counter-da'esh influence operations: cognitive space narrative

Thiswhitepaperisapprovedforpublicreleasewithunlimiteddistribution.

Counter-Da'eshInfluenceOperationsCognitiveSpaceNarrativeSimulationInsights

May2016

Contributing Authors: Brigadier General Charles Moore (Joint Staff J-39 DDGO), Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI), Ms. Sarah Canna (NSI), Ms. Patricia DeGennaro (TRADOC G-27), Mr. Devin Ellis (University of Maryland, ICONS), Dr. Garry Hare (Fielding Graduate University), Ms. Georgia Harrigan (DHS), Dr. Jerri Lynn Hogg (Fielding Graduate University), Mr. Adam Jonas (TRADOC G-27), Mr. David Koelle (Charles River Analytics), Mr. Jimmy Krakar (TRADOC G-27), SFC Adam Liette (USASOC), Dr. Gina Ligon (UNO), LTC Rafael Linera (USASOC), Ms. Angie Mallory (Iowa State University), SFC Matthew Martin (USASOC), Dr. Kay Mereish (DHS), Dr. Christophe Morin (Fielding Graduate University), Major Peter J. Reiley, Ph.D. (SOCOM), Dr. Pam Rutledge (Fielding Graduate University), MAJ Gregory Seese (USASOC), Dr. Susan Szmania (DHS), MAJ Patrick Taylor (USASOC), Dr. Jon Wilkenfeld (University of Maryland, ICONS), Dr. Rachel Wurzman (University of Pennsylvania)

Scientific Editors: LTC Rafael Linera & MAJ Gregory Seese (USASOC) and Ms. Sarah Canna (NSI)

Integration Editor: Mr. Sam Rhem (SRC)

This white paper represents the views and opinions of the contributing authors. It does not represent official USG policy or position.

Thiswhitepaperisapprovedforpublicreleasewithunlimiteddistribution

TableofContentsForeword:BrigGenMoore,JointStaff,DeputyDirectorforGlobalOperations(DDGO)..........1

ExecutiveSummary:Ms.SarahCanna,NSI..............................................................................2

Chapter1:Pre-PlanningProcess:LTCRafaelLinera,MAJGregorySeese,MAJPatrickTaylor,andSFCAdamLiette,USASOC;&Drs.PamRutledge,JerriLynnHogg,andGarryHare,FieldingGraduateUniversity;&Ms.AngieMallory,IowaStateUniversity...........................................5

Chapter2:DevelopStrategy:LTCRafaelLinera,MAJGregorySeese,MAJPatrickTaylor,andSFCAdamLiette,USASOC,&Drs.GarryHare,PamRutledge&Jerri-LynnHogg,FieldingGraduateUniversity..............................................................................................................10

Chapter3:ExecuteyourStrategy:LTCRafaelLinera,MAJGregorySeese,MAJPatrickTaylor,andSFCAdamLiette,USASOC;Drs.PamRutledge,ChristopheMorin,JerriLynnHogg,andGarryHare,FieldingGraduateUniversity;&Ms.AngieMallory,IowaStateUniversity.........19

Chapter4:ManeuveringtheNarrativeSpace—UnderstandingRelationshipsandNetworks:Ms.PatriciaDeGennaroandMr.AdamB.Jonas,TRADOCG27OperationalEnvironmentTrainingSupportCenter........................................................................................................29

Chapter5:UnifiedandSynchronizedCommunications—AnInter-AgencyPerspective:Dr.KayMereish,Ms.GiaHarrigan,Dr.SusanSzmania,DHS&Dr.GinaLigon,UniversityofNebraska,Omaha..................................................................................................................................34

Chapter6:InfluenceOperations—Observations&Opportunities,MajorPeterJ.Reiley,Ph.D.,USSOCOM.............................................................................................................................39

Chapter7:DesigningaPSYOPWargame—Challenges,Successes,Lessons-Learned:DevinH.EllisandJonathanWilkenfeld,ICONSProject,START,UniversityofMaryland.......................43

Chapter8:KnowYourAudience:Mr.JimmyKrakar,TRADOCG27ModelsandSimulationsDirectorate............................................................................................................................47

Chapter9:VirtualThinkTank—GlobalExpertiseforPopulationandDa’eshTeams:Ms.SarahCanna,NSIInc.......................................................................................................................52

Chapter10:IntegrationAcrossCognitiveArenas:Dr.RachelWurzman,UniversityofPennsylvania.........................................................................................................................56

Chapter11:EmbeddingTechnicalInformationinCounter-VEOMessaging:Dr.AllisonAstorino-Courtois,NSIInc.....................................................................................................59

Chapter12:ProvidingMISOOperatorswithInsightsfromNarrativeScience:DavidKoelle,CharlesRiverAnalytics..........................................................................................................62

AppendixA:ArchivalMaterial...............................................................................................66


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Foreword: Brig Gen Moore, Joint Staff, Deputy Director forGlobalOperations(DDGO)Whenplanning to dealwith any adversary or potential adversaries, it is essential to understandwhotheyare,howthey function, their strengthsandvulnerabilities,andwhy theyopposeus.Eventsoverthe course of the last year and a half highlight the importance of those factors as they relate to theIslamicStateof Iraqand theLevant (ISILorDa’esh).OneofDa’esh’sobviousstrengths is itsability topropagatetailoredmessagesthatresonatewithitsaudiences.IftheUSGovernmentandouralliesaretocounterDa’esheffectively,wemustattackthiscenterofgravity.The Joint Staff J-39 Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) branch has been evaluating options in“CognitiveSpace”toconductInformationOperationstodisruptDa’esh’sabilitytocommandandcontrolforces, neutralize its ability to maintain or increase moral, political, and financial support as well asrecruitforeignfighters.ThisSMAeffortcontinuestoidentifymethodstopsychologicallyisolateDa’eshleaders from one another and their respective constituencies inside and outside of the organization.Furthermore, this SMA effort has been assessing the value of “integrated neuro-cognitive-narrativemaneuver”approachestodevelopmessagesandactionsthataremore likelytohave intendedeffectsand less likely to have undesirable unintended or collateral effects, as well as to evaluate messagedeliverymethodsmore effectively and efficiently by developing campaigns that achieve undercuttingeffects.ThecornerstoneoftheeffortwastheexecutionofasimulationfacilitatedbytheUniversityofMarylandICONSteam,whichsoughtto

a. supportthePsychologicalOperations(PSYOP)community inmeetingtrainingrequirements inwaysthatreinforcethePSYOPprocessandenhancecounter-Da’eshmessaging.

b. support the PSYOP community in integrating neuro-cognitive and social science concepts torefine counter-Da’esh message content and increase the effectiveness of the InformationOperations(IO)campaign.

c. assist the PSYOP community with understanding the operational environment (OE) and thehumannetworksoperating in theOE: friendly, threat,andneutral.Possibleexamples includeproviding a (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure) PMESII-framedOEanalysisandcenterofgravityanalysis.

Thiswhitepaperisacompilationofthekeyfindingsfromthesimulation.


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Executive Summary: Ms. Sarah Canna, NSI [email protected]

Overview

AttherequestofJointStaff/J-39,theStrategicMultilayerAssessment(SMA)program,1incoordinationwith United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and the Department of HomelandSecurity (DHS), participated in a second2 Counter-Da’eshMessaging Simulation that brought togethernearly 100 Psychological Operation (PSYOP) operators, USG and international observers, interagencyrepresentatives,populationexperts fromIraqandNorthAfrica,Da’eshexperts,universities,andthinktanks.ThisexerciseservedasbothatestbedformessagingtechniquesandatrainingopportunityforPSYOPoperators.

The simulationwas run on a synchronous, virtual, anddistributed platform called ICONSnet, designed andmanagedbytheUniversityofMaryland(seeChapter6:Designing a PSYOPWargame). ICONSnetwas designedto advance participants' understanding of complexproblemsandstrengthentheirabilitytomakedecisions,navigate crises, think strategically, and negotiatecollaboratively. This platform was selected for thefollowing,criticalreasons.

• Online, distributed platform: ran across adozen time zones, three continents, and withoverninetyparticipants

• Operationally relevant: provided aninfrequent opportunity to test the effectiveness ofUSGmessaging

• Regional expertise: allowed 30 regionalexperts to provide real-time feedback from theperspectiveofvariouspopulationsegments

• Realistic: supported the integrationofaudio,video, imagery, and other types of formats so thatmessagingcameto thetargetaudiences throughtheappropriatemeansormessengers

• Synchronous: provide live feedback thatchallengedUSG’soperationaltempo

1StrategicMulti-LayerAssessment(SMA)providesplanningsupporttoCommandswithcomplexoperationalimperativesrequiringmulti-agency,multi-disciplinarysolutionsthatareNOTwithincoreService/Agencycompetency.SolutionsandparticipantsaresoughtacrossUSGandbeyond.SMAisacceptedandsynchronizedbyJointStaff/J-39DDGOandexecutedbyASD(R&E)/EC&P/RRTO.2ThefirstsimulationwasheldinDecember2015.

Figure1TeamandActivityStructure

Figure2DistributionofParticipants


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KeyTakeaways

ComparedtotheDecember2015Counter-Da’eshMessagingsimulation,

“This time the anti-ISIL side was doing it right. Volume of messaging? I know my wrist wascrampingup!–MubinShaikh,Red(Da’esh)teammember,formerSalafistactivist,participantinbothDecember2015andApril2016simulations

Thiswasasimulatedenvironment,butpreliminaryresultssuggestedlessonsnotonlyforPSYOPtrainingbut also for increasing the impact of messaging in forward operations. These results are describedbelow.

The pre-simulation preparation andconsequent volume of messaging that theBlueteamwasabletodeployduringtheApril2016simulationappearedtoconfoundDa’eshteameffortstodeliveritsownmessagingandforced it into a reactive position vis-à-visinteracting with the White teams. Whatemerged from this simulation was therealization that an increased operationaltempowithin the narrative space, combinedwith embedded, virtual expertise from a cadre ofmultidisciplinary experts, appeared to increase theeffectiveness3ofDoDmessaginginthesimulatednarrativespace.

EnhancingPYSOPTraining&Effectiveness

Several insights fromthe simulation suggestmeans of enhancingPSYOP training andmessage formation(visualized in the toppartofFigure4).

1. Develop a highlevel strategy thataligns with operationobjectives, which isflexible enough toallow PSYOP operatorsagility to maneuver inthenarrativespace

2. Set clearobjectivesfornarrativecampaigns conducted

3Messageeffectivenesswasmeasuredqualitativelythroughdailyafter-actionsurveystoWhiteteammembers.

Develop'a'strategy'(that'complements'opera3ons'

whenever'possible)'

Set'clear'objec3ves'

Prepare'tranche'of'effec3ve'

material'in'advance'

Virtually'embed'cultural'

&'technical'exper3se'

An3cipate'

follow'on'

messaging'

Test'

Lessons'learned'to'

degrading'ISIL'

messaging'

effec3veness'

Red' White'

H  Use'credible'voices''

H  Ac3ons'and'words'

H  Message'specific'

audiences'

H  Adapt'messaging'to'

popula3on'recep3veness'

H  Flood'the'narra3ve'space'

'H'Do'not'engage'ISIL'on'

ideology'

'H'Stay'on'message;'do'not'

engage'in'backHandHforth'with'

ISIL'

'

Lessons'learned'to'

enhancing'the'PO'process'

Figure4CounterDa’eshMessagingSimulationLessonsLearned

Blue:USG(DoDAnbar,DoDMosul,DoDNinewa,andInteragencyteams)

Red: Da’esh leadership and information operationsteam

White: Population (Anbar,Ninewa,andNorthAfricateams)

Figure3.Descriptionof"Blue,White,andRed"Teams


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insupportofoverallstrategy3. In advance of a narrative campaign, prepare a reservoir of tested,well developedmessaging

aimedspecificallyattargetpopulations4. Develop messages in coordination with cultural and technical experts to take advantage of

multidisciplinary insights from the fields of neuroscience, political science, modeling, andmarketing,etc.

5. Identifystrategiesforrespondinginrealtimetomessagingthatmaybeparticularlyeffectiveorineffective

6. Test theeffectivenessofmessagingand continually refine thePSYOP trainingprocess in safe,simulatedenvironmentsbeforefieldingwhenpossible

DegradingDa’eshMessageEffectiveness

Several generalizations emerged from the simulation regarding the effectiveness of various kinds ofmessaging between the USG, Da’esh, and population teams.4 In an environment devoid of trust, thepopulation teamsoften rejectedUSGmessagingas lackinga credible voice. They suggested thatUSGmessagingwouldonlybeenseenascredibleis if itwerereinforcedthroughactionbyCoalitionforces.Instead, they preferred to hear counter-Da’eshmessaging from local religious and cultural leaders. AsurprisingnumberofpopulationsegmentswereopentoUSG’scounter-Da’eshmessaging inprinciple,butwantedtoengageinadeeperconversationabouthowtoeffectchange.

Thisexercise illustrated thebenefitofusingvirtual, simulationplatforms for testingnotonlymessageeffectiveness,butalsoPOtrainingandoperationaleffectiveness.

4BlueTeam:TherewerefourBlueTeams:BlueAnbar,BlueNinewa,BlueMosul,andInteragency.Red:teamrepresentingDa’eshleadershipandinformationoperationsWhite:Therewerethreewhiteteams:Anbar(violentSalafists,passiveSalafists,politicallyneutral,SunniTribalists,andNeoBaathists);Ninewa/Mosul(violentSalafists,passiveSalafists,politicallyneutral,SunniTribalists,andNeoBaathists,IraqiKurds);NorthAfrica(onlythepopulationatriskofradicalization)


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Chapter 1: Pre-Planning Process: LTC Rafael Linera, MAJ Gregory Seese, MAJ Patrick Taylor, and SFC Adam Liette, USASOC; & Drs. Pam Rutledge, Jerri Lynn Hogg, and Garry Hare, Fielding Graduate University; & Ms. Angie Mallory, Iowa State University Headquarters

Thiswasaground-breakingsimulationthatemployedprovenPSYOPdoctrinecombinedwiththelatest21st century social, behavioral, cognitive, and neuroscience models and applied them to neutralize,overcome,andultimatelydominatethenarrativespace—inrealtime.Keycomponentsthatcontributedtosimulationplanningandexecutionwerethe1. development of real life scenarios that was conducive to PSYOP planning, analysis, and collectiveefforts.2. measurable goals and objectives that provided the behavioral framework and initial strategy forsimulationparticipants.3.detailedlistoftargetaudiencevulnerabilitiesandsusceptibilities(grievances,motivationsincontextto the situation and conditions). The reason for providing this upfront was to keep the simulationnarrative development focused. The simulation was not meant to be a PSYOP planning or a targetaudienceanalysisexercise.4. collegiateacademic support to the teams focusedonnotonlyculturaladvisement,butalsoon thesocial/behavior sciences aspects of influence.While PSYOPhas traditionally hadMaster’s degree andPh.D.levelculturaladvisementsupportintheformoftheStrategicStudiesDetachment(SSD)inthe4thand8thPSYOPGroups,theseprofessionalstypicallylackabackgroundinthesocial/behavioralsciencesandarenotabletoprovidethetypeofsupportneededfortheinfluenceofbehavior.5.fieldtestingofSerieslevelobjectivesrequiringparticipantstobreakdowntheirmessagesintowhatthe Target Audiences needs to ‘know,’ ‘believe,’ ‘feel,’ and ‘do’ provided detailed left/right limits formessageapproval thatwasconducivetoreal-timemessaging. In traditionaldoctrine,only thegeneralthemeisapprovedandeachindividualmessagemustgobackthroughalengthyapprovalprocessthatistime consuming and hinders the neutralization and overcoming of enemy/adversarial messages andactions.Notonlydidthismethodologyresultinbetternarratives(itassistedparticipantstoensuretheytied vulnerabilities/susceptibilities into messaging), but it also allowed them to develop a variety ofmessagesall tied into thepre-approvedseries levelobjectives (thusnot requiring re-approvalofeachmessage).Recommendations:1. Integrate Series level objectives into PSYOP doctrine to improve the quality of narratives and tofacilitaterapidreal-timemessaging,allowingteamstonotonlyneutralizeadversarialpropaganda,buttoseizetheinitiativeandcontrolanddominatethenarrativesinthecognitivebattlespace.


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2. Provide additional funding for the4th and8thGroup Strategic StudiesDetachments (SSD) and—inadditiontotheculturalexperts—includePh.D.-levelsocial/neuro-cognitive/behavioralscientists.3.InvestineducationalopportunitiesforPSYOPnon-commissionedofficers(NCOs)andofficerswithanemphasisonthesocial,behavioral,cognitive,andneurosciences.BlueTeamAnbarPre-planning improvedstrategicand real timemessaging.Pre-plannedcontentallowed formulti-levelassaults—strategiclong-termnarrativesandresponsivemessaging.Specifically,it

1. ensured integration of psychological drivers into commander’s intent. The ‘Brand Psychology’and‘AudienceEngagement’approachcombinedwithPSYOPprocessesestablishedparametersforthereal-timemessaging.

2. increased ability to counter enemy “noise” in social space, freeing up practitioners to moreeasilymonitorcurrentcommunicationwhilemaintainingarobustpresence.

3. enabled rapid testing, adjusting, eliminating, or amplifying in the field to promote successfulmessagingandmoreefficientlydeployresources.

4. encouraged innovative narrative strategies that model desired behaviors through edu-entertainment5 rather than “selling.” This documented approach effectively shifts beliefs andpromotesbehaviorchange.

BlueTeamAnbarhadthreeprimarypre-planninggoals:1)to integratePSYOPmessagingprocesswiththemediapsychologythatisthefoundationforFielding’sbrandpsychologyandaudienceengagementcurriculum(Seeflowchart);2)tocreatemediastrategies,tactics,andpreliminarymediaassetswithintheapprovedscenarioparameters;and3)toestablishworkingrelationshipsamongPSYOPpractitioners,Fielding’smediapsychologists,andthetechnicalliaisons.Theserelationshipswerenecessarytoexpandthe PSYOPmessaging process to include pre-approved narrative channels that allowed for real timemessagecreationthatcouldberapidlytestedinthefield.

5“EntertainmentEducationforBehaviorChange….examinesandteacheswaysinwhicheducationcanbesubtlybuteffectivelyworkedintobothnewandtime-honoredgenresofentertainmenttofosterpositivebehaviorchangeandlifeimprovement…[asitfocusesonthe]abilitytounderstandtheingredientsofsuccessfulentertainment(emotions,empathy,efficacy,andempowerment)andhowtheseingredientscanbeemployedtoenhancesocialandpersonalhealthandlifeskills.”Ref:http://ocw.jhsph.edu/index.cfm/go/viewCourse/course/EntertainmentEducation/coursePage/index/

IntegrationofmediapsychologyintoPSYOPmessagingprocessbyextendingpersonadevelopmentintoemotionsandneeds,andusingpsychologicaltheoryasaframeworkformediadevelopment,design,anddistributiondecisions.


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ResultsandBestPractices:The initial results were promising. Team members had good relationships due to the embeddingprocess. However, communication was hampered by PSYOP members’ conflicting demands thatresultinginlimitedavailability.UnevencontacthamperedintegrationofFieldingframeworkintoPSYOPprocessresultinginanarrowermessagelaneandlessdevelopedstrategythroughoutthesimulation.BlueTeamNinewaIn the pre-planning process, Blue Team Ninewa’s objectives were to 1) develop personas based thetarget audience to inform PSYOP messaging process; 2) use positive psychology (strength-basedpsychologicalapproachenablingindividualsandcommunitiestobeempowered)toinformthestrategyinmediadesign;3)collaboratewith technical liaisons toassessenvironmentalandculturalconditionsinfluencing the target audience (TA) and potential message success; and 4) coordinate with PSYOPpractitioners, Fielding’s media psychologists, and the technical liaisons to create a best practicesapproachsupportingPSYOPinfield.

Fielding’smediapsychologistsworkedtogetherinresearchingTAindetailtocapturethecomplexityoftheNinewapopulationtodraftpersonas.Thepersonadraftswerethensubmittedtotechnicalliaisons,BlueNinewaPSYOPmembers,andPSYOPcontrol(USASOCG39)forfeedbackandapprovaltoproceed.Drafted storyline and script for TA personaswere created and submitted for approval.Media for sixradio episodes alongwith announcements, handbills, and posterswere produced. A launch planwasgenerated.PSYOPcontrol,Fielding’smediapsychologists,andteam-embeddedTAanalystsworkedwellandfluidlytogether.

BlueTeamMosulThe bulk of the pre-simulation planning was conducted by the Narrative Fusion Cell (NFC) withOperationalDesign andTargetAudienceAnalysis being conductedwith the input from the additional

IntegrationofmediapsychologyandbrandpsychologyintoPSYOPmessagingprocessbycreatingpersonaswithidentifiedknowledgeobjectives,beliefobjectives,anddesiredoutcomesusingpsychologicaltheoryasaframeworkformessagedevelopment


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membersoftheteam.NarrativesforeachoftheTargetAudiencesweresubmittedtoUSASOCG39toprovidethe leftandright limitsofourstrategy.Duringthesimulation,thePSYOPTeamLeader largelycontrolledmessagingwithsignificant input fromthe teamregarding timing,phrasingof thenarrative,and response to theWhiteandRedcells injects.As the simulationwasupdated,dailybattle rhythmsandchanges to theoperationaldesignwereprovided toall the teammembersprior toexecution.Toensurecontinuityofthenarrativeandcontinuedmovementtotheobjective,TeamMosulstaged20-30messagesinthedraftfoldertoallowforfasterreviewbytheteamandsubsequentdissemination.

LessonsLearned

Thefirstlessonlearnedistheessentialtaskofplanningandpre-positioningmessagingtokeeptheteamon target during the hectic environment that is present during real-time messaging. Second, it isimperativethatthemessagingisadaptedasthenarrativedevelopstocontinuetomovetothedesiredbehavior. This can be informed by decision points placed throughout the design of the engagementstrategy.RedandWhiteCellmemberswerequick todisprovevisualproducts,pointingout that they“looked western” or “had picture of the Shia.” In contrast, text-only narratives allowed for quickeradaptionto thesituationandmitigated information fratricide.A third lesson learnedwas theneedtoown the narrative space through repetition and mass messaging. This caused information overload,whicheffectivelyshutRedcellmembersoutoftheconversation.Fourth,wealsoobservedthatdirectlycounter-messaging Red cell members could be ineffective as it results in an echo chamber with noresolution.Rather,messagingshouldbedirectedtowardstheTAinordertoownthebattlespaceandincreasetheeffectivenessoftheengagement.Finally,PSYOPtypicallyisconductedtoinfluencetheTAtoconductphysicalactivities,whichhavenomeasuresofeffectiveness inthenarrativespace.Rather,our engagementwould have beenmore effective had the TA been encouraged to conduct activitieswithinthisdimension,herebyincreasingthenumberofimpactindicatorsthatwereobservedduringthesimulation.6

BlueMosulPSYOPTeamLeader’sReflections

Certainly, the simulationwasoneof themostdifficultexercises that Ihaveeverparticipated in,bothduetothecomplexityoftheinformationenvironmentandthespeedatwhichthenarrativedeveloped.ItchallengedmeandrequiredskillslearnedthroughDOD(toincludeMILDEC,EWIC,ACOPC,POQC,SLC,andthreeMISTrotations)inadditiontoprofessionaleducation(MBAinMarketing,MediaPsychology).The simulation is themodel for the fusionof operations, intelligence, andacademia, andwouldbe avaluablevalidationexerciseforadvancedcapabilities/operationalcellspriortoemploymentintheater.

WehavetalkedinternallyhereattheNFCabouthowwewouldreplicatethisstrategyinreallifeifgiventheauthority todoso in thePACOMAOR.Thiswasavaluableexercise thatchallengedour teamandrequired all the professional and academic training that we had received during our careers. Irecommend that this simulation continue in order to prove the concept of real-time messaging by

6RemarksfromUSASOCG39:Manyoftheteam-membersemphasizedthatweneededtoenabletheTAtoact.Suggesttailoringfutureexercisestonotonlypreventaction,butrather,thattheTA’sindicatetheiractioninthenarrativespace.Ontheotherhand,whilesuggestingtocreatesomebehaviorsthatareconductedwithinthenarrativespace,theymusteventuallyspilloverintotherealworld.Suggest(inthefuture)havingawargamingsessionofjustonlinebehaviors.


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PSYOP forcesand tovalidateadvancededucation receivedby servicemembers, suchas thegraduatecertificateprogramandthecapabilitiesofoperationalcellspriortoemploymentintheatre.

ValueoftheMediaPsychologyCertificateProgram

Thecertificatewasinvaluabletomyabilitytoinfluencethenarrativespace.ThetwomainpointsthatIutilizedwere theuseof transmedia andpersonadevelopment.Myengagement strategywasdirectlybased on transmedia: understanding that a narrative can have a greater impact on the TA if it issupplemented through multiple conduits. Rather than working independently, all forms of mediacomplementoneanotherandhaveagreaterlevelofinfluencewhenusedconcurrently.Ireplicatedthisapproachduring the simulationbypostingnarrative injectsusing socialmedia, television, radio, SMS,key communicators, etc.Duringmypre-missionplanning, I took the raw informationgatheredduringtarget audience analysis to develop a persona (which I called the TA profile to avoid confusionwithother utilizationsof "persona") of eachof the TAs to better understand their life, vulnerabilities, andtheirreactionstothemessagingstrategy.


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Chapter 2: Develop Strategy: LTC Rafael Linera, MAJ Gregory Seese, MAJ Patrick Taylor, and SFC Adam Liette, USASOC, & Drs. Garry Hare, Pam Rutledge & Jerri-Lynn Hogg, Fielding Graduate University HeadquartersStrategyDevelopmentProcessHaving lines of efforts at the high operational/low strategic level with end states was essential forenablinglocalnarrativestobedevelopedthatwerebasedontheoperationalenvironment,bothinthephysicalandcognitiverealms,andatthelocallevel.

DesiredEndstate

ISILleadershipandorganizationdelegitimized,violentimpactsofnarrativereduced.

Regionalpartnersexhibitunitedcommitmentagainstviolentmovements,andcommitmenttopoliticalandsocialreform.

Socialstabilityandnonviolentmovementscharacterizenormalcy.

DesiredConditions

*ISILviolencecontainedtoIraq/Syria*ISILinternallyfractured*ISILperceptiondegraded

*Regionalcoalitionpursueslong-term,bindingcommitmenttoresolution*Regionalpartnersexhibitpoliticalreform

*Societalacceptanceofgovernmentalreform*Nonviolentcivilempowerment

LinesofEffort1

Shape2 Mitigate3 ExploitLOE1:DivisiveISFocused

DenyISILsuccessonthebattlefieldDifferencesbetweenleadership/FFAtrocitiesandcriminalactsPromotecomicalperceptionofthegroup

2

1

3

3

LOE2:Cohesive(partnerfocused)

RegionalunittocounterISILthreatPoorgovernance/poorsecuritycapacityPositivepoliticalchange

3

2

1

CondemnationfromlegitimateMuslimauthoritiesintheregion(KingofJordan,etc…)

EnemyEffects1-ISILlosesmomentumofsuccess2-ISILunabletosustaincivilorder3-ISILfailstosynchreligion/narrative/org.4-ISILperceptiondegradedthroughmockeryandsatire

SocietalEffects1-Qualityoflifeisimproved2-Civilawarenessandacceptanceofgovernmentreformefforts3-Nonviolentmovementsaresynonymouswithcivilempowerment

LOE3:CapacitySocietalFocused

CivildevelopmentMistrustofgovernmentinstitutionsPositivesocialchange

3

2

1

RegionalPartnerEffects1-RegionalcoalitionentersbindingagreementtocountertheISILthreat2-Regionalpartnersmakevalideffortstoaddresspoorgovernance,andpoliticalreformtocounterwidespreaddistrust

Blogpostinggrassroot organizationseffortsatthelocallevel;“i-ISLAM”

The overarching operational design accounts for our three major target audience groups: potentialsupporters, adversary, and “free rider” (neutral). The lines of effort are specifically constructed to bemutuallysupportiveandallowthegenerationoflocalmovementsandsupport.The lines of effort closely follow socialmovement theory and utilize elements of the “psychology ofsocial change.” These elements and goals allowed the inherent phasing of local activities based on aSpecialWarfareconstruct.Thedesignassumedthatatthelocal level,thesituationwouldbedifferentbydegree.A rigidphasing and structurewould inhibit the ability of the local units to accomplish theoverallobjective.ExamplesareBlueTeamMosul’senemyfocus,andBlueTeamNinewa’scohesivefocus


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in the initial phase to create “narrative and cognitive maneuver space,” setting a condition for thegenerationongroundmovementliketheFOM.ReflectingCommentsInthewordsofCSLewis,“Don'tusewordstoobigforthesubject.Don'tsayinfinitelywhenyoumeanvery;otherwiseyou'llhavenowordleftwhenyouwanttotalkaboutsomethingreallyinfinite.”7Wordshave truepoweronlywhen linked together effectively into anarrative.Narratives create a story andframework that the human mind can understand in order to break down cognitive barriers. Thisnarrative, in short, creates interest and in his seminal work, The Logic of Collective Action, MancurOlson8 discusses the simple fact that “without an interest, there is no group.” This group interest isessential in narrative design. Narratives are transformative and have power, often using existingnarratives to challengedominantparadigms. It is essential tobegin reframingandchanging stories inthedominantculturetocreatemorepoliticalpossibilityforsocialmovements.This understanding led to a few key points about strategic narrative design: 1) think holistically, 2)respecthistory,3)appreciatecontext,4) tella story,4)enlist collectivevalues,5)generateanalogies,and6)inviteaudienceengagement.9Theseparametersallowedforthedevelopmentoflinesofeffortsat the high operational/low strategic level with end states, which was essential in enabling localnarratives to be developed based on the operational environment in both the physical and cognitiverealmsatthelocallevel.Thisapproachtostrategicnarrativedevelopmentsupportedandenhancedourmaneuverabilityinthecognitivespace.BlueTeamAnbarStrategyDevelopmentProcess

• DevelopedmessagetemplatebasedonBrandPsychology&AudienceEngagementcurriculum• Researched TA, initial scenarios, anddrafted 16potential narrative threads formulti-pronged

messagingapproach• Submitteddraft totechnical liaisons,BlueAnbarPSYOPmembers,&Control for feedbackand

approvaltoproceed• Producedmediaforeightof16potentialthreads,withlaunchplan

Strategydevelopmenthappenedintwostages:1)preplanningofpersonasandnarrativethemesand2)usingthethemestoguiderealtimemessaginginresponsetoscenariochanges,interjects,andmessageflows.

Blue Team Anbar invested approximately 80 hours in developing narrative strategies that linked thePSYOP process with media psychology. This was evident in the persona development, the range ofnarrative strategies, and the media designed to triggers beliefs and emotions that lead to desiredbehaviors.

7C.S.Lewis,TheCollectedWorksofCSLewis.8MancurOlson,LogicofCollectiveAction:PublicGoodsandtheTheoryofGroupsRev.ed.(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1971).9http://strategic-narrative.net/byAmyZalman,04MAY2016.


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BlueTeamAnbarresearchedanddevelopedfourpersonasbasedontheinitialscenariosanddrafted16potential narrative threads for a multi-pronged messaging approach. These were submitted to thetechnicalliaisonsforfeedbackandtocontrolforapproval.BasedonfeedbackfromthetechnicalliaisonandControl,Fieldingmembersdevelopedarangeofvisual,text,andvideoassetsusingeightofthe16approvednarrativethreads.

EachthreadtargeteddifferentemotionaldriverstoachievethestatedSPOs.AdetailedreleasescheduleaccompaniedthemediadesignedforDay1toassurestrategiccontinuityandcoherence.Thisapproachcanbe replicated in the fieldbyestimating themessagingwindow surrounding theprimaryobjectiveandoperationtiming.

Pre-planningfacilitatedtheabilitytoadapttoradicalscenariochanges,allowingtheteamtoquicklydesignandproducemediathatfittheinitialnarratives,adjustedfortheradicalshiftinscenarioforBlueAnbar.

Pre-planned content allowed formulti-level assaults—strategic long-term narratives and responsivemessaging.

Developingastrategicplanwithmultiplenarrativethreadsensuredthe integrationofpsychologicaldrivers into the commander’s intent. We applied the Brand Psychology and Audience EngagementapproachtothePSYOPprocessesinordertocreateparametersforthenarrativechannelssubmittedtoControlforapproval.Thisprovidedthematicguidelinesforboththepreparedandreal-timemessaging.ThePSYOPtendencytofocusonnear-termmeasurableobjectivescanmeanthatlonger-termnarrativeapproachesareoverlooked

Acriticalelementofnarrativecombatistohavetheabilitytocounterenemy“noise”inthenarrativespace.Releasingpreplannedmediaassetsfreedpractitionerstomonitorthecommunicationflowswhilemaintainingarobustpresence.

Multiplenarrativethreadsandpreparedassetsenabledrapidtestingsothatpractitionersinthefieldcanquicklydecidewhatworksandwhatdoesnot,andmoreefficientlydeployresources.

ExamplesofmessagingpreparedtochallengeDa’eshimageonDay3inresponsetoscenarioshiftthatputDa’eshincontrolofRamadi,creatingjobsandhandingoutmoney.


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Preplanning encouraged more innovative narrative strategies, such as edu-entertainment andtargeting supporting audiences, such as village women, rather than repetitively “selling” the samemessagetothesameaudience.

BlueTeamNinewaStrategyDevelopmentProcess

• DevelopedmessagetemplatebasedonBrandPsychology&AudienceEngagementcurriculum• ResearchedTAindetailtocapturecomplexityofNinewapopulation• Submittedpersonadrafts to technical liaisons, BlueNinewaPSYOPmembers, andControl for

feedbackandapprovaltoproceed• Drafted storyline and script for TA personas. Produced media for six radio episodes, plus

announcementswithlaunchplan

StrategyfocusedaroundforcingDa’eshfromNinewaandconvincingtheNinewapopulationtheymustorganize and rise up against Da’esh. The strategywas enacted by conveying a vision for theNinewapopulationofaNewDaytheycouldcreate.Themessagingtoolswereprimarilybasedonasix-episoderadioseriesfeaturingvariousmembersoftheNinewapopulationdiscussinghowthefuturedependsonthem,thattheyarestrong,thatitisaNewDay,andthetimeisnowtoorganizeagainstDa’esh.

BlueTeamNinewainvestedapproximately100hoursindevelopingtargetaudiencepersonasbasedthevarious contingencies of the Ninewa population, developing radio scripts, producing radio media,supportingannouncementsof theradioshows,andcreatingposters linkedtotheradioshowandtheNewDayvision.AllmessagingwaslinkedtothePSYOPprocessaswellasmediapsychologytheoryandapplications.PSYOPcontrolreviewedallmediaandmessagingcompletedinthepreplanning.


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BlueTeamMosulOperationalDesignTheobjectiveforBlueTeamMosulwastofomentanuprisingagainsttheDa’eshoccupationinMosul,Iraq. To accomplish this scenario, the team devised an operational design that would task differentsegments of the population in order to form the three necessary components for unconventionalwarfarewhilesimultaneouslyincorporatingadeceptionstrategytoinfluenceDa’esh’sposture.

In order to implement this strategy, we incorporated four separate lines of effort to influence thepopulation to form a guerilla force, an underground, and an auxiliary, with the deception effortoccurringinthelaterstagesofthesimulation.Broadlyspeaking,ourtargetaudiencesfortheseeffortsweremarriedmen forming the guerilla force,marriedwomen as the underground, and unemployedteenagemenastheauxiliary.ThesetargetaudienceswerechosenbasedontheirabilitytoperformthedesiredbehaviorgiventhecurrentsituationwithinMosul.

PersonaDevelopment

BlueTeamMosulalso implementedpersonadevelopmentduringthetargetaudienceanalysisprocessto gain a better understanding of the TA, their vulnerabilities and motivations, and the anticipatedresponsetonarrativeinjects.Theprocessofpersonadevelopmentalsohumanizesthetargetaudience(TA),allowingtheteamtoempathizewiththeirplightandgeneratemoreeffectivestrategiestocounterthe influence thatDa’esh is able tomaintainover their lives andminds. The target audience analysis

MosulOperationDesignandLinesofEfforts


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worksheets that were developed in support of the exercise were lengthy, in-depth documents thatroutinelyexceededtwelvepagesinlength.Asaresult,thekeyfacts,conditions,andvulnerabilitiesthatweresignificanttotheengagementstrategywereoftentedioustofindandatrueunderstandingofthevariousTAsdifficultforallteammemberstoimmediatelyunderstand.

Todevelopthepersonas,whichwererenamedinto“TAProfiles”bythePSYOPteamtoavoidconfusionwithotherusesoftheword“persona,”informationderivedfromtargetaudienceanalysiswasusedtocreatethenarrativeforonememberoftheTA.BackgroundinformationfilledinthegapsintheTA’slifestory through assumptions, historical facts, and information about the TA from the Technical Team.TeamMosulobservedthatthisextrastepintheplanningprocesswashighlyeffectiveinunderstandingthehumanelementoftheTA,allowingforbetterandmoreeffectivemessagingduringtheexerciseinaddition toprovidingananalysis-derivedproduct thatcouldbequickly readandunderstoodbyotherteam members and higher headquarters. This facilitates greater team-driven development of thenarrativeinjectsthatareessentialtochangingthebehavioroftheTA.

Oncethetargetaudienceanalysisandpersonadevelopmentwascomplete,theteambeganplanningforthe engagement strategy during the simulation. Through a FRAGO issued from theUSASOCG39, theteamwasgiventhedesiredoutcomesforeachoftheregionsthatarecurrentlyunderDa’eshinfluence.By enabling the team to design their strategy within the construct of series-level objectives, thisprovided complete freedom of maneuver throughout the narrative space to influence the targetaudiencesintoperformingthedesiredbehaviorsthatwouldresultinaccomplishmentoftheendstate.

ForMosul,thisrequiredtheBlueteamtodevelopastrategythatwouldencourageapopularuprisingandrevoltagainsttheoccupation.Nestingoureffortsundertheumbrellaconstructofunconventional

TargetAudienceProfileExample


16

warfare (UW), thestrategywouldencompass threeseparate linesofeffort to formtheguerilla force,underground,andauxiliarycomponentsofaUWoperation.Understanding that these threeelementshave differing activities in UW, a deliberate delineation was made to target three different targetaudiences toactasmembersof their respectiveUWcomponent.Broadlyspeaking, the threeprimarytarget audiences that were developed for the campaign were: married men as the guerilla force,marriedwomenastheunderground,andunemployedteenagemenastheauxiliary.Thesethreetargetaudienceswere selected primarily on their ability to conduct their respectiveUWactivities given therestrictionsthatwereplaceduponthembyDa’eshinMosul.

To formthestagesof thestrategy,BlueTeamMosul took thedeliberateapproachofsegmenting thestrategyintothreedistinctstages,whichwouldoccuroneachofthethreedaysofthesimulation.Usingthesametactics thatareemployedbyviolentextremistorganizations (VEOs)duringtheir recruitmentprocess,thestageswerestaggeredto(1)builduponexistingvulnerabilitiesandgrievancesbythetargetaudience, (2) engage and educate the target audience on activities that they can conduct to resistDa’esh occupation, and (3) encourage adoption of the activities in the narrative and physical space.Expandinguponthepersonasthatweredevelopedduringthetargetaudienceanalysisphase,theteamsoughttopredicttheresponsethattheTAwouldhavetothevariousnarrativeinjectsinordertoshapethedisseminationplan.Thepredictionsmadeduringtheplanningprocessturnedouttobeaccurate,astheTAbegantoseekinformationaboutwhattheycoulddotoresisttheDa’eshoccupation,ratherthansimplybeingcompelledtoactproactively.

MosulOperationStages


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LessonsLearned

While theengagementstrategywaseffective, itwouldhavebeenmorepowerfulhadbehaviorsbeensuggestedthatwerelesskineticandmoreaccessibletotheTA(see198MethodsofNonviolentActionforaconsolidatedlistofprotestandpersuasionactivities)inadditiontofacilitatingadecreaseinfearofretaliationbyDa’esh forces. The stagingof thesenarrativeswas such that theTAwouldbegraduallyintroducedwithincreasinglymoredifficultactivitiesthatwouldbuildtooutrightrevoltagainstDa’esh.Inaddition,mostofthebehaviorsthatwereencouragedthroughmessagingtookplaceinthephysicalrealm, which could not be measured or observed in the narrative space. Going forward, counter-narrativemessaging needs to encourage a series of behaviors that can be executed in the narrativespace,suchascounteringDa’eshpropaganda,organizinggroupsonline,orpostingpro-Iraqi/resistancepropaganda. The effect of owning the narrative space cannot be understated, as we have seen theeffectofDa’eshcontrollingthenarrativebattlespaceduringtheirrisetopower.

TakeAways

1.Theresultoftheplanningprocesswasthedevelopmentoftheseriesnarrative,whichwassenttoUSASOC G39 (PSYOP control, simulation J39 and Headquarters Element) for approval and de-confliction.

198MethodsofNonviolentAction


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2.Onceanarrativewasapproved,theteamwouldhavetheirleftandrightlimits,withinwhichtheyhad total control and authority to adapt their narrative injects to continue to move towards thedesiredendstate.

3.ThiswasessentialtoallowingflexibilityandadaptationwhentheWhitecellmemberswouldrespondtoinjectswithquestionsorconcernsregardingthedesiredbehavior.Rephrasingoracompletereworkofthenarrativeinjectswouldbecomecriticalandwouldnothavebeenpossiblehadauthoritybeenrequiredforeachindividualdissemination.

4.InadditiontoencouragingtheTAtoperformactivitiesthatactivelycounterDa’eshcontrolofMosul,the team implemented a series of deception narratives into the operational design, with thedeceptiongoalofprovidingtheTAwithfreedomofmovementtoconducttheiractivitiesinthecity.

a.Throughawar-gaming sessionwith theothermembersof the team, thedeception conceptwasrefinedtoberootedinbelievableeventsontheground,withculturalexpertsprovidingfeedbackonDa’esh’sstrategyshouldthenarrativebetrue.

b. Thiswas reworked several times—with contingency plans in place should the situation change orDa’esh not respond in away thatwas anticipated.Similar to the TA, this strategywouldhavebeenmoreeffectivehaddeceptionbeenfocusedonachievingdeceptiongoalsinthenarrativespace,suchasbaitingRedcellroleplayersintocontradictingthemselvesorchangingtheirnarrative.


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Chapter 3: Execute your Strategy: LTC Rafael Linera, MAJ Gregory Seese, MAJ Patrick Taylor, and SFC Adam Liette, USASOC; Drs. Pam Rutledge, Christophe Morin, Jerri Lynn Hogg, and Garry Hare, Fielding Graduate University; & Ms. Angie Mallory, Iowa State University

BlueTeamAnbar

BlueTeamAnbarhadmixedsuccessintegratingallteammembers,whichhighlightedseveralimportantfactorsforsuccessfullyengaginganaudienceandholdingthenarrativespace.

Multi-disciplinary teamsarecritical.Reachback tounseenexpertsdoesnotwork.Ourexperienceofcommunication breakdowns showed that goodwill is not enough to bridge the gap. Integration ofcultural,psychological,andmediaproductionexpertiseisessentialforauthenticandspecificmessagingstrategies from inception of primary narrative threads to actual media creation. The hesitation toinvolveexpertsatanearlystage isdestructivetosuccessandteamcohesion.Communicationtrainingcan also address the differences between civilian and military communication styles, expectations,respect,andtrust.

Embedded experts are critical. Technical Team integration is essential to enhance authenticity andspecificityfrominceptionofprimarynarrativethreadstoactualmediacreation.Teamintegrationwouldbenefitfromcommunicationtrainingtoaddressanymilitaryvs.civilianbehavioralpatternsandimprovecollaboration.

Da’esh’sbrandexistsatmultiplelevels.Engagingaspecifictargetaudienceandmaintainingcontrolofthenarrativespaceisfrequentlynotthesamething.Thisunderscorestheneedformulti-prongmessageapproachandmorenuancedtargetaudiences.

Messagingisachessgame.PSYOPpractitionerswouldbenefitfromlearningskillsthathelpthemthinkstrategically rather than reactively beyond the first move. Relevant skills include 1) developing andprotecting a brand narrative; 2) identifying psychological drivers of audience engagement beyondgrievances such as affiliation, meaning, power, fear, identity, emotion, and instinct; and 3) strategic

message planning–choice of medium, anticipatingresponse, defending messages, counter-messaging, andstrategictiming.

A clear future vision is needed to anchor messagestrategies no matter what the PSYOP objective is.Disrupting the narrative space and motivating behaviorchange means painting a compelling and emotionalpicture of a desirable future to compete with Da’esh’sbrand story of a utopian caliphate. Messaging thatundermined Da’esh’s brand did not fill the vacuum ofuncertainty because it lacked specifics and proof.Behavior change comes from being able to “see” thefuture.Theneedremains foraclearvisioncorroborated

Join the fight against Da’esh today

The future of Iraq will be bright if you

fight for it united as one

Exampleofmediacreatedtoinspirehope.Whentrusthasbeenlost,theseneedtobeaccompaniedbyconcreteevidence.


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byactiontoencouragetheoptimismandbeliefsthatleadtowillingnesstoact.

SimulationBenefits

1)AllowedustoidentifyprocessissuesthatcanberesolvedwithgreaterfamiliaritywithICONSplatform

2)Highlightedtheimportanceofgettingtherightmedium-messagefit

3)EmphasizedtheneedforadeepunderstandingoftheTAtocreateauthenticnarratives

4)Highlightedthenecessityofbetterclarificationofteamexpectationsregardingroles,interaction,access,andparticipation

SimulationChallenges

1)Difficultyachievingconsistentintegrationbetweenvariousteamcomponents

2)Limitedabilitytopromiseresourcesnecessarytocreateapositivevisionofthefuture—particularlyinDay3whenAnbarscenarioshifthadDa’eshprovidingmuchneededservices

3)Directfocusonmeasurableobjectivesmeanslonger-termnarrativeapproachesareover-looked

BlueTeamNinewa

BlueTeamNinewahadaproactivetechnicalliaisonthatprovidedarangeofinformationandideasfromconceptstrategytomediaproduction.Pre-planningmeetingsbetweenFielding’smediapsychologistandthe technical liaison (and later in theprocess thePSYOPmembers)added to the fluidityand responsetimewhileinsimulation.Theteamwastrulyabletoactasagroupengagingtheaudience.

Maintained narrative focus is critical. The focus on apositive future vision appeared to get good tractionduring the simulation.Mediawas createdand rolledouton schedule with the specific vision to the communityworking together to oust Da’esh.Messaging followed tosupport the created media argument (creating a NewDay—positive vision) and stayed on message while alsolinkingtomessage.Preplanningandschedulingprovidedagood foundation, freeing up team members to monitorandreacttoothermessagesinrealtimewhilestillholdingthenarrativespace.

Team integration is important. Time was spent in thepreplanningperiodtolearnteammembers’strengthsandexpertise as well as to design specific tasks that bestsupportedtheirknowledgeandproficiencies.Therewerea few challenges in achieving integration among variousteamcomponentsduetochangeinscheduleandpersonalfamilyemergencyofsomeofthePSYOPmembers.Havinga multi-disciplinary team—as well as time for teammembers to become adept in collaboration—

ExampleofmediacreatedtoannouncetheradioepisodewhilealsosupportingthevisionofaNewDay.


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strengthenedteameffectivenessandefficiency.

Long-term vision needs to be actionable. In pre-planning, the message was specifically focused onempowerment.Allmedia(radio,recordedradioforsocialmediaposting,announcements,andposters)werespecificallydesignedaroundthemessage.

Thereal-timeresponsesinthesimulationneedtobecontinuallylinkedtothevisionofempowermentand the ability of the community to create a 'New Day’ narrative strategy. During the simulation, itbecame clear that the New Day narrative strategy, whileeffective, fell short due to the inability toprovideactionablestepswithconcreteresources.

SimulationBenefits

1) Proactive technical liaison provided a range of information and ideas from concept to mediaproduction

2)Maintainednarrativefocusonpositivefuturevision,whichappearedtogetgoodtraction

3)Preplanningandschedulingprovidedgoodfoundation,freeingupteamtomonitorandreacttoothermessagesinrealtime

SimulationChallenges

1)Difficultyachievingintegrationamongvariousteamcomponents

2)Focusonempowermentwaslimitedbyinabilitytoprovideactionablestepswithconcreteresources

Recommendation

Create messages containing actionable steps to follow and support vision messaging: When themessagesgarnerattentionandinterest, it isessentialtohaveanoutlineofnextsteps(behaviors)thatcanbemessagedforaction.

BlueTeamMosul

Thestrategywasexecutedinthreestages,eachtakingplaceonaseparatedayofthesimulation.StageonewasdesignedtopreparetheenvironmentbyhighlightingtheatrocitiesthatDa’eshhadcommittedduring their two-year occupation and directing the anger of the TA towards Da’esh. Stage two wasdesigned to engage and educate the TA by insertingmessaging that would remotely train the TA in

various skills, such as weapons use, tradecraft, andclandestine communication. Deception wasintroducedinthisstage,withthegoalofencouragingDa’esh to resume offensive operations outside ofMosul,leavingtheTAwithfreedomofmovementinthe city. Day three was the employment stage,wheretheTAwasintroducedtotacticssuchasbattledrills and pushed to join the resistance forcecurrently active inMosul. Deceptionwas continuedin this stage, with the goal of encouraging Da’eshfighters to search forUSgeo-sensors thathadbeen

SamplePrintProductDisseminatedDuringSimulation


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introducedtothesimulationandexposethemselvestofire.

TeamMosulenteredintothesimulationwithafairlygoodideaaboutwhattoanticipateandhowthenarrativewould be constructed. Quickly, the Red andWhite cellmemberswere able to confuse theteamthroughrapidengagementandrebuttalsofthedisseminationpoints.Asaresult,theteamspentasignificantamountoftimetryingreacttothevariousmessages,butfoundtheywewereunabletokeepup with their messaging. Quickly, we discovered that the products that were created prior to thesimulationbecameirrelevant,astheemerginginformationandperceptionsoftheTArenderedmanyofourmessages inoperable. Thiswas expoundedby the ability of bothRed andWhite cellmembers topointoutanymistakesthatweremadeintheuseofimageryandwordingontheproducts.

Inaddition,directcounter-messagingtoRedcellmembers, tryingtodisprovetheirarguments,wasatbestineffectiveandmayhaveevenexposedourignorancetotheinfluencethatIslamhadontheTA.Bytheobservationof the team leader, therewereno successful instancesofdirectly counter-messagingthe Da’esh role players, as engagements would result in an effect similar to an echo chamber andrequiredsignificanttimetocontinuetheconversationwithlittletonohopeofresolution.However,aswas done during the planning of the strategy, the teamdecided to use this strategy against Red cellduringsubsequentengagements.Byinundatingthenarrativespacewithrepeatedmessaging,wewereable to replicate the sameconfusionandover-stimulation thatwehadexperiencedondayone.As aresult,dominationof thenarrative spaceoccurredand the teamwasable todiminish thenoise fromRedcellroleplayers.

Toadapttotheinformationenvironment,theteamfocusedonmessagesthatcouldbequicklyeditedtomeet the needs of the TA as opposed to pre-positioned PDFs of print products. The ICONS platformcontained a draft folder, intowhichnarrative injects couldbepre-positioned to allow formore rapidengagementwiththeenvironment,inputfromthetechnicalteamstored,andusedtokeeptheteamontrack to achieving their strategic objectives. This was largely accomplished through describing theproduct that was to be disseminated in the text box, similar to line nine of the product/actionworksheet, andpushing it out as quickly as possible. In a real-life scenario, the teamanticipates thatgreater assets, to include cultural experts and25-seriespersonnel,wouldbeessential toquickly turn

ICONSDisseminationExample


23

these concepts into products. However, the power of narrative-only injects cannot be undersold,especiallywhenconsideringtheculturalrelevanceandinfluencethatstorytellingcanhaveonthetargetaudiences.Finally,whileothergroupsplannedthedisseminationoftheirproductsbasedontimelines,BlueTeamMosuldidsobasedoninternaldecisionpointsthatwereplannedpriortoeachengagement.Essentially,onceweobservedimpactindicatorsthatwouldconcludethattheTAacceptedthenarrativeinjects,thestrategywouldcontinuetothenextobjective.

Thefinalconsiderationthatwasnotedwithregardstostrategyexecutionwasthedevelopmentofthescenarioasaresultofnarrativeinjectsandsituationalupdatesinthephysicalspace.Asthescenariowasdesignedtotakeplaceoveraperiodofmonths,thisoftenrequiredextensiveadaptationstoensurethatthestrategytookintoconsiderationthechangesontheground.Toassurethattheteamwouldbeabletoachieveinformationdominanceduringthesecondandthirddayofthesimulation,greaterplanninghad tobeconducted inbetween theengagements. The intelligencebriefingswere released thenightbefore each engagement, allowing for the development of an order of battle and strategicmessageswere adapted to take advantage of developments and mitigate unintended consequences. ThedevelopmentoftheFreeOfficer’sMovement,aseparatistgroupoperatingtocounterDa’eshcontrolinMosul, was leveraged to provide the TA with a group that they would be able to organize around.FurtherpotentialriftswereexposedthatlentthemselvestodeceptiontokeeptheRedcellparticipantsconfusedandonthedefensive.Thisdeliberateapproachwasadvantageoustoallowtheteamleadertomaintaincontrolovertheexecutionof thenarrativestrategyandensurethatmessaging is tailoredtomeetthegrowingneedsanddesiresoftheTA.

HeadquartersAnti-Da’eshRecruitingEfforts

Recruits are joiningDa’esh by the thousands around theworld. They are young, impressionable, anddrivenbypowerfulmotives.Onlymessagesthatarearchitectedtotriggerspecificresponsesintargetscandeliverresults.


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TestedNarrativesthatInformedPersuasiveMediaDevelopment

Afirstroundofsuchmessageswasdesignedtoexploretheemotional,visual,andcognitiveboundariesof counterpropaganda campaigns—all within the approved narratives. These were divided in threemajor groups: FACT-BASED, FEAR-BASED, and HUMOR-BASED. Among these categories, they weretailoredtohittopicssuchasCOMMUNITY,ADVENTURE,REVENGE,andSEXUALFRUSTRATION.Giventherelativeyoungageofthetargetaudience(teenagers,adolescents), it isvery likelythatfear-based messages will have the strongest impact. We are currently conducting the forensics on themessagesthatattainedmoretractiontoinformsuchhypothesis.PredictiveEyeTrackingofEachMessagePredictiveeye tracking—aproof-of-conceptdemoof thesomeof themostvaluable technologies thathaveappeared inthe last fewyearstopredicttheeffectofmessagesonthebrain—servedtopretest(neurotestingphase)productspriortotheirdissemination.Basedonitsexecution,thiskindofresearchmethodology requires a rapid, nimble, and competent team of experts (a Special Operations teamcomposedofprofessionalneuroscientists).Predictiveeyetrackingwasutilizedforeachmessage.Seeexamplebelow.


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Predictiveeyetrackingsimulateshumanvisionandcreatesmeasurement reports thatpredictwhatareal humanwouldbemost likely to lookat. The reports closely resemblea five secondseye trackingsessionof40subjects.

TheAttentionHeatMap(AHP)displaysthemostattractiveelementsoftheimageintheformof"hot"and "cold" spots. The AHP report shows how areas of an image attract the attention. The heatmapcolors range fromgreen throughyellow to red.Thecolorsare representing low (green),mediumandhighlevelsofattention(red),respectively.Areaswithnocolorimplythatthisareawillbeignored.


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The Opacity Map (OP) removes areas that are not attractive and only visually displays what yourviewersmayperceiveduringthefirstfewsecondsofvisualinspection.Themosttransparentareasarethose thatattractmoreattention.Use theOP report to identifywhichareasarebeingperceivedandwhicharebeingignored.

TheGazePlot(GP)reportvisualizesthescanpathsandorderbetweenelementsinsidetheimage.AGPreportisalsoreferredasascanpathreport.Itismadeofaseriesofshortstops(calledfixations)andfastmovementsofaneye(calledsaccades).Fixationsaremarkedwithcirclesalongwithanumberthatstatetheorderinwhichtheeyesmovebetweenfixations.Thefirstfixationismarkedwiththenumber(1).Onaverage,fixationslastforaround200milliseconds(ms)duringthereadingoflinguistictext,and350msduringtheviewingofascene.Thereareupto30fixationsinthereport,representingupto7.5secondsgazepath.(250msx30=7.5seconds)

Predictiveeyetrackingishelpfulduringearlystagesofthecreativedevelopmentprocessbutdoesnotprovidethereliabilityanddepthoftrueeyetrackingresearch.


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Recommendation:Post-SimulationTestingWe recommend testing a selection of the messages that ran during the simulation using a suite ofneurosensorstorecordautonomicandcognitiveactivity.MediaNeurosciencefocusedcompaniessuchas SalesBrain have demonstrated that capturing neurodata below subjects’ level of awarenesscontributecriticalinsightsthatcanexplainandpredicttheeffectofmessagesonthebrain.FieldingGraduateUniversityReflectionApplyingneurosciencetoolsandmethodstopre-producedvisualmediacanidentifyemotionaltriggerswithinmessage;however,

1. pre-produced media has limited value in real world settings—rapid communication is ofhighvalue.

2. anarrativeandanindividualmessageisnotthesamething.J39’sapprovalofthenarrative

shouldenablePSYOPtooperatewithinit.

3. communicationstrategyneedstowrapbacktotheintelligencebriefings.Themosteffectivecommunicationrelatestoobservableeventsontheground.

4. deceptioncanbeveryeffectiveandenablesPSYOPtotakeandkeeptheinitiative.Heretoo,

themosteffectivemessagesneedtoberootedinrealorbelievableeventsontheground.

5. ideological messages are pretty much a waste of time. Localized media (tribes,neighborhoods, etc.) are farmore effective. Keep inmind that thesemessageswill travelbeyondtheintendedaudience.Usethisasstrategy.

6. effective communication is both strategic and creative. The best way to train PSYOP

practitioners is hands-on—put them in the communications environment, evaluate, andsupportasneeded.

IowaStateUniversityReflectionsKnowledgeofpre-existing localnarratives improvesability to tailor content inorder toattach it topreexistingTAvalues.Inadditiontoexploringwhatnarrativesgettractionwiththetargetpopulations,this simulation provided a window into what narratives already exists in these locations. While aproactivestancewasstressedinordertooverwhelmtheRedteam’sbulkofmessaging, itwasvitaltoremain conscious that, just like kinetic forcesbuttupagainstoneanother, so thenarrativeswe sendencounterpre-existingnarratives—narratives thatareparticular to small regionsandpopulationsandshiftdynamicallywithlocalandworldevents.

OnestrongnarrativealreadythrivingintheregionisthattheImamsarethemostvaluableassetintheregionbecausethepeople'sheartstrustthemtobeabovealltheothermayhem.Blueteamnarrativeshad an opportunity to earn more credibility with the populations by acknowledging where the TA’svalueandtrustalreadyrested,ratherthanriskappearingtopushanagenda.


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Narrativesmustbeactionable. It is importanttoreinforcethepopulations’existingnarrativewhereitaligns withmission goals by initiating or facilitating actions, and by preparing the TA for action. Themoment of strongest intent to act comes in the first moments of articulation of belief. Thepopulations—especially inNinewa—turnedtowardstheBlueteam’smessage.Theywerereadytoact.Thatmomentwillpass ifnotcapitalizedon.ForBlueteamnarrativestokeepthegroundtheygained,theymustbepairedwithactionsorfacilitateactions.Pointsforfurtherconsideration:

• HowcanwefacilitateprotectionoftheImams?• Da’eshexcelledatactinginconcertwiththeirownmessagingandevenframingtheeventsthey

hadnocontroloverinawaythatworkedfortheirmission.ItwasrepeatedlyevidentthatthisisanareawheretheBlueteam’sstrategiescanaffordtogrow.

• NarrativeadvantagerequiresresonancewiththeTA;currenteventscanbeusedasevidencethatbacksupthenarrative,butonlyifthenarrativesarecouchedinthecontextofactionsandeventseverytime.


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Chapter 4: Maneuvering the Narrative Space—UnderstandingRelationshipsandNetworks:Ms.PatriciaDeGennaroandMr.AdamB.Jonas,TRADOCG27OperationalEnvironmentTrainingSupportCenterpatricia.degennaro.ctr@mail.mil;[email protected]

Anygoodspeakerunderstandsthatyoumustknowyouraudienceandgagehowit isreactingtoyourmessage.Thinkaboutwhotheyare,wheretheycamefrom,andhowtheymayrespondtoyourspeechorthemessageyouaretryingtosend.Finally,howdoyouknowifyouweresuccessfulinyourdelivery?You notewhen heads nod, people laugh, stay silent, look sleepy or engaged. In person you can see,hear,andfeelthepulseoftheroom.Thereis,however,adifferencewhentheroomisdark,allyoucansee andhear are the voices in yourhead, and you cannot always see immediate reaction. The art ofinfluencingapersontotakeaction,thinkdifferently,andquestionbasicbeliefsisnoteasy.Anyattempttodosorequiresavidpreparation,study,andstrategicoperationalthinking,engagingthecognitive, ifyouwill,inordertoattempttoconvinceothersandleadthemtothedesiredoutcome.

InthemostrecentICONSsimulation,ManeuveringintheNarrativeSpace,approximatelyonehundredparticipantsattemptedtostageonlineinteractionwithDa’eshorISasitisalsoknown.Thissimulationput east againstwest, soldier against civilian, and natural tendencies, reactions, and bias against thehumanelementsoftheoperatingenvironment.Anenvironmentthatcouldnotbeviewedbytangibles,butinsteadengagedplayersmentallysotheyhadtogobeyondthephysicalterrainandunderstandthehumanone,inotherwordsculture,behavior,thoughtprocesses,andhistoricalnarrativesthatinformedperceivedrealitiesintheinformationenvironment.

The challenge in identifying not only threats in the environment, but friendly and neutral elementsensued.Respondingtoeachalsofoundplayersinaconundrum.HowshouldIrespond?TowhomshouldI respond? Should I respond or ignore? Ismy strategy andmanagement of it working? These are allquestionsthatmustbestrategicallyconsideredinorderto influencethetarget,which inthiscase isaperson’sbehavior.

Specific Elements of Learning Without going into detail about the simulation, teams found that therewere timeswhen theywereconfused, overwhelmed, paralyzed, and engaged. These are all human responses to a cognitive

challenge. To avoid some of thesephysical responses, teamspreparedby understanding the MasterNarrative, the Mission, and theaudience(s) andunderstanding thattherewasmore than one player inthe information environment (IO).As seen, in the Joint Publication 3-13,InformationOperationsfiguretothe left, the IO is complex andencompasses a host of factors thatmust be considered in planning,


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preparing,executing,andassessingthevariousdimensions.After careful analysis and consideration of the environment, the teams went through the messageplanningexerciseallowingthemtoidentifywhatactiontheymustinfluenceinordertosucceedwiththemissionwithinthecontextofamasternarrativeexplainedindetailinChapter5.

As noted in other chapters of this paper,the three-day simulation providedexceptional learning opportunities to theBlue teams. Some key takeaways inpreparation were 1) messaging must bealigned with the overall master narrativecoming from the command center ofoperations;2) identifying the conduitusedto disseminate a message could be themaindifferenceinsuccessfuleffects;and3)developing a clear strategy for each

audience is essential. Different TAshear, process, and perceive messagesdifferently.

Bringing these lessons into thesimulation from the beginning allowedBluetoprepare,adapt,andrestructuretargeting. Additionally, it allowedgroupstoidentifyandmovetoleveragefriendly and neutral actors as well asthoseinthethreatcategory.

Postsimulationassessment:

TheTRADOCG27OETSCprovided twoexpertstoassist inthesimulation.Postsimulation, parties had an exceptionalopportunitytoevaluatetheirparticipation.OurG27teamusedsocialnetworkanalysissoftwareinpostsimulation assessment, giving parties the ability to map their moves in an after action assessment.Further,participantswereabletovisualizeconsequences,orlackthereof,initsmessaging.

Socialnetworkanalysis (SNA) isatoolkitofstatisticalmethodsgrounded insocialsciencetheory.SNAhasexplodedinpopularitywithinthesocialsciencesandinthepopularpress.SNAcoursesaretaughtwithin the DoD at TRADOC, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), and West Point giving the group anopportunitytouseithere.

This SNA focuses on what insights teams can gain from the communication network that emergedduring each round of the ICONS exercise and which actors occupied certain positions within thenetwork.SNA,atoolalreadybeingusedtoidentifykeyplayersonthebattlefield,couldalsohelpBluediscernWhite,Grey,andRedteamsinthenarrativespacetotargetandtailormessaging.


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TheG27usedSNAinordertomapmessagingtoassistdecisionmakersinunderstandingimpactsontheTA.Forexample,theycoulddeterminewhatworkedintheIO,whotheyweretargetingmostoften,whowasresponding,andwerethetargetsactuallyrespondingmakingthemissionasuccess.

Forexample,usingthelastroundofthesimulation:

Slide1–SocialNetworkdiagramsareaprimarymethodofcheckingonyourownperformanceaswellastheimpactofyourstrategy.

Key Outcome: Blue is not the center of thenetwork. Da’esh is directly connecting allparties.Blue ismessagingBlue,but it seemsthey are not coordinating. They are at adisadvantage because there is no centralmediacenterorfusioncell.

Slide2–Depictstheinandoutratioofallmessagesreceivedandsent.Key Outcomes: Blue isbroadcasting, but is it beingstrategic? The primary Blue andRed team actors seemed todemonstrate a balance ofreceivingmessagingandproducingmessaging themselves, but howclose are they to the target—inthis case thepopulations theyaretrying to sway? Da’esh seems tobe setting the tone of mostexchanges.

Slide3–Whoisorneedstobethemostactive?

KeyOutcomes:Da’eshwasoften framingand controlling themessage.Here thepopulationofMosulwasmoreengaged,butBluewasonthe fringe.There isaprominentGrayactor in thisnetwork.Howmany players knewwho that gray actor was in the simulation?What is an opportunity to engage afriendlyorneutralnetworkratherthanfocusspecificallyonRed?

Figure1SlideOne

Figure2SlideTwo


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Slide 4 – Shows several of the most significant message chains that lasted over 7 messages. Redindicates the first message in the chain. Arrows indicate ‘response to.’ Size indicates how manyresponseswithin‘twosteps’(e.g.,responsetoresponsesofthemessage).

Figure4SlideFour

Key Outcomes: It appears Da’esh often got the ‘first response’ and framed future discussions. Bluetended to not participate asmuch in thesemore ‘viral chains.’ The largest chain, primarily betweenDa’esh and Mosul/Ninewa population, focused on the Kurds’ trustworthiness. The longest messagechain is 22 messages was starting with 999 – Da’esh messaging “the Kurds will abandon you.” ThisindicatesatargetwhereDa’eshissuccessfullyinfluenceMosulpopulationstomistrusttheKurds—itisclearlyencouragingdivisivenessbetweengroups.

Figure3SlideThree


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OtherMessagesofNote:Message952:Source:ImaminMosulpickedupbytheBlueAnbarImamandcausedanImamexecutionleadingto1279/1284thedeathoftheImamleadingtocoalitionagainstDa’esh.

Message955:FromDa’eshtoMosul:TheAmericancowardshidebehindtheirbombsandplanesfromthousandsoffeetinthesky.Whenthey"liberate"theykill.HereDa’eshisplayingtothenarrativethatblamestheWestforthechaosinIraq.

KEY TAKE AWAY: To directly assist Blue PSYOP teams in the field, simulations must be more representative of theoperationalenvironment(OE).

Examplesinclude1)teamshadtechnicalexpertsembeddedineachBlueteambutnomediacenterorfusioncell todisseminate real-time information;2) the simulationhadchallenges inexemplifying realtheater experience since Blue teams strategized independently and not together—they did notcommunicate directly during the simulation, a disadvantage and loss of the opportunity to directlycoordinate; and 3) Blue did not understand the ‘Gray’ players again due to lack of communicationbetweenteams.

Additionally,althoughlimitedinscope,realworldsocialmedianetworksareoftenmorerobust,SNAcanhelpvisualunderstandingofthebattlespace,butnotcompletelymapit.OnlygooddataandexperiencecaninformteamsandcommandersonhowtobestrategicabouttargetingyourTAandprovideclarityonovertargetingyourselfandothersormissingthegroupyouareactuallyhopingtoshape.

Conclusion In summary, there are many factors that reinforce maneuvering in the narrative space. Narrativenetwork structuring is important; one must know the TA, the relationships between them, and thenetworks they operate in in order to be strategic and deliberate about the content. Messages thatchange the narrative network can change opinions. Through network analysis, teams can identifymessagebroadcasters,targets,narrativeframes,andkeyplayers. Inessence,SNAprovidesananalytictoolbackedbysociologicalandcommunicationtheorytoinformmoves.

All inall,SNAandother toolscanassistBlue’smaneuvering in thenarrativespace; it cannot, though,replace the continued focus on other in theater engagement and face to face encounters thatsupplementit.NorcanBlueignorecultural,historical,orregionalknowledgetoinformwhatisseeninavisualnetworkingmap.But thebottom line is thatsimplyproducingcounternarratives is insignificant.The social structures individualsareembedded in shouldnotbe ignored since theyhavebeenshownrepeatedly to heavily influence behavior and individual cognition. Understanding these systems willincreaseyourunderstandingoftheIE/OEandhowtomoresuccessfullyoperatethere.


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Chapter 5: Unified and Synchronized Communications—An Inter-Agency Perspective: Dr. Kay Mereish, Ms. Gia Harrigan, Dr. SusanSzmania,DHS&Dr.GinaLigon,UniversityofNebraska,OmahaDr.KayMereishDepartmentofHomelandSecurity,OfficeofIntelligenceandAnalysisKay.mereish@hq.dhs.govMs.GiaHarriganDepartmentofHomelandSecurity,ScienceandTechnologyDirectorate,OfficeofUniversityProgramsgeorgia.harrigan@HQ.DHS.GOVDr.GinaLigonUniversityofNebraskaOmaha,[email protected]

Dr.SusanSzmaniaDepartmentofHomelandSecurity,ScienceandTechnologyDirectorate,OfficeofUniversityPrograms/OfficeforCommunityPartnerships,[email protected]

AbstractWhile the Department of Defense mission is to defeat and degrade Da’esh as a terrorist network,structure,leadership,andmaterial,theDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)missionwithregardtocounteringviolentextremism(CVE)istostrengtheneffortstopreventextremistsfromradicalizingandmobilizing recruits in the homeland to violence. While DHS does not engage in specific counter-messagingactivities,agoalofthiseffortwastodeterminehowtoleverageexistingdigitaltechnologiesand communications toengage, empower, and connectCVE stakeholders. Through this exercise,DHSworked with a variety of USG and civil society partners to understand and support CVE efforts.Furthermore, DHS currently leads an interagency “CVE Task Force” aimed at coordinating andprioritizing USG CVE activities, including digital engagement strategies and partnerships with privatesectorpartiestopursueCVE-relevanttools.ThefollowingchapterwillhighlightlessonslearnedfromtheAprilexerciseastheyrelatetotheDHSCVEmission.

DHSiscommittedtounderstandinghowviolentextremistsrecruitandmobilizeindividualstoviolence—including online—and DHS will prioritize support to communities that may be targeted by violentextremists.

OnegoaloftheAprilsimulationwastolookatmessagingtargetingandimpactingNorthAfricainorderto align with current USG capabilities and legal restraints to conduct countermessaging campaignsoutsideoftheUnitedStates.AlthoughthemessaginginthesimulationdidnotnecessarilydirectlytargetWesterners,theviralnatureoftheInternetandsocialmediaplatformsmayallowmessagestospreadfurther then their initial intended audience. DHS, as part of a whole of government approach tocountermessaging, benefitted from understanding how these messages and counter messages echo


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ontoWestern populations. As seen in Figure 1,messages and actions radiate out beyond their initialintended audienceor actors.DHS,while focusingon theperipheryofmessages targeted at a foreignaudience,stillneedstocoordinateitsstrategywithUSGpartnerstoensureconsistentapproaches.

Figure1.Messagesechooutsideofintendedaudience.

Accordingly, our DHS team supported a robust interagency team at the simulation exercise of April2016.TheDHSteamandresearchersfromDHSacademicCentersofExcellence(NationalConsortiumforStudiesofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START)andtheNationalCenterforRiskandEconomicAnalysisofTerrorismEvents(CREATE))evaluatedcommunications intendedforcertainWhiteandRedteams for 2nd and 3rd order effects of potential to attract foreign fighters and provide this insight tocommunitymemberssotheyarebetterinformedofthethreatandpositionedtocounterit.

SinceDHSisnot/notcurrentlymessagingdirectlyonthisissue,thisexerciseallowedDHStoexploretheroleitcanplaywithinthemultiagencyteams;Red,Blue,White,Technical,andAssessmentteams,asaBluecell(seeFigure2foranillustrationofcelldynamicsandinterplay).TheNationalCounterterrorismCenter (NCTC), theDepartment of State’s (DoS)Global Engagement Center (GEC), the TransportationSecurity Administration (TSA), DHS Office for Community Partnerships (OCP), DHS Science andTechnologyDirectorate, andDHS IntelligenceandAnalysis (I&A) focusedonevaluating themessagingsentbythevariousBlueteamstoRedandWhitepopulations.Inaddition,researchersfromSTARTandCREATEservedaspartoftheTechnicalTeamembeddedwiththisInteragencyCell.


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LessonsLearnedTherewereat leastthree importantoutcomesforthe Interagencyteamduringthisexercise.First,welearned that the DoS GEC has a significant effort in counter-messaging that the Interagency canleverage. Because the role of the GEC is coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing all publiccommunicationsoftheUnitedStatesGovernmentdirectedtowardforeignaudiencesabroadinordertocounter the messaging and diminish the influence of international terrorist organizations and otherviolent extremists abroad (Executive Order 13721 of March 14, 2016), it has devoted resources todevelopcommunicationcontent.Throughthisexercise,welearnedthattheGECoffersoverallnarrativesynchronization and a series of Thematic Guidance documents to ensure that there is a consistent,proactive message from the Coalition about Da’esh. For example, the Interagency team during the

exerciseestablishedthenarrative“United for All,” which shapedour messages to be positive,proactive, and consistent. WhilewedidnotignoreDa’eshcontent,wedidnotreacttoitmessageformessage. This overarchingnarrative empowered membersof our team to generate agency-specific communicationstrategies, (e.g., we developedpotential wording for a pressrelease for a high rankingmember of DHS in wake of thesimulated attack; this was doneto reassure our domesticCommunity Partners that westandwiththeminthefaceoftheatrocitiesconductedbyDa’esh).Second, we learned that an

important element of a communication strategy is that it is reinforced over time and withmultiple,credible voices. By using the Thematic Guidance from the GEC, our Interagency team developedcommunications variants from soccer players, mothers, government officials, and other sources toreinforce our message. This facilitated our team staying on message rather than engaging with the“Red” teamon specific threads and counter arguments.While Da’esh is able to “flood” socialmediawith a high volume of messages,10 the high-level narrative approach to counter-messaging allowedInteragencymembersandtheirpartnerstoreinforcetrulyengagingappeals foractionacrossmultiplemedia,messageformats,andcrediblesources.

Third,we learned that thereare significant efficiencies tobe gained in the Interagency. For example,whileDHSdoesnotengagedirectlyinmessagingagainstDa’esh,theOfficeforCommunityPartnerships(OCP) could potentially benefit from leveraging Thematic Guidance from the GEC to reinforce the

10DHSS&TOfficeofUniversityProgramshassponsoredSTARTresearchersatUniversityofNebraskaOmahatocontentcodeEnglish-languagemessagesonDa’eshforumsandtransientwebpages;theyhaveidentifiedover30,000uniquecyberobjectspostedinthelast12monthstargetedtowardEnglishspeakers.

Figure2Inter-AgencyRoleasitrelatedtoexerciseandgamedesign


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messaging about the degradation of Da’esh’s ability to govern, organize, and lead a successful state.However, inanAfterActionReview,our teamdiscovered that therehasbeennosystematiceffort toassess the impactofGECand coalition communications to foreigners abroadon individualswhomayhave ties to the Homeland. Thus, a potential way ahead is for DHS S&T to commission a study toexamine GEC messaging campaigns as they relate to stop the flow of Foreign Terrorist Fightersdomestically.

Finally, given research on inter-organizational collaboration, the nature of the problem of counteringDa’eshmessagingiscomplexandilldefined.11Thus,itrequiresthatagenciesdomorethaninformationsharing about their respective lines of effort; instead, we propose that members of the Interagencyteam form closely integrated work groups to facilitate collaborative problem solving in a cogent,innovativeway.Moreover,onestepofthePSYOPandGECmessagegenerationprocessistoanticipate2ndand3rdordereffectsofagivenmessage.ByhavingacloseworkingrelationshipwiththeDHS-CVETaskforceaswellas theDHSOffice forCommunityPartnerships,messagecraftingteamscan leverageexpertise on domestic populations to better anticipate both positive and potentially deleteriousoutcomesassociatedwiththeirmessages. Inaddition,we learnedthroughthisexercisethattherearesometimesduplicatedI&Aeffortsoccurringonthecollectionandanalysisfront;itmaymakesenseforamore cohesive team effort across the Interagency to gain greater efficiencies in analyzing Da’eshmessaging. Moreover, as the Office for Community Partnerships develops and manages counternarrativeinitiatives,suchasthePeer-to-PeerChallengingExtremism(P2P)universitystudentprogram,therecouldbepotentialwaysto increasecollaborationbetweentheGECandDHS.Thismight includeprovidingP2Pstudentteamswithunclassifiedguidanceonthecommunicationstrategiesortacticsusedby terrorist organizations or supporting research and analysis of online campaign measurement andmetrics.12

Way-AheadGiven the important lessons learned through this simulation, the Inter-Agency teamhas developed aseries of questions to be examined. First, what is the communication strategy domestically againstDa’esh? Given that there is a new DHS-CVE task force, with the related structure of the Office ofCommunity Partnerships, what can be leveraged from the international communication strategy toreinforcemessages domestically to vulnerable audiences and credible stakeholders? Our after actionreviewoftheexerciseledtoaconcertedconversationaboutthewayaheadforourindividualteamstowork together inpersonaswell aselectronically.Wealso found that therewas true synergy throughpartnership:multipleagenciesimplementingthesamenarrativeatthesametimereinforcedeachotherandhadagreaterimpactonthetargetaudiencethanuncoordinatedsocialmedia“fights”withDa’eshmessagesandmessengers.Consistencyovertime,echoedbymultiplevoices,helpedtheUSGmaintaincontrolofthenarrativefromthetacticaltostrategiclevelsandforcedDa’eshtofightdefensivelyonourtermsratherthansettheagenda.11DHSS&TCSDcommissionedastudyoncollaborationbetweenpublicandprivatepartnershipsthatsuggestedthatwhenthenatureoftheproblemiscomplex,moreintegratedworkgroupsshouldbestooduptoincreasecollaborationamongdiversestakeholders(Ligon,Derrick,Lundmark,Pleggenkuhle-Miles,2015).12PeertoPeer(P2P)ChallengingExtremismisapublicprivatepartnershipbetweenEdVenturePartnersandUSfederalagenciesincludingtheUSDepartmentofStateandUSDepartmentofHomelandSecurity.TheobjectiveofP2Pistoengageuniversitystudentsaroundtheglobe,whileearningacademiccredit,tocreatenarrativesonsocialmediatochallengeviolentextremistgrouprecruitment.Since2015,over120studentteamshaveparticipatedinP2Pfromuniversitiesandschoolsaroundtheglobe.


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ReferencesLigon, G.S., Derrick, D.C., Lundmark, L., & Pleggenkuhle-Miles, E. (2015). Collaborative Distance: An

Examination of Public-Private Partnerships in Protecting National Critical Infrastructure.TechnicalReporttotheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity,ScienceandTechnologyDirectorate,CyberSecurityDivision.

Executive Order 13721 (March 17, 2016). Developing an Integrated Global Engagement Center toSupport Government-wide Counterterrorism Communications Activities Directed Abroad andRevokingEO13584.(accessedfromwww.nodis3.gsfc.nasa.govonMay23,2016).


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Chapter 6: Influence Operations—Observations & Opportunities, Major Peter J. Reiley, Ph.D., USSOCOM

[email protected]

This simulation representeda significant step toward closing thegapbetweenevidence-based theoryand its applied practice in the counter-Da’esh narrative space. This chapter offers additional,overarchingobservationsandoperationalinsightfromthesimulationandhighlightssomeopportunitiestoenhanceandexpandtheeffort.

1. More frequent injects should simulateassessment information traditionally collected throughouttheMISOprocess.

2. Leveragemorekineticoperationstodemonstrateandreinforcemessages.

3. Rehearse broader PartnerNation and Interagency (IA) coordination and stress distinct roles andauthoritiesamongBlueteammembersin,andacross,undeclaredanddeclaredareasofhostility.

4. Teamtrainingandcompositionrequiresmoreinvestigationandanalysis.

5. Group related simulation messages graphically and relegate administrative conversations to aseparatechannel/postingboard.

MISO Assessment Injects The April simulation improved message quality and sheer overwhelming quantity; however, it isimportant to maintain focus on target audience attitudes and sentiment as impact indicators andevidence of effectiveness. The simulation provided measures of influence effectiveness primarilythrough end-of-day injects representing national “polling results” (based onWhite Team after-actionsurveys). Assessments are a central component of influence operations and should be incorporatedearlyonandthroughouttheMISOprocess(JP3-13.2,2010).Assessmentinjectsshouldbeofferedmorefrequentlytorepresent/simulateinformationtraditionallycollectedandanalyzedthroughouttheMISOprocess from a range of assessment resources (e.g., additional White team-based/simulated:intelligence,open sourcedata, commercial-off-the-shelfpolling,qualitative/quantitative research, andmorelocalized/targetedMISOassessments). IncorporatingmoreoftheseelementsintothesimulationwouldmirrortheintendedoperationaluseofassessmentsthroughouttheMISOprocess.UsingawiderrangeofassessmentresourcescouldhelptrainMISOpersonnelandfamiliarizethemwiththetypesofbroadly available information that might be used to build a composite picture of effectiveness.Furthermore,exposingtechnicalexpertstothetypesofresourcesMISOpersonnelutilize,aswellasthecontent theseMISO personnel seek, may inform and guide the technical experts’ own research andfutureproductionofvaluableassessmentmaterials.

Kinetic Operations Whilemessaginginthenarrativespaceshouldfirmlyremaintheprimaryfocusofthiswargamingeffort,these simulations should incorporate more kinetic operations with the express purpose ofdemonstratingandreinforcingmessages.Da’eshrepeatedlydemonstratesanadvantageouspropensityto leveragekineticoperationsandevents topunctuate theirmessaging, regardlessofwhetherornot


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theythemselvesplayedaroleinconductingthesephysicalactivities.Incontrast,whiletheUScontinuestoimprovethestrategicsynchronizationofinfluenceandleverageIOaspartofanintegratedeffort,IO(andparticularlyMISO) isstilloftenviewedandemployed inastrictlysupportingor,moreoftenthannot, separate role fromkinetic operations.As thiswargaming effort reinforces,messagingoperationscannotbeanafterthoughtinabattleforheartsandminds.Thecomplexityofincorporatingmorekineticoperations into the exercise to train, emphasize coordination, and support influence operations isultimatelyanecessaryandvaluablesteptoaddressreal-worldoperationalneeds.

Asnotedpreviously,targetaudiencesare lessreceptiveofUSGmessagingoverallandthesemessagesareonlyseenascrediblewhenreinforcedbyactualactions.Tosupportnarrativesaimedattheseedsofviolentextremism,operations in thephysicaldomainsshouldextendbeyondtheDoD,andtraditionalmilitary activities, to leverage IA capabilities as well as key non-USG influencers in Partner Nations(Lieber&Reiley,2016). Forexample, integratingmessagingeffortswithactive simulationparticipantsfromtheBroadcastingBoardofGovernors(BBG)wouldengagebroaderaudiencesandprovidefactualinformation to undermine Da’esh disinformation in regions without a MISO or Department of State(DoS) presence. Furthermore, USAID exercise objectives could be included and synchronizedsimultaneously with messaging objectives to amplify influence efforts and address underlyingsociological conditions, which leave populations vulnerable to the influence of violent extremistorganizations.

Integrating these elements into the simulationwith an informed bio-psycho-social perspectivewouldallow Blue teams to harness the impact of operations in the physical domains to supportmessagingeffortsintheinformationenvironment.Planningandconductingoperationswithmessagingastheleadeffort,punctuatedbykineticoperations,willprovidevaluablelessonslearnedandperspectivesforreal-world operational challenges. These coordinated elements are extended and elaborated on in thefollowingsection.

Rehearse Broader Coordination FuturesimulationsshouldrehearseevenbroaderPartnerNationandIAcoordinationandstressdistinctroles,authorities,andattributionsamongBlueteammembersin,andacross,undeclaredanddeclaredareas of hostility. As Chapter 5 discussed, different agencies have distinct roles and restrictions thatmust be addressed and coordinated to achieve a whole-of-government (and multinational) strategiccommunication effort. The recently released “DoS & USAID Joint Strategy on Countering ViolentExtremism” (2016) outlined the DoS-Global Engagement Center’s emerging responsibility to“coordinate,integrate,andsynchronizeUSgovernmentpubliccommunicationsdirectedtowardforeignaudiencesabroad,forthepurposesofcounteringviolentextremism”(p.8).Combiningthisrolewithabroader counter-narrative effort presents several challenges,whichwould benefit from inclusion andconsideration in the simulation.WhileeachBlue team’smembersworkedasa singlebody toengageaudiencesanddisseminatemessaging,testingtheuniqueroleofeachorganizationrepresented intheBlue teams more thoroughly might improve coordination, provide a shared understanding ofconstraints/restraints, and highlight challenges (or provide potential solutions) for the execution ofdistinct operational roles. For example, some real-world operational challenges include usingappropriate attributions when conducting MISO in different regions, engaging trans-regional targetaudiences,coordinatingmessagingdesignedtocounterforeignfighterfloworiginatingfrominsidetheUSandotherPartnerNations,andassessinginfluenceeffectivenessininaccessibleregions.


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Team Training and Composition Therewereseveralnotedbenefits toembeddingculturalandtechnicalexpertswithin theBlue teamsthat purportedly enhanced messaging and responsiveness. However, while teams with embeddedexpertsinthesecondsimulationwerequalitativelymoreeffectivethantheseparatedTechnical“reach-back”Teamsinthefirstsimulation,trainingandonboardinginterventionsmayimprovetheutilizationoftheseTechnicalTeams.Knowledgesharingindistributed/virtualteamsisdrivenbymembers’awarenessofandperceivedaccesstoapplicableknowledge(Gupta,Mattarelli,Seshasai,&Broschak,2009),aswellas a shared sense of connectedness (i.e., the degree of social interaction and social relationshipsbetween members; Coakes, Coakes, & Rosenberg, 2008). Training interventions aimed at rolefamiliarization, technical input expectations, task integration, and distributed/virtual teamwork mayimprove the Blue team MISO players’ interaction with and utilization of the Technical Teams.Endeavoring to use the Technical Teams more effectively may prove to be a more practical andoperationally achievable approach than embedding experts into everyMISO team, given the limitedavailabilityoftheseexpertresourcescomparedtotherangeandvolumeofglobalinfluenceoperations.Still,determiningthesuperiorteamcompositioncombinationrequiresmoreinvestigationandanalysis.

Simulation Messaging Pertainingtothesimulation’sfunctionality,aninterfacethatgroupsrelatedmessaginggraphically(e.g.,Twitter-like replies, reposts, and utilizing the message tags) and relegating administrativequestions/conversations to a separate channel/posting board might improve participants’ ability tointeractandmonitormessagingclearlyinthesimulatedenvironment.Whilethemessage“tag”functionwasavailable,itdidnotseemtobeutilizedextensivelybytheteams.Linkingconversationsvisually,andhavingmoreparticipantsuse the tags to group topics andmessages,mighthelp teammembers (andobservers following multiple posts and conversations) track messages and locate previously postedMISO products referenced in later messages more efficiently. Having administrative messagesintermixedwithoperationalmessagesandconversationswasalsosomewhatdistractinganddisruptiveduringthewargame.

Conclusion Overall,thesimulationprovidedvaluableinsightintocreatingamorebalancedandinformedscientist-practitioner approach to countering the Da’esh narrative. These observations and suggestions areintendedtobuildonasolidfoundation,offerinsightintocurrentandemergingchallenges,andhighlightopportunitiestomovetowardabroaderapplicationofcombinednationalandsocialinfluencetodefeattheDa’eshthreat.

References Coakes, E. W., Coakes, J. M., & Rosenberg, D. (2008). Co-operative work practices and knowledge

sharing issues: A comparison of viewpoints. International Journal of Information Management,28(1),12-25.

“Department of State&USAID Joint StrategyonCounteringViolent Extremism”. (2016).Washington,DC:(DepartmentofState&USAID)GovernmentPrintingOffice.

Gupta, A., Mattarelli, E., Seshasai, S., & Broschak, J. (2009). Use of collaborative technologies andknowledge sharing in co-located and distributed teams: Towards the 24-hour knowledge factor.JournalofStrategicInformationSystems,18(3),147-161.


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Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.2. (2010).Military information support operations (MISO).Washington,DC:(USJointChiefsofStaff)GovernmentPrintingOffice.

Lieber, P. S.,&Reiley, P. J. (2016). Countering ISIS socialmedia influence.SpecialOperations Journal,2(1),47-57.


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Chapter 7: Designing a PSYOP Wargame—Challenges, Successes, Lessons-Learned: Devin H. Ellis and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, ICONS Project, START, University of Maryland [email protected]

ThegenesisofthisprojectwasaseriesofstudiesandpapersdoneundertheauspicesofTRADOCandtheJointStaffexploringwaystobettercounter-messageDa’eshandoutmaneuvertheminthenarrativespace by leveraging the best practices from cognitive and social sciences, as well as marketing andcommunications.WhattheprojectteamdiscoveredwasthatthePSYOPcommunityhadrelativelyfewopportunities towargame the effectiveness of theirmessaging—especially in this critical arena.Oncethe Joint Staff effort to support USASOC with this gaming project was underway, serious designconsiderationshad tobeaddressed:howwouldadistributedexercise like thisbeassembled toallowBlue toproperlyaddress the targetaudiences (in this case IraqiandNorthAfricanpopulations)?Howwould we structure Blue chain of command? In a distributed simulation, running over a relativelycompressed period of time, and on an online platform, how best couldwe effectively represent andincorporatemanydifferentmediaplatformsandtypes,aswellasmessagingvehicles?Howwoulditbebest to captureand then incorporate live feedback from the targetaudienceson theeffectivenessofdifferentaspectsofthenarrativecampaigns?

Challenge:ExerciseDesignFocusing on PSYOP as the main activity of a wargame, rather than as part of a full spectrum ofDiplomatic InformationMilitary and Economic (DIME) activities, is quite rare within the professionaldefense community. The members of the project team and the Blue leadership from USASOC andFieldingUniversitymet for twodays inFebruaryat ICONStohammeroutanoverall structure for the

simulation and a work plan to getthe teams assembled and trainedby the April run-time. The teamsettled on a weeklong schedule,with synchronous rounds on

Monday/Wednesday/Fridaymornings, Eastern Time. TuesdayandThursdaywouldbeusedbytheControl team, and the supportingtechnical experts and SMEs, toadjudicate the impact of differentnarrative campaigns on thestorylinebasedoncarefulreviewofthe live feedback and post-roundquestionnaires collected from thetarget audiences. Prior to thebeginning of each subsequentround,ascenarioupdatewouldbereleased, describing events whichhadtranspiredsincetheendofthe

Figure1TeamandActivityStructure


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lastroundandupdatingthestateofplaywithregardtothepopulationsentimentandactivitytowardsbothBlueandRedteams.

Theteamdecidedthatsincethegoalof thesimulationwastofocusonnarrativeengagement,havingtheBlueandRedteamsalsoresponsibleforkineticandsupportoperationaldecisionswouldpotentiallyoverwhelmthefocus.Forthatreasonallkineticaction—aswellaseventsthatwouldchangethestateofplay in the scenario—were played out of the Control team. This left the participants to focus on themissionathand.Figure1showsthestructureofteamsandallocationofactivity,whichwasultimatelydecidedforthegame.

In most ways, the overall structure and facilitation of the simulation was quite traditional for awargame—whichtheteamviewedasapositive.Thefocuswouldremainontheefficacyofthecontentratherthanthenoveltyofdesign.

Challenge:DynamicandInteractiveMessaginginRealTimeThe goal of having this exercise serve as both a test bed for messaging techniques and a trainingopportunity for PSYOP operators put a high premium on the reliability of the feedback messagingproducts received. As discussed in previous sections of this white paper, great care was taken inrecruiting the players on the target audience population teams in order to provide as authentic andknowledgeable a spectrum of reactions to the Blue and Red products as possible. The next criticalconsideration was supporting a wide range of “platforms” and delivery methods for individualmessagingstrategies.

Anywargamingexerciserequiresacertainamountofsuspensionofdisbelief—butthechallengesofthisexercisewerehigherthannormal.Thepsychologicalresponsetobothmessagecontentandthemeansbywhich itwas conveyedwere themselves the critical barometer of success, so itwas important toemphasizerealismwhereverpossible.TheICONSnetplatformsupportedtheintegrationofaudio,video,imagery,andothertypesofformatswithrelativeease.TheBlueteamsworkeddiligentlyintherun-upto the simulation toproducemulti-media content for theirmessaging campaigns—and to thedegreethattheycould,usedtheoffdaysoftheexercisetoupdateandaddnewmaterial.However,someuseof ‘wand-waving’was unavoidable, given the time andbudget constraints of the exercise, and targetaudienceswereurgedtotryashardaspossibletofairlyevaluatemediacontentthatwasjustdescribedasopposedtoactuallybeingproduced.

Thefinal,criticalelementofsupportingrealismwastomakesurethatBlueandRedmessagingcametothetargetaudiencesthroughtheappropriatemeans.IndevelopingthiscapabilitywithinICONSnet,thedesignteamadoptedthetermmodalitytodescribethecollectionofplatforms,venues,andpeoplethatwould serve as ‘messengers’ for the Blue and Red content. A comprehensive listwas generated andintegrated into the ICONSnet messaging tool so that when Blue or Red players went to send outproducts,theycouldchoosetheappropriatemodalitytomatchthecontentandtargetaudience.Figure2belowisascreenshotofthetoolinuseduringthesimulation.


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Figure2:"Modality"MenuonMessagingScreen

Successes:Overall, as described in the early sections of this white paper, the exercise was considered verysuccessful.TheUSASOCteamfelttheirkeygoalshadbeenaccomplished,andconsiderablelearningonwhatmessagingwasandwasnoteffectivetookplace.Ofparticularnote:

Ø Theoverallparticipationwasextremelyconsistentandhighlyeffective,with fewtechnicalorsubstantiveissues,despitetheexercisetakingplaceacrossadozentimezonesandthreecontinents,withoverninetyparticipants.

Ø The newly developed features of the platform designed to support PSYOP gaming wereviewedaslargelyeffectiveandunderstandablebyusersandrecipientsalike.

Ø Pacing was brisk, with nearly 1,800 substantive messages sent in around six hours ofsynchronousplay.Manyparticipantsnotedthatthiscreatedanoverwhelmingfeelingthatmimickedtherealworldmedialandscape.

Ø Participants and observers noted that in both process, as a proof of concept for PSYOPgaming, and in substance, the exercise contributed many interesting positive ideas forfuturedevelopment.

LessonsLearnedAswithanyconceptininitialtesting,thereweremanylessonslearnedforthefuture.Afewofthemoreimportant:

Ø More‘affective’wrappers(makingthemodalitiesandthemessagecontentfeelevermorerealistic) would increase the effectiveness of the platform at serving the PSYOP


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environment. The ICONS teamsuspected this tobe the case from theoutset, and itwasconfirmedbyfeedbackfromparticipants.

Ø Lengthening the exercise time wherever possible would serve the mission of testingmessage efficacy. In the real world, the psychological impact of effective narrativecampaigns isdifficult togauge intheshort-term. Inthisexercise, theteamdid itsbesttoaccount for that with the modeling-supported adjudication in between rounds and thescenarioupdates.However,a longerexercisetimeframe—perhapsplayed inshortroundseveryweekorsooverseveralmonths—wouldincreasethesubtletyandvalueoffeedbackfromthetargetaudienceplayers.

Ø More scenario injects would have provided greater incentive to ‘shake up’ narrativecampaigns and given the target audience teamsa greater senseof ‘realism.’Despite thescenarioupdates,thecontrolteamchosetoputinveryfewinjectsduringthesynchronousplayineachroundinordertokeepfocusonthenarrative.However,ultimately,feedbacksuggests that with the criticality of programming PSYOP around events on the ground,moresubstantive‘storyline’developmentswouldhaveenrichedtheexercise.


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Chapter 8: Know Your Audience: Mr. Jimmy Krakar, TRADOC [email protected]

DuringtheICONSsimulationsupportingUSASOCG39,theTRADOCG27ModelsandSimulationBranchprovided the analytical framework for thepopulation (White teams).Developmentof this frameworkrequireddecomposingthepopulationintorelevantsub-groupswithapplicablebeliefsystems.Theteamthen quantified the effects of Blue and Red messaging/Information Operation (IO) actions on thepopulationbymodeling themwith theAthena Simulation.13 Thiswork expandedonpreviousDa’esh-relatedworkthattheteamhadconductedinsupportofSOCCENTandCJTF-OIR.

KeyFindings:1. Oftenmessagingwould influenceonly one group.Messaging that attempted to influence the

entirepopulationwasoftendilutedandineffective.2. Morespecificity inregardstogeographyandtargetedciviliangroupresulted inmoreeffective

messaging.3. Detailed knowledge of the socio-cultural aspects of population is necessary to properly

decompose population, which in turn will refine Target Audience Analysis supporting moredetailedmessaging.

4. Certain civilian groups will not be influenced by Blue messaging regardless of message orattribution.

5. Provisionofservicesoressentialnon-infrastructureserviceshadmoreeffectthanmessagingonhowthepopulationviewedRed,BlueorGreen.

MethodologyInordertodecomposethepopulation,thestudyteamtookthefollowingsteps:

1. identified and defined the key demographic groups (civilian groups) and decision makers(actors)thatsupportedthesimulationarchitecture;

2. deconstructedthestudyareageographicallytoisolatekeyareas;3. developedabeliefsystemforeachciviliangroupandactor;4. determinedpopulationnumbersforeachrespectiveciviliangroupineachgeographicarea;5. refineddecisionmakers(actors);6. vettedwithapplicablesubjectmatterexperts(SMEs)andUSASOCG39;and7. socializedwithControlandBlue.

Atthecompletionofthisprocess,theTRADOCG27teamhaddevelopedtheframeworkforthiseffort.Thisconsistedofsevenapplicableciviliangroups, fourgeographicstudyareas,andsufficientactorstosupportthewargameasitevolved.14Figure1(below)isthesimulationdemographicsforMosulCity.

13TheAthenaSimulationisadecisionsupporttooldesignedtoincreasedecision-makers’understandingoftheeffectsofPMESII-PTvariablesonoperationsinagivenareaovertime.ItwasdevelopedbyNASA’sJetPropulsionLaboratoryinconjunctionwiththeUSArmyTRADOCG-27ModelsandSimulationsBranch.14Pleasecontacttheauthorforthecomprehensiveproductsusedinthissimulation.


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Figure1:Anexampleofthesimulationdemographicconstruct.

Oncethiswascompleted,thestudyteamwasabletousethispopulationconstructtomodeltheeffectof messaging and IO on the populationwrit large but, more importantly, amongst each respectivepopulationgroup.

KeyFindingsinDetailToaccuratelysamplearepresentationofthemessagesbeingusedduringthewargame,thestudyteammodeled a string of Bluemessages from the ICONS simulation. Below are themessages,with ICONSreferencenumber:

ICONSMessage#132,whichemphasizedaPro-Iraqnationalism;ICONSMessage#141,whichwasanti-Da’esh;andICONSMessage#451,whichemphasizedunityagainstDa’esh.

ThestudyteamthenranthesemessagesintheAthenaSimulationforeachofthesevenMosulciviliangroups in order to assess with effect on each group. For Measure of Effect, the study team usedAutonomy:definedasagroup’ssatisfactionwiththeirgovernance—inthiscaseDa’esh. IntheAthenaSimulation,Autonomyrangesfrom100to-100,soifaciviliangroup’saffinitytowardsDa’eshdeclines,itwouldequatetoaworseninginrelationsbetweenthatgroupandDa’esh.

KeyFindings1and2.1)Oftenmessagingwouldinfluenceonlyonegroup.Messagingthatattemptedtoinfluencetheentirepopulationwasoftendilutedandineffective.

2) More specificity in regards to geography and targeted civilian group resulted in more effectivemessaging.

MosulCityPopulakonByGroup

Kurds PassiveSalafistSupporters

EthnicOthers SunniNeutrals

ViolentSalafists SunniTribalists

NeoBaathistSupporters

Total:1,150,500


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Figure2:EffectsofMessagingonSelectedCivilianGroupsinMosul

Figure2(above)showsthreeoftheMosulciviliangroups:theViolentSalafists,SunniNeutrals,andtheKurds. The three message campaign did not resonate with either the Violent Salafists or the Kurds.However,thiscampaigndidproduceanoticeableeffectamongtheSunniNeutrals—estimatedat36%ofthepopulation—duetothefactthatthemessagesspecificallyaddressedthekeyconcernsoftheSunniNeutralpopulation.

Key Finding 3:Detailed knowledgeof the socio-cultural aspects of population is necessary to properlydecompose population, which in turn will refine Target Audience Analysis supporting more detailedmessaging.Inthissimulation,thestudyteamwasabletoleverageboththeirpreviousCounter-Da’eshefforts15andtheexpertiseinherentintheSMAeffortinordertodeveloptheunderstandingnecessarytodecomposeboth the civilian population aswell as develop actors. However, the ability to develop,manage, andstorethesocio-culturaldatarequiredtodevelopdetailedresolutionofthesocio-culturalaspectsofthepopulationisrandomatbestformostareasoftheworld.

15TRADOCG-27participationinCounter-Da’esheffortshasincludedoperationalembedswithCENTCOMForward-Jordan,SOCCENT,andCJTF-OIR.


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KeyFinding4:CertainciviliangroupswillnotbeinfluencedbyBluemessagingregardlessofmessageorattribution.

Figure3:EffectsofCompetingMessagingonViolentSalafistsofWesternAnbar

Ondayoneofthewargame,theteamexpandedontheresultsfromFigure2bycomparingtheeffectsof duelingDa’eshandWhitemessageson theViolent SalafistsofWestAnbar. For this exchange, theteamusedanexchangerepresentedbyICONS#463astheDa’eshmessageandICONS#455astheanti-Da’eshmessage.Notonlydidthepro-Da’eshmessaginghaveadramaticimpactontheViolentSalafists,butthiseffectcontinuedafterthemessagingceased.Figure3(above)showstheeffectofboththepro-and anti-Da’esh messages. In order to remove attribution bias, the team ran these messages asunattributed.

Key Finding 5: Provision of services or essential non-infrastructure services had more effect than messaging on how the population viewed Red, Blue, or Green. DuringDay3oftheCounter-Da’eshMessagingWargame,TRADOCG27ModelsandSimulationsBranchusedtheAthenaSimulationtomodeltheeffectoftheFreeOfficerMovement(FOM)16conductingCivilMilitary Operations, distribution of funds, and messaging on local population groups in Mosul City(Figure4,below).

16TheFreeOfficerMovementwasanotionalactorusedtoadvancethesimulationscenario.


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For this series of simulation runs, the teamusedVertical Relations as theMeasureof Effect. Verticalrelationship isarepresentationofhowfavorablyaciviliangroupviewsanactor—inthiscasetheFreeOfficerMovement,TheTribalElite,orDa’esh.IfagrouphasapositiveVerticalrelationshipwithanactorandthatgrouphassufficientsecurity,itwillresultinthatactorhavinginfluenceandvyingforcontrolinthatgeographicarea.

Figure4:EffectsofCivilMilitaryOperationsonSunniTribalistRelationshipsinMosul


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Chapter 9: Virtual Think Tank—Global Expertise for Population andDa’eshTeams:Ms.SarahCanna,[email protected]

Forthiseffort,NSI’sVirtualThinkTank(ViTTa)17pulseditsglobalnetworkofexpertstorepresentthreepopulation teams: Anbar Province, NinewaProvince,andNorthAfricaaswellasaDa’eshleadership and information operationsteam.18 Experts were assigned to specificpopulation segments within the team asdescribedbelow.

Team Roles NumberofExpertsAnbar 1)ViolentSalafists,2)Passive

Salafists,3)PoliticallyNeutral,4)SunniTribalists,5)NeoBaathists

9

Ninewa 1)ViolentSalafists,2)PassiveSalafists,3)PoliticallyNeutral,4)SunniTribalists,5)NeoBaathists,6)IraqiKurds

8

NorthAfrica Populationvulnerabletoradicalization

6

Da’esh Leadership&informationoperationsteam

7

ItwastheresponsibilityofeachexperttorespondtoUSGandDa’eshmessagingfromtheperspectiveofhis or her assigned population segment. Experts could both respond directly to the originator of themessage as well as communicate within their population team about the message. USG and Da’eshmessaging effectiveness was measured through a survey at the end of each day of play asking theexpertstoidentifythemostandleasteffectivemessaginganddiscusswhy.

ResultsCompared to the December 2015 Counter-Da’esh Messaging Simulation, the most significantimprovement inUSGoperationswas its briskoperations tempo,which forced theDa’esh team tobe

17 The ViTTa process provides rapid response to critical information needs.We do this by pulsing our existing,global network of subject matter experts or by creating new networks customized to customers’ specificinformation needs. The ViTTa process allows us to produce in-depth, multidisciplinary data and analyses fordefense and industry clients. ViTTa brings together unconventional thinkers, foreign voices, and variedperspectivesonsocialphenomenaoutsideofgovernmentorindustryconventions.18Therewere17regionalexpertsontheAnbar&Ninewateams;6expertsontheNorthAfricateam;and7expertsontheDa’eshteam.TheexpertsweredrawnfromtheUS,Europe,theMiddleEast,andNorthAfrica.


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more reactive in their messaging. Mubin Shaikh, a former Salafist activist who participated in bothsimulationsontheDa’eshteam,stated inrelationtothespeedof thegame,“[T]his timetheanti-ISILside was doing it right.” However, outpacing Da’esh messaging does not necessarily mean that themessaging was effective. Below, we look at the population teams’ response to USG and Da’eshmessaging.

Pleasenotethattheconclusionsherearebasedsolelyonthesimulation,whichwasdesignedprimarilyasatrainingenvironmentfortheUSGPsychologicalOperations(PO)operatorsandmaynotbedirectlyapplicabletoarealworldenvironmentwithoutfurtherresearch.

Iraq(Anbar&NinewaProvinces)TheAnbarandNinewateamresponsesaregroupedhereduetothesimilarityoftheirresponsestoUSGandDa’eshmessaging.

USGMessaging

IraqpopulationteamswereforemostresponsivetoUSGmessaging highlighting Da’esh violence against fellowMuslims—particularly against women and children.Interestingly, the North Africa team also found thesekindsofmessagesparticularlyeffectiveaswell.

ThesecondmosteffectiveUSGmessagesupportedthereturn of normalcy: the end of violence, the end ofsuffering (particularly of women and children), andstability. However, the experts noted that themessaginghastogodeeperthanTweets,podcasts,and

posters—theUSGhastodemonstrateawillingnesstoact,communicateastrategyforachievingtheseends in coordinationwith localand regionalpowers,andbackup thesepromiseswithactualactions.Without credibility, several Iraq team members stated there were “no circumstances in which Bluemessagingcouldbeeffective.”

Da’eshMessaging

The top two messages that resonated with the Iraqpopulation include Da’esh posturing itself as the onlycredible option for pushing back Shia influence andDa’esh promising to bring stability to the region. Itshould also be noted that Da’esh rapidly and adeptlywasabletopointoutandmaximizethefalloutfromanyslipupBluemade in itsmessaging,whichunderminedtheUSG’smessagingeffectiveness.19

19ExamplesofBluemissteps:oneposterincludedanimageofaChristianchurch,onemessageincludedtheSaddamHussein-eraflag,andoneimageshowedShiasinsteadofSunnis.


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Insights

Overall,though,thepeopleofAnbarandNinewaseemedfairlypragmaticandwerenotresponsivetoeitherideologicalmessagesfromDa’eshorbumpersticker-likemessagesofhopefromtheUSGteam—insteadwantingtohearmoreabouthowtheUSGorDa’eshcouldbringstabilityandgovernancetotheregion.

NorthAfricaUSG/DoDMessaging

During the simulation, the USG/DoD “Blue” Teamdistributed globalmessages.While thesemessageswereoftenIraq-specific,thepopulationinNorthAfricareceivedand reacted to them as well. This population mirroredIraq’s reactiontoBluemessaging in that it sawmessageshighlightingDa’esh’sviolenceagainstMuslimsaseffective.They also were greatly affected by the before and afterpictures of Mosul—not wanting to see that happen totheircities.

Population teammembers alsomirrored Iraq populations’ concerns that themessagingmust go intogreater depth to engage the population in a discussion of how and why Da’esh should be rejected.ExpertsnotedthatNorthAfrica ismorediverse thanAnbarandNinewaand, therefore, themessagesmustbemorenuancedandtargetedtolocalconcerns.

USGInteragencyMessaging

A USG Interagency team had the primaryresponsibilityfordirectlymessagingtheNorthAfricateam to prevent the population vulnerable toradicalization from committing violence. Becausethis was a training exercise to explore interagencycoordination, the Interagency teamwasnotable todisseminatemessagingonthefirstday,sotheNorthAfrica team only responded to global Blue/DoDmessaging. However, when the Interagency teamdidengagethepopulationteam, themessaging—particularlymessagesshowingadisplayofsolidaritywithvictimsofDa’esh’sattackinRome—wasseenaseffective.

Da’eshMessaging

WewereunabletotrulyassesshoweffectiveDa’esh’seffortstorecruitfromthevulnerablepopulationinNorthAfricawereforseveralreasons.First,themembersoftheNorthAfricapopulationteamwereperhaps too close to the situationon the groundandhadadifficult time remaining in their assignedpopulation’s mindset (i.e., open to Da’eshmessaging). So in this simulation, the population was notparticularly receptive toDa’esh’s recruitmentcampaign.Second,expertspointedout thatwhilesocial


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mediaisanimportantcomponentofradicalization,soarepersonalconnectionstofriendsandrecruitersthat cannot be replicated easily in a virtualenvironment.

However, they noted that Da’esh’s inclusivemessaging resonated well with this populationbecausetensionsbetweenethnicArabsandBerbersin North Africa is quite high. Also, messaging thatdiscreditedgovernmentsintheregioncouldbeverydestabilizingsincedemocracyissonascentinmanycountries.

Insights

As we know, radicalization is a very complex phenomenon that varies from individual to individual.Therefore,messaging shouldnotbeexpected toprevent specific actsof violence,but insteadbuild apopulation’sresiliencetoDa’eshmessagingthroughtwoavenues:morepositiveactionsandmessagingthatbuildscommunityresiliencetoDa’eshpersuasionanddemonstrationof thepotentialdestruction(tocities,towomenandchildren,etc.)Da’esh’sbrandofgovernancebrings.

ConclusionAccurate and truly representative population team feedback is a critical component of successfultraining simulations. The interaction between the USG, Da’esh, and population teams generatedimportantinsightsforPOpreparationandtraining.

First,virtual,embedded,culturalknowledgeisextremelyimportanttoavoidcommunicationpitfallsnotobvioustoWestern-trainedanalysts.WhileitwouldbeidealtophysicallyembedaculturalexpertonallPO teams, this is not always possible. Instead, have virtual resources for reach back is essential foreffectivemessaging.

Second, while the Anbar, Ninewa, and North Africa population teams were open to counter-Da’eshmessagesandmessagespromotingthereturntostability,theydidnotfindthemessageseffectiveforanumberofreasons:1)theUSGlacksacrediblevoice,2)tobeperceivedascredible,theUSGmustbackup its wordswith deeds, 3) the USG failed to deepen communication in ameaningful way after theinitialsetofmessages.

Simulations are an efficient way to test methods that bridge the gap between the USG and targetpopulationsinasafeandproductiveway. Itservesmultiplepurposes: improvetraining,vetmessages,andlearnmoreabouttargetedpopulationinterests.


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Chapter 10: Integration Across Cognitive Arenas: Dr. Rachel Wurzman, University of Pennsylvania Summary

The Blue teams grew substantially more successful as the simulation progressed by increasinglyintegratingbiopsychosocial insights into theiroperationalplanningandexecution. Thebenefitsof thebiopsychosocial approach were evidenced by increased agility, sensitivity, responsiveness, andengagementofBlue teammessaging.Closerexaminationof the contexts inwhichBlue teamsgainedtraction ormissed opportunities leads to our assertion that enhanced integration across operational,strategic, and tactical cognitive arenas will improve counter-Da’esh messaging effectiveness, withreciprocalbenefitsinthekineticandnarrativespace.Forexample,themosteffectivemessagesincludedconcretereferenceto—orintegrationwith—exploitableactionsoreventsintherealworld.Incontrast,messagesexplicitlyaboutbroadthemesandideas(positiveornegative)werecalled“boring”andfailedto gain traction as topics of conversation. PSYOP strategy needs to anticipate and accommodatechanges in the cognitive battlespace that operations in other arenas might prompt—it needs to beintegrated.

The figure below diagrams how biopsychosocially-informed tactics bridge arenas of operationalplanning,thepointsatwhichtheycaninformoneanother,andhowneurocognitiveandsocioculturalSMEscanfacilitatethis.

KINETIC

OPERATIONAL

PLANNING

PSYOP

STRATEGIC

PLANNING

PSYOPSERIES

PLANNING

• Messagingwasfarmoreeffec?vewhenit

reinforcedbyac?onagainstDa’esh,to

supportthepopula?on,orwhenit

referredtospecificDa’eshac?onsversus

general‘bad’behaviors.

• Ex:Propagandaeasilyrecognized&rejected,broadthemepromo;onwas‘boring’

• Da’eshmessagingtac?csfollowedan

“biopsychosocial”PSYOPstrategythat

neededtoberecognizedandappreciated

tobeexploited.

• Ex:“Cogni;vepre-emp;vestrikes”needtobestrategicallycountered

• Westernbiasesandculturalassump?ons

wereinadvertentlyimplicitanddetectable

inmessagecontent,whichconsequently

waslessresonantordismissedoutright.

• Ex:Problema;cwordchoicesdetractfromvision-buildingorinadvertentlyreinforceDa’esh’s

EVENTSONTHEGROUND

NARRATIVE&BIOPSYCHOSOCIALOPERATIONALENVIRONMENT

GROWTHOPPORTUNITY:ARENA:

Neurocogni*ve&SocioculturalSMEs

Triggerreac*on

stoexploit


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Integrating thePSYOP strategy acrossmultiple cognitive arenas (tactical, operational, andstrategic) has the potential to magnify our capabilities to leverage insights from social,behavioral, cognitive, and neuroscience to undermine Da’esh influence in the followingways:Integration at the Level of Unit/Cell Organization and Series Planning

• Integrating operationally experiencedmemberswith social and behavioral science expertswithinteamsaffordedthecapabilityforneurocognitiveandsocioculturalinsightstofunctionlike strategic intelligence at the level of series development. This, in turn, enabled moreintegrativeplanningprocessesatbothstrategicandproductserieslevels,tothebenefitofall.

Ø ThemosteffectiveBluemessagingwasaccomplishedviaancreativeprocessthat fullyintegrated the sociocultural embedded expert member’s perspective throughout theanalysisandseriesdevelopmentprocess.

Ø TheMosulBlueteamdynamicwasanexemplarymodelforthis.

• Tighter functional integration between operators and embedded socio-cultural subjectmatterexpertswasessentialtoensuringthatthemessageresonatedfromthetargetaudience(TA)perspective.

Ø Some western biases and cultural assumptions were inadvertently implicit anddetectable inBluemessagecontent,whichconsequentlybecame lessresonantorwasdismissedoutright.

Ø Whenwordsareintendedtohelpbuildavisionofthefuture,monitortheirpotentialtocue unpopular or unwanted concepts (“democracy” or “united”) with negativeassociations(“hypocrisy”or“unfairness”).

Integration at the Level of Strategic PSYOP Planning

• IntegratingexpertinsightcanisusefulfortrainingPSYOPoperatorstoidentifythemessagingtacticsemployedbyDa’esh,whichfirstneedstoberecognizedandappreciatedbeforeitcanbeexploited.

Ø Blue became more effective once they increased their vigilance against the tacticsDa’esh would use predictably. For example, the Da’esh teamwould accuse Blue andothersofmorallyreprehensibleactionstheyhadrecentlyundertakenorwerepreparingtotakethemselves,verysoonafter itbecamepublicallyknown(whetherornot itwasmisinformation).Thistacticisa“cognitivepre-emptivestrike.”

Ø Without Blue anticipating or blocking their cognitive preemptive strikes, Da’esh waseasilyabletopintheblameelsewhere.Theysimplytargetedagroupaboutwhomthepopulationisalreadybiasedtoperceiveashostile(Iran,US,Israel,etc.).


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o Factual information to the contrary will be ineffective if such a competingassociationiswellreinforced.20

• Blue’sdeficitsinagilityandresponsivenesstoeventswererelatedtotheirisolationfromkineticoperationsandinabilitytosynchronizemessagingwithUS/Coalitionactionontheground.

Integration at the Level of Kinetic or Broad Tactical Operations Planning

• Effectivemessagingcannotconsistofblatantpropaganda.Propagandawas transparentandrejectedby theTAsas such.Repeatedmessagingabout general ideas (empowerment,unity,fightback)becameboringtopopulationteams.Onlyconcretereferencesgainedtraction.

• Actions speak louder thanwords. The action is not just in the narrative, the action is thenarrative.Messagingbecomesthe“voice-over”—itdeterminesthemeaningofthoseactionsorevents.

Ø MessagingwasfarmoreeffectivewhenitreferredtospecificandrecentDa’eshactionsasameans to conveybroad themes.Anexampleof thiswasmessaging that suppliedcommentaryinterpretingeveryDa’eshviolentactionas“ISILmustbedesperateiftheyareresortingtothis,”withregardtotorturingandexecutingwomenandchildren.

• WhentheTAperceived thatpastorpresentUSmilitaryactionconflictedwithamessage,messagingbackfiredandmadeDa’esh’scasestronger.

• When the primary objective is in “narrative space,” consider using kinetic actions asnarrativesupportoperationsbybaitingDa’eshintoapredictable,exploitablereaction.ThisisasuccessfultacticthatDa’eshusesandcouldbetestedinfuturesimulations.

20 Wurzman R and Casebeer W.D. (2016) Predicting And Reducing Hostility: Insights From Cognitive Models And Cognitive Behavioral Therapy. In: Giordano J., Rhem S., and Popp G. (Eds.) White Paper on Assessing and Anticipating Threats to US Security Interests: A Bio-Psycho-Social Science Approach for Understanding the Emergence of and Mitigating Violence and Terrorism. A Strategic Multi-Layer (SMA) Periodic Publication.


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Chapter 11: Embedding Technical Information in Counter-VEOMessaging:Dr.AllisonAstorino-Courtois,[email protected]

Abstract: This paper reports insight gained from two attempts to introduce technical and academicexpertinformationtypicallynotaccessedbyPSYOPplanners,namely:1)Blueteaminformationpulland2)assisted informationpullwhereTechnicalTeam liaisonswereassignedasBlue teammembers.TheTechnicalTeamsineachcaseconsistedofacademicsandresearchersrepresentinganalyticapproachesrelevanttoeffectivemessaging.Whilethiswasnotatruetestoftheseapproachesinthefield,eachoftheBlueteamsaccessedandusedsignificantlymoretechnical/academicinformationwheninformationpullwasassistedbyaTechnicalTeamliaison.Playersalsofeltthattheirownmessagingwasimprovedby the addition of this information. Red and White population players receiving these enhancedmessagesalsosawthemasmoreclosely“gettingitright”thaninthepurelyinformationpullsimulation.

KeyTake-awaysFromSimulation

• Embeddingoneortwotrusted“technical”expertsintoPSYOPteamsisaforcemultiplier.• The majority of players considered embedding Technical Team liaisons into Blue both saved

neededtimeandprovedtobeasignificantenhancementtomessagedevelopmenttasks.• Blue teammembersgenerallydidnot takeadvantageof reach-backanalytic support (i.e., the

expertiseresidentintheTechnicalTeam)duringeitherICONSexercise.However,embeddingaTechnical Team representative directly into Blue allowed for frequent and highly valuedtechnicalinputduringmessagedevelopmentandexpertreviewwhennewmessageshadtobedevelopedrapidly.

• TechnicalTeamembedswereabletobridgethegapbetweenBlueteamoperationalneedsandtheoretical or other academic work that is relevant but not necessarily tailored to theoperationalenvironment.

• The majority of Blue team information requested of Technical Team members can becategorizedasregionalorDa’eshexpertiseratherthananalyticinnature.

• CritiquesofTechnicalTeaminvolvementcenteredontheirgainingabetterunderstandingoftherealityofthePSYOPprocess.

Discussion

Thispaperreports insightaboutways toenhancethetechnical informationandexpertiseavailable toPSYOPplannersgainedduringtwoweb-basedsimulationsintendedtocounterDa’eshmessaginginIraqand Syria. The first (ICONS II) was held in December 2015. The second (ICONS III) was held in April2016.21Whilethereweretoomanyuncontrolledfactorsandgamechangestousethesimulationsasanexperimental test of the effect of embedding technical expertise,wedid derive a number of insightsthatmayprovehelpfultoconsidereitherinfuturesimulationsorPSYOPforceplanning.

21ThescenariosandBlueteamtasksforbothsimulationsfocusedoncounter-Da’eshmessagingandPSYOPplannersattemptingtoinfluence“White”(population)and“Red”(Da’eshsupporters,fighters,andleadership)populations.TheprimaryobjectiveoftheDecembersimulationwastosowdivisionandmistrustwithinDa’eshleadership.TheAprilsimulationfocusedonmessagingpopulationsinthreelocationsinIraq:Anbar,Mosul,andNinewa,andincludedanInter-agencyteamfocusedonvulnerablepopulationsinNorthAfrica.


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BothsimulationsincludedaTechnicalTeamconsistingof30+academicsandresearchersrepresentingavariety of analytic approaches (e.g., agent-basedmodeling, socialmedia analysis, etc.) anddisciplines(e.g.,neuroscience,communications,areastudies,etc.)relevanttoeffectivemessaging. Inbothcases,theprimaryobjectiveoftheTechnicalTeamwastoprovideinformationthatisnotreadilyaccessibletoPSYOP planners. The presumptionwas that the effectiveness of PSYOPmessaging in the simulationswouldincreasealongwiththeuseofthisinput.

December2015Simulation:BluePullonTechnicalInformation

Approximately one week prior to the December 2015 ICONS simulation, the Technical Team wasintroducedtotheBlueteamplayersbywayofabookletemailedtoeach.Thebookletcontainedbriefdescriptions of the types of assistance each Technical Teammember could provide to Bluemessagegenerationprocesses, including, forexample, insight fromneuroscientistsonhowmessagesmightbephrased tobemost appealing and interest analysis insighton typesofmessages thatwouldbemostlikely to provoke disagreement and dispute among different types of Da’esh leaders. During thesimulation,theTechnicalTeamwasmadeavailabletoBlueteamplayersondemand.Blueplayerswereinstructed that they could request technical support at any point during the span of the simulation.WhileitwasclearthatBlueteammembershadreadtheinformationinthebooklet,theydidnotreachout to the Technical Team for substantive input during the exercise. Even when Technical TeammembersbeganpushingsuggestionstoBlue,theinformationwasnotapparentinBluemessaging.

FeedbackfromBlueteamplayersafterthesimulationexplainedthereasons:

• TechnicalTeaminputwas“tootheoretical”anddifficulttoapplytothefast-pacedgame;• therewasnotenoughleadtimetotheexerciseallowforseriesdevelopmentandotheractivities

duringwhichtechnicalinputmighthavebeentailoredtomessagesandbeenmoreuseful;and• therewas a general disconnect between thedetail and tactically orientedBlue teamand the

ways that theTechnical playerswere presentinginput.

We suspected that therewere other reasons as well.For themostpart,Blue teamplayers had not interactedwith Technical Teammemberspriortothekick-offof the simulation. Inhindsight, it may not havebeen reasonable to expectthatduringthecourseofplayBlue team PSYOPprofessionals and othersengagedinfast-pacedtaskswouldaskfortechnicalinformationfrompeopletheyhadnevermet.


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April2016Simulation:TechnicalTeamAidedBluePull

For the April 2016 ICONS simulation, we refined the process by which Blue players might accesstechnical information by adding two Technical Team liaisons to each Blue team. Technical liaisonsparticipatedinweeklyBlueplanningmeetingsduringtherun-uptothesimulation.Inaddition,TechnicalTeammembersheldbriefings forBlue teammemberson theirownresearchand technicalwork.Theprimary functionof the liaisonwas to facilitate thepushandpullof information from the restof theTechnical Team into theBlueplanning andmessagingprocesses. The figureabove shows the generalpathforcommunicationbetweentheBlueandTechnicalTeams.

Priortothestartofthesimulation,threeBlueteamrequestsforinformationwereaddressedbythefullTechnicalTeam,andtwomorewereaddressedduringplay.Thenatureofeachofthequestionscanbecategorized as regional or Da’esh expertise rather than analytic in nature. While each Blue teamemployed its one or two Technical liaisons in slightly different ways, the most common was asconsultants/reviewers of message content prepared by other team members. In a couple of cases,liaisonsalsogotinvolvedinsuggestingmessagecontent.

Whatdidwelearn?

There were a couple of factors that muddy conclusions that may be drawn from the outcomedifferencesoftheembedstrategyusedforICONSIIIversustheinformationpullstrategyusedduringtheprevioussimulation(ICONSII).First,intherecentexercise,PSYOPoperatorswereinsomecasesunableto participate in the full exercise as they were being tasked by their home units at the same time.Second, the longer duration of ICONS III meant that civilian Blue players (mainly from FieldingUniversity) stepped into leadership roles in some cases, developedmessage content and production,and sent messages. As a result, post-simulation survey results may not be representative of what apurelyPSYOPoperator-led teamwouldbelieveabout theusefulnessof theTechnical liaisons.Despitethese caveats, we believe that this effort shed some light on the use and usefulness of embedding

technical expertise in PSYOP teams. Post simulation surveys andotherfeedbackfromplayersindicatethat:

AsduringtheDecembersimulation,Blueteamplayersfelttherewaslittle time for expert reach-back during game play even via theTechnical liaisons but that havingdirect access to the embeddedTechnical Team member was

extremelyvaluable.

MostreviewersratedtheinputoftheTechnicalliaisonsasimportanttothe success of the team and all thought that they “definitely helpedshape” the team’s output and provided valuable insight, especiallyregarding“wording,phrases,andculturalcontext”ofthemessages.

ThesuggestionsforimprovingtheinformationprovidedbytheTechnicalTeam and Technical liaisons included more timely input from theliaisons,andtrainingTechnicalTeammembersandliaisoninthePSYOPprocessandPSYOPauthorities.

“Duringthesimulationthetechliaisonplayedanintegralrole.Werequestedinformationonaregularbasis.Thetechliaisonagaingavefeedback,ideas,and/orwenttothelargergroupoftechsupportforadditionalsupport.”BlueTeamMember “…theexercisedidnot

accuratelyreflectthe[PSYOP]processor[PSYOP]operations.EachmemberoftheTechTeam,whileclearlyknowledgeableintheirownfields,didnotunderstandhowMISOworks,whichresultedinunfocusedmessagingwithoutaclearlydefinedtargetaudienceormeasureofeffectiveness.”BlueTeamMember


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Chapter 12: Providing MISO Operators with Insights from Narrative Science: David Koelle, Charles River Analytics [email protected] research in narrative science and operationally-relevant target audiences (e.g., Da’esh)continually identifies insights that canbeused tooptimize theeffectivenessofmessages intended toinfluence and change behavior. In fact, this volume of white papers itself includes a collection ofresearch results that are of benefit to MISO operators’ craft. While this white paper represents acollaboration between academic and operational communities, most academic research in narrativescienceisnotaseasilytransferredtoMISOoperatorsandmaderelevanttotheirneeds.

There are several challenges in transferring research findings to the operational community. Forinstance, results are often circulated within the academic community in the form of papers andpresentations,withlessopportunityforknowledgetransfertooperationalcommunities.Researchusesspecific terminology (e.g., “narrative transportation”) thatmaynotbewell-understoodoutsideof theresearch community. Research communities themselvesmay be specialized and disparate, so even amotivatedandwell-equippedoperationalrepresentativemaynothavetheawarenessofthediversityofcommunitiesortheavailabilitytoparticipateinmorethanafew.

To address these challenges, under the DARPA Narrative Networks (N2) effort, we developed anapproachinwhichresultsofnarrativescienceresearchandoperationalknowledge(includingresearchintospecifictargetaudiences)arerepresentedasmodels.Thesemodelsincludeactionableguidance—clearandpracticalsuggestionsfordevelopingandcommunicatingmessages—thatareprovidedtoMISOoperators within the context of their doctrinally-defined workflow. Furthermore, we developed aprototype user-centered application to assist MISO operators as they develop products intended toinfluenceandchangethebehavioroftargetaudiences.

For the April 2016 ICONS simulation, we used this prototype behind-the-scenes to provide the Blueteam with actionable guidance. In addition to the primary objective of providing Blue team withguidance,oursecondaryobjectivewastoassesstheutilityoftheprototypefordirectusebytheBlueteaminfuturesimulations,andeventuallybyMISOoperatorsinfuturedeployments.

Inthisbrief,wedescribethedetailsofourapproach,resultsfromtheICONSsimulation,andthoughtsforfuturework.

DetailsofOurApproachThecenterpieceofourapproachisacollectionofmodels,eachofwhichrepresentsrelationshipsamongnarrative concepts from a single publication or presentation. Themodels (e.g., as shown in Figure 1)captureanabstract-leveldescriptionoftheacademicwork inaformthatsoftwaretoolscanuseforavariety of applications. The models consist of an assortment of node types (e.g., general concepts,actionable guidance, neurophysiological state) and links between those nodes (e.g., increases,decreases,correlates to).Akey insight fromourresearchmotivates theuseofsuchmodels:abstract-levelqualitative summariesofnarrative researchareuseful forunderstanding themain conceptsandrelationshipsfromtheresearch.Thisisincontrasttohigh-fidelitycomputationalmodels,whichwedidnotadoptasoursolutiontothechallengespresentedearlier.


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Today,thesemodelsarecreatedmanuallybymembersoftheCharlesRiverAnalyticsteaminvolvedintheeffort,althoughweintendtotransferthisresponsibilitytomilitarytrainers,lessonslearnedcenters,ordoctrineshops, towhichwewouldsupplyamodelauthoring tool toaid thedevelopmentofhigh-quality models and a means to assess the validity of those models. We have currently modeledapproximately 50 research publications and presentations, including several models based onoperational experience from theMISO community and several that are specifically aboutDa’esh andhavebeeninformedbypreviousSMApresentations.

Individual models can bemerged together when themodelscontainnodesthathaveidentical definitions. Thisprovides an automated meansforgeneratingtheequivalentofa survey paper and it amplifiesthe end-to-end relevance ofindividual research results. Forexample, if Paper 1 states,“narrative transportation leadstopro-socialbehavior,”Paper2says, “identifiable characterscontribute to narrativetransportation,” and Paper 3claims, “narrativetransportation can be assessed

usingaquestionnaire,” the combinedmodel canprovide suggestions for creatingandmeasuringpro-socialbehavior,despitethatsuchguidanceisnotexplicitlystatedinanyoneofthethreepapers.

Theothersignificantcomponentofourapproachisoneormoreuser-centeredtoolsthatfitwithintheMISOoperators’workflowandthatusethemodelstoprovideactionableguidancetosoldiers.Therearenorestrictionswithinthemodelingformalismthatconstrainwhattypeoftoolscanbebuiltthatusethemodels,andourideashaveincludedtoolsthatprovideguidanceforcreatingnarrativeproducts,identifysensors to conduct pre- and post-testing to measure narrative effects, and assess measures ofeffectivenessfordeployednarrativeproducts(includingthosedeployedbytheadversary).

State of the Prototype and Rationale for Its Components UndertheDARPAN2effort,wedevelopedaprototypetoolthatassistsMISOoperatorsinthecreationofnarrativeinfluenceproducts.ThetoolintegrateswithaMISOsystemforconductingtargetaudienceanalysisandconforms to the steps thatMISOoperatorsperformwhendevelopingproducts.The tooltakes facts from the soldier’s target audience analysis as input, searches the narrative models forrelevantguidancebasedonthat input,andprovidestheoperatorswitharankedlistofguidancefromthemodels that they can use in developing their product. It also contains a worksheet that lets theoperatormapwhere in thedescriptionof theirproduct theyhaveaddressed thesuggestedguidance.Whiletheprototypeapplicationtestedwellwithoperators,onepathoffollow-onworkthatoriginatedwiththeN2effortismovinginadifferentdirectionthatdoesnotinvolvemodelsofnarrativeresearch.

Nevertheless,webelievethatthesemodelsrepresentacompellingandinnovativeapproachtodrawingconnections across otherwise unconnected research while also serving as a data source to inform a

Figure1.Samplemodelofnarrativeresearch


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varietyofMISO-centrictools.Forthisreason,wearefortunatetohavetheopportunitytoparticipateintheICONSsimulationtofurtheradvancethisareaofresearch.

ResultsonUsingthePrototypeToolintheICONSSimulation

ThepaceoftheICONSsimulationwasdifferentfromtheworkflowconsiderationsunderwhichwehaddesigned the prototype application. In the prototype, we assumed a well-formed target audienceanalysis would be used as input for themodel search capability and thatMISO operators would bedeveloping products through the worksheets specified in MISO doctrine. In contrast, the ICONSsimulationwas a fast-paced scenario inwhich productswere being developedwithMISOdoctrine inmind,butoutsideofastructuredMISOworkflowcompletewithworksheets. Inaddition,theproductsweredevelopedinresponsetoothernarrativessentthroughthesimulation’smessagingsysteminrealtime, rather thanproducts developed to support longer-term strategic objectives. TheprototypewasdesignedtosupportaworkflowthatwedidnotexperienceduringtheICONSsimulation.

Recall that thereareno constraintson the typeofuser-centered tools that thenarrativemodels cansupport.Knowingthatthemodelscansupportmoretypesoftoolsthantheprototypewehappenedtohavedeveloped,wemanuallynavigatedthemodelsthemselvestofindinformationtosupporttheBlueteam, while simultaneously thinking about how the Blue team working under the simulation’soperationaltempo(and,byextension,howMISOoperatorsmightneedtorespondtomessagesinrealoperations)mightbenefitfromatoolwithadifferentdesign.

Duringthesimulation,weprovidedseveralpiecesofactionableguidancetotheBlueteam.Forexample,afteraparticularlyegregiousdisplayfromDa’esh,weprovidedthefollowingpiecesofguidancedirectlyfromthemodels(recallthesearebasedonextantresearch,soyoumayrecognizethisguidanceifyouare familiarwith the original source) alongwith some additional discussion to describe, for example,whatismeantbytermslike“sacredvalues:”

- highlightDa’esh'stransgressionsofvaluesthataresacredtoMuslims;- especially identify instances where transgressions of values can be associated with material

gain;and- includestrongemotionalcontentinproducttext(e.g.,poster,radioshow)

Despiteourcurrentsetofmodels,thereweresituationsforwhichwesimplyhadnoreadyresponses.For example, there was no information in our models to address assassination, which was a pivotaleventtowardstheendoftheICONSsimulation.

Oneofourkeytakeawaysfromthesimulationisthatwebelievethereisstill immensepromiseinourapproach to representing research in models that can be searched by user-centered tools, and thecreationofanewtypeoftoolthatislessconstrainedtotheMISOworkflowandthatallowsoperatorstoexploretheresearchinamoredynamicmannerwouldbeavaluableadditiontotheirsoftwarearsenal.

Future Work Inthefuture,webelievethatsomethingakintoa“KnowledgeDiscoveryTool”centeredontheconceptsof narrative science and operational knowledge (e.g., guidance specific to Da’esh) would be aworthwhileadditiontotheBlueteam’stoolbox(and,byextension,toMISOoperators).Thistoolwouldprovideauser-centeredmeansforsearching,browsing,navigating,andunderstandingtheinformationthatthemodelsrepresent. (Wehesitatetoprovidethemodelsdirectlytousers; themergedmodel is


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overwhelming and a set of individual models lacks the connections to other relevant models.) Weenvision this as a sort of model-backed, MISO-oriented online encyclopedia with short, readabledescriptionsforkeyconceptsandclearactionableguidance.Thistoolwouldusetheconnectionsinthemodeltoaidinnavigatingtorelatedconcepts.Itwouldallowuserstosearchthecontentofthemodels,anditwouldallowuserstoflaggapsinthecontent(e.g.,assassination);trainersordoctrineteamscouldlater assess the flags to identify whether additional research needs to be codified to support futureoperationsandclosethegap.Thetoolwouldalsoprovideameanstoassisttheoperatorintailoringtheactionableguidancetoaspecificscenario:duringthesimulation,werealizedthatsomeoftheguidancefromthemodelsneededtoberestatedorrefinedtomaximizeitsrelevancetotheBlueteam.

We look forward to continuing our investigation into this promising research direction for the futurebenefitoftheMISOmission.


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Appendix A: Archival Material Thissimulationproducedavolumeofworkthatistoolargetoattachhere.Ifyouareinterestedinobtaininganyofthemateriallistedbelow,pleasecontactMr.SamRhematsamuel.d.rhem.ctr@mail.milorclickonthelinksprovided.

Simulation Scenarios Scenarios were produced and disseminated at the outset of each day during the simulation. ThesescenariossetthescenefortheBlue(USG),White(IraqandNorthAfricapopulations),andRed(Da’esh)teams.

Messages Prepared by Blue (USG) Teams The Blue teams produced numerous Tweets, podcasts, posters, flyers, and other forms ofmessagingthat is available on the ICONS website at http://www.icons.umd.edu/data/4952/.Many examples ofthesemessagesareinsertedthroughoutthetextofthisreport.

Corpus of all Simulation Content TheUniversityofMaryland ICONSteampreparedWordandExceldocumentscontainingallmessagesfrom the simulation on their website: http://www.icons.umd.edu/data/4952/. This open sourcematerialmay be used by researchers to conduct various forms of analysis. The corpus contains over1000messagesandcontainsmetadatarelatingtosender,receiver,content,timestamp,etc.

Author Bibliographies Toreviewacompilationofauthorbibliographies,pleasegotohttp://www.icons.umd.edu/data/4952/.

counter-da'esh influence operations: cognitive space narrative

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