Continuity and Collaboration?

Pacting and the Consolidation of Democracy:

The Spanish and Argentine Democracies Compared.

Bonnie N. Field

1

Department of Political Science

University of California, Santa Barbara

Santa Barbara, California 93106-9420

Email: fieldbonnie@hotmail.com

Prepared for delivery at the 2001 Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Washington,

DC, September 6-8, 2001.

2

A “wave” of transitions from authoritarian rule toward democracy began in Portugal in 1974

and was quickly followed by transitions in Greece and Spain. Somewhat later, regime change spread

to several countries in Latin America, Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe.1 Many of these countries have

successfully consolidated their democracies; however, they have consolidated different types of

democracy. Furthermore, these countries did not follow a unitary path from authoritarian rule. Rather,

they experienced various modes of transition. In this paper, I will assess the impact of the mode of

transition on the type of democracy established. More concretely, I will assess the degree to which

pacted transitions produce democracies in which there is a greater degree of elite continuity and

political party collaboration than in democracies produced by non-pacted transitions.

I will conduct a comparative study of the democracies established following the Spanish

(1976/77) pacted transition and the Argentine (1982/83) non-pacted transition to assess these potential

effects of pacted transitions. This study encompasses the first twelve years of democratic government

in both countries: Spain (1977-1989) and Argentina (1983-1995). I will use two indicators to measure

the degree of elite continuity: (a) the continuity of legislators, particularly deputies in the lower house,

and (b) the continuity of party candidates for deputy. These measures will allow me to assess the

continuity of those that exercise political power and to capture variation by political party. To measure

the degree of political party collaboration, I will use three indicators: (a) the success of government

bills, (b) the margin of support for the legislation passed in the respective legislatures, and (c) the use

of executive decree power. I will focus on the degree of political party collaboration in the legislative

arena as this will allow me to concentrate on actual policy decisions.

1 See Huntington (1991) for a categorization of transitions to democracy into three historic “waves.”

3

I will demonstrate that Spain has a significantly higher level of elite continuity than Argentina.

I argue that political party rules and regulations potentially hinder renovation in the Spanish case and

facilitate it in the Argentine case, and that the party rules in Spain may be partially the product of the

pacted nature of the transition to democracy. With respect to the degree of political party

collaboration, I find evidence of elite collaboration during the early years of democracy, and a decline

in collaboration over time in both cases. However, I will argue that political party collaboration in

Spain went beyond minimum-winning coalitions whereas in Argentina it did not. I will also suggest

that an elite norm or habit may offer a potential link between the pacted transition and continued

collaboration in Spain. Overall, the results suggest that pacted transitions may indeed produce

democracies in which there is a greater degree of elite continuity and political party collaboration than

in democracies produced by non-pacted transitions.

Transitions to Democracy and Modes of Transition:

Following the transitions from authoritarian rule beginning in the mid-1970s, a tremendous

amount of scholarly interest was focused on the causes of authoritarian decay and democratic

transition.2 Although interest in the causes of democratic transition has not dissipated, there has been a

shift toward trying to understand the processes, dangers and facilitating conditions of democratic

consolidation.3 Within this second body of literature, modes of transition have become an object of

scholarly interest. The literature on modes of transition has focused primarily on two issues. It

2A place to begin a review of the transitions literature on Southern Europe and Latin America is Pridham, ed. (1984); O'Donnell, et al, eds. (1986); Przeworski (1991). 3For a discussion of some of the issues involved in democratic consolidation, see Ethier, ed., (1990); Mainwaring, et al, eds. (1992); Gunther, et al, eds. (1995); Tulchin and Romero, eds., (1995).

4

examines how the mode of transition affects the likely collapse or survival of democracy, and how the

mode of transition affects the type of democracy institutionalized.

Terry Karl suggests that scholars studying democracy in Latin America should concentrate on:

(1) clarifying how the mode of regime transition (itself conditioned by

the breakdown of authoritarian rule) sets the context within which

strategic interactions can take place; (2) examining how these

interactions, in turn, help to determine whether political democracy will

emerge and survive; and (3) analyzing what type of democracy will

eventually be institutionalized.4

As the historical institutionalist literature argues, decisions made early often create institutional

rigidities and patterns of behavior that are difficult to change. Therefore, it is particularly important to

study the mode of transition, as it may have a profound impact on the democracy that emerges and on

who benefits.

Though the literature on modes of transition has primarily focused on how the mode of

transition affects the likely collapse or survival of democracy,5 some scholars have developed

hypotheses about how the mode of transition affects the type of democracy institutionalized.6 Karl and

Schmitter argue that the mode of transition may determine which type of democracy will emerge.7

4 Karl (1990), p.8. 5 Karl (1990), Hagopian (1990), Karl and Schmitter (1991), Munch and Skalnik Leff (1997), Hartlyn (1998). 6 Karl and Schmitter (1991), Karl (1990), Munch and Skalnik Leff (1997). 7 Karl and Schmitter (1991), p.269.

5

Karl develops four modes of transition: imposition, pact, reform, and revolution. She argues that these

modes of transition will produce, respectively, conservative, corporatist, and competitive democracies,

and a non-democratic category of one-party dominance.8

Pacting and Pacted Transitions:

In my research, I have focused on assessing the effects of pacted transitions. Pacted transitions

are those in which political elites from the authoritarian regime and the democratic opposition engage

in multilateral negotiation and compromise and agree to a transition.9 A review of the literature on

transitions reveals that pacted transitions produce contradictory outcomes. On the one hand, many

theorists argue that pacted transitions offer the most viable path to democracy. On the other, many

hypothesize that the long term effects of pacting will be negative.

O'Donnell and Schmitter argue that though pacts move the polity toward democracy by

undemocratic means, "where they are a feature of the transition, they are desirable - that is, they

enhance the probability that the process will lead to a viable political democracy."10 Along these same

lines, Karl and Schmitter argue that durable democracies tend to be produced in those cases with

“foundational pacts, that is, explicit (though not always public) agreements between contending elites,

which define the rules of governance on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of those

involved.”11 The cases generally cited to reinforce the positive role that pacts can play in the

8 Karl (1990), p.15. 9 Karl and Schmitter define a pacted transition as one in which “elites agree upon a multilateral compromise among themselves.” (1991), p.275. 10 O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), p.38-9. 11 Karl and Schmitter (1991), p.281.

6

installation and durability of democracy are Venezuela (1958), Colombia (1957), Spain (1976), and

Uruguay (1984).12

However, the literature is fraught with references to the problems pacts cause. Karl argues that

pacts may tend to demobilize new social forces, circumscribe the participation of certain actors in the

future, and "hinder the prospects for the future democratic self-transformation of the society, economy,

or polity, thereby producing a sort of ‘frozen’ democracy."13 Karl also argues that “pacted transitions

are likely to produce corporatist or consociational democracies in which party competition is regulated

to varying degrees determined, in part, by the nature of the foundational bargain.” She hypothesizes

that the party system in this type of democracy would be multi-party and collusive.14

Similarly, Przeworski argues that "the danger inherent in such substantive pacts is that they will

become cartels of incumbents against contenders, cartels that restrict competition, bar access, and

distribute the benefits of political power among the insiders. Democracy would then turn into a private

project of leaders of some political parties and corporatist associations, an oligopoly in which leaders

of some organizations collude to prevent outsiders from entering."15 Furthermore, he argues that pacts

made by the political elites include an agreement “to fix basic policy orientations,” that is, to remove

certain political issues from competitive party politics.16 Finally, Frances Hagopian argues that

“comparative evidence supports the contention that democratization is often slowed or stopped in

12 O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Karl (1990), Karl and Schmitter (1991). 13 Karl (1987), p.88. 14 Karl (1990), p.15. 15 Przeworski (1991), pp.90-91. It should be noted that Przeworski distinguishes between institutional pacts and substantive pacts. However, given that pacts are often not made public, it is difficult to assess the degree to which a pact is institutional or substantive. 16 Przeworski (1991), p.90. He defines political pacts as “agreements among leaders of political parties (or proto-parties) to (1) divide government offices among themselves independent of elections results, (2) fix basic policy orientations, and (3) exclude and, if need be, repress outsiders.”

7

regimes spawned by political pacts negotiated with traditional and authoritarian elites.”17 The cases

generally cited to emphasize the negative products of political pacts are Venezuela (1958), Colombia

(1957), and Brazil (1974).18

From the above, it appears that pacted transitions, relative to other modes of transition, may

produce democracies in which there is 1) a greater degree of elite continuity versus renovation, 2) a

greater degree of political party collaboration versus competition, 3) a greater degree of corporatist

state-society relations, and 4) lower levels of societal participation in the political system. Institutional

channels or patterns of behavior may develop between elites in government and civil society that

facilitate elite bargaining at the expense of elite renovation, political competition, mass inclusion, and

mobilization. In the following pages, I will assess the first two dependent variables, namely whether

pacted transitions produce democracies in which there is a greater degree of elite continuity and

political party collaboration.19

Referring back to the hypothesized contradictory results of pacting, it is not difficult to see how

extreme elite continuity and political party collaboration could jeopardize democracy as theorists have

argued. Uncertainty, competition and access are fundamental elements of political democracy.20

However, theorists also argue that a degree of elite continuity is a positive sign of the

institutionalization of democracy,21 and that the moderation of political conflict facilitates the

17 Hagopian (1996), p.22. 18 Karl (1987), Hagopian (1990), Hagopian (1996). 19 Please see Field (2001) for an exploration of political party collaboration in Spain between 1977 and 2000. Also see Encarnación (2001) for an exploration of the effects of pacting on the labor movement and mobilization in Spain. 20 Przeworski (1991), Dahl (1971). 21 The continuity of legislators, for example, has been used as a measure of parliamentary institutionalization. Polsby (1968).

8

consolidation of democracy.22 Therefore, it is important not to draw conclusions prematurely. We

need to discover if pacting produces the effects hypothesized, and, if so, determine whether they have

positively or negatively influenced the democracy.

Case Selection:

The comparison of Spain and Argentina will allow us to vary the mode of transition. The

transition in Spain was negotiated by a reformist sector of the authoritarian regime, led by President

Adolfo Suárez, with hardline sectors of the authoritarian regime (both military and “political”) and

with representatives of the democratic opposition.23 Neither the Suárez government nor the democratic

opposition had the ability to entirely impose the terms of the transition. However, the Suárez

government did not lose control of the process at any time.

Argentine transition actors did not engage in pacting during the transition. The transition was

not planned by the military regime, and the democratic opposition did not force a transition to

democracy.24 Rather, the transition resulted from the weakening of the military regime following the

Malvinas/Falkland Islands war. The debilitated military regime failed in its attempt to pact with the

democratic opposition. Burton, Gunther and Higley corroborate this point arguing that Argentina had

not experienced an “elite settlement”, similar to a pact.25

22 Valenzuela (1992), p.82. 23 Amongst which stand out Felipe González of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español and Santiago Carrillo of the Partido Comunista de España. 24 Furthermore, “no single social actor was strong enough to impose its will.” Ducantenzeiler (1990), p. 243. 25 Burton, Gunther and Higley (1992), p.325.

9

In addition to varying the mode of transition, a comparison of Spain and Argentina controls for

potentially significant variables. First, the democratic opposition was not able to overthrow the

authoritarian regime in either case. By controlling for this factor, we minimize the possibility that any

variation in political party collaboration could be explained by the relative power of democratic

opposition actors. If there is indeed a difference in the type of democracy established in Spain and

Argentina, it would more likely be due to the existence, or not, of a pact, rather than to the strength of

the democratic opposition. Second, both countries share important features of their electoral laws,

most importantly the d’Hondt method of proportional representation, closed-party electoral lists, and

no term limits. This will be important in the analysis of elite continuity as all of these factors may

influence the ability of political party elites to control the degree of continuity. Third, no political

party enjoyed an absolute majority in their respective legislatures immediately following the

transitions. This will be crucial to our understanding of the level of political party collaboration, as a

degree of compromise across political parties was necessary to pass legislation in both cases. Forth,

these initial periods were followed by the turnover of executive power to the main opposition party.

The new governing parties enjoyed a stronger position in the legislature than did their predecessors.

This will allow us to evaluate the extent to which the dynamics of collaboration or competition were

dependent on the distribution of power across the various political forces.

I have chosen Spain as the prototype of a pacted transition. If pacting produces the effects

hypothesized, it should do so in the Spanish case. If pacting does not produce these effects, this would

strongly refute the above hypotheses, despite being a single case of pacting. Furthermore, as the

paradigmatic case of a pacted transition, Spain has not been discussed as a case in which the negative

effects of pacting have materialized. It, therefore, provides the ideal case through which to explore

10

these effects. We must first determine what effects, if any, the mode of transition had on the dynamics

of the new democracy, and, subsequently, determine what it was about the Spanish pacted transition

that enabled it to pact its way to democracy without, apparently, jeopardizing the development of that

democracy.26

I. Pacting and Elite Continuity:

In order to assess the degree of elite continuity, I will focus on the continuity of legislators,

particularly deputies in the lower houses, and the continuity of party candidates for deputy. If pacted

transitions indeed produce democracies in which there is a greater degree of elite continuity, continuity

should be higher in Spain than in Argentina.

Deputy Continuity:

Although both countries have bicameral legislatures, a comparison of the levels of continuity in

the lower houses is more interesting politically and more justifiable methodologically. First, the lower

houses enjoy a similar level of authority. The two chambers of the Argentine Congress, the Chamber

of Deputies and the Senate, have relatively equal powers. 27 However, the powers of the two chambers

of the Spanish Parliament, the Cortes, are not equal. The Spanish lower house, the Congress of

Deputies, is far more powerful than the Senate. The Spanish Constitution of 1978 gave the Congress

the sole power to elect the prime minister and remove the prime minister from office, as well as the

26 In a recent study, Encarnación (2001) found that the hypothesized negative effects of pacting on the labor movement did not occur in Spain. 27 Particularly important for this study is that both houses must sanction a bill in order for it to become law.

11

power to over-ride vetoes or amendments placed on legislation by the Senate.28 As the Spanish

Congress is clearly the more powerful chamber of the Cortes, the level of continuity is more politically

significant. Second, the Spanish and Argentine electoral laws with regard to the election of deputies

are very similar, which allows us to control for the potential effects of these features of the electoral

laws. There are no term limits for deputies in either case.29

In the literature on legislative careers in Spain and Argentina, one commonality stands out: the

high level of deputy renovation in both cases.30 Nevertheless, there are significant differences between

the two countries. Below, I analyze the Spanish parliamentary elections of 1977, 1979, 1982, 1986,

and 1989, and the Argentine Chamber elections held in 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, and 1995.

It is clear from the results in Tables 1 and 2 that the degree of continuity in the Spanish case is much

higher than in the Argentine case.

Table 1: Deputy Continuity, Congress of Deputies, Spain, 1977-1989

28 If the Senate vetoes a bill passed by the Congress, the Congress will debate the Senate veto, and then the initial text of the bill approved by the Congress will be submitted for a vote. The Senate veto will be lifted with the favorable vote of the absolute majority of the members of the Congress. If the initial text does not receive an absolute majority, another vote will be taken two months from the time of the Senate veto. At this time, the veto will be lifted with a simple majority of the vote. If not, the veto will stand. Senate amendments are debated and submitted to a vote in the Congress. Those that receive a simple majority of the vote are incorporated into the text. (1978 Constitution, Art. 90. Congressional Rules.) 29 Both countries elect their lower houses on the basis of the d’Hondt method of proportional representation and both have a 3% minimum threshold at the district level. Furthermore, both countries adopted a system of closed-party lists. In Spain, the Congress of Deputies has 350 members directly elected from 50 multi-member districts and two single-member districts. Ceuta and Melilla, Spanish territories in northern Africa, elect only one deputy each. The electoral laws also stipulate that each province is guaranteed a minimum of two deputies (this does not include Ceuta and Melilla). Deputies serve four-year terms (or until parliamentary elections are called), and are all renewed at the same time. (Ley para Reforma Política 1/1977, Real Decreto-Ley Sobre Normas Electorales 20/1977, Art. 68-9 of the 1978 Constitution, and the Régimen Electoral General Ley Orgánica 5/1985. This law was later modified by Leyes Orgánicas 1/1987 and 8/1991.)

In Argentina, the Chamber of Deputies has 257 deputies (254 prior to 1991) directly elected from 24 multi-member districts. Similar to the Spanish case, the Argentine electoral laws provide for minimum levels of representation, namely that no district will have fewer than five deputies, and that no district will have fewer deputies than it had during the previous democratic period (1973-76). Deputies serve four-year terms, and half of the Chamber is renewed every two years. It should be noted that all 254 deputies were elected in 1983, half of which served two-year terms and the other half if which served full four-year terms. Jones (1997).

12

Election Year Proportion of Deputies Reelected Total Number of Deputies

1977 - 350

1979 .55 350

1982 .40 350

1986 .57 350

1989 .62 350

Average Reelection .54

Source: Alda Fernández and López Nieto (1993), p.248.

The average percentage of Spanish deputies reelected to the Congress of Deputies between 1979 and

1989 was 54%.31 In the Argentine case, this average decreases to 20%. Spain’s deputy continuity rate

is 34 percentage points higher than Argentina’s.

30 On Spain: Morán (1989), Alda Fernández and López Nieto (1993), and López Nieto (1997). On Argentina: Saiegh (1997), Jones (1997). 31 It should also be noted that this measure only takes into consideration legislative experience during the democratic period. There were several deputies, in the Spanish case, that had been members, procuradores, of the authoritarian legislature, Las Cortes Españolas.

13

Table 2: Deputy Continuity, Chamber of Deputies, Argentina, 1983-199532

Election Year Proportion of Deputies Reelected Total Number of Deputies

1983 - 254

1985 .30 127

1987 .24 127

1989 .21 127

1991 .18 130

1993 .15 127

1995 .15 130

Average Reelection .20

Source: Elaborated by the author based on deputy lists provided by the Chamber of Deputies, Argentina.

The higher continuity rate in the Spanish Congress holds true regardless of which election we

examine. For example, Spain experienced the lowest degree of deputy continuity in 1982 (40%) when

the entire party system realigned. This election saw the dramatic electoral defeat of the governing

Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD). Electoral support for the UCD declined more than 28

percentage points. This decline resulted not only in the turn over of government to the opposition

Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), but also in the rise of the Alianza Popular (AP) as the

largest opposition party. If we compare this to the highest Argentine deputy continuity rate in 1985

(30%), we still find that the Spanish continuity rate is 10 points higher than the Argentine rate.33

32 The Argentine data include deputies elect that held a seat in the previous legislative period regardless of whether or not they were in office at the close of the prior legislative term. Though this only affects the calculations in two elections, 1989 and 1991, the inclusion of only those deputies that were sitting at the close of the prior legislative term would only slightly reduce the level of reelection. 33 This election did not coincide with a presidential election, but rather confirmed the relative popularity of the governing Unión Cívica Radical (UCR)

14

This pattern remains even when we take out the consecutive nature of the reelection measure

and determine the number of terms that each deputy served.

Table 3: Terms in Office, Deputies, Spain (1977-1989) and Argentina (1983-1995)34

1 Term 2 Terms 3 Terms 4 Terms 35Entire Period 36N=

Spain 558 277 81 46 46 1539

Argentina 706 119 21 1 4 1011

Source: Elaborated by the author based on deputy lists provided by the Chamber of Deputies, Argentina, and the Congress

of Deputies, Spain.

Of all of the deputies who held a seat during this period of time, 558 or 36.3% of the Spanish

deputies served only one term while the percentage rises to 69.8% of the Argentine deputies.

Furthermore, 46 Spanish deputies held their seat throughout the entire period whereas this number

drops to just four of the Argentine deputies.

What accounts for the different levels of elite continuity? I will discuss a few of the hypotheses

that have been used to account for renovation in the respective countries, and explore whether they can

explain of the difference between Spain and Argentina. I will discuss party splits and defections,

34 Terms may be partial as the analysis includes all deputies elect and substitutes. These figures only include deputies prior to the 1989 elections in Spain, and prior to the 1995 elections in Argentina. 35 In Argentina, those that were deputies during the entire period could have been deputies during four terms (1983/85, 1985/89, 1989/93, 1993/97) or three (1983/87, 1987/91, 1991/95).

15

deputy career paths, electoral volatility, and internal party rules and regulations as explanations of the

variation in deputy continuity.37 In this section, I will focus on the first three explanations, and address

the final one after evaluating the degree of candidate continuity.

Party splits and defections, deputy career paths, electoral volatility do not convincingly explain

the difference in continuity levels for the two countries being discussed. Cross-nationally, the above

measure captures party splits and defections. For example, the Frente Renovador (FR), a break-off

faction of the Argentine Partido Justicialista (PJ), presented a separate list of candidates for deputy in

1985, and the 11 deputies elected from the FR list are included in the above results and counted as

repeating if they had previously attained a seat on a PJ list.38 There may be legislators that defect to

minor parties, and therefore reduce their chances of reelection. This likely occurs in both cases.

However, Spain has been more affected by splits and defections particularly with regard to the UCD,

AP and the Partido Comunista de España (PCE).

Deputy career paths may explain a slight degree of the difference in deputy continuity. Though

very little work has been done on the career paths of deputies in either country, we can shed some light

on this question. Deputies that abandon their chamber careers to occupy positions in the national

government may be comparatively significant. Mark P. Jones found that four of President Menem’s

eight ministers had previously been Chamber deputies.39 At least at the ministerial level, this factor

does not operate in the Spanish system given that deputies can be members of parliament and ministers

36 Spain: includes deputies elect (1400) and substitutes (139). I found that there were 11 substitutes in the 1977/79 legislative term, 42 during 1979/82, 42 during 1982/86, and 44 during the 1986/89 term. Argentina: includes deputies elect (892) and substitutes (119). 37 López Nieto (1997); Jones (1997); Saiegh (1997). 38 The PJ is also known as the Peronist Party. 39 As of January 1995. Jones (1997), p.277.

16

at the same time.40 Therefore, this factor may account for a small portion of the lower continuity rate

in Argentine. It remains unclear the degree to which deputies leave to occupy other positions in the

national executive.

However, more Spanish deputies abandon their chamber to later occupy seats in the Senate

than in Argentina. María Luz Morán found that 51 Spanish deputies (1977/79, 1979/82, 1982/86) later

occupied positions in the national Senate (1979/82, 1982/86, 1986/89).41 This represents

approximately 4.5% of the deputies during that period. On the other hand, I found that Argentine

deputies (1983-1995) abandoned the chamber to later occupy seats in the Senate (prior to 1998) at a

rate of 2.9%. This is despite the fact that the Argentine Senate is significantly more powerful than its

Spanish counterpart.

Do deputies disproportionately abandon the chamber to hold political office at the regional

level? Both countries have decentralized systems of government, which may attract national deputies

either to hold positions in the regional executive or in the regional legislature. Spain has 17

autonomous communities that also function as parliamentary systems with unicameral legislatures that,

in turn, elect the “president” of their regional governments. Argentina has 23 provinces that directly

elect regional legislators and a governor.42 I found that 17 Spanish deputies (1977-89) later became

presidents of autonomous communities.43 This represents 1.10% of all deputies. Similarly, I found

40 Art. 70, Constitution of 1978. In fact, 40% of the ministers during the Constituent legislature (1977/79) were also deputies. In the Socialist governments between 1982 and 1993, 70% of the ministers were deputies. López Nieto (1997), p.197. 41 Morán (1989), p.84. 42 22 before 1990 when Tierra del Fuego became a province. 43 This includes deputies that served at any point prior to the 1989 parliamentary elections. Calculated by the author based on data provided by the governments of the autonomous communities.

17

that 1.09%, or 11, of the Argentine deputies (1983-95) were later elected governor.44 Therefore, it is

unlikely that the draw of regional office can explain the difference between the two cases.

Electoral volatility can account for a large degree of within country variation in reelection rates

in both cases, but to what extent can it explain the difference in continuity rates? Let us first examine

the election results for the main parties in Spain and Argentina.

Table 4: % of Vote by Election, Congress of Deputies, Spain

1977 1979 1982 1986 1989

UCD 34.5 35.0 6.5 - -

PSOE 29.2 30.5 48.3 44.3 39.9

PCE/IU 9.4 10.7 4.0 4.4 9.1

AP/PP45 8.1 6.0 26.5 26.1 26.0

PDC/CIU 2.8 2.7 3.7 5.1 5.1

PNV 1.6 1.5 1.9 1.5 1.2

Others 14.4 13.7 9.1 18.5 18.7

UCD (Unión de Centro Democrático); PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español); PCE/IU (Partido Comunista de

España/Izquierda Unida); AP/PP (Alianza Popular/Partido Popular); PDC/CIU (Pacte Democràtic per

Catalunya/Convergència i Unió); PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco).

44 This includes deputies that served at any point prior to the 1995 Chamber elections. This also includes two deputies that were not immediately elected to the office of governor: Eduardo Duhalde was a Chamber deputy between 1987 and 1989, vice-president between 1989 and 1991, and then governor of Buenos Aires beginning in 1995. Ruben Marin was governor of La Pampa from 1983 to 1987, Chamber deputy from 1987 to 1989, national senator from 1989 to 1991, and then governor of La Pampa again beginning in 1991. Calculated by the author based on data provided by the Dirección Nacional Electoral, Ministerio de Interior.

18

Source: Elaborated by the author based on data provided by the Junta Electoral Central. Ministerio del Interior, Spain.

Argentine electoral results, in Table 5, are presented in their most volatile light. That is, no Peronists

that presented a separate list from the official PJ list are included in the electoral results.46 Table 5

shows that the PJ sharply declined in the 1985 election, but later recovered and saw its support remain

relatively constant during the rest of the period.47 We also observe the steady decline of the UCR from

a high of 48% in 1983 to 21.7% in 1995. These results illustrate that Argentina has experienced

electoral volatility, but this electoral volatility does not compare to the 1982 virtual disappearance of

the UCD and the dramatic rise of AP in Spain.48

Table 5: % of Vote by Election, Chamber of Deputies, Argentina

1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995

UCR49 48.0 43.6 37.2 28.8 29.0 30.2 21.7

PJ50 38.5 24.5 41.5 44.8 40.2 42.5 43.0

Others 13.5 31.9 21.3 26.4 30.8 27.3 35.3

UCR (Unión Cívica Radical); PJ (Partido Justicialista).

Source: Molinelli, et al, (1999), pp.268-73.

45 In 1979, Alianza Popular presented candidates in coalition as Coalición Democrática; in 1986, as Coalición Popular. In 1989, Alianza Popular was renamed Partido Popular 46 Only official party lists and coalitions are included. 47 However, this sharp decline was largely the result of a faction of the PJ presenting their own list of candidates and not the result of the electorate transferring their votes from Peronists to another political formation. In fact, most analysts will include both lists in their calculations for the PJ. 48 It should be noted that the decline of the UCR has clearly transformed Argentine politics. 49 Includes the UCR-MPC alliance which attained 2 seats in 1985.

19

A comparison of the formal levels of electoral volatility, using the Pedersen index, confirms the

higher level of electoral volatility in Spain.51 The average volatility index for elections to the Spanish

Congress of Deputies during this period is 17 whereas the average for Argentine Chamber elections

declines to 13.52 The 4 point difference clearly demonstrates the higher level of electoral volatility in

the Spanish case. If we were to predict the level of continuity solely on the basis of electoral volatility,

i.e. the greater degree of electoral volatility, the lower level of continuity, we would predict that Spain

would have a lower degree of continuity than Argentina. This is not the case.

In order to better control for the effects of electoral volatility on deputy continuity, I have

developed the following deputy continuity index (DCI). The index is calculated by multiplying the

proportion of deputies reelected by the electoral volatility index expressed as a proportion. The values

for this index vary between 0 and 1. Zero represents maximum renovation and 1 represents maximum

continuity. For real world cases of reelection and electoral volatility, the index produces non-extreme

values.53

Deputy Continuity Index: DCI=r*v

50 1985 presented candidates as PJ and in coalition as the Frente Justicialista de Libertad; 1989 presented candidates in coalition as Frente Justicialista Popular. The Frente Renovador, that presented a separate list of candidates in 1985, is not included. 51 The Pedersen index of electoral volatility “measures the net change in the seat (or vote) shares of all parties from one election to the next. The index is derived by adding the net change in percentage of seats (or votes) gained or lost by each party from one election to the next, then dividing by two. An index of 15, for example, means that some parties experienced an aggregate gain of 15 percent of the seats from one election to the next while others lost a total of 15 percent.” Mainwaring and Scully (1995), p.6. 52 Spanish volatility index was calculated using vote shares. Anduiza and Méndez (1997), p.280. Volatility indexes for Argentina were made available by Kenneth M. Roberts and Erik Wibbels, University of New Mexico. Also see Roberts and Wibbels (1999). 53 A hypothetical case of extreme renovation would be produced in a case where only 10% of deputies are reelected in an election in which the volatility index is 1. This case would yield a DCI index value of .001. On the other hand, an extreme

20

r=proportion of deputies reelected

v=electoral volatility index (votes), Pedersen Index, expressed as a proportion

renovation 0<DCI>1 continuity

Table 6: Deputy Continuity Index, Congress of Deputies, Spain, 1979-1989

r v DCI

1977 - - -

1979 0.55 0.07 0.04

1982 0.40 0.43 0.17

1986 0.57 0.12 0.07

1989 0.62 0.06 0.04

1979-1989 0.54 0.17 0.09

Source: Calculated by the author using reelection data published by Alda Fernández and López Nieto (1993), p.248, and

volatility indexes published by Anduiza and Méndez (1997), p.280.

Table 7: Deputy Continuity Index, Chamber of Deputies, Argentina, 1985-1995

r v DCI

1983 - - -

1985 0.30 0.09 0.03

continuity value would be produced in a situation in which 100% of deputies are reelected despite an electoral volatility level of 99. This case would yield a DCI index value of .99.

21

1987 0.24 0.12 0.03

1989 0.21 0.13 0.03

1991 0.18 0.14 0.03

1993 0.15 0.08 0.01

1995 0.15 0.24 0.03

1985-1995 0.20 0.13 0.03

Source: Calculated by the author using reelection data elaborated by the author, and volatility indexes made available by

Kenneth M. Roberts and Erik Wibbels, University of New Mexico.

Tables 6 and 7 demonstrate that the deputy continuity index for Spain (.09) is three times as

high as the Argentine value (.03). Therefore, electoral volatility clearly cannot account for the cross-

national variation. We should note that the deputy continuity index in the Argentine case has remained

extremely constant throughout the period studied. Though reelection has been consistently low, it

appears that variation in reelection rates in Argentina has been due to electoral volatility. Also, the

1982 election in Spain ironically produced the highest level of continuity according to this index. This

means that despite the dramatic realignment of the party system and the collapse of the governing

UCD, a surprising number of deputies managed to hold on to their seats either as candidates for the

party lists on which they were elected in 1979 or for a new party.

Overall, it does not appear that the above factors can account for a large degree of the cross-

national difference in continuity rates. Next, I will assess the degree to which political parties

influence the level of elite continuity. I will provide an empirical analysis of the continuity of

candidates for deputy in both cases to determine whether the degree of continuity in Spain remains

higher than in Argentina. I will then explore whether political parties themselves influence the level of

22

continuity, particularly whether internal political party rules and regulations facilitate or hinder

continuity. I will also explore whether, in the Spanish case, the pacted nature of the transition to

democracy influenced the content of party rules and regulations.

Candidate Continuity:

A measure of candidate continuity will permit us to assess the roll of political parties more

directly. As pacting is an elite activity, we want to assess the degree to which the party elites influence

the degree of continuity, and eliminate, to the degree possible, the effects of voters.

The electoral laws in both countries stipulate the use of closed-party lists for elections to the

lower house, which means that the political parties control which candidates appear on the election

ballot and the order in which they appear. The voter cannot designate whether her vote goes for a

particular candidate, alter the order of the list or cross out any candidates. The voter must vote for the

entire list as presented by the party. Closed-list systems give parties the greatest degree of control over

candidates and, in turn, encourage party discipline.54 For our purposes, closed-lists allow parties a

great deal of influence over the level of deputy and candidate continuity.55

54 Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), pp.421-29. 55 For each election studied below, the candidates are presented by electoral district, and then within each electoral district by political party or electoral coalition. Each political party presents their candidates and alternates in the order in which the seats will be distributed. I have only included those candidates on the list that equal the number of seats available in that district, i.e. alternates are not included. For the parties analyzed, I included the party-list itself or any list presented by a formal electoral coalition in which the party under study took part. Independents that are included on the party-list are also included in the analysis.

23

This analysis was conducted by political party, and, at each point in time, I included the two

main political parties.56 During the period studied, both countries produced party systems in which

two parties dominated. The 1977 parliamentary elections in Spain produced two main political parties,

the UCD and the PSOE. In the 1977 and 1979 elections, these two parties captured an average of 82%

of the seats in Congress. Following the 1982 elections, the two largest political parties changed with

the AP replacing the UCD. However, the combined Congressional representation of the PSOE and AP

increased. In the 1982 and 1986 elections, they captured 85% of the seats. In Argentina, the two

largest parties were the Partido Justicialista (PJ) and the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR). These two

parties attained a combined maximum of 94.5% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and a

minimum of 74.6%.57

Below, I present the proportion of candidates re-nominated.58 In addition to this measure, I

have developed an index that controls for the electoral success of the political parties under analysis.

Less successful political parties will likely have lower levels of continuity due to the greater difficulty

of election. Controlling for this factor will allow us to compare political parties more accurately. The

index is calculated by subtracting the proportion of seats the party attained in the previous election

from the proportion of candidates for deputy re-nominated for the election under scrutiny.

56 In order to accurately capture the degree of continuity or renovation, the two largest parties were determined by looking at the two largest parties (% of seats) in the previous election, i.e. for the 1982 parliamentary election average in Spain, I included the two largest parties from the 1979 parliamentary elections. 57 Molinelli, et al. (1999), p.268-75. 58 There is not a directly comparable measure of candidate continuity in both cases. All Spanish deputies are elected when parliamentary elections are called. However, Argentine deputies are elected for a four-year term, and half of the Chamber is renewed every two years (Except in 1983 when the entire Chamber was elected, half of the Chamber served for 2 years and the other half for 4 years). This means that if a candidate is not elected on the list presented in 1985, he can be placed on the list again in 1987, and again in 1989. Therefore, we cannot simply compare candidate lists that are four years apart because we would miss those that reappear in between. I have, therefore, compared the proportion of Spanish candidates on the list under scrutiny that were also candidates in the previous election to the proportion of Argentine candidates that

24

Candidate Continuity Index: CCI = R-p

R = proportion of candidates re-nominated on list (r/St)

r = number of candidates on list under scrutiny that were also candidates in the previous

election (in either of the previous two elections in Argentina).

St = seats available in election under scrutiny

p = party strength in last election; = ps/St-1

ps = party list seats attained in previous election

St-1= seats available in previous election

Values for this index vary between (renovation) –1 and 1 (continuity). An index of 0 would effectively

mean that the parties are re-nominating successful candidates, positive numbers mean that they are re-

nominating even previously unsuccessful candidates, and negative numbers mean that they are not re-

nominating some successful candidates.

renovation –1<CCI>1 continuity

Table 8: Candidate Continuity, 1977-1989, Two Largest Parties,59 Congress of Deputies, Spain

(Proportion of Candidates Re-nominated in the Following Election)

R p CCI

were candidates in either of the previous two elections. Though this measure is not directly comparable, it represents a more difficult test of whether pacting produces democracies in which there is a greater degree of elite continuity. 59 1979 (UCD and PSOE), 1982 (UCD and PSOE), 1986 (PSOE and AP), 1989 (PSOE and PP).

25

Average 1979 0.33 0.40 -0.08

Average 1982 0.26 0.41 -0.16

Average 1986 0.31 0.44 -0.13

Average 1989 0.32 0.41 -0.10

Average 1979-1989 0.30 0.42 -0.12

Source: Elaborated by the author based on party-lists published in the Boletín Oficial del Estado.60

Several conclusions can be drawn from the results of our analysis of candidates for deputy.

First, Tables 8 and 9 show that the principal Spanish parties re-nominate almost twice as many

candidates as the principal Argentine parties, 30% versus 16%. This continues the pattern of higher

levels of elite continuity in the Spanish case. Second, the CCI index shows that previously successful

candidates are not consistently re-nominated in either case, though this is more accentuated in the

Argentine case. Looking at the CCI, the main Spanish parties renew 12% of successful candidates,

whereas the Argentine ones renew 26% of successful candidates.

Table 9: Candidate Continuity, 1983-1995, Two Largest Parties, Chamber of Deputies,

Argentina

(Proportion of Candidates Re-nominated in Either of the Following Two Elections)

60 Candidate lists are published in the government bulletin, Boletín Oficial del Estado. 15 June 1977 Elections: Candidate lists were published 20 May 1977, and corrections were published May 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, and June 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, and 20. 1 March 1979 Elections: Candidate lists and corrections were reproduced in Esteban and Lopez-Guerra (1979). 28 October 1982 Elections: Candidate lists were published 2 October 1982, and corrections were published October 9, 14, 16, 27 and 28. 22 June 1986 Elections: Candidate lists were published 21 May 1986, and corrections were published May 27, 28, 29, 30, and June 3, 6, 14, 20 and 21. 29 October 1989 Elections: Candidate lists were published 30 September 1989, and corrections were published October 7, 14, 21, 28.

26

R* p CCI

Average 1985 0.25 0.47 -0.22

Average 1987 0.19 0.40 -0.21

Average 1989 0.16 0.44 -0.28

Average 1991 0.13 0.42 -0.29

Average 1993 0.16 0.40 -0.24

Average 1995 0.08 0.41 -0.33

Average 1985-1995 0.16 0.42 -0.26

Source: Elaborated by the author based on party-lists collected from the Departamento de

Estadísticas, Dirección Nacional Electoral, Ministerio del Interior, Argentina

Moreover, continuity in Spain is under-stated in these results. This measure does not take into

account individuals that left one of the main parties to become a candidate for another political party.

For example, the AP absorbed several candidates that had previously appeared on UCD candidate lists.

I found that, in 1982, AP incorporated 15 candidates that had been candidates for the UCD in 1979,

and in 1986 incorporated 13 candidates from the 1982 UCD lists. Though candidates in Argentina

may defect from one political party to join another, they are unlikely to switch from the PJ to the UCR

or vice versa given the strong personal and historical connection that many of these deputies have to

their party.61 Therefore, the gap between the two cases is probably even larger than the above results

indicate.

61 Jones (2000), p.17.

27

The higher level of candidate continuity in Spain is further illustrated if we break down the

results by political party. As can be seen in Table 10, all of the Spanish parties studied had higher

levels of continuity than the Argentine parties. The Spanish AP/PP had the highest level of candidate

continuity, followed by the PSOE and UCD, and then by the Argentine parties.

Table 10: Candidate Continuity Index by Political Party

renovation –1<CCI>1 continuity

Party Dates R CCI

AP/PP 1977-1989 .13 -0.04

PSOE 1977-1989 .38 -0.07

UCD 1977-1982 .25 -0.22

UCR 1983-1995 .17 -0.23

PJ 1983-1995 .15 -0.30

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Continuity and the Role of Political Parties. Internal Rules and Regulations:

Can party rules and regulations explain, at least partially, the variation in continuity rates?

Despite the fact that the electoral laws in both countries stipulate the use of closed party-lists for the

election of deputies, this does not determine the means by which the parties will choose those

candidates. Therefore, we must determine how the parties themselves choose their candidates for

deputy. The different levels of continuity may, in fact, be the result of internal party rules and

regulations that are voluntarily adopted by the political parties themselves. I will argue that the party

28

rules and regulations established by the PJ and the UCR in Argentina facilitate renovation to a greater

extent than do those of the Spanish parties. I will also explore the possibility that the pacted nature of

the transition in Spain conditioned the internal rules and regulations adopted by the Spanish parties,

particularly the main party of the left, the PSOE. Though I will not be able to thoroughly develop the

argument here, I will demonstrate that this hypothesis merits further research.

In Argentina, the party rules and regulations established by the PJ and the UCR facilitate

renovation through the use of party primaries and the representation of minority factions. Party

primaries may be used to determine the candidates when the political party cannot agree on a common

list, either because there is disagreement between the provincial and national party organizations or

because the provincial party organization cannot agree on a single list.62 Furthermore, sitting UCR

deputies, competing in internal primaries, must attain 2/3 of the vote in these internal primaries in

order to be, again, presented on the party list.63 Finally, the Argentine parties incorporate the

representation of minority party factions for both party offices and candidacies for public office.64 In

internal elections, both the PJ and the UCR provide for the representation of minority party factions

that attain 25% of the vote. These rules clearly facilitate renovation.

The internal party regulations established by the Spanish political parties, on the other hand, do

not appear to facilitate renovation to the same extent. During the transition in Spain, neither of the

main political parties established a system of primaries to choose their candidates. Rank-and-file party

62 Jones (1997), pp.270-5. 63 Art. 31. Unión Cívica Radical. 1985, 1989, 1993 and 1997. Carta Orgánica Nacional. The list on which the candidate appears must receive 2/3 of the vote in the primary. If the list does not receive the required 2/3, then the sitting deputy is replaced by the next person on the list. I thank Mark P. Jones for his clarification of this matter. 64 Art. 31. UCR. Carta Orgánica. Art. 44. Partido Justicialista. Carta Orgánica Nacional. Aprobada según las modificaciones introducidas en el Congreso Nacional Partidario, realizado el 20 de Septiembre de 1991.

29

members did not determine candidates for public office at any point during the period studied.

Furthermore, no formal hurdles were placed on the reelection of sitting deputies.

A comparison of candidate continuity by political party demonstrates that the initial difference

in continuity levels is largely due to the higher levels of candidate continuity in the PSOE.

Table 11: Candidate Continuity Index by Party, Second and Third Democratic Elections

renovation –1<CCI>1 continuity

Second Election Third Election

PSOE -0.01 -0.03

UCD -0.15 -0.29

UCR -0.19 -0.28

PJ -0.26 -0.13

Source: Elaborated by the author based on lists published in the B.O.E.

The PSOE registered, by far, the highest levels of candidate continuity for the second and third

democratic elections. It is, therefore, crucial to understand its internal functioning. In the following

paragraphs, I will focus more specifically on the PSOE.

Within the PSOE, candidate lists were ultimately determined by the top party elites at the

national level. Party statutes from this period state that the party hierarchies at both the local and

regional levels develop preliminary candidate lists. These lists then require the approval of the

national level party organization, the Federal Committee. If there is a disagreement between the

30

national and regional party organizations, the final decision, at least formally, is left to the Federal

Committee. This was the case for the candidate lists developed for the elections between 1979 and

1996. There were no party primaries to determine candidates for office during this period.65 It was

only in 1998 that the PSOE, and only the PSOE, decided to use primaries to select some candidates,

i.e. the heads of the candidate lists, and as part of the party’s strategy to renew itself.66

Furthermore, the dominant party elites were relatively insulated from internal challengers

during the early period of party institutionalization. Insulation declined somewhat after 1984. The

PSOE statutes explicitly stated that the party would not tolerate ‘organized tendencies,’67 which

Gillespie argues were understood as “factions with independent structures and the ambition to take

control of the party.”68 This remains true today. However, beginning in 1984, the party explicitly

began to permit, regulate, and provide for the representation of ‘currents of opinion’ within the party.69

Most importantly for our analysis, the party regulations provided for their active participation in party

decisions. The party decided to elect their executive bodies on the basis of a majority vote. However,

non-executive bodies, such as Convention Delegates, and Provincial, Regional and Federal

Committees would be elected in a way that facilitated the representation of these ‘currents.’ A

minority that obtained at least 20% of the votes would attain 25% of the positions up for election, and,

65 Estatutos del Partido Socialista Obrero Español. Passed in the 28th through the 34th Party Conventions between May 1979 and June 1997. PSOE internal party documents: “Procedure for the Elaboration of Lists of Candidates for Legislative Elections” used for the 1986, 1989, 1993, and 1996 elections 66 “Regulations for the Selection of Candidates for Public Office,” Approved by the PSOE Federal Committee in March 1998 and modified in July 1998, and used for the 2000 elections. However, the future of these primaries is unclear as they slipped out of control when put into practice to determine the party candidate for prime minister. Josep Borrell defeated the party hierarchy candidate, Joaquín Almunia, though Borrell later stepped down to be replaced by the loser of the party primary - Almunia. In turn, Almunia, in the parliamentary elections held on March 12, 2000, led the party to its worst electoral result since 1979. 67 “tendencias organizadas.” Art. 3, Estatutos del Partido Socialista Obrero Español. 27th (1976) through 34th Party Convention (1997). 68 Gillespie (1995), p.47. 69 “corrientes de opinion.” Art. 3, Estatutos del Partido Socialista Obrero Español. 30th Party Convention (1984).

31

if two minorities achieved 20% of the vote, then each would obtain 20% of the positions.70 The

Federal Committee, mentioned above, was ultimately responsible for the approval of candidate lists.

The data on PSOE candidate continuity support the argument that the concentration of final

decision making power at the national level and the insulation of party elites from internal challengers

produced the highest levels of continuity.

Table 12: Candidate Continuity Index, PSOE, 1977-1989

renovation –1<CCI>1 continuity

R CCI

1979 0.33 -0.01

1982 0.32 -0.03

1986 0.44 -0.14

1989 0.43 -0.09

Source: Elaborated by the author based on lists published in the B.O.E.

The 1979 and 1982 candidate lists, when these two conditions were met, produced CCI values of -.01

and -.03 respectively. Continuity decreased to -.14 in 1986, and -.09 in 1989.

The PSOE party rules and regulations clearly facilitate a greater degree of elite control than the

rules and regulations for the Argentine parties. This does not determine, however, why the dominant

70 It should also be mentioned that, beginning in 1988, the party began to officially require a minimum representation of women, 25%, within the party. The statutes also state that they will attempt “to maintain this quota, as a minimum, in the

32

party elites would be concerned with continuity and not renovation. It should be noted that the PSOE

party leadership, led by Felipe González, took control of the party prior to the first democratic

elections, and was therefore concerned with maintaining control of the party – protecting their

positions and strategies from internal challengers. The fact that ultimate control over candidate lists

resided with the national party elites, and the fact that minority factions were not formally represented

provided a degree of insulation and control that was not available to the Argentine parties. In

Argentina, the party rules provided more room for internal challengers to affect outcomes.

It cannot be discarded that the greater degree of control exercised by the PSOE hierarchy,

determined by its own party statutes, may be partially due to the mode of transition to democracy.

After more than forty years of authoritarian rule, the Spanish political parties were poorly organized

and not deeply rooted in Spanish society. The democratic opposition in Spain was not able to impose

the transition on its own terms. The Suárez government negotiated and exacted political compromises

from the leaders of the democratic opposition parties. Those compromises were not equally accepted

by all of the members of those parties. It is possible that the democratic opposition parties,

consciously or not, were conditioned by circumstances to establish a greater degree of control over

their political parties. This was necessary to enforce the terms of the compromises they made. As

Stepan argues, “party pacts by their very nature have two indispensable requirements: first, leaders

with the organizational and ideological capacity to negotiate a grand coalition among themselves;

second, the allegiance of their political followers to the terms of the pact.”71 The party elite, in order to

maintain their positions and strategies, had to protect themselves from those in their party that

disagreed. The pacted nature of the transition may have encouraged elite control within the PSOE,

elaboration of the lists of candidates the party presents for legislative, regional and local elections.” Art. 9, k. Estatutos del Partido Socialista Obrero Español. 31st Party Convention (1988).

33

which in turn allowed the party leadership to maintain a higher level of continuity during the initial

phase of democracy. Therefore, the rules that political parties adopt during the transition, and why,

merit further research.

II. Pacting and Political Party Collaboration:

In addition to producing a greater degree of elite continuity, scholars also hypothesize that

pacted transitions produce democracies in which there is a greater degree of political party

collaboration. In this section, I will use three indicators to assess the degree of political party

collaboration: (a) the success of government bills, (b) the margin of support for the legislation passed

in the respective legislatures, and (c) the use of executive decree powers.72 If the hypothesis is correct,

political party collaboration should be higher in Spain than in Argentina.

Partisan Distribution of Power:

The partisan distribution of power in the legislature is naturally going to affect the incentives

for compromise and, therefore, must be taken into consideration. At the outset of democracy, neither

the Spanish nor the Argentine governing parties enjoyed an absolute majority in their respective

legislatures. This was the case of the UCD administrations of Adolfo Suárez and Leopoldo Calvo-

Sotelo in Spain between June 1977 and October 1982, and of the Raúl Alfonsín administration (UCR)

between December 1983 and July 1989. Therefore, the comparison of Spain and Argentina during

71 Stepan (1986), p.80. 72 We must keep in mind that political party collaboration is inherently difficult to measure, and it is likely that the use of several additional indicators will be necessary in order to adequately assess the level of party collaboration in the political system as a whole. In my dissertation, I use additional indicators to measure the level of party collaboration.

34

these periods will control for the potential effects of minority governments. However, we must keep in

mind that the UCD held a plurality of the seats in the Spanish parliament whereas the UCR did not

attain a plurality of the seats in the Argentine Congress.

In both cases, these periods of minority government were followed by the turnover of executive

power to the main opposition party. The new governing parties enjoyed a stronger position in the

legislature than did their predecessors. In the Spanish case, the PSOE won an absolute majority of the

seats in the Congress of Deputies and in turn elected their party leader, Felipe González, as Prime

Minister (1982-86 and 1986-89). During the Menem (PJ) administration between 1989 and 1995, the

PJ did not clearly enjoy an absolute majority of the seats in the Argentine Congress, however it did

hold a plurality. These changes in the relative majorities and of the governing political parties will

allow for an interesting cross-national and longitudinal study of the pattern of political party

collaboration.

In Spain, the first parliamentary elections on 15 June 1977 were won by the center-right UCD

that coalesced around the leadership of President Adolfo Suárez, the last president of the authoritarian

regime. However, the UCD did not attain an absolute majority of the seats in the parliament.73 In the

Congress of Deputies, the UCD received 47.1% of the seats, eleven seats shy of an absolute majority.

The PSOE emerged as the largest party coming out of the democratic opposition to the Franco regime

with 33.7% of the seats. The partisan distribution of power between these two dominant political

parties remained relatively constant in the 1979 parliamentary elections. Both parties slightly

increased their representation in the Congress, gaining 3 and 4 seats respectively. The UCD once

73 The Spanish Congress of Deputies is far more powerful than the Senate. Therefore, the analysis below will only include the Congress of Deputies.

35

again fell short of an absolute majority. Therefore, any party hoping to pass its legislation required the

support of at least one other political party.

Table 13: Composition of the Congress of Deputies, Spain, 1977-1989

(Number and Percentage of Seats)

1977 1979 1982 1986

UCD 165 (47.1) 168 (48.0) 11 (3.1) -

PSOE 118 (33.7) 122 (34.9) 202 (57.7) 184 (52.6)

PCE/IU 20 (5.7) 22 (6.3) 4 (1.1) 7 (2.0)

AP/PP74 16 (4.6) 9 (2.6) 107 (30.6) 105 (30.0)

PDC/CIU 11 (3.1) 8 (2.3) 12 (3.4) 18 (5.1)

PNV 8 (2.3) 7 (2.0) 8 (2.3) 6 (1.7)

Others 12 (3.4) 14 (4.0) 6 (1.7) 30 (8.6)

Total 350 (100) 350 (100) 350 (100) 350 (100)

UCD (Unión de Centro Democrático); PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español); AP/PP (Alianza Popular/Partido

Popular); PCE/IU (Partido Comunista de España/Izquierda Unida); PDC/CIU (Pacte Democràtic per

Catalunya/Convergència i Unió); PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco).

Source: Elaborated by the author based on data provided by the Junta Electoral Central. Ministerio del Interior, Spain.

In 1982, the entire party system experienced massive realignment. Electoral support for the UCD

dropped by 28.5 percentage points! This fall was the "single greatest electoral disaster ever to befall a

74 In 1979, Alianza Popular presented candidates in coalition as Coalición Democrática; in 1986, as Coalición Popular. In 1989, Alianza Popular was renamed Partido Popular

36

contemporary western European party."75 Similarly, the PCE lost 18 of its previous 22 seats by dropping

almost 7 points in the popular vote. Both the PSOE and AP benefited from these electoral disasters. AP

increased its parliamentary representation from 9 seats to 107, and the PSOE from 122 to 202, providing

the PSOE with a comfortable absolute majority of the seats in the Congress of Deputies. The relationship

between the two largest parties, the PSOE and AP, remained relatively the same following the 1986

election in which the PSOE was able to maintain their absolute majority in the Congress of Deputies,

though the gap between the parties decreased from 95 to 79 seats.

Table 14: Composition of the Chamber of Deputies, Argentina, 1983-199576

(Number and Percentage of Seats)

1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993

UCR 129 (50.8) 130 (51.2) 117 (46.1) 94 (37.0) 85 (33.1) 84 (32.7)

PJ 111 (43.7) 103 (40.6) 109 (42.9) 127 (50.0) 129 (50.2) 129 (50.2)

Others 14 (5.6) 21 (8.3) 28 (11.1) 33 (13.0) 43 (16.8) 44 (17.1)

Total 254 (100) 254 (100) 254 (100) 254 (100) 257 (100) 257 (100)

75 Gunther et al (1988), p.401. 76 Alfonsín did not complete the full constitutional term. Menem therefore governed from July to December 1989. For all of the Argentine Congressional data in this section, PJ data includes parties that represent PJ splinters, and PJ and UCR data

37

Table 15: Composition of the Senate, Argentina, 1983-1995

(Number and Percentage of Seats)

1983 1986 1989 1992

PJ 21 (45.6) 21 (45.6) 25 (54.4) 30 (62.5)

UCR 18 (39.1) 18 (39.1) 14 (30.4) 11 (22.9)

Others 7 (15.2) 7 (15.2) 7 (15.2) 7 (14.6)

Total 46 (100) 46 (100) 46 (100) 48 (100)

UCR (Unión Cívica Radical); PJ (Partido Justicialista).

Source: Mark P. Jones (1997), p.265.

In Argentina, President Alfonsín (1983-89) was indirectly elected by an electoral college.

Alfonsín received 51.8% of the popular vote and was elected with 57% of the electoral college votes,

whereas the PJ candidate, Luder, received 40.2% of the popular vote and 42% of the electoral college

vote.77 The UCR did not enjoy an absolute majority or even a plurality in both houses at any point

during the Alfonsín presidency. The UCR did have a slight majority in the Chamber of Deputies

between 1983 and 1987, but slipped to a plurality following the 1987 Chamber elections. This was not

the case in the Senate where the main opposition party, the PJ, held a plurality of the seats throughout

the Alfonsín Presidency. Once again, any party hoping to pass its legislation required the support of at

least one other political party.

include those presented on PJ/UCR lists. Seat totals are based on election results and do not take into account changes during the legislative period. See Jones (1997). 77 Molinelli, et al (1999), pp.564, 573.

38

In the 1989 Presidential election, Menem received 49.4% of the popular vote and was elected

with 54% of the electoral college votes, whereas the UCR candidate, Angeloz, received 37.1% of the

popular vote and 39% of the electoral college vote.78 The partisan make-up of the Argentine Congress

during this period was more heavily weighted in favor of the president’s party, the PJ, than during the

Alfonsín administration.79 The above results show that the PJ enjoyed a near majority in both houses

of Congress between 1989 and 1991, and an absolute majority in both houses of Congress between

1991 and 1995. However, it is more accurate to consider this period as one of a PJ plurality. The data

include PJ party splinters at the provincial level, and non-PJ deputies that were included of PJ lists,

who did not feel subject to PJ party discipline.80

Considering only the partisan distributions of power, we would expect ceteris paribus that (1)

the success of government bills will increase as the governing party increases its representation in the

legislature, and (2) that the incentive to pass legislation with the collaboration of other political parties

will decrease as the governing party increases its representation in the legislature.

Table 16: Relationship between the Executive and the Legislature:

Executive Country Governing Party Legislative Majority

Alfonsín Argentina UCR No Plurality

Suárez/Calvo-Sotelo Spain UCD Plurality

Menem Argentina PJ Plurality

González Spain PSOE Absolute Majority

78 Molinelli, et al (1999), pp.564, 573. 79 “From July to December 1989 the PJ lacked a plurality of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. However, as part of his deal to assume office early Menem received the UCR’s commitment not to oppose his key policies.” Jones (1997), p.264 80 Jones (1997), pp.265-7.

39

Therefore, we would expect that the Alfonsín administration would have the greatest difficulty passing

its legislation, and that legislation passed during this period would be passed with the highest levels of

collaboration. On the other hand, we would expect that the González Administration would have the

least difficulty passing its legislation, and that there would be little incentive to seek out the support of

additional political parties to pass legislation. The Suárez/Calvo-Sotelo Administrations and Menem

Administration would fall in between these two extremes.

Success of Government Bills:

The degree to which the government is able to negotiate the passage of its legislation will

provide us with an initial, though incomplete, picture of the degree of party collaboration. I expect,

ceteris paribus, that a government will have a greater degree of success passing its legislation in a

political system with a high level of political party collaboration than in one with a high level of

political party competition.

The fact that the partisan distribution of power and the relationship between the legislature and

the executive have varied across time and across cases allows us to use the relationship between the

two as an indirect indicator of political party collaboration. During times of minority government, the

executive, controlled by one political party, must make agreements with other political parties in order

to pass its legislation. This is not required during periods of majority government, such as the

González administrations between 1982 and 1989.

40

Tables 17 and 18 show that Spanish governments, in general, have been more successful

attaining the passage of their legislation than Argentine governments. The percentage of government

bills passed in Spain (78.2%) is higher than the percentage of government bills passed in Argentina

(64.4%). Also, the minority UCD governments were more successful than the Alfonsín

administration.

Table 17: # of Government Bills and % Passed, Spain, 1977-1989

Presented Passed %Passed

811977-79 167 143 85.6%

1979-82 287 179 62.4%

1982-86 205 183 89.3%

1986-89 125 108 86.4%

1977-89 784 613 78.2%

UCD (1977-82) 454 322 70.9%

PSOE (1982-89) 330 291 88.2%

Source: Elaborated by the author based on data provided by the Congress of Deputies, Spain.

Table 18: # of Government Bills and % Passed, Argentina, 1983-199582

81 Total passed includes 43 government bills passed in the parliamentary period (1979/82). Following the early termination of the Constituent Legislature (1977/79) and parliamentary elections, the government petitioned to have these bills re-included in the parliamentary agenda where they had been left.

41

Presented Passed % Law President

1983 53 42 79.0% UCR

1984 129 101 78.0% UCR

1985 131 105 80.0% UCR

1986 95 47 49.0% UCR

1987 93 58 62.0% UCR

1988 66 43 65.0% UCR

1989 82 46 56.0% UCR/PJ83

1990 108 59 54.6% PJ

1991 142 80 56.3% PJ

1992 72 40 55.6% PJ

1993 106 73 68.9% PJ

1994 95 58 61.1% PJ

1995 84 57 67.9% PJ

1983-95 1256 809 64.4%

Source: Molinelli, et al. (1999), p.434.

As Table 17 demonstrates, the UCD was able to pass 70.9% of its legislation.84 This percentage drops

to 61.6% for the Alfonsín administration.85 The first two socialist governments of Felipe González

(1982-86 and 1986-1989) in Spain were able to pass 88.2% of their legislation. However, during the

82 Laws Passed includes laws passed at any time. These results may overestimate the degree of success of the Alfonsín administration vis-à-vis the UCD governments as several of the Alfonsín laws (69) {Molinelli, et al (1999), p.438} were passed during the Menem administration and under a PJ controlled Congress. 83 Menem governed between July and December 1989. 84 It should be noted that the drop in the success of government bills between 1979-82 is partially due to the number of bills presented and to the process of disintegration of the UCD which culminated in Suárez’s abandonment of the party, the 1982 electoral disaster, and eventual disappearance of the party in 1983. 85 This can be broken down into two periods, 1983-87 when the UCR enjoyed an absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies (65.1%), and 1987-89 when it lost that majority (50.4%). De Riz (1994), p.59. These figures include all legislation presented and passed during the Alfonsín administration, and is therefore the most comparable to the UCD figure in the Spanish case.

42

first presidency of the PJ’s Carlos Menem (1990-95) in Argentina, the Menem administration was only

able to pass approximately 60.5% of its legislation.86

These findings are not surprising given the variation in the partisan distributions of power. The

Spanish governments, overall, have enjoyed larger majorities in their legislatures. However, two

pieces of information may provide some clarification. Using the data in Table 18, Menem (1990-

1995) was less successful at achieving the passage of his legislation than Alfonsín (1983-88), 60.5%

versus 69.8% respectively, despite the fact that the PJ held a plurality of the seats in the Congress and

the UCR did not.87 Second, the Menem administration (with a plurality of PJ seats in Congress) was

less successful than the UCD governments (with a plurality of UCD seats in the parliament) in Spain,

60.5% versus 70.9%. This pattern does not follow that which one would expect given the various

partisan distributions of power, and demonstrates a higher degree of political party collaboration in

Spain.

Support for Legislation:

The second indicator of the degree of political party collaboration is the margin of support that

laws received within the respective legislatures. During periods in which no single political party had

an absolute majority of the seats in the legislature, any political formation that hoped to pass its

legislation had to seek out allies. These allies had to either actively support the legislation by voting in

favor, or passively support the legislation by abstaining or providing the quorum necessary for a vote.

86 This figure should be considered approximate as it is based on the Molinelli data from 1990-95. First, this excludes Menem bills presented in 1989. Second, it includes bills passed at any point prior to May 21, 1998, not just during his first administration. 87 The inclusion of 1989 in either President’s statistics does not significantly alter the results.

43

Though a degree of inter-party collaboration was initially required to pass legislation in both countries,

we can assess the degree to which legislation was supported by super-majorities. How much

additional support, beyond that necessary to simply pass the bill, did the legislation receive? I expect,

ceteris paribus, that political systems with a high level of political party collaboration will be more

likely to pass legislation based on super-majorities than those with a high level of political party

competition. I will assess both the level of political party collaboration in the respective legislatures as

a whole and between the two principal political parties.

Spain:

To assess the margin of support for legislation in Spain, I have conducted an analysis of floor votes

in the Congress of Deputies. The analysis includes the votes on all of the laws passed between the first

democratic elections in 1977 through September 1989. This analysis requires two caveats. First, I

have analyzed those bills that were later passed, which overestimates the degree of political party

collaboration. However, for the entire period under study, there was only one government bill rejected

due to being voted down in a parliamentary vote in Congress.88 Of the government bills not passed

within the legislative period in which they were presented, most were not passed due to their expiration

when parliamentary elections were called. Clearly withdrawal of a bill or its expiration may be due to

a lack of parliamentary support.

88 This is not the case with parliamentary bills. Bills presented by parliamentary groups or legislators are frequently voted down in the toma en consideración phase. Guerrero Salom (2000), p.162. All parliamentary bills must pass this initial vote by which the chamber decides whether or not it will take the bill into consideration. If a bill makes it through this phase, it will then be assigned to committee and the chamber will establish a period of time during which amendments can be presented. Bustos (2000), pp.53-4.

44

Table 19: Spanish Government Bills not Passed during the Parliamentary Period in which they

were Presented89

Total Not Passed Withdrawn Expired Rejected

1977-79 67 4 62 1

1979-82 108 12 96 0

1982-86 22 3 19 0

1986-89 17 0 17 0

Source: Elaborated by the author based on data provided by the Congress of Deputies, Spain.

Second, I have only included the votes for the first consideration of the bill by the lower house. I

did not include any Senate votes or votes in the Congress on amendments from the Senate. This

should, therefore, not be considered a complete picture of voting behavior in the Spanish Parliament.

However, as mentioned above, the Congress is by far the most important chamber.

Our analysis will include both organic and ordinary laws. Organic laws are those that legislate the

development of fundamental rights and liberties, those that approve the regional government statutes of

autonomy, the electoral laws, and many other laws that regulate the institutions of the state. They

require the favorable vote of an absolute majority of the members of the Congress and a final vote on

the entire bill.90 Ordinary laws do not require a final vote and only require a favorable plurality of the

vote to pass.

89 The 1979-82 figures include bills from 1977/79 that the government petitioned to have re-included on the Parliamentary agenda.

45

For each individual ordinary bill, I have averaged all of the votes on the content/articles of the bill

presented for a vote on the floor.91 Deputies can cast various types of votes: in favor, against, and

abstain. Furthermore, votes can be declared null, generally due to problems that the deputies had with

the electronic voting system.92 After calculating the results for each bill, I averaged the support

received by all of the individual laws passed during each parliamentary period: Constituent

Legislature (1977-79), Legislature I (1979-82), Legislature II (1982-86), and Legislature III (1986-89).

The same was done for organic bills, except that I used the final votes instead of an average of all of

the votes on the bill.

The level of support for laws passed between 1977 and 1989 was tremendously high. On average

ordinary laws were passed with 88% of the deputies casting their vote in favor of the legislation, 7%

against, and 5% in active abstention. On average, organic laws were passed with 87% of the deputies

casting their vote in favor of the legislation. 93 However, these figures mask variation over time in the

level of collaboration and the effect of the partisan distribution of power.

90 Organic laws did not exist until following the approval of the 1978 Constitution. Constitution 1978, Art.81. 91 Votes on amendments are not included in this analysis. These votes will be included in a future analysis. As the party that proposes the amendment is indicated in the congressional record, I will be able to provide a more direct analysis of the dynamics of competition across political parties.

92 In the Congress, bills may be voted on in their entirety or may be broken down and voted on by article, partial article, and so forth. Therefore, the number of votes on any one law can range from one to hundreds. The results of each vote are recorded in the congressional record, the Diario de Sesiones. The results are presented globally, i.e. number of votes in favor, votes against, abstentions, and null, and do not indicate the names of the deputies voting or the political parties. Roll call votes do occasionally occur, though there were very few during the period studied. Until February 1982, a roll call vote, aside from those required by the parliamentary rules, was taken when requested by two parliamentary groups or 50 deputies. Following the new parliamentary rules, passed on February 10, 1982, this requirement changed to two groups or a fifth of the deputies. See the Provisional Parliamentary Regulations for the Congress of Deputies passed October 13, 1977 (Boletín Oficial del Estado, N.256, October 26, 1977), and the Parliamentary Regulations for the Congress of Deputies passed February 10, 1982 (Boletín Oficial de las Cortes. Congreso, Serie H, N.33, February 24, 1982). 93 These results should be considered very reliable as they confirm the high level of consensus found by Jordi Capo (1990, 1994) despite the fact that he followed a different methodology.

46

Below I present a collaboration index (C.I.) that controls for the size of the governing party during

each legislative period. The index is calculated by subtracting the proportion of governing party

deputies from the proportion of favorable votes. The values of the index vary between maximum

conflict at –1.00 and maximum collaboration at 1.00. 94 However, actual cases do not produce extreme

values.95

CI= (Favorable Votes/Total Votes)-(Governing Party Deputies/Total Deputies)

Maximum Conflict -1.00 <C.I.> 1.00 Maximum Consensus

Table 20: Margin of Support for Bills Passed, Ordinary Laws, Congress of Deputies,

Spain, 1977-1989 (Average Votes on Articles of Bill)

Legislature

Proportion Votes in

Favor

Proportion Governing

Party Deputies

C.I.

Leg C (1977-79) 0.91 0.47 0.43

Leg I (1979-82) 0.89 0.48 0.41

Leg II (1982-86) 0.84 0.58 0.26

Leg III (1986-89) 0.88 0.53 0.35

Average C-III 0.88 0.36

94 In a hypothetical situation in which the vote in favor of a bill is unanimous and the governing party holds 5% of the seats, the CI would produce a high collaboration value of .95. On the other hand, if the legislation receives the favorable vote of only 5% of the chamber during a period of time in which the governing party holds 95% of the seats, it would receive a very low collaboration value of -.90. 95 Negative values effectively mean that governing party votes were cast against the bill, a value of zero means the bill only achieved governing party deputy support, and positive values represent additional support for the bill beyond the governing party.

47

Source: Elaborated by the author based on voting results published in the Diario de Sesiones, Congreso de los Diputados,

Spain.

The results in Tables 20 and 21 clearly establish that the Spanish Congress operated with a

great deal of collaboration. The collaboration index for ordinary laws passed during this period is .36.

Organic laws, by far the most important laws received a collaboration index of .34. These results

confirm that there was a great deal of political party collaboration.

Table 21: Margin of Support for Bills Passed, Organic Laws, Congress of Deputies,

Spain, 1977-1989 (Final Votes on Entire Bill)

Legislature

Proportion Votes in

Favor

Proportion Governing

Party Deputies

C.I.

Leg I (1979-82) 0.93 0.48 0.45

Leg II (1982-86) 0.79 0.58 0.21

Leg III (1986-89) 0.90 0.53 0.37

Average Leg I-III 0.87 0.34

Source: Elaborated by the author based on voting results published in the Diario de Sesiones, Congreso de los Diputados,

Spain.

Even during the II Legislature, the period with the lowest degree of collaboration, Ordinary

laws counted on 84% support and a consensus index of .26, and Organic laws received 79% support

and a consensus index of .21. This means that during a period of a PSOE absolute majority, when the

48

governing party could count on the votes of 58% of the chamber and thereby pass its legislation alone,

laws were still passed with significant super-majorities.

Table 22: Opposition to Bills Passed, Congress of Deputies, Spain, 1977-89

(% of Vote Cast Against Bill)

Legislature Organic Ordinary

Leg C (1977-79) - 4.2

Leg I (1979-82) 4.1 6.0

Leg II (1982-86) 13.3 10.6

Leg III (1986-89) 5.6 7.0

Average 7.7 6.9

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Furthermore, the percentage of the vote cast against the legislation indicates that the principal political

parties did not oppose legislation in any consistent manner.

Argentina:

Unfortunately, there are very few floor votes registered in the Argentine congressional record,

the Diario de Sesiones. This makes it very difficult to find a comparable measure in both cases. There

are some roll call votes that are published in the Diario de Sesiones; however, these roll call votes were

49

taken infrequently during the Alfonsín presidency, 39 in the Chamber of Deputies.96 Therefore,

congressional experts have used signatures on committee reports to analyze voting behavior in the

Argentine Congress.97

The parliamentary committees are responsible for presenting the text that will be debated (and

voted) on the floor of the respective chambers.98 Committee members sign the committee reports,

expressing their agreement or dissent, and these reports are then printed in the Diario de Sesiones.99

Though signatures on committee reports cannot be considered directly comparable to votes on

legislation, they are nonetheless the best proxies for actual votes. It should also be noted that the

committees are composed of members roughly in proportion to their representation in the chamber.

The table below demonstrates, for the legislative term between 1983 and 1985, that the UCR was

slightly over-represented and the PJ slightly under-represented on the Chamber committees. Also, the

smaller parties may be underrepresented on some committees. This is due to the small number of

deputies that represent these minor parties.100

96 Jones (2000), p.4. 97 Unless otherwise indicated, the information provided in this section is taken from Mustapic and Goretti (1991) and Mustapic and Goretti (1992). The reader should refer to those publications for a more detailed explanation of their study. 98 The requirement of a committee report can be by passed with a 2/3 vote on the floor. For a detailed explanation of the chamber rules for the Chamber of Deputies, please see Schinelli (1996). 99 The committee members have several ways of expressing agreement or dissent. In the case of agreement, one Committee Report is issued and the committee members sign the report. But, if a portion of the committee disagrees with the report supported by the majority of the members, it is possible to issue a Majority Report and a Minority Report, and the committee members would then sign the appropriate report. Furthermore, it is possible to show disagreement with the Committee Report short of writing a Minority Report. This can be done by signing the Committee Report in dissent, in partial dissent and total dissent. 100 Mustapic and Goretti (1991), p.6.

50

Table 23: Partisan Composition of Committees,101 UCR and PJ, Chamber of Deputies,

Argentina, 1983-1985

UCR PJ

% of Committee Positions 53.9% 41.0%

% of Seats in Chamber 50.8% 43.7%

Difference 3.1% -2.7%

Source: Elaborated by the author based on committee assignments provided by the Chamber of Deputies, Argentina.

Mustapic and Goretti conducted a study of the signatures on 1062 committee reports

corresponding to the laws passed during the Alfonsín presidency. They found that there was a great

degree of collaboration in the legislature as a whole and between the two principal political parties.

They concluded that 74.1% of the laws passed received the unanimous agreement of the members of

the parliamentary committees, and that only a small proportion of the laws were passed with any

opposition at all (14.4%).102

101 This was calculated based on committee assignments made following the 1983 elections, and does not include changes that occurred in the composition of those committees. 102 The authors consider the law to be passed unanimously when there was only one Committee Report and no dissent. They consider the law to have faced opposition when the law received more than one Committee Report or dissent. It should be noted that “opposition” to the legislation is registered even when only one committee member signs the Committee Report in dissent. Mustapic and Goretti (1992), p.259.

51

Table 24: Support for Legislation, Chamber of Deputies and Senate, Argentina, 1983-1989

%

Unanimous 74.1%

Opposition 14.4%

No Committee Report 11.5%

Source: Mustapic and Goretti (1992), p.259.

Moreover, they found that the overwhelming majority of committee reports were passed with

the cooperation of the two main political parties. To come to this conclusion, they placed each

committee report into several categories: Cooperation: The UCR and PJ support the only committee

report or the majority report. Active Opposition: The PJ and UCR support different reports or one of

the parties dissents on the report supported by the other. Passive Opposition: One of the two parties

abstains from voting, in support or dissent, on the committee report. Mixed: One or both parties are

divided (internally) in their support of the report.

Table 25: Support for Committee Reports, UCR and PJ, Argentina, 1983-89

%

Cooperation 89.2%

Active Opposition 4.8%

Passive Opposition 3.9%

Mixed 2.1%

52

Source: Mustapic and Goretti (1992), p.257.

As can be seen in Table 25, the UCR and the PJ agreed on 89% of the committee reports, and they

actively disagreed on only 5%.

Despite the fact that distinct methodologies were used, the evidence on the margin of support

for legislation passed indicates that there was a high degree of collaboration in both countries

immediately following their transitions. Furthermore, this collaboration included the two main

political parties. Unfortunately, there is no comparable study of the committee reports during the

Menem administration. However, executive decree laws can be used as a final indicator of the degree

of collaboration.

Executive Decrees:

In both countries, executive decrees have been used to make laws that normally require

legislative action. In the Spanish case, the issuance of executive decrees has not generated as much

controversy as it has in the Argentine Case. This lower level of controversy reinforces the argument

that Spain indeed has a greater degree of political party collaboration. Furthermore, the sharp increase

in the use of executive decrees in Argentina and the controversy surrounding their use indicate that

political party collaboration declined during the Menem presidency (1989-1995) vis-à-vis the Alfonsín

presidency.

Spain:

53

In Spain, the Constitution of 1978 states that executive decree laws can be issued by the

Government in cases of extraordinary and urgent need. The executive decree is called a Royal Decree

Law, Real Decreto-Ley. The Constitution regulates and limits the use of these decrees. Royal Decree

Laws cannot affect 1) the arrangement of basic government institutions, 2) citizen rights, obligations

and liberties regulated in Title I of the Constitution, 3) the structure of the Autonomous Communities,

or 4) general electoral law. Furthermore, the executive must immediately send the royal decree to the

Congress of Deputies for ratification or rejection, which the Chamber must do within 30 days.103

Decrees have been issued throughout the period studied. However, these decrees have not

caused a great deal of controversy and therefore their use cannot be interpreted as an indication of a

lack of collaboration. Between 1979 and 1989, I found that the Chamber repealed only one decree

law. Furthermore, the congressional votes on the decree laws produced large super-majorities in favor

of ratification.

Table 26: Support for Royal Decree Laws, Congress of Deputies, Spain, 1979-1989

Maximum Conflict -1.00 <C.I.> 1.00 Maximum Consensus

# of Decrees Proportion of Votes in Favor C.I.

Leg I (1979-82) 71 0.84 0.36

Leg II (1982-86) 40 0.80 0.22

Leg III (1986-89) 20 0.83 0.30

1979-89 131 0.82 0.29

103 Art. 86. Spanish Constitution (1978); Art. 151. Reglamento del Congreso de los Diputados de 10 de febrero de 1982.

54

Source: Elaborated by the author based on voting results published in the Diario de Sesiones, Congreso de los Diputados,

Spain.

Though support for decree laws was slightly lower than for organic and ordinary laws, the pattern is

very similar. It should be noted that despite the large number of decree laws issued during the first

legislative period, 71, this large number should not be interpreted as a sign of conflict as these decrees

were ratified with the favorable vote of 84% of the deputies and the highest collaboration index (.36)

of the legislative periods studied here.

Argentina:

On the other hand, executive decree laws have, since the beginning of the Menem presidency in

1989, generated a tremendous amount of controversy in Argentina.104 These decree laws are called

‘Need and Urgency Decrees’ or decretos de necesidad y urgencia. The 1853 Argentine Constitution

did not authorize or regulate the use of ‘Need and Urgency Decrees’ (NUDs).105 Furthermore,

executive decrees have not been consistently sent to or voted on in Congress.

Historically, Argentine presidents have used this device, though infrequently. Between 1853

and 1983, for example, constitutional governments issued approximately 20 NUDs. This practice

continued following the re-establishment of democracy in 1983. However, the use (or abuse) of

emergency decree power has varied tremendously. Whereas President Alfonsín issued only ten NUDs,

104 Most of the information in this section is taken from Ferreira Rubio and Goretti (1998). 105 These decrees were authorized and regulated in the Constitutional reforms of 1994.

55

President Menem issued 166 such decrees.106 The increase in the use of decree laws can be partially

accounted for by the fact that Menem assumed power during an acute economic crisis. However, it is

also clear that Menem both used and misused this power. “In some cases the emergency was real; in

others there were only particularistic needs, and in others the putative emergency was merely a vehicle

for Menem to exercise personal discretion.”107

Was the rapid rise in the use of decrees the result of a lack of political collaboration? The PJ

did not have an absolute majority in both chambers of Congress. It is possible, therefore, that many of

these laws would not have been passed had they been submitted to Congress as government bills. This

is corroborated by Domingo Cavallo’s (Minister of the Economy) 1993 statement acknowledging “that

without Menem’s NUDs, only 20 percent of the policies involved in the economic reform would have

been implemented.”108 Further indication that NUDs were used because of a lack of congressional

support is the fact that their potential use was threatened in order to get government legislation passed.

“Government officials, including ministers and the president, publicly stated that if Congress did not

pass these bills, the executive would implement them by NUD and that if Congress introduced

modifications into the texts, the executive would veto them.”109 The fact that Menem resorted to

NUDs on at least 166 occasions, versus 20 for Alfonsín, demonstrates that political party collaboration

had declined.

Explaining Political Party Collaboration:

106 Ferreira Rubio and Goretti found that Menem effectively issued 336 such decrees, however, only 166 of these were recognized by the executive to be ‘Need and Urgency Decrees.’ Ferreira Rubio and Goretti (1998), p.42-3. 107 Ferreira Rubio and Goretti (1998), p.51. 108 (La Nación 8/31/93; Página 12 9/1/93) cited by Ferreira Rubio and Goretti (1998), p.36.

56

Overall, the evidence presented suggests that there was a higher degree of political party

collaboration in Spain than in Argentina. In both cases, I find evidence of elite collaboration during

the early years of democracy, and a decline in collaboration over time. However, collaboration in the

Spanish case went beyond that which could be explained by the partisan distribution of power. The

pattern of party collaboration in Argentina can either largely be explained by the partisan distribution

of power or falls below what one would expect given the partisan distribution of power.

The Spanish Governments overall have been more successful passing their legislation. This is

not surprising given that the Spanish governments, overall, have enjoyed larger majorities in their

legislatures. However, two pieces of information stray from that which one would expect given the

distribution of power. First, the Menem administration (with a plurality of PJ seats in Congress) was

less successful than the UCD governments (with a plurality of UCR seats in the parliament) in Spain.

This indicates that, even when the governing party majorities were similar, the Spanish executive was

better able to collaborate with the opposition in order to pass its legislation. Second, Menem was less

successful at achieving the passage of his legislation than Alfonsín, despite the fact that the PJ held a

plurality of the seats in the Congress and the UCR did not. This indicates that party collaboration had

declined in Argentina despite the more advantageous position held by Menem. The lower level of

collaboration during the Menem years is further illustrated by the dramatic rise in the use of ‘Need and

Urgency Decrees’ during this period.

Despite the fact that distinct methodologies were used, the evidence on the margin of support

for legislation passed indicates that there was a high degree of collaboration in both countries

immediately following their transitions. Furthermore, this collaboration included the two main

109 Ferreira Rubio and Goretti (1998), p.36.

57

political parties. However, I will argue that collaboration in Spain went beyond minimum-winning

coalitions whereas in Argentina it did not. As mentioned above, no single party held an absolute

majority of the seats in the Spanish or Argentine legislatures initially following the transitions.

Therefore, any party hoping to pass its legislation had to seek out extra-party support. However, the

degree of additional support required and the potential allies varied. In the following analysis, I will

assume that the parties were able to maintain party discipline and that an absolute majority of the votes

in their respective legislatures would have assured the passage of legislation.110

In Spain, legislation needed to receive 176 votes to pass. The governing UCD had to obtain the

support of an additional 11 deputies (3.1% of the Congress) during the 1977/79 parliamentary period,

and an additional 8 deputies (2.3%) during the 1979/82 parliamentary period to attain an absolute

majority. The UCD had several potential partners, and had the option to seek out strategic

compromises with different political formations depending on the content of the legislation. The UCD

had the option of exclusively negotiating with the right-wing Alianza Popular (AP), the center-right

Catalan regional coalition Convergència i Unió (CIU),111 or with both CIU and the Basque center-right

regional party, Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV). This is in addition to the potential for negotiation

with various smaller parties, the Partido Comunista de España (PCE), and the UCD’s main rival, the

PSOE. The governing UCD had no objective need to reach agreements with the main opposition

party. However, the evidence shows that legislation was consistently passed with very large super-

majorities and with the collaboration of the main opposition party. This pattern continued even under

majority PSOE governments. The PSOE had no need to collaborate with any opposition parties as it

110 In this section, I use the seats that each party held at the beginning of the legislative period. It does not include changes that may have occurred following the election, e.g. deputies or senators that abandoned their seats or changed political party. 111 The Catalan coalition presented candidates as Pacte Democràtic per Catalunya (PDC) in 1977.

58

could pass its legislation with the votes of its own party. Nonetheless, the evidence shows that

legislation was consistently passed with large super-majorities.

Any Argentine bill needed to receive 128 votes in the Chamber of Deputies and 24 votes in the

Senate to pass. During the period between 1983 and 1987, the governing UCR needed to obtain the

support of an additional 6 senators (13% of the Senate) to attain an absolute majority. In essence, this

meant that President Alfonsín had to receive the support of three of the four minor parties, the support

of its main rival, the PJ, or some combination of the two groups. Furthermore, the PJ had to provide

the necessary quorum for a vote in the Senate.112 This situation worsened following the elections of

1987 when the UCR lost its slim majority in the Chamber. The UCR then had to receive the support of

an additional 11 deputies (4.3% of the Chamber) on top of the continuing difficulties it faced in the

Senate. For the PJ to pass its legislation, it had to count on the UCR to provide the quorum in the

Chamber of Deputies between 1983 and 1987 and seek out the support of smaller parties, or the UCR.

Furthermore, PJ legislation faced potential veto by President Alfonsín throughout the period studied.

Realistically speaking any legislation passed during the Alfonsín Administration required the

collaboration of the UCR and the PJ. It was possible for the main parties to make agreements with

smaller parties. However, this was difficult and still required the tacit consent of the other main party.

Mustapic and Goretti argue that in a situation in which the government and the opposition hold veto

power over the other’s policies, and in which no basic agreement on policy has been established

112 Argentine Congressional Rules require a quorum of an absolute majority in order to constitute a legal session and to vote. This absolute majority is understood as the presence of half plus one of the members of the chamber. Unlike in other countries that establish a legal quorum, this rule is rigorously applied in Argentina. At the time of the vote, the quorum is verified. If the quorum is not attained, the debate will be closed without taking the vote. See Schinelli (1996), pp. 111-12. It should also be noted that this requirement is used politically. Molinelli, et al (1999), p.343.

59

between them, only those laws that gain the unanimous agreement of both parties will pass.113

Effectively, this means that the minimum-winning coalition during this period was near unanimity, and

the collaboration of the UCR and the PJ.114

Though these examples are just illustrative, they nonetheless demonstrate that Argentina faced

a situation in which collaboration between the governing UCR and the opposition PJ was required.

This also partially explains why the Alfonsín administration was less able to pass its legislation. Those

bills that could not be worked out between the UCR and the PJ were not passed. Overall, the evidence

presented in this section is consistent with the hypothesis that pacted transitions produce democracies

in which there is a greater degree of political party collaboration. In Spain, party collaboration went

beyond minimum-winning coalitions whereas it did not in Argentina.

What is the link between the pacted transition and continued collaboration? In the following

paragraphs, I will argue that an elite norm established at the time of the transition may, at least

partially, account for political party collaboration in Spain. In order to establish the plausibility of this

mechanism, I will look at the level of bi-partisanship attained for organic laws between 1979 and

2000.115

113 Mustapic and Goretti (1992), p.268. 114 This conclusion should, however, be qualified. As was later to be demonstrated by President Menem, Alfonsín had another option – to resort to the excessive use of executive decrees. Alfonsín could have behaved in such a way as to compromise the functioning of the newly established democratic institutions. 115 As mentioned in the last section, votes are presented globally, i.e. number in favor, number against and number abstain, and are not presented by political party or deputy. Therefore, the measure for bi-partisan support includes those laws that received a % of votes in favor greater than or equal to the percentage of seats held by the governing party and the main opposition party. It should be noted that no other combination of parties could have produced such a high percentage of votes in favor.

60

Table 27 provides an indication of the degree of bi-partisanship. We should keep in mind that

bi-partisanship was not required to pass legislation at any point in time. Table 27, however, shows that

on average 70% of legislation was passed with bi-partisan support. Based on the need for legislative

coalition partners, the incentive for bi-partisanship was lowest during periods of majority government

(Leg II, III, IV), and then followed, in order, by the minority governments during Leg I, V, and then

VI.

Table 27: Bi-partisan Support, Congress of Deputies, Spain, 1979-2000

(Organic Laws that received % of votes in favor greater than or equal to the percentage of seats held by the governing party

and the main opposition party)

Leg I (1979/82) 95%

Leg II (1982/86) 34%

Leg III (1986/89) 72%

Leg IV (1989/93) 67%

Leg V (1993/96) 76%

Leg VI (1996/2000) 78%

Average 70%

Source: Elaborated by the author based on voting results published in the Diario de Sesiones, Congreso de los Diputados,

Spain.

Periods of minority government (83%) have produced higher levels of bi-partisanship than

periods of majority government (58%). This is not surprising. It demonstrates that the partisan

distribution of power does matter. What is surprising is that following a decline of collaboration

61

during Leg II the Congress returned to a collaborative decision-making style during Leg III and IV.

This was so despite the fact that the governing PSOE maintained an absolute majority and its clear

advantage over the main opposition party. Furthermore, collaboration was reestablished despite the

fact that the more majoritarian nature of the previous period did not destabilize the new democracy.

The fact that bi-partisanship was attained on only 34% of organic laws during Leg II (1982/86)

may provide us with an explanation of the degree of political party collaboration. There are several

possible explanations for this decline. First, collaboration may have been more difficult. Those

involved in the collaborative politics between 1977 and 1982 were the UCD and the PSOE. This was

not the case following the 1982 elections when the main players were the PSOE and AP. It is possible

that the institutional channels and/or the behavioral norms that had developed between the UCD and

the PSOE were not readily transferable to PSOE-AP/PP inter-party relations. Also, the ideological

distance between the right-wing AP and the center-left PSOE increased vis-à-vis the distance between the

center-right UCD and the center-left PSOE. Both of these factors potentially made collaboration more

difficult.

Second, one or both parties may have been unwilling to collaborate. The PSOE achieved a

tremendous victory in the 1982 elections, won an absolute majority of the seats in the Congress of

Deputies, and took control of the executive branch for the first time since democracy was reestablished

in 1977. This victory also came on the heals of what many describe as a period of a ineffective

government, or desgobierno, due to the internal disintegration of the governing UCD. These two

factors may have provided the PSOE with the confidence to advance its program without the

collaboration of the main opposition party. Also, AP and its leader, Manuel Fraga, practiced an

62

opposition style that differed from that practiced by the PSOE. Richard Gillespie argues that “on a few

major issues, Fraga’s party resorted to intransigent opposition.”116 Furthermore, Richard Gunther, in

his study of elite settlement in Spain, calls attention to the importance of the “relative pragmatism” of

individuals involved in negotiating the Spanish Constitution of 1978. He points out that “the dynamic

and strong-willed AP representative, Manuel Fraga Iribarne, was systematically excluded from the

nocturnal negotiations of the ‘politics of consensus’ in order to facilitate compromise among the other

parties.”117 This was the same Manuel Fraga that in 1982 was the leader of the main opposition

party.118 It is likely that all of the above factors played a roll in the decline of political party

collaboration between 1982 and 1986. Though legislation was passed with super-majorities, the two

largest parties were unable or unwilling to achieve the level of bi-partisanship that they had previously

attained.

However, the fact that collaboration returned following 1986 means that the previous period

should be seen as a temporary departure from the norm. Can the reestablishment of political party

collaboration be attributed to the pacted nature of the transition? A partial link may lie in a norm

established during the pacting of the transition period. The dominant parties in the transition

negotiations were the UCD and the PSOE, and many UCD politicians ended up in AP/PP. I found

that, in 1982, AP incorporated 15 candidates for deputy that had been candidates for the UCD in 1979.

This was prior to the disappearance of the UCD in 1983. In 1986, AP incorporated 13 candidates from

the 1982 UCD lists.

116 He also states that PSOE and AP/PP engaged in an important degree of bi-partisanship. Gillespie (1990), p.135. This is reflected in the data, particularly after 1986. 117 Gunther (1992), p.76. 118 Colomé and López Nieto (1993), p.354-5.

63

Also, AP experienced a process of renovation beginning in 1986. Manuel Fraga resigned in

late 1986 and was formally replaced as party leader in February 1987. Though Fraga briefly returned

in 1989, he definitively stepped down in late 1989 to be replaced by José María Aznar in March

1990.119 Furthermore, the highest level of renovation of candidates for deputy in AP/PP occurred in

1986. Below, I present the proportion of party candidates for deputy re-nominated by the same

political party. In addition to this measure, I have developed an index that controls for the electoral

success of the political party under analysis. The index is calculated by subtracting the proportion of

seats the party attained in the previous election from the proportion of deputies re-nominated for the

election under scrutiny.

Candidate Continuity Index: CCI = R-p

R = proportion of deputies re-nominated on list (r/St)

r = number of people on list under scrutiny that were also candidates in the previous election (in either of the

previous two elections in Argentina).

St = seats available in election under scrutiny

p = party strength in last election; = ps/St-1

ps = party list seats attained in previous election

St-1= seats available in previous election

Values for this index vary between (renovation) –1 and 1 (continuity). An index of 0 would effectively

mean that the party re-nominated all successful candidates, positive numbers mean that it re-nominated

119 Colomé and López Nieto (1993), p.354-5.

64

even previously unsuccessful candidates, and negative numbers mean that it did not re-nominate some

successful candidates.

Table 28: Candidate Continuity Index, AP/PP, 1979-2000

renovation –1<CCI>1 continuity

R CCI

1979 .06 .01

1982 .08 .06

1986 .19 -.12

1989 .20 -.10

1993 .29 -.02

1996 .37 -.03

2000 .40 -.05

Source: Elaborated by the author based on lists published in the Boletín Oficial del Estado, Spain.

As can be seen in Table 28, 12% of previously successful AP candidates were not re-nominated

on the 1986 AP lists. This differs from the prior elections when the AP effectively re-nominated

successful candidates, and re-nominated 1% (1979) and 6% (1982) of unsuccessful candidates.

Therefore, AP experienced a process of renewal that included politicians from the UCD. The

incorporation of UCD politicians may partially account the reestablishment of the pattern of political

party collaboration. Furthermore, we should recall that the establishment of bi-partisanship between

the PSOE and AP occurred when the PSOE still held an absolute majority of the seats in Parliament

65

and had no need to seek out collaboration with AP. The PSOE did not loose its absolute majority until

the 1993 elections.

Conclusion:

The evidence presented in this paper reveals that Spain had a higher degree of elite continuity

and political party collaboration than Argentina. This suggests that pacted transitions may indeed

produce democracies in which there is a greater degree of elite continuity and political party

collaboration than in democracies produced by non-pacted transitions. I have also offered potential

links between pacting and the dependent variables analyzed here. Though further research needs to be

conducted, I have argued that internal party rules and regulations that hinder renovation in Spain vis-à-

vis Argentina may be linked to the pacted nature of the Spanish transition. Furthermore, elite norms

may provide a possible mechanism through which political party collaboration was maintained. The

main parties involved in transition pacting were the UCD and the PSOE. During the period in which

the UCD was disintegrating, collaboration declined. In 1982, some UCD politicians left the party to

join AP, others followed Adolfo Suárez to his new party, the CDS, and still others stayed on with the

UCD until its disappearance in 1983. However, in the legislative period (1986/89) following the

disappearance of the UCD and the eventual incorporation of many UCD politicians in AP/PP,

collaboration increased. Collaboration increased despite the fact that the PSOE maintained its very

comfortable absolute majority in the Congress of Deputies.

66

Bibliography:

Alda Fernández, Mercedes, y Lourdes López Nieto. 1993. “El Parlamento Español: 1977-1993.”

Revista de Estudios Políticos (Nueva Epoca) 81(Julio-Septiembre):241-63.

Anduiza, Eva y Mónica Méndez. 1997. “Elecciones y Comportamiento Electoral.” In Política y

Gobierno en España, eds. Manuel Alcántara and Antonia Martínez. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch.

Burton, Michael, Richard Gunther, and John Higley. 1992. “Elites and Democratic Consolidation in

Latin America and Southern Europe: An Overview.” In Elites and Democratic Consolidation

in Latin America and Southern Europe, eds. John Higley and Richard Gunther. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Bustos, Rafael. 2000. “La Función Legislativa.” In El Congreso de los Diputados en España:

Funciones y Rendimiento, ed. Antonia Martinez. Madrid: Editorial Tecnos.

Capo Giol, Jordi. 1990. La Legislación Estatal en la España Democrática. Una Aproximación

Politiológica. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales.

Capo Giol, Jordi. 1994. “Oposición y Minorías en las Legislaturas Socialistas.” REIS: Revista

Española de Investigación Sociologicas 66(April-June):91-113.

Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press.

De Riz, Liliana. 1994. Radicales y Peronistas: El Congreso Nacional entre 1983 y 1989. Buenos

Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, S.A.

Ducantenzeiler, Graciela. 1990. “Social Concertation and Democracy in Argentina.” In Democratic

Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, ed. Diane

Ethier. Houndmills, Hampshire: Macmillian.

67

Encarnación, Omar G. 2001. “Labor and Pacted Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative

Perspective.” Comparative Politics 33(April):337-55.

Esteban, Jorge de, and Luis López Guerra, eds. 1979. Las Elecciones Legislativas del 1 de Marzo de

1979. 1979. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas.

Ethier, Diane, ed. 1990. Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America,

and Southeast Asia. Houndmills, Hampshire: Macmillian.

Ferreira Rubio, Delia and Matteo Goretti. 1998. “When the President Governs Alone: The Decretazo

in Argentina, 1989-93.” In Executive Decree Authority, eds. John M. Carey and Matthew

Soberg Shugart. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Field, Bonnie N. 2001. “Pacting and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Spanish and Argentine

Democracies in Comparative Perspective.” Paper prepared for delivery at the 2001 Annual

Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30-September 2, 2001.

Gillespie, Richard. 1990. “Regime Consolidation in Spain: Party, State, and Society.” In Securing

Democracy, ed. Geoffrey Pridham. New York: Routledge.

Gillespie, Richard. 1995. “Factionalism, the Left and the Transition to Democracy in Spain.” In

Factional Politics and Democratization, eds. Richard Gillespie, Michael Waller and Lourdes

López Nieto. London: Frank Cass.

Guerrero Salom, Enrique. 2000. Crisis y Cambios en las Relaciones Parlamento-Gobierno (1993-

1996). Madrid: Editorial Tecnos.

Gunther, Richard. 1992. “Spain: The Very Model of the Modern Elite Settlement.” In Elites and

Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, eds. John Higley and

Richard Gunther. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

68

Gunther, Richard, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, eds. 1995. The Politics of

Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective. Baltimore: Johns

Hopkins University Press.

Gunther, Richard, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad. 1988. Spain After Franco: The Making of a

Competitive Party System. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hagopian, Frances. 1990. "'Democracy by Undemocratic Means'?: Elites, Political Pacts, and Regime

Transition in Brazil," Comparative Political Studies 23(July):147-70.

Hagopian, Frances. 1996. Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil. New York: Cambridge

University Press.

Hartlyn, Jonathan. 1998. “Political Continuities, Missed Opportunities, and Institutional Rigidities:

Another Look at Democratic Transitions in Latin America.” In Politics, Society, and

Democracy, eds. Scott Mainwaring and Arturo Valenzuela. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Jones, Mark P. 1997. “Evaluating Argentina’s Presidential Democracy: 1983-1995.” In Scott

Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin

America. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Jones, Mark P. 2000. “Explaining the High Level of Party Discipline in the Argentine Congress.”

Unpublished Manuscript.

Karl, Terry Lynn. 1987. "Petroleum and Political Pacts," Latin American Research Review 22(1):63-94.

Karl, Terry Lynn. 1990. "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," Comparative Politics 23

(October):1-23.

Karl, Terry Lynn and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1991. "Modes of Transition in Southern and Eastern Europe,

Southern and Central America," International Social Science Journal (May):269-84.

69

López Nieto, Lourdes. 1997. “El Parlamento.” In Política y Gobierno en España, eds. Manuel

Alcántara and Antonia Martínez. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch.

Mainwaring, Scott. 1992. “Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and

Comparative Issues.” In Issues in Democratic Consolidation, eds. Scott Mainwaring, et al.

Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press.

Mainwaring, Scott, Guillermo O’Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds. 1992. Issues in Democratic

Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective. Notre Dame:

Notre Dame Press.

Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy Scully. 1995. “Introduction: Party Systems in Latin America.” In

Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America, eds Scott Mainwaring and

Timothy R. Scully. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Mainwaring, Scott, and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1997. “Conclusion: Presidentialism and the Party

System.” In Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, eds. Mainwaring, Scott, and

Matthew Soberg Shugart. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Molinelli, N. Guillermo, M. Valeria Palanza and Gisela Sin. 1999. Congreso, Presidencia y Justicia en

Argentina: Materiales para su Estudio. Buenos Aires: CEDI –Fundación Gobierno y Sociedad.

Morán, María Luz. 1989. “Un Intento de Analisis de la ‘Clase Parlamentaria’ Española: Elementos de

Renovación y de Permanencia (1977-1986).” REIS 45(Enero-Marzo):61-84.

Munck, Gerardo L, and Carol Skalnik Leff. 1997. “Modes of Transition and Democratization: South

America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics

29(April):343-62.

70

Mustapic, Ana María and Matteo Goretti. 1991. Gobierno y Oposición en el Congreso: la Práctica de

la Cohabitación durante la Presidencia de Alfonsín (1983-1989). Buenos Aires: Instituto

Torcuato Di Tella, Centro de Investigaciones Sociales.

Mustapic, Ana María and Matteo Goretti. 1992. “Gobierno y Oposición en el Congreso: la Práctica de

la Cohabitación durante la Presidencia de Alfonsín (1983-1989).” Desarrollo Económico

32(Julio-Setiembre):251-69.

O'Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe Schmitter. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative

Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University

Press.

O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds. 1986. Transitions from

Authoritarian Rule. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Polsby, Nelson W. 1968. “The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives.” American

Political Science Review LXII(March):144-68.

Pridham, Geoffrey, ed. 1984. The New Mediterranean Democracies: Regime Transition in Spain, Greece

and Portugal. London: Frank Cass and Company Limited.

Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Roberts, Kenneth M., and Erik Wibbels. 1999. “Party Systems and Electoral Volatility in Latin

America: A Test of Economic, Institutional, and Structural Explanations.” American Political

Science Review 93(September):575-90.

Saiegh, Sebastian M. 1997. “’Conserverás el Cargo con el Sudor de tu Frente’: El Control Electoral

como Mechanismo de Incentivos Compatibles,” Paper Presented at the III Congreso Nacional

de Ciencia Política, Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Político, Mar del Plata, 5-8 November

1997.

71

Schinelli, Guillermo Carlos. 1996. Reglamento de la Cámara de Diputados de la Nación: Comentado.

Buenos Aires: Secretaría Parlamentaria, Dirección de Información Parlamentaria, Honarable

Cámara de Diputados de la Nación.

Stepan, Alfred. 1986. “Paths Toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative

Considerations.” In Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, eds.

Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. Baltimore and London:

The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Tulchin, Joseph S. and Bernice Romero, eds. 1995. The Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America.

Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Valenzuela, J. Samuel. 1992. “Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion,

Process, and Facilitating Conditions.” In Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South

American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, eds. Scott Mainwaring, et al. Notre Dame:

Notre Dame Press.