G.R. No. L-6546

January 15, 1912

GREGORIA ARNEDO CRUZ, ET AL., petitioner-appellees

vs. DOMINGO DE LEON, ET AL., opponents-appellants

FACTS:

On August 12, 1907, Gregoria Arnedo Cruz, in her own behalf and in the name and representation of her sisters, Maria Concepcion, Manuela and Juana, all surnamed Arnedo Cruz, made written applications to the Court of Land Registration for the registration of two parcels of land, situated in the barrio of San Miguel, pueblo of Calumpit, Province of Bulacan, of which they claimed to be absolute owners, and described as follows:

Parcel A, bounded on the north by land of Ramon delos Reyes; on the east by that of Victoria A. Cruz; on the south by a road from the barrio of San Miguel; and on the west by the land of Eugenia de Jesus. It has an area of 222,871.23 square meters.

Parcel B, bounded on the north by the road from the barrio of San Miguel; on the east by the land of Victoria A. Cruz; on the south by the Rio Grande de Calumpit; and on the west by the land of Eugenia de Jesus. It has an area of 14,130.67 square meters. The estate described, composed two parcel of land, was appraised, for the purpose of the last assessment, together with the buildings thereon constructed.

Petioners’ allegations:

1. that there was no encumbrance on the property, nor any person entitled to any right or share therein, according to their best knowledge and belief

2. that they acquired this land by inheritance from their deceased parents, Jose Arnedo Cruz and Maria Santos Espiritu

3. and that, in the unlikely event of its being impossible to grant their application in accordance with the Land Registration Act, they would rely upon the benefits of chapter 6 of Act No. 926, inasmuch as they had been in possession of the said lands for more than fifty years, during which period they were used for the cultivation of rice, being surrounded by pilapiles, or earthen dikes.

LC:

On February 20, 1908, the court, by an order of the same date and after the issuance of a decree of general default, decreed the adjudication and registration of the two parcels of land in the names of the sisters Gregoria Arnedo Cruz, Manuel Arnedo Cruz, Maria Concepcion Arnedo Cruz and Juana Arnedo Cruz.

A written petition on December 15, 1908 stated to the court that Toribio de Leon, Agustin Catanghal, Fulgencio Clarin, Clara de Leon, Antonio Mundo, Julian de Leon, Joaquin de Leon, Domingo de Leon,

Bernardo Reyes, Ambrosio Carlos, Pedro de Leon, Florentina Ramos, Monica Laderas, Juana Martinez, Francisco de Torres, and Mariano Valladar were the owners and possessors of certain building lots which formed a part of the two parcels of land concerned in this case.

Opponents alleged that their respective lots were within the perimeter of the parcels of land registered in the name of the applicants by the decree of February 20, 1908, and therefore asked for the annulment of the same, in so far as it affected their above-described respective lots, and that the costs be assessed against the applicants.

They therefore petitioned that the previous judgment on February 20 be reconsidered and reversed, after due procedure, in so far as their respective lots were concerned.

ISSUE:

WON it is proper to register (in the Court of Land Registration) the aforementioned two parcels of land with the inclusion of the lots that are the subject of the oppositions

RULING:

Yes, it is proper to register the two parcels of land, but with the exclusion of the lots or portions of land owned by the opponents.

It does not show by decisive and conclusive proof, that the lots of the opponents are comprised within the lands of the applicants, and that the opponents are and have been in possession of the lots in question, unduly or precariously, by tolerance of their legitimate owners, for a less time than the required by statute for prescription, and without any good right.

It is unquestionable that the said four sisters are the owners and are in possession of the two said parcels of land, used for the cultivation of rice and sugar cane and situated in the barrio of San Miguel, of the pueblo of Calumpit Bulacan, yet they have not duly established the fact that they are the owners of the portions now in the possession of the opponents, and whether these lots are comprised within the perimeter and boundaries of the two said parcels of land designated on the plan under the letters A and B.

From the foregoing testimony (Santiago V. Cruz and Victoria Arneda Cruz)

Santiago V. Cruz, an agent of Teodoro Tiongson, who was formerly a lessee of the two parcels of land during three years prior to 1882, testified that, as such agent, he had not collected any land rent for the lots, occupied by many houses, which were within the land that formed the barrio called Frances; that the lands leased by Tiongson from the appellants' mother were used for the cultivation of rice and sugar cane; that, at the expiration of Tiongson's lease, the latter were taken over by Victoria Arnedo; and that several tenants on shares lived in their house built on the leased lands.

Victoria Arneda Cruz testified that she had leased the said two parcels of land, used for the cultivation of rice and sugar cane; that in the barrio of Frances there were houses, about fifteen or twenty in number, built on the lots which adjoined the lands of Gregoria

Arnedo Cruz, some of which lots are situated on the bank of the river; that in the contract of lease executed by the witness and the applicants' mother, the said lots are not included, for the land leased by the former only extended to the fences of the said lots, and this she also had been told by Teodoro Tiongson, the preceding lessee, who himself had been so informed by the owner of the lands, the applicants' mother; that witness did not know whether the latter, during her lifetime, collected rent for the said lots, witness, as lessee, did not collect such rent for them; that she did not believe that these lots were comprised within the lands leased by her, and, finally, that some of them, occupied by residents of that barrio, formed a part of the land owned by her, adjacent to the lands of the applicants, while others were a part of the lands of the latter.

it is concluded that, in the successive lease of the said two parcels of land, there were not included lots which appear to have been occupied by various residents of the locality, apparently the opponents, and, inasmuch as the latter were long prior to 1882 in material possession of the lots which were occupied, without having made any acknowledgment of the applicants' alleged ownership, nor of that of their predecessor in interest; and, further, since there is no evidence to show how and in what manner the opponents and their predecessors in interest began to occupy the lots in question and that they entered upon the same through the tolerance of their alleged owners, and also that the said lots formed a part of the two parcels of land sought to be registered, it would be improper to hold that the disputed lots should be included in the registration.

As for all other aspects of the case, let it be borne in mind that by abandonment, negligence or carelessness, owners provided with the most perfect titles may be deprived and dispossessed of their properties by usurpers who, by the lapse of the time specified by law, acquire the same by prescription. (Arts. 1930 and 1959, Civil Code.)

Civil possession, according to the article 430 of the same code, is the holding of a thing of the enjoyment of a right, together with the intention of acquiring ownership of the thing or right. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein, he must be protected or possession must be restored to him by the means established in laws of procedure. (art. 446, Civil Code.)

For reasons aforesaid, and with the modification specified, the judgment appealed from is affirmed; but before completing the inscription and registration of the said parcels of land in the name of the applicants, with the exclusion of the portions of land owned by the opponents, a correct survey, which must be duly approved, shall be made of the said properties, and a plan shall be drawn, for the purpose of the issuance of the proper title in accordance with the law. No special finding is made as to the costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 80638 April 26, 1989

GABRIEL ELANE, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and INOCENCIO V. CHUA, respondents.

CASE DOCTRINESGeneral Rule: Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalitiesException: in the case of co-possessionShould a question arise regarding the fact of possession;1. the present possessor shall be preferred;2. if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession;3. if the dates of the possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and4. if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.

NATURE: petition for review on certiorari

FACTS:

On August 16, 1961, Ordinary Residence Permit No. 1675 was issued by the Bureau of Forestry authorizing the petitioner (Elane) to occupy four hectares of public forest land situated in Sitio Upper Kalaklan, Olongapo, Zambales (Exhibit A), on which he constructed a warehouse and a gasoline station pursuant to permits issued to him by the said bureau (Exhibits C, C-1, 1 and J), which on February 10, 1970 were declared for purposes of taxation in his name (Exhibits E and E-1) and taxes due thereon were paid (Exhibits F-4 and F-5).

On January 19,1977, the parcel of land in question, designated as Block V, LC Project No. 14, Olongapo City, BF Map LC 2427, containing an area of 42,086 square meters, covered by the sketch (Exhibit G), having been declared alienable and disposable, the petitioner filed an application with the Bureau of Lands to purchase it under Miscellaneous Sales Application No. (111-4) 9019 (Exhibit M).

On March 1, 1980, the petitioner wrote to the respondent advising him to stop construction of the building that he was putting up within the parcel of land in question (Exhibit H).

On March 6, 1980, the respondent having refused to desist from constructing the building that he was putting up, the petitioner filed the instant complaint for forcible entry in the then City Court of Olongapo.

Chua’s allegations:

1. That on February 15, 1980, while visiting the property, he discovered that petitioner was constructing a semi-concrete building on a portion thereof, without his knowledge and consent.

2. The order made by private respondent upon petitioner to desist therefrom was ignored by the latter.

Elane’s claims:

1. that he was granted a permit by the Bureau of Forest Development over a parcel of land located at Upper Kalaklan, with an area of 360 square meters, more or less, designated as Block V, LC Project No. 14, Olongapo City, BF Map LC 2427, as allegedly evidenced by a certification from the said bureau dated April 10, 1979

2. that he has been in possession and occupation of that parcel of land continuously and uninterruptedly since 1970 having originally erected a hut thereon which was later replaced by a bungalow

3. and that the land has been declared for taxation in his name and the real property taxes thereon paid by him for the years 1970 to 1979

MTCC decision: dismissed the complaint

RTC decision: affirmed the MTCC

CA decision: reversed the RTC and MTCC

ISSUE:

WON private respondent Chua has a better right over the property.

RULING:

Yes. Having been in prior continuous possession, private respondent is preferentially entitled to occupy the land.

In sum, private respondent was in earlier possession of the contested lot; his sales application preceded that of petitioner; his warehouse and gasoline station already existed long before petitioner took possession of the parcel of land in question; and he has been paying taxes and rental fees thereon since 1968. As provided by the Civil Code -

Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the case of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; ...

Judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, without pronouncement as to costs.