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Annals of Tourism Research, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 969–989, 20080160-7383/$ - see front matter � 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved

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doi:10.1016/j.annals.2008.09.004www.elsevier.com/locate/atoures

CULTURAL TOURISM, CEREMONYAND THE STATE IN CHINA

Hongliang YanBill Bramwell

Sheffield Hallam University, UK

Abstract: The state is uniquely placed to determine how cultural heritage is used for tour-ism. Yet, even in highly centralized regimes, at times the central state is likely to respondto societal pressures and local government initiative in order to maintain its political hege-mony. The paper explores the changing attitudes of China’s Communist Party-led nationalgovernment toward cultural heritage and Confucianism, and the consequences of that shiftfor tourism and a Confucian ceremony at Qufu World Heritage Site. A gradual acceptanceby central government of tourism and traditional cultural activities at the site is related togrowing tensions and instabilities in Chinese society and to a slow decentralization of gov-ernment policymaking. Keywords: state policy, cultural tradition, cultural tourism, socialism,China. � 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

INTRODUCTION

Through visiting tourist attractions and reading promotional mate-rial, tourists may be able to make a connection between themselvesand their society, thereby influencing their sense of identity and feel-ings for social cohesion. This paper examines the state’s efforts toinfluence such connections between tourism and cultural identity.Governments may seek to shape cultural identity by promoting aspectsof a country’s cultural patrimony for tourism, and by ignoring or resist-ing others. They may also attempt selectively to re-work and re-write thecultural heritage presented at tourist attractions (Palmer 1999). Be-hind these actions there may be intentions to strengthen loyalties tothe government’s favored ideologies and political objectives. Theseintentions might include the use of ‘‘tourism and its promotion inan effort to exercise control and demonstrate authority and legiti-macy’’ (Henderson 2002:73; Handler 1988; Leong 1997; Light 2007;Tunbridge and Ashworth 1996; Wood 1984). Tourism may be used,for example, to transmit images of the competence of the ruling eliteand the correctness of the government’s political beliefs (Richter

Hongliang Yan and Bill Bramwell are respectively, Researcher and Professor in tourism atSheffield Hallam University (Sheffield S1 1WB, United Kingdom. Email: <[email protected]>). The former is researching modernity, sustainability and heritage tourism inChina and the connections between tourism and change in Chinese society; and the latterhas research interests in actors and political economy, the politics of sustainability, andChina’s tourism development.

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1999). Governments may also attempt to use tourism as a tool inshaping national identity, such that ‘‘tourism and nationalist policiesare often complementary’’ (Henderson 2002:72). This can have widesignificance as people’s sense of identity may cohere around the ideaof the nation, with the nation being ‘‘not only a political entity butsomething which produces meanings—a system of cultural representa-tion’’ (Hall 1992: 292).

Yet the state is rarely the only actor influencing how cultural heritageis developed and used, and it may well have to respond to societal ten-sions and instabilities. There may be pressures from the broad changesaffecting groups in society, such as tourism industry groups, conserva-tion interests, the media or community groups. Although the state hasvery considerable powers, it is rare that it will completely ignore all ten-sions and interests, especially if they operate in concerted ways. Purcelland Nevins (2005:212) suggest that ‘‘In order to maintain politicallegitimacy and effective authority over its people, the state must repro-duce a politically stable relationship between state and citizen’’. In cap-italist societies there may be crises exerting pressure on the state toalter its policies toward cultural tradition: these can include economiccrises, when the economy sees limited accumulation and fails to meetpopular expectations, and legitimation crises, where the state loses itsability to reflect the popular will (Majone 1999; Swyngedouw 2000). Inaddition, the state is itself composed of central government, or the na-tional-level state, and also regional and more local tiers of government(Yuksel, Bramwell and Yuksel 2005). Each of these government tiersmay have different objectives for cultural heritage and for tourism usesof that heritage.

For such reasons the hegemony of the central state or national gov-ernment is never total. Continuing processes of adjustment are usuallyneeded in order to develop and maintain support in society and thusto legitimate the state’s position. While the central state may select pol-icies to strengthen its position, these policies may not be completely ofits own making. Rarely do people remain passive and powerless in theprocess (Wood 1984). Henderson (2002:73) suggests that ‘‘attempts toharness tourism to hegemonic ambitions are not always successful. Lo-cal residents may dispute promulgated notions of identity’’. This is evi-dent in Cano and Mysyk’s (2004) assessment of the Mexican state’sattempts to transform a cultural celebration in a rural community—the Day of the Dead—into a tourist attraction, such as by developinga small hotel and promoting cultural tourism. The authors show thatthe government was opposed by some residents, who attempted to con-trol tourist activity during the celebration. These residents are depictedas having ‘‘at least a minimal amount of power to cause the state to re-examine its tourism strategies’’ (p. 894). Because the residents wereessential to the celebration’s success, the state made several conces-sions to ensure their continued participation. Yet, while the state re-thought aspects of its strategy due to this opposition, it remainedintent on using this cultural attraction for tourism.

In the present study the connections between the state, tourism andcultural identity are examined for a socialist country led by a com-

H. Yan, B. Bramwell / Annals of Tourism Research 35 (2008) 969–989 971

munist political party. Henderson (2007:250) contends that ‘‘The va-lue attached to tourism as a propaganda channel is especially highwithin a communist context where the fundamental insecurity ofauthoritarianism gives rise to a compulsion to trumpet the superiorityof the doctrine and the benefits of life in a socialist utopia’’. There isan emerging literature on the roles that the state may play in tourismdevelopment in these socio-political contexts, mostly in Central andEast European countries and recently also in Asian countries. Thiswork shows that in several communist countries in Central and EasternEurope between the 1960s and 80s tourism commonly was used to pres-ent their unique identities as socialist states, and sometimes to high-light the superiority of socialist ideology (Hall 1981). Sites ofreligious pilgrimage there were often regarded as irritants and theywere not officially encouraged as tourist attractions; while numerousopen air ‘‘village museums’’ were promoted so as to inculcate nationalpride in the shared socialist endeavour (Hall 2000). In Albania, smallgroups of international tourists were taken on carefully constructedtours to sites of significance for socialism (Hall 1990). Henderson(2007:249) argues that in North Korea ‘‘some sites contribute to xeno-phobia and a siege mentality which is fundamental to the regime’spreservation’’.

Since communism’s collapse in many Central and East Europeancountries in 1989, tourism has been one of several ways in which thesenations have sought to remake national identity (Burns 1998; Hall1999; Light 2000, 2007). The new states have attempted to projectpost-socialist identities as part of a re-integration into Western Europe’seconomic and political structures (Hall 1999; Light 2001). This has of-ten involved denying memories of the communist past and the con-struction of new identities oriented to the democratic and capitalistWest. Tourism has been used by the state to achieve these objectives,such as through images used in tourism promotion and stories toldat heritage sites. Equally importantly, these post-communist govern-ments have promoted tourism in order to attract tourist expenditureas their economies have struggled to adjust to capitalism (Chance1994; Lowenthal 1997).

Even in socialist countries with Communist Party-led governments,the state’s attempts to use tourism to build cultural identity may notalways have gone completely unchallenged or been fully successful.Based on a study of the uses of cultural heritage for tourism in threeEast Asian socialist countries (Laos, Vietnam and North Korea), Hen-derson (2007:244) concludes that ‘‘While the ruling Communistelites allocate the highest priority to retaining their authority, theydo confront potentially destabilising questions of political legitimacyand social and economic uncertainties’’. In post-communist states,the use of tourism for identity-building is less likely to be widely ac-cepted. For instance, while these states have sought to put the com-munist period firmly behind them, some tourists still want to seeevidence of the ‘‘communist heritage’’. And there has been someaccommodation to this desire because it is a valuable source of in-come (Light 2000).


This paper examines the roles of both the national-level state and lo-cal state in the relationships between tourism and cultural identity inChina. This is a socialist country with a Communist Party-led state.The continuity of rule of the Chinese Communist Party constitutes astriking feature of China today, in contrast to the nations of Centraland Eastern Europe. After Mao Zedong assumed political leadershipof China in 1949, the communist central state rejected many past cul-tural traditions, including beliefs associated with Confucianism, and italso resisted tourism development. After Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 ‘‘OpenDoor’’ reforms, however, China began to re-evaluate its cultural pastand also to encourage tourism. Authority in China has remained highlycentralized over this period, so that cultural and tourism policies arestill greatly influenced by national government. It is in this context thatthe relationships between state, cultural identity and tourism are ex-plored through the experiences of one cultural site—the family homeof Confucius at Qufu, in East China’s Shandong Province—and partic-ularly through a traditional cultural ceremony held there, the Confu-cius ‘‘cult ceremony’’. The buildings and other facilities there arenow a UNESCO World Heritage Site and it is a tourist attraction of na-tional importance.

The study’s first aim is to assess how China’s national governmenthas sought to influence Qufu’s tourism development and also the Con-fucius ‘‘cult ceremony’’ held there. This relationship has been partic-ularly affected by the central state’s attitudes to Confucianism as apart of the Chinese people’s cultural traditions. A second aim is to eval-uate whether the national government’s approach to tourism and the‘‘cult ceremony’’ at this site has been affected by tensions and instabil-ities in China’s society or by pressures from lower tiers of government.Since Deng’s 1978 reforms, tensions have emerged between the pre-vailing socialist ideology and the increasing ‘‘marketization’’ of theeconomy, and there has also been a trend towards government decen-tralization. These issues are examined for this site using both relationaland historical approaches to research.

Reform in China is usually described as having been gradual due tothe persistence of the fundamental principles and political institutionsof socialism (Sun 2008). There has been much stability in the concep-tion of authority as ‘‘deriving ultimately from a single, exceedinglycentralized source on high’’ (Shue 2008:141). While the CommunistParty-led state retains a dominant position, it might still have had tomake concessions at Qufu, even if only in minor ways. This is possiblebecause in recent years China has experienced contradictions and ten-sions that have started to encourage ideological debates in both societyand government (Wang 2008). Tensions have occurred, for example,between socialism and Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 market reforms, and be-tween socialism and China’s traditional cultural values. Some centralstate concessions might also have been encouraged by the growingdecentralization in China’s governance since Deng’s reforms. Further,it has been suggested that China’s state has been adept at incorporat-ing new reforms into pre-existing ideology, and also at ‘‘putting asidethe debate’’ which, in effect, involves allowing something to occur but


not talking much about it (Shue 2008; Sun 2008). How these processesare worked out can only be fully understood through close studies ofthe operational realities of ‘‘practice’’, rather than through officialrhetoric or institutional structures. Thus, the analysis here examinessuch ‘‘practice’’ in relation to Qufu’s tourism development and ‘‘cultceremony’’, and it relates these to wider trends in China’s governanceand society.

CULTURAL TOURISM, CEREMONY AND THE STATE

Qufu and the Confucius ‘‘cult ceremony’’ held there are highlyprominent symbols of Confucian philosophy, a traditional set of philo-sophical beliefs and cultural values that in feudal times profoundlyinfluenced Chinese people’s lives, and it remains a significant influ-ence today. The site’s prominence derives from it being the familyhome of Confucius, the renowned philosopher, educator and politi-cian, who lived there from 551 to 479 BC. While Confucianism is a phi-losophy rather than a religion, Confucius himself has been deeplyrevered in Chinese society and Confucianism is a highly influential cul-tural tradition in China. At Qufu, additions over many years to the ori-ginal small house of Confucius have created a huge complex, with theConfucian temple alone having over one hundred buildings (Lu1994). The site’s cemetery contains the Confucius tomb and the re-mains of over 100,000 of his descendents, and the site also houses a col-lection of detailed genealogies of his family. Qufu was visited by manyof China’s past feudal emperors in order to pay homage to Confucius(Lu 1994). A focus for analysis here is the traditional Confucius ‘‘cultceremony’’ held there. Originally a state-sponsored event establishedby Emperor Gao in 205 BC, it was stopped during Mao Zedong’s eraof revolutionary socialism and it has only been re-established in recenttimes. The ceremony’s changing fortunes are considered in the paper,together with their recent connections with tourism development.

Changes at the site and in the ‘‘cult ceremony’’ are assessed hereusing a relational approach where social life is considered to involveconnected and circulating relations interacting in diverse ways (Bram-well and Meyer 2007; Jessop 1990). The complicated relationshipsamong the inner elements of a phenomenon in society, and betweenthat phenomenon and its various contexts, are regarded as perpetuallyevolving and ‘‘emergent’’. This study also adopts an historical or longi-tudinal perspective. This temporal emphasis seeks to understand thedynamic interplay between Qufu’s local situation and China’s politicaland socioeconomic changes. As Sofield and Li (1998a:273) contend, itis necessary ‘‘to ensure that any historical study of the particular tour-ism element also takes into account the changing political and socio-economic forces at work over time’’.

China’s shifting socioeconomic and political contexts and their con-nections with cultural tradition are highly significant. Much of the na-tion’s history was based on a feudal social system and a political orderof royal dynasties. That feudal society was guided by traditional philos-


ophies, religions and spiritual meanings that emphasized respect forsociety’s rulers and elders and morality in personal relationships. Con-fucianism was highly influential in that era. These cultural traditionswere completely rejected, however, after Mao Zedong assumed politi-cal leadership of the country in 1949. In this new socialist era led byChina’s Communist Party, the cultural traditions of feudalism, includ-ing Confucianism, were attacked as based on superstitions and anexploitative and unequal social order (Sofield and Li 1998b; Spence1999). Attitudes to traditional culture began to change again, albeitslowly, after Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 ‘‘Open Door’’ reforms. Deng’s pol-icies sought to ‘‘modernize’’ the country through a more market-ori-ented economy, but still within ideological frameworks and a socialistsystem led by the Communist Party. The reforms did not really changethe dominant position of the Communist Party and state, and thepiecemeal character of the reform process has given the governmenttime to adjust its strategies of control (Kang and Han 2008). Sincethese reforms, the country’s tourism industry has expanded rapidly,including at sites such as Qufu that are based on cultural traditionsoriginating from the feudal period.

Shifting relations between China’s central state and local govern-ment have been another important influence on the site’s develop-ment. The city of Qufu is responsible for both heritage conservationand tourism development at the site. After 1949 the site’s conservationwas managed by the city’s heritage preservation committee, which laterbecame its Cultural Heritage Preservation Administration (ShandongProvince 2007). Its tourism promotion after 1978 was handled by thecity’s Foreign Affairs Office and from 1985 by its Tourism Administra-tion (Li 2001). The Cultural Heritage Preservation Administration wasnot directly involved in developing tourism at the site, with this beingleft to the Tourism Administration (Li 2001). The revival of the Confu-cius ‘‘cult ceremony’’ was also steered by the Tourism Administration,with the Cultural Heritage Preservation Administration taking just asecondary, facilitating role. In 2005 a new site management committeewas established: the Qufu Cultural Heritage Administration Commit-tee. While it combined tourism promotion and heritage conservation,in practical terms the Tourism Administration retained its local domi-nance in directing tourism development and in shaping the ‘‘cult cer-emony’’ (Jining Tourism Authority 2005).

Both the conservation and tourism organizations report to Qufu’scity government. There is also a hierarchical chain of reporting up-wards to corresponding organizations in the larger city of Jining, andfrom there to Shandong Province and to national government. Atthe government’s top tier, heritage management responsibility lieswith the Ministry of State Administration of Cultural Heritage, andtourism is dealt with by the National Tourism Administration (ChinaNational Tourism Administration 2007; Qian 2007). This hierarchyof government levels can allow China’s central state to determine thedirection of local decision making. Another potential top-down influ-ence on local government is that many of its politicians are CommunistParty appointees, and many of its officials are Communist Party cadres


who seek to carry out the Party’s national policies. Qian (2007) noteshow many conservation officials also hold positions as CommunistParty cadres and must therefore ensure that the Party’s agenda is car-ried out. Yet there has been a slow but growing decentralization of gov-ernance in China since Deng’s reforms, with the relations betweencentral government, provinces and localities becoming more complex.This process of decentralization has shifted some of the public admin-istration and economic authority from the central state to provincial,city and county levels (Lewis and Xue 2003; White 1992). Conse-quently, there is a greater capacity than in the past for creative localleadership.

Research Methods

Multiple sources and methods were used to understand the attitudesof national government and other groups to Qufu’s heritage, the ‘‘cultceremony’’ and Confucian values. In-depth interviews were under-taken with 28 actors. Of these, 15 were policymakers or managerswho were employed at the site or worked for local government andwere regularly involved with the site. Among these there were employ-ees of local government departments for tourism, cultural heritage andurban planning. There were five further interviews with residents ofnearby Qufu town who were very knowledgeable about the site’s devel-opment. Two of these were local community leaders as well as descen-dents of Confucius, and three were retired government officialspreviously involved in the site’s management. Finally, interviews witheight officials in relevant national and regional government depart-ments provided other information concerning Qufu. They includedofficials from the national and provincial tourism and also cultural her-itage administrative organisations, and also from the provincial officefor compiling historical records. Only two people were unavailablefor interview, this being because they were away on business. In addi-tion to the 28 actors, five academics with interests in cultural heritageand Confucianism were interviewed about views within China concern-ing cultural tradition.

All interviews took place between July and September 2005. Theygenerally lasted 40 to 80 minutes, were guided by a flexible scheduleof themes and were recorded. The same themes were also consideredwhen consulting a range of documents and when undertaking four sitevisits in 2005. Several visits had also been made previously. Among thedocuments reviewed were planning studies, policy statements andmonitoring reports produced by national and local government, pro-motional and interpretive materials, and articles in local and nationalnewspapers.

Qufu and the Cult Ceremony Before 1978

Qufu and the cult ceremony are prominent symbols of Confucianism,a philosophy that was central to China’s society in the feudal period. It


considers that a utopian society requires the regulation of human rela-tionships, so as to secure social order and also the attainment of harmonybetween individuals, groups and the nation. It sees a utopian society asone guided by the ‘‘five constant virtues’’ of benevolence (ren), righ-teousness (yi), propriety (li), knowledge (zhi) and sincerity (xin). Confu-cian teaching also stresses a hierarchical societal order based on the‘‘three cardinal guides’’, whereby the ruler guides the subject, the fatherguides the son, and the husband guides the wife. These Confucian valuesbecame firmly established within the beliefs underpinning China’s feu-dal society and its hereditary emperors. Although some scholars avoiddescribing Confucianism as an ideology, in many respects it served as astate ideology responding to ‘‘the changing political needs of its believ-ers’’ (Lieberthal 1995), and it retained its influential position until feu-dalism was replaced by the Republic of China in 1912.

After the death of Confucius, Qufu became a place of devotion andremembrance for his followers, including the nation’s emperors. In205 BC, Emperor Gao established the Confucius ‘‘cult ceremony’’there. This state-sponsored ceremony centred on offering sacrificesto Confucius’ spirit in the temple. It involved the offering of food tohis memory and also an ‘‘eight-row dance’’ in his honour performedby eight rows of eight dancers. Confucius was the only person to be rev-ered in this way by an imperial ruler. Further evidence of the imperialleaders’ homage to him over the feudal period was seen in the 12emperors who paid their respects to him at Qufu, and the deputiesof about 100 emperors who attended 196 Confucian ‘‘cult ceremo-nies’’ (Xu 1993). The imperial court also sent funds each year to main-tain and extend the site’s buildings, and in the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) they allowed the building of an enclosure wall around the tem-ple modelled on Beijing’s Imperial Palace.

The position of the site and ceremony changed dramatically after thecommunist revolution and establishment of the People’s Republic ofChina under Mao Zedong in 1949. Mao strove fervently for a socialistsocio-economic system based on the philosophies of Marx, Lenin andMao, which were held to be scientific and revolutionary (Ogden 1995).His search for a ‘‘modern’’ socialist society involved a strong aversionto feudalism’s traditional cultural values, including those associatedwith Confucius, with these values depicted as major obstacles to social-ism. It was contended that feudal elites had used traditional values—such as support for hereditary lineage and imperial dynasties, andthe veneration of ancestors—as a means to strengthen their exploita-tion and dominance (Dardess 1983). In 1958 Mao attacked these val-ues and practices, claiming that they needed to be abandonedbecause ‘‘only blank paper could draw the latest and most beautifulpictures’’ (Mao 1999:178). The Communist Party severely criticisedQufu’s ‘‘cult ceremony’’ as representing a feudal superstition con-tradicting socialist principles. During Mao’s era the site’s authoritiesfeared the consequences of continuing the traditional activities, andthus they were abandoned.

The state under Mao also generally discouraged domestic and inter-national tourism (Chow 1988; Wen and Tisdell 2001), with tourist


numbers being tightly restricted. China’s cultural sites were also notpromoted for tourism. When tourism occasionally was encouraged itwas for propaganda purposes as a part of China’s foreign affairs poli-cies (China National Tourism Administration 1992; Qiao 1995), suchas to celebrate communist achievements through visits to factoriesand to groups of socialist workers and peasants (Sofield and Li1998b). Socialist ideology especially discouraged visits to sites associ-ated with traditional culture because that was connected with backwardfeudalism and with unscientific beliefs. While a heritage preservationcommittee for Qufu was set up in 1949, its scope was restricted to pres-ervation work rather than to encouraging tourism, and it had only verylimited state funding (Li 2001).

Qufu’s fortunes notably deteriorated from 1966 when Mao launchedhis ‘‘Cultural Revolution’’ in an attempt to reinvigorate the socialistrevolution (Sofield and Li 1998a and b). He called for a more radicalremoval of past traditions, including the ‘‘four olds’’, of ‘‘old customs,old culture, old habits, and old ideas’’ and, of course, these were essen-tial features of the site (Spence 1999:575). During the ‘‘Cultural Revo-lution’’ the Red Guards tried to damage Qufu physically. According toa later account, during one assault on the site they yelled slogansagainst the Confucius family name of Kong, such as ‘‘Topple OldKong!’’ and ‘‘Burn the Kong family shop!’’ (People’s Daily 2001; Qian2007). Two groups of local people, however, sought to stop the RedGuards from causing damage. First, the local Qufu County CommunistParty worked hard to dissuade them, arguing that, despite the site’sassociations with feudalism and imperial dynasties, it was just an arte-fact administered by national authorities that followed socialist princi-ples, and that those authorities should not to be opposed (Wang2002:385). Second, nearby residents gathered to protect the site fromthe Red Guards. Many of these were descendents of Confucius or ofConfucian scholars and many were simply proud of the site’s associa-tions and reputation. Despite the local opposition, a national-levelorganization—the Central Revolutionary Leadership Committee ofthe Communist Party—allowed the Red Guards to damage the site’sbuildings and other relicts, apart from the temple, house and cemetery(Wang 2002:385). By the end of the ‘‘Cultural Revolution’’ approxi-mately 2,700 books, 900 paintings, 1,000 stone pillars and inscriptions,and 6,000 other items had been destroyed there (Xu 1993). The RedGuards even exceeded their authorization, with various objects insidethe temple being smashed or burnt, including the statue of Confucius,and the grave of Confucius was also levelled.

Negotiating Change at Qufu After 1978

Deng Xiaoping’s ‘‘Open Door’’ reforms from 1978 involved the lim-ited introduction of market forces in the economy and a shift inemphasis from political struggles to economic development. Afterthese reforms, China’s government began to change its views about tra-ditional cultural values, influenced by growing instabilities and con-


cerns in Chinese society. The state remained highly dominant, butthere was some interplay between it and the societal tensions that wereaffecting attitudes to cultural heritage. The discussion next exploreshow the state’s reforms and the growing tensions in society encourageda degree of public debate about cultural tradition, including Confu-cianism, and also changing views in government about this and aboutQufu’s cultural tourism.

After 1978 both central and local government became increasinglyenthusiastic about tourism as a stimulus to economic growth and mod-ernization (Wen and Tisdell 2001). Deng recognized in 1979 that‘‘there is a lot to be achieved through tourism’’ and that this industrycould ‘‘increase national income’’ (China National Tourism Adminis-tration 2000a and b), and the state agencies subsequently endorsed itas ‘‘a vehicle which could help to achieve national and local economicdevelopment, especially for poor areas with rich tourism resources’’(Hu, Z., 2005:52). The new emphasis on tourism for economic devel-opment encouraged the rehabilitation of numerous cultural sites,including those associated with traditional Confucian values. By theearly 1980s Qufu had accessed national, regional and also internationalfunding for restoration work, including repairs to damage caused bythe Red Guards. There was also a huge inflow of investment intonew tourist accommodation in the small neighbouring town of Qufu,allowing it to receive 1.3 million domestic and 15,000 internationaltourists annually by the early 1990s (Li 2001), and 4.5 million and170,000 international tourists by 2004 (Qufu Committee for CompilingAnnual Statistics 2005).

The growth in tourism at China’s cultural sites based on traditionalvalues also reflected the central state beginning to re-evaluate those val-ues. This new assessment had complex roots. The ‘‘Open Door’’ poli-cies encouraged China’s leaders to start to search for ways to legitimizethe incorporation of market forces within socialism and also to main-tain the Communist Party’s political dominance (Deng 1993:173; So-field and Li 1998b). As well as the tensions between socialistprinciples and the operation of the market, there was a growing beliefthat market expansion had encouraged a ‘‘moral vacuum’’ in Chinesesociety, seen in trends toward materialism, the pursuit of individualrather than collective advancement, and increasing selfishness. In theyears after 1978, the national leadership began to see how a selectiverevival of traditional Chinese values might assist in reducing tensions.This was because in the past these values had underpinned Chinesepeople’s senses of social responsibility and shared national identity,and thus a limited revival of these values might allow for a smoothertransition from a socialist planned economy to a more market-basedeconomy, and also for a greater acceptance of a distinctive Chineseapproach to development combining socialism with certain capitalistfeatures (Mackerras, Taneja and Young 1994).

The position of the Communist Party might also be strengthened bya modest revival of traditional values because previously those valueshad encouraged acceptance of established authority and leadership.An official from the province’s heritage administration contended in


his interview that cultural heritage was being ‘‘re-valued’’ and its mean-ings being reinterpreted for differing purposes by national govern-ment since Deng’s reforms in the late 1970s. China’s currentPresident, Hu (2005), has regularly advocated the need to ‘‘build upa socialist harmonious society’’. A Confucian academic suggested inhis interview that because ‘‘harmony’’ is a key Confucian objective,then Hu’s phrase might imply there are merits in combining some fea-tures of Confucianism with socialism. Such reasons may help explainwhy, after Deng’s reforms, the Chinese state has accepted a gradual in-crease in traditional cultural activities, including encouragement to ex-pand tourism at sites associated with traditional values, as exemplifiedby Qufu.

The state’s changing attitudes after 1978 were seen in a very gradualrelaxation of political control over religion in the country, leading to asignificant growth in religious activity. An ‘‘intensified ritual land-scape’’ emerged, particularly in rural areas, with the rebuilding of com-munity temples, ancestor halls and sites of pilgrimage on holymountains (Jing 2002:335). While Confucianism is not a religion, thereducing controls over traditional values also substantially benefitedcultural sites associated with this philosophy.

While the state’s position on traditional culture was starting to bemodified, this change was also encouraged by a growing nostalgiaamong some in China for the moral codes and certainties of the pastand for a more supportive social order (He 2002). These ideas werebecoming expressed after 1978 by some individuals and groups otherthan the descendents of Confucius. From the 1990s, increasing num-bers of academics argued in public that it was time to revisit and evenrestore some cultural traditions from the past, including Confucian-ism. Often they supported Confucianism because its traditional beliefscould help to rebuild social solidarity in response to an alleged ‘‘moralvacuum’’. A Confucian scholar from a local university argued in hisinterview that Confucian teachings are the cultural root of Chinesesociety and that the promotion of this philosophy in contemporarysociety could help to re-establish past social morality. In other casesthe teachings were supported as a defence against western values andas a means of boosting people’s confidence in indigenous Chinese val-ues. In an interview, a researcher from the China Social Science Re-search Institute complained that socialism and capitalism, as theleading philosophies influencing China’s recent history, had origi-nated in the West, and he argued that this made it inevitable thatthe country would come to revive its own traditional values, includingConfucianism. He contended that this ‘‘country with 1.3 billion peopleneeds the ‘cultural conformity’’’ provided by traditional values, andnotably by Confucianism. According to another Chinese academicwho was interviewed, the country’s assault on traditional culture sinceMao had reduced many people’s self-confidence, and he believed itcould be restored if people were allowed to revere their cultural past.

This public debate has been influenced by some business communitymembers arguing for a selective recuperation of traditional Confucianvalues (He 2002; Oakes 1998). One private sector interviewee lamented


how the country’s rapid economic development had resulted in the ‘‘lossof our proud tradition for moral beliefs’’. For him, the ideal societywould be a ‘‘market economy with a social order based on Confucian val-ues’’. Often the private sector was less concerned about the consolida-tion of socialist values or of a shared national identity, rather theirviews reflected their admiration of the economic success of some otherAsian countries, which was attributed to their distinctive combination ofConfucian values with Western capitalism (Oakes 1998; Zhang 1999).Further, some followers of traditional religions and of Confucianism be-gan to advocate a loosening of constraints on cultural traditions.

Local government in places with cultural attractions associated withtraditional values also often advocated further tourism developmentbased on those attractions, seeking the local economic benefits result-ing from tourists’ spending and related place marketing. Local govern-ment also gained some greater autonomy after Deng’s reforms whichsought to promote more decentralized public administration and poli-cymaking (Liu 2001). Thus, Qufu’s Tourism Administration was highlyprominent in developing the site’s tourism activities and in the re-emer-gence of a Confucius ‘‘cult ceremony’’. The organization’s Directoremphasized in his interview in 2005 that the cult ceremony was a focusfor their work intended ‘‘to use the media and local heritage to boostthe local economy’’. He also emphasized how one in seven of Qufu’sresidents depended directly on tourism, which meant he consideredit essential to develop the ceremony further and in ways that providedlong-term, local economic benefits. Some local officials used the notionof ‘‘culture taking the stage, and the economic acting upon it’’.

The Cult Dance Show, 1986–1993

The discussion now focuses on the slow re-emergence of Qufu’s‘‘cult ceremony’’, which originally was established by an emperor inthe feudal era to pay homage to Confucius. The analysis examinesthe timing of changes to the ceremony and the influences on thosechanges. Qufu’s Tourism Administration organization led the intro-duction of an event connected with the original ‘‘cult ceremony’’. Thiswas first held in 1986 as part of a domestic and international tourismpromotion called ‘‘Travel to the Hometown of Confucius’’. This localtourism organization had been set up in 1985, the previous year, and ithad grown out of a Foreign Affairs Office set up in 1978. Both organi-zations had quickly gained powers and influence due to the decentral-ization of public administration from central government and thebooming tourism industry since Deng’s reforms. The ‘‘cult danceshow’’ event held annually from 1986 was promoted as part of a pro-gram to celebrate the birthday of Confucius, this being seen as accept-able to central government as it distanced it from the ‘‘cult ceremony’’of the feudal period that had followed a seasonal pattern based onfood offerings. The local authorities also called the event the ‘‘cultdance show’’ rather than the ‘‘cult ceremony’’ (Xu 1993) and this gaveprominence to the ‘‘eight-row dance’’ undertaken in honour of Con-


fucius, and it did not suggest that there were other traditional ceremo-nial elements.

During the planning for the 1986 program, however, there were dis-cussions about holding a ceremony that more closely resembled thoseheld in feudal times, this being argued as necessary because most inter-national tourists likely to attend would be from Asian countries whereConfucianism had retained its prominence and traditions. A retiredmanager of the Qufu site recalled how central government had re-sponded to these local discussions by sending an official to instructthe local authorities that the ‘‘cult ceremony’’ was forbidden. The localorganisers in turn sought to convince the higher government officialsand Communist Party that the program excluded many elements ofthe traditional ‘‘cult ceremony’’ and that it was not a ‘‘cover’’ for sus-pect activities. Subsequently, the event was allowed to be held after itwas agreed that during the ceremony the temple door would be shutso that nobody could pay homage to the statue of Confucius, homagewould not be paid on bent knees, and the lead ceremonial role wouldnot be taken by a descendent of Confucius. Three years later, the pro-gram was renamed the ‘‘International Confucian Cultural Festival’’and the scale of dancing activities was expanded, but there were noother substantive additions to the ceremonial content.

The Civilian Cult Ceremony, 1993–2004

In acts of official support for Qufu, Prime Minister Li Peng and Pres-ident Jiang Zemin paid visits to the site in 1991 and 1992 respectively.During Li’s visit he left a written statement that the site ‘‘derives fromthe essence of Confucianism and it promotes the magnificence of ourChinese culture’’ (Xu 1993:i). According to an official in the city’sTourism Administration, this statement gave local officials more confi-dence and a clearer direction for restoring the traditional Confuciusceremony. These visits encouraged local government to believe thatthe state’s attitudes to Confucianism were changing, and they decidedto restore more of the ceremony’s traditional features. The first ‘‘cultceremony’’ took place in 1993 as part of the annual ‘‘InternationalConfucian Cultural Festival’’. In addition to the cult dancing show,the ceremony now also included homage paid by representatives ofthe descendents of Confucius and by several officials from the localbranch of the Chinese People’s Consultative Committee. The templedoor was now left open revealing the Confucius statue during the cer-emonial, including during the dancing, and ceremonial activity nowtook place in front of the statue. However, while in feudal times theceremony’s participants had included imperial emperors or their dep-uties, the revived ceremony from 1993 was not attended by representa-tives of organizations directly within central government or byrepresentatives of the Communist Party. In effect, it was a civilian cer-emony that lacked endorsement by the central state through the atten-dance of its representatives. The one organization with links to centralgovernment that sent representatives was the Chinese People’s


Consultative Committee. This is an organization for political partiesother than the Communist Party that provides policy suggestions forcentral government consideration.

The continuing restrictions at that time on the civilian ‘‘cult cere-mony’’ were criticized by several local interviewees, often on thegrounds that the ceremony was largely being developed as a major tour-ist event rather than to pay homage to Confucius and his philosophy. Alocal organizer of the event complained that ‘‘it was still a show put onfor tourists, and it was far removed from its original political meanings’’.Numerous descendents of Confucius and his scholars contended thatthe ceremony was failing to be true to the essence of its cultural tradi-tions. A descendent of Confucius lamented how the ‘‘people [apartfrom the dancers] who took part in the cult ceremony were wearing wes-tern-style business suits and ties, but not the traditional cult suit. It wasirreverent and ignorant about Confucius and Chinese tradition’’. An-other of their complaints was that the ceremony suffered as it was beingrevived to cater to international tourists who followed Confucianism asmuch as to cater for the beliefs of China’s own population. A local Con-fucian scholar, for example, used a Chinese saying in his complaint thatattitudes in China towards the traditional ‘‘cult ceremony’’ were ‘‘like adomestic sale of a commodity originally produced for export’’. His yearsof research on the subject led him to believe that people from othercountries with a Confucian tradition often displayed a much more seri-ous attitude towards the ceremony than did people living in China.

In this period the local Tourism Administration was concerned thatinternational tourists from countries with a Confucian traditionthought that Qufu’s ceremony was ‘‘inauthentic’’, and they feared thiswould restrict its future tourist appeal. After attending two of these cer-emonies, the Director of a Korean Confucian Committee complainedthat similar ceremonies held in Korea were ‘‘more authentic and tradi-tional than the Qufu one’’ (Wenweipo 2005). Concerns were being ex-pressed more generally in China over these years that Korea wasclaiming some traditional Chinese events and activities to be part ofthat country’s national tradition without reference to their origins inChina. Thus, in the interviews, an official in the national cultural her-itage administration argued that the government was not credible inclaiming the Confucian heritage as its own unless it ‘‘turns its slogansinto our daily practice’’.

During this period the growing political acceptance of the relevanceof Confucianism to contemporary China was demonstrated when thenational Communist Party awarded Qufu the title of ‘‘National Sitefor Patriotic Education’’ in 1997 (China’s Moral and Civic Education1997). It had gained UNESCO recognition as a World Heritage Sitea little earlier, in 1994 (Lu 1994; UNESCO 2006).

The Public Cult Ceremony, 2005

In 2005 the central state authorities finally gave permission for therestoration of the public ‘‘cult ceremony’’. It became ‘‘public’’ as there


was involvement by at least some central government representatives.In that year the ceremony was attended for the first time by represen-tatives of two important national organisations, the China NationalTourism Administration and the State Administration of Radio, Filmand Television, and also by international organizations that requirednational authorization to participate, such as UNESCO and the Inter-national Confucian Committee. This was in addition to the officials ofvarious local and regional government organisations that had beeninvolved for several years, such as representatives of Qufu City Govern-ment, Jining Municipal Government, Shandong Provincial Govern-ment and Shandong Provincial Tourism Administration. Thoseattending also included representatives of two NGOs: the Chinese Cul-ture Promotional Organization and the China Confucius Foundation.A manager at the site claimed that increasing support from higher levelauthorities meant that the 2005 ceremony could have ‘‘the largest scaleyet in the People’s Republic of China’s history’’. For the first time, Chi-na’s Central TV station broadcast the event live to the world, and theQufu organizers used their connections with thirty Confucius templesin other countries to hold simultaneous ceremonies. Yet, if judged bythe central state’s main representative who attended the 2005 cere-mony, then the state still appeared to treat the ceremony with someambivalence. As in previous years, this representative was the Chairmanof the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee. On the onehand, he was the son of a leading military figure who had been hon-oured by Chairman Mao, but he still represented an advisory commit-tee for a process still led by the much more powerful Communist Party.

According to a local Tourism Administration official, they sought tomake the 2005 ceremony ‘‘more authentic and traditional than previ-ously was the case’’. The ceremony was now much more fully modelledaccording to historical records, with traditional utensils used for thefood offerings, everyone attending wearing traditional Chinese suits,and the dancers also wearing clothes based on those from the Ming dy-nasty (1368–1644). A descendent of Confucius also now took the leadrole in the ceremony, and the Mayor of Qufu was the ‘‘master of cer-emonies’’ who read out a ‘‘cult text’’ in front of the temple’s Confuciusstatue. That text was drafted by a Qufu Normal University scholar. Heexplained how it ‘‘tries to explain a Confucian perspective on humanand environmental relationships, traditional culture, the building ofsocial or moral standards, China’s economic revival, and on politicalscience’’ (Wenweipo 2005). Local government support for the 2005ceremony was evident in the substantial role now taken by Qufu’sMayor. The text he read drew on many political slogans and phrasesused by past national leaders in major speeches, and this openly linkedthe ceremony and the involvement of this local government leaderwith the views of China’s national leadership.

The 2005 ‘‘cult ceremony’’ remained somewhat modified, however,from its traditional form in order to conform to the position on socia-list values of the Communist Party-led central government. Two differ-ences were that it did not include paying homage to the Confuciusstatue on bended knees, with the participants simply bowing to the


statue and offering flowers instead, and that incense was not burnt forthe dead Confucian ancestors. This probably reflected continuing con-cern not to upset the national government, but it was also affected bymore traditional ceremonies having last been performed almost be-yond living memory, and aspects of what took place had not been re-corded. Thus, several site managers explained that, despite muchresearch to reconstruct technical details, they had considerable diffi-culty in establishing an appropriate content for the text that was readout in front of the tables with food offerings for the Confucius spirit. Arather different change from the feudal period was that this new public‘‘cult ceremony’’ was accompanied by much attention to merchandis-ing opportunities. This was seen in the plans by local officials for thesale of copies of the text read out when the food offerings were pre-sented. The increasing commercialism concerned some people, withone local descendent of Confucius complaining that in the past ‘‘theConfucius cult ceremony was done as a rapturous thing. When eco-nomic benefits are used as the rationale for the tradition, will peoplestill be awe-struck as they were in ancient times?’’

While the 2005 public ‘‘cult ceremony’’ differed from those held inthe feudal period, a Chinese ‘‘cultural conservative’’ academic arguedthat it was through this ceremony that the ‘‘CCP ‘‘[China CommunistParty]’’ authorities declared to the world that they also respect Confu-cius and his philosophy—Confucianism’’. With the central govern-ment’s permission for, and involvements in, the 2005 public ‘‘cultceremony’’, some local officials and private sector actors began to planto promote it as an official ‘‘state level’’ ceremony under the nationalgovernment’s leadership. But in the interviews some local academicsexpressed opposition to this plan. One argued that it was potentiallyunconstitutional: ‘‘to upgrade the ‘civilian cult’ to a ‘public cult’ is ille-gal and against the PRC’s constitution’’. His contention was that the‘‘cult ceremony’’ was a ‘‘superstitious ceremony’’ little different fromother religious activity, and that it would contradict the state’s constitu-tional guarantee that all citizens are free to decide for themselveswhether they believe in a religion.

CONCLUSION

There is still only a modest literature on the attitudes of national gov-ernments to how cultural heritage is presented for tourism. Futurework on this theme will be enhanced if it is based on an appreciationof wider theoretical debates about the state and governance. Accordingto Jessop (1990:221), for example, the state in capitalist societies can beregarded ‘‘as a system of strategic selectivity and the nature of politicalstruggle as a field of competing strategies for hegemony’’. From hisperspective, a key task for research about the state’s influence on thepresentation of traditional culture for tourism would be to determinehow the state, as a strategic terrain, privileges some strategies over oth-ers. The state’s strategic choices are likely to be affected by pressuresfrom various sources, including the tensions resulting from broad


economic and socio-cultural changes, the struggles between the centraland local state, and the efforts and even protests of actors in civil soci-ety. While most theoretical interpretations of the state have been devel-oped in relation to capitalist societies, these interpretations may stillhave a degree of relevance in Communist Party-led socialist politicalsystems, such as in China.

How the central state may seek to influence the depiction of the pastat cultural attractions will vary from case to case, and it can be betterunderstood through careful empirical analysis of specific contexts.There is an especial need for detailed studies of particular instancesin China today as in that context there can be ‘‘a great divergence be-tween theory and practice’’ (Sun 2008:110). The present study exam-ined whether the development of tourism and ceremony at QufuWorld Heritage Site was affected by shifting views in China’s state aboutcultural tradition and Confucianism. A relational and longitudinal per-spective was used to understand this relationship from the feudal era toMao’s period of revolutionary communism, and then to the decadessince Deng introduced his ‘‘Open Door’’ policies in 1978.

During Mao’s ‘‘Cultural Revolution’’, Qufu was associated with thedominance of feudal elites and with superstitious beliefs that con-tradicted ‘‘modern’’ socialist principles. However, since Deng intro-duced his ‘‘Open Door’’ reforms the Communist Party-led centralstate has begun to change its views about traditional cultural valuesand Confucianism, and it was shown how at Qufu it has allowed bothcultural tourism and the traditional Confucian ‘‘cult ceremony’’ to de-velop. Although China’s central state has remained highly dominantsince Deng’s reforms, the changes allowed at Qufu appear to reflecthow the national government has begun to rethink its ideologicalframeworks in response to emerging socioeconomic tensions and insta-bilities. The state has begun to search for new ways to legitimize theincorporation of market forces within a communist society and alsoto maintain the Communist Party’s political hegemony in the contextof rapid change. Among the concerns in wider society to which thestate is responding is a growing belief that the expansion of marketshas encouraged a ‘‘moral vacuum’’. In this context a return to sometraditional values, including allowing tourism and ceremony at Qufu,might help to maintain social stability and encourage acceptance ofthe state’s established political authority. The local state has clearly alsoplayed a significant role in pushing for changes at Qufu, and this hasbeen encouraged by decentralization and a slow devolution of author-ity from central to local government. Local government there has beenparticularly concerned to secure tourism-related development at thesite for the benefit of the local economy.

While there has been much stability in the authority of the centralCommunist Party-state since Deng’s reforms, central government ap-pears gradually to have made some ‘‘concessions’’ to local governmentorganizers at Qufu. Yet many of the changes at the site may actually re-flect shifting attitudes within central government, and the apparent‘‘concessions’’ actually may have been made quite willingly. Shue(2008) has argued that the state in China is rather adept at allowing


some practices to be carried on without them being entirely and unam-biguously ‘‘officially sanctioned’’. This may be a means for the centralauthorities to assess what ‘‘social utility’’ they may have for the stateand its hegemony, and subsequently they may be partially embracedby central government, and then finally they may be dignified with fulland formal approvals. This trial process may help to explain what hastaken place at Qufu over recent years, and thus it may illustrate anothercomplex connection between the central state, local government andsociety in China.

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