crimpro search and seizure

1. INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARRESTPeople vs. Chua Ho San [GR 128222, 17 June 1999] - ANNEFacts:

In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Jim Lagasca Cid, as Chief of Police of the Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers.

While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted, which looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores.

Cid and 6 of his men led by his Chief Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua, proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao beach, conferred with Almoite, and observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger.

When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried what appeared a multicolored strawbag, and walked towards the road.

By this time, Almoite, Cid and Badua, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms, became suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing the approaching officers. Badua, prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to his right arm.

Although Cid introduced themselves as police officers, the man appeared impassive. Speaking in English, then in Tagalog, and later in Ilocano, Cid then requested the man to

open his bag, but he seemed not to understand. Cid then resorted to "sign language," motioning with his hands for the man to open the bag. The man apparently understood and acceded to the request.

A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. As Cid wished to proceed to the police station, he signaled the man to follow, but the latter did not comprehend.

Hence, Cid placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and escorted the latter to the police headquarters. At the police station, Cid then "recited and informed the man of his constitutional rights" to remain silent, to have the assistance of a counsel, etc.

In the meantime, Badua opened the bag and counted 29 plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances.

The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan, finally arrived, through whom the man was "apprised of his constitutional rights." When the policemen asked the man several questions, he retreated to his obstinate reticence and merely showed his ID with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon. Chua's bag and its contents were sent to the PNP

SEARCH AND SEIZURE Up to BAIL

Crime Laboratory at Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for laboratory examination.

In the meantime, Chua was detained at the Bacnotan Police Station. Later, Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid (wife of

Cid), conducted a laboratory examination of 29 plastic packets, she stated that her qualitative examination established the contents of the plastic packets, to be positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

Chua was initially charged with illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC (Criminal Case 4037).

However, pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, La Union, the information was subsequently amended to allege that Chua was in violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425 as amended by RA 7659 (illegal transport of a regulated drug).

At his arraignment on 31 July 1995, where the amended complaint was read to him by a Fukien-speaking interpreter, Chua entered a plea of not guilty.

Trial finally ensued, with interpreters assigned to Chua (upon the RTC's direct request to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines, after its failure to acquire one from the Department of Foreign Affairs).

DEFENSE: Chua, claiming that the bags belong to his employer Cho Chu Rong, who he accompanied in the speedboat; that they decided to dock when they were low on fuel and telephone battery; that the police, with nary any spoken word but only gestures and hand movements, escorted him to the precinct where he was handcuffed and tied to a chair; that the police, led by an officer, arrived with the motor engine of the speedboat and a bag, which they presented to him; that the police inspected opened the bag, weighed the contents, then proclaimed them as methamphetamine hydrochloride.RTC: convicted ChuaChua prays for the reversal of the RTC decision and his acquittal before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chua’s illegal entry into the Philippines, Chua’s suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, constitute "probable cause."Held: No. Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of home and person. It explicitly ordains that people have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and


effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. Inseparable, and not merely corollary or incidental to said right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is the exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does not, of course, forestall reasonable searches and seizure. This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence. The Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners. The prosecution and the defense painted extremely divergent versions of the incident, but the Court is certain that Chua was arrested and his bag searched without the benefit of a warrant. There are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of Chua’s participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. The RTC never took the pains of pointing to such facts, but predicated mainly its decision on the finding that "accused was caught red-handed carrying the bagful of shabu when apprehended." In short, there is no probable cause. Persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chua’s illegal entry into the Philippines, Chua’s suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, 20 confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist — accepted by the Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in the case. There was no classified information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in question. Chua was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. To reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest.There was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court as already shown. From all indications, the search was nothing but a fishing expedition. Casting aside the regulated substance as evidence, the same being the fruit of a poisonous tree, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain Chua’s conviction


2. PLAIN VIEWVICENTE DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, [G.R. No. 142295. May 31, 2001] - Leslie

Nature :Petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas appeals via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals[] affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Branch 20, Malolos, and finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P. D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294 (illegal possession of firearms)Facts:

May 1996, the police received a report that accused Vicente del Rosario was in possession of certain firearms without the necessary licenses.

Acting upon the report, P/Sr. Insp. Jerito Adique of the PNP Criminal Investigation Group, inquired from the PNP Firearms and Explosive Division whether or not the report was true.

May 10, 1996, P/Sr. Insp. Edwin C. Roque of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Division issued a certification (Exhibit L) stating that per records in his office, the appellant is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber.

Armed with the said certification, P/Sr. Insp. Adique applied for a search warrant to enable his team to search the house of appellant.

On June 13, 1996, a search warrant was issued by RTC of Quezon City, Branch 217, authorizing the search of the residence of appellant at Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan.

On June 15, 1996, at about 7:00 oclock in the morning, a team led by P/Sr. Insp. Adique went to Norzagaray to serve the warrant.

Before proceeding to the residence of the appellant, the police officers requested Barangay Chairman Rogelio de Silva and Barangay Councilman Aurelio Panteleon to accompany them in the implementation of the warrant.

Upon arrival at the house of appellant, the police officers introduced themselves to the wife of appellant. When the appellant came out, P/Sr. Insp. Adique informed him that they had a search warrant and that they were authorized to search his house.

After appellant gave his permission, the police officers conducted a search of the house. The search yielded the following items. (a) a caliber .45 pistol with Serial No. 703792 with five magazines of caliber .45 (Exhibits B and H) found at the masters bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and two radios (Exhibits C to C-4) found in the room of appellants daughter; and (c) a caliber .22 revolver with Serial No. 48673 (Exhibit F) containing 8 pieces of live ammunition (Exhibit M) found in the kitchen of the house.


http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/may2001/142295.htm#_edn1

When asked about his license to possess the firearms, the appellant failed to produce any. This prompted the police officers to seize the subject firearms.

Petitioner’s defense: Contends that he had a license for the caliber .45 pistol recovered in his bedroom and

that the other items seized during the search including the caliber .22 revolver, were merely planted by the police officers.

Likewise assails the manner in which the search was carried out, claiming that the police officers just barged into his house without asking permission. Furthermore, he claimed that the barangay officials arrived only after the police already had finished the search.

RTC: rendered a judgment of convictionCA: affirmed.. ---- > MR ( denied) Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE/ HELD: First: whether petitioner had a license for the .45 caliber Colt pistol and ammunition

seized in his bedroom; 45 cal. Colt pistol in question was duly licensed.

Second: whether the .22 caliber revolver seized in a drawer at the kitchen of his house, a magazine for 5.56 mm. cal. Armalite rifle and two 2-way radios found in his daughter’s bedroom, were planted by the police or were illegally seized.

22 caliber revolver with Serial No. 48673, that the police raiding team found in a drawer at the kitchen of petitioners house, suffice it to say that the firearm was not mentioned in the search warrant applied for and issued for the search of petitioners house. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such search and seizure becomes unreasonable within the meaning of said constitutional provision.Following requisites for a search warrants validity, the absence of even one will cause its downright nullification:

(1) It must be issued upon probable cause;(2) The probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the

applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath

or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and

persons or things to be seized. Seizure is limited to those items particularly described in a valid search warrant. In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. It was found

as a result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of petitioners house. This firearm, to emphasize, was not mentioned in the search warrant. Hence, the

seizure was illegal.[50] The seizure without the requisite search warrant was in plain violation of the law and the ConstitutioN.

True that as an exception, the police may seize without warrant illegally possessed firearm or any contraband for that matter, inadvertently found in plain



view. However, [t]he seizure of evidence in plain view applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.[52] Specifically, seizure of evidence in plain view is justified when there is:

o (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

o (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;

o (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, ando (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.[53]

Hence, the petitioner rightly rejected the firearm as planted and not belonging to him. The prosecution was not able to prove that the firearm was in the effective possession or control of the petitioner without a license. In illegal possession of firearms, the possessor must know of the existence of the subject firearm in his possession or control.

People v Musa- DeejPlain view doctrine

Facts: On Dec. 13, 1989 Sgt. Ani, a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) officer was given the order to conduct surveillance and test buy marijuana from Mari Musa. On the same day, he bought 10php worth of marijuana and reported back to his superior, T/Sgt. Belarga. The following day, they conducted a buy-bust operation wherein Sgt. Ani will buy 20php worth of Marijuana using marked money. They went to the house of Musa where Sgt. Ani and Musa transacted for the sale. Upon being signalled by Sgt. Ani, T/Sgt. Belarga and two other NARCOM officers went to apprehend Musa. They searched Musa for the 20php marked money that Ani paid, but they could not find it. Musa said that his wife had it. They searched the house and saw a red and white striped plastic bag in the kitchen. They asked Musa what its contents were, but Musa did not answer. They found marijuana inside.

Issue: Whether or not the marijuana found in the plastic bag is admissible in evidence by virtue of the “plain view” doctrine.

Held: No. The plain view doctrine may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of the defendant’s guilt. It is usually applied when a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.




Even if an object is observed in plain view, the doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object if its incriminating nature is not apparent from the plain view.

In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The marijuana inside the bag was therefore not within their plain view when they arrested the appellant to justify the seizure.

Therefore, it is held that under the circumstances of the case, the plain view doctrine does not apply and the marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence.PEOPLE VS ROBERTO SALANGUITGR 133254-55APRIL 19, 2001 - JAN

FACTS: January 27, 1998, Salanguit was convicted by the RTC for possession of 11.14 grams of

shabu (violation of RA 6425)

Dec 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in RTC to search the residence of Salanguit. Presented as witness SPO1 Badua, who testified as poser-buyer and was able to purchase 2.12grams of shabu from Salanguit which was taken from a cabinet inside his room.

Search Warrant was issued for the UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OD SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA

That night, 10 policemen went to the residence of Salanguit but no one opened the door. The police operatives forced the door open and enter the house upon showing the search warrant.

They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it.

After the search, they brought Salanguit to the police station. In his defense, Salanguit testified with his mother-in-law that when they were about leave he house, around 20 civilian men with firearms climed over the gate an entered the premises. When asked for the warrant, a piece of paper inside a folder was waived in front of him but did not have the chance to read it.


ISSUE:

1. WAS THERE A VALID WARRANT CONSIDERING THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED WITH RESPECT TO THE DRUG PARAPHERNALIA? ONLY EVIDENCE PRESENTED ON THE POSSIBLE POSSESSION OF SHABU

2. IS THE RECOVERED MARIJUANA ADMISIBLE AS EVIDENCE AGAINST SALANGUIT ON THE GROUND OF PLAIN VIEW DOCTIRNE?

HELD: 1. Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that a search

warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify its issuance.Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled.

the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence

Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that it was invalid as a whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper if viewed separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect to other articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the authorization relating to the named books, which formed the principal basis of the charge of obscenity. The search for and seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects concerning other articles. . . . In so holding we do not mean to suggest that invalid portions of a warrant will be treated as severable under all circumstances. We recognize the danger that warrants might be obtained which are essentially general in character but as to minor items meet the requirement of particularity, and that wholesale seizures might be made under them, in the expectation that the seizure would in any event be upheld as to the property specified. Such an abuse of the warrant procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.


2. The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure. This case is similar to People. v. Musa in which we declared inadmissible the marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents because the said drugs were contained in a plastic bag which gave no indication of its contents

No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. In this case, the marijuana allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or manner these items were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in accordance with the plain view doctrine, we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld.

PEOPLE vs. MACALABA- Jaycee

3. CONSENTED SEARCH

PEOPLE vs. KAGUI

4. TERRY RULECaballes vs. Court of Appeals [GR 136292, 15 January 2002]- ANNEFacts: About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. VictorinoNoceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes y Taiño. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, but he appeared pale and nervous. With Caballes' consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National


Power Corporation (NAOCOR). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55,244.45.Noceja asked Caballes where the wires came from and Caballes answered that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, Caballes and the vehicle with the highvoltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. DaniloCabale took pictures of Caballes and the jeep loaded with the wires which were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Caballes was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail. Caballes was charged with the crime of theft in an information dated 16 October 1989. During the arraignment, Caballes pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued. On 27 April 1993, Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna rendered judgment, finding Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft. In a resolution dated 9 November 1998, the trial court denied Caballes' motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision on 15 September 1998. Caballes appealed the decision by certiorari.Issue: Whether Caballes’ passive submission to the statement of Sgt. Noceja that the latter "will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive" be considered as waiver on Caballes’ part on warrantless search and seizure.Held: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III thereof. The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right. The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of moving vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured. It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers was not authorized by a search warrant. The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches


without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. Herein, the police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of Caballes' vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It thus cannot be considered a simple routine check.Also, Caballes' vehicle was flagged down because the police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, were unusual and uncommon. The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant. In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Philippine jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in the present case. Further, the evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of Caballes for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When Caballes' vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached Caballes and "told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive." By uttering those words, it cannot be said the police officers were asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of Caballes. For all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon Caballes that they will search his vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty.In addition, in cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive proof. Neither can Caballes' passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless search. Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to sustain Caballes' conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BINAD SY CHUA, accused-appellant.


[G.R. Nos. 136066-67. February 4, 2003]- Leslie

Nature:

Facts:

Accused-appellant BinadSy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal Possession of Drugs in two separate Informations.

SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidentialinformant that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives. The group positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other group acted as their back up.

Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived and parked near the entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.

Accused-appellant

Vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different version of the incident.

Alleged that he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and his son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along McArthur Highway. He stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the store, he noticed a man approaches and examines the inside of his car. When he called the attention of the onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman.

During the course of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to open his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police officer’s companions arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others searched his car.


Thereafter, he was brought to a police station and was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the presence of reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box while pictures were being taken.

LC: acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, yet convicted him for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu.

Hence,thisappeal to the Court.

Issues: (1) Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful; and(2) WON the search of his person and the subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly found on him were conducted in a lawful and valid manner.

Held:

The lower court believed that since the police received information that the accused will distribute illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly and there was no more time to secure a search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a “stop and frisk”.

The trial court confused the concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be arrest before a search can be made—the process cannot be reversed. Accordingly, for this exception to apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant

has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. “Reliable information” alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in

the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.


With regard to the concept of “stop-and frisk”: mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop-and-frisk”. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.

Finally, a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.

A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should also be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.

The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-appellant’s business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending police officers only introduced themselves when they already had custody of accused-appellant.

In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the “stop and frisk” principles is applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant.

Wherefore, accused-appellant BinadSy Chua is hereby Acquitted

5. CHECK POINTS

Valmonte v de Villa- Deej

Checkpoints

Facts:

Atty. Valmonte and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People’s Rights (ULAP) assail the validity of the checkpoints in Valenzuela installed by the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC.) Because of the checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the disposition of the military manning the checkpoints considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups at night or at dawn without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.

One Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer was allegedly gunned down by the members of the NCRDC when he refused to submit himself to the checkpoint. Moreover, he alleges that the


checkpoints give blanket authority to the NCRDC to conduct the searches in violation of the constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the checkpoints of the NCRDC are constitutional.

Held: Yes. The petitioner’s arguments are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as illegal. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. Those searches which are reasonable are not forbidden, and a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

In the case at bar, the checkpoints may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

-------

Obiter: Petitioners (ULAP) had no locus standi, considering that the constitutional right is personal and invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed. Individual petitioners who do not allege that their rights have been infringed are not qualified to bring the action as real parties in interest.

ROMEO POSADAS VS CAGR 89139AUGUST 2, 1990 - JAN

FACTS: Two Integrated National Police (INP) spotted Posadas, a minor, carrying a “buri” bag and

acted suspiciously. Posadas tried to flee when the INPs approached him but was able to stop him.

The INPs checked the buri bag and found several fire arms and ammunitions. In the police station, Posadas failed to show necessary licenses or authority to possess fire arms and ammunitions.

RTC found Posadas guilty of illegal possession of fire arms . CA – affirmed

ISSUE:

1. WAS THERE A VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH?

HELD:


it is clear that an arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it.

At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant.

However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa

o Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.

It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EXALA- jaycee

Facts:

On 2 November 1982, a private jeep driven by accused-appellant Restituto B. Bocalan was topped at a police checkpoint in Cavite City for routine inspection regarding unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items. With Bocalan were his co-accused Jaime P. Fernandez and Rodelio C. Exala. Pfc. Ricardo Galang, a member of the inspection team asked the occupants if there were firearms inside. They answered in the negative. Pfc. Galang then proceeded to inspect the vehicle by beaming a flashlight inside. He noticed a black leather bag with its sides bulging. He asked what it contained but nobody answered. The three accused, Restituto B. Bocalan, Jaime P. Fernandez and Rodelio C. Exala, suddenly became fidgety. Suspicious, Pfc. Galang ordered the bag opened and he saw marijuana inside. At this juncture, the three remained motionless in their seats and appeared petrified with fear. They were brought to the police station that same night for further investigation. The bag was verified by laboratory examination to contain more


than two kilos of Indian hemp otherwise known as marijuana. Thereafter, the three accused were accordingly charged for violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended. After trial, Bocalan was held guilty as principal and sentenced to life imprisonment and the other two were convicted as accomplices and received lighter penalties. Fernandez appealed to the Court of Appeals. Exala did not. Bocalan, whose punishment is reviewable only by this Court, contends that the trial court erred in admitting the bag as evidence against him since it was obtained through a warrantless search.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is correct in his contention that the evidence is inadmissible since it was obtained through a warrantless arrest?

Held:

The issue was never raised in the proceedings in the lower court. Bocalan never objected to the admissibility of the evidence on the ground that the same was obtained in a warrantless search. Consequently, he is deemed to have waived his objection on the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained in the course thereof. In view of such waiver, the court is bound to admit the evidence. But even assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, still appellant’s contention deserves consideration.

There are indeed instances where search and seizure can be affected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest. An illustration would be the “stop-and-seizure” without a warrant at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality of which has already been upheld by this Court. Vehicles are generally allowed to pass through these checkpoints after a routine inspection and answering a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of those manning the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments in the commission of an offense. However, it should not be misunderstood, this doctrine is not intended to do away with the general rule that no person shall be subjected to search of this person, personal effects and belongings or his residence except of virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The case before us is an incident to or an offshoot of a lawful “stop-and-seizure” at a military or police checkpoint.

Their submissive stance after the discovery of the bag of marijuana, as well as the absence of any protest on their part when arrested, not only casts serious doubts on their professed innocence but also confirms their acquiescence to the search. Clearly, there was a waiver of right against the unreasonable search and seizure. The arrest was lawful because it was made upon the discovery of the prohibited drug I their possession. There was no need for a warrant, the arrest was made while a crime was committed. The accused were caught in the act of dispatching in transit or transporting marijuana.

6. MOVING VEHICLE


PEOPLE VS. DEL MUNDO-

People vs Lapitaje [G.R. No. 132042. February 19, 2003]

Facts:

On October 31, 1993, at about 7:30 oclock in the evening, three unmasked armed men barged inside Domingo Colonia’s store. Two of the men pointed firearms at him, one at his forehead, the other at his nape. They introduced themselves as members of the New Peoples Army (NPA) asking for aid. He recognized accused Arnold Bacla-an Lapitaje who used to deliver edible oil to his store and was a customer in his tailoring shop. He saw Arnold go to the kitchen and point a firearm at his wife. The man who pointed a firearm at his nape opened the drawer of the table, took the coins amounting to P1,000.00, and took the contents of his wallet which amounted to around P1,000.00. When his wife shouted for help, neighbors came rushing to their aid, prompting the men to leave hastily. After the three men left, they heard gunfires. He learned that the fleeing robbers shot one of his neighbors, Nelson Saavedra, who was rushed by other bystanders to the nearest hospital. The following morning, a dead person was discovered at Sitio Bakhaw in Barangay Catmondaan, Municipality of Catmon, Cebu. Found in the dead mans belongings were assorted coins and bills amounting to P790.00 wrapped in a small towel, a .38 caliber firearm with two live ammunitions and an empty shell. He recognized the deceased as the person who poked a firearm at his forehead the night before. When asked to identify the persons apprehended and detained in jail in Catmon, he recognized accused Arnold Lapitaje.

Witnesses were presented and both parties gave their testimonies and alibis. Rizalina and Fred Ares, the neighbors who rushed Nelson to the hospital were able to identify the feeling robbers and saw a speeding Hi-Ace van then arrived. Military men donning firearms alighted from the van and approached the taxi. The military men held the driver of the taxi, a man seated in the first seat and another man about to enter the taxi. The three men who were held by the military were recognized by Fred in the courtroom as the accused Romy Baluyos, Wendel Arellano and Arnold Lapitaje. Likewise, SPO2 Calixto Nueza testified that he saw the same and approached the military men, identified himself and the captured robbers were then turned over into his custody. Subsequently, firearms were seized by the police without a search warrant. It was alleged that those were the weapons used in the perpetration of the crime. Oarga and his men turned over to SPO2 Nueza a .22 caliber revolver magnum, five live ammunitions, one empty shell and a hand grenade which was allegedly recovered under the front seat of the taxi much later.

On January 13, 1994, an Information was filed before the trial court against Arnold Bacla-an Lapitaje, Mario Reyes, Wendell Arellano y Tanio and Romy Baluyos y Pingki-an for Robbery with Frustrated Homicide to which they all pleaded not guilty. Despite timely medical attention, victim Nelson Saavedra died by reason of which the Information was amended to Robbery with Homicide.

Accused-appellants were found guilty of Robbery with Homicide by the trial court and were sentenced to death penalty. Thus, the automatic review.

Issue:


1.Whether or not the trial court erred in in finding that appellants Wendel Arellano and Romy Baluyos were in cahoots with the other appellant Arnold Lapitaje and Mario Reyes in the perpetration of the crime despite the existence of exculpatory evidence warranting the acquittal of the first duo.

2. Whether or not the trial court erred in relying on the vulnerability of the defense evidence rather than on the strength of the prosecution evidence.

3. Whether or not the trial court erred in not finding that the arrest of all appellants were illegal and the subsequent alleged recovery of incriminatory evidence presented against the latter was a product of a poisonous tree, hence inadmissible in evidence.

Held:

1. Yes. Wendel Arellano and Romy Baluyos’s guilt not having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, they are absolved from liability; and, that the judgment convicting Arnold Lapitaje and Mario Reyes is affirmed with the modification that the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed upon them in the absence of any aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime charged.

The well-settled rule is that the trial courts findings on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are accorded great weight and respect, in the absence of any clear showing that some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could have affected the result of the case have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied

2. Yes. By the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Fred Ares and SPO2 Nueza, it is established that Arnold was arrested by Lt. Col. Oarga. However, it must be stated that the warrantless arrest of appellant Arnold together with Wendel and Romy was not lawful. Oarga testified that he caused the arrest of four men running towards the taxi since they were acting suspiciously. However, Oarga did not elaborate why he thought said men were acting suspiciously.

None of the aforesaid circumstances in Rul2 113 were attendant in the case at bar. The four men were not prisoners who had just escaped from a penal establishment. Oarga did not testify that the four men he had seen running towards the taxi have earlier committed or were actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in his presence.

3. Yes. The firearm and live ammunition taken from the taxi during the search, cannot be admitted in evidence against appellants because they were seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful.

The above notwithstanding, the trial court did not err in finding both appellants Arnold Lapitaje and Mario Reyes to be the perpetrators of the crime of robbery. Despite the inadmissibility of the guns and ammunitions, both appellants were positively identified by the prosecution witnesses.

Consequently, appellants Arnold Lapitaje and Mario Reyes should have been found guilty only of the simple crime of Robbery under paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code which prescribes a penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period ranging from four years, two months and 1 day up to ten years.


Accused-appellants Arnold Bacla-an Lapitaje and Mario Reyes are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the simple crime of Robbery, and Wendel Arellano and Romy Baluyos are acquitted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. LIBNAO

[G.R. No. 136860. January 20, 2003]- LESLIE

Nature:

Appealfrom the Decision Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac City, finding appellant AgpangaLibnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga guilty of violating Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.[1] For their conviction, each was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos.

Facts:

On August 1996, intelligence operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers in the area.

They learned from their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a month in big bulks.

On 19 October 1996, at about 10 p.m., Chief Inspector Benjamin Arceo, Tarlac Police Chief, held a briefing in connection with a tip which his office received that the two drug pushers, riding in a tricycle, would be making a delivery that night.

An hour later, the Police Alert Team installed a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan to apprehend the suspects.

.At about 1:00 a.m. of the following day, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle. It had two female passengers seated inside, who were later identified as AgpangaLibnao and Rosita Nunga.

In front of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the two’s uneasy behavior when asked about its ownership and content, the officers invited them to Kabayan Center 2 located at the same barangay.

They brought with them the black bag. Upon reaching the center, PO3 Ferrer fetched Barangay Captain Roy Pascual to witness the opening of the black bag. In the meantime, the two women and the bag were turned over to the investigator on duty, SPO3 Arthur Antonio.

As soon as the barangay captain arrived, the black bag was opened in the presence of Libnao, Nunga, and personnel of the center.

Found inside it were 8 bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered with newspaper. The leaves were suspected to be marijuana.

To determine who owns the bag and its contents, SPO3 Antonio interrogated the two.


http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/136860.htm#_ftn1

Nunga stated that it was owned by Libnao. The latter, in turn, disputed this allegation. Thereafter, they were made to sign a confiscation receipt without the assistance of any counsel, as they were not informed of their right to have one.

During the course of the investigation, not even close relatives of theirs were present. The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San Fernando, Pampanga on 23 October 1996.

Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babu conducted a laboratory examination on them. She concluded that the articles were marijuana leaves weighing eight kilos.

Libnao and Nunga were charged for violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.

RTC: Found Libnao and Nunga guilty. For their conviction, each was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos.

Libnao appealed.ISSUE: Whether the warrantless search and seizure made upon Libnao and Nunga was reasonable.

HELD: The constitutional guarantee (in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution) is not a

blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates only against "unreasonable" searches and seizures. Searches and seizures are as a rule unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest.

Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between persons and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants and warrants of arrest.

Be that as it may, the requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is not absolute. There are certain familiar exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to search of moving vehicles.

Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection.

When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains as item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.

The warrantless search herein is not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance operation for three months in the


area. The surveillance yielded the information that once a month, Libnao and Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm of 19 October 1996, the police received a tip that the two will be transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle.

Surely, the two were intercepted three hours later, riding a tricycle and carrying a suspicious-looking black bag, which possibly contained the drugs in bulk. When they were asked who owned it and what its content was, both became uneasy.

Under these circumstances, the warrantless search and seizure of Libnao’s bag was not illegal. It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing a criminal offense. She was making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under the Rules of Court, one of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto

7. AIRPORT SEARCH

People v Canton- Deej

Airport Search

Facts: Susan Canton was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, being a passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. She passed through a metal detector booth and it beeped. The frisker on duty frisked and searched Canton and felt something bulging from her abdominal area. Canton was then brought to a comfort room for a thorough physical examination.

In the examination, it was found out that Canton was carrying packages of shabu.

Issue: whether or not airport searches are valid.

Held: Yes.

RA 6235 "Sec. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among others the following condition printed thereon: 'holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials of substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft' which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier." This constitutes another exception against warrantless searches and seizures.

Issue: Whether or not the search is incidental to a lawful arrest.


Held: No.

Susan's arrest did not precede the search. When the metal detector alarmed, the lady frisker made a pat down search on Susan and felt the bulge. The strip search was for the purpose of ascertaining the packages in Susan's body. If ever Susan was deprived of will and liberty, the same did not amount to an arrest. Prior to the strip search, the airport security personnel had no knowledge yet of what were hidden in Susan's body. Hence, there was no knowledge whether a crime was being committed. Only after the strip was it discovered she was carrying shabu and she was then arrested. The search cannot be said to have been done incidental to a lawful arrest. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that the arrest be made first before the search. The process cannot be reversed.

8. REMEDY AGAINST IMPROPER ISSUANCE AND ENFOCEMENTALIH vs. CASTRO- JAN

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ALICANDO- JAYCEEFacts:

In the afternoon of 12 June 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father of the four year old victim Khazie Mae, was drinking liquor with Ramil Rodriguez and Remus Gaddi in his house at Barangay Rizal, Zone 1, PuloBala, Iloilo. ArnelAlicando y Briones joined them but every now and then would take leave and return. Alicando was living in his uncle's house some 5 arm's length from Penecilla's house. At about 4:30 p.m., Penecilla's group stopped drinking and left. At about 5:30 p.m. of that day, Luisa Rebada saw the victim at the window of Alicando's house. She offered to buy her "yemas" but Alicando closed the window. Soon she heard the victim crying. She approached Alicando's house and peeped through an opening between its floor and door. She saw Alicando naked, on top of the victim, his left hand choking her neck. She retreated to her house in fright. She gathered her children together and informed her compadre, Ricardo Lagrana, then in her house, about what she saw. Lagrana was also overcome with fear and hastily left. Romeo Penecilla returned to his house at 8:00 p.m.. He did not find Khazie Mae. He and his wife searched for her until 1:00 a.m. Their effort was fruitless. Rebada was aware that the Penecillas were looking for their daughter but did not tell them what she knew. Instead, Rebada called out Alicando from her window and asked him the time Khazie Mae left his house. Alicando replied he was drunk and did not know. As the sun started to rise, another neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago went down from his house to answer the call of nature. He discovered the lifeless body of Khazie Mae under his house. Her parents were informed and so was the police. At 9:00 a.m., Rebada suffered a change of heart. She informed Romeo Penecilla and his wife Julie Ann, that Alicando committed the crime. Forthwith, Alicando was arrested and interrogated by P03 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounseled verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from Alicando's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair


of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt. Alicando was charged with the crime of rape with homicide. On 29 June 1994, Alicando was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO, Department of Justice. Alicando pleaded guilty. After Alicando's plea of guilt, the trial court ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. It also set the case for reception of evidence for Alicando, if he so desired. On 20 July 1994, the trial court found Alicando guilty and sentenced him to death, and to indemnify the heirs of the offended party, Khazie Mae D. Penecilla, the sum of P50,000.00. Hence, the automatic review.Issue:

Whether the pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains, evidence derived from the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from Alicando, may be admitted as evidence?Held:

It is now familiar learning that the Constitution has stigmatized as inadmissible evidence uncounselled confession or admission. Section 12 paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution provide that "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel"; and "Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible against him"; respectively. Herein, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense to reduce the all important confession of Alicando in writing. Neither did he present any writing showing that Alicando waived his right to silence and to have competent and independent counsel. It is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence derived therefrom. The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were evidence derived from the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from Alicando. The Court has not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in Philippine jurisdiction. It has also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v. United States. According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence, because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before making a confession under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the burden of the


prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not tainted as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The burden has to be discharged by clear and convincing evidence.

BAIL:DELA CAMARA vs. ENAGE-

Almeda vs. Villaluz [GR L-31665, 6 August 1975]- ANNEFacts:Leonardo Almeda (alias NardongPaa) was charged, together with five others, with the crime of qualified theft of a motor vehicle (criminal case 285-Pasay) in the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, presided by Judge OnofreVillaluz. The amount of the bond recommended for the provisional release of Almeda was P15,000, and this was approved by the judge with a direction that it be posted entirely in cash. At the hearing of 18 February 1970, Almeda asked the trial court to allow him to post a surety bond in lieu of the cash bond required of him. This request was denied, and so was an oral motion for reconsideration, on the ground that the amended information imputed habitual delinquency and recidivism on the part of Almeda. At the same hearing, the city fiscal of Pasay City (Fiscal Gregorio Pineda), thru his assistant, reiterated his oral motion made at a previous hearing for amendment of the information so as to include allegations of recidivism and habitual delinquency in the particular case of Almeda. The latter vigorously objected, arguing that :(a) such an amendment was premature since no copies of prior conviction could yet be presented in court, (b) the motion to amend should have been made in writing in order to enable him to object formally, and (c) the proposed amendment would place him in double jeopardy considering that he had already pleaded not guilty to the information. The trial court nevertheless granted the fiscal's motion in open court. An oral motion for reconsideration was denied. Immediately thereafter, the assistant fiscal took hold of the original information and, then and there, entered his amendment by annotating the same on the back of the document.Almeda forthwith moved for the dismissal of the charge on the ground of double jeopardy, but this motion and a motion for reconsideration were denied in open court. Almeda filed the present special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court.Issue: Whether the insistence of a cash bond, over any other surety, renders the recommended bail excessive.Held:


Bail is "the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance." The purpose of requiring bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial. The accused, as of right, is entitled to bail prior to conviction except when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. This right is guaranteed by the Constitution, and may not be denied even where the accused has previously escaped detention, or by reason of his prior absconding. In order to safeguard the right of an accused to bail, the Constitution further provides that "excessive bail shall not be required." This is logical because the imposition of an unreasonable bail may negate the very right itself. "Where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy." Herein, the amount fixed for bail, while reasonable if considered in terms of surety or property bonds, may be excessive if demanded in the form of cash. A surety or property bond does not require an actual financial outlay on the part of the bondsman or the property owner, and in the case of the bondsman the bond may be obtained by the accused upon the payment of a relatively small premium. Only the reputation or credit standing of the bondsman or the expectancy of the price at which the property can be sold, is placed in the hands of the court to guarantee the production of the body of the accused at the various proceedings leading to his conviction or acquittal. Upon the other hand, the posting of a cash bond would entail a transfer of assets into the possession of the court, and its procurement could work untold hardship on the part of the accused as to have the effect of altogether denying him his constitutional right to bail. Aside from the foregoing, the condition that the accused may have provisional liberty only upon his posting of a cash bond is abhorrent to the nature of bail and transgresses our law on the matter. The sole purpose of bail is to insure the attendance of the accused when required by the court, and there should be no suggestion of penalty on the part of the accused nor revenue on the part of the government.The allowance of a cash bond in lieu of sureties is authorized in this jurisdiction only because our rules expressly provide for it. Were this not the case, the posting of bail by depositing cash with the court cannot be countenanced because, strictly speaking, the very nature of bail presupposes the attendance of sureties to whom the body of the prisoner can be delivered. And even where cash bail is allowed, the option to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to the accused. Thus, the trial court may not reject otherwise acceptable sureties and insists that the accused obtain his provisional liberty only thru a cash bond. The court is not without devices with which to meet the situation, considering that Almeda's past


record that is the range of his career in crime weighs heavily against letting him off easily on a middling amount of bail. First, it could increase the amount of the bail bond to an appropriate level. Second, as part of the power of the court over the person of the accused and for the purpose of discouraging likely commission of other crimes by a notorious defendant while on provisional liberty, the latter could be required, as one of the conditions of his bail bond, to report in person periodically to the court and make an accounting of his movements. And third, the accused might be warned, though this warning is not essential to the requirements of due process, that under the 1973 Constitution "Trial may proceed notwithstanding his absence provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified." With respect to the amount of the bail bond, the trial court is well advised to consider, inter alia, the following factors, where applicable:

(1) the ability of the accused to give bail: (2) the nature of the offense; (3) the penalty for the offense charged; (4) the character and reputation of the accused; (5) the health of the accused; (6) the character and strength of the evidence; (7) the probability of the accused's appearance or non-appearance at the trial; (8) forfeiture of previous bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) whether the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases.

It is not amiss, at this point, to remind all courts to exercise extreme care and caution in the screening of bondsmen and sureties in regard to their reputation, solvency and promptitude. Aside from the other precautions hitherto considered useful, courts should see to it that all surety bonds are accompanied by corresponding clearances from the Office of the Insurance Commissioner. Bondsmen who cannot make good their undertakings render inutile all efforts at making the bail system work in this jurisdiction.*** Mangalindan vs CA (can’t find the case )

JURISDICTION OVER PERSON


crimpro search and seizure

Documents

chief of police

police officers

police assistance

bacnotan police station

police headquarters

police chief inspector

jim lagasca cid

transparent plastic