criminal history primer - home | united states … because such sentence was counted as a single...

PRIMER

CRIMINALHISTORY

April 2017

PreparedbytheOfficeofGeneralCounsel,U.S.SentencingCommission

Disclaimer: This document provided by the Commission’s Legal Staff is offered to assist inunderstandingandapplyingthesentencingguidelines. TheinformationinthisdocumentdoesnotnecessarilyrepresenttheofficialpositionoftheCommission,anditshouldnotbeconsidereddefinitive or comprehensive. The information in this document is not binding upon theCommission,courts,orthepartiesinanycase.PursuanttoFed.R.App.P.32.1(2007),somecasescitedinthisdocumentareunpublished.PractitionersshouldbeadvisedthatcitationofsuchcasesunderRule32.1requiresthatsuchopinionsbeissuedonorafterJanuary1,2007,andthattheyeitherbe“availableinapubliclyaccessibleelectronicdatabase”orprovidedinhardcopybythepartyofferingthemforcitation.

Pr imer on Cr iminal History

ii

ContentsI. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW ............................................................................... 1

II. CRIMINAL HISTORY (CHAPTER FOUR, PART A) .................................................... 2

A. Computation ................................................................................................................... 2

B. Definitions and Instructions .......................................................................................... 3

1. “Prior Sentence” ......................................................................................................... 3

2. “Sentence of Imprisonment” ..................................................................................... 4

3. Felony Offense............................................................................................................. 6

4. Misdemeanor and Petty Offenses .............................................................................. 6

5. Timing and Status Concerns ..................................................................................... 6

6. Military, Foreign, and Tribal Court Sentences ....................................................... 9

7. Sentences on Appeal ................................................................................................... 9

III. REPEAT OFFENDERS ....................................................................................................... 9

A. Career Offender ........................................................................................................... 10

1. GeneralApplication(§4B1.1) ............................................................................... 10

2. CrimeofViolence(§4B1.2(a)) ............................................................................. 12

3. ControlledSubstancesOffense(§4B1.2(b)) ...................................................... 13

4. CategoricalandModifiedCategoricalApproach .............................................. 14

C. Criminal Livelihood (§4B1.3) ...................................................................................... 15

D. Armed Career Criminal .............................................................................................. 15


2. ViolentFelony .......................................................................................................... 16

3. Seriousdrugoffense ............................................................................................... 17


E. Repeat and Dangerous Sex Offender Against Minors .............................................. 17



IV. CATEGORICAL APPROACH AND MODIFIED CATEGORICAL APPROACH .. 18

V. DEPARTURES (CHAPTER FOUR, PART A) ............................................................... 22

A. Upward Departures ...................................................................................................... 22

1. BasisforUpwardDeparture ................................................................................. 23

2. Other Considerations ............................................................................................... 24


iii

B. Downward Departures ................................................................................................. 25

1. LowerLimit .............................................................................................................. 25

2. LimitationforCareerOffenders .......................................................................... 26

3. ProhibitionsforCertainRepeatOffenders ........................................................ 26

C. Departures: Procedural Concerns .............................................................................. 26


1

I. INTRODUCTIONANDOVERVIEW Thepurposeofthisprimeristoprovideageneraloverviewofthesentencingguidelines,pertinentstatutes,issues,andcaselawrelatingtothecalculationofadefendant’scriminalhistorypursuanttoChapterFouroftheguidelines.ThisprimerfocusesonsomeapplicablecasesandconceptsrelatingtoChapterFourbutisnotintendedasacomprehensivecompilationofallcaselawaddressingtheseissues.

ThefollowingaresomeofthemainfeaturesofChapterFour— TheGrid.Theguidelinesentencingtableiscomprisedoftwocomponents:OffenseLevelandCriminalHistoryCategory.Criminalhistoryformsthehorizontalaxisandisdividedintosixcategories,fromI(low)toVI(high).ChapterFour,PartAprovidesinstructiononhowtocalculateadefendant’scriminalhistoryscorebyassigningpointsforcertainpriorconvictions.Thenumberofpointsscoredforapriorsentence(from1–3)isbasedprimarilyonthelengthofthepriorsentence.Twopointsareaddedifthedefendantcommitstheinstantfederaloffensewhileundercriminaljusticesupervision.However,priorsentencesforconductthatwaspartoftheinstantoffensearenotcounted.Somepriorsentencesarenotcountedbecauseofstaleness,theirminornature,orotherreasons.Foroffensescommittedbeforetheageof18,somepriorconvictionsarescoreddifferentlyregardingstalenessissues.Adefendant’scriminalhistorycategory,combinedwiththetotaloffenselevel,determinestheadvisoryguidelinerange. Timing.Becausestatutoryandguidelineprovisionscontaindifferentdefinitionsofprioroffenses,thetimingrequirementsofeachrequirecarefulconsideration.Forexample,§4A1.1,§4B1.1,theimmigrationandfirearmsguidelinesimposeremotenessconstraintsontheuseofpriorconvictions,but§4B1.4,§4B1.5,andthestatutesdonot.1 CertainRepeatOffenders.Thenatureofadefendant’scriminalrecordmayaffectthecalculationofthecriminalhistoryscore.Statutoryenhancementsthatrequiremandatoryminimumsentencesmayresultinincreasedstatutorymaximumsandtheapplicationofdifferentcriminalhistoryguidelines.Certaincriminalconvictions,generallyrelatingtocrimesofviolence,drugandsexoffenses,mayincreasethedefendant’sguidelineoffenselevel.Assessingthesepriorconvictionsrequiresscrutinytodeterminewhetherapriorstateorfederalconvictionfitsthespecificdefinitionthattriggerstheenhancedpenaltyprovisions. Departures.Departuresforover‐representationorunder‐representationofcriminalhistoryareauthorizedbythepolicystatementssetforthin§4A1.3(DeparturesBasedonInadequacyofCriminalHistoryCategory[PolicyStatement]).Anupwarddeparturefromtheguidelinerangemaybewarrantedwhenadefendant’scriminalhistorydoesnot 1 See8U.S.C.§1326(b);18U.S.C.§924(e);21U.S.C.§841(b).


2

adequatelyreflecttheseriousnessofpastcriminalconductorthelikelihoodthatthedefendantwillcommitothercrimes.Likewise,adownwarddeparturemaybeauthorizedifadefendant’scriminalhistoryoverstatestheseriousnessofhispastcriminalrecordorthelikelihoodthatthedefendantwillcommitothercrimes.II. CRIMINALHISTORY(CHAPTERFOUR,PARTA)

A. Computation Attheoutset,andexcludingstalenessconcerns,thecalculationofthecriminalhistorycategorystartswithcomputinghowmanypointseachpriorconvictioncarries.Section4A1.1(CriminalHistoryCategory)providesasfollows:

(a) Add3pointsforeachpriorsentenceofimprisonmentexceedingoneyearandonemonth.

(b) Add2pointsforeachpriorsentenceofimprisonmentofatleastsixty

daysnotcountedin(a).(c) Add1pointforeachpriorsentencenotcountedin(a)or(b),uptoa

totalof4pointsforthissubsection.(d) Add2pointsifthedefendantcommittedtheinstantoffensewhile

underanycriminaljusticesentence,includingprobation,parole,supervisedrelease,imprisonment,workrelease,orescapestatus.

(e) Add1pointforeachpriorsentenceresultingfromaconvictionofa

crimeofviolencethatdidnotreceiveanypointsunder(a),(b),or(c)abovebecausesuchsentencewascountedasasinglesentence,uptoatotalof3pointsforthissubsection.2

Pleasenotethereisnolimittothenumberofpointsthatcanbeassignedforsubsections(a)and(b)typeconvictions.Undersubsection(e),convictionsforcrimesofviolencecanoverridethefour‐pointlimitonsubsection(c)typesentencesuptothreeadditionalcriminalhistorypoints.

2 USSG§4A1.1.


3

B. DefinitionsandInstructions Section4A1.2(DefinitionsandInstructionsforComputingCriminalHistory)containskeydefinitionsandspecificinstructionsforcomputingcriminalhistory.

1. “PriorSentence”

Under§4A1.2(a),a“priorsentence”is“anysentencepreviouslyimposeduponadjudicationofguilt,whetherbyguiltyplea,trial,orpleaofnolocontendere,forconductnotpartoftheinstantoffense.”3Theterm“priorsentence”“isnotdirectedatthechronologyoftheconduct,butthechronologyofthesentencing.”4Thus,apreviouslyimposedsentencecountsevenifitwasforconductthatoccurredaftertheoffenseofconviction.5Courtsaredividedoverwhethertoconsiderasentenceimposedaftertheoriginalsentencingbutbeforere‐sentencing.6

a. RelevantConduct Asentencecannotbetakenintoaccountincalculatingcriminalhistoryifitencompassedconductthatwouldbeconsideredrelevantconducttotheoffenseofconvictionunder§1B1.3(RelevantConduct[FactorsthatDeterminetheGuidelineRange]).7

b. Multiplepriorsentences

Priorsentencesarealwayscountedseparatelyiftheoffenseswereseparatedbyaninterveningarrest(thedefendantisarrestedforthefirstoffensepriortocommittingthesecondoffense).8Section4A1.2(a)(2)statesthat“Ifthereisnointerveningarrest,prior 3 Id.§4A1.2(a)(1).

4 UnitedStatesv.Lopez,349F.3d39,41(2dCir.2003)(citingUnitedStatesv.Espinal,981F.2d664,668(2dCir.1992).

5 Lopez,349F.3dat41.

6 CompareUnitedStatesv.Klump,57F.3d801(9thCir.1995)(canconsider),andUnitedStatesv.Bleike,950F.2d214(5thCir.1991)(notplainerrortoconsider),withUnitedStatesv.Ticchiarelli,171F.3d24(1stCir.1999)(impropertoconsiderinterveningsentenceunderlawofthecasedoctrine).

7 CompareUnitedStatesv.Henry,288F.3d657(5thCir.2002)(firearmsandtrespass),UnitedStatesv.Salter,241F.3d392(5thCir.2001)(taxevasionrelatedtomoneylaunderinganddrugoffenses),andUnitedStatesv.Thomas,54F.3d73(2d.Cir.1995)(statelarcenyrelatedtofederalforgery),withUnitedStatesv.Yerena‐Magana,478F.3d683(5thCir.2007)(illegalreentrynotpartofdrugoffense).

8 SeeUnitedStatesv.Fueher,844F.3d767(8thCir.2016)(nointerveningarrestwheredefendantwasarrestedforfirstoffenseaftercommissionofsecond),UnitedStatesv.Smith,549F.3d355,361(6thCir.


4

sentencesarecountedseparatelyunless(A)thesentencesresultedfromoffensescontainedinthesamecharginginstrument;or(B)thesentenceswereimposedonthesameday.”9

c. Singlesentence

Ifpriorsentencesaretreatedasasinglesentence,usethelongestsentenceifconcurrentsentenceswereimposed,andtheaggregatesentenceifconsecutivesentenceswereimposed.10

d. Revocationsentences Revocationofprobation,parole,orsupervisedreleasesentencesarecountedandthetermofimprisonmentimposeduponrevocationisaddedtotheoriginalsentencetocomputethecorrectnumberofcriminalhistorypoints.11

2. “SentenceofImprisonment”

Thistermreferstothemaximumsentenceimposed;thatis,thesentencepronouncedbythecourt,notthelengthoftimeactuallyserved.12Inthecaseofanindeterminatesentence,thehighendoftheprescribedsentencingrangeistreatedasthemaximumsentence.13Ifthecourtreducestheprisonsentence,however,thereducedsentencecontrols.14

2008)(nointerveningarrestbetweenthefirsttwoprioroffenses,butinterveningarrestbetweenthesecondandthirdoffensecommittedwhileonbond).SeealsoUnitedStatesv.Leal‐Felix,665F.3d1037,1039(9thCir.2011)(Defendant’stwodrivingwhilelicensesuspended“citations”arenotconsideredformalarrestsforcriminalhistorypurposesandthus,cannotbe“interveningarrests”).

9 USSG§4A1.2(a)(2).

10 Id.

11 Id.§4A1.2(k)(1).

12 Id.§4A1.2(b)(1).

13 Id.§4A1.2,comment.(n.2).SeealsoUnitedStatesv.Levenite,277F.3d454(4thCir.2002)(indeterminatesentenceoftwodaysto23monthsscoredassentence“exceedingoneyearandonemonth”under§4A1.1(a)eventhoughdefendantactuallyservedtwodays).

14 UnitedStatesv.Kristl,437F.3d1050(10thCir.2006).


5

a. Suspendedsentence

Ifpartofthesentenceissuspended,the“sentenceofimprisonment”includesonly

theportionthatwasnotsuspended.15Ifadefendantreceives“timeserved,”theactualtimespentincustodywillbecounted.16Adischargedsentencedoesnotqualifyasasuspendedsentenceunder§4A1.2(b)(2)ifthe“suspension”wasnotorderedbyacourt.17

b. Whatisasentenceofimprisonment? Indeterminingwhetheradefendanthasservedasentenceofimprisonment,thecourtlookstothenatureofthefacility,ratherthanitspurpose.18InUnitedStatesv.Brooks,19thecourtheldthatincarcerationinabootcampwasaprisonsentence.Thecourtdistinguishedbetweenfacilitieslikethebootcamp“requiring24hoursadayphysicalconfinement”andotherdispositionssuchas“probation,fines,andresidencyinahalfwayhouse.”20Generally,communitytypeconfinementisdeemedtobea“substituteforimprisonment”andnota“sentenceofimprisonment.”21Asix‐monthsentenceofhomedetentionisnotconsideredasentenceofimprisonment.22Thecourtshavelargelyheldthatcommunitytreatmentcentersorhalfwayhousesarenotimprisonment.23

15 USSG§4A1.2(b)(2).See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Tabaka,982F.2d100(3dCir.1992)(allbuttwodayssuspended).

16 SeeUnitedStatesv.Rodriguez‐Lopez,170F.3d1244(9thCir.1999)(addingtwopointsfor62daysserved),andUnitedStatesv.Dixon,230F.3d109(4thCir.2000)(58daysspentincustodydidnotwarranttwopoints).SeealsoUnitedStatesv.Hall,531F.3d414,419(6thCir.2008)(“adefendantwhoreceivesfullcreditfortimeservedonanentirelyseparateconvictiondoesnotinfact‘actuallyserve’anytimefortheoffenseinquestion.”).

17 SeeUnitedStatesv.Rodriguez‐Bernal,783F.3d1002(5thCir.2015).

18 UnitedStatesv.Brooks,166F.3d723(5thCir.1999);UnitedStatesv.Latimer,991F.2d1509(9thCir.1993).

19 166F.3d723(5thCir.1999).

20 Id.,at725–26.

21 USSG§§5B1.3(e)(1)–(2),5C1.1(c)–(d).SeealsoUnitedStatesv.Phipps,68F.3d159(7thCir.1995);UnitedStatesv.Latimer,991F.2d1509,1512‐13(9thCir.1993).

22 UnitedStatesv.Gordon,346F.3d135(5thCir.2003).

23 UnitedStatesv.Pielago,135F.3d703,711–14(11thCir.1998);UnitedStatesv.Latimer,991F.2d1509,1511(9thCir.1993).ButseeUnitedStatesv.Rasco,963F.2d132(6thCir.1992)(communitytreatmentcenteruponrevocationofparoleistobeviewedaspartoftheoriginaltermofimprisonmentand,thus,additionalincarcerationunder§4A1.2(k)(1)),andUnitedStatesv.Jones,107F.3d1147(6thCir.1997)(timeservedinhomedetentionisnot“sentenceofimprisonment”).


6

3. FelonyOffense

Afelonyoffenseisanyoffenseunderfederal,state,orlocallawthatispunishableby

atermofimprisonmentexceedingoneyear,regardlessoftheactualsentenceimposed.24Thisdefinitionrequirescarefulreviewofcertainpriormisdemeanorsinjurisdictionswheresomemisdemeanoroffensescarrytwo‐yearorthree‐yearstatutorymaximums.25However,inatleastonejurisdiction,certainclassesoffeloniesarenotpunishablebymorethanoneyear.26

4. MisdemeanorandPettyOffenses

Certainmisdemeanors(e.g.,carelessorrecklessdriving,gambling,drivingwithoutalicense,disorderlyconduct,prostitution,resistingarrest,trespassing)arecountedonlyiftheyresultedinaprisonsentenceofatleastthirtydaysormorethanoneyearofprobation,ortheyaresimilartotheinstantoffense.27Otherpettyoffenses(e.g.,fishandgameviolations,juvenilestatusoffenses,hitchhiking,loitering,minortrafficinfractions,publicintoxication,vagrancy)arenevercounted.28Convictionsfordrivingwhileintoxicatedandothersimilaroffensesarealwayscounted.29

5. TimingandStatusConcerns

Whetherapriorconvictionisscoredforthecriminalhistorycomputationdependsonseveralfactors—theageofthepriorconviction,thedateofimpositionofthesentence,thelengthofthepriorsentence,andanysentenceimposeduponrevocationofthepriorsentence—andwhetherthepriorconvictionswereforoffensescommittedbeforetheageof18.Likewise,thestatusofthedefendantatthetimeoftheinstantfederaloffensemattersandmayresultincriminalhistorypoints.

24 USSG§4A1.2(o).

25 UnitedStatesv.Coleman,635F.3d380(8thCir.2011)(statemisdemeanorpunishablebylessthantwoyearsisaqualifyingfelonyforcareeroffenderpurposes).

26 UnitedStatesv.Simmons,649F.3d237(4thCir.2011)(enbanc)(priorNorthCarolinafelonythatdidnotexposedefendanttoatermofimprisonmentgreaterthanoneyearwasnotaqualifyingfelonyforpurposesofasentencingenhancementunder21U.S.C.§851).

27 USSG§4A1.2(c)(1).

28 Id.§4A1.2(c)(2).

29 Id.§4A1.2,comment.(n.5).


7

a. Fifteen‐yearwindowforpriorsentencesgreaterthan13months

Threepointsareassignedtoeachadultsentenceofimprisonmentexceedingone

yearandonemonthimposedwithin15yearsoftheinstantoffenseorresultinginincarcerationofthedefendantduringanypartofthe15‐yearperiod.30Section4A1.2(e)(1)mayresultinthescoringofremoteconvictions,especiallywhereadefendantwasonparoleorsupervisedreleaseandwasrevokedandincarceratedduringthe15‐yearperiodimmediatelyprecedingtheinstantoffense.31Thecourtwillcountaconvictionofadefendantwhoseparoleisrevokedduringtheoperativetimeperiod,evenifthedefendantisincarceratedforanewoffenseatthetimeofrevocation.32Adefendantonescapestatusisdeemedincarcerated.33

b. Ten‐yearwindowforsentenceslessthan13months

Forpriorsentenceslessthan13months,thereisa10‐yeartimelimitation,whichrunsfromthedatethepriorsentencewasimposed,notwhenitwasserved.34Likewise,thetimelimitrunsfromtheoriginalimpositiondate,nottherevocationdate,unlesstheoriginalsentenceaddedtotherevocationsentenceexceeds13months.35

c. Statusofdefendantattimeoffederaloffense

Twocriminalhistorypointsareaddediftheinstantoffensewascommittedwhilethedefendantwasunderacriminaljusticesentence.36Thisprovisioncoversvirtuallyallformsofsuspendedsentenceswherethereisapossibilityofacustodialsentence,evenif

30 Id.§§4A1.1(a),4A1.2(e)(1).

31 Id.§4A1.2(k)(2)(A).See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Semsak,336F.3d1123(9thCir.2003)(revocationofparole).

32 UnitedStatesv.Ybarra,70F.3d362(5thCir.1995).

33 UnitedStatesv.Radziercz,7F.3d1193,1195(5thCir.1993)(“[thedefendant]wouldhavebeenincustodyduringthe15‐yearperiodprecedingcommencementoftheinstantoffensehadhenotescapedfromcustodywhileservingtheeight‐yearsentence.”).

34 USSG§4A1.2(e)(2).

35 Id.§§4A1.2(a)(1),(e)(2),(k)(2)(B).SeealsoUnitedStatesv.Arviso‐Mata,442F.3d382(5thCir.2006)(sentenceimposedwhendefendantfoundguiltyandsentencewassuspended);UnitedStatesv.Arnold,213F.3d894,895–96(5thCir.2000)(“asentenceis‘imposed’whenitisfirstpronouncedbythecourt,andnotwhenthetermofimprisonmentbegins....[S]entencepronouncementisthesole,relevanteventforpurposesof§4A1.2(e)(2)....”).

36 USSG§4A1.1(d).


8

thereisnoactivesupervision.37However,asuspendedsentencewhereafineistheonlysanctionisnotconsideredtobeacriminaljusticesentence.38Adefendant,whoseprobationwouldhaveotherwiseexpiredbutforanoutstandingrevocationwarrant,isdeemedtobeunderacriminaljusticesentenceevenifthestatedidnotuseduediligencetoexecutethewarrant.39Forpurposesof§4A1.1(d),adefendantmustbe“underacriminaljusticesentence”atthetimeheorshecommittedtheinstantoffense.40Note,however,thatadefendantwhofailstoreportforserviceofasentenceofimprisonmentshallbetreatedashavingescapedandthereforeisunderacriminaljusticesentence.41

d. OffensesCommittedPriortoAge18 For an offense committed by the defendant before age 18 thatresultedinanadultprisonsentenceexceeding13monthswithintheprior15‐yearperiod,threecriminalhistorypointsareadded.42Foranoffensecommittedbeforeage18thatresultedinajuvenileoradultsentencetoconfinementofatleast60days,twopointsareaddedifthedefendantwasreleasedfromthatconfinementwithinfiveyearsoftheinstantoffense.43Otherwise,onepointisaddedforanoffensecommittedbeforeage18thatresultedinajuvenileoradultsentenceimposedwithinfiveyearsoftheinstantoffense.44

Juvenileadjudicationsarecountedeventhoughnotconsidered“convictions”instatecourt.45But,thediscontinuanceofajuvenileadjudicationisnotconsideredasentence.46Asentenceofcommitmenttothecustodyofthestate’sjuvenileauthorityconstitutesa

37 See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Giraldo‐Lara,919F.2d19(5thCir.1990)(deferredadjudicationprobation);UnitedStatesv.Perales,487F.3d588(8thCir.2007)(diversion);UnitedStatesv.Miller,56F.3d719(6thCir.1995)(conditionaldischargesentenceasthe“functionalequivalent”ofunsupervisedprobation).

38 Id.§4A1.1,comment.(n.4);UnitedStatesv.Kipp,10F.3d1463(9thCir.1993).

39 Id.§4A1.2(m);SeealsoUnitedStatesv.Anderson,184F.3d479(5thCir.1999).SeealsoUnitedStatesv.McCowan,469F.3d386(5thCir.2006).

40 SeeUnitedStatesv.Caldwell,585F.3d1347(7thCir.2009).(Atthetimeoftheoffense,thedefendantwasonprobationfordrivingwhileahabitualoffender,buthehadnotservedanyportionofhis30‐daysentence.Therefore,hewasnotundera“criminaljusticesentence.”).

41 Id.§4A1.2(n);SeealsoUnitedStatesv.Aska,314F.3d75(2ndCir.2002),UnitedStatesv.Fisher,137F.3d1158,1167(9thCir.1998).

42 Id.§4A1.2(d)(1);UnitedStatesv.Gipson,46F.3d472(5thCir.1994).

43 Id.§4A1.2(d)(2)(A)&comment(n.7).44 See §4A1.2(d)(2)(B).

45 UnitedStatesv.Holland,26F.3d26(5thCir.1994).

46 UnitedStatesv.Langford,516F.3d205,210(3rdCir.2008).


9

sentencewithinthemeaningof§4A1.2(d)(2).47Thejuvenile’sageatthetimeofarevocationresultinginconfinement,ratherthanthetimeoftheoffense,controls.48Juveniledetentionthatdidnotresultfromanadjudicationofguiltdoesnotcount.49

6. Military,Foreign,andTribalCourtSentences

Militarysentencesresultingfromageneralorspecialcourtmartialarecounted.Sentencesimposedasaresultofasummarycourt‐martialorArticle15proceedingdonotcount.50ForeignsentencesandNativeAmericantribalcourtsentencesdonotcountbutmaybeconsideredunder§4A1.3(DeparturesBasedonInadequacyofCriminalHistoryCategory[PolicyStatement]).51

7. SentencesonAppeal

Priorsentencesunderappealarecounted.Wheretheexecutionofapriorsentencehasbeenstayedpendingappeal,subsections(a)through(e)of§4A1.1stillapplyincomputingcriminalhistory.52III.REPEATOFFENDERS

PartBofChapterFour(CareerOffendersandCriminalLivelihood)providesinstructiononhowtocalculateenhancedcriminalhistoryscoresandoffenselevelsforcertainrepeatoffenders,suchascareeroffenders,armedcareercriminals,andrepeatanddangeroussexoffendersagainstminors.

47 See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Birch,39F.3d1089(10thCir.1994).

48 UnitedStatesv.FemaleJuvenile,103F.3d14,17(5thCir.1996).

49 UnitedStatesv.Johnson,205F.3d1197(9thCir.2000).

50 USSG§4A1.2(g).

51 Id.§4A1.2(h),(i).

52 Id.§4A1.2(l).


10

A. CareerOffender

1. GeneralApplication(§4B1.1) Anindividualisa“careeroffender”if(1)heorshewasatleast18atthetimeoftheinstantoffense,(2)theoffenseofconvictionisafelonycrimeofviolenceorfelonycontrolledsubstanceoffense,and(3)thedefendanthasatleasttwopriorfelonyconvictionsofeitheracrimeofviolenceoracontrolledsubstanceoffense.53

a. OffenseLevelandCriminalHistoryCategory Theguidelinesprovidesignificantlyenhancedoffenselevelsforcareeroffenders.Generally,theoffenselevelincreasesdependingonthestatutorymaximumfortheoffenseofconviction.54Likewise,theguidelinesestablishthatacareeroffender’scriminalhistorycategoryisVI.55

b. CareerOffenderand924(c)

Theinterplaybetweenthecareeroffenderenhancementand18U.S.C.§924(c)warrantscarefulconsideration.56Ifthedefendantisonlyconvictedofthefirearmsoffense,theguidelinerangeis360monthstolife,althoughthereductionforacceptanceofresponsibilityisstillavailable.57Iftherearemultiplecountsofconviction,theapplicableguidelinerangeisthegreaterofthemandatoryminimumconsecutivesentenceplustheguidelinerangefortheunderlyingoffenseortheguidelinerangederivedfromthecareeroffendertablefor§924(c)or§929(a)offendersin§4B1.1(c)(3).58Thesentenceisapportionedamongthecountstomeetanymandatoryminimumrequirements.59Ifthe

53 Seeid.§4B1.1(a).Seealso§4B1.2,comment.(n.1)(Aconvictionforusing[carryingorpossessing]afirearmduringaviolentfelonyordrugtraffickingoffensemayqualifyasapredicateoffenseforcareeroffenderpurposes.).

54 Seethetablesetforthinid.§4B1.1(b).

55 Id.§4B1.1(b).

56 Seeid.§4B1.1(c),the§4B1.1(c)(3)table,and§4B1.1,comment.(n.3).SeealsoUnitedStatesv.Diaz,639F.3d616(3dCir.2011).

57 USSG§4B1.1(c)(3).

58 Seeid.§4B1.1(c)(2).

59 Id.§5G1.2(e).


11

defendantisnotacareeroffenderbuthasmultipleconvictions,pursuantto§924(c),thecourtcandepartupward.60Thecourtcanalsodepartifthedefendant’sguidelinerangeislowerthanifhedidnothavea§924(c)conviction.61

c. AcceptanceofResponsibility Acareeroffendermayreceiveareductionforacceptanceofresponsibilitypursuantto§3E1.1(AcceptanceofResponsibility).However,otherChapterThreeadjustments,whetherupwardordownward,maynotapply.62

d. PredicateConvictions

(1)Adultconvictionsrequired.

Unlikeothercriminalhistoryprovisions,onlyadultconvictionscanserveasapredicateunderthecareeroffenderguideline.63However,adefendantwhowasconvictedasanadultbutwasonly17canbeconsideredacareeroffender.64

(2)Predicateconvictionmustbepriortofederaloffense.

Becausethecareeroffenderenhancementappliestocriminal“convictions,”notsentences,thedefendantmusthavebeenconvictedoftheoffensebeforehecommittedthefederaloffense.65Thedateofconvictionisthedatethattheguiltofthedefendanthasbeenestablished,whetherbyguiltyplea,trial,orpleaofnolocontendere.66

60 Id.§2K2.4,comment.(n.2(B)).

61 Id.§2K2.4,comment.(n.4).

62 UnitedStatesv.Warren,361F.3d1055(8thCir.2004)(plainerrortoapplyanobstructionofjusticeenhancementtothecareeroffenderoffenselevel);UnitedStatesv.Perez,328F.3d96(2ndCir.2003)(careeroffendercannotreceiveminorrolereductionifitwouldresultinanoffenselevelbelowthecareeroffenderminimum).

63 SeeUSSG§4B1.2,comment.(n.1).

64 Id.Seealso,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Otero,495F.3d393(7thCir.2007);UnitedStatesv.Moorer,383F.3d164(3dCir.2004);butseeUnitedStatesv.Mason,284F.3d555,558–62(4thCir.2002)(adultconvictiondidnotcountbecausethedefendantwassentencedasajuvenile).

65 USSG§4B1.2(c).SeealsoUnitedStatesv.Guerrero,768F.3d351(5thCir.2014).

66 Id.§4B1.2(c).


12

(3)Predicateconvictionsmustbecountedseparately.

Thepriorconvictionsmustbecountedseparatelyunder§4A1.1(a),(b),or(c),toqualifyaspredicateconvictionsforcareeroffenderpurposes.But,priorsentencesincludedinasinglesentencemayeachbetreatedasapredicateifthesentencesindependentlywouldhavereceivedcriminalhistorypointsbutforthesinglesentencerule.67

(4)Predicateconvictionsmustbescored.

Priorconvictionsmustnotbetooold(i.e.,outsidethetimelimitssetforthin§4A1.2(d),(e)),andmustreceivecriminalhistorypointsunder§4A1.1(a),(b),or(c)toqualifyaspredicatesforthecareeroffenderenhancement.68Apriorsentenceincludedinasinglesentence,thatisremoteintime,andwouldnotindependentlyreceivecriminalhistorypoints,cannotserveasapredicateoffense.

e. InchoateOffenses

Thecareeroffenderguidelineincludesconvictionsforinchoateoffensessuchasaidingandabetting,conspiring,andattemptingtocommita“crimeofviolence”and“controlledsubstanceoffense.”69Thisprovisionislimited,however,tocircumstanceswherethedefendantintendedtocommitorfacilitatethesubstantiveoffense.Accordingly,theNinthCircuithasheldthataccessoryafterthefactdoesnotconstituteapredicateoffense,70andtheSecondCircuitheldthataNewYorkfacilitationconvictiondidnotcountbecausetherewasnorequirementthatthedefendantintendedtocommittheoffense.71

2. CrimeofViolence(§4B1.2(a)) Theterm“crimeofviolence”isdefinedinsubsection(a)of§4B1.2(DefinitionofTermsUsedinSection4B1.1)as:

67 Id.§4A1.2,comment.(n.3).

68 SeeUnitedStatesv.Dewey,599F.3d1010(9thCir.2010)(affirmingrelianceon18‐yearoldsentencewheredefendantwasincarceratedwithinprevious15years).

69 SeeUnitedStatesv.Shumate,341F.3d852(9thCir.2003)andUnitedStatesv.Medina,714F.3d232(4thCir.2013)(solicitationofcontrolledsubstanceoffenseisincluded);seealsoUnitedStatesv.Dolt27F.3d235(6thCir.1994)(solicitationofcontrolledsubstanceoffenseisnotincluded);UnitedStatesv.Lightbourn,115F.3d291(5thCir.1997)(conspiracy).

70 UnitedStatesv.Vidal,504F.3d1072(9thCir.2007)(enbanc)(notdrugtraffickingunder§2L1.2).

71 UnitedStatesv.Liranzo,944F.2d73,79(2dCir.1991).


13

anyoffenseunderfederalorstatelaw,punishablebyimprisonmentforatermexceedingoneyear,that—(1) hasasanelementtheuse,attempteduse,orthreateneduseof

physicalforceagainstthepersonofanother,or

(2) ismurder,voluntarymanslaughter,kidnapping,aggravatedassault,aforciblesexoffense,robbery,arson,extortion,ortheuseorunlawfulpossessionofafirearmdescribedin26U.S.C.§5845(a)orexplosivematerialasdefinedin18U.S.C.§841(c).72

The“crimeofviolence”definitionisusednotonlytodeterminewhetheradefendant’ssentenceissubjecttothecareeroffenderenhancementin§4B1.1,butalsowhetheradefendant’ssentenceissubjecttoenhancementinotherguidelines.73Inaddition,itisusedtodeterminewhetheranupwarddepartureiswarrantedunder§5K2.17(SemiautomaticFirearmsCapableofAcceptingLargeQuantityMagazine[PolicyStatement]).

3. ControlledSubstancesOffense(§4B1.2(b)) Thecareeroffenderguidelinesdefinea“controlledsubstanceoffense”asfollows:“[A]noffenseunderfederalorstatelaw,punishablebyimprisonmentforatermexceedingoneyear,thatprohibitsthemanufacture,import,export,distribution,ordispensingofacontrolledsubstance(oracounterfeitsubstance)orthepossessionofacontrolledsubstance(oracounterfeitsubstance)withintenttomanufacture,import,export,distribute,ordispense.”74

a. PredicateDrugOffensePunishablebyMorethanOneYear NotethatthisguidelinecoverstraffickingoffensespunishablebymorethanoneyearandthereforeappliestoanumberofminordrugoffensesnotcoveredbytheArmedCareer

72 USSG§4B1.2(a).

73 Seeid.§2K1.3(a)(1)–(2)&comment.(n.2);§2K2.1(a)(1),(2),(3)(B),(4)(A)&comment.(n.1),§2K2.1(b)(5)&comment.(n.13(B));§2S1.1(b)(1)(B)(ii)&comment.(n.1);§4A1.1(e)&comment.(n.5).

74 Id.§4B1.2(b).


14

CriminalAct(ACCA),whichlimits“seriousdrugoffenses”tooffensespunishablebyatleasttenyears.75Somestatemisdemeanorconvictionsmayqualify.76

b. PredicateDrugConvictionLimitedtoDrugTraffickingOffensesFirearmOffenses

Unlikethestatutorydrugenhancements(e.g.,21U.S.C.§841(b)),thisguidelineprovisionislimitedtotrafficking‐typeoffensesanddoesnotcovermerepossessionofacontrolledsubstance.77

c. SpecificListedOffenses Certaindrugoffensesconstitutecontrolledsubstanceoffensesincludingpossessionoflistedchemicalsandequipmentwithintenttomanufactureacontrolledsubstance(21U.S.C.§§841(c)(1),843(a)(6)),usingacommunicationfacilitytocommitafelonydrugoffense(21U.S.C.§843(b)),andmaintainingpremisestofacilitateadrugoffense(21U.S.C.§856).78Useofacommunicationfacilitytobuydrugsforpersonaluseisnotaviolationof21U.S.C.§843(b)becausemerepossessionofacontrolledsubstanceisafederalmisdemeanor.79

4. CategoricalandModifiedCategoricalApproach Thecategoricalapproachandmodifiedcategoricalapproachesapplytothedeterminationwhetheranoffenseisa“crimeofviolence”or“controlledsubstanceoffense.”80

75 18U.S.C.§924(e)(2)(A).

76 See“felony”definitionatUSSG§4A1.2(o).SeealsoUSSG§4B1.1,comment(n.4)foradownwarddepartureprovisionforstatemisdemeanorscountedaspredicateconvictions.

77 Salinasv.UnitedStates,547U.S.188(2006)(percuriam);UnitedStatesv.Gaitan,954F.2d1005(5thCir.1992)(categoricalapproachprecludesgoingbehindoffenseofconviction).

78 USSG§4B1.2,comment.(n.1).

79 Abuelhawav.UnitedStates,556U.S.816(2009).

80 SeesectionIVinfra.


15

C. CriminalLivelihood(§4B1.3)

Ifthedefendantcommittedanoffenseaspartofapatternofcriminalconductengagedinasalivelihood,hisoffenselevelmustbeatleast13unlessacceptanceofresponsibilityapplies,inwhichcasetheminimumoffenselevelshallbe11.TheCommentaryto§4B1.3includesdefinitionsofthekeyterms“patternofcriminalconduct”and“engagedinasalivelihood.”Fullfacevalueofstolenchecks,andgrossprofithasbeenusedtocalculatethedefendant’sderivedincomeforpurposesofapplyingtheenhancement.81

D. ArmedCareerCriminal

1. GeneralApplication(§4B1.4) Adefendantconvictedofaviolationof18U.S.C.922(g),andwhohasthreepriorconvictions,foraviolentfelonyorseriousdrugtraffickingoffense,orboth,committedinoccasionsdifferentfromoneanotherisconsideredan“armedcareercriminal.”82Thedefendantissubjecttoanenhancedsentenceunder18U.S.C.§924(e).

a. OffenseLevelandCriminalHistoryCategory

Section4B1.4providesthattheoffenselevelforanarmedcareercriminalisthegreatestofthefollowing:

(1)theoffenselevelapplicablefromChapterTwoandThree;(2)theoffenselevelfrom§4B1.1(CareerOffender),ifapplicable;(3)anoffenselevelof34ifthedefendantusedorpossessedthefirearm,orammunition,inconnectionwithacrimeofviolenceoracontrolledsubstanceoffense,orpossessedafirearmdescribedin26U.S.C.§5845(a);or(4)anoffenselevelof33inothercircumstances.83

ThecriminalhistorycategoryisraisedtoaminimumlevelofIVandiscalculatedas

thegreatestofthefollowing:

81 SeeUnitedStatesv.Quertermous,946F.2d375(5thCir.1991),UnitedStatesv.Gordon,No.15‐2395,2017WL1164364,(1stCir.Mar.29,2017).82 See18U.S.C.§924(e)and§4B1.4,comment(n.1).

83 USSG§4B1.4(b).


16

(1)ChapterFour,PartA (2)CareerOffenderGuidelineifapplicable, (3)CategoryVI,ifthedefendantusedorpossessedafirearmorammunitioninconnectionwitheitheracrimeofviolenceoracontrolledsubstanceoffense;orthefirearmpossessedbythedefendantwasofthetypedescribedin26U.S.C.§5845(a)84;or (4)CategoryIV.

b. ArmedCareerOffenderand844(h),924(c),or929(a)

Sections4B1.4(b)(3)(A)and(c)(2)donotapplyifadefendantisalsoconvictedofaviolationof18U.S.C.§844,924(c),or929(a).85However,ifthemaximumpenaltyresultingfromtheguidelinerange,combinedwiththemandatoryconsecutivesentences,islowerthanthemaximumpenaltythatwouldhaveresultedifsuchprovisionsapplied,anupwarddeparturemaybewarranted.Notethattheupwarddeparturehasacap.86

c. AcceptanceofResponsibility

Acceptanceofresponsibilityunder§3E1.1isavailableandwilldecreasetheoffenselevel,butnotbelowthestatutorilyrequiredminimumsentenceof180months.

d. Predicateconvictions

Differentthanthecareeroffenderguideline,18U.S.C.§924(2)doesnotprovidefor

timelimitationsinpredicateconvictions.Itreferstoconvictionscommittedonoccasionsdifferentfromoneanother.Inaddition,burglaryisincludedasapredicateoffense.

2. ViolentFelony

Theterm“violentfelony”means: a.Anycrimepunishablebyimprisonmentforatermexceedingoneyear,oranyactofjuveniledelinquencyinvolvingtheuseorcarryingofafirearm,knifeor

84 Id.§4B1.4(c).SeealsotheCommission’ssubjectmatterprimeronFirearmsathttp://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/primers/firearms.

85 Id., comment (n. 1).

86 Id., comment (n. 2).


17

destructivedevicethatwouldbepunishableofsuchtermifcommittedbyanadultthat: 1) hasasanelementof,theuse,attempteduse,orthreateneduseofphysicalforceagainstthepersonofanother;or 2) isburglary,arson,orextortion,involvingtheuseofexplosives.87

3. Seriousdrugoffense

Thetermseriousdrugoffensereferstoanoffenseunder21U.S.C.§801etseq.,§951etseq.,or46U.S.C.§70501etseq.,oranoffenseunderstatelawinvolvingmanufacturing,distributing,orpossessingwithintenttomanufactureordistribute,acontrolledsubstanceforwhichamaximumtermofimprisonmentisatleasttenyears.88

4. CategoricalandModifiedCategoricalApproach Thecategoricalapproachandmodifiedcategoricalapproachesapplytothedeterminationwhetheranoffenseisa“crimeofviolence”or“controlledsubstanceoffense.”89

E. RepeatandDangerousSexOffenderAgainstMinors

1. GeneralApplication(§4B1.5) Ifthedefendant’sinstantoffenseisoneofthecoveredsexcrimes,90andthedefendanthasapriorqualifyingsexoffenseconviction,orhasengagedinapatternofactivityinvolvingprohibitedsexualconduct,thenthedefendantissubjecttotheconditionssetforthin§4B1.5.

87 The Supreme Court invalidated the residual clause in United States v. Johnson, 135S.Ct.2551(2015). Different than the career offender guideline, the armed career criminal statute includes a burglary conviction.

88 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A).

89 SeesectionIVinfra.90 USSG§4B1.5(comment.n.2).


18

a. OffenseLevelandCriminalHistoryCategory

Ifthedefendanthasapriorqualifyingsexconvictionandisnotacareeroffender,then

theoffenseshallbethegreaterof(1)ChapterTwoandThree;or(2)theoffenselevelfromthetabledecreasedbytheacceptanceofresponsibilitydeduction.ThecriminalhistorycategoryisnotlessthanV.91

A5‐levelenhancementisappliedifthedefendantisnotacareeroffender,hasnoprior

qualifyingsexconviction,andengagedinapatternofprohibitedsexualconduct.92

b. AcceptanceofResponsibility

Acceptanceofresponsibilityunder§3E1.1isapplicable.

c. Predicateconvictions

TheSixthCircuitconcludedthatthetimelimitationsof§4A1.2arenotapplicable.93

Section4B1.5(a)appliestoadefendantwhosepriorsexconvictionisbasedontheadjudicationofguiltybuthasnotyetbeensentenced.94

2. CategoricalandModifiedCategoricalApproach Thecategoricalapproachandmodifiedcategoricalapproachesapplytothedeterminationofwhetheranoffenseisaqualifiedpriorsexconviction.95

IV.CATEGORICALAPPROACHANDMODIFIEDCATEGORICALAPPROACH

Assetforthabove,offenderswhosecriminalhistoryevidencesviolenceorothertypesofseriousfelonyconductmaybesubjecttoenhancedpenaltiesbothinfederalstatutesandintheUnitedStatesSentencingGuidelines.Congress,instatutes,andthe

91 Id. §4B1.5(a).

92 Id. §4B1.5(b).

93 SeeUnitedStatesv.Babcock,753F.3d587(6thCir.2014). 94 See United States v. Leach, 491 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2007).

95 SeesectionIVinfra.SeealsoUnitedStatesv.Dahl,833F.3d345(3rdCir.2016).


19

Commission,inthesentencingguidelines,haveeachattemptedtosingleoutthetypesofpriorconvictionsthattheyconsiderparticularlyrelevanttosentencing,andwhichthereforehaveagreatereffectonsentencelength.Sentencingandappellatecourtshaveinterpretedthesetermsthroughapplicationofthe“categoricalapproach”mandatedbytheSupremeCourtinTaylorv.UnitedStates,96andthe“modifiedcategoricalapproachestablishedinShepardv.UnitedStates97andfurtherclarifiedinDescampsv.UnitedStates98andMathisv.UnitedStates.99Althoughthesecasesdealtwithstatutoryenhancementsat18U.S.C.§924(e),lowercourtshaveappliedtheircategoricalapproachinothercontextswhereasentencingenhancementisbasedonapriorconviction,includingthecareeroffenderguideline.100 ThecategoricalapproachwasfirstadoptedinTaylorv.UnitedStates.101Under the categorical approach, courts must look to the statutory elements of an offense, rather than the defendant’s conduct, when determining the nature of a prior conviction. Thus, Taylorheldthat,whendecidingwhetherapriorconvictionfallswithinacertainclassofcrimes,asentencingcourtmay“lookonlytothefactofconvictionandthestatutorydefinitionoftheprioroffense.”102Acourtisnotconcernedwiththe“factsunderlyingthepriorconvictions;”inotherwords,thecourtmaynotfocusontheunderlyingcriminalconductitself.103This form of analysis permits a federal sentencing court to examine only the statute under which the defendant sustained a conviction (and, in certain cases, judicial documents surrounding that conviction) in determining whether the prior conviction fits within a federal predicate definition.

The modified categorical approach may only be used “when apriorconvictionisforviolatinga‘divisiblestatute’—onethatsetsoutoneormoreoftheelementsinthealternative,e.g.,burglaryinvolvingentryintoabuildingoranautomobile.”104Underthemodifiedcategoricalapproach,sentencingcourtsmayonlyconsultalimitedclassofdocuments,suchasindictmentsandjuryinstructions,todeterminewhichalternativeelementformedthebasisofthedefendant’spriorconviction.

96 495 U.S. 575 (1990).

97 544 U.S. 13 (2005).

98 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).

99 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016).

100 See United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2008).

101495U.S.575(1990).

102Taylor,495U.S.at602.

103Id.at600–02;seealsoKawashimav.Holder,132S.Ct.1166,1172(2012)(“[W]eemployacategoricalapproachbylookingtothestatutedefiningthecrimeofconviction,ratherthantothespecificfactsunderlyingthecrime.”).

104 Descamps,133 S. Ct. 2276 at 2279.


20

Forapriortrialconviction,thesentencingcourtmayconsultjudicialrecordssuchastheindictmentandjuryinstructions.Forapriorguiltypleaconviction,thesentencingcourt’sreviewis“limitedtothetermsofthechargingdocument,thetermsofthepleaagreementortranscriptofcolloquybetweenjudgeanddefendantinwhichthefactualbasisforthepleawasconfirmedbythedefendant,ortosomecomparablejudicialrecordofthisinformation.”105

TheFifthCircuitextendedthislistofjudicialrecordsfromapriorconvictiontoinclude

NewYorkCertificatesofDispositionifitspecifiesthesubsectionunderwhichthedefendantwasconvicted,106andtheNinthCircuitincludedCaliforniaMinuteEntries.107Ontheotherhand,courtstypicallymaynotrelyonthedescriptioninafederalPSR,108Californiaabstracts,109orpolicereports.110TheFifthCircuithasalloweduseofapolicerecordfromastatethatallows“acomplaintwrittenbyapoliceofficer[to]bethechargingdocument,”111andtheNinthCircuithasauthorizedcourtstolookatpolicerecords“todeterminethat[a]priorconvictionwasforsellingmarijuana”becausethedefendanthad“stipulatedduringthepleacolloquythatthepolicereportscontainedafactualbasisforhisguiltyplea.”112Similarly,whileabstractscannotbeusedtodeterminethenatureofaprior

105 Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26.

106 United States v. Neri-Hernandes, 504 F.3d 587, 592 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding district court may rely on a New York Certificate of Disposition “to determine the nature of a prior conviction,” but this evidence “is not conclusive and may be rebutted,” such as “where the defendant shows a likelihood of human error in the preparation of the Certificate”). United States v. Bonilla, 524 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding certificate of disposition did not support enhancement because it did not specify which subsection of a statute with multiple parts was the basis of conviction).

107 United States v. Snellenberger, 548 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 2008); overruled on other grounds by Young v. Holder, 697 F.3d 976, 986 (9th Cir. 2012) (when a conjunctively phrased charging document alleges several theories of the crime, a guilty plea establishes conviction under at least one of those theories, but not necessarily all of them).

108 See, e.g., United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268, 274 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding the court may not “rely on the PSR’s characterization of the [prior] offense in order to make its determination of whether it [fit within one of the categories in §2L1.2]”).

109 See, e.g., United States v. Gutierrez-Ramirez, 405 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Navidad-Marcos, 367 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2004).

110 See, e.g., Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16; United States v. Almazan-Becerra, 482 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting “[t]he Supreme Court appears to have foreclosed the use of police reports in a Taylor analysis” but that such reports may be used when stipulated to by defendant).

111 United States v. Rosas-Pulido, 526 F.3d 829, 832 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Minnesota law), superseded on other grounds by guideline amendment.

112 United States v. Almazan-Becerra, 537 F.3d 1094, 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008).


21

conviction,underthemodifiedcategoricalapproach,theymaybeusedtoestablishthefactofconvictionorthelengthofapriorsentence.113 Intheabsenceofsupportingdocumentsthatlimitthescopeofaconvictionunderanoverbroadstatute,theenhancementdoesnotapply.114

“Themodifiedapproachserves–andservessolely–asatooltoidentifytheelementsof

thecrimeofconvictionwhenastatute’sdisjunctivephrasingrendersone(ormore)ofthemopaque.”115Oncetheelementsofthecrimeofconvictionareidentified,thecategoricalapproachisfollowed,i.e.,“theelementsoftheoffenseofconvictionarecomparedwiththeelementsofthestatutoryoffenseandonlyiftheyalignmaytheoffensecount.”116

Inrecentyears,theSupremeCourthasclarifiedtheoperationofthecategoricalandmodifiedcategoricalapproaches.

InDescamps,theSupremeCourtexplainedthat,inthecategoricalapproach,the

comparisonisbetweenthepriorconviction’selementsoftheoffensewiththeelementsofthegenericoffense.Id.2285.Ifthe“relevantstatutehasthesameelementsofthe‘generic’ACCAcrime,thenthepriorconvictioncanserveasanACCApredicate,sotooifthestatutedefinesthecrimemorenarrowly.”117But,a“statecrimecannotqualifyasACCAifitselementsarebroaderthanthoseofalistedgenericoffense.”118

Descampsheldthat“thesentencingcourtsmaynotapplythemodifiedcategorical

approachwhenthecrimeofwhichthedefendantwasconvictedhasasingle,indivisiblesetofelements.”119Inotherwords,thesentencingcourtcannotlookatthedocumentsasdefinedinTaylorinatrialconviction,orthedocumentssetforthinShepardinthecontextofaconvictionuponaplea,inthecategoricalapproach.120Itclarifiedthat“Taylor

113 See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval-Sandoval, 487 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2007) (length of sentence); United States v. Valle-Montalbo, 474 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2007) (fact of conviction); United States v. Zuniga-Chavez, 464 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2006) (fact of conviction).

114 See, e.g., United States v. Pimentel-Flores, 339 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding conviction for “assault in violation of a court order” could not categorically be a crime of violence where the government did not provide statute of conviction).

115 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. 2243 at 2253, citing Descamps, 133 S. Ct. 2276 at 2285.

116 United States v. Faust, No. 14-2292, 2017 WL 1244844, at *7 (1st Cir. Apr. 5, 2017).

117Taylor,495U.S.at599.

118Mathis,at2251.

119 Descamps,133S.Ct.2276at2282. 120 See United States v. Hinkle, 832 F.3d 569, 574–75 (5th Cir. 2016), and United States v. Tanksley, 848 F.3d

347 (5th Cir. 2017).


22

recognizeda‘narrowrangeofcases’inwhichsentencingcourts—applyingwhatwewouldlaterdubthe‘modifiedcategoricalapproach’—maylookbeyondthestatutoryelementsto‘thechargingpaperandjuryinstructions’usedinacase.”121

InMathis,theCourtheldthatwhenthepredicateconvictionstatuteenumeratesfactualmeansofcommittingasingleelementofanoffense,thosealternativefactualmeansarenotelementsoftheoffense.Thesentencingcourtcannotusethemodifiedcategoricalapproachwhenthestatuteofconvictionisindivisible122,i.e.,itcannotlookbeyondthefactofconvictiontoestablishthedefendant’sconductintheprioroffense.Therefore,the“firsttaskforasentencingcourtfacedwithanalternativelyphrasedstatuteisthustodeterminewhetheritslisteditemsareelementsormeans.”123TheCourtwentfurtherandidentifiedaidstobeusedtodetermineifastatuteenumeratesalternativeelementsorfactualmeans.Specifically,theCourtexplainedthat,inmakingthisdetermination,thesentencingcourtmayexaminestatesupremecourtopinions,reviewthestatutetodeterminewhetheritprovidesdifferentpunishmentsforeachalternative124andexamineany“illustrativeexamples”providedinthestatute.Additionally,ifthe“statelawfailstoprovideclearanswers,”thesentencingcourtmaytakea“peekattherecorddocuments”todetermineifthe“listeditemsareelementsoftheoffense.”125

V. DEPARTURES(CHAPTERFOUR,PARTA) Upwardanddownwarddeparturesareencouragedwherethedefendant’scriminalhistoryoverstatesorunderstatestheseriousnessofadefendant’scriminalrecordorthelikelihoodofrecidivism.Therearesomelimitationsontheavailabilityofthedeparture,particularlyforcareerandsexoffenders.

A. UpwardDepartures Anupwarddeparturemaybewarrantedif“reliableinformationindicatesthatthecriminalhistorycategorysubstantiallyunder‐representstheseriousnessofthedefendant’scriminalhistoryorthelikelihoodthatthedefendantwillcommitothercrimes.”126

121 Descamps,at2283–84.

122 See United States v. Titties, No. 15-6236, 2017 WL 1102867, (10th Cir. Mar. 24, 2017). 123 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. 2243 at 2256.

124 See United States v. Dozier, 848 F.3d 180, 187 (4th Cir. 2017).

125 Mathis, at 2256.

126 USSG§4A1.3(a)(1)(emphasisadded).


23

1. BasisforUpwardDeparture

Factorsconsideredinimposinganupwarddeparturearesetforthinsubdivisions(A)

through(E)of§4A1.3(a)(2)andincludethefollowing:

a. Priorsentencenotusedincriminalhistoryscore Thecourtmayrelyonasentencenotusedincomputingcriminalhistory,suchastribalorforeignconvictions.127

b. Priorsentencesubstantiallylongerthanoneyear

Priorsentencesofsubstantiallymorethanoneyearimposedasaresultofindependentcrimescommittedondifferentoccasionsmayformthebasisforanupwarddeparture.

c. Similarmisconductestablishedbyanalternativeproceeding

Priormisconductadjudicatedinacivilproceedingorbyafailuretocomplywithanadministrativeorderthatissimilartotheinstantoffense.128

d. Whetherthedefendantwaspendingtrialorsentencing

Thecourtmayconsiderwhetherthedefendantwaspendingtrialorsentencingonanotherchargeatthetimeoftheinstantoffense.129

127 SeeUnitedStatesv.Lente,759F.3d1149(10thCir.2014).

128 SeeUnitedStatesv.Beltramea,785F.3d287(8thCir.2015).

129 United States v. Hernandez, 896 F.2d 642, (1st Cir. 1990).


24

e. Priorsimilarconductnotresultinginacriminalconviction

Similaradultconductnotresultinginconvictionmayberelieduponforanupwarddeparture.130Notethattheoffense(s)mustbesimilar,131andsignificant.132

2. OtherConsiderations

a. Natureofpriorconviction

Thenature,ratherthanthenumber,ofpriorconvictionsismoreindicativeoftheseriousnessofadefendant’scriminalrecord.133

b. Previouslenienttreatment

Thecourtmayalsodepartbecausethedefendantpreviouslyreceived“extremeleniency”foraseriousoffense.134

c. Relevantconduct

Thecourtcannotrelyonapriorconvictionasthebasisforadeparturebecausethecriminalhistorycategorydoesnotadequatelyreflecttheseriousnessofthepastcriminalconduct,ifthecourtpreviouslydeterminedthattheconductunderlyingthatconvictionisrelevantconducttotheinstantoffenseandconsidersitincalculatingtheoffenselevel.135 130 SeeUnitedStatesv.Bolt,782F.3d388(8thCir.2015);UnitedStatesv.Luna‐Trujillo,868F.2d122(5thCir.1989);UnitedStatesv.Hefferon,314F.3d211(5thCir.2002).

131 UnitedStatesv.Leake,908F.2d550(9thCir.1990);UnitedStatesv.Allen,488F.3d1244(10thCir.2007)(post‐Bookerreversalofdeparturebasedonuncharged,unrelatedmisconduct).

132 UnitedStatesv.Martinez‐Perez,916F.2d1020(5thCir.1990)(departurenotjustifiedbyremotemisdemeanorconviction).

133 USSG§4A1.3,comment.(n.2(B)).See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Carillo‐Alvarez,3F.3d316(9thCir.1993)(reversingupwarddeparturewherecriminalhistorynotegregious).

134 Id.§4A1.3,comment.(backg’d.).SeeUnitedStatesv.Delgado‐Nunez,295F.3d494(5thCir.2002).

135 UnitedStatesv.Cade,279F.3d265(5thCir.2002);UnitedStatesv.Hunerlach,258F.3d1282(11thCir.2001).


25

d. Priorarrestswithoutconviction

Thecourtcannotdepartbasedonapriorarrestrecorditself.136

e. Categoricalapproach InUnitedStatesv.Gutierrez‐Hernandez,137thedistrictcourtdepartedabovetheguidelinerangebecauseamisdemeanorstatefirearmconvictioncouldhavebeenprosecutedasamoreseriousfederalfelony,andthepolicereportsuggestedthatadrugconvictionwasatraffickingoffenseeventhoughthecategoricalapproachprohibitedtreatingitassuch.TheFifthCircuitreversed,holdingfirstthatthecourtcouldnotadjusttheoffenselevelbaseduponahypotheticalfederalcrime.Second,thecourtcouldnotescapetherequirementofthecategoricalapproachbyrelyingonapolicereporttodepartbecausetheenhancementshouldhaveapplied.

B. DownwardDepartures Adownwarddeparturemaybewarrantedwhere“reliableinformationindicatesthatthecriminalhistorycategorysubstantiallyoverrepresentstheseriousnessofthedefendant’scriminalhistoryorthelikelihoodthatthedefendantwillcommitothercrimes.”138

1. LowerLimit

AdeparturebelowthelowerlimitoftheapplicableguidelinerangeforCriminalHistoryCategoryIisprohibited.139

136 USSG§4A1.3(a)(3).SeeWilliamsv.UnitedStates,503U.S.193(1992);UnitedStatesv.Jones,444F.3d430(5thCir.2006)(cannotdepartbasedonarrest,buterrorharmless).

137 581F.3d251(5thCir.2009).

138 USSG§4A1.3(b)(1)(emphasisadded).See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Shoupe,988F.2d440(3dCir.1993);UnitedStatesv.Lacy,99F.Supp.2d108(D.Mass.2000);UnitedStatesv.Santos,406F.Supp.2d320(S.D.N.Y.2005)(criminalconvictionsunnecessarilycountedtwice);UnitedStatesv.Frappier,377F.Supp.2d220(D.Me.2005);UnitedStatesv.Swan,327F.Supp.2d1068(D.Neb.2004).

139 USSG§4A1.3(b)(2)(A).


26

2. LimitationforCareerOffenders

Adownwarddepartureunder§4A1.3foracareeroffendermaynotexceedone

criminalhistorycategory.140

3. ProhibitionsforCertainRepeatOffenders

Downwarddeparturesforoverrepresentationofcriminalhistoryareprohibitedfordefendantswhoarearmedcareercriminalsunder§4B1.4orwhoarerepeatanddangeroussexoffendersagainstminorswithinthemeaningof§4B1.5.141

C. Departures:ProceduralConcerns Thecriminalhistorydeparturesareprocedurallyregulatedaswell.Inconsideringanupwarddeparturebasedoninadequacyofthecriminalhistory,thecourtisinstructedtouse“asareference,thecriminalhistorycategoryapplicabletodefendantswhosecriminalhistoryorlikelihoodtorecidivatemostcloselyresemblesthedefendant’s.”142Ifadefendantisalreadyatthehighestcriminalhistorycategory,thecourtshouldmoveincrementallyalongtheoffenselevels.143Courtshadheldthatthesentencingcourtmustconsideradjacentcategories,determineontherecordwhethereachcategoryisinadequate,andprovidereasonsforthesefindings.144Thesamefindingsshouldbemadefordownwarddepartures.145

Inapost‐Bookerworld,strictcompliancewiththisproceduremaynolongerberequired.146TheSixthCircuitreviewscriminalhistorydeparturesundertheGallv.UnitedStates147frameworkforbothproceduralandsubstantivereasonableness.148

140 Id.§4A1.3(b)(3)(A).

141 Id.§4A1.3(b)(2)(B).

142 Id.§4A1.3(a)(4)(A).

143 Id.§4A1.3(a)(4)(B).SeealsoUnitedStatesv.Pennington,9F.3d1116(5thCir.1993).

144 UnitedStatesv.Lambert,984F.2d658(5thCir.1993)(enbanc).SeealsoUSSG§4A1.3(c)(1).

145 USSG§4A1.3(c)(2).

146 SeeUnitedStatesv.Colon,474F.3d95(3dCir.2007);UnitedStatesv.Zuniga‐Peralta,442F.3d345(5thCir.2005).

147 552U.S.38(2007).

148 UnitedStatesv.Tate,516F.3d459(6thCir.2008).

criminal history primer - home | united states … because such sentence was counted as a single...

Documents