countering the global islamist terrorist threat

Countering the Global Islamist Terrorist Threat

Barry Desker and Arabinda Acharya

Abstract

Worldwide terrorist attacks since September 11 suggest that the threat fromIslamist terrorism is far from being over. This is despite the arrests and eliminationof a significant number of leaders, both of Al Qaeda and its associated groups. Withthe loss of its leadership, Al Qaeda has become more dispersed and more difficult topredict and preempt. More significantly, Osama Bin Laden has become a beacon forjihadi insurgents everywhere.

On the other hand, the use of overwhelming force in the global war on terror iscounterproductive. A militaristic approach has further radicalized the Islamic world,increasing the ranks of the jihadis. Similarly, the U.S. invasion of Iraq exacerbatedMuslim resentment and nourished those forces, which the world community wishesto undermine and destroy. Terrorists have a powerful advantage: they need to succeedonly occasionally; but as defenders, the global community needs to be successfulalways.

This article argues that failure to understand the Islamist terrorist threat in itsentirety and to deal with the threat poses significant danger—not only for the UnitedStates and its interests, but also for the international community as a whole. Islamistterrorism represents a global ideological battle. It is a battle of hearts and minds. Asideology is at the centre of the current wave of Muslim terrorism, it is necessary toundercut the appeal of radical Islam. This involves empowering moderate Muslimsto counter the influence of the radicals. No single country can do this alone.

The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, Spring 2006

Introduction

In a message aired on January 19, 2006, Osama Bin Laden—theleader of Al Qaeda—asserted that jihad is on its way, regardless of theaggressive military campaigns by the United States and its alliesagainst the followers of Islam. In a way, the global terrorist campaign,which the radicals call “jihad,” is not unique. The best historical analo-gy is the wave of bombings and assassinations by anarchist and nation-alists engaged in political violence at the beginning of the 20th century.However, while the anarchists did not succeed in overturning the West-phalian state system, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand ofAustria in Sarajevo in June 1914 led to the outbreak of the First WorldWar. Similarly, the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States ledto the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan and the occupation of Iraq. Thefailure of the anarchists is a reminder of the likely outcome of the jihadivision of a global caliphate replacing the existing international system.

As Osama Bin Laden claimed, the occupation of Iraq by the UnitedStates and its allies synergized the campaign for jihad in the Muslimworld. Currently, the jihadists believe that the war in Iraq andAfghanistan is definitely going their way. They would fight the ene-mies of Islam with patience until they (the enemy) wear out. In thiscampaign, the jihadists believe that history is on their side. Their beliefis reinforced by the legacies of the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, thetriumph of the mujahideen against the Soviet Union in Afghanistanand the sense of fear and vulnerability created by the September 11attacks. The jihadists have a strategic advantage as well; there are “noterritories or citizens or assets,” that their adversary can readily “threaten,overwhelm, or destroy” with military might.1

From the perspective of the international community, the Septem-ber 11 incidents significantly changed global perceptions, especiallyinvolving those that were willing to make exceptions for the “freedomfighters,” and those who did not give their opposition to terrorism pri-ority over other foreign policy issues. As a result, states came together

60 Countering the Global Islamist Terrorist Threat

1 The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission onTerrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Washington DC: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 2004), p. 348.

to work more closely with each other against terrorism. Increased coor-dination to break terrorist webs and their support structures were theresults of shifts in perceptions of interest arising from what Robert Keo-hane termed “the public delegitimation of terrorism.”2 As an immedi-ate outcome of the U.S.-led coalition’s assaults in Afghanistan, AlQaeda lost its bases, training facilities, and other logistical networks,along with its state sponsor—the Taliban. Governments all over theworld worked closely together to get at the leadership, support struc-tures and sanctuaries of Al Qaeda and its associates. Since then, manytop-ranking leaders of Al Qaeda and its associate groups have beeneither killed or captured in almost 102 countries across the globe. Theyinclude Mohammed Atef; Khalid Sheikh Muhammad—mastermind ofthe September 11 attacks—as well as Abu Zubayda; Ramzi Binalshibh;Ibn Al-Shaykh al-Libi; Abu Zubair al-Haili; Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri;Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani; Mohammad Naeen Noor Khan (the Al Qaedacomputer specialist and communications expert); and Riduan Isamud-din (alias Hambali)—Al Qaeda point man for Southeast Asia and oper-ational commander of JI.3 In many countries, plots to stage terroriststrikes such as in Singapore; in Bangkok, coinciding with the APECsummit in October 2003; and the plot to target U.S. financial centers,were disrupted. In May 2005, Pakistani authorities arrested Abu FarajFarj al Libi, Al Qaeda’s third most-important figure. The arrest was asevere blow to the group’s ability to replenish its leadership.

With its leadership in disarray, Al Qaeda was severely restricted toplanning and executing multiple large-scale attacks on its own. Mean-while, counter-terrorism cooperation also became more institutional-ized with the participation of the United Nations and other regionaland multilateral agencies and institutions. Involvement of the UN andother specialist institutions was especially invaluable in denying terror-ists their sanctuaries and support systems. Thus, as Cofer Black, formerhead of the U.S. State Department’s counter-terrorism office claimed, it

Barry Desker and Arabinda Acharya 61

2 Robert Keohane, “The Public Delegitimation of Terrorism and Coalition Poli-tics,” in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, eds., Worlds in Collision: Terror and theFuture of Global Order (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 141–44.

3 Also see, “Al-Qaeda Arrests Worldwide,” Fox News Channel, Nov. 22, 2002,available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,64199,00.html.

“proves that the global war on terrorism has been effective, focusedand has got these (terrorists) on the run.”4

However, worldwide terrorist attacks since September 11 wouldsuggest that these successes by the international community have notbeen able to keep pace with the regenerative and adaptive capabilitiesof the Islamist terrorist groups. Al Qaeda and associated groups continuewith their campaign of terror, targeting not only the interests of theUnited States, but its allies and supporters worldwide. Al Qaeda con-tinues to be a source of inspiration for dispersed local and regionalgroups that share its agenda for global jihad. The group has mutatedinto new forms with deadlier manifestations. It has become largely self-sustaining. Even with diminished infrastructure and impeded leader-ship, Al Qaeda is still able to plan and execute significant attacks in awide variety of locations, and against an even wider array of targets.Attacks against Western targets in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Indonesia,Pakistan, Britain and Iraq indicate that the threat from Al Qaeda is farfrom over.5 On the other hand, many obstacles have emerged incounter-terrorism efforts and the international coalition against terror-ism seems to be weakening.

It is important here to explain these setbacks for the global counter-terrorism regime. Firstly, the international community has failed tounderstand the nature of the threat, especially the “Al Qaeda phenom-enon” in its entirety—including the vision, capabilities, acumen andthe organizational skills of Osama Bin Laden, “terrorism’s CEO.”6 Thisis more problematic in the context of Islamist terrorism in which it isnecessary to explain terrorist motivation in terms of abstract ideologies.Secondly, there is also a failure to address the core issues that havebrought transnational Islamist groups together in conflict against theWest in the first place, and helped sustain their campaign.


4 Cited in Walter Pincus and Dana Priest, “Spy Agencies’ Optimism on Al Qaedais Growing: Lack of Attacks Thought to Show Group is Nearly Crippled,”Washington Post, May 6, 2003, p. A16.

5 Alastair Macdonald, “Bombing Probes Go on Amid Signs Al-Qaeda Regroup-ing,” Reuters, May 20, 2003.

6 Bruce Hoffman, “The Emergence of New Terrorism,” in Andrew Tan and KumarRamakrishna, eds., The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends and Counter-Strategies(Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2002), p. 35.

More importantly, the spirit of cooperation, witnessed among theworld community, immediately after the September 11 attacks, appearsto be weakening. This is not to say that there is an acceptance of terror-ism and the terrorists’ methods by the members of the internationalcommunity. In fact, measures contemplated by the world communityto interdict terrorists and their infrastructures are robust and pack suffi-cient punch to substantially debilitate the terrorists—both militarilyand financially. What has been increasingly lacking is the internationalpolitical will for a sustained campaign on this front. In the absence ofsustained universal cooperation, these measures have now becomepatchworks of domestic, bilateral, and regional efforts—working, atbest, at cross-purposes.7

This paper seeks to examine each of these issues. We argue thatfailure to understand the Islamist terrorist threat in its entirety and todeal with the threat poses significant danger not only for the UnitedStates and its interests, but also for the international community as awhole. While we do not believe that jihadi terrorists can overturn theinternational system and establish a global caliphate, complacencyagainst a dynamic threat that targets all and spares none, could only becounter-productive. The threat today is just not a new form of asym-metric warfare explainable in terms of military or quasi-military doc-trine and manageable through the use of force. Islamist terrorism ismore about a global ideological conflict. The Muslim radicals exploitthe fundamentals of Western culture and the tolerance of its politicalsystem, targeting vulnerabilities in what the West views as its virtues.8

The threat therefore, needs to be countered on a variety of fronts, notjust with armies. The response would require cooperation of a varietyof national governments, regional and global agencies and arrange-ments, dissuasions and denials.9 As ideology is the centre of gravity of


7 Matthew Levitt, “Stemming the Flow of Terrorist Financing: Practical and Con-ceptual Challenges,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2003), p. 63.

8 Charles Dunlop Jr. “Preliminary Observations: Asymmetrical Warfare and theWestern Mindset,” in Lloyd J. Mathews, ed., Challenging the United States Sym-metrically and Asymmetrically: Can the United States be Defeated? (U.S. Army WarCollege, Strategic Studies Institute, July 1998), p. 3.

9 Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism:Annex to A/57/273 (New York: United Nations), available at http://www.

Islamist terrorism, it needs to be countered with ideas. It is a battle ofhearts and minds. This involves empowering moderate Muslims tocounter the influence of the radicals. No single country can do thisalone.

Al Qaeda: From a Group to a Movement

Al Qaeda has become a global social movement, a “global insur-gency,” that continues to challenge the world’s most powerful nationssuccessfully.10 With the significant loss of its bases and support struc-tures, and the dispersal of its top leadership, Al Qaeda metastasizedfrom a centralized entity to a scattered global network.11 However, thisdid not diminish its ability to conduct attacks or to inspire others to joinits global jihad bandwagon. Al Qaeda has clearly emerged as the van-guard of the current wave of terrorism in many parts of the world. Ithas become an even more formidable adversary. Islamist groups, likeAl Qaeda, have adapted and are able to operate with flattened hierar-chies without centralized command and control.12 Unlike hierarchicalstructures that can be eliminated through decapitation of its leadership,these structures resist fragmentation because of their dense intercon-nectivity. Furthermore, these structures grow spontaneously and areable to self-organize.13 In fact, even though most of its top leadershiphas been taken out, Al Qaeda has not ceased to exist. It has simplybecome more disaggregated and hence more difficult to predict andpre-empt.14 More significantly, Osama Bin Laden has become a beacon


un.org/terrorism/a57273.htm#top.10 John Mackinlay, “Globalisation and Insurgency,” Adelphi Paper 352 (London:

International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), p. 79.11 Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random

House, 2002), p. 167.12 Kevin A. O’Brien, “Networks, Netwar and Information Age Terrorism,” The

New Terrorism, p. 90.13 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of

Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p. 140.14 Michael Kenney, “From Pablo to Osama: Counter-terrorism Lessons From the

War on Drugs,” Survival, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Autumn 2003), pp. 187–206.

for jihadi insurgents. Al Qaeda’s influence arises from the inspirationOsama Bin Laden provides and the ideas and techniques he hasspawned.

An essential component of Islamist terrorism has been networking.Contemporary Islamist groups now operate with an internationalmatrix of operational, logistical and financial networks. Such network-ing compensates for the loss of centralized command and control struc-tures. Additionally, the radical Islamists are becoming increasinglyembedded in the Muslim Diaspora, humanitarian organizations, andinternational financial systems. Diasporas in countries such as Germany,the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Belgium and Switzerland havebecome important hubs of operations and recruitment for the Islamists.15

In contrast to the historical legacy of transnational Islam during the13th century (Indian Ocean trading networks) or the early reformistmovements, when Islam spread far and beyond through trade andindentured servitude, the growth of the Muslim Diaspora in recentyears is attributed to people fleeing the lands of violent conflict. Withinthe Diaspora, a shared sense of collective injustice fosters the formationof distinct Islamist identity. The autarchic isolation of the Diaspora fromthe surrounding society makes them sanctuaries for the radicals whomanipulate the religious tolerance of the host societies for fundraisingand recruitment, and even for planning and executing operations.16

The Diaspora is quite flexible, linked to other Muslim communitiesthrough ethnic affinity, common Islamic belief systems, family ties aswell as perceptions of injustice. Instead of integration within the hostsocieties, the development of a supranational Muslim identity hasmade radicalization and violence within the Diaspora potentially seriousissues in recent times.17 The July 2005 bombings in London’s subway


15 Report of the Spanish Investigation of the Al Qaeda Cell in Spain, JuzgadoCentral de Instruction No. 005 (Madrid, Sumario, Proc.Ordinario) Sept. 17,2003, available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/espbinldn91703cmp.pdf.

16 See, Theodore Karasik and Cheryl Benard, “Muslim Diasporas and Networks,”in Angel M. Rabasa, et al., The Muslim World After 9/11 (Santa Monica, CA:RAND Corporation 2004), pp. 434–38.

17 See, Olivier Roy, “EuroIslam: The Jihad Within,” National Interest (Spring2003), pp. 64–69.

system by local Muslims are an indication of the consequences of such“failed integration,” where the lack of a direct link to Al Qaeda reflectsthe ideational influence of its message about the liberating effect ofsuicide attacks.

What makes Islamist groups “so simultaneously successful andelusive” is the fact that they inhabit the “same nebulous channels ofcommunication and transmission that define contemporary globaliza-tion.” The infrastructure of the global liberal economy is in effect the“transmission line that political Islam rides.”18 Paradoxically, globaliza-tion has enabled “modern supranational networks and traditional,even archaic, infra-state forms of relationships (for instance, tribalismor religious schools’ networks),”19 which is now being manipulated bythe Muslim militants to keep recreating the hatred against the West andits allies. Even puritanical movements seeking a strict adherence to thelifestyle of the Prophet and a literal interpretation of his teachings haveembraced modern technology, jet travel, global trading, and financeand instant communications networks to conduct their campaigns,20 anapproach not unique to Muslim fundamentalists as it is also seen in thenetworks spawned by puritanical Christians. With a combination ofdecentralized cells operating across the globe, united by religion andideology, the relatively cheap cost of carrying out attacks and the abilityto disguise fund transactions, such terrorist movements have nowemerged as the “harbingers of a new and vastly more threatening terrorism, one that aims to produce casualties on a mass scale.”21

After it was disrupted from its safe haven in Afghanistan, AlQaeda rapidly adapted itself to an environment of borderless existence.This was possible as Al Qaeda was already successful in crafting acomplex “confederation” of militant groups and “aggregating supportnetworks.”22 This goes back to the days of anti-Soviet Afghan jihad in


18 Karasik and Benard, “Muslim Diasporas and Networks,” pp. 433–34.19 Olivier Roy, “Neo-Fundamentalism,” Social Science Research Council, available

at http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/roy.htm.20 “Responding to Terrorism: What Role for the United Nations?” International

Peace Academy (October 2002), p. 19, available at http://www.ipacademy.org/PDF_Reports/Conference_Report_Terr.pdf.

21 Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, “America and New Terrorism,” Survival,Vol. 42, No. 1 (Spring 2000), p. 59.

which many Muslims from the Arab world and other parts of theglobe—the Chechens, the Egyptians, the Saudis and those from Southand Southeast Asia—volunteered to take part. After the Soviets with-drew, Al Qaeda was able to spread its influence worldwide with well-entrenched and extensive networks. Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Ladenwere able to co-opt dispersed local conflicts in different parts of theworld, making this part of an international Islamic jihad. The platformof universal jihad brought disparate Islamist groups from the MiddleEast, South and Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa together under acommon platform and a common agenda.23 The movement subsumedIslamist struggles in many parts of the world with the result that moreterritorial Islamist groups today espouse universal agendas.24

Driving this movement currently is an abstract and hate-based ide-ology targeted against the West, especially the United States, its alliesand regimes, including moderate Muslim governments, accused by thegroup of imposing dysfunctional and immoral ways of life across theglobe.25 The movement uses Islam as a tool of mass mobilizationthrough the citation of prophetic truths from the Koran to show ‘theinherent incompatibility of modern day concerns with the sacredtexts.’26 One of the most significant accomplishments of Osama BinLaden was the effective “melding of the strands of religious fervor,Muslim piety and a profound sense of grievance into a powerful ideo-logical force,”27 and turning it into an “effective weapon with the tech-


22 Jean-Charles Brisard, “Terrorism Financing: Roots and Trends of Saudi TerrorismFinancing,” Report Prepared for the President of the Security Council (Paris:JCB Consulting, Dec. 19, 2002), p. 6, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/document/document-un122002.pdf.

23 Rohan Gunaratna, ed., The Changing Face of Terrorism (Singapore: Eastern Uni-versity Press, 2004), p. 14.

24 Rohan Gunaratna, “Al-Qaeda’s Trajectory in 2003,” IDSS Perspectives, May 3,2003, available at http://www.ntu.edu.sg/idss/Perspective/research_050303.htm.

25 Peter Chalk, “Al Qaeda and Its Links to Terrorist Groups in Asia,” The NewTerrorism, p. 109.

26 Karim Raslan, “Now a Historic Chance to Welcome Muslims into the System,”International Herald Tribune, Nov. 27, 2001, available at http://www.asiasource.org/asip/raslan.cfm.

27 Hoffman, “The Emergence of New Terrorism,” p. 38.

nological munificence of modernity.”28 As Peter Bergen puts it, “Thisgrafting of entirely modern sensibilities and techniques to the mostradical interpretation of holy war, is the hallmark of Osama BinLaden’s network.”29 Besides, locational opacity and absence of nego-tiable political objectives has rendered the movement a hard adversaryto deal with. Attacks in Tunisia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Yemen, Kenya,Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Spain, the United Kingdom and in Iraq tell ushow the movement’s strength is not in its location in a defined geo-graphical territory, but in its fluidity and flexibility.30

In the campaign for global jihad, the United States is perceived tobe the main Western power threatening the very existence of Islam andthe Muslim Ummah. Many of the U.S. policies—its support for Israeland for “apostate” Muslim regimes, the U.S. military presence in SaudiArabia, Afghanistan and Iraq—mixed up with a historical residue offrustration arising from what many see as a series of defeats of theArab and Muslim world, have galvanized the Muslim anger.31 Thisdates back to the demise of the Ottoman Empire. Presently, the West—led by the United States—is occupying a center of Islamic civilizationand the “Jewel of the Arab world”—Baghdad.32 Paradoxically, Washing-ton’s policies that are supportive of Muslim issues—such as its supportfor Kuwait in 1991, and its involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo, do notaffect this-anti-U.S. sentiment.

In Osama Bin Laden’s own words, the United States has created“an ocean of oppression, injustice, slaughter and plunder” and has thusmerited responses like the 9/11 attacks.33 As examples, Osama Bin


28 Ibid., p. 35.29 Peter Bergen, Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden (New

York: Free Press, 2001), p. 28.30 Bruce Hoffman, “Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism and Future Potentialities: An

Assessment,” Paper Presented at the RAND Center for Middle East PublicPolicy and Geneva Center for Security Policy, 3rd Annual Conference, TheMiddle East After Afghanistan and Iraq (Geneva, Switzerland: May 5, 2003), pp.15–16.

31 Asher Susser, Director of the Dayan Centre for Middle Eastern and AfricanStudies, Tel Aviv University—cited in The Muslim World After 9/11, p. 87.

32 Ibid.33 “Azzam Exclusive: Letter from Usamah Bin Muhammad Bin Ladin to the

American People,” Waaqiah, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Oct. 26,

Laden cites U.S. interventions and foreign policy accountable for theloss of millions of Muslim lives around the world, including inAfghanistan, the Philippines, Kashmir, and Central Asia—and now inIraq. As Osama Bin Laden explains: “Our method thus far in this battlehas been to continue to pile up more American corpses . . . until webreak the arrogance of the United States, crush its pride, and trampleits dignity.”34 His message of hatred has now transformed into rhetoricof revenge, focusing on the United States and its allies. This messageresonates well with sizeable pockets of disaffected youth across theglobe.35 Bound together by an increasing hatred against the West, suchindividuals and groups continue their domestic struggles, but add theprism of a global cause and a global purpose-the defense of Islam.36

Thus “Al Qaedaism” has become a movement on its own. AlQaeda has become a beacon of light for worldwide Muslim liberation.It has shown itself to be a remarkably nimble, flexible and adaptiveentity.37 For some analysts, the group now is more a worldview or ideol-ogy than an organization.38 “Because of what Al Qaeda sees as Ameri-ca’s global “war on Islam,” the movement’s sense of commitment andpurpose today is arguably greater than ever.”39 It would not probablymuch alter the dynamics of the militant Islamic terrorist threat even ifOsama bin Laden is killed or captured or if Al Qaeda is completelydecimated. As Osama Bin Laden himself put it, “Regardless if Osama iskilled or survives, the (Muslim) awakening has started.”40


2002.34 Muhammad Salah, “World Islamic Front Threatens New Operations Against

Americans,” Al-Hayah, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Aug. 19, 1998.35 Barry Desker, “The Jemaah Islamiyah Phenomenon in Singapore,” Contempo-

rary Southeast Asia, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2003), pp. 489–90.36 Ibid., p. 493.37 Hoffman, “Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism and Future Potentialities,” p. 15.38 See for example Xavier Raufer, “Al Qaeda: A Different Diagnosis,” Studies in

Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 6, No. 6 (November–December 2003), pp. 391–98;“Symposium: Diagnosing Al Qaeda,” Front Page Magazine, Aug. 18, 2003.

39 Hoffman, “Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism and Future Potentialities,” p. 22.40 “‘Full Text’ of Usama Bin Ladin Recorded Statement Aired By Al-Jazirah TV,”

Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Dec. 27, 2001.

Al Qaedaism: The Global Ideology of Hate?

In a narration, Eliot Cohen observes:

“The enemy in this war is not “terrorism”—a distilled essence of evil,conducted by the real-world equivalents of J.K. Rowling’s LordVoldemort, Tolkien’s Sauron or C.S. Lewis’ White Witch—but mili-tant Islam. The enemy has an ideology, and an hour spent surfing theWeb will give the average citizen at least the kind of insights that hemight have found during World Wars II and III by reading MeinKampf or the writings of Lenin, Stalin or Mao. Those insights, ofcourse, eluded those in the West who preferred—understandably,but dangerously—to define the problem as something more manage-able, such as German resentment about the Versailles Treaty, anexaggerated form of Russian national interest, or peasant resentmentof landlords taken a bit too far. In the reported words of one survivorof the Holocaust, when asked what lesson he had taken from hisexperience of the 1940s, “If someone tells you that he intends to killyou, believe him.”41

Following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States;there is now a tendency to treat the Islamist terrorist threat more as acivilizational conflict. Equating contemporary terrorism with Islam hasalso become the predominant discourse of security debates. In TheRoots of Muslim Rage, Bernard Lewis wrote how “we are facing a moodand a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies andgovernments that pursue them.”42 Similarly, Samuel Huntingtonargued that the present conflict could turn into a “clash of civiliza-tions”—one of the cultural conflicts he predicted in his now famouswork, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, severalyears ago.43

Sweeping generalizations such as “Al Qaeda spearheaded universal


41 Eliot Cohen, “Fighting Terrorism and the Ideologies that Drive it,” The Com-mittee on the Present Danger, available at http://www.fightingterror.org/members/index.cfm.

42 Cited in Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking ofWorld Order (London: Simon and Schuster, 1996), p. 213.

43 Ibid.

jihad;”44 “Islam’s inherent incompatibility with modernity;”45 and“moral and ideological crisis” that has beset “the collective Muslimmind,”46 seek to explain conflicts that may have something more to dowith their respective sociological, historical, and political contexts,rather than abstract philosophies and radical ideologies. The tempta-tion to stereotype the conflict in this manner has also taken its strengthfrom the fact that the game the terrorists are in today is almost zero-sum. “There is no room for compromise except as a tactical expedient.America may be the main enemy but it is not the only one.47 The mes-sage of universal jihad offers no real solutions to the more urgent prob-lems of the Muslim community.48

As Gilles Kepel describes, the ideology is an extremist Islamic par-adigm based on “respect for the sacred texts in their most literal form[combined with] an absolute commitment to jihad.”49 This in essenceunderscores the fact that extremist statements like those calling forjihad against the West have more to do with a bitter struggle nowunfolding between moderates and radicals within the Muslim commu-nity itself.50 Many Islamic scholars point to the “moral and ideologicalcrisis” that has beset “the collective Muslim mind.”51 A category of


44 Chalk, “Al Qaeda and Its Links to Terrorist Groups in Asia,” p. 109.45 See Fareed Zakaria, “The Return of History: What September 11 Hath Wrought,”

in James F. Hoge and Giden Rose, eds., How did This Happen? (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001); Timur Kuran, “The Religious Undercurrents of Muslim Eco-nomic Grievances,” Social Science Research Council, available at http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/kuran.htm; Karim Raslan, “Now a Historic Chance toWelcome Muslims into the System,” International Herald Tribune, Nov. 27,2001, available at http://www.asiasource.org/asip/raslan.cfm.

46 See Farish A. Noor, New Voices of Islam (Leiden: Institute for the Study of Islamin the Modern World, 2002).

47 Goh Chok Tong, “Fight Terror With Ideas, not Just Armies,” speech of thePrime Minister of Singapore at the Council on Foreign Relations, WashingtonDC, May 6, 2004, as reproduced by The Straits Times, May 7, 2004.

48 See Michael Scott Doran, “Somebody Else’s Civil War,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81,No. 1 (January/February 2002).

49 Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Uni-versity Press, 2002), p. 220.

50 Robert W. Hefner, “September 11 and the Struggle for Islam,” Social ScienceResearch Council, available at http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/hefner.htm.

self-appointed defenders of orthodoxy seems to have hijacked some ofthe key instruments of the religion, i.e. jihad, fatwa, and the Shariah, tomake them serve their politically utilitarian and instrumental purposes.52

The current form of radical Islamic thought is firmly entrenched in thehearts and minds of sizeable pockets of ideologically exclusionist andpolitically repressed young Muslims throughout the world.53 This hasbeen made more complicated and difficult by the conditions imposedon the community as it makes the painful transition to modernity. Mus-lim communities are finding themselves threatened, disadvantagedand marginalized by the processes of globalization. For many Muslims,globalization is a strategy of hegemony, of “cultural infiltration or pen-etration” (al-ikhtiraq al-thaqafi), which leads to more social fragmenta-tion.54 Political Islam has exacerbated the conflict by transforming eco-nomic grievances into a mistrust of Westernization and even into anantagonism to modernity.55 A result of failed and incomplete modern-ization, radical Islam has festered in societies where contact with theWest has produced more chaos than growth and more uncertainty thanwealth.56

Radical Islam has manipulated this inherent tension between“secularizing, homogenizing and avaricious capitalism and ethnic andreligious fundamentalism”57 to construct and nurture its campaign ofhatred against the West. In the context of growing disillusionment with


51 See Farish A. Noor, New Voices of Islam (Leiden: Institute for the Study of Islamin the Modern World, 2002).

52 Farish A. Noor, “The Evolution of Jihad in Islamist Political Discourse: How aPlastic Concept Became Harder,” Social Science Research Council, available athttp://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/noor.htm.

53 Barry Desker and Kumar Ramakrishna, “Forging an Indirect Strategy inSoutheast Asia,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Spring 2002), p. 166.

54 Ahmad Shboul, “Islam and Globalization: Arab World Perspectives, “ in V.Hooker and Amin Saikal, eds., Islamic Perspectives on the New Millennium (Singa-pore: ISEAS, 2004), pp. 56–57.

55 Timur Kuran, “The Religious Undercurrents of Muslim Economic Grievances,”Social Science Research Council, available at http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/kuran.htm.

56 Zakaria, “The Return of History: What September 11 Hath Wrought,” p. 316.57 See, Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs Mcworld: How Globalism and Tribalism are

Reshaping the World (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996).

the conventional modes of political dialog and negotiation, the radicalshave misused the Islamic religious discourse as a framework for amoral/ethical critique of power and recreated a religiocentric viewpoint from which, as they claim, an idealistic pan-Islamic Muslim societycan be constructed.58 This form of radical Islam has become immenselyappealing. It negates the existing order in quest of a more just society.59

It purports to explain the loss of values and cultural disorientation fac-ing Muslim societies confronting the challenges of globalization andmodernization.60

The radicals form a minority of Muslims but they hold the advan-tage because they are able to exploit the roots of Muslim rage and theavenues to peddle the same among the dispossessed communityworldwide. While Muslim moderates are beset with a sense of ideolog-ical paralysis, often unwilling to confront the radicals, there is a con-sciousness of the need to acquire political space to avenge the per-ceived inferior position of Muslims. This led to initial reservationsamong Muslim moderates against public criticism of the radicals spear-heading jihad through acts of terror.

As Samuel Huntington wrote, for Islam, the problem is about thepeople who “are convinced of the superiority of their culture and areobsessed with the inferiority of their power.”61 They know “theirknowledge is superior, and have the capacity to affect change,”62 butare overwhelmingly frustrated and angered by the “inadequacy, by thesense of being left out and the sense of being done injustice, to the pointof desperation.”63 This is a powerful message that nurtures a strongcommitment among those recruited for such radical Muslim move-


58 Farish A. Noor, “Globalization, Resistance and the Discursive Politics of Terror,”The New Terrorism, p. 161.

59 Yoram Schweitzer and Shaul Shay, The Globalization of Terror (New Brunswick,London: Transaction Publishers, 2003), p. 19.

60 Francis Fukuyama, “History and September 11,” How did This Happen? p. 32.61 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, p. 217.62 Shibley Telhami, “It’s Not About Faith: A Battle for the Soul of the Middle

East,” Current History, Vol. 100, No. 650 (December 2001), p. 415.63 Surin Pitsuwan, “Strategic Challenges Facing Islam in Southeast Asia,” Lecture

delivered at a forum organized by the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studiesand the Centre for Contemporary Islamic Studies, Singapore, Nov. 5, 2001.

ments. For a group of persons ready to hate, to uncritically believe andto attempt the impossible, radical belief systems provide a venue forself-expression. This also makes them aggressively defensive against anenemy whom they perceive as challenging their belief systems.64

Factored into this equation is Osama Bin Laden’s call for revenge.In an audiotape released on April 7, 2003, Osama Bin Laden urged hisfollowers to mount suicide attacks “to avenge the innocent children . . .assassinated in Iraq.” Osama has projected the ruling to kill Americansand their allies as a sacramental obligation and a duty against theenemy who is corrupting the life and the religion.65 Referring to “morethan 80 years” of dispossession, Osama bin Laden in his first broadcastafter the September 11 attacks described that what America sufferedwas insignificant compared to more than 80 years of humiliation anddegradation that the Islamic world was subjected to.66 For the likes ofOsama, the dispossession and humiliation must be redressed throughrevenge. The enactments in Iraq now follow this trend. As a resident ofFallujah himself expressed, “it is a shame to have foreigners breakdown . . . doors . . . , to have foreigners stop and search their women.This is a great shame for the whole tribe. It is the duty of that man, andof that tribe, to get revenge on this soldier—to kill that man . . . we can-not sleep until we have revenge.”67 Radical Muslims often project theworld as satanic, dominated by the forces of imperialism and deca-dence. The rage and a sense of injustice leading to disappointment, dis-illusionment and frustration are breeding revengeful followers withextreme positions.68 This rage is projected onto scapegoats—hence theneed to have enemies—and results in violence.69


64 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, p. 88.65 Ibid., p. 19.66 Cited in Farhang Rajaee, “The Challenges of the Rage of Empowered Dispos-

sessed: The Case of the Muslim World,” in Responding to Terrorism: WhatRole for the United Nations? International Peace Academy (October 2002), p. 35,available at http://www.ipacademy.org/PDF_Reports/Conference_Report_Terr.pdf.

67 Cited in M. Danner, “Torture and Truth,” New York Review of Books, June 10,2004, p. 46.

68 Rajaee, “The Challenges of the Rage,” p. 37.69 See, Vamik Volkan, The Need to have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to

The governing elite in some of the Muslim countries themselvesoften provide the basis for Muslim anger. For one thing, many Islamistscast the rulers in those countries as apostate and heretic, being slaves tomodernization and by extension to the West. These are the regimes,which according to the radicals “claim to be Muslim, but whose imple-mentation of Islamic precepts is judged to be imperfect.”70

Significantly, today’s archetypical Muslim radicals clearly placethemselves and their enemies in a theological context. They understandthemselves to be fighting on behalf of Islam against the enemies ofGod, epitomized by the United States—the “Hubal of this age’ and lit-erally “satanic”—being in league with the devil.71 The mujahideen arenot necessarily the marginalized elements in society—ill-educated,impoverished, destitute or disenfranchised.72 Ironically, these newbrands of supranational neo-fundamentalists are more a product ofcontemporary globalization than of the Islamic past.73 What motivatesthem is not material deprivation but an all-consuming ideology. In asurvey of Al Qaeda affiliates, Marc Sageman found that 75 percent ofthose interviewed were from upper-middle classes; 60 percent wereeducated, from inclusive families and were either professionals orsemi-professionals. Seventy-five percent of those interviewed weremarried, the majority of them with children. Fifty-percent of themcome from religious families. Interestingly, less than one percentdemonstrated any signs of mental pathology. Most of them are verycomputer savvy. They are not religious fanatics; they go the mosquenot for religiosity always, but mostly for companionship.74 The JemaahIslamiyah members in Southeast Asia, those detained in Singapore and


International Relationships (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1994).70 Robert Irwin, “Is This the Man Who Inspired Bin Laden?” Guardian, Nov. 1,

2001, p. 8.71 Chris Brown, “Narratives of Religion, Civilization and Modernity,” How did

This Happen? p. 293.72 Barry Desker, “The Jemaah Islamiyah Phenomenon in Singapore,” Contempo-

rary Southeast Asia, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2003) p. 502.73 Roy, “Neo-Fundamentalism.”74 Notes taken at the conference on “Al Qaeda 2.0: Transnational Terrorism After

9/11.” For a detailed analysis of this phenomenon see, Marc Sageman, Under-standing Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

Malaysia, and those on the run, also fit into this profile. These personsare not just Muslims but also Islamists pursuing goals they considerhigher than life itself. They read the sacred text with the same degree ofintensity as they would read a textbook on physics or engineering.75

This mono-dimensional reading of the scripture leads them to seethings in very stark terms.76 More than reacting against Westernization,which they believe “masquerades as globalization and whose chiefinstruments are the military, cultural, and economic powers of theUnited States,” Muslim anger is being propelled by a vision that treatsIslam as the answer to every conceivable problem.77 And it is not justabout releasing pent-up frustrations, but also about seeking spiritualanswers through violence.78 Beset by alienation and loneliness, andconsumed by an intense search for identity, such radical Muslims haveoften fallen prey to a formalistic understanding of Islam that breedsviolent radicalism.79 While Islam has always been the faith of “the veryrich and the very poor,” the radical orthodoxy has united “the veryangry and the very worried (and eager to channel this anger awaytoward conflicts with what they perceive as the ‘hegemonic powers.’)”80

The War on Terror: An Unending War?

Reviewing the progress of the global war on terrorism in October2003, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld asked his advisers, “Arewe capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every


75 See Desker, “The Jemaah Islamiyah Phenomenon.”76 Malise Ruthven, A Fury for God: The Islamist Attack on America (London, Granta

Publications, 2002), p. 103; Kumar Ramakrishna, “Constructing the JemaahIslamiyah Terrorist, A Preliminary Inquiry,” WP, No. 71, Institute of Defenceand Strategic Studies, Singapore (October 2004).

77 Timur Kuran, “The Religious Undercurrents of Muslim Economic Grievances,”Social Science Research Council, available at http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/kuran.htm.

78 Desker, “The Jemaah Islamiyah Phenomenon,” p. 502.79 Abdurrahaman Wahid, “Best Way to Fight Islamic Extremism,” Sunday Times

(Singapore), April 14, 2002.80 Pavel K. Baev, “Examining the Terrorism-war Dichotomy in the ‘Russia-

Chechen’ Case,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 24, No. 2 (August 2003), p. 21.

day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, trainingand deploying against us?”81 This is reflective of how after more thanfour years; the U.S.-led coalition’s “war on terror” remains ineffective.The failure stems from the fact that, in responding to Al Qaeda and itsjihad, the policymakers and analysts have systematically failed tounderstand the enemy. Whereas Osama Bin Laden has worked effec-tively to “convince the Islamic world” that the West or the United Statesis their “common enemy,” (the West) “have done little or nothing.”82

The present conflict, as the 9/11 Commission noted, is not justabout terrorism—“some generic evil.”83 The root of the conflict is a rad-ical ideological movement in the Muslim world. Rather than being a“clash of civilizations,” the present conflict is more about a struggle forthe soul of Islam within the global Muslim community today. Viewedin this context, the discursive about the inevitability of conflict betweenIslam and the West is rather problematic. It is rather far too easy toassume what Ann Coutler said, “. . . not all Muslims may be terrorists,but all terrorists are Muslims.”84 As Farish Noor puts it, “[the Islamist]threat must not be taken seriously as an epistemic category,” or asEdward Said, “many Muslims cannot be simplified.”85 At the sametime though, it would be dangerous to discount the potency of theIslamist religious discourse in fuelling the contemporary wave of ter-rorism. It is therefore important to undermine the appeal of radical ide-ology and purge it of its universalistic appeal, which creates and sus-tains the psychic tensions that demand release “through a spasm ofviolence.”86 An overemphasized militaristic approach risks further


81 DoD memo, Rumsfeld to Myers, Wolfowitz, Pace, and Feith, “Global War onTerrorism,” Oct. 16, 2003, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm.

82 General Wayne A. Downing, cited in Barton Gellman and Dafna Linzer,“Afghanistan, Iraq: Two Wars Collide,” Washington Post, Oct. 22, 2004, p. A01.

83 The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 362.84 Cited in Bret T. Saalwaechter, “Militarism, Fear, and New Communism,”

DemocraticUnderground.com, May 7, 2004, available at http://www.democ-raticunderground.com/articles/04/05/p/07_fear.html.

85 Edward W. Said, “Impossible Histories: Why the Many Islams Cannot be Sim-plified,” Harper’s (July 2002), pp. 69–70.

86 Kumar Ramakrishna and Andrew Tan, “The New Terrorism: Diagnosis andPrescriptions,” The New Terrorism, p. 4.

marginalizing the disaffected and increasing the ranks of the jihadists.As former U.S. diplomat John Brady Kiesling cautioned, “The moreaggressively we use our power to intimidate our foes, the more foes wecreate and the more we validate terrorism as the only effective weaponof the powerless against the powerful.”87

Ideology is at the center of the current wave of Muslim terrorism.To counter the threat, it is necessary to undercut the appeal of radicalIslam. This involves changing the minds and winning the hearts byaddressing the grievances that underlie the call for jihad.88 In the politi-cal spectrum, it behooves the West, especially the United States, to con-vince Muslims that the West is a friend of Islam and prove it throughconcrete action. There is a need to persuade Muslims that the West har-bors no ulterior motives, no desire to subjugate them, as claimed byradical Muslim activists.89 At the same time, the West must assist mod-erate, progressive Muslim leaders and intellectuals who want Islam tomake a successful transition to modernity.90 For the ideological combatagainst radical Islamism to be effective, “Muslims must conduct it.”91

The Muslim community must rescue key concepts of the ideologicaldiscourse from the rigid pedagogical structures that have kept it in staticmode and enthuse it with inherent conservatism. It is not Islam whichobstructs its progress, but its “wrong and rigid interpretations.”92 Asthe 9/11 Commission Report succinctly observed, Muslims themselveswould have to reflect upon such basic issues as the concept of jihad, theposition of women, and the place of non-Muslim minorities. “TheWest can promote moderation, but cannot ensure its ascendancy. OnlyMuslims can do this.”93


87 John Brady Kiesling, “Diplomatic Breakdown,” Boston Globe Magazine, April27, 2003.

88 Michael Mandelbaum, “Diplomacy in Wartime: New Priorities and Align-ments,” How Did This Happen? p. 263.

89 Desker and Ramakrishna, “Forging an Incident Strategy in Southeast Asia,”p. 168.

90 Ibid., p. 167.91 Derk Kinnane, “Winning Over the Muslim Mind,” National Interest, Vol. 75

(Spring 2004), p. 98.92 Mahathir Mohamad, “Breaking the Muslim Mindset,” Sunday Times (Singapore),

July 28, 2002.

At present, moderates are generally unwilling to confront the radi-cals. This is due to the values and the belief systems and the visions ofthe future social order that both moderates and the radicals sharetogether. Moderates are also wary about the consequences of challeng-ing the radicals. More importantly, most moderates are unlikely to beable to influence Muslim radicals. The challenge to views that supportsacts of terrorism is likely to succeed only when it comes from deepwithin the Islamic tradition. This is possible only when those challeng-ing the radical’s worldview are themselves as deeply steeped in Mus-lim doctrines and can argue on the basis of the texts so frequently citedby the radicals.

The United States, as the former Prime Minister of Singapore GohChok Tong said, cannot “lead the ideological battle.” It has little credi-bility. The sources of Muslim distrust of the United States are complex,and its anger greater today than ever before. Washington has also failedin public diplomacy directed at the Muslim world. “In many instances,”American Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld admitted, “We’re notthe best messengers.”94 This has much to do with what many perceiveas America’s double standards: taking action against Iraq but notagainst Israel for noncompliance with UN Security Council resolutionsand for Tel Aviv’s policy of “targeted assassinations.”95 The revelationsof mistreatment of Iraqi detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdadand abuse of the Holy Text in Guantanamo Bay, and the accompanyingglobal revulsion have further undermined any U.S. claims to the highmoral ground.

Additionally, the global coalition against terrorism is being under-mined by Washington’s “proclivities toward unilateral multilateral-ism,”96 and very “aggressive go-it-alone” attitude.97 The United States


93 The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 376.94 Cited in Kinnane, “Winning Over the Muslim Mind,” p. 94.95 Goh, “Fight Terror With Ideas.”96 Thomas J. Biersteker, “Targeting Terrorist Finances,” in Ken Booth and Tim

Dunne, eds., Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order (New York:Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 84.

97 Mwesiga Baregu, “Beyond September 11: Structural Causes of BehavioralConsequences of International Terrorism,” in Responding to Terrorism: What Rolefor the United Nations? Conference Report (New York: International Peace Academy,

is obsessed with its own security and has unleashed the passions of itsown nationalism in a wave of redemptive violence abroad, as in Iraq.98

Since September 11, Washington’s policymakers appear obsessed withthe idea that the war on terror can be a prescription for global order.This may stem from the legacy of vulnerability that the September 11incidents set up for the Bush administration. Under threat from non-state actors with global reach, the Bush administration shifted to a poli-cy of pre-emptive defense, which culminated in Washington’s contro-versial engagement in Iraq. It went on the offensive to forestall or pre-vent hostile acts by its adversaries, and if necessary, to strike terroristsabroad so as to keep the homeland safe. The overall strategic goals forits war on terror are woven around the key concepts of preventing a“nuclear Pearl Harbor”—“forestall or prevent hostile acts by . . . adver-saries [and] . . . if necessary, act preemptively.”99 Translated into strategy,this means aggressive unilateralism, less importance accorded to multi-lateralism and almost total neglect of international institutions. Thisstrategy nevertheless has put too many issues at stake—non-prolifera-tion, democratic transformation, regime change and the like.100 As thedust settled down on the ruins of the World Trade Centre and the Penta-gon, this “go-it alone” and “mission defines the coalition” attitude hasdeprived America’s global leadership of much of its legitimacy.101

Moreover, the war in Iraq exacerbated Muslim resentment and fur-ther radicalized the Islamic world against America and its allies. AsFrench Judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere commented, “In Iraq, a problemhas been created that didn’t exist there before.”102 Iraq helped focus


October 2002), p. 42.98 Neil Smith, “Global Executioner: Scales of Terror,” Social Science Research

Council, available at http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/nsmith.htm.99 “Disarming Iraq: Prospects for Disarmament of Iraq: the UN Route, and UN

Weapons Inspections,” the Second Report of the House Of Commons SelectCommittee on Foreign Affairs, Dec. 19, 2002.

100 James Thomson, “U.S. Interests and the Fate of the Alliance,” Survival, Vol. 45,No. 4 (Winter 2003/2004), p. 212.

101 Robert Kagan, “America’s Crisis of Legitimacy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 2(March/April 2004), p. 67.

102 Cited in “The New Face of Al Qaeda: Al Qaeda Seen as Wider Threat,” LosAngeles Times, Sept. 26, 2004; Jessica Stern, “How America Created a Terrorist

militants’ anger and became a rallying point remobilizing dormantjihadists, and recruiting new militants to the cause.103 For the jihadists,Iraq is now the “front that (they) want to utilize for fighting the Ameri-cans, like the other fronts [of Jihad].”104 Ironically, by going into Iraq aspart of its war on terror, the United States has provided “political oxy-gen” and nourished those very forces that it wished to undermine anddestroy.

The U.S. engagement in Iraq has seriously jeopardized the globalterrorism campaign as coalition forces increasingly get diverted to dealwith the Iraqi insurgency. The Iraq war created the additional politicalrisk of sharpening the divide between the Muslim moderates and radi-cals. Within the Western community itself, debates are emergingregarding the extent to which acts of Muslim terrorism are anti-Ameri-can and how much is against the West as a whole. This division hasbeen more pronounced in U.S.—Europe relations. To the Europeans,Americans appear to be besotted with power, and becoming increas-ingly “overbearing, jingoistic and rash.”105 According to a survey bythe Pew Research Centre, skepticism about U.S. motives in the globalanti-terror campaign has led to growing popular support for disen-gagement with Washington in foreign and security policy, including onterrorism.106 The growing evidence of disagreement at the politicallevel is having its obvious repercussions on the campaign on variousfronts against terrorism, and is making the global counter-terrorismstrategy less and less effective.


Haven,” New York Times, Aug. 20, 2003.103 “French Judge: Iraq Conflict Helping al-Qa’ida Recruitment,” Agence France-

Presse (North American Service), Sept. 9, 2003.104 “New Al-Qa’ida Online Magazine Features Interview with a ‘Most-Wanted’

Saudi Islamist, Calls for Killing of Americans and Non-Muslims,” MEMRI,Dispatch Series, No. 591, Oct. 17, 2003, available at http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects&Area=jihad&ID=SP59103.

105 Madeleine Albright, “Farce to Tragedy in One Act of U.S. Folly,” In Review,Jan. 19, 2004, available at http://www.inreview.com/showthread.php?s=&threadid=15250.

106 “A Year After Iraq War: Summary of Findings,” Pew Research Center for thePeople and the Press, March 16, 2004, available at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=206.

Conclusion

“I want to say that the war will be won by either us or you. If wewin, then it will be a shame for you forever. If you win, then historywill witness our courage to fight for dignity. We have nothing tolose. He who is swimming in the sea does not fear the rain.”107

(Osama Bin Laden, in his message to the American people on January19, 2006)

“The war against terrorism is not just a war of arms, but also a warof values.”108 As Gal Luft, Executive Director of the Institute for theAnalysis of Global Security, puts it, “Ideological wars take decades todecide. This is why we must brace ourselves for a protracted conflict.The strategy we should adopt must be comprehensive, enduring andmultidisciplinary.” The international community must develop whatGeorge Kennan called a robust “political warfare” capability,109 to dealwith the threat from radical Muslim ideology that, like Marxism-Lenin-ism in the past, serves as an intellectual, political, and emotional foun-dation of a worldwide revolutionary movement.110

Osama Bin Laden, in his May 2004 audio message urged mujahideento avail itself of the rare opportunity in Iraq to bury the “head ofinternational infidelity.”111 Unfortunately however, as the ranks andthe resolve of the terrorists seem to be on the rise, the well-establishedmainstays of the global order—the Western alliance, European Union,and the United Nations—seem to be cracking under the stress.112 Inter-


107 Full translation of Osama bin Laden’s audio-taped message aired by AlJazeera TV.

108 Senator Joseph Lieberman, Honorary Co-Chairman, The Committee on thePresent Danger, quote found at http://www.fightingterror.org/members/index.cfm.

109 See, George F. Kennan and Giles D. Harlow, Measures Short of War: The GeorgeF. Kennan Lectures at the National War College 1946–47 (Washington: NationalDefense University Press, 1991), pp. 302–309.

110 See Carnes Lord, “Psychological-Political Instruments,” in Audrey KurthCronin and James M. Ludes, eds., Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a GrandStrategy (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2004), pp. 220–221.

111 “Transcript of Osama Bin Laden audiotape message,” CBS News (LondonDesk), May 6, 2004.

state cooperation on the terrorism issue in many parts of the worldimproved significantly with an increasing awareness of the transna-tional character of the challenge posed by the current wave of Islamistterrorism. However, the continuing emphasis on national sovereignty,and the relative youth of most states facing this challenge, resulted inlimits to the degree of cooperation envisaged. This explains why thereis a preference for national mechanisms rather than regional or interna-tional initiatives to combat terror. There is also reluctance by states tobe involved when the threat does not seem be directed at their ownsoil.

Developments in Iraq in the coming months would be a criticaldeterminant in shaping future challenges from terrorism spearheadedby Muslim radicals. If the efforts to rebuild Iraq fail, it will help popu-larize the cause of the jihadists against the West, especially the UnitedStates. This could severely undermine much-needed reforms in theMiddle East. There is no denying the fact that one way to deal with aviolent extremist ideology is to provide peaceful democratic avenuesfor expressing dissent.113 The international community needs to ensurethat democracy in Iraq is given a chance. It is very important that theinsurgents in Iraq do not get away with the feeling that they succeededin defeating the world’s sole surviving superpower. A repetition ofwhat happened to the Soviet Union in Afghanistan will embolden vio-lent insurgencies around the globe.


112 Fareed Zakaria, “The Arrogant Empire,” Newsweek, March 24, 2003, availableat http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/newsweek/032403.html

113 John Harrison, “Call for U.S. Troop Withdrawal from Iraq: Democrats’ PulloutPlan Flawed,” Straits Times, Singapore, Dec. 27, 2005.

countering the global islamist terrorist threat

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