DECIDED BY THE PHIL. SUPREME COURT SAID:

“SOMEONE HAS SAID THAT THE POWERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT, LIKE THE BOUNDARIES OF THE OCEAN, ARE UNLIMITED. IN CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, AS WELL AS GOVERNMENTS ACTING UNDER DELEGATED AUTHORITY, THE POWERS OF EACH OF THE

DEPARTMENTS OF THE SAME ARE LIMITED AND CONFINED WITHIN THE FOUR WALLS OF THE CONSTITUTION OR THE CHARTER, AND EACH DEPT. CAN ONLY EXERCISE SUCH POWERS AS ARE EXPRESSLY GIVEN AND SUCH OTHER POWERS AS ARE NECESSARILY

□ POWERS OF CONGRESSIMPLIED FROM THE GIVEN (OR EXPRESS)

POWERS. THE CONSTITUTION IS THE SHORE OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AGAINST WHICH THE WAVES OF LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT MAY DASH, BUT OVER WHICH IT CANNOT LEAP” (Gov’t. v. Springer, 50Phil. 529, 309 [1927]).

ALTHOUGH THE ORIGINAL 1973 CONSTITUTION ADOPTED A PARLIAMENTARY FORM OF GOVERRNMENT, IT DID NOT ADOPT THE ENGLISH PRINCIPLE OF PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY UNDER WHICH “PARLIAMENT CAN DO EVERTHING BUT MAKE A WOMAN A MAN, AND A MAN A WOMAN” (De Lolme, The Constitution of England 102 [1853]. NEITHER DID THE REVISION OF 1981 NOR THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. THUS, LEGISLATIVE POWER REMAINS A LIMITED POWER AFTER THE MANNER OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM EMBODIED IN THE 1935 CONSTITUTION.

□ POWERS OFCONGRESSIT IS SUBJECT TO:b.1) SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS (*****)

WHICH CIRCUMSCRIBE BOTH THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER ITSELF AND THE ALLOWABLE

SUBJECTS OF LEGISLATION.

THE SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS ARE

FOUND IN:

b.1.a) ARTICLE III, THE BILL OF RIGHTS;

b.1.b) ARTICLE VI, THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT;

b.1.c) OTHER PORTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION.

□ POWERS OFCONGRESSb.2) FORMAL AND PROCEDURAL

LIMITATIONS (*****) PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF PASSING BILLS AND THE FORM THEY SHOULD TAKE. THESE ARE FOUND, AMONG

OTHERS, IN:

b.2a) SEC. 24, ART. VII, THE PASSAGE OF APPROPRIATION, REVENUE, AND TARIFF AND OTHER BILLS;

b.2.b) SEC. 26(1), ART. VII, SINGULARITY OF SUBJECT OF BILLS;

b.2.c) SEC. 26(2), ART. VII, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS;

b.2.d) SEC. 27(1), ART. VII, APPROVAL OF BILLS INTO LAW.

□ POWERS OFCONGRESSb.3) IN SUMMARY: *****

LEGISLATIVE IS SUBJECT TO SUBSTANTIVE, FORMAL, AND PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS AS EMBODIED IN THE

CONSTITUTION.□ POWERS OF

CONGRESSc. CLASSIFICATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER: (*****)

c.1) GENERAL LEGISLATIVE POWER – CONSISTS IN THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS INTENDED AS RULES OF CONDUCT TO GOVERN THE RELATIONS AMONG INDIVIDUALS OR BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUALS AND THE STATE.

c.2)SPECIFIC LEGISLATIVE POWER - CONSISTS IN THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS EXPRESSLY MANDATED IN THE CONSTITUTION, SUCH AS TO PASS A GENERAL APPROPRIATION LAW.

NOTE: HOW ABOUT THE ANTI-DYNASTY LAW?□ POWERS OF

CONGRESSCLASSIFICATION OF POWERS OF CONGRESS:

2. NON-LEGISLATIVE POWER, SUCH AS:2.a) POWER TO IMPEACH;2.b) POWER TO CONCUR IN

TREATIES AND INTER- NATIONAL AGREEMENT EXECUTED BY THE

PRESIDENT;2.c) POWER TO DECLARE THE

EXISTENCE OF WAR;2.d) POWER TO ACT AS

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY;2.e) POWER TO CONCUR IN

AMNESTY GRANTED BY THE PRESIDENT;2.f) POWER TO ACT AS BOARD OF

CANVASSER FOR PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE-PRESIDENTIAL VOTES.

□ POWERS OFCONGRESS

CLASSIFICATION OF POWERS OF CONGRESS:3. IMPLIED POWERS – THOSE THAT

ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE EFFECTIVE EXECUTION OF OTHER POWERS EX- PRESSLY GRANTED.

EXAMPLE – POWER OF LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION.

4. INHERENT POWERS – THESE ARE POWERS WHICH THOUGH NOT EXPRESSLY GIVEN ARE NEVERTHELESS EXERCISED BY CONGRESS AS THEY ARE NECESSARY FOR ITS EXISTENCE.

EXAMPLES (EXAMPLES GIVEN ARE ALSO EXPRESS POWERS):

a. TO DETERMINE THE RULES OF ITS PROCEEDINGS (Sec. 16 [3] & 21, Art. VII);

b. TO DISCIPLINE ITS MEMBERS (Sec. 16[3], Art. VII); c. TO KEEP JOURNALS OF ITS PROCEEDINGS (Sec. 16[4], Art. VII).


REPORT ON THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS:1. JOURNALS

1.1 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS1.2 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

2. FLOW CHART OF PROCEDURE3. ORIGIN OF BILLS4. PROHIBITED MEASURES5. TITLE OF BILLS6. ENROLLED BILL7. ENGROSSED BILL8. FORMALITIES9. APPROVAL OF BILLS

□ POWERS OF

CONGRESSLEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES:

SEC. 21, ART. VI: (*****) “THE SENATE OR THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES OR ANY OF ITS RESPECTIVE COMMITTEES MAY CONDUCT INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS DULY PUBLISHED RULES OF PROCEDURE. THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS APPEARING IN OR AFFECTED BY SUCH INQUIRIES SHALL BE RESPECTED.”


LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES:SEC. 21, ART. VI (CON’T): (*****)1. IN AID OF LEGISLATION ( BENGZON V. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE, 203 SCRA 767) – IN THIS CASE, PETITIONERS SOUGHT TO RESTRAIN THE RESPONDENT FROM INVESTIGATING THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE ALLEGED MISUSE OF GOVERNMENT FUNDS AND THE ILLICIT ACQUISITION OF PROPERTIES BEING CLAIMED BY THE PCGG FOR THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHL.

THE SC GRANTED THE PETITION, HOLDING, INTER ALIA, THAT THE “PETITIONERS ARE PRESENTLY IMPLEADED AS DEFENDANT IN A CASE BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN, WHICH INVOLVES ISSUES INTIMATELY RELATED TO THE SUBJECT OF CONTEMPLETED INQUIRY BEFORE THE RESPONDENT COMMITTEE”, AND THAT NO LEGISLATION WAS APPARENTLY BEING CONTEMPLETED IN CONNECTION WITH THE SAID INVESTIGATION.

HE DECISION, HOWEVER, FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN WAS CRIMINAL IN NATURE AND THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION WAS TO ASCERTAIN THE DISPOSITION OF FUNDS AND PROPERTIES CLAIMED TO BE PUBLIC IN NATURE. ITS FINDINGS ON THIS MATTER COULD BE THE SUBJECT OF LEGISLATION ALTHOUGH IT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN EXPRESSLY STATED THAT SUCH WAS THE PURPOSE OF THE INQUIRY. AS OBSERVED IN THE EARLIER CASE OF ARNAULT V.

NAZARENO (87 PHIL 29), THE SC SAID “WE ARE BOUND TO PRESUME THAT THE ACTION OF THE LEGISLATIVE BODY WAS WITH A LEGITIMATE OBJECT IF IT WAS CAPABLE OF BEING SO CONSTRUED, AND WE HAVE NO RIGHT TO ASSUME THAT THE CONTRARY WAS INTENDED”.

□ POWERS OF

CONGRESSLEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES:SEC. 21, ART. VI (CON’T): (*****)1.1) IN AID OF LEGISLATION (RECENT JURISPRUDENCE):

GARCILLANO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (575 SCRA 170, 12/23/2008):

THE SC STRESSED THAT THE “SENATE CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE WITH THE CONDUCT OF THE QUESTIONED LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY WITHOUT DULY PUBLISHED RULES OF PROCEDURE, IN CLEAR DEROGATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT.”

IN SAID CASE, THE PETITIONERS CLAIMED THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO PUBLISH ANEW THE SENATE’S RULES OF PROCEDURE GOVERNING INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION, CONSIDERING THAT THEY HAD BEEN PUBLISHED IN NEWSPAPERS OF GEN. CIRCULATION ONLY IN 1995 AND IN 2006, ALTHOUGH IT WAS CONCEDED THAT SAID RULES HAD NOT BEEN PUBLISHED FOR PURPOSES OF THE 14TH CONGRESS, WHICH COMMENCED ON JUNE 30, 2007. CITING NERI V. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS (549 SCRA 77, 3/25/2008); AND (564 SCRA 152, 9/4/2008), THE COURT CLARIFIED THAT IT IS

“INCUMBENT UPON THE SENATE TO PUBLISH THE RULES FOR ITS LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN EACH CONGRESS OR TO OTHERWISE MAKE THE PUBLISHED RULES CLEARLY STATE THAT THE SAME SHALL BE EFFECTIVE IN SUBSEQUENT CONGRESSES OR UNTIL THEY ARE AMENDED OR REPEALED TO SUFFICENTLY PUT PUBLIC ON NOTICE.”

THE COURT LIKEWISE EXPLAINED THAT PUBLICATION OF SAID RULES THROUGH THE INTERNET CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS COMPLIANCE WITH THIS CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS. IN ANY EVENT, THE LEGISLATURE HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED TO POSSESS “VIRTUALLY UNRESTRICTED AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE ITS OWN RULES” AND WOULD BE AT

“LIBERTY TO ALTER OR MODIFY THESE RULES AT ANY TIME IT MAY SEE FIT, SUBJECT ONLY TO THE IMPERATIVES OF QUORUM, VOTING AND PUBLICATION.” (DE LA PAZ V. SENATE, 579 SCRA 521, 2/13/2009).

IN ADDITION TO THESE LIMITATIONS, THE SC HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT OTHER PREROGATIVES, PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS MAY VALIDLY BE INVOKED AGAINST THIS POWER OF CONGRESS. THESE WOULD INCLUDE THE PRESIDENT’S EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, BUT “ONLY IN RELATION TO CERTAIN TYPES OF INFORMATION OF A SENSITIVE CHARACTER” AND WHICH WOULD NOT SERVE TO AUTOMATICALLY EXEMPT EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS FROM THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE

INFORMATION BY THE MERE FACT OF THEIR BEING EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS (SENATE V. ERMITA, 488 SCRA 1, 4/20/2006), THE “FISCAL AUTONOMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY” (SENATE V. ERMITA, SUPRA), THE SUB-JUDICE RULE,

“WHICH RESTRICTS COMMENTS AND DISCLOSURES PERTAINING TO JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS TO AVOID PREJUDGING THE ISSUE, INFLUENCING THE COURT, OR OBSTRUCTING THE ADMINSTRATION OF JUSTICE” (ROMERO V. ESTRADA, 583 SCRA 396, 4/2/2009), THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY (SABIO V. GORDON, 504 SCRA 704, 10/17/2006), WHICH, HOWEVER, MAY NOT BE PROPERLY INVOKED IF THE SUBJECT OF THE LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY PERTAINS TO THE WITNESS’ DISCHARGE OF HIS OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS, AND THE RIGHT TO SELF-INCRIMINATION (STANDARD CHARTERED BANK V. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, 541 SCRA 456, `12/27/2007).

□ POWERS OF

CONGRESSLEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES:SEC. 21, ART. VI (CON’T): (*****)1.1) IN AID OF LEGISLATION (RECENT JURISPRUDENCE):

GUDANI V. SENGA (498 SCRA 671, 8/15/2006):

IN GUDANI V. SENGA (498 SCRA 671, 8/15/2006), THE COURT DECLARED THAT THE PRESIDENT, AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, MAY VALIDLY PROHIBIT A GENERAL FROM APPEARING IN A LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY, ALTHOUGH THE LEGISLATURE WOULD NOT BE “PRECLUDED FROM SEEKING JUDICIAL RELIEF TO COMPEL HIS ATTENDANCE.”

□ POWERS OF

CONGRESSLEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES:SEC. 21, ART. VI (CON’T): (*****)2. PUNISHMENT FOR FAILURE OR REFUSAL OR CONTUMACY OF WITNESS (ARNAULT V. NAZARENO (87 PHIL 29) - FAILURE OR REFUSAL TO ATTEND A LEGITIMATE INVESTIGATION OR CONTUMACY OF THE WITNESS MAY BE PUNISHED AS LEGISLATIVE CONTEMPT. THUS IN THIS CASE, THE PETITIONER WAS ORDERED INCARCERATED BY THE SENATE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS HE DECIDED TO ANSWER CERTAIN RELEVANT QUESTIONS PUT TO HIM IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF A GOVERNMENT TRANSACTION.

IT WAS HELD IN THIS CASE THAT THE QUESTIONS THAT MAY BE RAISED IN A LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION DO NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE RELEVANT TO ANY PENDING LEGISLATION, PROVIDED ONLY THAT THEY ARE RELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED. SUCH INVESTIGATION MAY RESULT IN THE SUBMISSION OF

PROPOSED LEGISLATION BASED UPON THE FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE.

□ POWERS OF

CONGRESSLEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES:SEC. 21, ART. VI (CON’T): (*****)

3. DURATION OF PUNISHMENT (LOPEZ V. DE LOS REYES, 55 PHIL. 170) AND (ARNAULT V. NAZARENO): IN THE OLD RULE ANNOUNCED IN LOPEZ V. DE

LOS REYES, WAS THAT THE PUNISHMENT COULD LAST ONLY FOR THE DURATION OF THE SESSION WHEN THE CONTEMPT WAS COMMITTED.

IN ARNAULT CASE, HOWEVER, THE SC HELD THAT THE OFFENDER COULD BE IMPRISONED INDEFINITELY BY THE SENATE, IT BEING A CONTINUING BODY, PROVIDED THAT THE PUNISHMENT DID NOT BECOME SO LONG AS TO VIOLATE DUE PROCESS.

AS FOR THE HOUSE OF REP, THE SAME

DECISION DECLARED THAT THE IMPRISONMENT COULD LAST NOT ONLY DURING THE SESSION WHEN THE OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED BUT UNTIL THE FINAL ADJOURNMENT (ADJOURNMENT SINE DIE) OF THE BODY. THIS RULE IS PRESUMABLY STILL VALID AND MAY BE APPLIED, UNLESS CHANGED, TO THE PRESENT CONGRESS.

□ POWERS OF

CONGRESSLEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES:SEC. 21, ART. VI (CON’T): (*****)3.3 LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY IS A POLITICAL QUESTION (DE LA PAZ V. SENATE, 579 SCRA 521, 2/13/2009; PHILCOMSAT V. SENATE, 673 SCRA 611, 6/19/2012):

IN THESE CASES, THE SC CLARIFIED THAT THE SUBJECT OF A LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY IS A POLITICAL QUESTION, AND THE MERE FILING OF A CRIMINAL OR AN ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT BEFORE A COURT OR A QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY SHOULD NOT AUTOMATICALLY BAR THE CONDUCT OF LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION (STANDARD CHARTERED BANK V. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, 541 SCRA 456, 12/27/2007).

POWERS OFCONGRESSTHE POWER OF APPROPRIATION *****

REPORT ON CURRENT APPROPRIATIONS CASES:

1) TRANSFER OF FUNDS2) PDAF CASES3) DAP CASESREQUIRED: a. COPIES OF ORGINAL CASES WITH

FINAL DECISIONS

b. CASE DIGESTS/POWER POINT REPORT

c. CASE FOLDERS d. TWO (2) STUDENTS

□ POWERS OF

CONGRESSTHE POWER OF APPROPRIATION *****SEC. 29(1), ART. VI – “NO MONEY SHALL BE PAID OUT OF THE TREASURY EXCEPT IN PURUSUANCE OF AN APPROPRIATION MADE BY LAW.”

1. APPROPRIATION DEFINED – AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE MAY BE DEFINED AS A STATUTE THE PRIMARY AND SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO AUTHORIZE THE RELEASE OF PUBLIC FUNDS FROM THE TREASURY.

EXAMPLE: THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT.

□ POWERS OF

CONGRESSTHE POWER OF APPROPRIATION2. IMPLIED LIMITATIONS 2.1a) PASCUAL V. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATION (110 PHIL. 331) (CON’T): *****THE SUPREME COURT OBSERVED THAT THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE IMPROVED WITH PUBLIC FUNDS WAS PRIVATE IN NATURE AT THE TIME THE APPROPRIATION WAS MADE. THE CIRCUMSTANCE THAT THE ROADS WERE LATER DONATED TO THE GOVT DID NOT CURE THE BASIC DEFECT OF THE APPROPRIATION AS IT WAS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.

□ POWERS OF

CONGRESSTHE POWER OF APPROPRIATION

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONSIN ADDITION TO THESE EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS, THE CONSTITUTION LISTS DOWN SEVERAL SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION OF THE CONGRESS:

3.1) SEC. 24, ART. VI: (*****)“ALL APPROPRIATION BILLS SHOULD ORIGINATE EXCLUSIVELY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, BUT THE SENATE MAY PROPOSE OR CONCUR WITH AMENDMENTS.” POWERS OFCONGRESSTHE POWER OF TAXATION

SEC. 28(3), ART. VI (CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS) : (*****)

“CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS, CHURCHES, PARSONAGES OR CONVENTS APPURTENANT THERETO, MOSQUES, NON-PROFIT CEMETERIES, AND ALL LANDS, BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY,

AND EXCLUSIVELY USED FOR RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE, OR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM TAXATION.”

□ POWERS OF

CONGRESSTHE POWER OF TAXATION

SEC. 28(3), ART. VI (CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS) :

LLADOC V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE (14 SCRA 292) (*****)

IN THIS CASE, A DONATION OF P10,000 WAS ACCEPTED BY A PARISH PRIEST FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A CHURCH. THE BIR SOUGHT TO IMPOSE A DONEE’S TAX UPON HIS SUCCESSOR, WHO PROTESTED, INVOKING THE CONSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTION OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS.

THE SC SUSTAINED THE BIR, HOLDING THAT THE TAX IMPOSED WAS AN EXCISE TAX, A TAX LEVIED NOT UPON THE CHURCH ITSELF BUT UPON THE PARISH PRIEST FOR THE EXERCISE BY HIM OF THE PRIVILEGE OF RECEIVING THE DONATION. THE TAXES COVERED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTION ARE REAL ESTATE TAXES OR AD VALOREN TAXES IMPOSED ON THE PROPERTY ITSELF.

□ POWERS OF

CONGRESSREFERENDUM AND INITIATIVE

SEC. 32, ART. VI (ENABLING LAW – RA NO. 6735):

a) INITIATIVE (CON’T) – THERE ARE 3 SYTEMS OF INITIATIVE, NAMELY:

a.3 INITIATIVE ON LOCAL LEGISLATION WHICH REFERS TO A PETITION PROPOSING TO ENACT A REGIONAL, PROVINCIAL, CITY, MUNICIPAL, OR BARANGAY LAW, RESOLUTION, OR ORDINANCE.

b) INDIRECT INITIATIVE – IS THE EXERCISE OF INITIATIVE BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH A PROPOSITION SENT TO CONGRESS OR LOCAL LEGISLATIVE BODY (SEC. 2, RA 6735).

THE EXECUTIVE

DEPARTMENT3. QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT

(MEMORIZE VERBATIM): (*****)

SEC. 2, ART. VII, PROVIDES THAT: “NO PERSON MAY BE ELECTED PRESIDENT UNLESS HE IS:

a. A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES;

b. A REGISTERED VOTER;c. ABLE TO READ AND WRITE;

d. AT LEAST FORTY YEARS OF AGE ON THE DAY OF THE ELECTION; AND

e. A RESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST TEN YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEEDING SUCH ELECTION”.

□ THE EXECUTIVEDEPARTMENT

3. QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT. (*****)

RECITATION:

1) CAN CONGRESS INCREASE OR REDUCE THE ABOVE QUALIFICATIONS?

2) WHAT IS “EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS”

3) WHO IS CONSIDERED A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN?

4) DEFINE RESIDENCE?□ THE EXECUTIVE

DEPARTMENT4. MEANING OF RESIDENCE. (*****)

WHO IS CONSIDERED RESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (MEMORIZE VERBATIM)?

AS DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN SEVERAL CASES:

“ONE IS A RESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES IF HE IS ‘DOMI- CILED’ THERE, THAT IS, THERE MUST CONCUR:

(1) BODILY PRESENCE IN THE LOCALITY; (2) AN INTENTION TO REMAIN THERE – ANIMUS

MANENDI; AND 3. AN INTENTION TO ABANDON THE OLD

DOMICILE, IF HE HAD ONE, OR ANIMUS NON-REVERTENDI.

WHILE, HOWEVER, BODILY PRESENCE IN THE LOCALITY IS REQUIRED, THE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT ALLOWS FOR TEMPORARY PHYSICAL ABSENCES PROVIDED THAT THE ANIMUS REVERTENDI TO THE DOMICILE IS NEVER ABAN-DONED”. (Gallego v. Vera, 73 Phil. 453 [1941]); Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954]).


6. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION - TERM OF OFFICEOF THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT.

(*****)

“THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL BE ELECTED BY DIRECT VOTE OF THE PEOPLE FOR A TERM OF SIX YEARS WHICH SHALL BEGIN AT NOON ON THE 30TH DAY OF JUNE NEXT FOLLOWING THE DAY OF THE ELECTION AND SHALL END AT NOON OF THE SAME DATE SIX YEARS THEREAFTER.



(*****)

THE PRESIDENT SHALL NOT BE ELIGIBLE FOR ANY REELECTION. NO PERSON WHO HAS SUCCEEDED AS PRESIDENT AND HAS SERVED AS SUCH FOR MORE THAN FOUR YEARS SHALL BE QUALIFIED FOR ELECTION TO THE SAME OFFICE AT ANY TIME”. (Sec. 4, Art. VII, par. 1).

NOTA BENE: LONZANIDA V. COMELEC (311 SCRA 602) RE

THREE-TERM LIMIT IN THE CONSTITUTION.



(*****)NOTE LONZANIDA V. COMELEC CASE (311

SCRA 602) REGARDING THE 3-TERM LIMIT IN THE CONSTITUTION:

IN THIS CASE, THE PETITIONER WAS ELECTED 3 TIMES AS MAYOR BUT LOST IN AN ELECTION PROTEST AND WAS OUSTED DURING HIS 3 RD TERM . INTERPRETING THE 3-TERM LIMIT IN THE CONSTITUTION AND LGC FOR LOCAL OFFICIALS, THE SC HELD THAT HE WAS NOT DISQUALIFIED FROM RUNNING FOR THE SAME POSITION AGAIN BECAUSE HIS 3 RD ELECTION WAS NULLIFIED AND HE DID NOT FULLY SERVE THE 3 RD TERM .

HOWEVER, THIS RULING IS NOT NECESSARILY DECISIVE OF THE QUESTION AS IT APPLIES TO THE TERM LIMITS OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT.

□ THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

6. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION-TERM OF OFFICEOF THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT.

(*****)

“NO VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN TWO SUCCESSIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF THE SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.” (Sec. 4, Art. VII, par. 2).

THE SUPREME COURT, SITTING EN BANC, SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS, AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OR VICE-PRESIDENT, AND MAY PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE PURPOSE.” (Sec. 4, Art. VII, par. 7).


7. DISCUSSION ON THE TERM OF THE PRESIDENT. (***)

IT WAS ARGUED THAT SIX YEARS WAS LONG ENOUGH FOR A GOOD PRESIDENT TO IMPLEMENT HIS PROGRAMS AND, RATHER OPTIMISTICALLY, THAT WITH THE CONSTRAINTS BUILT AROUND THE PRESIDENCY, A BAD ONE WOULD NOT SUCCEED IN ACCOMPLISHING HIS EVIL DESIGNS.


7. DISCUSSION ON THE TERM OF THE PRESIDENT. (***)

THE FIXING OF THE EXACT TIME AND DATE FOR THE START AND ENDING OF THE TERM EXCLUDES THE RIGHT TO “HOLD-OVER”. AT NOON ON JUNE 30 SIX YEARS AFTER THE START OF THE TERM, EITHER THE NEWLY ELECTED PRESIDENT TAKES OVER OR THE RULE ON FILLING OF VACANCIES FOUND IN SECTION 7, ARTICLE VII BECOMES OPERATIVE.


7. DISCUSSION ON THE TERM OF THE PRESIDENT.***

AN INNOVATION INTRODUCED BY THE 1986

CONCOM IS THE LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF TERM A PRESIDENT MAY SERVE. A PRESIDENT IS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR ANY REELECTION FOR THAT OFFICE, THAT IS, EITHER IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS TERM OR EVEN AFTER AN INTERVAL OF ONE OR MORE TERMS.

NOTA BENE: THE ERAP CASE WAS NOT TESTED IN THE SC

AS HE LOST IN THE ELECTION TO AQUINO IN

2010 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.


7. DISCUSSION ON THE TERM OF THE PRESIDENT.***

IT WAS THOUGHT THAT THE ELIMINATION OF THE PROSPECT OF REELECTION WOULD MAKE FOR A MORE INDEPENDENT PRESIDENT CAPABLE OF MAKING CORRECT, EVEN IF UNPOPULAR, DECISIONS. THE PROHIBITION OF REELECTION APPLIES TO ANY PERSON WHO HAS SERVED* AS PRESIDENT FOR MORE THAN FOUR YEARS. (The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, First Edition, 1988, Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.).

*EITHER BY ELECTION OR SUCCESSION


5. CASE EXAMPLE - TERM OF OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT:

IN AN ELECTION FOR THE PRESIDENCY FOR A TERM OF 6 YEARS STARTING JUNE 30, 200A TO JUNE 30, 200G, MR. MEROLCO WAS PROCLAIMED AS THE ELECTED PRESIDENT FOR A FIXED TERM OF 6 YEARS STARTING JUNE 30, 200A. HOWEVER, MR. GSAS, HIS RIVAL, FILED AN ELECTION PROTEST WITH THE PET. AFTER 4-1/2 YEARS IN OFFICE, THE ELECTION PROTEST WAS DECIDED IN FAVOR OF MR. GSAS;THEREAFTER, MR . GSAS TOOK HIS OATH OF OFFICE AS THE DULY ELECTED PRESIDENT TO GOVERN THE COUNTRY FOR THE BALANCE OF THE TERM WHICH IS 1-1/2 YEARS.

QUESTIONS: CAN MR. MEROLCO RUN FOR PRESIDENT IN THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION? HOW ABOUT MR. GSAS?

(Note Lonzanida v. Comelec, case 311 SCRA 602)

□ THE EXECUTIVEDEPARTMENTTHE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

(MACALINTAL SEEKS ABOLITION OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL – PETITION WITH SC DATED APRIL 5, 2010):

PGMA ELECTION LAWYER, R. MACALINTAL, SOUGHT THE ABOLITION OF THE PET, WHICH HE ARGUED WAS ILLEGALLY CREATED AND COULD BE UNNECESSARILY EATING UP GOVERNMENT FUNDS.

IN A 7-PAGE PETITION, MACALINTAL ASKED THE SC TO DECLARE THE CREATION OF THE PET IN VIOLATION OF TWO PROVISIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION: PAR. 7, SEC. 4,

□ THE EXECUTIVEDEPARTMENTART. VII, AND SEC. 12, ART. VIII.MACALINTAL ARGUED THAT THE SC SITTING EN

BANC SHOULD RESOLVE ELECTORAL PROTESTS IN THE PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE-PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, AND NOT THE PET.

THE FIRST PROVISION STATES: “THE SC, SITTING EN BANC, SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS, AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OR VICE-PRESIDENT, AND MAY PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE PURPOSE.” (par. 7, Sec. 4, Art. VII)

□ THE EXECUTIVEDEPARTMENTTHE SECOND PROVISION STATES: “THE

MEMBERS OF THE SC AND OTHER COURTS ESTABLISHED BY LAW SHALL NOT BE DESIGNATED TO ANY AGENCY PERFORMING QUASI-JUDICIAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS.” (Sec. 12, Art. VIII)

MACALINTAL ALSO SAID THE HIGH COURT WAS MISTAKEN IN CREATING THE PET BECAUSE THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT AUTHORIZE THE CREATION OF ANOTHER TRIBUNAL OPERATING ON ITS OWN BUDGET.

MACALINTAL ARGUED THAT THE PET GIVES SC MAGISTRATES DUAL POSITIONS IN GOVERNMENT.

□ THE EXECUTIVEDEPARTMENT“TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE THAT THIS PETITION

BE RESOLVED WITH DISPATCH IN VIEW OF THE

FORTHCOMING PRESIDENDTIAL ELECTIONS IN MAY, 2010 WHERE CASES MAY BE FILED INVOLVING THE ELECTION, RETURNS OR QUALIFICATIONS OF CANDIDATES FOR PRESIDENT OR VICE-PRESIDENT,” HE SAID IN THE PETITION.


THE SC HELD THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PET IS AUTHORIZED BY THE LAST PAR. OF SEC. 4, ART. VII OF THE CONSTITUTION AND SUPPORTED BY THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CONCOM. THE PROVISION WHICH STATES THAT “THE SC SITTING EN BANC, SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO ELECTIONS, RETURNS, AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OR VICE PRESIDENT, AND MAY PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE PURPOSE,” MANDATES THE SC TO CREATE THE PET, THE COURT HELD.


THE COURT STRESSED THE PLENARY GRANT TO IT BY THE CONSTITUTION OF JUDICIAL POWER AND THAT “UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION, THE ADDITIONAL JURISDICTION BESTOWED BY THE LAST PAR. OF SEC. 4, ART. VII OF THE CONSTITUTION TO DECIDE PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE PRESDIENTIAL CONTESTS INCLUDES THE MEANS NECESSARY TO CARRY IT. THE SC RULED THAT ITS METHOD OF DECIDING PRESDIENTIAL AND VICE PRESDIENTIAL ELECTION CONTESTS THROUGH PET, IS ACTUALLY A DERIVATIVE OF THE EXERCISE OF THE PREROGATIVE CONFERRED BY THE SAID CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION (LAST PAR., SEC. 4, ARTICLE VII).


THE SC HELD “THE POWER OF PET IS A DERIVATIVE OF THE PLENARY JUDICIAL POWER ALLOCATED TO COURTS OF LAW, EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONSTITUTION.” (MAKALINTAL V. PET, GR NO. 191618, JUNE 7, 2011) [WRR].


8. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION.

A. THERE ARE TWO SETS OF RULES ON PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION:

SECTION 7 – ON VACANCIES OCCURING BEFORE THE PRESIDENT ASSUMED HIS TERM OF OFFICE;

SECTION 8 – ON VACANCIES OCCURING AFTER THE PRESIDENT ASSUMED HIS TERM OF OFFICE.


8. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION:SECTION 7, ARTICLE VII (BEFORE ASSUMING

OFFICE):

“THE PRESIDENT-ELECT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL ASSUME OFFICE AT THE BEGINNING OF THEIR TERMS.

IF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT FAILS TO QUALIFY, THE VICE-PRESIDENT–ELECT SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT UNTIL THE PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL HAVE QUALIFIED.

IF THE PRESIDENT SHALL NOT HAVE BEEN CHOSEN, THE VICE-PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT UNTIL A PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN CHOSEN AND QUALIFIED.


8. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION.IF AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TERM OF THE

PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL HAVE DIED OR SHALL HAVE BECOME PERMANENTLY DISABLED, THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL BECOME PRESIDENT.

WHERE NO PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN CHOSEN OR SHALL HAVE QUALIFIED, OR WHERE BOTH SHALL HAVE DIED OR BECOME PERMANENTLY DISABLED, THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OR, IN CASE OF HIS INABILITY, THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT UNTIL A PRESIDENT OR A VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN CHO- SEN AND QUALIFIED.


8. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION.THE CONGRESS SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR

THE MANNER IN WHICH ONE WHO IS TO ACT AS PRESIDENT SHALL BE SELECTED UNTIL A PRESIDENT OR A VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE QUALIFIED, IN CASE OF DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY, OR INABILITY OF THE OFFICIALS MENTIONED IN THE NEXT PRECEEDING PAPRAGRAPH”.

SECTION 8, ARTICLE VII (AFTER ASSUMING OFFICE):

“IN CASE OF DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY, REMOVAL FROM OFFICE, OR RESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDENT, THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL BECOME THE PRESIDENT TO SERVE THE


8. THEPRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION.UNEXPIRED TERM. IN CASE OF DEATH,

PERMANENT DISABILITY, REMOVAL FROM OFFICE, OR RESIGNATION OF BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OR, IN CASE OF HIS INABILITY, THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE SHALL THEN ACT AS PRESIDENT

UNTIL THE PRESIDENT OR VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED.


8. THEPRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION.

THE CONGRESS SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE, WHO

SHALL SERVE AS PRESIDENT IN CASE OF DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY, OR RESIGNATION OF THE ACTING PRESIDENT. HE SHALL SERVE UNTIL THE PRESIDENT OR THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED, AND BE SUBJECT TO THE SAME RESTRICTIONS OF POWERS AND DISQUALIFICATION AS THE ACTING PRESIDENT.”


8. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION.THE CASES CONTEMPLATED IN SECTION 7 ARE:a. FAILURE OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT

TO QUALIFY, THAT IS, TO ASSUME HIS OFFICE BY TAKING THE OATH AND ENTERING INTO THE DISCHARGE OF HIS DUTIES;

b. FAILUE TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT, AS WHERE THE CANVASS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS HAS NOT YET BEEN COMPLETED, OR WHERE FOR ONE REASON OR

ANOTHER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION HAS NOT BEEN HELD;

c. DEATH OR PERMANENT DISABILITY OF THE PRESDIENT

ELECT.IN (a) AND (b), THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL

MERELY ACTS AS PRESIDENT; WHILE, IN (c), HE BECOMES THE PRESIDENT.



SECTION 8 DEALS WITH VACANCIES OCCURING IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT DURING HIS INCUMBENCY AND IS LIMITED TO FOUR INSTANCES:

a. DEATH;b. REMOVAL;c. RESIGNATION; ORd. PERMANENT DISABILITY, LIKE

INCURABLE INSANITY.□ THE EXECUTIVE

DEPARTMENT8. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION.

B. JOSEPH ESTRADA V. GMA (G.R. NO. L-146738, MARCH 2, 2001).

ESTRADA QUESTIONED GMA’S RIGHT TO SUCCEED HIM AS PRESDIENT, CLAIMING THAT HE HAD LEFT MALACANANG ON JAN. 20, 2001 ONLY TO DIFFUSE THE TENSION BUILDING UP AMONG THE DEMONSTRATORS AT EDSA WHO

WERE DEMANDING HIS RESIGNATION. HE DENIED HE HAD RESIGNED AND SAID HE HAD EVERY INTENTION TO RETURN AFTER THE DISTURBANCES SHALL HAVE ENDED BUT WAS PREVENTED FROM DOING SO.

JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO DECLARED IN PART FOR THE COURT:


8. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION.B. ESTRADA V. GMA:

“IN SUM, WE HOLD THAT THE RESIGNATION OF THE PETITIONER CANNOT BE DOUBTED. IT WAS CONFIRMED BY HIS LEAVING MALACANANG. IN THE PRESS RELEASE CONTAINING HIS FINAL STATEMENT, (1) HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE OATH-TAKING OF THE RESPONDENT AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC ALBEIT WITH RESERVATION ABOUT ITS LEGALITY; (2) HE EMPHASIZED HE WAS LEAVING THE PALACE, THE SEAT OF THE PRESIDENCY, FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE AND IN ORDER TO BEGIN THE HEALING PROCESS OF OUR NATION. HE DID NOT SAY HE WAS LEAVING THE PALACE DUE TO ANY KIND OF INABILITY AND THAT HE WAS GOING TO RE-ASSUME THE PRESIDENCY AS SOON AS THE DISABILITY APPEARS (DIS?); (3) HE EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE TO THE PEOPLE FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO SERVE THEM. WITHOUT DOUBT HE WAS REFERRING TO THE PAST


8. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION.B. ESTRADA V. GMA:OPPORTUNITY GIVEN HIM TO SERVE THE

PEOPLE AS THEIR PRESIDENT; (4) HE ASSURED THAT HE WILL NOT SHIRK FROM ANY FUTURE CHALLENGE THAT MAY COME AHEAD IN THE SAME SERVICE OF OUR COUNTRY. PETITIONER’S REFERENCE IS TO A FUTURE CHALLENGE AFTER OCCUPYING THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT WHICH HE HAS GIVEN UP, AND (5) HE CALLED ON HIS SUPPORTERS TO JOIN HIM IN THE PROMOTION OF A NATIONAL SPIRIT OF RECONCILIATION AND SOLIDARITY. CERTAINLY, THE NATIONAL SPIRIT OF RECONCILIATION AND SOLIDARITY COULD NOT BE ATTAINED IF HE DID NOT GIVE UP THE PRESIDENCY. THE PRESS RELEASE WAS PETITIONER’S VALEDICTORY, HIS FINAL ACT OF FAREWELL. HIS PRESIDEN-CY IS NOW IN THE PAST TENSE.”


8. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION.B. ESTRADA V. GMA:ESTRADA ALSO AGRUED THAT GMA

COULD NOT HAVE REPLACED HIM EITHER IN AN ACTING CAPACITY BECAUSE THE DETERMINATION OF THE PRESIDENT’S INABILITY TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF HIS OFFICE SHOULD BE MADE BY THE CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE PROCEDURE LAID DOWN IN SECTION 11, ARTICLE VII. THE COURT HELD THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN REPLACED ON THAT GROUND; AND ANYWAY, THE SENATE AND

THE HOUSE HAD, BY RESOLUTION, FORMALLY RECOGNIZED GMA AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUCCESSOR OF ESTRADA BY REASON OF HIS RESIGNATION AS PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.


8. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION.C. INABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO

DISCHARGE HIS POWERS AND DUTIES.

SECTION 11, ARTICLE VII. “WHENEVER THE PRESIDENT TRANSMIT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HIS WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT HE IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, AND UNTIL HE TRANSMITS TO THEM A WRITTEN DECLARATION TO THE CONTRARY, SUCH POWERS AND DUTIES SHALL BE DISCHARGED BY THE VICE-PRESIDENT AS ACTING PRESIDENT.



DISCHARGE HIS POWERS AND DUTIES (CON’T):WHENEVER A MAJORITY OF ALL THE

MEMBERS OF THE CABINET TRANSMIT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THEIR WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE OFFICE AS ACTING PRESIDENT .

THEREAFTER, WHEN THE PRESIDENT TRANSMIT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HIS WRITTEN DECLARATION


8. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION.C. INABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT . . . (CON’T):THAT NO INABILITY EXISTS, HE SHALL

REASSUME THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE. MEANWHILE, SHOULD A MAJORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET TRANSMIT WITHIN FIVE DAYS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THEIR WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, THE CONGRESS SHALL DECIDE THE ISSUE. FOR THAT PURPOSE, THE CONGRESS SHALL CONVENE, IF IT IS NOT IN SESSION, WITHIN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS RULES AND WITHOUT NEED OF CALL.


8. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. C. INABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT . . . (CON’T):

IF THE CONGRESS WITHIN TEN DAYS AFTER RECEIPT OF THE LAST WRITTEN DECLARATION, OR, IF NOT IN SESSION, WITHIN TWELVE DAYS AFTER IT IS REQUIRED TO ASSEMBLE, DETERMINES BY A TWO-THIRDS VOTE OF BOTH HOUSES, VOTING SEPARATELY, THAT THE PRESIDENTV IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT ; OTHERWISE, THE PRESIDENT SHALL CONTINUE EXERCISING THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE.”



DISCHARGE HIS POWERS AND DUTIES (CON’T).

1. ESTRADA V. GMA (G.R. L - 146738, March 2, 2001)

“JAN. 20, 2001SIR,BY VIRTUE OF PROVISION SEC. 11,

ART. VII OF THE CONSTITUTION, I AM HEREBY TRANSMITTING THIS DECLARATION THAT I AM UNABLE TO EXERCISE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF MY OFFICE. BY OPERATION OF LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION, THE VICE- PRESIDENT SHALL BE THE ACTING PRESIDENT.

PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”



DISCHARGE HIS POWERS AND DUTIES (CON’T):

2. ESTRADA V. GMA (G.R. L – 146738, March 2, 2001).

ESTRADA TRIED TO TEST THIS PROVISION BY HIS MYSTERIOUS LETTER BUT THE COURT HELD THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN REPLACED ON THAT GROUND; AND

ANYWAY, THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE HAD, BY RESOLUTION, FORMALLY RECOGNIZED GMA AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUCCESSOR BY REASON OF HIS RESIGNATION AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES. HENCE, THIS ISSUE BECAME A POLITICAL QUESTION WHICH THE COURT, UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, HAS NO POWER TO REVIEW.


8. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. (***)D. VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE-

PRESIDENT DURING THE TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS

ELECTED.

QUESTION: WHAT IS THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS

REQUIRED TO REPLACE AND INSTALL A NEW VICE-PRESDIDENT IN

CASE A VACANCY OCCURS IN HIS OFFICE DURING THE TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED, LIKE FOR

INSTANCE, WHEN THE INCUMBENT VICE-PRE- SIDENT SUCCEDED AS PRESIDENT?



D. VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT

DURING THE TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.

SECTION 9, ARTICLE VII: “WHENEVER THERE IS A VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT DURING THE TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED, THE PRESDIENT SHALL NOMINATE A VICE-PRESIDENT FROM AMONG THE MEMBERS OF SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WHO SHALL ASSUME OFFICE UPON CONFIRMATION BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS VOTING SEPA-RATELY. “ (GMA & GUINGONA CASE)



E. FILLING OF THE VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT (SIMULTANEOUS):

SECTION 10, ARTICLE VII: “THE CONGRESS SHALL, AT TEN O’CLOCK IN THE MORNING OF THE THIRD DAY AFTER VACANCY IN THE OFFICES OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OCCURS, CONVENE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS RULES WITHOUT NEED OF A CALL AND WITHIN SEVEN DAYS ENACT A LAW CALLING FOR A SPECIAL ELEC- TION TO ELECT A PRESIDENT AND A VICE-PRESIDENT TO BE HELD NOT EARLIER THAN 45 DAYS NOR LATER THAN 60 DAYS FROM THE TIME OF SUCH CALL. THE BILL CALLING SUCH SPECIAL ELECTION SHAL BE DEEMED CERTIFIED UNDER PARAGRAPH 2, SECTION 26, ARTICLE VI OF THIS


8. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION.E. FILLING OF THE VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF

THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT (SIMULTANEOUS):

CONSTITUTION AND SHALL BECOME LAW UPON ITS APPROVAL ON THIRD READING BY THE CONGRESS. APPROPRIATION FOR THE SPECIAL ELECTION SHALL BE CHARGED AGAINST ANY

CURRENT APPROPRIA- TIONS AND SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM THE REQUIRE -MENTS OF PARAGRAPH 4, SECTION 25, ARTICLE VI OF THIS CONSTITUTION. THE CONVENING OF THE CONG- RESS CANNOT BE SUSPENDED NOR THE SPECIAL ELECTION POSTPONED. NO SPECIAL ELECTION SHALL BE CALLED IF THE VACANCY OCCURS WITHIN I8 MONTHS BEFORE THE DATE OF THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.”


9. EXECUTIVE INHIBITIONS (*****)QUESTION: CAN AN ENERGY SECRETARY BE

QUALI- FIED TO THE APPOINTMENT AS MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES?

a) SECTION 13, ARTICLE VII; b) SECTION 7, PAR. 2, ARTICLE IX-B;

c) SECTION I, ARTICLE XI; d) EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 284, JULY

23, 1987e) CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. THE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (194 SCRA 317) DECLARING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 284 UNCONSTITUTIONAL.


SEC. 13, ARTICLE VII: (*****)“THE PRESIDENT, VICE-PRESIDENT, THE

MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, AND THEIR DEPUTIES OR ASSISTANTS SHALL NOT, UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THIS CONSTITUTION, HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE OR EMPLOY-MENT DURING THEIR TENURE. THEY SHALL NOT, DURING SAID TENURE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY PRACTICE ANY OTHER PROFESSION, PARTICIPATE IN ANY BUSINESS, OR BE FINANCIALLY INTERESTED IN ANY CONTRACT WITH, OR IN ANY FRANCHISE, OR SPECIAL PRIVILEGE GRANTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY SUBDIVISION, AGENCY, OR INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CON-TROLLED CORPORATIONS OR THEIR SUBSIDIARIES.”


SEC. 7, 2ND PAR, ARTICLE IX-B, THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION): (*****)

“UNLESS OTHERWISE ALLOWED BY LAW OR BY THE PRIMARY FUNCTIONS OF HIS POSITION, NO APPOIN- TIVE OFFICIAL SHALL HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY SUBDI-VISION, AGENCY OR INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS OR THEIR SUBSIDIARIES.


SEC. 1, ARTICLE XI, ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS:

PUBLIC OFFICE IS A PUBLIC TRUST. PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES MUST AT ALL TIMES BE ACCOUNTA- BLE TO THE PEOPLE, SERVE THEM WITH UTMOST RES-PONSIBILITY, INTEGRITY, LOYALTY, AND

EFFICIENCY, ACT WITH PATRIOTISM AND JUSTICE, AND LEAD MO- DEST LIVES.


EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 284, JULY 23, 1987, RULE ON MULTIPLE POSITIONS FOR THE CABINET MEMBERS AND OTHER APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS:

SEC. 1 – “EVEN IF ALLOWED BY LAW OR BY THE PRIMARY FUNCTION OF HIS POSITIONS, A MEMBER OF CABINET, UNDERSECRETARY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OR OTHER APPOINTIVE OFFICIAL OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT MAY, IN ADDITION TO HIS PRIMARY POSITION, HOLD NOT MORE THAN TWO POSITIONS IN THE GOVERNMENT AND GOCC’S AND RECEIVE THE CORRESPONDING COMPENSATION THEREFOR: PROVIDED, THAT THIS LIMITATIONS SHALL NOT APPLY TO AD HOC BODIES OR COMMITTEES, OR TO BOARDS, COUNCILS, OR BODIES OF WHICH THE PRESIDENT IS THE CHAIRMAN.”


EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 284, JULY 23, 1987 (CON’T):1) CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. THE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (194 SCRA 317) (*****)- IN THIS CASE, THE PETITIONER CHALLENGED EO NO. 284, JULY 23, 1987, WHICH IN EFFECT ALLOWED CABINET MEMBERS, THEIR UNDERSECRETARIES AND ASSISTANT SECRETARIES AND OTHER APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPT TO HOLD OTHER POSITIONS IN THE GOV’T ALBIET SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED THEREIN. THE RESPONDENTS, IN REFUTING THE PETITIONEDR’S ARGUMENT THAT THE MEASURE WAS VIOLATIVE OF ART. VII, SEC. 13 OF THE



EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (194 SCRA 317) (CON’T): CONSTITUTION, INVOKED ART. IX-B, SEC. 7, ALLOWING THE HOLDING OF MULTIPLE POSITIONS BY THE APPOINTIVE OFFICIAL IF “ALLOWED BY LAW OR BY THE PRIMARY FUNCTIONS OF HIS POSITION”.

IN DECLARING THE EO UNCONSTITUTIONAL,

THE SC DECLARED: “IN THE LIGHT OF THE CONSTRUCTION GIVEN TO SEC. 13, ART. VII IN RELATION TO SEC. 7, PAR. 2, ART. IX-B OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 284 DATED JULY 23, 1987 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.



EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (194 SCRA 317) (CON’T): OSTENSIBLY RESTRICTING THE NUMBER OF POSTIONS THAT CABINET MEMBERS, UNDERSECRETARIES OR ASSISTANT SECRETARIES MAY HOLD IN ADDITION TO THEIR PRIMARY POSITION TO NOT MORE THAN 2 POSITIONS IN THE GOV’T AND GOCC’S, EO 284 ACTUALLY ALLOWS THEM TO HOLD MULTIPLE OFFICES OR EMPLOYMENT IN DIRECT CONTRAVENTION OF THE

EXPRESS MANDATE OF SEC.13, ART. VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION PROHIBITING THEM FROM DOING SO, UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION ITSELF.”



EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (194 SCRA 317) (CON’T): “THE COURT IS ALERTED BY REPONSDENTS TO THE IMPRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES THAT WILL RESULT FROM A STRICT APPLICATION OF THE PROHIBITION MANDATED UNDER SEC. 13, ART. VII (CONSTITUTION) ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE GOV’T, CONSIDERING THAT CABINET MEMBERS WOULD BE STRIPPED OF THEIR OFFICES HELD IN AN EX-OFFICIO CAPACITY, BY REASON OF THEIR PRIMARY POSITIONS OR BY VIRTUE OF LEGISLATION.”



EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (194 SCRA 317) (CON’T): “AS EARLIER CLARIFIED IN THIS DECISION, EX-OFFICIO POSTS OR THOSE REQUIRED BY THE PRIMARY FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICIAL CONCERNED DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF “ANY OTHER OFFICE” WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION. WITH RESPECT TO OTHER OFFICES OR EMPLOYMENT HELD BY VIRTUE OF LEGISLATION, INCLUDING CHAIRMANSHIPS OR DIRECTORSHIPS IN GOCC’S AND THEIR SUBSIDIARIES, SUFFICE IT TO SAY THAT THE FEARED IMPRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES ARE MORE APPARENT THAN REAL. BEING HEAD OF AN


EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 284, JULY 23, 1987 (CON’T):

1) CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (194 SCRA 317) (CON’T): EXECUTIVE DEPT IS NO MEAN JOB. IT IS MORE THAN A FULL-TIME JOB, REQUIRING FULL ATTENTION, SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS AND EXPERTISE. IF MAXIMUM BENEFITS ARE TO BE DERIVED FROM A DEPT HEAD’S ABILITY AND EXPERTISE, HE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO ATTEND TO HIS DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES WITHOUT THE DISTRACTION OF OTHER GOV’T OFFICES OR EMPLOYMENT.



EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (194 SCRA 317) (CON’T): HE SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM DISSIPATING HIS EFFORTS, ATTENTION AND ENERGY AMONG TOO MANY POSITIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY, WHICH MAY RESULT IN HAPZARDNESS AND INEFFICIENCY. SURELY THE ADVANTAGES TO BE DERIVED FROM THIS CONCENTRATION OF ATTENTION, KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERTISE, PARTICULARLY AT THIS STATE OF OUR NATIONAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPEMNT, FAR OUTWEIGH THE BENEFITS, IF ANY, THAT MAY BE GAINED

FROM A DEPARTMENT HEAD SPREADING HIMSELF TOO THIN AND TAKING IN MORE THAN WHAT HE CAN HANDLE.”


10. PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. (*****)QUESTION: IS THE PRESIDENT IMMUNE FROM SUIT?


10. PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY.A. LEGAL BASIS:1) THE 1935 CONSTITUTION2) ORIGINAL 1973 CONSTITUION

SECTION 7, ARTICLE VII: “THE PRESIDENT SHALL BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT DURING HIS TENURE.

3) 1973 CONSTITUTION, AS AMENDED IN 1981: SECTION 17, ARTICLE VII: “THE PRESIDENT

SHALL BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT DURING HIS TENURE. THEREAFTER, NO SUIT WHATSOEVER SHALL LIE FOR THE OFFICIAL ACTS DONE BY HIM OR BY OTHERS PURSUANT TO HIS SPECIFIC ORDERS DURING HIS TENURE.”

4) 1987 CONSTITUTION5) FORBES, ETC. V. CHUOCO TIACO AND

CROSSFIELD(16 PHIL. 534 [1910]).


10. PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY.B. 1987 CONSTITUTION.WHEN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION WAS

CRAFTED, ITS FRAMERS DID NOT REENACT THE EXECUTIVE UMMUNITY PROVISION OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION. THE FOLLOWING EXPLANATION WAS GIVEN BY DELEGATE J. BERNAS, VIZ:

“MR. SUAREZ. THANK YOU.THE LAST QUESTION IS WITH

REFERENCE TO THE COMMITTEE’S OMITTING IN THE DRAFT PROPOSAL THE IMMUNITY PROVISION FOR THE PRESIDENT. I AGREE WITH COM. NOLLEDO THAT THE COMMITTEE DID VERY WELL IN STRIKING OUT THIS SECOND SENTENCE, AT THE VERY LEAST, OF THE ORIGINAL PROVISION ON IMMUNITY FROM SUIT UNDER THE 1973 CONSTITUTION. BUT WOULD THE


10. PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY.COMMITTEE MEMBERS NOT AGREE TO A

RESTORATION OF AT LEAST THE FIRST SENTENCE THAT THE PRESIDENT SHALL BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT DURING HIS TENURE, CONSIDERING THAT IF WE DO NOT PROVIDE HIM THAT KIND OF IMMUNITY, HE MIGHT BE SPENDING ALL HIS TIME FACING LITIGATIONS, AS THE PRESIDENT-IN-EXILE IN HAWAII IS NOW FACING LITIGATIONS ALMOST DAILY?”

“FR. BERNAS. THE REASON FOR THE OMISSION IS THAT WE CONSIDER IT UNDERSTOOD IN PRESENT JURISPRUDENCE THAT DURING HIS TENURE HE IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT.”

“MR. SUAREZ. SO THERE IS NO NEED TO EXPRESS IT HERE.”


10. PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY.

“FR. BERNAS. THERE IS NO NEED. IT WAS THAT WAY BEFORE. THE ONLY INNOVATION MADE BY THE 1973 CONSTITUTION WAS TO MAKE THAT EXPLICIT AND TO ADD OTHER THINGS.”

“MR. SUAREZ. ON THAT UNDERSTANDING, I WILL NOT PRESS FOR ANY MORE QUERY, MADAM PRESIDENT. I THANK THE COMMISSIONER FOR THE CLARIFICATION.” (CITED BY THE SC IN ESTRADA V. GMA & ESTRADA V. DESIERTO CASES).


10. PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. (*****)C. FORBES,ETC., V. CHUOCO TIACO AND

CROSSFIELD (16 Phil. 534 [1910]).THE COURT SAID ON THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-

LIABILITY: “THE THING WHICH THE JUDICIARY CAN NOT

DO IS MULCT THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL PERSONALLY IN DAMAGES WHICH RESULT FROM THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTY… PUBLIC POLICY FORBIDS IT.

WHAT IS HELD HERE IS THAT HE WILL BE PROTECTED FROM PERSONAL LIABITY FOR DAMAGES NOT ONLY WHEN HE ACTS WITHIN HIS AUTHORITY, BUT ALSO WHEN HE IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY, PROVIDED HE ACTUALLY USED DISCRETION AND JUDGMENT, THAT IS JUDICIAL FACULTY, IN


10. PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY.C. FORBES, ETC V. CHUOCO TIACO AND

CROSSFIELD (CON’T): DETERMINING WHETHER HE HAD

AUTHORITY TO ACT OR NOT. IN OTHER WORDS, HE IS ENTITLED TO PROTECTION IN DETERMINING THE QUESTION OF HIS AUTHORITY. IF HE DECIDES WRONGLY, HE IS STILL PROTECTED PROVIDED THE QUESTION OF HIS AUTHORITY WAS ONE OVER WHICH TWO MEN, REASONABLY QUALIFIED FOR THAT POSITION, MIGHT HONESTLY DIFFER; BUT HE IS NOT PROTECTED IF THE LACK OF AUTHORITY TO ACT IS SO PLAIN THAT TWO SUCH MEN COULD NOT HONESTLY DIFFER OVER ITS DETERMINATION. IN SUCH CASE, HE ACTS, NOT A GOVERNOR-GENERAL BUT AS A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL, AND, AS SUCH, MUST ANSWER FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS ACT.”


10. PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY.

D. THE COURT UNDERSCORED THE CONSEQUENCES IF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE WAS NOT GRANTED IMMUNITY FROM SUIT, VIZ:

“XXX. ACTION UPON IMPORTANT MATTERS OF STATE DELAYED; THE TIME AND SUBSTANCE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE SPENT IN WRANGLING LITIGATION; DISRESPECT ENGENDERED FOR THE PERSON OF ONE OF THE HIGHEST OFFICIALS OF THE STATE AND FOR THE OFFICE HE OCCUPIES; A TENDENCY TO UNREST AND DISORDER; RESULTING IN A WAY, IN A DISTRUST AS TO THE INTEGRITY OF GOVERNMENT ITSELF.” (CITED BY THE SC IN ESTRADA V. GMA & ESTRADA V. DESIERTO CASES).


10. PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY.E. ESTRADA V. DESIERTO, GR NOS. 146771-15,

MARCH 2, 2001 (IMMUNITY OF A NON-SITTING PRESIDENT):

WHEN SEVERAL CRIMINAL CHARGES WERE FILED AGAINST HIM WITH THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FORMER PRES. ESTRADA SOUGHT TO DISMISS THEM ON THE GROUND OF HIS CLAIMED PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. IN THIS CASE, THE SC DISMISSED HIS PETITION, HOLDING IN PART AS FOLLOWS:

“WE NOW COME TO THE IMMUNITY THAT CAN BE CLAIMED BY PETITIONER AS A NON-STTTING PRESIDENT. THE CASES FILED AGAINST PETITIONER ESTRADA ARE CRIMINAL IN CHARACTER. THEY INVOLVE PLUNDER, BRIBERY, AND GRAFT AND CORRUPTION. BY NO STRETCH OF THE IMAGINATION CAN


10. PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY.E. ESTRADA V. DESIERTO (GR NOS. 146771-15,

MARCH 2, 2001) (CON’T):THESE CRIMES, ESPECIALLY PLUNDER WHICH

CARRIES THE DEATH PENALTY, BE COVERED BY THE ALLEGED MANTLE OF IMMUNITY OF A NON-SITTING PRESIDENT. PETITIONER CANNOT CITE ANY DECISION OF THIS COURT LICENSING THE PRESIDENT TO COMMIT CRIMINAL ACTS AND WRAPPING HIM WITH THE POST-TENURE IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY. IT WILL BE ANOMALOUS TO HOLD THAT IMMUNITY IS AN INOCULATION FROM LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL ACTS AND OMISSIONS. THE RULE IS THAT UNLAWFUL ACTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS ARE NOT ACTS OF THE STATE, AND THE OFFICER WHO ACTS ILLEGALLY IS NOT ACTING AS SUCH BUT STANDS IN THE SAME FOOTING AS ANY OTHER TRESPASSER.”

□ THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

A. SCOPE OF POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT:MENTION HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE OF THE

PROFOUND INFLUENCE EXERTED BY THE PRESIDENT AS HEAD OF STATE AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. THIS INFLUENCE DERIVES FROM THE VAST POWERS CONFERRED ON HIM THAT ENABLE HIM TO ASSUME

THE LEADERSHIP IN THE CONDUCT OF PUBLIC AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS.

THIS LEADERSHIP IS DISPLAYED BY HIM NOT ONLY IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS BUT ALSO IN THEIR ENACTMENT, AS WELL AS IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE COMMAND OF THE AFP, THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE

GOVERNMENT AND EVEN THE CRYSTALLIZATION OF PUBLIC OPINION ON VITAL ISSUES.


A. SCOPE OF POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (CON’T):SO THE QUESTION IS:DOES THE PRESIDENT ENJOY THE TOTALITY OF

EXECUTIVE POWER? IS HE AUTHORIZED TO EXERCISE ANY POWER SO LONG AS IT IS BY NATURE EXECUTIVE? IN OTHER WORDS, IS EVERY POWER RELATING TO THE ENFORCEMENT AND

ADMINISTRATION OF LAWS TO BE REGARDED AS BELONGING TO THE PRESIDENT BY VIRTUE OF HIS OFFICE?


A. SCOPE OF POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (CON’T):1) VILLENA V. SECRETARY OF THE (67 PHIL 451) AND PLANAS V. GIL (67 PHIL 62):THE ORIGINAL VIEW OF OUR SUPREME COURT ON THESE QUESTIONS AS THEY APPLIED TO THE PRESIDENT UNDER THE 1935 CONSTITUTION FAVORED HIS COMPLETE ASSUMPTION OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER. IN THESE CASES, THE SC DECLARED THAT “THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHIL IS THE EXECUTIVE OF THE GOV’T OF THE PHIL, AND NO OTHER” AND THAT “ALL EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY IS THUS VESTED IN HIM.”


A. SCOPE OF POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (CON’T):2. MYERS V. US (272 US 52) - THE PRONOUCEMENTS IN VILLENA AND PLANAS WERE IN KEEPING WITH THIS U.S. CASE WHERE CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT HELD THAT “THE WORDS OF SEC. 2 FOLLOWING THE GENERAL GRANT OF EXECUTIVE POWER UNDER SEC. 1 WERE EITHER AN ENUMERATION AND EMPHASIS OF SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE, NOT ALL INCLUSIVE, OR WERE LIMITATIONS UPON THE GENERAL GRANT OF EXECUTIVE POWER.”


A. SCOPE OF POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (CON’T):2. MYERS V. US (272 US 52) (CON’T):

THE U.S. SC CITED WITH APPROVAL ALEXANDER HAMILTON’S (ONE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS OF USA) OPINION THAT “THE ENUMERATION (OF SPECIFIC POWERS) OUGHT THEREFORE TO BE CONSIDERED AS INTENDED MERELY TO SPECIFY THE PRINCIPAL ARTICLES IMPLIED IN THE DEFINITION OF POWER, LEAVING THE REST TO FLOW FROM THE GENERAL GRANT OF THAT POWER.”


A. SCOPE OF POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (CON’T):3. LACSON V. ROQUE (92 PHIL. 456) AND MONDANO V. SILVASOA (97 PHIL. 143):

THE FOREGOING VIEWS HAVE BEEN RECONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF A STRICTER INTERPRETATION OF EXECUTIVE POWER. IN THESE TWO CASES, FOR EXAMPLE, OUR SC HELD THAT THE PRESIDENT’S POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS COULD BE EXERCISED BY HIM ONLY “AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW” IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION.


A. SCOPE OF POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (CON’T):4. YOUNGSTOWN TUBE AND SHEET CO. V.

SAWYER (343 U.S. 579):IN THIS FAMOUS STEEL SEIZURE CASE IN THE U.S., PRESIDENT TRUMAN’S TAKEOVER OF THE STEEL MILLS TO CONTINUE THEIR OPERATIONS WHILE THE STEEL WORKERS WERE ON STRIKE WAS DECLARED ILLEGAL IN THE ABSENCE OF A SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY AUTHORITY. THE ARGUMENT OFFERED WAS THAT THE CLAUSE VESTING IN THE PRESIDENT THE EXECUTIVE POWER “CONSTITUTE A GRANT OF ALL EXECUTIVE POWER OF WHICH THE GOVERNMENT IS CAPABLE..”


A. SCOPE OF POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (CON’T):4. YOUNGSTOWN TUBE AND SHEET CO. V.

SAWYER (343 U.S. 579) (CON’T):THE U.S. SC, BY A VOTE OF 6 TO 3, DID NOT AGREE. “IF THAT BE TRUE,” JUSTICE BLACK COMMENTED, “IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHY OUR FOREFATHERS BOTHERED TO ADD SEVERAL SPECIFIC ITEMS, INCLUDING SOME TRIFLING ONES . . . I CANNOT ACCEPT THE VIEW THAT THIS CLAUSE IS A GRANT IN BULK OF ALL CONCEIVABLE EXECUTIVE POWER BUT REGARDS IT AS AN ALLOCATION TO THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE OF THE GENERIC POWERS THEREATER STATED.”


A. SCOPE OF POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (CON’T):5. MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS (177 SCRA 668):IN THIS CASE, THE SC DECLARED: “X X X WE HOLD THE VIEW THAT ALTHOUGH THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IMPOSES LIMITATIONS ON THE EXERCISE OF SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT, IT MAINTAINS INTACT WHAT IS TRADITIONALLY CONSIDERED AS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF “EXECUTIVE POWER.” COROLLARILY, THE POWERS OF THE PRESDIENT CANNOT BE SAID TO BE LIMITED ONLY TO THE SPECIFIC POWERS ENUMERATED IN THE CONSTITUTION. IN OTHER WORDS, EXECUTIVE POWER IS MORE THAN THE SUM OF SPECIFIC POWERS SO ENUMERATED.”NOTE: THIS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED THE LAST WORD ON THE MATTER, CONSIDERING THE STRONG DISSENTS REGISTERED IN THIS 8-7 DECISION.


A. SCOPE OF POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (CON’T):6. LAUREL V. GARCIA (187 SCRA 797):IN THIS SUBSEQUENT CASE, THE SC PROHIBITED THE SALE OF THE PROPERTIES OF THE PHILIPPINES AT ROPPONGI, JAPAN, ON THE GROUND, INTER ALIA, THAT THE

PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES HAD NO SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO SELL THEM. NOTE: THIS TIME THE VOTE WAS 9-6


A. SCOPE OF POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (CON’T):7. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF 1987 (EO NO. 292, JULY 25, 1987, EFFECTIVE NOV. 24, 1989 PER RA NO. 6682)POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (BOOK III, TITLE I):

a. POWER OF CONTROL (CHAPTER 1)b. ORDINANCE POWER (CHAPTER 2)

c. POWER OVER ALIENS (CHAPTER 3)d. POWERS OF EMINENT DOMAIN, ESCHEAT, LAND RESERVATION AND RECOVERY OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH (CHAPTER 4)e. POWER OF APPOINTMENT (CHAPTER 5)f. GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (CHAPTER 6)


A. SCOPE OF POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (CON’T):7. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF 1987 (EO NO. 292, JULY 25, 1987, EFFECTIVE NOV. 24, 1989 PER RA NO. 6682)POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (BOOK III, TITLE I) (CON’T):g. OTHER POWERS (CHAPTER 7):g.1) SEC. 19. SUCH OTHER POWERS AS ARE PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.g.2) SEC. 20. RESIDUAL POWERS – UNLESS CONGRESS PROVIDES OTHERWISE, THE PRESIDENT SHALL EXERCISE SUCH OTHER POWERS AND FUNCTIONS VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT WHICH ARE PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE LAWS AND WHICH ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY ENUMERATED ABOVE, OR WHICH ARE NOT DELEGATED BY THE PRESIDENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. (WRR)

□ THE POWERS OFTHE PRESIDENT

B. THE APPOINTING POWER. (*****)1. APPOINTMENT2. DISTINGUISH APPOINTMENT FROM

COMMISSION3. DISTINGUISH APPOINTMENT FROM

DESIGNATION4. DISTINGUISH PERMANENT FROM

TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT5. DISTINGUISH REGULAR FROM AD

INTERIM APPOINTMENT

6. IF THE POWER TO APPOINT BELONGS TO THE PRESIDENT, CAN CONGRESS INTERFERS WITH IT BY PRESCRIBING THE QUALIFICATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC OFFICE? IF THE PRESIDENT APPOINTS ONE WHO LACKS QUALIFICATION,

IS THIS ISSUE A POLITICAL QUESTION THAT CANNOT BE A SUBJECT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW?

□ THE POWERS OFTHE PRESIDENTANSWER TO NO. 6:SINCE THE APPOINMENT TO OFFICE IS AN

EXECUTIVE FUNCTION, THE CLEAR IMPLICATION IS THAT THE LEGISLATURE MAY NOT USURP SUCH FUNCTION. THE LEGISLATURE MAY CREATE AN OFFICE

AND PRESCRIBE THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PERSON WHO MAY HOLD THE OFFICE, BUT IT MAY NEITHER SPECIFY WHO SHALL BE APPOINTED TO SUCH NOR ACTUALLY APPOINT HIM.

IF THE PRESIDENT APPOINTS ONE WHO LACKS THE QUALIFICATIONS, IT IS NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION; HENCE, IT CAN BE THE SUBJECT OF A JUDICIAL REVIEW.


B. THE APPOINTING POWER.7. THE PRESIDENT IN A PHONE CALL

APPOINTED MEROLCO AS SECRETARY OF DECS. AFTER THE CALL, MEROLCO THROW OUT A LAVISH PARTY, WITH 500 GUESTS, AND SPEND P500,000.00. BEFORE FORMALLY ACCEPTING THE

APPOINTMENT, THE PRESIDENT APPOINTED AND ISSUED A COMMISION INSTEAD TO GSAS AS SECRETARY OF DECS.

QUESTIONS:a) CAN MEROLCO SUE THE

PRESIDENT FOR DAMAGES? b) IS THE APPOINTMENT OF GSAS

LEGAL? 8. WHAT ARE THE CATEGORIES OF

OFFICIALS WHO ARE SUBJECT TO THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT?

(*****)


C. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON THE APPOINTING POWER (SEC. 16, ART. VII):

(*****)

(1) “THE PRESIDENT SHALL NOMINATE AND, WITH THE CONSENT OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINMENTS, APPOINT THE HEADS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, AMBASSADORS, OTHER PUBLIC MINISTERS AND CONSULS, OR OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES FROM THE RANK OF COLONEL OR NAVAL CAPTAIN, AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION.



(*****)

(2) HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ALL OTHER

OFFICERS OF THE GOVERNMENT WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, AND THOSE WHOM HE MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO APPOINT.



(*****)

(3) THE CONGRESS MAY, BY LAW, VEST THE

APPOINTMENT OF OTHER OFFICERS LOWER IN RANK IN THE PRESIDENT ALONE, IN THE COURTS, OR IN THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, OR BOARDS.”


C. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON THE APPOINTING POWER (SEC. 16, ART. VII) *****“THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE THE

POWER TO MAKE APPOINTMENTS DURING RECESS OF THE CONGRESS, WHETHER VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY, BUT SUCH APPOINTMENTS SHALL BE EFFECTIVE ONLY UNTIL DISAPPROVED BY THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS OR UNTIL THE NEXT ADJOURNMENT OF THE CONGRESS.”

□ THE POWERS OFTHE PRESIDENTCATEGORIES OF OFFICIALS WHO ARE SUBJECT TO THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE

PRESIDENT:*****1. THE HEADS OF THE EXECUTIVE

DEPARTMENTS;2. AMBASSADORS, OTHER PUBLIC

MINISTERS AND CONSULS;3. OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES

FROM THE RANK OF COLONEL OR NAVAL CAPTAIN;

4. THOSE OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM BY THE CONSTITUTION;

□ THE POWERS OFTHE PRESIDENTCATEGORIES OF OFFICIAL WHO ARE SUBJEC TO

THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT (CON’T): *****

5. ALL OTHER OFFICERS OF THE GOVERNMENT WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR BY LAW; AND

6. THOSE WHOM HE MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO APPOINT;

7. OFFICERS LOWER IN RANK WHOSE APPOINTMENTS THE CONGRESS MAY BY LAW VEST IN THE PRESIDENT ALONE.


QUESTION: IS THE APPOINTMENT OF THE COMMISSIONER

OF THE BIR SUBJECT TO THE CONFIRMATION OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT?


D. SARMIENTO III V. MISON (156 SCRA 549 [Dec. 17, 1987]).PETITION FOR PROHIBITION (12-2 Vote)

(*****)1. PETITIONERS SARMIENTO III &

ARCILLA, TAXPAYERS AND MEMBERS OF IBP, CLAIMED THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF MISON AS COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS REQUIRES THE CONFIRMATION OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTION.

2. RESPONDENTS MISON & CARAGUE MAINTAINED THAT SUCH APPOINTMENT DOES NOT NEED THE CONFIRMATION OF THE CA SINCE CONFIRMATION IS REQUIRED ONLY FOR THE OFFICERS MENTIONED IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF SECTION 16, ARTICLE VII, TO WIT:

□ THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENTa. THE HEADS OF THE EXECUTIVE

DEPARTMENTS;b. AMBASSADORS, OTHER PUBLIC

MINISTERS AND CONSULS;c. OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES

FROM THE RANK OF COLONEL OR NAVAL CAPTAIN;

d. OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT IN THE CONSTITUTION.

NO CONFIRMATION IS REQUIRED FOR:a. ALL OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE

APPOINTMENTS ARE NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW (Second Sentence, Constitution);

b. THOSE WHOM THE PRESIDENT MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO APPOINT (Second Sentence, Constitution); AND

c. THOSE OTHER OFFICERS LOWER IN RANK WHOSE APPOINTMENT IS VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT ALONE (Third Sentence, Constitution).

□ THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT3. AMICUS CURIAE SENATOR NEPTALI

GONZALES ARGUED THAT THE PHRASE IN THE SECOND SENTENCE “HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT” IMPLIES THAT THE PRESIDENT SHALL “IN LIKE MANNER” APPOINT THE OFFICERS MENTIONED IN THE SECOND SENTENCE. IN OTHER WORDS, THE PRESIDENT SHALL APPOINT THE OFFICERS MENTIONED IN SAID SECOND SENTENCE IN THE SAME MANNER AS HE APPOINTS OFFICERS MENTIONED IN THE FIRST SENTENCE, THAT IS, BY NOMINATION AND WITH THE CONSENT (CONFIRMATION) OF THE CA.

4. MAJORITY OF THE COURT HELD THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS IS NOT SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION, BEING OF THE RANK OF THE BUREAU DIRECTOR, WHO WAS PURPOSELY DELETED FROM THE LISTING OF THOSE WHOSE APPOINTMENTS HAD TO BE APPROVED BY THE CA. AS POINTED OUT BY THE


COURT: “IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, HOWEVER, AS ALREADY POINTED OUT, THE CLEAR AND EXPRESSED INTENT OF ITS FRAMERS WAS TO EXCLUDE PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS FROM CONFIRMATION BY THE CA, EXCEPT APPOINTMENTS TO OFFICES EXPRESSLY MENTIONED IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF SECTION 16, ARTICLE VII.” *****

5. JUSTICE CRUZ DISSENTED: “THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT BUREAU DIRECTORS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO BE CONFIRMED UNDER THE FIRST SENTENCE OF SECTION 16, BUT THAT IS NOT THE PROVISION WE OUGHT TO INTERPRET. IT IS THE SECOND SENTENCE WE MUST UNDERSTAND FOR A PROPER RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE NOW BEFORE US. SIGNIFICANTLY, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A LONG DISCUSSION OF THE FIRST SENTENCE IN THE CONCOM, THERE WAS NONE …ON THE SECOND SENTENCE…

WE CAN THEREFORE SPECULATE ON THE CORRECT

□ THE POWERS OFTHE PRESIDENTINTERPRETATION OF THIS PROVISION IN

THE LIGHT OF THE FIRST AND THIRD SENTENCES OF SECTION 16 OR BY BY READING THIS SECTION IN ITS TOTALITY .”

“THE MAJORITY OPINION SAYS THAT THE SECOND SENTENCE IS THE EXCEPTION TO THE FIRST SENTENCE AND HOLDS THAT THE SETS OF OFFICERS SPECIFIED THEREIN MAY BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF THE CA. THIS INTERPRETATION IS PREGNANT WITH MISCHIEVOUS IF NOT ALSO RIDICULOUS RESULTS THAT PRESUMABLY WERE NOT ENVISIONED BY THE FRAMERS.”

“ONE MAY WONDER WHY IT WAS FELT NECESSARY TO INCLUDE THE SECOND SENTENCE AT ALL, CONSIDERING THE MAJORITY OPINION THAT THE ENUMERATION IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE OFFICERS SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION IS EXCLUSIVE ON


THE BASIS OF EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS. IF THAT BE SO, THE FIRST SENTENCE WOULD HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENT BY ITSELF TO CON- VEY THE IDEA THAT ALL OTHER APPOINTEES OF THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT NEED CONFIRMATION.”

“MY OWN READING IS THAT THE SECOND SENTENCE IS BUT A CONTINUATION OF THE IDEA EXPRESSED IN THE FIRST SENTENCE AND SIMPLY MENTIONS THE OTHER OFFICERS APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT WHO ARE ALSO SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION.”

□ THE POWERS OFTHE PRESIDENT“IN MY VIEW, THE ONLY OFFICERS

APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT WHO ARE NOT SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION BY THE CA ARE:

(1) THE MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY AND THE OMBUDSMAN AND HIS DEPUTIES, WHO ARE NOMINATED BY THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL;

(2) THE VICE-PRESIDENT WHEN HE IS APPOINTED TO THE CABINET; AND

(3) ‘OTHER OFFICERS LOWER IN RANK’, BUT ONLY WHEN THEIR APPOINTMENT IS VESTED BY LAW IN THE PRESIDENT ALONE.”

□

THE POWERS OFTHE PRESIDENT

E. QUESTION:MAY CONGRESS PASS A LAW ADDING TO THE

CONSITUTIONAL LIST OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS REQUIRE THE APPROVAL OR CONFIRMATION BY THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS?


F. WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE FUNCTION OF THE CA: (***)ALTHOUGH THE CA IS ASSEMBLED BY

CONGRESS AND CAN MEET ONLY WHEN CONGRESS IS IN SESSION AND, THEREFORE, CAN, TO THAT EXTENT, BE IMMOBILIZED WHEN CONGRESS DECIDES TO ADJOURN (Guevara v. Inocentes, 16 SCRA 379), THE CA IS A CREATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND NOT OF CONGRESS, AND IS NOT LEGISLATIVE BUT EXECUTIVE IN NATURE. AS THE SC SAID “ALTHOUGH ITS MEMBERSHIP IS CONFINED TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, SAID COMMISSION IS INDEPENDENT OF CONGRESS… IN FACT, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION ARE PURELY EXECUTIVE IN NATURE (Cunanan v. Tan, Jr., 5 SCRA 1).

SO WHEN THE CA CHECKS THE APPOINTMENTS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT, IT IS NOT STRICTLY A CASE OF THE LEGISLATIVE INTERFERRING WITH THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.


AD INTERIM VS. MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENT:SEC. PAR., SEC. 16, ART. VII – “THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO MAKE APPOINTMENTS DURING THE RECESS OF CONGRESS, WHETHER OR COMPULSORY, BUT SUCH APPOINTSMENT SHALL BE EFFECTIVE ONLY UNTIL DISAPPROVAL BY THE CA OR UNTIL THE NEXT ADJOURNMENT OF THE CONGRESS.”AD INTERIM OR RECESS APPOINTMENT – IS ONE MADE BY THE PRESIDENT WHEN CONGRESS IS NOT IN SESSION.


AD INTERIM VS. MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENT (CON’T):MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENT – IS ONE MADE ALMOST AT THE END OF THE TERM OF AN INCUMBENT PRESIDENT “TO FORESTALL THE RIGHTS AND PREROGATIVES OF HIS SUCCESSOR BY MAKING A PROSPECTIVE APPOINTMENT

TO FILL AN OFFICE, THE TERM OF WHICH IS NOT TO BEGIN UNTIL HIS OWN TERM AND POWER HAVE EXPIRED.” (SIGUIENTE VS. SEC. OF JUSTICE, GR NO. L-20370, NOV. 29, 1963)


AD INTERIM VS. MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENT (CON’T):AYTONA V. CASTILLO (4 SCRA 1) :FACTS: UPON ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE, PRES. MACAPAGAL ISSUED A0 NO. 2 RECALLING AND CANCELLING ALL AD-INTERIM APPOINTMENTS MADE BY PRES. GARCIA AFTER DEC. 13, 1961. AMONG THESE APPOINTEES WAS DOMINADOR V. AYTONA AS GOV OF CENTRAL BANK. ON JAN. 1, 1962, ANDRES V. CASTILLO WAS APPOINTED, AD INTERIM, AS GOV. OF CENTRAL BANK BY MACAPAGAL. HE IMMEDIATELY QUALIFIED. BOTH CASTILLO AND AYTONA DISCHARGED THEIR DUTIES UNTIL JAN. 3, 1962 WHEN AYTONA WAS


AD INTERIM VS. MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENT (CON’T):AYTONA V. CASTILLO (4 SCRA 1) :PREVENTED BY A CONTIGENT OF THE AFP UPON ALLEGED INSTRUCTION OF CASTILLO, AYTONA THEN FILED THIS ACTION CONTESTING THE RIGHT OF CASTILLO TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS OF GOV. OF CENTRAL BANK.HELD: THIS IS A CASE OF MIDNIGHT OF APPOINTMENT DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.


G. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT:

SECTION 14, ART. VII: “APPOINTMENTS EXTENDED BY AN ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL REMAIN EFFECTIVE UNLESS REVOKED BY THE ELECTED PRESIDENT WITHIN NINETY DAYS FROM HIS ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE.”

SECTION 15, ART. VII: “TWO MONTHS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND UP TO THE END OF HIS TERM, A PRESIDENT OR ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL NOT MAKE APPOINTMENTS EXCEPT TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS TO EXECUTIVE POSITIONS WHEN CONTINUED VACANCIES THEREIN WILL PREJUDICE PUBLIC SERVICE OR ENDANGER PUBLIC SAFETY.” (NOTE: READ THE CJ CORONA CASE - DE CASTRO V. JBC & PGMA, GR NO. 191002, MAR 7 & APR 20, 2010)



SECTION 15, ART. VII: “TWO MONTHS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND UP TO THE END OF HIS TERM, A PRESIDENT OR ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL NOT MAKE APPOINTMENTS EXCEPT TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS TO EXECUTIVE POSITIONS WHEN CONTINUED VACANCIES THEREIN WILL PREJUDICE PUBLIC SERVICE OR ENDANGER PUBLIC SAFETY.” (NOTE: READ THE AYTONA V. CASTILLO CASE [ 4 SCRA 1] AND CJ CORONA

CASE - DE CASTRO V. JBC & PGMA, GR NO. 191002, MAR 7 & APR 20, 2010)



SECTION 15, ART. VII:THE OBVIOUS PURPOSE OF THIS PROVISION IS

TO PREVENT THE USE, OR ABUSE, OF THE APPOINTING POWER FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENLISTING POLITICAL SUPPORT IN EXCHANGE FOR SOME APPOINTIVE OFFICE IN GOVT. THIS WILL ALSO PREVENT THE “MID-NIGHT APPOINTMENTS” THAT MAY OTHERWISE BE ISSUED BY AN OUTGOING PRESIDENT, AS HAPPENED IN THE CASE OF AYTONA V. CASTILLO (4 SCRA 1) WHERE THE FORMER WAS APPOINTED CB GOVERNOR BY GARCIA AFTER DEC. 13, 1961 AND THEN THE LATTER WAS APPOINTED TO THE SAME POSITION BY MACAPGAL ON JAN. 2, 1962. THE FORMER APPOINTMENT WAS RECALLED BY MACAPAGAL.


G. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT:SEC. 4 (1), ART. VIII, APPOINTMENT OF

MEMBERS OF SC: THE SUPREME COURT SHALL BE COMPOSED OF

A CHIEF JUSTICE AND FOURTEEN ASSOCIATE JUSTICES. IT MAY SIT EN BANC OR IN ITS DISCRETION, IN DIVISION OF THREE, FIVE, OR SEVEN MEMBERS. ANY VACANCY SHALL BE FILLED WITHIN NINETY (90) FROM THE OCCURRENCE THEREOF.”



SEC. 4 (1), ART. VIII, APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS OF SC:

QUESTION: SUPPOSE THE 90-DAY REQUIREMENT IN SEC. 4 (1), ART. VIII CONFLICTS WITH SEC. 15, ART. VII, PROHIBITING THE PRESIDENT FROM MAKING APPOINTMENTS DURING THE PERIOD OF 2 MONTHS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND UP TO THE END OF HIS TERM, IS THE INCUMBENT PRESIDENT BARRED FROM FILLING UP ANY VACANCY IN THE SUPREME COURT?



SEC. 4 (1), ART. VIII: APPOINTMENTS OF MEMBERS OF SC:

IN IN RE MATEO A. VALENZUELA AND PLACIDO B. VALLARTE (298 SCRA 408), THE SC HELD THAT DURING THE PERIOD COVERED BY SEC. 15, ART. VII, “THE PRESIDENT IS NEITHER REQUIRED TO MAKE

APPOINTMENTS TO THE COURTS NOR ALLOWED TO DO SO, AND SEC. 4(1) AND SEC. 9 OF ART. VIII SIMPLY MEAN THAT THE PRESIDENT IS REQUIRED TO FILL VACANCIES IN THE COURTS WITHIN THE TIME FRAMES PROVIDED


G. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION OF THE APPOINTING POWER:

SEC. 4 (1), ART. VIII: APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS OF SC:

THEREIN UNLESS PROHIBITED BY SEC. 15, OF ART. VII. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT THE PROHIBITION ON APPOINTMENTS COMES INTO EFFECT ONLY ONCE EVERY SIX YEARS.”


G. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION OF THE APPOINTING POWER:

SEC. 4 (1), ART. VIII: APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS OF SC:

IN THE DE CASTRO V. JBC & PGMA CASE, GR NO. 191002, MARCH 17, 2010 & APRIL 20, 2010 (THE CJ RENATO CORONA CASE), THE SC HELD THAT THE 2-MONTH RULE APPLIES ONLY TO APPOINTMENTS IN THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT BUT NOT TO THE MEMBERS OF THE SC WHICH THE PRESIDENT IS MANDATED TO FILL UP WITHIN 90 DAYS FROM OCCURRENCE OF ANY VACANCY.



SEC. 9, ART. VIII, APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE SC AND JUDGES OF THE LOWER COURTS:

THE MEMBERS OF THE SC AND JUDGES OF LOWER COURTS SHALL BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT FROM A LIST OF AT LEAST THREE NOMINEES PREPARED BY THE JBC FOR EVERY VACANCY. SUCH APPOINTMENTS NEED NO CONFIRMATION.

FOR THE LOWER COURTS, THE PRESIDENT SHALL ISSUE THE APPOINTMENTS WITHIN 90 DAYS FROM THE SUBMISSION OF THE LIST.


H. THE REMOVAL POWER. (*****)

QUESTIONS:

1. THE POWER TO APPOINT CARRIES WITH IT THE IMPLIED POWER TO REMOVE. IS THIS POWER TO REMOVE ABSOLUTE?

2. CAN AN OFFICER APPOINTED TO A 3-YEAR TERM BE LEGALLY REMOVED BY THE PRESIDENT EVEN BEFORE THE EXPIRY OF THE SAID TERM?


H. THE REMOVAL POWER.

QUESTIONS:

3. CAN AN OFFICER APPOINTED TO A POSITION WITHOUT A FIXED TERM BE REMOVED BY THE PRESDENT ANYTIME?

4. CAN AN OFFICER WHOSE OFFICE WAS GIVEN A P1.00 BUDGET COMPLAIN OF CONSTRUCTIVE TERMINATION?


H. THE REMOVAL POWER. (*****)

1. ALAJAR V. ALBA (100 Phil. 683)(VICE-MAYOR OF ROXAS CITY)

2. APARRI V. CA (127 SCRA 231)(GENERAL MANAGER OF NARRA)

AN OFFICER WHOSE OFFICE IS NOT FIXED BY LAW, HOLDS THE SAME AT THE PLEASURE OF THE APPOINTING POWER. WHEN HE IS REPLACED BY THE APPOINTING POWER OR HIS OFFICE ABOLISHED BY LAW, HE IS NOT CONSIDERED TERMINATED BUT THAT HIS TERM OF OFFICE HAS MERELY EXPIRED.


I. THE CONTROL POWER. (*****)CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, SECTION 17,

ARTICLE VII: “THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE CONTROL OF ALL THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, BUREAUS AND OFFICES. HE SHALL ENSURE THAT THE LAWS BE FAITHFULLY EXECUTED.”

1. THE POWER OF CONTROL2. THE POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION3. THE “TAKE CARE” CLAUSE


4. CONTROL (*****)– IS DEFINED AS “THE POWER OF AN OFFICER TO ALTER OR MODIFY OR NULLIFY OR SET ASIDE WHAT A SUBORDINATE OFFICER HAD DONE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AND TO SUBSTITUTE THE JUDGMENT OF THE FORMER FOR THAT OF THE LATTER (Montano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143).

5. SUPERVISION (*****)– MEANS “OVERSEEING OR THE POWER OR AUTHORITY OF

AN OFFICER TO SEE THAT SUBORDINATE OFFICERS PERFORM THEIR DUTIES (Ibid).

□ THE POWERS OFTHE PRESIDENT5.1 POWER OF SUPERVISION

SEC. 4, ART. X (LOCAL GOVT) – “THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHIL. SHAL L EXERCISE GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVT. PROVINCES WITH RESPECT TO COMPO-NENT CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES, AND CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES WITH RESPECT TO COMPONENT BA-RANGAYS SHALL ENSURE THAT THE ACTS OF THEIR COMPONENT UNITS ARE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THEIR

PRESCRIBED POWERS AND FUNCTIONS.

□ THE POWERS OFTHE PRESIDENT6. DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONTROL

AND SUPERVISION:*****

IN THE CASE OF DRILON V. LIM (235 SCRA 135), THE SC ELABORATED ON THE DISTINCTION THUS:

“AN OFFICER IN CONTROL LAYS DOWN THE RULES IN THE DOING OF AN ACT. IF THEY ARE NOT FOLLOWED, HE MAY, IN HIS DISCRETION, ORDER THE ACT UNDONE OR RE-DONE BY HIS SUBORDINATE OR HE MAY EVEN DECIDE TO DO IT HIMSELF. SUPERVISION DOES NOT COVER SUCH AUTHORITY. THE SUPERVISOR OR SUPERINTENDENT MERELY SEES TO IT THAT THE RULES ARE FOLLOWED, BUT HE HIMSELF DOES NOT LAY DOWN SUCH RULES, NOR DOES HE HAVE THE DISCRETION TO MODIFY OR REPLACE THEM.

□ THE POWERS OFTHE PRESIDENT6. DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONTROL

AND SUPERVISION:*****

IN THE CASE OF DRILON V. LIM (235 SCRA 135), THE SC ELABORATED ON THE DISTINCTION THUS (CONTINUED):

IF THE RULES ARE NOT OBSERVED, HE MAY ORDER THE WORK DONE OR RE-DONE BUT ONLY TO CONFORM TO THE PRESCRIBED RULES. HE MAY NOT PRESCRIBE HIS OWN MANNER FOR THE DOING OF THE ACT. HE HAS NO JUDGMENT ON THIS MATTER EXCEPT TO SEE TO IT THAT THE RULES ARE FOLLOWED.”

7. “TAKE CARE” CLAUSE - THE POWER TO INSURE THAT ALL LAWS ARE FAITHFULLY EXECUTED.

□ THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT7.1 THE “TAKE CARE” CLAUSETHE LAW THE PRESIDENT IS SUPPOSED TO

ENFORCE INCLUDES THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF, STATUTES, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATIONS, MUNICIPAL ORDINANCIES,

WAS WELL AS TREATIES ENTERED INTO BY OUR GOVERNMENT.

QUESTION:IS THE PRESIDENT EMPOWERED NOT TO

ENFORCE A LAW WHICH IN HIS BELIEF IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL?


J. THE MILITARY POWER (SECTION 18, ARTICLE VII). (*****)THIS SECTION BOLSTER THE PRINCIPLE

ANNOUNCED IN ARTICLE II, SECTION 3, THAT: “CIVILIAN AUTHORITY IS, AT ALL TIMES, SUPREME OVER THE MILITARY”. BY MAKING THE PRESIDENT THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF ALL THE ARMED FORCES, THE CONSTITUTION LESSENS THE DANGER OF A MILITARY TAKE-OVER OF THE GOVERNMENT IN VIOLATION OF ITS REPUBLICAN NATURE.

THE MILITARY POWER ENABLES THE PRESIDENT TO: (*****)

1. COMMAND ALL THE ARMED FORCES;2. SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; AND3. DECLARE MARTIAL LAW.

□ THE POWERS OFTHE PRESIDENT1. COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES:

THE “POWER OF THE SWORD” MAKES THE PRESIDENT THE MOST IMPORTANT FIGURE IN THE COUNTRY IN TIMES OF WAR OR OTHER SIMILAR EMRGENCY. HE CAN:

a. ORGANIZE COURT MARTIAL FOR THE DISCIPLINE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES VIOLATING MILITARY LAW;

RUFFY V. CHIEF OF STAFF (75 Phil. 875) – COURT MARTIAL IS AN AGENCY OF EXECUTIVE IN CHARACTER WHICH MAY BE CONVENED BY THE PRESIDENT INDEPENDENTLY OF

LEGISLATION AND BY VIRTUE OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTION AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. THESE ARE NOT JUDICIARY COURTS.

□ THE POWERS OFTHE PRESIDENTb. CREATE MILITARY COMMISSION FOR THE

PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRIMMINALS.KURODA V. JALANDONI (42 O.G.

4282) – THE SUPREME COURT, CITING THE EARLIER CASE OF YAMASHITA V. STYER (75 Phil.

563), WHICH UPHELD THE JURISDICTION OF MILITARY COMMISSION OVER WAR CRIMMINALS, DECLARED THAT THE PROMULGATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 68

ESTABLISHING WAR CRIMES OFFICE WAS “AN EXERCISE BY THE PRESIDENT OF HIS POWERS AS COMMANDIER-IN-CHIEF OF ALL OUR ARMED FORCES”.

AQUINO V. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 2 (63 SCRA 546, [1975]) – THE SUPREME COURT UPHELD THE POWER OF THE PRES. TO CREATE MILITARY TRIBUNALS AUTHORIZED TO

TRY NOT ONLY MILITARY PERSONNEL

BUT ALSO CIVILIANS EVEN IF AT THAT TIME CIVIL COURTS WERE OPEN AND FUNCTIONING, THUS, REJECTING THE “OPEN COURT” THEORY OBSERVED IN THE UNITED STATES.


OLAQUER V. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34 (150 SCRA 144, [MAY 22, 1987]). - IN THIS CASE, HOWEVER, THE AQUINO DECISION WAS

REVERSED AND IT WAS HELD IN PART:“DUE PROCESS OF LAW DEMANDS

THAT IN ALL CRIMMINAL PROSECUTIONS (WHERE THE ACCUSED STANDS TO LOSE EITHER HIS LIFE OR HIS LIBERTY), THE ACCUSED SHALL BE ENTITLED TO, AMONG OTHERS, A TRIAL. THE TRIAL

CONTEMPLATED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IN RELATION TO THE CHARTER AS A WHOLE, IS A TRIAL BY JUDICIAL PROCESS, NOT BY EXECUTIVE OR MILITARY PROCESS. A MILITARY COMMISSION OR

TRIBUNAL, BY WHATEVER NAME THEY ARE CALLED, ARE NOT COURTS WITHIN THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL SYSTEM”.

□ THE POWERS OFTHE PRESIDENTc. CALL OUT THE ARMED FORCES TO PREVENT

OR SUPRESS LAWLESS VIOLENCE, INVASION, OR REBELLION.

IBP V. ZAMORA (338 SCRA 81) - IBP QUESTIONED THE COMMAND OF PRES. ESTRADA DEPLOYING THE PHIL. MARINES TO JOIN THE PNP IN VISIBILITY PATROLS AROUND METRO MANILA FOR THE PURPOSE OF CRIME PREVENTION.

THE ORDER WAS OBVIOUSLY BASED ON THE DETER- IORATING PEACE AND ORDER IN THE METROPOLIS. THE IBP CONTENDED THAT THERE WAS NO EMERGENCY OR A STATE OF “LAWLESS VIOLENCE” TO WARRANT THE

CALLING OF THE ARMED FORCES, WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF MILITARIZING THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PREJUDICE OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES AND THE

SUPREMACY OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITY.□ THE POWERS OF

THE PRESIDENT

IBP V. ZAMORA (CONTINUATION) –THE SUPREME COURT

DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION, HOLDING

THAT INASMUCH AS THE IBP HAD NOT SHOWN THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING HIS COMMAND, IT WAS NOT INCLINED TO OVERRULE THE PRESIDENT’S DETER-

MINATION OF THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE CALL- ING OF THE MARINES.”


2. SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.*****

1935 CONSTITUTION BILL OF RIGHTS (SEC. 14, ART. III): “THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHALL NOT BE SUSPENDED EXCEPT IN CASES OF INVASION, INSURRECTION, OR REBELLION, WHEN THE PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT, IN ANY OF WHICH EVENTS THE SAME MAY BE SUSPENDED WHENEVER DURING SUCH PERIOD THE NECESSITY FOR SUCH SUSPENSION SHALL EXIST”.

1973 CONSTITUTION BILL OF RIGHTS (SEC. 15, ART.1V): “THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHALL NOT BE SUSPENDED EXCEPT IN CASES OF INVASION, INSURRECTION, REBELLION, OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF, WHEN PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT .

□ THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT1935 CONSTITUION, SEC. 10 (2), ART. VII: “IN

CASE OF INVASION, INSURRECTION, OR REBELLION, OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF, WHEN PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT, HE MAY SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS…”

1973 CONSTITUTION, SEC. 11, ART. VII: “IN CASE OF INVASION, INSURRECTION, OR REBELLION, OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF, WHEN PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT, HE MAY SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS…”

1987 CONSTITUTION, SEC. 18, ART. VII: “IN CASE OF INVASION, OR REBELLION, WHEN THE PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT, HE MAY, FOR A PERIOD OF NOT EXCEEDING 60 DAYS, SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF HABEAS CORPUS…”

□ THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENTQUESTION:WHAT IS THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS?


PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUSTHE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS A

PREROGATIVE WRIT OF LIBERTY EMPLOYED TO TEST THE VALIDITY OF A PERSON’S DETENTION. IF HE IS RESTRAINED OF HIS LIBERTY, HE OR SOMEONE ACTING ON HIS BEHALF MAY FILE A PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS TO SECURE HIS RELEASE.


PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUSTHE WRIT “IS DIRECTED TO THE PERSON

DETAINING ANOTHER, COMMANDING HIM TO PRODUCE THE BODY OF THE PRISONER AT A DESIGNATED TIME AND PLACE, WITH THE DAY AND CAUSE OF HIS CAPTION AND DETENTION, TO DO, TO SUBMIT TO, AND RECEIVE WHATEVER THE COURT OR JUDGE AWARDING THE WRIT SHALL CONSIDER IN HIS BEHALF. IT IS A HIGH PREROGATIVE COMMON LAW WRIT OF ANCIENT ORIGIN THE GREAT OBJECT OF WHICH IS THE LIBERATION OF THOSE WHO MAY BE IN PRISON WITHOUT SUFFICIENT CAUSE.” (MORAN, RULES OF COURT, VOL. II, 499).


1987 CONSTITUTION BILL OF RIGHTS (SEC. 15, ART. III): “THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHALL NOT BE SUSPENDED EXCEPT IN CASES OF INVASION OR REBELLION,

WHEN PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT. (SEC. 13, ART. III) “…THE RIGHT TO

BAIL SHALL NOT BE IMPAIRED EVEN WHEN THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS SUSPENDED…”

MONTENEGRO V. CASTANEDA (91 Phil. 882) – IN 1951, PRES. QUIRINO BASED HIS SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ON “SEDITION” AND

“IMMINENT DANGER OF INSURRECTION OR REBELLION”. IF HE HAD NOT ADDED THE LATTER GROUND, WHICH WAS LISTED IN THE 1935 CHARTER, THE SC WOULD HAVE INVALIDATED HIS PROCLAMATION.


BARCELON V. BAKER (5 Phil. 87) and MONTNENGRO V. CASTANEDA (91 Phil. 882) CASES, THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT THE DETERMINATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES OF THE EXISTENCE OF ANY OF THE

GROUNDS PRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION FOR THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHOULD BE CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS.

THE JUSTIFICATION WAS THAT THE PRESIDENT, WITH ALL THE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AVAILABLE TO HIM AS

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, WAS IN A BETTER POSTION THAN THE SUPREME COURT TO ASCERTAIN THE REAL STATE OF PEACE AND

ORDER IN THE COUNTRY.IN SHORT, IN THESE TWO CASES,

THE DETERMINATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE FACTUAL BASIS, WAS CONSI- DERED A POLITICAL QUESTION AND BEYOND THE PO-

WER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE JUDICIARY.

□ THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENTLANSANG V. GARCIA (42 SCRA 448) – THE

DOCTRINE IN THE BARCELON AND MONTENEGRO CASES WAS ABANDONED IN THE LANSANG CASE WHERE THE SUPREME COURT DECLARED THAT IT HAD THE POWER TO INQUIRE INTO THE FACTUAL BASIS OF THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BY PRES. MARCOS IN AUG. 1971 AND TO ANNUL THE SAME IF NO LEGAL GROUND COULD BE ESTABLISHED.

AFTER HEARINGS, HOWEVER, A UNANIMOUS COURT, AFTER SATISFYING ITSELF THAT THERE WAS ACTUALLY A MASSIVE AND SYSTEMATIC COMMUNIST-OIRIENTED CAMPAIGN TO OVERTHROW THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. BY FORCE, AS CLAIMED BY THE PRESIDENT, DECIDED TO UPHOLD THE SUS-

PENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

□ THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENTGARCIA-PADILLA V. ENRILE (121 SCRA

472)***** IN THIS CASE, HOWEVER, THE SUPREME

COURT REVERSED THE LANSANG DECISION AND REVIVED THE BAKER AND MONTENEGRO DOCTRINES, REITERATING THAT THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WAS A POLITICAL QUESTION TO BE RESOLVED SOLELY BY THE PRESIDENT.

1987 CONSTITUTION (PAR. 3, SEC. 18, ART. VII) – THIS PROVISION, HOWEVER, HAS ABROGATED THE GARCIA-PADILLA DOCTRINE AND EXPRESSLY CONSITUTIONLIZED THE LANSANG DOCTRINE, THUS NOW, “THE SUPREME COURT MAY REVIEW … THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE FACTUAL BASIS OF THE …SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS...”


3. DECLARE MARTIAL LAW.1935 CONSTITUTION (SEC. 10[2], ART. VII)

“. . . IN CASE OF INVASION, INSURRECTION, OR REBELLION, OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF, WHEN PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT, HE MAY . . . PLACE THE PHILIPPINES OR ANY PART THERE- OF UNDER MARTIAL LAW”.

1973 CONSTITUTION (SEC. 11, ART. VII) – SAME PROVISION.

1987 CONSTITUION (SEC. 18, ART. VII) “… IN CAS OF INVA-SION, REBELLION, WHEN THE PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT, HE MAY, FOR A PERIOD NOT EXCEEDING 60 DAYS, … PLACE THE PHILIPPINES OR ANY PART THEREOF UNDER MARTIAL LAW”. MORE THAN THIS, CONGRESSIONAL IN-TERVENTION AND APPROVAL IS ALREADY NECESSARY.

□ THE POWERS OFTHE PRESIDENTAQUINO V. ENRILE (59 SCRA 183). IN THIS

CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, BY UNANIMOUS VOTE OF ITS MEMBERS THEN, SUSTAINED THE PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW BY PRES. MARCOS ON SEPT. 23, 1973, BUT NO CLEAR CONSENSUS WAS REACHED ON THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE COMMON CONCLUSION. FOR THIS REASON, EACH OF THE JUSTICES SUBMITTED HIS OWN OPINION OF THE RATIONALE FOR SUCH PROCLAMATION.

MARTIAL LAW UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUION – CONFORMS WITH WILLOUGHBY THAT MARTIAL LAW IN ITS STRICT SENSE REFERS TO THAT LAW WHICH HAS APPLICATION WHEN THE MILITARY ARM DOES NOT SUPERSED CIVIL AUTHORITY BUT IS CALLED UPON TO AID IT IN THE EXECUTION OF ITS CIVIL FUNCTION.


4. LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITARY POWERS. (*****)

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION HAS PROVIDED FOR THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE ORIGINAL AUTHORITY OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

a. HE MAY CALL OUT THE ARMED FORCES WHEN IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO PREVENT OR SUPRESS LAWLESS VIOLENCE,

INVASION, OR REBELLION ONLY.b. THE GROUNDS FOR THE SUSPENSION

OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND THE PROCLMATION OF MARTIAL LAW ARE NOW LIMITED ONLY TO INVASION OR

REBELLION, WHEN PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT.


4. LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITARY POWERS: (*****)c. THE DURATION OF SUCH

SUSPENSION OR PROCLAMATION SHALL NOT EXCEED SIXTY (60) DAYS, FOLLOWING WHICH

IT SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY LIFTED.d. WITHIN FORTY EIGHT HOURS AFTER

SUCH SUSPENSION OR PROCLAMATION, THE PRESIDENT SHALL PERSONALLY OR IN WRITING REPORT HIS ACTION TO THE CONGRESS. IF NOT IN SESSION, CONGRESS MUST CONVENE WITHIN 24 HOURS

WITHOUT NEED OF A CALL.e. CONGRESS MAY THEN, BY A

MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL ITS MEMBERS VOTING JOINTLY, REVOKE HIS ACTION.


4. LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITARY POWERS: (*****)f. THE REVOCATION MAY NOT BE SET

ASIDE BY THE PRESIDENT.g. BY THE SAME VOTE AND IN THE

SAME MANNER, THE CONGRESS MAY, UPON INITIATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT, EXTEND HIS SUSPENSION OR PROCLAMATION FOR A PERIOD TO BE DETERMINED BY THE CONGRESS IF THE

INVASION OR REBELLION SHALL CONTINUE AND THE PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES THE EXTENSION.


4. LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITARY POWERS: (*****)

h. THE ACTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS SHALL BE SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY THE SUPREME COURT WHICH SHALL HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE

SUFFICIENCY OF THE FACTUAL BASIS OF SUCH ACTION. THIS MATTER IS NO LONGER CONSIDERED A POLITICAL QUESTION AND MAY BE RAISED IN AN APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING BY ANY CITIZEN. MOREVER, THE SUPREME COURT MUST DECIDE

THE CHALLENGE WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM THE TIME IT IS FILED.



i. MARTIAL LAW DOES NOT

AUTOMATICALLY SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OR THE

OPERATION OF THE CONSTITUTION. THE CIVIL COURTS AND THE LEGISLATIVE BODIES SHALL REMAIN OPEN. MILITARY COURTS AND AGENCIES ARE NOT CONFERRED JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIANS WHERE THE CIVIL COURTS ARE OPEN.



j. THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHALL APPLY ONLY TO PERSONS FACING CHARGES OF REBELLION OR OFFENSES INHERENT IN OR DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH INVASION.

k. ANY PERSON ARRESTED FOR SUCH OFFENSES MUST BE JUDICIALLY CHARGED THEREWITH WITHIN THREE (3) DAYS. OTHERWISE, HE SHALL BE RELEASED.

□ THE POWERS OFTHE PRESIDENT5. JURISPRUDENTIAL LEGACY OF

MARTIAL LAWWITH THE DECISION IN SANIDAD V. COMELEC

(73 SCRA 333 (OCT. 12, 1976), THE MAIN LINEAMENTS OF PHIL. MARTIAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE HAD BEEN DRAWN:

a) THE MARTIAL LAW PROCLAMATION OF 1972 WAS VALIDLY MADE ON THE BASIS OF AN EXISTING REBELLION;

b) THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW CARRIED WITH IT THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;

□ THE POWERS OFTHE PRESIDENT5. JURISPRUDENTIAL LEGACY OF

MARTIAL LAWc) THE MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR

COULD LEGISLATE ON ANY MATTER RELATED TO THE WELFARE OF THE NATION;

d) HE COULD CREATE MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND CONFER ON THEM JURISDICTION TO TRY CIVILIANS FOR CRIMES RELATED TO THE PURPOSE OF MARTIAL RULE;

e) IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY OTHER OPERATIVE CONSTITUENT BODY HE COULD EVEN PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.

□ THE POWERS OFTHE PRESIDENTALL OF THE ABOVE, MOREOVER, ARE

CONFIRMED BY THE BROAD GRANT OF POWER FOUND IN ARTICLE XVII, SEC 3(2), OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION WHICH WAS ITSELF RATIFIED IN A MOST UNIQUE MANNER. THE SUPREME COURT WAS TO ADD LATER THAT, UNDER MARTIAL LAW, CLAIMS OF DENIAL OF SPEEDY TRIAL ARE UNAVAILING (OCAMPO V. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 25, 109 SCRA 22, Nov. 6, 1981), AND THAT THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ALSO SUSPENDS THE RIGHT TO BAIL (BUSCAYNO V. MILITARY COMMISSION NOS. 1, 2, 6, and 25, 109 SCRA 273, Nov. 19, 1981).

□ THE POWERS OFTHE PRESIDENTON JAN. 17, 1981, ON THE EVE OF THE VISIT

OF POPE JOHN PAUL II TO THE PHILS, MARTIAL LAW WAS LIFTED BY PROC. NO. 2045. BUT NOT REALLY. IF THE HEART OF MARTIAL LAW IS THE CONCENTRATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS IN THE HANDS OF THE EXECUTIVE, THE EQUIVALENT OF MARTIAL LAW REMAINED AS PART OF NORMAL DAY TO DAY GOVERNMENT. THIS WAS THE EFFECT OF AMENDMENT NO. 6 OF 1976 WHICH GRANTED FULL LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE PRESIDENT (THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, A COMMENTARY, VOLUME II, FIRST EDITION, 1988, JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).

□ THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT6. THE NEW MARTIAL LAW DOCTRINEIT WAS UNDER THE SHADOW OF THIS

JURISPRUDENTIAL LEGACY OF THE MARCOS REGIME THAT THE 1986 CONCOM WENT ABOUT FORMULATING THE MARTIAL LAW DOCTRINE OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. IN SUM, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION: 1) NARROWED THE GROUNDS FOR THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, 2) LIMITED THE DISCRETION OF THE PRESIDENT AND PUT IT UNDER REVIEW POWERS OF CONGRESS AND OF THE SUPREME COURT, AND 3) REJECTED THE BULK OF MARTIAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE THAT HAD DEVELOP UNDER PRESIDENT MARCOS.


UNDER BOTH THE 1935 AND 1973 CONSTITUTIONS, THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS COULD BE SUSPENDED AND MARTIAL LAW COULD BE IMPOSED “IN CASE OF INVASION, INSURRECTION, OR REBELLION, OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF, WHEN THE PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT. THE 1987 CONSTITUTION HAS NARROWED THE GROUNDS TO “[ACTUAL] INVASION OR REBELLION, WHEN THE PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT.”

□ THE POWERS OFTHE PRESIDENTUNDER THE 1935 AND 1973 CONSTITUTION THE

PRESIDENT COULD SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE AND

IMPOSE MARTIAL LAW FOR AN INDEFINITE DURATION AND CONGRESS HAD NO POWER TO CURTAIL HIM OR REVIEW HIS DECISION. UNDER THE 1987 CONSITUTION, THE INITIAL SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE AND THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IS STILL FOR THE PRESIDENT TO DECIDE BUT THEY CAN ONLY BE “FOR A PERIOD NOT EXCEEDING SIXTY (60) DAYS.” (THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, A COMMENTARY, VOLUME II, FIRST EDITION, 1988, JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.


K. THE PARDONING POWER: (*****)1. DEFINITION OF TERMS:

a. PARDONb. COMMUNTATIONc. REPRIEVEd. PARDON VS. PAROLEe. PARDON VS. PAROLE VS.

PROBATIONf. PARDON VS. AMNESTY

2. KINDS OF PARDON:a. ABSOLUTE VS. CONDITIONALb. PLENARY VS. PARTIAL


K. THE PARDONING POWER. (*****)3. LIMITATIONS ON THE PARDONING

POWER:a. CAN PARDON BE GRANTED IN

CASES OF IMPEACHMENT?b. CAN PARDON BE GRANTED FOR

THE VIOLATION OF ANY ELECTION LAW?c. CAN PARDON BE GRANTED EVEN

BEFORE CONVICTION BY FINAL JUDGMENT?d. CAN PARDON BE EXTENDED TO

A PERSON CONVICTED OF LEGISLATIVE CONTEMPT.

e. CAN PARDON BE EFFECTIVE EVEN IF THE PARDONEE (CONVICTED PERSON) DOES NOT ACCEPT IT?


K. THE PARDONING POWER.

4. NATURE OF PARDON.

UNITED STATES V. WILSON, (7 Pet 150 [1833]) – C.J. MARSHALL SAID: “A PARDON IS AN ACT OF GRACE, PROCEEDING FROM THE POWER ENTRUSTED WITH THE EXECUTION OF THE LAWS, WHICH EXEMPTS THE INDIVIDUAL ON WHOM IT IS BESTOWED, FROM THE PUNISHMENT THE LAW INFLICTS FOR A CRIME HE HAS COMMITTED. IT IS THE PRIVATE, THOUGH OFFICIAL ACT OF THE EXECUTIVE MAGISTRATE, DELIVERED TO THE INDIVIDUAL FOR WHOSE BENEFIT IT IS INTENDED, AND NOT COMMUNICATED OFFICALLY TO THE COURT…



4. NATURE OF PARDON.

UNITED STATES V. WILSON, (7 Pet 150 [1833]) (CON’T):

A PARDON IS A DEED, TO THE VALIDITY OF WHICH DELIVERY IS ESSENTIAL, AND DELIVERY IS NOT COMPLETE WITHOUT ACCEPTANCE. IT MAY THEN BE REJECTED BY THE PERSON TO WHOM IT IS TENDERED; AND IF IT BE REJECTED, WE HAVE DISCOVERED NO POWER IN A COURT TO FORCE IT ON HIM”.


K. THE PARDONING POWER. (*****)5. EFFECTS OF PARDON. (*****)EX PARTE GARLAND (71 U.S. 333) – FACTS:

IN 1865, THE US CONGRESS PASSED A LAW THAT EFFECTIVELY BEBARRED FORMER MEMBERS OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT BY REQUIRING A LOYALTY OATH BE RECITED BY ANY FEDERAL COURT OFFICER AFFIRMING THAT THE OFFICER HAD NEVER SERVED IN THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT.

AUGUSTUS HILL GARLAND, AN ATTORNEY AND FORMER CONFEDERATE SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS, HAD PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED A PARDON FROM PRES. ANDREW JOHNSON. GARLAND PETITIONED THE US SUPREME COURT TO DECLARE THE ACT OF CONGRESS AS A BILL OF ATTAINDER AND AN


K. THE PARDONING POWER.5. EFFECTS OF PARDON.EX PARTE GARLAND (CON’T): EX POST

FACTO LAW WHICH UNFAIRLY PUNISHED HIM FOR THE CRIME HE HAD BEEN PARDONED FOR AND WAS THEREFORE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

DECISION: IN A 5-4 VOTE, THE SUPREME COURT RULED THAT THE LAW WAS INDEED A BILL OF ATTAINDER AND AN EX-POST FACTO LAW. THE COURT RULED THAT GARLAND WAS BEYOND THE REACH OF PUNISHMENT OF ANY KIND DUE TO HIS PRIOR PRESIDENTIAL PARDON. THE COURT ALSO STATED THAT COUNSELORS ARE OFFICERS OF THE COURT AND NOT OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT THEIR REMOVAL WAS AN EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER AND NOT LEGISLATIVE POWER. THE LAW WAS STRUCK DOWN, OPENING THE WAY FOR FORMER CONFEDERATE GOVERNEMNT OFFICIALS TO RETURN TO THE POSITIONS WITHIN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY.


K. THE PARDONING POWER.5. EFFECTS OF PARDON.EX PARTE GARLAND (CON’T): JUSTICE FILED

SAID – “A PARDON REACHES BOTH THE PUNISHMENT

PRESCRIBED FOR THE OFFENSE AND THE GUILT OF THE OFFENDER; AND WHEN THE PARDON IS FULL, IT RELEASES THE PUNISHMENT AND BLOTS OUT THE EXISTENCE OF GUILT, SO THAT IN THE EYE OF THE LAW, THE OFFENDER IS AS INNOCENT AS IF HE HAD NEVER COMMITTED THE OFFENSE . . . IT MAKES HIM, AS IT WERE, A NEW MAN, AND GIVES HIM A NEW CREDIT AND CAPACITY.”

GARLAND WAS THEREAFTER RE-ADMITTED AND RE-INSTATED TO HIS FORMER POSITION AS ATTORNEY AND COUSELOR OF THE (FEDERAL) COURT.


K. THE PARDONING POWER.5. EFFECTS OF PARDON.PELOBELLO V. PALATINO (72 Phil. 441 [1941]).

THE LEGAL EFFECT OF A PARDON IS TO RESTORE NOT ONLY THE OFFENDER’S LIBERTY BUT ALSO HIS CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. IN THIS CASE, A MAYOR’S ELECTION WAS CONTESTED ON THE GROUND THAT HE WAS DISQUALIFIED FROM PUBLIC OFFICE BECAUSE OF A PRIOR CONVICTION AND IMPRISONMENT. IT WAS SHOWN, HOWEVER, THAT BEFORE ASSUMING OFFICE FOLLOWING HIS ELECTION HE WAS GRANTED AN ABSOLUTE PARDON BY PRES. QUEZON. AS A RESULT, THE SUPREME COURT HELD, HIS FORMER DISABILITIES HAD BEEN REMOVED, AND HE WAS THEREFORE ELIGIBLE FOR THE PUBLIC OFFICE IN QUESTION.



5. EFFECTS OF PARDON.

NOTA BENE: THE EX PARTE GARLAND DOCTRINE WAS APPLIED IN PELOBELLO V. PALATINO CASE, CRISTOBAL V. LABRADOR CASE (71 PHIL. 34 [1940]), AND SEVERAL OTHER CASES.

.□ THE POWERS OF

THE PRESIDENTK. THE PARDONING POWER.


MONSANTO V. FACTORAN (170 SCRA 190) (*****)– THE EX PARTE GARLAND DOCTRINE, AS APPLIED IN THE PELOBELLO AND CRISTOBAL CASES, HOWEVER, WAS MODIFIED IN THIS CASE WHERE A WOMAN CONVICTED OF ESTAFA THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS WAS GRANTED AN ABSOLUTE PARDON AND THEREAFTER CLAIMED SHE WAS ENTITLED AS A CONSEQUENCE TO REINSTATEMENT AS ASSISTANT CITY TREASURER WHICH THE COURT DID NOT AGREE.


K. THE PARDONING POWER.5. EFFECTS OF PARDON.

MONSANTO V. FACTORAN: C.J. FERNAN SAID: “PARDON CANNOT MASK THE ACTS CONSTITUTING THE CRIME. THESE ARE HISTORICAL FACTS WHICH, DESPITE A PUBLIC MANIFESTATION OF MERCY AND FORGIVENESS IMPLICIT IN PARDON, ORDINARY PRUDENT MEN WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN THEIR SUBSEQUENT DEALINGS WITH THE ACTOR.”

“PARDON GRANTED AFTER CONVICTION FREES THE INDIVIDUAL FROM ALL THE PENALTIES AND LEGAL DISABILITIES AND RESTORES HIM TO ALL HIS CIVIL RIGHTS. BUT UNLESS EXPRESSLY GROUNDED ON THE




MONSANTO V. FACTORAN: ERSON’S INNOCENCE (WHICH IS RARE), IT

CANNOT BRING BACK LOST REPUTATION FOR HONESTY, INTEGRITY AND FAIR DEALING. THIS MUST BE CONSTANTLY KEPT IN MIND LEST WE LOSE TRACK OF THE TRUE CHARACTER AND PURPOSE OF THE PRIVILEGE.




MONSANTO V. FACTORAN:THUS, NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXPANSIVE

AND EFFUSIVE LANGUAGE OF THE GARLAND CASE, WE ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH THE COMMONLY-HELD OPINION THAT PARDON DOES NOT IPSO FACTO RESTORE A CONVICTED FELON TO PUBLIC OFFICE NECESSARILY RELINQUISHED OR FORFEITED BY REASON OF THE CONVICTION ALTHOUGH SUCH PARDON UNDOUBTEDLY RESTORES HIS ELIGIBILITY FOR APPOINTMENT TO THAT OFFICE.”

□ AUTHORITIES

1. PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, 2002 EDITION, ISAGANI A. CRUZ, RETIRED ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT.

2. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VOLUME II, FIRST EDITION, 1988, JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.

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