cs on management of large amounts of waste after an emergency a few thoughts michael tichauer 5...

CS on Management of large amounts of waste after an

emergency

A few thoughts

Michael Tichauer

5 February 2013

(it’s my birthday!)

CS on management of large amounts of waste – 5/02/2013

I want to share three little thoughts wth you…

Tackling post-accidental situations

defence in depth:

a new layer ?

The ‘I don’t know’ effect

Chaos,Taxis,Cosmos


Defence in depth (1/3)

“This idea of multiple levels of protection is the central feature of defence in depth...”

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Outer layer : off-site emergency response


Defence in depth (2/3) After the emergency response : Remediation, land reclaim, population re-allocation, economic recovery


Defence in depth : conclusion (3/3)

▌ Incorporating planning for post-emergency situation will become a new argument of the safety case

▌ Demonstration of a nuclear facility’s safety will be strengthened by this new outer layer

▌ … keeping in mind the graded approach : planning for the post-accidental phase is worthy if consequences of an accident induce major socio-economic and radiological impact.

▌ A little bit of philosophy (read P. Virilio if you wish). How precisely should we plan for the catastrophic event ? All in all this is a question of geography: how far does the nuclear power plant “control” the land (therefore annihilate part of its free use)? How organized, planned and ‘ready’ should the territory be ?


Defence-in-depth is a concept that has been the cornerstone of nuclear safety for the past fifty years. The TMI accident (1979) was a brutal

awakening for nuclear safety specialists since they had to admit that even if DiD was a robust concept, it was not fail-proof: the nuclear

safety doctrine expanded further the concept by adding an extra layer of “Emergency preparedness and response”. Later, DiD was

codified at the international level (INSAG-10). Even after the Chernobyl accident, it was a common saying that RBMK reactor design did not

take fully into account the principles of DiD. In 2011, the Fukushima accident struck the nuclear safety specialists’ community because

such a scenario had not been imagined ever: a wave almost twice as big as the biggest expected wave, a loss of coolant and a concurrent

loss of power, the extremely difficult access of the site (due to the tsunami), etc. On top of that, in every operator’s emergency

preparedness plan, one only reactor is almost systematically accounted for in the accident scenario, not four plus pools. etc. In other

words, this accident was not just an error in the calculation, it was a misunderstanding of the highest possible external aggression and the

question is still raised whether the nuclear safety doctrine is now robust enough. Among the lessons learned, the post-accidental phase

(after the acute situation in the NPP and its vicinity) now raises many issues, especially when it comes to waste management, sometimes

dozens of kilometres away from the accident site.

In the post-accidental phase, different actions will take place, most of them directed towards the overall goal of reclaiming the land that

was contaminated by the fallout in the aftermath of the accident. Thanks to the experience gained countries who faced such situations, it

is admitted today that a good planning of the post accidental phase would ensure a much more efficient management by the different

actors than improvisation and new thinking. In fact, the questions at stake during the post accidental phase go well beyond strict

radiological issues : since population (and its role in the remediation process and in the re- development of affected territories), is at stake,

quick results, efficiency and coordination between the actors are paramount.

It is then proposed to incorporate into the nuclear safety basic doctrine of DiD an extra layer beyond emergency preparedness and

emergency response : post-accidental planning and actions to help remediation after an emergency.


Chaos, taxis, cosmos

▌ Our issue is: To organise a vast amount of parameters in such a waynthat the post-accidental phase is not too long, does not harm too much the society, is affordable, is showing progress, etc. the goal is to take care of the people and the environment.

▌ In the world, there are hundreds of different NPPs, in hundreds of different environments, with thousands of different cultures, lives, priorities…

▌ How could it be possible to describe a post-accidental situation ? thus, how to organise it ?



▌ The ancient greeks used to talk about the organization of complex things as such :

Χαος / Khaos is born out of void Chaos is the father of reality, he precedes the gods. Therefore Chaos is not “nothing” but the possibility of all possibilities.Out of chaos, there are two ways of organizing things :

Τάξις

Taxis

Κόσμος

Kosmos

Taxinomy: arrangement,

ordering, sorting…

Cosmos:Nature, harmony,

A dynamic and ever-rearranging order



▌ therefore… Should we think about everything and arrange what we think will be the reality in a static and extremely efficient (but improbable) table? ……………………………or

▌ Should we rather identify the main parameters of a post accidental situation

assign them a set of properties that allows them to change over time and space

imagine within which boundaries they will evolve

propose a framework in which they interact

▌ set the scene and its possibilities rather than describe the play we will not see ?



▌ Way forward:

▌ Identify the main scenarios: land contamination or not, massive fallout or not, etc.

▌ Identify the geographic parameters: the cities, the infrastructures, the topography, the land, the economic and cultural assets (such as the vineyards in France, the peaches in Fukushima/Yamagata prefectures…), the targets to protect no matter what (water, industries…)

▌ Identify the waste: man-made, soil, trees, water…

▌ Assign ranges of parameters : displacement of population, volumes of waste, etc.

▌ Derive stylized scenarios let them organize by themselves.


Why doing so ? Because ‘I don’t know’

▌ Setting the best organization to manage waste seems like an impossible task.

▌ Setting guidelines that can be rearranged upon the evolution of the accident and its aftermath seems achievable.

▌ A dynamic waste management framework ?

cs on management of large amounts of waste after an emergency a few thoughts michael tichauer 5...

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