search and seizure 3.0 (autosaved)

8/17/2019 Search and Seizure 3.0 (Autosaved)

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C.) Jurisprudence

Cases:

Olmstead v. U.S., 227 U.S. 438

(June 4, 128)!a"t, C.J.,

#acts:$%t inv&lved t'e empl&ment &" n&t less t'an "i"t pers&ns, &" t&sea*&in* vessels "&r t'etransp&rtati&n &" li+u&r t& ritis'C&lum-ia, &" smaller vessels "&rc&astise transp&rtati&n t& t'e

State &" as'in*t&n, t'epurc'ase and use &" a ranc'-e&nd t'e su-ur-an limits &" Seattle, it' a lar*e under*r&undcac'e "&r st&ra*e and a num-er&" smaller cac'es in t'at cit, t'emaintenance &" a central &""icemanned it' &perat&rs, t'eempl&ment &" e/ecutives,salesmen, delivermen,

dispatc'ers, sc&uts, -&&00eepers,c&llect&rs and an att&rne.$Olmstead as t'e leadin*c&nspirat&r and t'e *eneralmana*er &" t'e -usiness. emade a c&ntri-uti&n &" 1, t&t'e capital eleven &t'ersc&ntri-uted 1, eac'.$!'e in"&rmati&n 'ic' led t& t'edisc&ver &" t'e c&nspirac and

its nature and e/tent as lar*el&-tained - interceptin*messa*es &n t'e telep'&nes &" t'e c&nspirat&rs - "&ur "ederalpr&'i-iti&n &""icers. Small iresere inserted al&n* t'e &rdinartelep'&ne ires "r&m t'eresidences &" "&ur &" t'epetiti&ners and t'&se leadin* "r&mt'e c'ie" &""ice. !'e inserti&ns

ere made it'&ut trespass up&nan pr&pert &" t'e de"endants.

!'e ere made in t'e -asement&" t'e lar*e &""ice -uildin*.$ t'e de"endants &-5ected t& t'eadmissi&n &" t'e evidence&-tained - iretappin* &n t'e

*r&und t'at t'e 6&vernmentsiretappin* c&nstituted anunreas&na-le searc' and seiurein vi&lati&n &" t'e #&urt'9mendment, and t'at t'e use asevidence &" t'e c&nversati&ns&ver'eard c&mpelled t'ede"endants t& -e itnessesa*ainst t'emselves in vi&lati&n &" t'e #i"t' 9mendment.

%ssue: O t'e use in evidence&" private telep'&nec&nversati&ns, intercepted -means &" iretappin*, vi&latedt'e #&urt' and #i"t'9mendments.

eld:$!'e lan*ua*e &" t'e 9mendment

cann&t -e e/tended ande/panded t& include telep'&neires reac'in* t& t'e '&le &rld"r&m t'e de"endants '&use &r&""ice. !'e intervenin* ires aren&t part &" 'is '&use &r &""ice anm&re t'an are t'e 'i*'as al&n*'ic' t'e are stretc'ed.$!'e c&mm&n la rule must applin t'e case at -ar. &r can e,

it'&ut t'e sancti&n &" c&n*ressi&nal enactment,su-scri-e t& t'e su**esti&n t'att'e c&urts 'ave a discreti&n t&e/clude evidence t'e admissi&n &" 'ic' is n&t unc&nstituti&nal-ecause unet'icall secured. !'is&uld -e at variance it' t'ec&mm&n la d&ctrine *enerallsupp&rted - aut'&rit. !'ere is

n& case t'at sustains, n&r an


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rec&*nied te/t -&&0 t'at *ivesc&l&r t&, suc' a vie.

Justice &lmes, dissent:$% t'in0 it a less evil t'at s&me

criminals s'&uld escape t'an t'att'e 6&vernment s'&uld pla ani*n&-le part.$% 'ave said t'at e are "ree t&c'&&se -eteen t& principles &" p&lic. ut i" e are t& c&n"ine&urselves t& precedent and l&*ic,t'e reas&n "&r e/cludin* evidence&-tained - vi&latin* t'eC&nstituti&n seems t& me l&*icall

t& lead t& e/cludin* evidence&-tained - a crime &" t'e &""icers&" t'e la.$iretappin* is made a crime -t'e la &" t'e State, n&t - t'ela &" t'e United States. %t is truet'at a State cann&t ma0e rules &" evidence "&r C&urts &" t'e UnitedStates, -ut t'e State 'asaut'&rit &ver t'e c&nduct in

+uesti&n, and % 'ardl t'in0 t'att'e United States &uld appear t&*reater advanta*e 'en pain*"&r an &di&us crime a*ainst Statela t'an 'en incitin* t& t'edisre*ard &" its &n

randeis, JJ., dissent:$Clauses *uaranteein* t& t'eindividual pr&tecti&n a*ainstspeci"ic a-uses &" p&er must'ave a similar capacit &" adaptati&n t& a c'an*in* &rld.$;e*islati&n, -&t' statut&r andc&nstituti&nal, is enacted, it istrue, "r&m an e/perience &" evils,-ut its *eneral lan*ua*e s'&uld

n&t, t'ere"&re, -e necessarilc&n"ined t& t'e "&rm t'at evil 'ad

t'eret&"&re ta0en. !ime &r0sc'an*es, -rin*s int& e/istencene c&nditi&ns and purp&ses.$'en t'e #&urt' and #i"t'9mendments ere ad&pted,


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0n&led*e, s&u*'t, t'r&u*' t'e>epartment &" Justice, t& availitsel" &" t'e "ruits &" t'ese acts in&rder t& acc&mplis' its &n ends,it assumed m&ral resp&nsi-ilit

"&r t'e &""icers crimes$Crime is c&nta*i&us. %" t'e6&vernment -ec&mes ala-rea0er, it -reeds c&ntempt"&r la it invites ever man t&-ec&me a la unt& 'imsel" itinvites anarc'. !& declare t'at,in t'e administrati&n &" t'ecriminal la, t'e end 5usti"ies t'emeans $$ t& declare t'at t'e

6&vernment ma c&mmit crimesin &rder t& secure t'e c&nvicti&n&" a private criminal $$ &uld-rin* terri-le retri-uti&n. 9*ainstt'at pernici&us d&ctrine t'is C&urts'&uld res&lutel set its "ace

6&ldman vs. U.S., 31? U.S. 2(9pril 27, 142)

@&-erts, J.,

#9C!S:$!'e petiti&ners and an&t'er ereindicted "&r c&nspirac t& vi&lateA 2(-)(B) &" t'e an0ruptc 9ct- receivin*, &r attemptin* t&&-tain, m&ne "&r actin* &r"&r-earin* t& act in a -an0ruptcpr&ceedin*. !'e ere c&nvicted

and sentenced, and t'e 5ud*ments ere a""irmed - t'eCircuit C&urt &" 9ppeals$6&ldman pr&p&sed t'at &""man,att&rne &" assi*nee, sell t'eassets in -ul0 "&r an &stensi-leprice 'ic' &uld net t'ecredit&rs a certain dividend, -utin "act at a secret *reater price,and t'at &""man and t'e

petiti&ners s'&uld divide t'edi""erence -eteen t'em.

&ever, t'e latter re"used. One&" t'e petiti&ners, "iled a petiti&n"&r -an0ruptc -ut pr&p&seda*ain t& &""man t'at i" t'e lattera*rees t& t'e arran*ement, it

&uld -e dismissed. &""manc&nsulted a "ederal investi*at&r'ic' advised t'e "&rmer t&c&ntinue t'e ne*&tiati&ns.$=eantime, t& "ederal a*ents,it' t'e assistance &" t'e -uildin*superintendent, &-tained accessat ni*'t t& S'ulmans &""ice andt& t'e ad5&inin* &ne and installeda listenin* apparatus in a small

aperture in t'e partiti&n all it'a ire t& -e attac'ed t&earp'&nes e/tendin* int& t'ead5&inin* &""ice. !'is as "&r t'epurp&se &" &ver'earin* ac&n"erence it' &""man set "&rt'e "&ll&in* a"tern&&n. 9detectap'&ne as t'en installedt& ampli" t'e e""ect, t'en t'esten&*rap'er transcri-ed t'e

c&nversati&ns includin* telep'&ne&nes.$9t t'e preliminar 'earin* and att'e trial, c&unsel "&r petiti&nersdemanded t'at t'e -e permittedt& inspect t'e n&tes andmem&randa made - t'e a*entsdurin* t'e investi*ati&n, t'ea*ents 'avin* admitted t'e 'adre"res'ed t'eir rec&llecti&n "r&m

t'ese papers pri&r t& testi"in*.!'e trial 5ud*e ruled t'at t'epapers need n&t -e e/'i-ited -t'e itnesses.

%SSU: O t'e &ver'eardtelep'&ne c&nversati&ns ereadmissi-le as evidenceD

;>:

$Ees. 'at is pr&tected is t'emessa*e itsel" t'r&u*'&ut t'e


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c&urse &" its transmissi&n - t'einstrumentalit &r a*enc &" transmissi&n. &rds ritten - apers&n and intended ultimatel t&-e carried as s& ritten t& a

tele*rap' &""ice d& n&t c&nstitutea c&mmunicati&n it'in t'e terms&" t'e 9ct until t'e are 'andedt& an a*ent &" t'e tele*rap'c&mpan. &rds sp&0en in ar&&m in t'e presence &" an&t'erint& a telep'&ne receiver d& n&tc&nstitute a c&mmunicati&n -ire it'in t'e meanin* &" t'esecti&n.

$9s 'as ri*'tl -een 'eld, t'is&rd indicates t'e ta0in* &rseiure - t'e a &r -e"&rearrival at t'e destined place. %td&es n&t &rdinaril c&nn&te t'e&-tainin* &" 'at is t& -e sent-e"&re, &r at t'e m&ment, itleaves t'e p&ssessi&n &" t'epr&p&sed sender, &r a"ter, &r att'e m&ment, it c&mes int& t'e

p&ssessi&n &" t'e intendedreceiver. !'e listenin* in t'e ne/tr&&m t& t'e &rds &" S'ulman as'e tal0ed int& t'e telep'&nereceiver as n& m&re t'eintercepti&n &" a irec&mmunicati&n it'in t'emeanin* &" t'e 9ct t'an &uld'ave -een t'e &ver'earin* &" t'ec&nversati&n - &ne sittin* in t'e

same r&&m.$ t'e relati&n -eteen t'etrespass and t'e use &" t'edetectap'&ne as t'at &" antecedent and c&nse+uent. &t'c&urts -el& 'ave "&und t'at t'etrespass did n&t aid materiall int'e use &" t'e detectap'&ne.Since e accept t'ese c&ncurrent"indin*s, e need n&t c&nsider a

c&ntenti&n -ased &n a denial &" t'eir verit

$!'e ar*ue t'at t'e case ma -edistin*uis'ed. !'e su**ested*r&und &" distincti&n is t'att'e Olmstead case dealt it' t'etappin* &" telep'&ne ires, and

t'e c&urt adverted t& t'e "actt'at, in usin* a telep'&ne, t'espea0er pr&5ects 'is v&ice -e&ndt'e c&n"ines &" 'is '&me &r &""ice,and t'ere"&re assumes t'e ris0t'at 'is messa*e ma -eintercepted. %t is ur*ed t'at'ere, as in t'e present case,&ne tal0s in 'is &n &""ice, andintends 'is c&nversati&n t& -e

c&n"ined it'in t'e "&ur alls &" t'e r&&m, 'e d&es n&t intend 'isv&ice s'all *& -e&nd t'&se alls,and it is n&t t& -e assumed 'eta0es t'e ris0 &" s&me&nes use &" a delicate detect&r in t'e ne/tr&&m. e t'in0, '&ever, t'edistincti&n is t&& nice "&r practicalapplicati&n &" t'e C&nstituti&nal*uarantee, and n& reas&na-le &r

l&*ical distincti&n can -e dran-eteen 'at "ederal a*ents didin t'e present case and state&""icers did in t'e Olmstead case.

6ris&rld vs. C&nnecticut, (June7, 1?B)

>&u*las, J.,

#9C!S:$9ppellant 6ris&ld is /ecutive>irect&r &" t'e FlannedFarent'&&d ;ea*ue &" C&nnecticut. 9ppellant u/t&n is alicensed p'sician and a pr&"ess&rat t'e Eale =edical Sc'&&l.$9ppellant 6ris&ld, /ecutive

>irect&r &" t'e FlannedFarent'&&d ;ea*ue &" C&nnecticut


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and 9ppellant u/t&n, a licensedp'sician '& served as =edical>irect&r "&r t'e ;ea*ue at itsCenter in e aven, erearrested and c'ar*ed it' *ivin*

in"&rmati&n, instructi&n, andmedical advice t& married pers&ns&n means &" preventin*c&ncepti&n. 9ppellants ere"&und *uilt as access&ries and"ined 1 eac'. 9ppellantsappealed &n t'e t'e&r t'at t'eaccess&r statute as appliedvi&lated t'e 14t' 9mendment t&t'e United States C&nstituti&n.

9ppellants claimed standin*-ased &n t'eir pr&"essi&nalrelati&ns'ip it' t'e marriedpe&ple t'e advised."Any person who uses any drug,medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventingconception shall be fined not lessthan fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more

than one year or be both fined and imprisoned."

%SSU: O t'e ri*'t &" privacas vi&latedD

;>:$Ees. Suc' a la cann&t stand in

li*'t &" t'e "amiliar principle, s&&"ten applied - t'is C&urt, t'at a


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$!'e resp&ndent Fe&ple ar*uet'at an e/tensi&n telep'&ne isem-raced and c&vered - t'eterm :“Section 1. t shall be unlawful for any person, not being authori!ed by all the parties to any private

communication or spoen word,to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoenword by using a device commonly nown as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walie#talie or tape#recorder$%

$'et'er &r n&t listenin* &ver atelep'&ne part line &uld -epunis'a-le as discussed &n t'e"l&&r &" t'e Senate. Eet, 'en t'e-ill as "inalied int& a statute, n&menti&n as made &" telep'&nesin t'e enumerati&n &" devices


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m&st p&pularl 0n&nc&mmunicati&n device.

$9n e/tensi&n telep'&ne is aninstrument 'ic' is ver c&mm&n

especiall n& 'en t'e e/tendedunit d&es n&t 'ave t& -ec&nnected - ire t& t'e maintelep'&ne -ut can -e m&ved "r&mplace t& place it'in a radius &" a 0il&meter &r m&re. 9 pers&ns'&uld sa"el presume t'at t'epart 'e is callin* at t'e &t'erend &" t'e line pr&-a-l 'as ane/tensi&n telep'&ne and 'e runs

t'e ris0 &" a t'ird part listenin*as in t'e case &" a part line or atelephone unit 'ic' s'ares itsline it' an&t'er$9 perusal &" t'e SenateC&n*ressi&nal @ec&rds ill s'&t'at n&t &nl did &ur lama0ersn&t c&ntemplate t'e inclusi&n &" an e/tensi&n telep'&ne as apr&'i-ited device &r arran*ement<

-ut &" *reater imp&rtance, t'eere m&re c&ncerned it'penaliin* t'e act &" rec&rdin*t'an t'e act &" merel listenin* t&a telep'&ne c&nversati&n.

=&r"e vs =utuc (Januar 31,1?8)#ernand&, J.,

#9C!S:$C&n*ress in 1? enacted t'e9nti$6ra"t and C&rrupt Fractices9ct 1 t& deter pu-lic &""icials andempl&ees "r&m c&mmittin* acts&" dis'&nest and impr&ve t'et&ne &" m&ralit in pu-lic service$!'e pr&visi&n as c'allen*ed "&r-ein* vi&lative &" due pr&cess asan &ppressive e/ercise &" p&lice

p&er and as an unla"ulinvasi&n &" t'e c&nstituti&nal ri*'t

t& privac, implicit in t'e -ana*ainst unreas&na-le searc' andseiure c&nstrued t&*et'er it't'e pr&'i-iti&n a*ainst sel"$incriminati&n.

Iand it'in t'e m&nt' &" Januar&" ever &t'er ear t'erea"ter


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relati&ns'ip suc' a re+uirementp&ssesses it' t'e &-5ective &" avalid statute *&es ver "ar inprecludin* assent t& an &-5ecti&n&" suc' c'aracter.

$!'is is n&t t& sa t'at a pu-lic&""icer, - virtue &" a p&siti&n 'e'&lds, is -ere"t &" c&nstituti&nalpr&tecti&n it is &nl t& emp'asiet'at in su-5ectin* 'im t& suc' a"urt'er c&mpuls&r revelati&n &" 'is assets and lia-ilities, includin*t'e statement &" t'e am&unts ands&urces &" inc&me, t'e am&unts

&" pers&nal and "amil e/penses,and t'e am&unt &" inc&me ta/espaid "&r t'e ne/t precedin*calendar ear, t'ere is n&unc&nstituti&nal intrusi&n int&'at &t'erise &uld -e a privatesp'ere.$'o. 'othing can be clearer than that (.A. )*1+ was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimi!ing theopportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the

public service. t is intended to further promote morality in public administration. A public office must indeed be a public trust. 'obody cancavil at its obective- the goal to be

pursued commands the assent of all.he conditions then prevailing called for norms of such character. he timesdemanded such a remedial device. nthe absence of a factual foundation, the

presumption of a statute/s validity must prevail over mere pleadings and stipulation of facts 0rmita#2alate 3otel,et. al. v. 2ayor of 2anila4. 5hile in theattainment of attainment of such public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is permissible, there must be ashowing, clear, categorical, and undeniable that what the 6onstitutioncondemns, the statute allows. 5hile thesoundness of the assertion that a public office is a public trust and as such not

amounting to property in its usual sensecannot be denied, there can be no

disputing the proposition that from thestandpoint of the security of tenureguaranteed by the 6onstitution themantle of protection afforded by due

process could rightfully be invoed 7

Ople vs !&rres (Jul 23, 18)Fun&, C.J.,

#9C!S:$Fetiti&ner Senat&r las #. Opleassailed t'e c&nstituti&nalit &" t'e 9dministrative Order &. 38entitled I9d&pti&n &" C&mputeried %denti"icati&n@e"erence SstemK &n t'e"&ll&in* *r&unds:

1.) !'e administrative &rderissued - t'e e/ecutive is deemedt& -e a la and n&t a mereadministrative &rder t'us it is ausurpati&n &" le*islative p&er &" t'e c&n*ress t& ma0e las, and2.) %t impermissi-l intrudes t'ecitienGs c&nstituti&nal ri*'t &" privac.

%SSU: >&es t'e 9dministrativeOrder &. 38 vi&lates t'ec&nstituti&nal ri*'t t& privacD

;>: Ees, t'e 9dministrativeOrder vi&lates t'e c&nstituti&nalri*'t t& privac -ecause its sc&peis t&& -r&ad and va*ue t'at illput pe&ple s ri*'t t& privac in‟clear and present dan*er i"

implemented. !'e 9.O. 38 als&lac0s &" pr&per sa"e*uards "&r


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p'sicians in t'e psc'iatricresidenc pr&*ram. &spital&""icials -ecame c&ncerned a-&utp&ssi-le impr&prieties in 'ismana*ement &" t'e pr&*ram,

particularl it' respect t& 'isac+uisiti&n &" a c&mputer andc'ar*es a*ainst 'im c&ncernin*se/ual 'arassment &" "emale'&spital empl&ees andinappr&priate disciplinar acti&na*ainst a resident. 'ile 'e as&n administrative leave pendin*investi*ati&n &" t'e c'ar*es,'&spital &""icials, alle*edl in

&rder t& invent&r and securestate pr&pert, searc'ed 'is &""iceand seied pers&nal items "r&m'is des0 and "ile ca-inets t'atere used in administrativepr&ceedin*s resultin* in 'isdisc'ar*e. & "&rmal invent&r &" t'e pr&pert in t'e &""ice asever made, and all t'e &t'erpapers in t'e &""ice ere merel

placed in -&/es "&r st&ra*e.@esp&ndent "iled an acti&n a*ainstpetiti&ner '&spital &""icials in#ederal >istrict C&urt under 42U.S.C. 183, alle*in* t'at t'esearc' &" 'is &""ice vi&lated t'e#&urt' 9mendment. On cr&ss$m&ti&ns "&r summar 5ud*ment,t'e >istrict C&urt *ranted

5ud*ment "&r petiti&ners,

c&ncludin* t'at t'e searc' aspr&per -ecause t'ere as a needt& secure state pr&pert in t'e&""ice. 9""irmin* in part, reversin*in part, and remandin* t'e case,t'e C&urt &" 9ppeals c&ncludedt'at resp&ndent 'ad a reas&na-lee/pectati&n &" privac in 'is&""ice, and t'at t'e searc'vi&lated t'e #&urt' 9mendment.

!'e c&urt 'eld t'at t'e rec&rd 5usti"ied a *rant &" partial

summar 5ud*ment "&rresp&ndent &n t'e issue &" lia-ilit "&r t'e searc', and itremanded t'e case t& t'e >istrictC&urt "&r a determinati&n &"

dama*es.

%SSU: O t'e searc' asvalidD

;>:$%n &ur vie, re+uirin* anempl&er t& &-tain a arrant'enever t'e empl&er is'ed t&enter an empl&ees &""ice, des0,

&r "ile ca-inets "&r a &r0$relatedpurp&se &uld seri&usl disruptt'e r&utine c&nduct &" -usinessand &uld -e undul-urdens&me. %mp&sin* unieldarrant pr&cedures in suc' casesup&n supervis&rs, '& &uld&t'erise 'ave n& reas&n t& -e"amiliar it' suc' pr&cedures, issimpl unreas&na-le. %n c&ntrast

t& &t'er circumstances in 'ic'e 'ave re+uired arrants,supervis&rs in &""ices suc' as att'e &spital are 'ardl in t'e-usiness &" investi*atin* t'evi&lati&n &" criminal las. @at'er,&r0$related searc'es are merelincident t& t'e primar -usiness&" t'e a*enc. Under t'esecircumstances, t'e imp&siti&n &" a

arrant re+uirement &uldc&n"lict it'


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inc&mpetence, mismana*ement,&r &t'er &r0$related mis"easance&" its empl&ees.$%n &ur vie, t'ere"&re, apr&-a-le cause re+uirement "&r

searc'es &" t'e tpe at issue 'ere&uld imp&se int&lera-le -urdens&n pu-lic empl&ers. !'e dela inc&rrectin* t'e empl&eemisc&nduct caused - t'e need"&r pr&-a-le cause rat'er t'anreas&na-le suspici&n ill -etranslated int& tan*i-le and &"tenirrepara-le dama*e t& t'ea*encs &r0, and ultimatel t&

t'e pu-lic interest. t'e empl&erintrusi&ns at issue 'ere first, one must consider Bwhether the . . . action was ustified at its inception- second,one must determine whether thesearch as actually conducted Bwas reasonably related in scopeto the circumstances which ustified the interference in the

first place ,7$C9Gs decisi&n is reversed andremanded.

A. Liberty of abode and travel (Sec.

7, Art. III)

1. Purpose

2. Limitations

CASES: Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39

Phil 778 (March 25, 1919)

Malcolm, J.,

FACTS:

- The Mayor of the city of Manila,

Justo Lukban, for the best of all

reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered

the segregated district for women of ill

repute, which had been permitted for anumber of years in the city of Manila,

closed. Between October 16 and

October 25, 1918, the women were

kept confined to their houses in the

district by the police. They intend to

send them to Davao to work.

- They had not been asked if they

wished to depart from that region and

had neither directly nor indirectly giventheir consent to the deportation. The

involuntary guests were received on

board the steamers by a representative

of the Bureau of Labor and a

detachment of Constabulary soldiers.

- The women were landed and

receipted for as laborers by Francisco

Sales, provincial governor of Davao,

and by Feliciano Yñigo and RafaelCastillo. The governor and

the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as

parties in the case, had no previous

notification that the women were

prostitutes who had been expelled from

the city of Manila. The attorney for the

relatives and friends of a considerable

number of the deportees presented an

application for habeas corpus to amember of the Supreme Court


12/114

- The court awarded the writ, in an

order of November 4, that directed

Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of

Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of

police of the city of Manila, FranciscoSales, governor of the province of

Davao, and Feliciano Yñigo,

an hacenderoof Davao, to bring before

the court the persons therein named,

alleged to be deprived of their liberty.

ISSUE: WON the ordinance,

deporting prostitutes from Manila,

was constitutional?

HELD:

-No. Always a law! Even when the health

authorities compel vaccination, or

establish a quarantine, or place a leprous

person in the Culion leper colony, it isdone pursuant to some law or order. But

one can search in vain for any law, order,

or regulation, which even hints at the right

of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the

chief of police of that city to force citizens

of the Philippine Islands — and these

women despite their being in a sense

lepers of society are nevertheless not

chattels but Philippine citizens protected

by the same constitutional guaranties as

are other citizens — to change their

domicile from Manila to another locality.

On the contrary, Philippine penal law

specifically punishes any public officer

who, not being expressly authorized by

law or regulation, compels any person to

change his residence.

- A prime specification of an application

for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of

liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into

all manner of involuntary restraint as

distinguished from voluntary, and to

relieve a person therefrom if such restraint

is illegal. Any restraint which will

preclude freedom of action is sufficient.

The forcible taking of these women fromManila by officials of that city, who

handed them over to other parties, who

deposited them in a distant region,

deprived these women of freedom of

locomotion just as effectively as if they

had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao

without either money or personal

belongings, they were prevented from

exercising the liberty of going when and

where they pleased. The restraint of libertywhich began in Manila continued until the

aggrieved parties were returned to Manila

and released or until they freely and truly

waived his right.

- Even if the party to whom the writ is

addressed has illegally parted with the

custody of a person before the application

for the writ is no reason why the writ

should not issue

[The first order, it will be recalled, directedJusto Lukban, Anton Hohmann, FranciscoSales, and Feliciano Yñigo to present thepersons named in the writ before the courton ecember !, "#"$% The order was dated&o'ember (, "#"$% The respondents werethus gi'en ample time, practicall) onemonth, to compl) with the writ% As far as therecord discloses, the *a)or of the cit) of *anila waited until the !"st of &o'ember before sending a telegram to the pro'incialgo'ernor of a'ao% According to theresponse of the attorne) for the +ureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, therewere then in a'ao women who desired toreturn to *anila, but who should not bepermitted to do so because of ha'ingcontracted debts% The halfhearted effortnaturall) resulted in none of the parties in-uestion being brought before the court onthe da) named%.n response to the second order of the court,the respondents appear to ha'e becomemore /ealous and to ha'e shown a better spirit% Agents were dispatched to *indanao,

placards were posted, the constabular) andthe municipal police 0oined in rounding up


13/114

the women, and a steamer with freetransportation to *anila was pro'ided% 1hilecharges and countercharges in such abitterl) contested case are to be e2pected,and while a critical reading of the recordmight re'eal a failure of literal fulfillment with

our mandate, we come to conclude thatthere is a substantial compliance with it% 3ur finding to this effect ma) be influencedsomewhat b) our sincere desire to see thisunhapp) incident finall) closed% .f an) wrongis now being perpetrated in a'ao, it shouldrecei'e an e2ecuti'e in'estigation% .f an)particular indi'idual is still restrained of her libert), it can be made the ob0ect of separate habeas corpus proceedings%4

Manotoc v. CA, 142 SCRA 149 (May

30, 1986)

Fernan, J.,

FACTS:

- Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is

one of the two principal stockholders of

Trans-Insular Management, Inc. and

the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock

brokerage house. He is the president of

the former.

- Following the "run" on stock

brokerages caused by stock broker

Santamaria's flight from this

jurisdiction, petitioner, who was then in

the United States, came home, and

together with his co-stockholders, filed

a petition with the Securities and

Exchange Commission for theappointment of a management

committee, not only for Manotoc

Securities, Inc., but likewise for Trans-

Insular Management

- Pending disposition of SEC Case No.

001826, the Securities and Exchange

Commission requested the then

Commissioner of Immigration,

Edmundo Reyes, not to clear petitioner

for departure and a memorandum to

this effect was issued by the

Commissioner on February 4, 1980 to

the Chief of the Immigration

Regulation Division.

- When a Torrens title submitted to and

accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc.

was suspected to be a fake, six of its

clients filed six separate criminal

complaints against petitioner and one

Raul Leveriza, Jr., as president and

vice-president, respectively, of

Manotoc Securities, Inc. Moreover,

charges for estafa were also filed. In all

cases, petitioner has been admitted tobail in the total amount of P105,000.00,

with FGU Instance Corporation as

surety.

-Petitioner then wanted to leave the

country “relative to his business

transactions and opportunities." The

prosecution opposed the same [the

surety companies that filed the bail

bonds in his behalf might claim that

they could no longer be held liable in

their undertakings because it was the

Court which allowed the accused to go

outside the territorial jurisdiction of

the Philippine Court, should the

accused fail or decide not to return]

and was subsequently denied by the

RTC.

- Petitioner contends that having been


14/114

admitted to bail as a matter of right,

neither the courts which granted him

bail nor the Securities and Exchange

Commission which has no jurisdiction

over his liberty, could prevent himfrom exercising his constitutional right

to travel.

ISSUE: WON a person facing a

criminal indictment and

provisionally released on bail have

an unrestricted right to travel?

HELD:

-Yes. A court has the power to prohibit a

person admitted to bail from leaving the

Philippines. This is a necessary

consequence of the nature and function

of a bail bond. Its object is to relieve the

accused of imprisonment and the state

of the burden of keeping him, pending

the trial, and at the same time, to put

the accused as much under the power of

the court as if he were in custody of the

proper officer, and to secure the

appearance of the accused so as to

answer the call of the court and do what

the law may require of him.

- The condition imposed upon petitioner to

make himself available at all times

whenever the court requires his presence

operates as a valid restriction on his right

to travel.

- From the tenor and import of petitioner'smotion, no urgent or compelling reason

can be discerned to justify the grant of

judicial imprimatur thereto. Petitioner has

not sufficiently shown that there is

absolute necessity for him to travel

abroad.

- As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial

courts and the appellate court of the

urgency of his travel, the duration thereof,

as well as the consent of his surety to theproposed travel, We find no abuse of

judicial discretion in their having denied

petitioner's motion for permission to leave

the country

- The constitutional right to travel being

invoked by petitioner is not an absolute

right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973Constitution states:

The liberty of abode and of travel shall not

be impaired except upon lawful order of

the court, or when necessary in the

interest of national security, public safety

or public health.

To our mind, the order of the trial court

releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such

lawful order as contemplated by the above-

quoted constitutional provision

Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 669

(read also the dissenting opinions)

EN BANC,

FACTS:

- In its decision dated September15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight

(8) to seven (7), dismissed the petition,

after finding that the President did not

act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of

discretion in determining that the return

of former President Marcos and his

family at the present time and under

present circumstances pose a threat to

national interest and welfare and in

prohibiting their return to the

Philippines. On September 28, 1989,

former President Marcos died in

Honolulu, Hawaii. In a statement,

President Aquino said:

In the interest of the safety of those

who will take the death of Mr. Marcos

in widely and passionately conflicting

ways, and for the tranquility of the stateand order of society, the remains of


15/114

Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be

allowed to be brought to our country

until such time as the government, be it

under this administration or the

succeeding one, shall otherwise decide.

-Upon MR petitioner contends that to

bar former President Marcos and his

family from returning to the Philippines

is to deny them not only the inherent

right of citizens to return to their

country of birth but also the protection

of the Constitution and all of the rights

guaranteed to Filipinos under the

Constitution.

ISSUE: WON the executive has the

power to bar any individual of the

right to enter the state?

HELD:

-Yes. MR denied. The death of Mr.

Marcos, although it may be viewed as a

supervening event, has not changed thefactual scenario under which the

Court's decision was rendered. The

threats to the government, to which the

return of the Marcoses has been viewed

to provide a catalytic effect, have not

been shown to have ceased. On the

contrary, instead of erasing fears as to

the destabilization that will be caused

by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs.Marcos reinforced the basis for the

decision to bar their return when she

called President Aquino "illegal,"

claiming that it is Mr. Marcos, not Mrs.

Aquino, who is the "legal" President of

the Philippines, and declared that the

matter "should be brought to all the

courts of the world.

- 5ontrary to petitioners' view, it cannot bedenied that the President, upon whom

executive power is vested, has unstated

residual powers which are implied from

the grant of executive power and which are

necessary for her to comply with her duties

under the Constitution. The powers of the

President are not limited to what are

expressly enumerated in the article on the

Executive Department and in scattered

provisions of the Constitution

- Among the duties of the President under

the Constitution, in compliance with his

(or her) oath of office, is to protect and

promote the interest and welfare of the

people. Her decision to bar the return of

the Marcoses and subsequently, the

remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time

and under present circumstances is in

compliance with this bounden duty. In the

absence of a clear showing that she had

acted with arbitrariness or with grave

abuse of discretion in arriving at this

decision, the Court will not enjoin the

implementation of this decision

Dissents:

Cruz:

- This only shows that if he was at all a

threat to the national security when he was

already moribund that feeble threat has

died with him. As the government stresses,

he has been reduced to a non-person

(which makes me wonder why it is still

afraid of him). His cadaver is not evenregarded as a symbol of this or that or

whatever except by his fanatical followers.

It is only a dead body waiting to be

interred in this country.

This is a tempest in a teapot. We have

more important things to do than debating

over a corpse that deserves no kinder fate

than dissolution and oblivion. I say let it be

brought home and buried deep and let usbe done with it forever.


16/114

Paras:

- Firstly, the former President, although

already dead, is still entitled to certain

rights. It is not correct to say that a dead

man, since he is no longer a human being,has ceased to have rights.

- Secondly, up to now, the alleged threats

to national security have remained

unproved and consequently, unpersuasive.

In fact, the converse appears to be nearer

the truth, that is, if we do not allow the

remains to come, more trouble may be

expected.

- Thirdly, reconciliation can proceed at a

much faster pace if the petition for the

return is granted. Upon the other hand, to

grant the petition may well soften the

hearts of the oppositionists; paving the

way for a united citizenry.

- Finally, the entire world will surely

applaud our government's act of mercy.

Padilla:

- For, our democracy is built on the

fundamental assumption (so we believe)

that the Constitution and all its guarantees

apply to all Filipinos, whether dictator or

pauper, learned or ignorant, religious or

agnostic as long as he is a Filipino.

- the second cogent and decisive

proposition in this case is that respondents

have not presented any "hard evidence"

(factual bases) or convincing proof of such

threat. "All we have are general

conclusions of national security and public

safety' in avoidance of a specific,

demandable and enforceable constitutional

and basic human right to return."

- On the other hand, if the remains of Mr.

Marcos are brought to the country andallowed the burial to which he is

constitutionally and humanly entitled,

Marcos' supporters would be deprived of

an otherwise potent argument—so

conducive to mass protests and even

violence—that their Idol has been cruelly

denied the right to be buried in his

homeland.

- In the first place, one cannot overlook

that the right of Mr. Marcos, as a Filipino,

to be buried in this country, is asserted not

for the first time after his death. It was

vigorously asserted long before his death.

It is part of a continuing right that starts

from birth and ends only on the day he is

finally laid to rest in his country.

Sarmiento:

- The Charter says that the right may only

be restricted by: (1) a court order; or (2) by

fiat of law. Had the fundamental law

intended a presidential imprimatur, it

would have said so. It would have also

completed the symmetry: judicial,

congressional, and executive restraints onthe right. No amount of presumed residual

executive power can amend the Charter.

- That "[t]he threats to the government, to

which the return of the Marcoses has been

viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have

not been shown to have ceased" (Res., 3)

is the realm of conjecture, speculation, and

imagination. The military has shown no

hard evidence that "the return of theMarcoses" would indeed interpose a threat

to national security.

- That Mrs. Marcos has referred to

President Corazon Aquino as an

illegitimate President, does not, so I

submit, reinforce alleged fears of a

massive destabilization awaiting the

nation. The military has said over and over

that Marcos followers are not capable of successful destabilization effort.


17/114

B. Freedom of Religion (Sec 5, Art.

III)

1. Other relevant provisions

Religion in the constitution

Preamble (“We, the sovereign Filipino

people, imploring the aid o almight!

"od ###$%

&ec. ', rt. )) (separation o church and

the &tate%

&ec. 2* (+%, rt. ) (ta# e#emption o

religious, charitable and educational

institutions%

&ec. 2- (2%, rt. ) (appropriations or

sectarian purposes%

Religion in rt. 1* o the niversal

/eclaration 0uman Rights

2. Religion deined

+. &eparation o the hurch and the

&tate (the nonestablishment clause3

appropriations or sectarian purpose%

CASES:

Engel v. Vitale (the School Prayer

case), 370 US 421 (June 25, 1962)

Black, J.,

FACTS:

- The respondent Board of Education of

Union Free School District No. 9, New

Hyde Park, New York, acting in its

official capacity under state law,

directed the School District's principal

to cause the following prayer to be said

aloud by each class in the presence of ateacher at the beginning of each school

day:

"Almighty God, we acknowledge our

dependence upon Thee, and we beg

Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our

teachers and our Country."

This daily procedure was adopted on

the recommendation of the State Board

of Regents, a governmental agency

created by the State Constitution to

which the New York Legislature has

granted broad supervisory, executive,

and legislative powers over the State's

public school system.

-Shortly after its adoption, the parents

of some pupils in the school district

challenged its constitutionality as a

violation of establishment clause and

claims it to be contrary to the beliefs,

religions, or religious practices of both

themselves and their children.

ISSUE: WON the adoption of the

practice was a violation of theconstitution?

HELD:

-Yes. We think that, by using its public

school system to encourage recitation

of the Regents' prayer, the State of New

York has adopted a practice wholly

inconsistent with the Establishment

Clause.

- For this reason, petitioners argue, the

State's use of the Regents' prayer in its

public school system breaches the

constitutional wall of separation

between Church and State. We agree

with that contention, since we think

that the constitutional prohibition

against laws respecting anestablishment of religion must at least


18/114

mean that, in this country, it is no part

of the business of government to

compose official prayers for any

group of the American people to

recite as a part of a religiousprogram carried on by government.

- The Establishment Clause, unlike the

Free Exercise Clause, does not depend

upon any showing of direct

governmental compulsion and is

violated by the enactment of laws

which establish an official religion

whether those laws operate directly to

coerce non-observing individuals or

not.

- When the power, prestige and

financial support of government is

placed behind a particular religious

belief, the indirect coercive pressure

upon religious minorities to conform to

the prevailing officially approved

religion is plain. Its first and mostimmediate purpose rested on the belief

that a union of government and religion

tends to destroy government and to

degrade religion. Another purpose of

the Establishment Clause rested upon

an awareness of the historical fact that

governmentally established religions

and religious persecutions go hand in

hand.

- It is neither sacrilegious nor anti-

religious to say that each separate

government in this country should stay

out of the business of writing or

sanctioning official prayers and leave

that purely religious function to the

people themselves and to those the

people choose to look to for religious

guidance.

Everson v. Board of Education, 330

US 1 (February 10, 1947)

Black, J.,

FACTS:

- A New Jersey statute authorizes its

local school districts to make rules and

contracts for the transportation of

children to and from schools. 1 The

appellee, a township board of

education, acting pursuant to this

statute authorized reimbursement to

parents of money expended by them for

the bus transportation of their children

on regular busses operated by the

public transportation system. Part of

this money was for the payment of

transportation of some children in the

community to Catholic parochial

schools. These church schools givetheir students, in addition to secular

education, regular religious instruction

conforming to the religious tenets and

modes of worship of the Catholic Faith.

- The appellant, in his capacity as a

district taxpayer, filed suit in a State

court challenging the right of the Board

to reimburse parents of parochial

school students. He [330 U.S. 1,

4] contended that the statute and the

resolution passed pursuant to it violated

both the State and the Federal

Constitutions.

- First. They authorize the State to take

by taxation the private property of

some and bestow it upon others, to be

used for their own private purposes.This, it is alleged violates the due


19/114

process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Second. The statute and

the resolution forced inhabitants to pay

taxes to help support and maintain

schools which are dedicated to, andwhich regularly teach, the Catholic

Faith.

ISSUE: WON the statute violated the

constitution?

HELD:

- The fact that a state law, passed to

satisfy a public need, coincides with thepersonal desires of the individuals most

directly affected is certainly an

inadequate reason for us to say that a

legislature has erroneously appraised

the public need. Thus, it is not a

violation of due process clause.

- The 'establishment of religion' clause

of the First Amendment means at least

this: Neither a state nor the FederalGovernment can set up a church.

Neither can pass laws which aid one

religion, aid all religions, or prefer one

religion over another. Neither can force

nor influence a person to go to or to

remain away from church against his

will or force him to profess a belief or

disbelief in any religion. No person can

be punished for entertaining or

professing religious beliefs or

disbeliefs, for church attendance or

non-attendance. No tax in any amount,

large or small, can be levied to support

any religious activities or institutions,

whatever they may be called, or

whatever from they may adopt to teach

or practice religion.

-we cannot say that the FirstAmendment prohibits New Jersey from

spending taxraised funds to pay the bus

fares of parochial school pupils as a

part of a general program under which

it pays the fares of pupils attending

public and other schools. It isundoubtedly true that children are

helped to get to church schools. that

Amendment requires the state to be a

neutral in its relations with groups of

religious believers and non-believers; it

does not require the state to be their

adversary. State power is no more to be

used so as to handicap religions, than it

is to favor them.

- It appears that these parochial schools

meet New Jersey's requirements. The

State contributes no money to the

schools. It does not support them. Its

legislation, as applied, does no more

than provide a general program to help

parents get their children, regardless of

their religion, safely and expeditiously

to and from accredited schools.

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 US 602

(June 28, 1971)

Burger, C.J.,

FACTS:

- Pennsylvania has adopted a statutory

program that provides financial support

to nonpublic elementary and secondary

schools by way of reimbursement for

the cost of teachers' salaries, textbooks,

and instructional materials in specified

secular subjects. Rhode Island has

adopted a statute under which the State

pays directly to teachers in nonpublicelementary schools a supplement of


20/114

15% of their annual salary. Under each

statute state aid has been given to

church-related educational institutions.

We hold that both statutes are

unconstitutional.

- The Rhode Island Salary Supplement

Act was enacted in 1969. It rests on the

legislative finding that the quality of

education available in nonpublic

elementary schools has been

jeopardized by the rapidly rising

salaries needed to attract competent and

dedicated teachers. The Act authorizes

state officials to supplement the salariesof teachers of secular subjects in

nonpublic elementary schools by

paying directly to a teacher an amount

not in excess of 15% of his current

annual salary. As supplemented,

however, a nonpublic school teacher's

salary cannot exceed the maximum

paid to teachers in the State's public

schools, and the recipient must be

certified by the state board of education

in substantially the same manner as

public school teachers.

- Appellees are citizens and taxpayers

of Rhode Island. They brought this suit

to have the Rhode Island Salary

Supplement Act declared

unconstitutional and its operation

enjoined on the ground that it violatesthe Establishment and Free Exercise

Clauses of the First Amendment.

- Pennsylvania has adopted a program

that has some but not all of the features

of the Rhode Island program. The

Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary

and Secondary Education Act was

passed in 1968 in response to a crisis

that the Pennsylvania Legislature foundexisted in the State's nonpublic schools

due to rapidly rising costs. The statute

authorizes appellee state

Superintendent of Public Instruction to

"purchase" specified "secular

educational services" from nonpublicschools. Under the "contracts"

authorized by the statute, the State

directly reimburses nonpublic schools

solely for their actual expenditures for

teachers' salaries, textbooks, and

instructional materials. Finally, the

statute prohibits reimbursement for any

course that contains "any subject matter

expressing religious teaching, or the

morals or forms of worship of anysect."

ISSUE: WON the statutes were

constitutional?

HELD:

-No. Every analysis in this area must

begin with consideration of the

cumulative criteria developed by theCourt over many years. Three such

tests may be gleaned from our cases.

First, the statute must have a secular

legislative purpose; second, its

principal or primary effect must be one

that neither advances nor inhibits

religion, finally, the statute must not

foster "an excessive government

entanglement with religion."

- Inquiry into the legislative purposes

of the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island

statutes affords no basis for a

conclusion that the legislative intent

was to advance religion. On the

contrary, the statutes themselves clearly

state that they are intended to enhance

the quality of the secular education in

all schools covered by the compulsoryattendance laws.


21/114

- In the absence of precisely stated

constitutional prohibitions, we must

draw lines with reference to the three

main evils against which the

Establishment Clause was intended toafford protection: "sponsorship,

financial support, and active

involvement of the sovereign in

religious activity."

- We need not decide whether these

legislative precautions restrict the

principal or primary effect of the

programs to the point where they do

not offend the Religion Clauses, for weconclude that the cumulative impact of

the entire relationship arising under the

statutes in each State involves

excessive entanglement between

government and religion.

- In order to determine whether the

government entanglement with religion

is excessive, we must examine the

character and purposes of theinstitutions that are benefited, the

nature of the aid that the State provides,

and the resulting relationship between

the government and the religious

authority.

- The substantial religious character of

these church-related schools gives rise

to entangling church-state relationships

of the kind the Religion Clauses sought

to avoid. Although the District Court

found that concern for religious values

did not inevitably or necessarily intrude

into the content of secular subjects, the

considerable religious activities of

these schools led the legislature to

provide for careful governmental

controls and surveillance by state

authorities in order to ensure that stateaid supports only secular education.

- In terms of potential for involving

some aspect of faith or morals in

secular subjects, a textbook's content is

ascertainable, but a teacher's handling

of a subject is not. We cannot ignorethe danger that a teacher under

religious control and discipline poses to

the separation of the religious from the

purely secular aspects of pre-college

education. The conflict of functions

inheres in the situation.

- the very restrictions and surveillance

necessary to ensure that teachers play a

strictly non-ideological role give rise toentanglements church and state. The

Pennsylvania statute, like that of Rhode

Island, fosters this kind of relationship.

- The Pennsylvania statute, moreover,

has the further defect of providing state

financial aid directly to the church-

related school.

- In particular the government's post-audit power to inspect and evaluate a

church-related school's financial

records and to determine which

expenditures are religious and which

are secular creates an intimate and

continuing relationship between church

and state.

- In a community where such a large

number of pupils are served by church-related schools, it can be assumed that

state assistance will entail considerable

political activity.

- Under our system the choice has been

made that government is to be entirely

excluded from the area of religious

instruction and churches excluded from

the affairs of government. TheConstitution decrees that religion must


22/114

be a private matter for the individual,

the family, and the institutions of

private choice, and that while some

involvement and entanglement are

inevitable, lines must be drawn.

Zurach v. Clauson, 343 US 306

(April 28, 1952)

Douglas, J.,

FACTS:

- New York City has a program which

permits its public schools to release

students during the school day so that

they may leave the school buildings

and school grounds and go to religious

centers for religious instruction or

devotional exercises. A student is

released on written request of his

parents. Those not released stay in theclassrooms.

- This "released time" program involves

neither religious instruction in public

school classrooms nor the

expenditure of public funds. All costs,

including the application blanks, are

paid by the religious organizations.

-Their argument, stated elaborately invarious ways, reduces itself to this: the

weight and influence of the school is

put behind a program for religious

instruction; public school teachers

police it, keeping tab on students who

are released; the classroom activities

come to a halt while the students who

are released for religious instruction are

on leave; the school is a crutch on

which the churches are leaning for

support in their religious training.

ISSUE: WON the New York by this

system has violated the establishment

clause?

HELD:

-No. No one is forced to go to the

religious classroom and no religious

exercise or instruction is brought to the

classrooms of the public schools. A

student need not take religious

instruction. He is left to his own desires

as to the manner or time of his religiousdevotions, if any.

- The First Amendment within the

scope of its coverage permits no

exception; the prohibition is absolute.

The First Amendment, however, does

not say that in every and all respects

there shall be a separation of Church

and State. Rather, it studiously defines

the manner, the specific ways, in whichthere shall be no concert or union or

dependency one on the other. That is

the common sense of the matter.

- In each case the teacher requires

parental consent in writing. In each

case the teacher, in order to make sure

the student is not a truant, goes further

and requires a report from the priest,

the rabbi, or the minister. The teacher

in other words cooperates in a religious

program to the extent of making it

possible for her students to participate

in it. Whether she does it occasionally

for a few students, regularly for one, or

pursuant to a systematized program

designed to further the religious needs

of all the students does not alter the

character of the act.


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- When the state encourages religious

instruction or cooperates with religious

authorities by adjusting the schedule of

public events to sectarian needs, it

follows the best of our traditions. For itthen respects the religious nature of our

people and accommodates the public

service to their spiritual needs. To hold

that it may not would be to find in the

Constitution a requirement that the

government show a callous

indifference to religious groups. That

would be preferring those who believe

in no religion over those who do

believe.

- In the McCollum case the classrooms

were used for religious instruction and

the force of the public school was used

to promote that instruction. Here, as we

have said, the public schools do no

more than accommodate their

schedules to a program of outside

religious instruction.

Board of Education v. Allen, 392 US

236 (June 10, 1968)

White, J.,

FACTS:

- In 1965 the Legislature amended 701,

basing the amendments on findings that

the "public welfare and safety require

that the state and local communities

give assistance to educational programs

which are important to our national

defense and the general welfare of the

state." Beginning with the 1966-1967

school year, local school boards were

required to purchase textbooks and lend

them without charge "to all children

residing in such district who are

enrolled in grades seven to twelve of apublic or private school which

complies with the compulsory

education law."

- Appellant Board of Education of

Central School District No. 1 in

Rensselaer and Columbia Counties,

brought suit in the New York courts

against appellee James Allen.

- Appellants therefore sought a

declaration that 701 was invalid, an

order barring appellee Allen from

removing appellants from office for

failing to comply with it, and another

order restraining him from

apportioning state funds to school

districts for the purchase of textbooks

to be lent to parochial students.

ISSUE: WON the statute violates the

Fourteenth Amendment?

HELD:

-No. "The test may be stated as

follows: what are the purpose and the

primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition

of religion then the enactment exceeds

the scope of legislative power as

circumscribed by the Constitution. That

is to say that to withstand the strictures

of the Establishment Clause there must

be a secular legislative purpose and a

primary effect that neither advances nor

inhibits religion.


24/114

- We reach the same result with respect

to the New York law requiring school

books to be loaned free of charge to all

students in specified grades. The

express purpose of 701 was stated bythe New York Legislature to be

furtherance of the educational

opportunities available to the young.

Appellants have shown us nothing

about the necessary effects of the

statute that is contrary to its stated

purpose. The law merely makes

available to all children the benefits of

a general program to lend school books

free of charge. Books are furnished atthe request of the pupil and ownership

remains, at least technically, in the

State. Thus no funds or books are

furnished to parochial schools, and the

financial benefit is to parents and

children, not to schools.

- Of course books are different from

buses. Most bus rides have no inherent

religious significance, while religious

books are common. However, the

language of 701 does not authorize the

loan of religious books, and the State

claims no right to distribute religious

literature. Although the books loaned

are those required by the parochial

school for use in specific courses, each

book loaned must be approved by the

public school authorities; only secularbooks may receive approval. The law

was construed by the Court of Appeals

of New York as "merely making

available secular textbooks at the

request of the individual student,"

supra, and the record contains no

suggestion that religious books have

been loaned.

- we cannot agree with appellants either

that all teaching in a sectarian school is

religious or that the processes of

secular and religious training are so

intertwined that secular textbooks

furnished to students by the public arein fact instrumental in the teaching of

religion. This case comes to us after

summary judgment entered on the

pleadings. Nothing in this record

supports the proposition that all

textbooks, whether they deal with

mathematics, physics, foreign

languages, history, or literature, are

used by the parochial schools to teach

religion. No evidence has been offeredabout particular schools, particular

courses, particular teachers, or

particular books.

- Appellants also contend that 701

offends the Free Exercise Clause of the

First Amendment. However, "it is

necessary in a free exercise case for

one to show the coercive effect of the

enactment as it operates against him in

the practice of his religion,"

4. )ntramural Religious /ispute

Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil 201 (March

13, 1937)Laurel, J.,

FACTS:

- The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio

Aglipay, Supreme Head of the

Philippine Independent Church, seeks

the issuance from this court of a writ of

prohibition to prevent the respondent

Director of Posts from issuing and


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27/114

to the Flag' which it defined.

Objections to the salute as 'being too

much like Hitler's' were raised by the

Parent and Teachers Association, the

Boy and Girl Scouts, the Red Cross,and the Federation of Women's Clubs.

- Failure to conform is 'insubordination'

dealt with by expulsion. Readmission is

denied by statute until compliance.

Meanwhile the expelled child is

'unlawfully absent'5 and may be

proceeded against as a delinquent. 6

His parents or guardians are liable to

prosecution,7 and if convicted aresubject to fine not exceeding $50 and

jail term not exceeding thirty days.

- Appellees, citizens of the United

States and of West Virginia, brought

suit in the United States District Court

for themselves and others similarly

situated asking its injunction to restrain

enforcement of these laws and

regulations against Jehovah'sWitnesses.

ISSUE: WON the law and

regulations in issue are

constitutional?

HELD:

-No. But here the power of compulsion

is invoked without any allegation that

remaining passive during a flag salute

ritual creates a clear and present danger

that would justify an effort even to

muffle expression. To sustain the

compulsory flag salute we are required

to say that a Bill of Rights which

guards the individual's right to speak

his own mind, left it open to public

authorities to compel him to utter whatis not in his mind.

- The right of a State to regulate, for

example, a public utility may well

include, so far as the due process test is

concerned, power to impose all of the

restrictions which a legislature mayhave a 'rational basis' for adopting. But

freedoms of speech and of press, of

assembly, and of worship may not be

infringed on such slender grounds.

They are susceptible of restriction only

to prevent grave and immediate danger

to interests which the state may

lawfully protect.

- It seems trite but necessary to say thatthe First Amendment to our

Constitution was designed to avoid

these ends by avoiding these

beginnings. There is no mysticism in

the American concept of the State or of

the nature or origin of its authority. We

set up government by consent of the

governed, and the Bill of Rights denies

those in power any legal opportunity to

coerce that consent. Authority here is to

be controlled by public opinion, not

public opinion by authority.

- Nevertheless, we apply the limitations

of the Constitution with no fear that

freedom to be intellectually and

spiritually diverse or even contrary will

disintegrate the social organization. To

believe that patriotism will not flourishif patriotic ceremonies are voluntary

and spontaneous instead of a

compulsory routine is to make an

unflattering estimate of the appeal of

our institutions to free minds.

- We think the action of the local

authorities in compelling the flag salute

and pledge transcends constitutional

limitations on their power and invadesthe sphere of intellect and spirit which


28/114

it is the purpose of the First

Amendment to our Constitution to

reserve from all official control.

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 US 296

(May 20, 1940)

Roberts, J.,

FACTS:

- Newton Cantwell and his two sons,

Jesse and Russell, members of a group

known as Jehovah's witnesses, and

claiming to be ordained ministers, were

arrested in New Haven, Connecticut,

and each was charged by information

in five counts, with statutory and

common law offenses. After trial in the

Court of Common Pleas of New Haven

County each of them was convicted on

the third count, which charged a

violation of 6294 of the General

Statutes of Connecticut,1 and on the

fifth count, which charged commission

of the common law offense of inciting

a breach of the peace. On appeal to the

Supreme Court the conviction of allthree on the third count was affirmed.

The conviction of Jesse Cantwell, on

the fifth count, was also affirmed, but

the conviction of Newton and Russell

on that count was reversed and a new

trial ordered as to them.

- The appellants pressed the contention

that the statute under which the third

count was drawn was offensive to thedue process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment because, on its face and as

construed and applied, it denied them

freedom of speech and prohibited their

free exercise of religion.

- On the day of their arrest the

appellants were engaged in going

singly from house to house on Cassius

Street in New Haven. They were

individually equipped with a bag

containing books and pamphlets on

religious subjects, a portable

phonograph and a set of records, each

of which, when played, introduced, and

was a description of, one of the books.Each appellant asked the person who

responded to his call for permission to

play one of the records. If permission

was granted he asked the person to buy

the book described and, upon refusal,

he solicited such contribution towards

the publication of the pamphlets as the

listener was willing to make. If a

contribution was received a pamphlet

was delivered upon condition that it

would be read.

- Cassius Street is in a thickly

populated neighborhood, where about

ninety per cent of the residents are

Roman Catholics. A phonograph

record, describing a book entitled

'Enemies', included an attack on the

Catholic religion.

- 'No person shall solicit money,

services, subscriptions or any valuable

thing for any alleged religious,

charitable or philanthropic cause, from

other than a member of the

organization for whose benefit such

person is soliciting or within the county

in which such person or organization is

located unless such cause shall havebeen approved by the secretary of the


29/114

public welfare council. Upon

application of any person in behalf of

such cause, the secretary shall

determine whether such cause is a

religious one or is a bona fide object of charity or philanthropy and conforms to

reasonable standards of efficiency and

integrity, and, if he shall so find, shall

approve the same and issue to the

authority in charge a certificate to that

effect. Such certificate may be revoked

at any time.

ISSUE: WON the state violates the

freedom of speech?

HELD:

- Yes. The constitutional inhibition of

legislation on the subject of religion

has a double aspect. On the one hand, itforestalls compulsion by law of the

acceptance of any creed or the practice

of any form of worship. Freedom of

conscience and freedom to adhere to

such religious organization or form of

worship as the individual may choose

cannot be restricted by law. On the

other hand, it safeguards the free

exercise of the chosen form of religion.

Thus the Amendment embraces two

concepts, -freedom to believe and

freedom to act. The first is absolute but,

in the nature of things, second cannot

be.

- The state is likewise free to regulate

the time and manner of solicitation

generally, in the interest of public

safety, peace, comfort or convenience.But to condition the solicitation of aid

for the perpetuation of religious views

or systems upon a license, the grant of

which rests in the exercise of a

determination by state authority as to

what is a religious cause, is to lay aforbidden burden upon the exercise of

liberty protected by the Constitution.

- Having these considerations in mind,

we note that Jesse Cantwell, on April

26, 1938, was upon a public street,

where he had a right to be, and where

he had a right peacefully to impart his

views to others. There is no showing

that his deportment was noisy,truculent, overbearing or offensive. He

requested of two pedestrians’

permission to play to them a

phonograph record. The permission

was granted. It is not claimed that

he intended to insult or affront the

hearers by playing the record. It is plain

that he wished only to interest them in

his propaganda. The sound of the

phonograph is not shown to have

disturbed residents of the street, to have

drawn a crowd, or to have impeded

traffic. Thus far he had invaded no

right or interest of the public or of the

men accosted.

- Although the contents of the record

not unnaturally aroused animosity, we

think that, in the absence of a statutenarrowly drawn to define and punish

specific conduct as constituting a clear

and present danger to a substantial

interest of the State, the petitioner's

communication, considered in the light

of the constitutional guarantees, raised

no such clear and present menace to

public peace and order as to render him

liable to conviction of the common law

offense in question.


30/114

American Bible Society v. City of

Manila, 101 Phil 386 (April 30, 1957)

Felix, J.,

FACTS:

- Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-

stock, non-profit, religious, missionary

corporation duly registered and doing

business in the Philippines through its

Philippine agency established in

Manila. The defendant appellee is a

municipal corporation with powers that

are to be exercised in conformity with

the provisions of Republic Act No.

409, known as the Revised Charter of

the City of Manila.

- In the course of its ministry, plaintiff's

Philippine agency has been distributing

and selling bibles and/or gospelportions thereof (except during the

Japanese occupation) throughout the

Philippines and translating the same

into several Philippine dialects. On

May 29 1953, the acting City Treasurer

of the City of Manila informed plaintiff

that it was conducting the business of

general merchandise since November,

1945, without providing itself with the

necessary Mayor's permit and

municipal license, in violation of

Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and

Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364,

and required plaintiff to secure, within

three days, the corresponding permit

and license fees, together with

compromise covering the period from

the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd

quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45

- In its complaint plaintiff prays that

judgment be rendered declaring the

said Municipal Ordinance No. 3000, as

amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529,

3028 and 3364 illegal andunconstitutional, and that the defendant

be ordered to refund to the plaintiff the

sum of P5,891.45 paid under protest,

together with legal interest thereon, and

the costs, plaintiff further praying for

such other relief and remedy as the

court may deem just equitable.

- Predicated on this constitutional

mandate, plaintiff-appellant contendsthat Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as

respectively amended, are

unconstitutional and illegal in so far as

its society is concerned, because they

provide for religious censorship and

restrain the free exercise and enjoyment

of its religious profession, to wit: the

distribution and sale of bibles and other

religious literature to the people of the

Philippines.

- Defendant answered the complaint,

maintaining in turn that said ordinances

were enacted by the Municipal Board

of the City of Manila by virtue of the

power granted to it by section 2444,

subsection (m-2) of the Revised

Administrative Code, superseded on

June 18, 1949, by section 18,subsection (1) of Republic Act No.

409, known as the Revised Charter of

the City of Manila

ISSUE: Whether or not the

ordinances of the City of Manila,

Nos. 3000, as amended, and 2529,

3028 and 3364, are constitutional and

valid.


31/114

HELD:

- The only essential difference that We

find between these two provisions that

may have any bearing on the case at

bar, is that, while subsection (m-2)

prescribes that the combined total tax

of any dealer or manufacturer, or both,

enumerated under subsections (m-1)

and (m-2), whether dealing in one or all

of the articles mentioned therein, shall

not be in excess of P500 per annum, the

corresponding section 18, subsection

(o) of Republic Act No. 409, does not

contain any limitation as to the amountof tax or license fee that the retail

dealer has to pay per annum. Hence,

and in accordance with the weight of

the authorities above referred to that

maintain that "all rights and liabilities

which have accrued under the original

statute are preserved and may be

enforced, since the reenactment

neutralizes the repeal, therefore

continuing the law in force without

interruption", We hold that the

questioned ordinances of the City of

Manila are still in force and effect.

- The constitutional guaranty of the

free exercise and enjoyment of

religious profession and worship

carries with it the right to

disseminate religious information.

Any restraints of such right can only

be justified like other restraints of

freedom of expression on the

grounds that there is a clear and

present danger of any substantive

evil which the State has the right to

prevent". In the case at bar the license

fee herein involved is imposed upon

appellant for its distribution and sale of

bibles and other religious literature.

- It may be true that in the case at bar

the price asked for the bibles and other

religious pamphlets was in some

instances a little bit higher than the

actual cost of the same but this cannot

mean that appellant was engaged in the

business or occupation of selling said

"merchandise" for profit. For this

reason We believe that the provisions

of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529,

as amended, cannot be applied to

appellant, for in doing so it would

impair its free exercise and enjoymentof its religious profession and worship

as well as its rights of dissemination of

religious beliefs.

With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as

amended, which requires the obtention

the Mayor's permit before any person

can engage in any of the businesses,

trades or occupations enumerated

therein, We do not find that it imposesany charge upon the enjoyment of a

right granted by the Constitution, nor

tax the exercise of religious practices.

- It seems clear, therefore, that

Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be

considered unconstitutional, even if

applied to plaintiff Society. But as

Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of

Manila, as amended, is not applicable

to plaintiff-appellant and defendant-

appellee is powerless to license or tax

the business of plaintiff Society

involved herein for, as stated before, it

would impair plaintiff's right to the free

exercise and enjoyment of its religious

profession and worship, as well as its

rights of dissemination of religious

beliefs, We find that Ordinance No.3000, as amended is also inapplicable


32/114

to said business, trade or occupation of

the plaintiff.

Ebranilag v. Division

Superintendent, 219 SCRA 256

(March 1, 1993)

Griño-Aquino, J.,

FACTS:

- In G.R. No. 95770 "Roel Ebralinag, et

al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Manuel F.

Biongcog, Cebu District Supervisor,"

the petitioners are 43 high school and

elementary school students in the towns

of Daan Bantayan, Pinamungajan,

Carcar, and Taburan Cebu province.

All minors, they are assisted by their

parents who belong to the religious

group known as Jehovah's Witnesseswhich claims some 100,000 "baptized

publishers" in the Philippines.

In G.R. No. 95887, "May Amolo, et al.

vs. Division Superintendent of Schools

of Cebu and Antonio A. Sangutan," the

petitioners are 25 high school and

grade school students enrolled in public

schools in Asturias, Cebu, whose

parents are Jehovah's Witnesses. Bothpetitions were prepared by the same

counsel, Attorney Felino M. Ganal.

All the petitioners in these two cases

were expelled from their classes by the

public school authorities in Cebu for

refusing to salute the flag, sing the

national anthem and recite the patriotic

pledge as required by Republic Act No.

1265.

- They[Complainants] think the action

of the local authorities in compelling

the flag salute and pledge transcends

constitutional limitations on the State's

power and invades the sphere of theintellect and spirit which the

Constitution protect against official

control.

ISSUE: WON plaintiff could be

compelled to salute to the Philippine

flag, pursuant to RA 1265.

HELD:

- The sole justification for a prior

restraint or limitation on the exercise

of religious freedom is the existence

of a grave and present danger of a

character both grave and imminent,

of a serious evil to public safety,

public morals, public health or any

other legitimate public interest, that

the State has a right (and duty) toprevent."

- We are not persuaded that by

exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses

from saluting the flag, singing the

national anthem and reciting the

patriotic pledge, this religious group

which admittedly comprises a "small

portion of the school population" will

shake up our part of the globe and

suddenly produce a nation "untaught

and un-inculcated in and unimbued

with reverence for the flag, patriotism,

love of country and admiration for

national heroes". Forcing a small

religious group, through the iron hand

of the law, to participate in a ceremony

that violates their religious beliefs, will

hardly be conducive to love of countryor respect for dully constituted


33/114

authorities.

- Moreover, the expulsion of members

of Jehovah's Witnesses from the

schools where they are enrolled will

violate their right as Philippine citizens,

under the 1987 Constitution, to receive

free education, for it is the duty of the

State to "protect and promote the right

of all citizens to quality education . . .

and to make such education accessible

to all

- If they quietly stand at attention

during the flag ceremony while theirclassmates and teachers salute the flag,

sing the national anthem and recite the

patriotic pledge, we do not see how

such conduct may possibly disturb the

peace, or pose "a grave and present

danger of a serious evil to public

safety, public morals, public health or

any other legitimate public interest that

the State has a right (and duty) to

prevent

'. Religious 8ests

C. Freedom of expression (Sec. 4,

Art. III; also relate to Sec 18 (1), Art.

III)

1. )mportance and &cope

2. 9odes o :#pression

+. :lements

Freedom rom ensorship

CASES: Grosjean v. American Press

Co., 297 US 233 (February 10, 1936)

Sutherland, J.,

FACTS:

- This suit was brought by appellees,

nine publishers of newspapers in the

state of Louisiana, to enjoin the

enforcement against them of the

provisions of section 1 of the act of the

Legislature of Louisiana known as Act

No. 23, passed and approved July 12,

1934, as follows: 'That every person,

firm, association or corporation,domestic or foreign, engaged in the

business of selling, or making any

char

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