understanding the rise of isil/da'esh (the 'islamic state') · 2015. 3. 17. · isil/da'esh also...

Briefing17 March 2015

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research ServiceAuthor: Eric PichonMembers' Research Service

ENPE 551.329

Understanding the rise of ISIL/Da'esh(the 'Islamic State')

SUMMARY

Already in control of a third of Syrian territory (most of it uninhabited), the jihadistterrorist group that has declared itself 'the Islamic State' (known variously as IS, ISIS orISIL, and by the Arabic acronym 'Daesh' or 'Da'esh'), also seized large portions of Iraqiterritory in a matter of days in summer 2014.

Beyond the daily account of atrocities committed by ISIL/Da'esh, analysts have tried tofathom how this group, now boasting tens of thousands of fighters and several billioneuros in resources, emerged on the international scene and made its claim to powerwith such sweeping assertiveness.

Syria and Iraq's neighbours now find themselves on the frontlines of furtherexpansion: a US-led international coalition, including countries in the region, is tryingto halt the ISIL/Da'esh advance.

The conflict has triggered considerable EU humanitarian effort, and a review of theEU's counter-terrorism strategy to better address the global dimension of the terroristthreat.

In this briefing: Origins What are ISIL/Da'esh's resources? Spillover at the Syrian and Iraqi borders EU response

EPRS Behind the rise of ISIL/Da'esh

Members' Research Service Page 2 of 6

Origins

Sunnis–Shiites; Jihadists Soon after the Prophet Muhammad's death (632 AD), a conflict erupted over who should be his successor ('caliph' in Arabic). Although some of his companions were in favour of his cousin and son-in-law Ali, the majority decided to nominate Abou Bakr, who was not of Muhammad's bloodline but was deemed more fit for the task. After years of successive battles, Ali was killed in 661 AD, and Hussein, his son and the grandson of Muhammad, was beheaded in 680 AD by the caliph's supporters. Since then, Muslims are seen as divided between the Sunnis, who recognise the caliphs succeeding Muhammad as legitimate, and the Shiites, and Shi'a, the partisans of Ali, who believe the true leaders ('imam' in Arabic), should have been his descendants.

Sunnis make up 87-90% of Muslims, 10-13% are Shiites; the latter live predominantly in an area between southern Lebanon and Bahrain, commonly known as the 'Shiite Crescent'. A third branch of Islam (the Kharadjites), produced the Ibadis, who are in the majority in Oman. In addition, there are also Muslims who identify themselves as 'just Muslim'.

Sunnis and Shiites live peacefully together in many parts of the world, but their religious divergences have also pitched them into power conflicts with each other for many centuries. There is also great diversity within these two main groups: in particular, among the Sunnis, Salafis believe that the only way to be a 'good Muslim' is to adhere, in the strictest possible way, to the code of behaviour of Muhammad and his immediate successors. A fraction of them claims it is their duty to fight against those who believe anything else. These violent extremists are often referred to as 'Salafi jihadists' or 'Jihadi Salafis' – although violence is not implied in the word 'jihad', which simply refers to 'efforts to be a "good Muslim" or believer, as well as working to inform people about the faith of Islam'. Traditional Salafis deny that these violent extremists are entitled to call themselves Salafis.

The 'Islamic State' and the 'Caliphate' Among Salafi jihadists, ISIS or ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham/Levant) was originally a branch of Al-Qaeda, known as 'Al-Qaeda in Iraq', founded in 2004 to resist the US invasion and the Shiite-led government it imposed. Political and theoretical differences led to a split after Osama Bin Laden's death. After the beginning of the Syrian uprising, ISIL entered Syria and, unsuccessfully, tried to take over the Al-Nusra Front, Al-Qaeda's Syrian branch. The two groups have been fighting each other for control of Syrian territory, but cooperate on some battlefronts.

On 29 June 2014, the group renamed itself 'the Islamic State' ('Da'esh' is the Arab acronym used by those fighting against it), to mark its will to restore an institution weakened and subsequently abolished by Turkey's secular leader, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, in 1924: the 'Caliphate', i.e. theocratic rule of a territory where all inhabitants should abide by 'Sharia' – the Islamic law. Current ISIL/Da'esh leader Abou Bakr Al-Baghdadi declared himself the new caliph, with an ambition to govern the lives of all Muslims in the world. This act of self-declaration has not been recognised by Muslim authorities, or by the Muslim community, and is even rejected by other Salafi jihadists. More generally, support for ISIL/Da'esh in the Arab world is not high.

In the areas ISIL/Da'esh controls, in particular its 'capital' Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq, it installs its own administration, by means of coercion and violence, but also by

http://www.cairn.info/revue-etudes-2008-6-page-741.htmhttp://www.vox.com/a/maps-explain-the-middle-east#map-13http://www.vox.com/a/maps-explain-the-middle-east#map-13http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/18/the-sunni-shia-divide-where-they-live-what-they-believe-and-how-they-view-each-other/http://www.pewforum.org/2012/08/09/the-worlds-muslims-unity-and-diversity-executive-summary/http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/10938.pdfhttp://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2015/02/CONESA/52626http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2015/02/CONESA/52626http://islamicsupremecouncil.org/understanding-islam/legal-rulings/5-jihad-a-misunderstood-concept-from-islam.html?start=9http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/493http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/493http://orientxxi.info/magazine/le-califat-imaginaire,0689http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/isil-declares-new-islamic-caliphate-201462917326669749.htmlhttp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/07/syria-iraq-isis-caliphate-egypt-azhar-reaction.htmlhttp://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/religion-geopolitics/commentaries/opinion/most-muslims-dont-care-about-isis-caliphatehttp://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/01/27/jihadi-salafi-views-of-the-islamic-state/http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/06/How-does-the-Arab-world-view-ISIS.aspxhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/war-with-isis-inside-the-islamic-state-caliphate-life-goes-on--but-beatings-are-frequent-and-punishments-swift-and-savage-9955949.htmlhttp://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-islamic-state-mosul-20150126-story.html#page=1http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/02/05/how-much-of-a-state-is-the-islamic-state/



spending money and recruiting its own workforce for courts, police, and education,Some 6 million people live under ISIL/Da'esh rules.

What are ISIL/Da'esh's resources?Human resourcesEstimates of the number of ISIL/Da'esh fighters in Iraq and Syria vary from 9 000 to200 000 (20 000-31 500 as of September 2014, according to the CIA) – among themchildren. This variation may be explained by the fact that the highest figures take intoaccount ISIL/Da'esh's core troops plus allied factions. Despite its record of crime andviolence, particularly based on ethnic and religious motivation,1 ISIL/Da'esh enjoys somesupport in Iraq. The country's former Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, is said by manyobservers to have pitted Sunni tribal leaders against the regime. Furthermore, some ofSaddam Hussein's former collaborators see ISIL/Da'esh as a route back onto the politicaland military scene. The seizure of Mosul would not have been so swift without the helpof other armed Sunni factions. Nevertheless, a total sectarian conflict has not takenplace: a number of Sunni tribes have now taken up arms against ISIL/Da'esh to combatits violent methods and aspirations for dominance.

ISIL/Da'esh also recruits its members among radicalised Muslims globally.2 To reachthem, it has a very sophisticated 'communication plan', of which the appalling videos ofviolent executions are only a part. ISIL/Da'esh uses all available channels, from a papermagazine, Dabiq, to the full range of social media. Social platforms deliver messages inseveral languages, tailored to a broad spectrum of target audiences. These are not onlycalls to take up arms, but also testimonials from Western volunteers, declaring theyhave found a more meaningful life as ISIL/Da'esh fighters. Online chat rooms andforums afford ISIL/Da'esh direct contact with prospective recruits. On the ground,'welcome actions' are implemented: ISIL/Da'esh has for example allegedly openedEnglish-speaking schools in Raqqa for foreign fighters' children.

Since the international coalition's strikes, attracting new fighters has become moredifficult: ISIL/Da'esh is more prudent in the use of social media, as some posts or textmessages have helped the international coalition3 locate its strongholds and identify itsforces. Recent testimonies also suggest that the bloodshed by ISIL/Daesh troopsdeterred new local recruitment, and that foreign recruits are reluctant to go into battle.

Military equipmentAccording to Conflict Armament Research-iTrace, an EU-funded project, most of themilitary equipment in ISIL/Da'esh possession was seized from the defeated Iraqi army innorthern Iraq, or from the Free Syrian Army: ISIL/Da'esh holds 'significant quantities ofUS-manufactured small arms'. Jana Hybášková, a former MEP and now head of the EUDelegation in Iraq, also voiced concerns that arms aimed at helping the KurdishPeshmerga troops fighting ISIL/Da'esh, may have been diverted by the jihadists.Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that 'some of the weapons' the USdropped to help the Kurdish forces fighting in Kobanî 'were seized by ISIL'.

Financial resourcesThere are suspicions that ISIL/Da'esh receives funding from some Gulf States, but itgenerates most of its income from the territories it occupies, according to the inter-governmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF). For instance, ISIL/Da'esh has revived apractice once applied by Muhammad and the early caliphates: the so-called 'jizya' – a

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tax imposed on other 'religions of the Book' (mainly Christians, as there are very fewJews in Iraq).

Money also flows in from ransoms paid for hostages, from human trafficking and bankrobbery. In a robbery of the largest bank in the city of Mosul, ISIL/Da'esh obtained500 billion Iraqi dinars (around €330 million), and it has also plundered other banks.

International smuggling is yet another important source of ISIL/Da'esh income. Analystsestimate ISIL/Da'esh already controls 60% of Syrian oil fields; in Iraq, it took control ofseven oil fields and two refineries. Illicit oil trade might have provided around€1.5 million a day, but it could now be less, as US airstrikes have destroyed part of therefineries – and also because crude oil prices have declined globally. The head of the EUDelegation in Iraq accused EU countries – without naming them – of buying oil fromISIL/Da'esh, and the UN Security Council warned ISIL/Da'esh clients that they could facesanctions.

ISIL/Da'esh communicates widely on its destruction of 'idols of the past', but it alsomakes a lot of money out of Iraqi heritage. Smuggling of antiquities from Shiitemosques, Christian churches, and archaeological sites is probably worth hundreds ofmillions of euros.

Organ trafficking has also been alleged by Iraq's ambassador to the UN.

Spillover at the Syrian and Iraqi bordersThe ISIL/Da'esh advance in Iraq and Syria raises concerns that it will sooner or later spillover into other countries in the neighbourhood, already destabilised by the influx ofrefugees. Threats have also been identified far beyond Iraqi and Syrian borders,especially in Libya, where attacks have been perpetrated under the ISIL/Da'esh banner,and Nigeria where Boko Haram4 has pledged allegiance to ISIL/Da'esh. (This expansion isnot covered in this document, nor are the Iraqi and Syrian governments' positions.)

In August 2014, ISIL/Da'esh attacked, without success, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)and Internal Security Forces (ISF) on the Syria-Lebanon border. To better resistISIL/Da'esh, the government fostered better cooperation between the LAF andHezbollah-led forces; it also gave more political responsibilities to Sunni leaders, inorder to prevent them forming a tactical alliance with ISIL/Da'esh. Nevertheless,ISIL/Da'esh and other armed groups still pose a threat on the Syria-Lebanon border, inthe mountain region of Qalamoun.

Fighting on the Golan Heights has led the UN peacekeeping mission (UNDOF) towithdraw its troops, de facto removing a buffer zone between Israel and Syria; however,Israel's military superiority might thwart ISIL/Da'esh attack. At the UN General Assembly(UNGA), Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu declared that 'Hamas and ISIS arebranches of the same poisonous tree' but no concrete alliance between the two groupshas been identified to date.

The four month siege by ISIL/Da'esh of the Kurdish-populated Syrian city of Kobanî,close to the Turkish border, put Turkey's diplomacy under severe pressure.President Erdoğan, motivated by domestic policy considerations, was reluctant to helpthe Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and its Syrian allies. The Turkish governmentreluctantly allowed Kurdish forces, led by PKK and its Syrian ally, the People's ProtectionUnits (YPG), to access the battlefield via Turkish territory only after the US ordered

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airstrikes in support of the Kurdish fighters. Later in February, to demonstrate its will tofight against ISIL/Da'esh, the Turkish army entered a Turkish enclave in Syria.

Jordan's army has also blocked several ISIL/Da'esh attempts to invade its territory. Theimmolation of the Jordanian pilot Moaz al-Kassasbeh in February 2015 has not deterredKing Abdullah's engagement against ISIL/Da'esh; on the contrary he pledged to 'wipeout' ISIL/Da'esh and called for a quick delivery of sophisticated US military materiel. Thisposition is likely to raise concern among the Israeli leadership and their allies in the USCongress.

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, suspected of funding Salafi terrorism, now fear a backlash ontheir territories, and are increasingly engaged in securing the region and combating theillicit financing of ISIL/Da'esh. The perception of ISIL/Da'esh as a common risk to bothSaudi Arabia and Iran did not trigger the expected rapprochement between the tworival states in the region, embroiled in other conflicts (in particular in Yemen).

Iran has not confirmed ISIL/Da'esh incursions on its territory, but the Shiite-led IslamicRepublic considers a possible Islamic state led by Sunni Salafi extremists at its borders asa serious security threat. For this reason, Iran keeps close connection with the Iraqigovernment and supports Iraqi unity– with a Shiite majority – rather than a partitioninto three distinct entities (Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni).

EU responseThe EU has repeatedly 'condemn[ed] the indiscriminate attacks, atrocities, killings andabuses of human rights which are perpetrated by ISIL/Da'esh and other terrorist groups,in particular against Christians and other religious and ethnic groups'. The 'Elements foran EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da'esh threat', adopted by theCouncil on 16 March 2015, aims at setting up a coordinated action of the EU andMember States within an international framework, provides €1 billion in additionalfunding for the next two years, 'for essential priorities: relief, stabilisation anddevelopment in the region, as well as countering the threat posed by terrorist groupslike Da'esh'.

Concerning counter-terrorism and military actions, the EU and Western states faceseveral challenges: they have to stop financial and human outflows to ISIL/Da'esh5 aswell as coordinate their actions in the field. The EU Counter-Terrorism/Foreign FightersStrategy, adopted on 20 October 2014 urges Member States to enforce measures totackle the financing of terrorism and to deter citizens from joining the ranks ofISIL/Da'esh as 'foreign fighters'. On 9 February 2015, the Council pointed out the needfor an external dimension to policy on counterterrorism, complementing justice andhome affairs action: 'Close coordination between internal and external action on theone hand, and between relevant EU actors and EU Member States on the other hand,will enhance the impact of our common efforts'.. On the military side, the ForeignAffairs Council of 15 August 2014 endorsed the supply of arms by some Member Statesto Kurdish regional authorities. The coordination of the response to ISIL/Da'esh goesbeyond the EU framework: at the NATO Wales Summit in September 2014, six EUMember States (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Denmark, and the UK), together withAustralia, Canada, Turkey and the US, committed to 'take the necessary steps to helpIraq; to stop the advance of the terrorist organisation Islamic State'. On 15 September,representatives of the UN, the EU, the Arab League, and of 26 countries, met in Paris tocoordinate their actions to 'eradicate' ISIL/Da'esh.6

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European Parliament

The European Parliament adopted several resolutions condemning the human rights abusesperpetrated by warring parties in Iraq and Syria.7 In particular, in resolution P8_TA(2014)0027(18/09/2014), the EP approved the implementation of an international coalition againstISIL/Daesh; it emphasised the need for a better inclusion of minorities in Iraq; it called for aneffective implementation of 'the arms embargo and assets freeze imposed by UN SecurityCouncil resolutions' and 'for the referral of those suspected of committing crimes againsthumanity in Syria and Iraq to the International Criminal Court'. On 10 February 2015 the'Elements for an EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da'esh threat'communication was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET).

Main referencesThe main sources used for this briefing and further references canbe found in our online 'keysource': ISIL/Da'esh (The 'Islamic State'):background information http://wp.me/p2qdgs-4sR.

Endnotes1 See our briefing and the related keysource: 'Minorities in Iraq – Pushed to the brink of existence', EPRS,

11 February 2015.2 See our briefing and the related keysource: 'Foreign fighters: Member States' responses and EU action in an

international context', EPRS, February 2015.3 See our briefing on the international coalition against ISIL/Da'esh.4 See our briefing: 'African-led counter-terrorism measures against Boko Haram'.5 See our briefing and the related keysource on Foreign fighters (above).6 For further information see our briefing on the international coalition against ISIL/Da'esh, above.7 Resolutions adopted since the beginning of the eighth parliamentary term: 2015/2599(RSP); 2015/2559(RSP);

2014/2971(RSP); 2014/2899(RSP); 2014/2843(RSP); 2014/2716(RSP).

Disclaimer and CopyrightThe content of this document is the sole responsibility of the author and any opinions expressed thereindo not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. It is addressed to theMembers and staff of the EP for their parliamentary work. Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and the European Parliament isgiven prior notice and sent a copy.

© European Union, 2015.

Photo credits: © luisrsphoto / Fotolia

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OriginsSunnis–Shiites; JihadistsThe 'Islamic State' and the 'Caliphate'

What are ISIL/Da'esh's resources?Human resourcesMilitary equipmentFinancial resources

Spillover at the Syrian and Iraqi bordersEU responseMain referencesDisclaimer and Copyright

understanding the rise of isil/da'esh (the 'islamic state') · 2015. 3. 17. · isil/da'esh also...

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