copyright ©2004 [email protected] myth breakers for election officials a brief summary hava...

Copyright ©2004 [email protected]

Myth Breakers for Election Officials

A Brief Summary

HAVA Facts

E-Voting Problems in Recent Elections

Election Complexities with E-Voting

HAVA–Compliant Alternatives to DREs

Costs Considerations

Distinguishing Truth from Myth


What Myths?

Many local election officials don't have the information they need to make wise decisions about voting equipment. They hear many conflicting stories, and it's hard to tell truth from myth.

This presentation gives facts that dispel many of the e-voting myths.

Preface

For details download:www.votersunite.org/takeaction/mythbreakers.pdf


For Example: did you know?

A repeat of a failed election was held in 2004

• Hinds County, Mississippi had to hold its November 2003 election all over again because so many of the DREs broke down that they couldn't determine the will of the voters.

Dead batteries had to be replaced before an election

• Neglecting to keep the DRE batteries charged between elections cost Arapahoe County, Colorado over $100,000 in battery replacements just before a recent election.

Logic and Accuracy testing is labor-intensive

• If it takes an hour to do the Logic and Accuracy testing on one DRE, San Diego county would have to spend 1275 person-days testing before every election in order to comply with California law.

Preface


Facts about The Help America Vote Act (HAVA)

HAVA Does Not Require the Use of DREs

• States are required to allow the disabled to vote unassisted, and they have until the first general election of 2006 to comply.

• Three non-DRE systems currently satisfy this requirement:

• Ballot marking devices, such as the AutoMark.

• Tactile ballots like they use in Rhode Island.

• Open Voting Consortium system, which is free software that runs on standard computers.

HAVA Does Not Prohibit Punch Card and Lever Systems

• A jurisdiction may continue to use its punch card or lever system if it adds a training program for voters to prevent over-votes and accidental under-votes.

HAVA Facts


More Facts about HAVA

HAVA Allows Partial Replacement of Old Systems

• A state can take HAVA funds to replace punch cards or levers in some counties and not in others.

HAVA "Audit" Requirement is Not a Meaningful Recount

• Vendors and some election officials say that an end-of-day printout satisfies the HAVA audit requirements. However, if a DRE has made any errors in recording or storing votes, its end-of-day printouts will be incorrect, and no meaningful audit can be done.

• When a machine produces results a second time, it's merely a reprint, not a recount.

HAVA Facts


And More Facts about HAVA

HAVA Preserves the Right to Use Paper Ballots

• HAVA explicitly preserves jurisdictions' rights to use paper ballots. Section 301(c)(2) specifically says that the term "verify" may not be construed to forbid the use of paper ballots.

EAC Guidelines and Standards Are Strictly Voluntary

• HAVA charges the Election Assistance Commission with developing guidelines and voting system standards, but compliance with these standards is not mandated for the states, nor is compliance required in order to receive HAVA funds for voting equipment upgrades or purchases.

• This means that states retain control over whether or not they upgrade voting equipment to the FEC 2002 standards, which are the current standards.

HAVA Facts


Map of E-Voting Problems

1) California, 2003: Diebold installs uncertified software without notifying

authorities

1) California, 2003: Diebold installs uncertified software without notifying

authorities

2) California, 2004: Senate majority leader

introduces urgent bill to ban computerized voting

2) California, 2004: Senate majority leader

introduces urgent bill to ban computerized voting

3) California, 2004: Sec’y of State decertifies Diebold for November

3) California, 2004: Sec’y of State decertifies Diebold for November

4) Alameda County, 2004:Diebold control modules

fail to start up

4) Alameda County, 2004:Diebold control modules

fail to start up5) Orange County, 2004:

Hart DREs trip circuit breaker and shut down when batteries run out; voters turned away

from the polls

5) Orange County, 2004:Hart DREs trip circuit breaker and shut down when batteries run out; voters turned away

from the polls

6) Orange County, 2004: Hart access-code confusion

causes 7,000 voters to receivethe wrong ballots

6) Orange County, 2004: Hart access-code confusion

causes 7,000 voters to receivethe wrong ballots

7) San Diego County, 2004:Diebold DREs lose votes;

control modules fail to start up properly

7) San Diego County, 2004:Diebold DREs lose votes;

control modules fail to start up properly

8) Arapahoe County, 2004:Failure of battery charge in

DREs costs over $100,000 to replace batteries

8) Arapahoe County, 2004:Failure of battery charge in

DREs costs over $100,000 to replace batteries

9) Bernalillo County, 2002: Sequoia DREs fail to count 12,000 out of 48,000 votes –

insufficient memory

9) Bernalillo County, 2002: Sequoia DREs fail to count 12,000 out of 48,000 votes –

insufficient memory

10) Dallas County, 2002: ES&S iVotronics mark

incorrect choices on the screen

10) Dallas County, 2002: ES&S iVotronics mark

incorrect choices on the screen11) Harris County, 2003: Hart DREs won’t start; voters

write votes on make-shift paper

11) Harris County, 2003: Hart DREs won’t start; voters

write votes on make-shift paper

12) Indiana, 2004: ES&S installs uncertified

software on iVotronics; admits certified version won't tabulate

votes

12) Indiana, 2004: ES&S installs uncertified

software on iVotronics; admits certified version won't tabulate

votes

13) Hinds County, 2003:DREs overheat, break down;

election invalidated, and re-held later

13) Hinds County, 2003:DREs overheat, break down;

election invalidated, and re-held later

14) Floyd, Coweta Counties, 2002: Diebold DREs lock up; access cards

malfunction; wrong candidate marked on screen

14) Floyd, Coweta Counties, 2002: Diebold DREs lock up; access cards

malfunction; wrong candidate marked on screen


15) Bryan, Terrell Counties, 2002: Diebold DRE ballots omit races;

and present wrong races

15) Bryan, Terrell Counties, 2002: Diebold DRE ballots omit races;

and present wrong races16) Muscogee County, 2003: DREs register "yes"

when voters vote "no"

16) Muscogee County, 2003: DREs register "yes"

when voters vote "no"

17) Montgomery County, 2004: Diebold DRE presents incomplete

ballot when font is magnified

17) Montgomery County, 2004: Diebold DRE presents incomplete

ballot when font is magnified 18) Sarasota County, 2004:

ES&S DREs fail to count 189 votes.

18) Sarasota County, 2004: ES&S DREs fail to count

189 votes.19) Wake County, 2002: Flawed ES&S iVotronic

software loses 436 ballots

19) Wake County, 2002: Flawed ES&S iVotronic

software loses 436 ballots 20) Georgia, 2004: Diebold ballot-encoding

mix-ups prevent voters from voting in primary

20) Georgia, 2004: Diebold ballot-encoding

mix-ups prevent voters from voting in primary

21) Miami-Dade County 2002: ES&S iVotronics fail to count

8.2% of the votes

21) Miami-Dade County 2002: ES&S iVotronics fail to count

8.2% of the votes22) Broward County, 2002: ES&S iVotronic error misses

counting 22% of the votes

22) Broward County, 2002: ES&S iVotronic error misses

counting 22% of the votes23) Broward County, 2004:ES&S iVotronics lose 134 votes;

winning margin is 12 votes

23) Broward County, 2004:ES&S iVotronics lose 134 votes;

winning margin is 12 votes

24) Napa County, 2004:Optical Scan calibration error fails

to tally thousands of votes

24) Napa County, 2004:Optical Scan calibration error fails

to tally thousands of votes25) Lubbock County, 2004:Optical Scan programming error

prevents all votes from being counted

25) Lubbock County, 2004:Optical Scan programming error

prevents all votes from being counted26) Scurry County, 2004:

Defective chip in Optical Scan gives landslide victory to

the wrong candidate

26) Scurry County, 2004:Defective chip in Optical Scan

gives landslide victory to the wrong candidate 27) Bay County, 2004:

Optical Scan ballot alignment error hands thousands of votes to

opponent

27) Bay County, 2004:Optical Scan ballot alignment error

hands thousands of votes to opponent

These are just a few examples

of the E-voting problems in U.S elections in the last

two years

These are just a few examples

of the E-voting problems in U.S elections in the last

two years


California, 2003: Diebold installs uncertified software without notifying authorities

California, 2004: Senate committee passes urgent bill to ban computerized voting in 2004

California, 2004: Secretary of State decertifies all Diebold DREs for the November election

Alameda County, 2004: Diebold control modules fail to start up

Orange County, 2004: Hart DREs trip a circuit breaker and shut down when batteries run out; voters turned away from the polls. Access-code confusion causes 7,000 voters to receive wrong ballots

San Diego County, 2004: Diebold DREs lose votes; control modules fail to start up

Arapahoe County, 2004: Failure of battery charge in DREs costs over $100,000 to replace batteries

Bernalillo County, 2002: Insufficient memory causes failure to count 12,000 out of 48,000 votes

Dallas County, 2002: ES&S iVotronics mark incorrect choices on the screen

Harris County, 2003: Hart DREs won’t start; voters write votes on make-shift paper

Indiana, 2004: ES&S installs uncertified software on iVotronics; admits certified version won't tabulate votes


Many people advocate the use of voter-verified paper ballots (VVPB) on DREs, but when machines break down or voters receive the wrong ballots, a VVPB printer would be no help.

Some of the Recent DRE Problems


Sarasota County, 2004: ES&S DREs fail to count 189 votes

Wake County, 2002: Flawed ES&S iVotronic software loses 436 ballots

Georgia, 2004: Diebold ballot-encoding mix-ups prevent voters from voting in primary

Miami-Dade County, 2002: ES&S iVotronics fail to count 8.2% of the votes

Broward County, 2002: ES&S iVotronics lose 22% of the votes

Broward County, 2004: ES&S iVotronics lose 134 votes; winning margin is 12 votes

Hinds County, 2003: DREs overheat, break down; election invalidated, and re-held later

Floyd, Coweta Counties, 2002: Diebold DREs lock up; access cards malfunction; wrong candidate marked on screen

Bryan, Terrell Counties, 2002: Diebold DRE ballots omit races; present wrong races

Muscogee County, 2003: DREs register "yes“ when voters vote "no"

Montgomery County, 2004: Diebold DRE presents incomplete ballot when font is magnified


More of the Recent DRE Problems

So, some people question the wisdom of using the current crop of DREs, even if they have a printer attached. To make sure voters aren’t disenfranchised, each precinct would have to have paper on hand anyway in case the machines malfunction.


Napa County, 2004: Optical Scan calibration error fails to tally thousands of votes

Lubbock County, 2004: Optical Scan programming error prevents all votes from being counted

Scurry County, 2004: Defective chip in Optical Scan gives landslide victory to the wrong candidate

Bay County, 2004: Optical Scan ballot alignment error hands thousands of votes to opponent

Optical Scan Machines Miscount, Too

Problems with optical scan machines have been severe but recoverable.

These examples illustrate the importance of auditing optical scan machines by performing random recounts of the paper ballots.



Illegal Use of Uncertified Software Most states require electronic voting equipment to be certified

before it can be used in an election.

• If the state requires federal certification, only equipment with a NASED qualification number may be used. Some states also require state certification for all voting systems.

In violation of state laws and without the knowledge of election officials, uncertified software has been installed by vendors and used in elections in at least these states:

• California – Diebold

• Indiana – ES&S

• Maryland – Diebold

• Arizona - Diebold



The NASED Qualification Process

Independent Testing Authorities (ITA) are selected by NASED

• The ITA testing process is a secret from election officials and the public

• All contracts and contacts are between the vendors and the ITA

• ITAs test a machine’s design, not individual voting machines

• Currently qualified machines meet 1990 standards, not 2002 standards

NASED-qualified, state-certified machines have performed like this:

• New Mexico – Sequoia voting systems lost 12,000 votes

• North Carolina – ES&S iVotronic lost 436 votes

• California – Diebold TSx lost 10 votes



Chain of Custody is More Complex

Election equipment is particularly vulnerable to tampering after it has been installed tested but before it is used.

• Every single DRE must be secured to ensure that the software is not illegally altered between elections.

• Each DRE, after being tested and zeroed out, must remain secure until election day.

• Electronic machines break down during an election and are removed for repair. Procedures must be developed for retesting the machines before they are placed back in service.



Ballot Boxes are the Size of a Credit Card

Using electronic voting equipment does not eliminate the need to track and preserve the physical records of votes.

The physical records are now in the form of ballot memory cards rather than paper ballots.

• Ballot cards are not a permanent form of storage since the data can be erased or overwritten

• Ballot cards are the size of a stack of about five credit cards

• Ballot cards, which can be easily lost or slipped into a pocket, must be kept as secure as ballot boxes



Logic & Accuracy Testing – the Reality

Logic & Accuracy testing on electronic voting machines is essential.

• In November 2001, the failure of Registrar of Voters managers to do L&A testing on ballot counting machines caused votes for some candidates to go to other candidates. All 82 elections were subjected to a hand recount, with the results in 13 local water and school board races overturned.

Testing DREs is a major undertaking

• To comply with California law, the Registrar of San Diego County must test 10,200 DREs before every election. If it takes an hour to do the Logic and Accuracy testing on one DRE, San Diego county would have to spend 1275 person-days testing before every election.



Logic & Accuracy Testing – What if it Fails?

Ideally, every L&A test would show that the machines are operating correctly. But if a machine fails, then:

• It would be necessary to take the machine out of service or have it repaired.

• If the software were flawed, the flaw would be present in all DREs using that same software.

• It would be too late to have a software patch developed, tested, certified, and installed in time for the election.

• It might be too late to print absentee ballots for the entire county to use for the election.



Increase in Human Error

While many look to e-voting machines as a way of reducing human error, the fact is that human error may be on the increase because of the new and complex problems they present:

• Houston, Texas: Poll workers assigned the wrong ballots to voters.

• Orange County, California: Poll workers gave thousands of voters the wrong ballots.

• San Diego, California: Poll workers gave voters the wrong provisional ballots.

• Walker County, GA: after six elections were held on the same equipment, even vendor technicians couldn’t operate it successfully.



Potential Problems Inherent in Electronic

Devices Touch Screen Misalignment (Florida, 2003)

Miscellaneous Breakdowns on Election Day (California, 2004)

Power Surges or Static Electricity Discharges

Electrical Outages and Inadequate Battery Charges (Colorado, 2004)

Maintenance Challenges for Poll Workers (San Diego, 2004)

Rapid Obsolescence and Toxic Waste Disposal

• When they are obsolete, HAVA funds won’t replace them

• Rechargeable batteries in DREs wear out and are toxic waste



Election Official’s Challengesfrom the San Diego Report, 2004

Recruiting more poll workers, and technically savvy workers

Additional training for poll workers

Testing thousands of machines before each election

Providing troubleshooting and hotline support during an election

Providing field support

Educating the public about using the machines

Handling technical problems on election day

Creating a back up plan for emergency problems



HAVA-Compliant Alternatives

Precinct optical-scan with ballot-marking devices.

• Two major studies of voting systems determined that precinct-count optical scan systems outperformed DRE voting machines in terms of residual voting errors and cost per voter.

• Ballot-marking devices provide all the support for disabled individuals that DREs provide.

Tactile ballots for the vision-impaired and hearing-impaired

• Tactile ballots have been used in Rhode Island very successfully.

Open Voting Consortium System

• Free voting software to install on standard computers provides all the features of other computerized systems.


HAVA does not require DREs. Here are some alternatives:


The Possibility of Paper

Several touch screen systems provide an integrated printer for printing voter-verified paper ballots:

• Avante

• AccuPoll

• TruVote

Some citizen groups advocate the exclusive use of paper ballots in systems where no vote is recorded electronically:

• Ballot Integrity Project



Comparison of ApproximateAcquisition Costs

System Type 5-Booth Precinct

Paperless DRE System $19,000

DREs with integrated VVPB Printer

$20,000

Optical Scan + Ballot-Marking Device

$10,000

Optical Scan + Tactile Ballots $6,000

Open Voting Consortium System

Free software + $6,000

Cost Considerations


Hidden Costs of DREs Increased warehouse costs for secure and environmentally-

controlled storage for the machines when they are not in use.

Increased energy costs for keeping the backup batteries charged between elections.

Increased labor costs for security when these machines are stored overnight at the polling place before an election.

Increased costs for hardware maintenance and software upgrades for each of the thousands of such machines for a typical large county.

Increased costs for expendable parts, including the backup batteries and smart cards used by these machines.

Increased labor costs for verifying the software and firmware version on each machine before every election.

Cost Considerations


More Hidden Costs of DREs

Increased personnel costs for performing logic and accuracy tests on every one of the machines prior to the start of every election.

Increased labor costs for hiring additional poll workers (San Diego required twice as many when it switched to DREs).

Increased training costs for longer training sessions and larger number of poll workers to train on using a more complicated system.

Massive costs for replacing these machines in 10 to 15 years when the technology that they use is no longer maintained or supported by the vendor, and HAVA funding is no longer available.

Cost Considerations


What Computer Experts Say Johns Hopkins/Rice Report on Diebold DRE software

• “Our analysis shows that this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts.”

SAIC Report on Diebold Software

• “The system, as implemented in policy, procedure, and technology, is at high risk of compromise.”

Compuware Report on Diebold, ES&S, Sequoia, and Hart

• The study showed that all four of the voting machines had serious security problems. These problems are described in great detail in the report, which is over 200 pages long.

RABA Technologies Report on Diebold

• "I was really surprised with the totality of the problems we found. Just about everywhere we looked we found them."



How the Vendors Respond

RABA expert

• William Arbaugh, a University of Maryland assistant professor of computer science who participated in the test, graded the system an "F," "with the possibility of raising it to a 'C' with extra credit -- that is, if they follow the recommendations we gave them."

Diebold President

• Bob Urosevich said in the release that the RABA Technologies report confirmed "the accuracy and security of Maryland's voting procedures and our voting systems as they exist today."



Georgia Secretary of State Cathy Cox

From a Walker County, GA news report:

• “The voting machines have been used for six elections, three of which were for the same State House District 1 race. Problems have cropped up at every election.”

Claims made, on Atlanta television, by Cathy Cox days after the problems in Walker County.

• "Though Georgia Secretary of State Cathy Cox said the state’s 26,000 elections voting machines performed without any problems on Super Tuesday earlier this week, some lawmakers Thursday said the machines may nonetheless be vulnerable to fraud and wanted printed receipts to serve as proof of the computer tabulation."



Florida Secretary of State Glenda Hood

U.S. Representative Robert Wexler (D-FL)

• One of the many recent severe election problems in Florida has led to the federal lawsuit filed by Representative Robert Wexler (D-FL). It is currently scheduled for a hearing in August of 2004.

Florida Secretary of State Glenda Hood

• On Lou Dobbs tonight, March 8, 2004, Secretary of State Glenda Hood said this:

“Well, I have a high confidence level. And it's based on the fact that, since 2002, when we put new equipment in place in the state of Florida, that we have had no problem whatsoever, according to our 67 supervisors of elections.”



Clearing up Misconceptions

League of Women Voters' opposition to Voter-verified paper ballot (VVPB) is not a member-endorsed position.

• Many rank and file members strenuously object to the policy and have launched a website in opposition to the Executive Board's action.

No systems require voters to verify their ballots

• If machines are required to provide a method by which voters could verify paper ballots, voters would NOT be required to verify them.



Clearing up More Misconceptions

VVPB does not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act

• Some people are concerned that providing different verification methods to sighted and blind individuals would be a violation of the law. The United States Department of Justice disagreed in an official opinion issued through its Office of Legal Counsel.

Optical scan machines are a reliable way to count paper ballots

• Jim Dickson, vice president for governmental affairs at the American Association of People with Disabilities, says: "As a matter of fact, not theory, whenever paper ballots are counted by an automatic tabulator you never get the same results twice."

However, a Caltech/MIT report says, “"Optical scanning has the best track record of all equipment types currently in use."



Clearing up More Misconceptions

Election Center Received Large Donations from Vendors

• In March of 2004, it was discovered that, for years, the Election Center has been receiving large donations from the three major manufacturers of paperless electronic voting. Optical scan machines are a reliable way to count paper ballots

• Executive Director R. Doug Lewis, a major defender and proponent of DREs, confirmed that the center had taken donations from makers of electronic voting machines – Sequoia, Electronic Systems & Software, and Diebold.

• Lewis said he did not think accepting donations from the manufacturers presented any conflict of interest or breach of ethics.



Election Transparency

Election transparency minimizes fraud and miscounts.

With transparency, ballots are collected and counted in public view.

With electronic voting, ballots are collected and counted by software processes, which are:

• developed by anonymous software engineers, who are hired by vendors.

• federally qualified by anonymous testers, who are hired by vendors.

• installed and maintained by technicians, who are hired by vendors.

• trade secrets of the vendors and therefore not open to public scrutiny.

“An election that uses electronic ballots is not transparent.”


Myth Breakers for Election Officials

For more details, download the entire “Myth Breakers” file: http://www.votersunite.org/takeaction/mythbreakers.pdf

A Brief Summary

copyright ©2004 [email protected] myth breakers for election officials a brief summary hava...

Documents

hava funds

paper ballots hava

hava audit requirements

failed election

election neglecting

general election

myth slide

preface slide