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Culture of fear and a status conflict in Estonia-Russia relationship

Paper for ECPR Joint Sessions in Mainz 2013.

Holger MölderPhD, Associate Professor of the Estonian National Defence College.

holger.molder@mil.ee

NB! This paper is still a preliminary draft in its initial stage.

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Abstract

A culture of fear is a term used in social sciences in order to describe the emotional response produced by actors using fear as a political incentive. It increases the role of instability and anxiety in social discourses and relationships and makes distinctions between friendly Us and hostile Others. These emotions may be deliberately used for political gains (e.g. in starting wars, in tensioning relations with other countries, but also in building a kind of national solidarity). There are regions of the world, in which the culture of fear has proved itself as a main force in arranging security environments. The story of the Middle-East or India-Pakistan security identities is built on the maintaining constant fear between actors. Post-Cold war relationship between the Baltic states and Russia is strongly influenced by the culture of fear. Post-Cold war relationship between the Baltic states and Russia is strongly influenced by the emergence of culture of fear, which may cause a status conflict reflecting to norms, values and beliefs of actor – the Hobbesian conflict in the Kantian security environment. Theoretical guidelines of the paper follow cultural theory of international relations and the study examines emotional narratives that may impact security cultures of Estonia and Russia, which practice similar narratives influenced by the culture of fear. The Estonian security narrative has been built up on the imminent threat from Russia, while the Russian security narrative still relies on the Cold-War competition between the United States (or NATO) and Russia (formerly the Soviet Union). These two narratives feed each other and thus establish a kind of mutual interdependence. The paper focuses on two case studies, which reflect to the status conflict between Estonia and Russia – the border agreement and the Nord Stream gas pipeline, which is highly securitized in public discourses

Introduction

In his “A Cultural Theory in International Relations” Richard Ned Lebow (2008) provides a theoretical framework that allows the examination of international relations through cultural paradigms, which takes into account how irrational motives (appetite, spirit, fear) can play a significant role besides rational motives (reason) in shaping behaviour of international actors and examines how the international order has been influenced by lack of harmony between rational norms and irrational behaviour since Ancient times. Theoretical guidelines of the paper follow the cultural theory of international relations and the study examines emotional narratives that may affect the basic values, behaviours and preferences in specific security environments. In this work, security environments apply to the constructed areas in which security of actors are interdependent from each others.

Culture of fear has proved itself as an important force to impact international politics, justify the activities of actors and produce enmities and polarizations within the international system. Aristotle has described fear as an imagined pain or disturbance that prepares mind-set for evil future (Lebow 2008, 89). Whatever perceptions people would have against each other, these are often constructed imaginations about possible actions, which manifest conflicting identities: Self and Others, but the motives for these constructions often serve powerful emotions with irrational origin based rather on sentiments than rational calculations. The fear is probably the most powerful incentive within the Hobbesian security culture, which follows the concept of permanent state of war in the anarchical order of the international system. Conflict between opposing security narratives, produced by fear against Others, may conclude in status conflicts. For example, the story of the Middle-East or India-Pakistan security identities is built on the maintaining constant fear between actors in the affiliated security environments.

Similarly, the post-Cold war security dilemma between the Baltic states and Russia is strongly influenced by the culture of fear based on their contrasting security narratives. Fear has been among the most prominent incentives to shape Estonia-Russia relationship in the post-Cold War, which produces a clearly distinctive security environment with the appearance of the Hobbesian motives in their security cultures, while the most part of

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Europe follows the Kantian culture guided by more rational motives. Influenced by the culture of fear, security cultures of Estonia and Russia experience similar composition, in which the Estonian security narrative has been built up on the imminent security threat from Russia, and the Russian security narrative still relies on the Cold-War competition between the United States (or NATO) and Russia (formerly the Soviet Union). These two narratives feed each other, able to establish a kind of mutual interdependence in security matters.

In this work I argue that there is currently a hidden status conflict between Estonia and Russia, which is caused by conflicting security narratives. A hidden status conflict strongly influences the normalization of bilateral relationship between two countries. This paper pointed out two case studies, which reflect to the status conflict between Estonia and Russia – the border agreement still not coming into force and the Nord Stream gas pipeline, strongly rejected by Estonia on security reasons. The Nord Stream gas pipeline is highly securitized in the Estonian daily discourses, which establishes a security narrative that may differ from other similar narratives in the region. The border agreement contains a significant amount of bilateral misperceptions that have been counteracted rational moves providing results. Estonia refers to the Tartu Treaty of 1920 as a cornerstone of her independence and sovereignty and relates its statehood strongly to Russia’s recognition of Estonia in 1920. Russia does not recognize the continuity of this treaty, which does not mean that she does not necessarily recognize the Estonian statehood, but there are distinctive arguments and narratives used following to building up their understandings in decoding the history.

Cultures and motives

Lebow (2008) has paid attention to motives, which influence paradigms of international relations: appetite, spirit, reason, and fear. In setting up his theory, he refers to Ancient Greek philosophic schools of Plato and Aristotle, which determine appetite, spirit, and reason as three fundamental human drives. Plato tells that the each human soul contains three elements: reason, spirit, and appetite (Brown 2011). In practice of international relations, these fundamental drives have been accompanied by the fourth driver of fear, which has always had an immense impact for shaping developments in multifunctional relations between Self and Others. Lebow (2008, 89) describes fear as an emotion not a fundamental drive, differently from three other drives (appetite, spirit, and reason). However, his conclusion cannot be fully agreed. Fear has been one of the major fundamental drivers throughout the development of international society, being a general motive often appearing in fear-introduced situations like security dilemma and producing enmities and polarizations in the particular security environments. In building up balancing and cooperative international regimes, international actors often balance between fear, honour (representing spirit) and reason.

Motives are strongly interrelated with political cultures that drive international relations in affiliated security environments, in which the international system itself forms a distinctive security environment. Alexander Wendt (1999) determines three basic political cultures (see table 1) as ideal types, which influence world politics and international systems in general as well behaviour of international actors within the system. The Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures can be identified as basic political cultures, which are subsets of social values originated from the Western civilization (Wendt 1999, 250). The Hobbesian culture is oriented towards maintaining anarchy in relations between international actors. Its doctrines (bandwagoning, coalition-building, arms racing) seek the enhancement of power in the framework of international system. The Lockean culture recognizes rivalry and competition in the international system, but intends to stabilize anarchical order of the system by balancing, ally-seeking, or neutrality among other doctrines. Appetite would be a general motive stimulating competition. The Kantian culture intends to escape from anarchy. The impact of anarchical order of the international system will be decreased by cooperative regimes in favour of world society and absolute values. While the Hobbesian culture proceeds from the culture of fear, the logic of Kantian culture highlights the motive of reason and presupposes the implementation of measures creating more trust between international actors.

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Table 1: Ideal types of political cultures

Cultures Hobbesian Lockean KantianEnvironment anarchy anarchy communitySystemic requirements conflict conflict cooperationMotives fear appetite reasonPositioning with others enmity rivalry cooperationSocial interactions with

others

war competition friendship

Polarity polarity polarity Non-polarityStability unstable stable Stable/unstableDoctrines coalition-building,

arms-racing,

bandwagoning

balancing, neutrality

ally-seeking

Peace, complex

interdependence

Until the 20th century, the system of international relations has been strongly influenced by the Hobbesian culture. Its basic principles come from the works of the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), who established in his book “Leviathan” of 1651 an idea that the world lives in a constant anarchy with unregulated relationship between actors. The Hobbesian culture departs from the concept of state of nature, which prompts conflicts relying on three guiding principles – competition, diffidence and glory. A war of all against all (bellum omnium contra omnes) is a fundamental driver in the anarchical security environment of the world and the only way to avoid violence is to impose absolute power. Therefore, Hobbes and his disciples assumed that states always seek ways to maximize their power. In Alexander Wendt’s (1999, 268) description, the Hobbesian culture bases on three assumptions: 1) states are dealing with others states, beings like themselves; 2) these other beings are enemies, and thus threat to the life and liberty to the self; 3) states use war, threats, surrenders, balance of power against others. Therefore, states and their national interests dominate in the international arena, international institutions do not play an independent role in the international system, collective interests for peace and stability do not exist, and consequently, states interrelate with each other by power capabilities. All these paradigms constitute basic principles of the realist school of IR theory and the Hobbesian security culture, deeply connected with the realist tradition, follows a self-centred and competitive perspective of the international society. The enmity is a natural relationship between actors and, therefore, a war is a widely practiced normative political measure in the Hobbesian culture, which is used to realize power capabilities.

The Lockean culture values a status quo is more than an increase of power, which makes maintaining stability an important political guidance for the Lockeans. Similarly to the Hobbesians, it describes the international society as anarchical body, manifested by competing nation-states. Probably the main difference between these cultures relies on Locke’s ideal of a stable international system, whilst the Hobbesian world stresses on changing and conflictual nature of international relations. In the context of international relations, stable systems may mitigate negative effects of anarchical international order. Thomas Hobbes wrote its “Leviathan” in a seventeenth-century England under the circumstances of civil war causing insecurity, force, and survival. A half century later, John Locke saw a more stable England and argued that “although state of nature” lacked a common sovereign, people could develop ties and make contracts, and therefore anarchy was less threatening,” (Nye 2009, 4). Hobbes assumed that individuals and the state have made a social contract in order to survive in the anarchic environment. Locke, again, has stressed on a contract between individuals in order to set up a sovereign (Holsti 1996, 46).

In comparison with works of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, Immanuel Kant proposed in his essay from 1795 “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch” a totally different cultural

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approach, in which the general principles of conflict and competition are replaced with the principles of cooperation and friendship among international actors (Wendt 1999). Kant settled an idea about the federation of liberal states and stipulated a war-free federation of states, which values the maintenance of human rights, endeavours to create a perpetual peace, and respects the supremacy of international law. In his essay, Immanuel Kant established general principles that would lead to an international society valuing peaceful relations between actors: peace among representative democracies, economic interdependence, and international law (Russett 1998, 441). Kant assumed that shared values non-aggressive towards fellow members within the international society may cause the emergence of common identity, which forms a basis for the Kantian security culture.

Since the narrower or wider community of the peoples of the earth has developed so far that a violation of rights in one place is felt throughout the world, the idea of a law of world citizenship is no high-flown or exaggerated notion. It is a supplement to the unwritten code of the civil and international law, indispensable for the maintenance of the public human rights and hence also of perpetual peace. One cannot flatter oneself into believing one can approach this peace except under the condition outlined here (Kant 1795). A basic driving motive in the Kantian culture is reason, where actors should be able to subordinate their relative interests under the common goods. The Lockean culture emphasizes the motive of appetite, where actors compete with each other in order to achieve their relative gains. In the Hobbesian culture, the main driving force is fear. Actors seek more security in the permanent state of war. In the current analysis I have excluded spirit (and honour as its manifestation) from driving motives of political cultures, as it would be very difficult to tie it with a particular political culture. Spirit is a universal motive that forms a part of each political culture. Lebow (2008, 60) admits that “spirit has not made the basis for any paradigm of politics or international relations.”

Three political cultures can emphasize different fundamental motives. The Hobbesian culture relies on fear, the Lockean culture recognizes appetite as the most influential human drive and the Kantian culture values reason as a fundamental drive that may object escape from fear and appetite. Sprit and honour can be identified as intercultural drives that cannot be related with a particular political culture. "A spirit-based paradigm starts from the premise that people individually and collectively seeks self-esteem ... that makes people feel good about themselves, happier about life and more confident about their ability to confront its challenges," (Lebow 2008, 61). There is probably not a cultural identity that bases 100% on appetite or fear or reason, but all motives are usually combined with a certain amount of spirit, which is inescapable fundamental drive in building collective identities.

The culture of fear in international politics

In Constructivism, perceptions of actors are constructed endogenously and social interactions are based on intersubjective constructions of reality (Heller 2010, 7). Emotions are subjective and mostly irrational forces in the hand of social delivery that may construct imagined communities, which are consolidated on motives of interest, honour or fear. Social delivery can be a driving force containing a considerable amount of public expectations within the society, which is able to mobilize people for challenges. It is based on a belief that dominates in public discourses, which means that the particular society overwhelmingly supports one or another position per se, without any rationally developed argument. Social delivery reflects to constructed popular narratives, which express public expectations in one or another socially sensitive case. In the long-run, social deliveries may affect to the official discourses of actors, which are dependent on popular consent.

A culture of fear is precipitated by an emotional response to uncertainty, instability and anxiety in social discourses and relationships. It is a powerful tool in the hands of ideologies stressing on conflict between Self and Other, being an attractive political instrument for hiding motives, evoking irrational emotions and mobilizing people under the flag of populist gains (Mölder 2011). In international politics, the culture of fear is closely related to the Hobbesian

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political culture, which emphasizes a permanent state of war between international actors. Raymond Aron has explained that “fear needs no definition. It is a primal, and so to speak, a subpolitical emotion," (Robin, 2004, 9). Zbigniew Brzezinski (2007) has noted that a culture of fear “obscures reason, intensifies emotions and makes it easier for demagogic politicians to mobilize the public on behalf of the policies they want to pursue.” Norbert Elias (1982, 300) implied that fear is among the most important mechanisms through which “the structures of society are transmitted to individual psychological functions”.

By Lebow (2008, 90), a fear is one of general motives shaping international relations, settling security as a goal and using power as an instrument. In interstate relations, a fear is an emotion, which demands that security is guaranteed through the direct acquisition of military power and the economic well-being is a tool for establishing such a power requirement. Therefore, culture of fear can be identified as a core element of the Hobbesian culture. The Kantian environment promotes cooperation, which should increase trust between actors attempting to enhance peace and stability in the particular security environment. Enmity- and rivalry-oriented Hobbesian and Lockean worlds would deepen misperceptions against other actors. Fear is able to produce security dilemmas, classical dilemmas in the Hobbesian environment and cooperative dilemmas in the Kantian environment, if the Kantian culture meets the Hobbesian one. Later in this work, while examining the role of fear in the Estonian and Russian societies, there can be found evidences how fear prevents the recognition of the Kantian security environment in the post-modern international system and keeps the Hobbesian culture alive with its security dilemmas.

Culture of fear has its roots from the Ancient world. Already Thucydides argues in his Melian Dialogue “what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta,” (Williams 1994, 184). Thomas Hobbes stipulated that mistrust is a natural and inescapable feature of international society. Security dilemmas are products of fear-driven worlds, which are easy to enter and difficult to leave (Lebow 2008, 92). Fear and misperceptions caused by imagined 'evil intentions' of Others has ability to produce classical security dilemmas in the Hobbesian security environment, where “an increase in one state’s security decreases the security of others,” (Jervis 1978, 169). The emergence of a security dilemma may suggest: 1) a lack of interaction between actors in the security environment; 2) the emergence of mutual distrust; 3) the system of dispute regulation does not work or works inappropriately (Booth and Wheeler, 2008, 4-6).

Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchinson (2008, 116) agree that even fear is one of pivotal realist motives in explaining security dilemmas, but it is identified as such only by few scholars. Many seek rational explanations that rely on reason, and therefore the role of emotion international decision-making is often underestimated in scholarly debates. According to Alexander Wendt (2004), international actors may possess consciousness and they may experience emotions. Such a powerful emotion like fear may produce a kind of interdependence between international actors, as they would construct opposing narratives, which would become a natural part of their national self-identification. For, example the Estonian self-identification may strongly rely on the national myth of victorious War of Independence against Russia in 1918-1920, which is considered more important than the recognition of her statehood by the League of Nations in 1922 or the United Nations in 1991. Similarly, the Russian self-identification may strongly lie on the myth of the Soviet Union as the leader of one subsystem of the world in the Cold War's international system, which claims for respect and recognition as a great power.

Fear becomes morally justified in the time of crisis. Reed Davis (2008) explains that “in real wars, fear and uncertainty act as a drag on action and constitute what Clausewitz termed a ‘moral force of gravity,’ a force that weighs down decision-making and drains the ardour from military campaigns.” Fear may consolidate nations against commonly identified threat, which in a long-run may take a shape of national enemy. Crisis management presumes that irrational motives guided by emotions would be taken out from the decision-making-process and reason will be established as a primary social drive enabling to achieve results accepted by all parties of the conflict. In practice, it would be difficult to exclude

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emotions producing overwhelmingly supported social deliveries that makes a crisis management especially complicated process, where is hard to find solutions satisfying all parties of the conflict. In the crisis-prone societies, fear may correspond to the particular social delivery, if it emphasizes public expectations prevailing in the public opinion. For example, people may demand the restoration of death penalty as a punishment if they believe that it would help to decrease the criminal rate in the society, even if social research does not support this argument. The argument used for that expresses general understandings that punishment has to be as possible harsh in order to maintain public order within the society.

If the fear becomes a part of identity-related narratives, it would drive us into the fear-based world, which makes the Hobbesian culture guiding the whole international system. Similarly to the situation in the threshold of the Peloponnesian war described by Thucydides, the growth of Russia’s power in 2000s and the fear this caused in Estonia feeds the classical security dilemma between Estonia and Russia in the Kantian international system of the post-modern society, where the outbreak of major war has been minimized. Historical evidences can be used to form proper arguments in order to justify misperceptions promoted through social deliveries, similarly to the arguments used in favour of death penalty. In international politics, the conflicting actors often follow similarly constructed narratives, which make the mentality of the Estonian society more close to the Russian mentality, as social deliveries in both countries often refer to international systems of 19 th century, when war against other country has been treated as a normal political behaviour. Therefore the Estonian social delivery often refers to war with Russia as an inevitable case hardly to be avoided and Russia deliberately takes NATO’s intentions to increase its defence capabilities in favour of her security narrative telling us about Western hostile intentions against Russia. On this basis, the Russian social delivery often treats Estonia as a naturally hostile country that has joined the West in the anti-Russia’s campaign.

The role of security narratives and causes of the status conflict

It would be very difficult to know emotions of another person, and therefore, we can distinguish emotions through narratives and other tools of communication (Bleiker, Hutchinson 2008, 129-130). According to Sasley (2011, 470) political elite interacts in a variety of ways with each other and with citizens: meeting with constituents, appearing in public or in the media, negotiating with other political leaders and bureaucrats etc. Narratives used to justify status claims in international politics have frequently emerged from the interactions between political elites and public expectations. A particular narrative constitutes a primary and crucial source of legitimacy and national dignity, which would be easily securitized, bringing nations into being as a unique, particular and privileged entity (Lehti, Jutila, Jokisipilä 2010, 17). The narrative of the nation is frequently founded onto the past experiences, myths and glory, and transferred into the contemporary reality through national mythology, which may easily produce identity dilemmas relied on emotional sentiments. In extreme cases, the relationship between a constructed identity of ideal types and a reality may lead to activities for so-called self-preservation, in which individuals may feel that their collective identity is under attack by hostile Others, which calls them to active defence for constructed myths (i.e. 11th September 2001, Breivik’s case of 2011 etc).

Historical memory reproduced by security narratives would be an impressive argument for producing irrational emotions like fear or honour. Researchers focusing on collective memories sometimes do not investigate the perspective of historical truth or how the myth-producing events really took place, but they focus on “how historical events, developments or structures are reconstructed and represented in individual and collective consciousness, and how this representation changes,” (Hackmann 5, 2010). Nations may apply for fear in order to promote national spirit or national honour and consolidate the nation under the unifying emotions. Appetite, fear, spirit, and honour are irrational paradigms, even if they could be established through rational arguments. Lebow (2008, 89) mentions that fear is dependent

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on the ability of actors to satisfy their spirit and appetites, which may impact their survival. Fear to misplace their identity can be a powerful motive, which may strengthen collective Us-feelings within the particular identity group.

Buzan (1991, 115) recognizes that the national security problems may be rather a matter of choice than objective facts, which have to balance between paranoia, waste of resources, aggressive policies and serious distortions of domestic political life from the one hand and failure to prepare for major assaults until too late. To be in risk is an ambiguous concept, which is used to denote certain types of people who are particularly vulnerable to a hazard (Furedi 2002, 19). Buzan (1991, 115) states that fear is “a volatile political commodity, more so for humans in large groups than for individuals”, and therefore, fear-related problems are not objects for “coolly rational assessment and carefully calculated policy.”

The current post-modern international system follows the Kantian political and security culture, which stimulates cooperation and democratic principles among the international actors, members of the peace-oriented international society. However, the international system may include environments, which follow their own political culture in order to organize relationship within the affiliated self-emerging environments, which does not accommodate with the general culture manifested by the international system. The Kantian international system may contain Lockean and Hobbesian environments, which base rather on rivalry and enmity instead of following the Kantian principles of cooperation. There are regions of the world, in which the culture of fear has proved itself as a main force in arranging security environments: the Middle-East, Caucasus, India-Pakistan, Korean Peninsula among others. Sometimes, the international system will still maintain cultural influences from the previous system after the cultural change of the system actually took place.

For example, the Hobbesian enmity prevails in the Middle-East, where the security environment is strongly influenced by the Hobbesian principles of permanent state of war between actors and natural enmities between the Arab countries and Israel, while the historical rivalries influence relationship between India and Pakistan. Historical memory can create situations that are based on emotions, honour and fear, which would switch off rational developments based on reason. Honour and fear on their turn can be developed into the status conflict, if Us and Others are clearly distinguished in the particular environment. In certain circumstances, fear can be consolidating power that builds identity against potential adversary. The story of the Middle-East or India-Pakistan security identities is built on the maintaining constant fear between actors in the their security environments.

Distinctive cultural environments and the conflicting narratives can cause status conflicts within the system. Certain actors may fear to lose their respective positions in the challenging international system. The Middle-East security environment experiences several status conflicts regarding Israel and the Arab nations, but also Iran, attempting to demonstrate her intention to be a political and ideological leader of the Shia-community of the world. The appearance of Palestine’s statehood to the international society is prevented by the policy of mutual rejection of each other by Israel and the Arab nations, even if more than 130 states officially recognize the statehood of Palestine. Post-Cold war relationship between the Baltic states and Russia is also strongly influenced by the consolidating force of culture of fear. The Estonian nation-building after the restoration of her independence claims the rejection of her Soviet past, the historic homeland for the Estonian nation and the reconnection with the Western World after five decades of enforced international isolation (Smith 2010, 43). The Estonian security narrative after the restoration of her statehood still produces a position of annexed and colonized state, which has to fight for her sovereignty. The Russian security narrative follows the spirit of the Cold War competition between the East and West, where Russia expressing her ambitions continues to position herself as a competing power to the United States in the polarized world.

After becoming members in NATO and the EU, the Baltic countries have formally adapted the post-modern political culture with the Kantian origin, but despite their successful integration into the European structures, the commitment of Baltic states to the Kantian culture is vulnerable due to their Hobbesian security narrative. The strengthening of Russia in the first decade of the twenty-first century and the growth of her imperialistic ambitions after

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self-identifying herself as a rising power has negatively influenced the Baltic-Russian relationship. Following NATO and EU enlargement, the Baltic countries have been expected to present more calm views towards Russia, which did not happen. Väyrynen (1999, 216) notes that due to historical reasons, the Baltic states started to securitize their relations with Russia, which causes that their relations with the West have been simultaneously translated into security terms. The tense atmosphere in their relations with Russia makes them more supportive to the Cold War bipolarity and the Hobbesian security culture, where Russia was commonly recognized as a major opponent to NATO.

The post-Cold War environment strengthened national sentiments in former Communist countries, including Estonia and Russia, where Nationalism often replaced Marxism as a driving ideological force for post-Communist societies. Here are the roots of the current identity dilemma between Estonia and Russia. In the official discourse, there is no a status conflict as both countries have officially recognized each other as legal international actors. However, the narratives practiced by both countries still indicate the presence of a status conflict between security narratives. While Estonian security narrative is built up on the inevitable Russia’s attack against the Estonian sovereignty, Russia still lives with Cold War originated security narrative, where NATO is a natural enemy to the Soviet Union (Russia). These fear-based narratives feed each other and create misperceptions that influence security-related understandings in both societies.

Estonian security narrative

Estonia's security narrative strongly manifests a security dilemma related to neighbouring Russia. Official security-related documents (i.e. National Security Concept, National Military Strategy) are concerned about Russia’s unadaptedness with the post-modern Kantian System.

The National Security Concept of Estonia states that: "The European Union and NATO have made consistent efforts to co-operate with

Russia in order to ensure European security and well-being. Relations between the European Union and Russia are inconsistent, depending on the particular area, yet, mutual interdependence has grown. Russia has considered NATO’s growing role in security co-operation and NATO’s enlargement as directed against its interests. Russia defines its interests departing from restoration of its status as a major global power, and occasionally does not refrain from contesting other countries. In addition to political and economic means, Russia is also prepared to use military force to achieve its goals. Russia also uses its energy resources as political and economic means in different areas of international relations."

The past experience has a general impact onto interpretations about the possible developments in the regional security environment, in which Russia remains to be a priority security concern for Estonia, whether it is officially recognized or not it in Estonia's security- and defence-related political discourses. Under the security dilemma, all Russia's attempts to overlook and reform her military capabilities have been taken extremely seriously. There might be different opinions how to position Russia in security-related discourses - is it more an irrational fear based on historical memories or a rational assessment relied on current political and military ambitions of Russia? Indeed, in main security- and defence related documents, Russia is not in any way identified as a direct security threat, but rather it would be identified as a security concern. A security concern is something you cannot predict in the near future, but there might be some reasons you would not like to exclude it from potential security risks and threats. Security concerns are usually imagined and constructed narratives emerging from emotions-based feelings, which do not appear in rational calculations.

Since 1990s, the official doctrines of the country generally follow the post-modern approach to security, which applies to Europe as the region of stable peace with no

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immediate military threat from other countries. However, the security concern from Russia is often hinted in daily public discourse and security- and defence-related public debates are still to large extent concerned for the possible future behaviour from Russia, recognizing her possible intentions to change a status quo. Estonia’s relations with Russia found themselves at the lowest point after the annulment of the border agreement and during the “Bronze Soldier” monument drama in 2005-2007. The statehood of Estonia was officially recognized by the Soviet Union and Russia in 1991, and the Soviet forces returned to their homeland after the bilateral agreement in 1994, but the possibility of Russian invasion still exists in public discourses. Securitization of Russian issues in daily public discourses certainly emphasizes background of social delivery by creating an atmosphere of „silent knowledge“ – one day they will attack.

Military superiority of Russia has certainly an impact to the security- and defence-related establishments and understandings in Estonia including the emerging military culture, which follows traditional patterns in building up capabilities that would be able to stand against Russia’s possible military attack. The future attack by a militarily superior Russia is generally considered being unlikely and doubted by many Western experts, but even in the case of worst scenario, the Baltic defence capabilities must ensure ample of time for outside powers to intervene with airstrikes against invading forces (Wallin, Andersson 2001, 96). The Estonian military culture relies on conscription and mobilization of reservists, which by Estonia's security narrative has to ensure an independent capability to be prepared against possible intervention.

There is a slight difference between the official discourses and public discourses. Frank Möller (2007, 239) notes that the "lack of information renders difficult the renegotiation of memories in the light of historical data and documents." Therefore, it would be possible to argue that the Estonian security narrative unofficially recognizes the Russian military threat, even if the main security-related official guidelines do not support this argument. The Estonian security narrative relies on several misperceptions towards Russia that have formed “general understandings” in security matters that have an influence to the public opinion (Mölder 2007, 143-144). These general understandings, which appear in popular expectations, are important factors in shaping the Estonian security narrative.

First, historical misperceptions that stem from the Soviet occupation ended with annexation of the independent and internationally recognized country in 1940 and brutal measures used by the Soviet authorities after annexation: mass deportations in 1941 and 1949, and suppression of personal liberties. Second, psychological misperceptions stem from the Estonian historical experience, evidently being under the rule of other nations for centuries, while experiencing suppression to the Estonian language and culture. The Estonian statehood often follows the concept of an ethnic state rather than she associates herself with the Western meaning of a nation-state based on citizenship and state patriotism. This can be explained with limited years of experiencing independent statehood, which favours the appearance of ethno-nationalist sentiments, where the fear to lose its identity may produce a strong impetus to the emergence of Estonian ethno-nationalism. The experience as a non-state ethnos has been historically longer than statehood. Third, the strong appearance of ethno-nationalism may produce misperceptions that would be called mythological, in which the public attitude to some security- and defence-related issues is close to being religious. The role of national mythology in the Estonian political and security ideation is rather obvious, in which the opposition to Russia is strongly related to the Estonian self-identification.

Security concerns of Estonia are also accompanied by the Russian minority issues. There is large number of Russian ethnic minorities in Estonia, and a significant number of them are or non-citizens of their country of residence: they are either citizens of Russia or residents with alien’s passport. The considerable amount of Russian citizens in Estonia have caused tensions, which has a great ability to impact bilateral relationship between two countries, Estonia and Russia. Besides the problem with the border agreement and the minority issues, Russia's ambitions to enhance her participation in the European market as a

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gas provider and to built a gas pipeline between Russia and Germany to Baltic Sea has caused another status conflict between Estonia and Russia.

In sum, the Estonian security narrative has to combine official discourses that take into account the current security environment in Europe as it has been turned out after the Cold War and the Estonian social deliveries that often manifest past memories and experiences. The official discourses manifest reason as a driving motive in arranging international relations, while the public discourses manifest spirit and fear. Estonia values the concept of nation-state with relies on ethnic unity rather than state patriotism. At the same time, considering that “national values appear to be shared by a large part of the Russian elite,” (Diligensky, Chugrov 2000, 32), misperceptions between two nations are influenced by strengthening motives of national honour after the dissolution of the Soviet empire. Therefore, the increased role of nationalism in their security narratives makes troubles for both countries in coming out from the Hobbesian narrative of the international order. In this respect, the Estonian security narrative with its security concerns is close to the Russian one and diverges from the security narrative mostly accepted in the Western European countries, which follows the Kantian principles of maintaining stable peace.

Russian security narrative

In the framework of post-modern international system with the only great power (the United States) appearing, Russia can be described as a ´rising power’ besides the European Union and China. Rising powers intend to gain “recognition as a great power and recognized as such by their contemporaries” (Lebow 2010, 251). During the Yeltsin’s era of 1990s, Russia was economically weak potential ally in maintaining the Western influence to the international system and therefore the West wanted to keep political dialogue with Russia, but Russia meant in this context the Russian political elites. Similarly to Estonia, there might be a difference in official doctrines and social deliveries based on public expectations. During the Putin’s era of 2000s, Russia became more stable and she was successful in departing a constant economic crisis due to increasing oil and gas prices. Russia was able to stabilize her political system, where some authoritarian tendencies appeared and national sentiment has grown. As the result of stabilization, Russia’s international appearance has been ideologically more influenced by Russian ethno-nationalism.

After Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, Russian official discourses continued to follow a narrative that Russia is a great power, but it “now sought recognition in terms of democracy and market economy,” (Neumann 2008, 146). By Morozov (2004), Russia aimed “to overcome this isolation by attempts to build some sort of Russian Europe by consolidating its real or imagined leadership in the Commonwealth of Independent States, in particular among the European CIS members.“ Unlike China, which gradually spreads its influence through economic tools into the different regions of the world, being active in Latin America and Africa, Russia’s main concern seems to be her neighbouring areas, by developing the concept of “near abroad” and being more cooperative and having more potential of being ally to the West than China. The concept of “near abroad” has traditionally been one of the main concerns of Baltic countries, wishing to avoid Russia's political and economic influence to their countries. Are they included or not?

As much the Baltic countries have misperceptions against Russia’s intentions in the region, Russia mistrusts NATO’s intentions towards her country as well. The enlargement of European Union to the Baltic states has been received calmly by Russia. NATO’s enlargement, however, has caused some fears from the Russia’s side, which still considers NATO as a military alliance directed against Russia. There are multiple manifestations of misperceptions regarding the NATO enlargement to the Baltic states in the rhetoric of Russian officials. President Medvedev has said that no state can be pleased having representatives of a military bloc to which it does not belong coming close to its borders (Steinbock 2008, 206). Medvedev’s words confirm the existence of cooperative security

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dilemma - some states tend to cooperate in decreasing their security fears, but it could decrease the security of these states and others if any country remained outside of the cooperative security arrangements (Mölder 2010, 18) - between Russia and other countries in the region as Russia remains to be a sole actor outside of EU/NATO framework in the Baltic area.

Russia’s National Security Concept to 2020 declares:A determining aspect of relations with NATO remains the fact that plans to extend the alliance's military infrastructure to Russia's borders, and attempts to endow NATO with global functions that go counter to norms of international law, are unacceptable to Russia.Russia is prepared to develop relations with NATO on the basis of equality and in the interests of strengthening the general security of the Euro-Atlantic region. The content and depth of these relations will be determined by the preparedness of the alliance to recognise Russia's legal interests when engaging in military-political planning, and to respect norms of international law; and likewise NATO's readiness to consider the further transformation of these relations and the search for new tasks and functions with a humane] orientation.

Russian attitude vis-à-vis NATO as a military bloc hostile towards Russia is comparable to an earlier vision of a similar kind of the Soviet Union. The Baltic States are not mentioned in the security-related concepts of Russia as they have handled as part of NATO members. There is a simple reason for such distinction: while Russia is a security dilemma for Estonia, NATO is a security dilemma for Russia. At the same time, the memory-influenced policy of the Baltic countries helps Russia to maintain her modern understanding of security. The Baltic countries often criticize Russia’s great-power behaviour without offering a constructive solution for the existing security dilemma that may lead to the construction of Russia as an eternal enemy for them. Due to the often used Hobbesian rhetoric, the Baltic states have not been to very successful in using their membership in NATO and the EU for mitigating Russia’s misperceptions and the security dilemma between Russia and the Baltic states may vary from the classical Hobbesian security dilemma to the cooperative security dilemma.

Russia’s political and security culture appears to be tied with the Hobbesian and Lockean political cultures and it opposes the Kantian principles of the post-modern international system, identifying herself as a competing power to the Kantian institutions NATO and the EU. Russia does not admit the Kantian logics of the post-modern international system and sets herself outside of it. Moreover, Russia sets herself as the Hobbesian/Lockean power in the Kantian security environment and identifies the current security architecture in Europe through a Hobbesian/Lockean framework, which bases on competition if not enmity between actors. As a leading nation in a separate security arrangement of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), established on the basis of former Soviet Republics, Russia still seeks to establish some kind of balance between the West and the East as it was practiced during the Cold War. The establishment of CSTO still corresponds to the structure of hegemonic security community, where Russia’s political and military influence has a considerable strength.

After the Yeltsin’ era Russia has started to move from unconsolidated democracy to autocracy (Kolga, 2006). Authoritarian tendencies in the country have strengthened during the second presidency of Vladimir Putin, during which time the economic situation of the country has improved due to high oil prices, and Russia has clearly shown her intent to restore her one-time position as a superpower. Russia has gradually started to restore her positions as a great power with intentions to be a considerable power at the European neighbourhood. This trend has been followed by the Russia’s increasing role as one of the biggest energy providers to Europe, which on the one hand, has facilitated Russia’s prospects to strengthen its positions as a great power, but on the other hand, has decelerated her internal democratization process.

Respect and social recognition are important driving forces in the Russian political decision-making. By Heller (2010, 13), “the Russian elite and society seems to very much tie back their self-esteem in the relations with the West to the degree to which the West affirms

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or supports Russia’s historical and international role and subjective social value.” The need for social recognition as a great power from the international society has been canalized into initiatives made by Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev in order to work out alternative frameworks for the European security architecture, outside NATO and the European Union, where Russia would be one of decision-makers, similarly to the “European Concert” of the 19th century.

Samuel Huntington (1997) identified Russia as a semi-European power, a torn country, similarly to Turkey. There are significant cultural divergences between Russia and the West, including their definition to liberal democracy, which differs to some degree from the standard Western ideal of liberal democracy. The question, to which extent Russia shares democratic values, is still highly contestable. Russia, though on some counts it may be considered a democracy, can nevertheless hardly pretend to be called a stable liberal democracy, and they often tend to define international policy in the traditional Hobbesian terms keeping spheres of influence in a significant position of their security policy practices. Russia’s suspicions towards the West and the Kantian international system make the valid international system vulnerable for serious Hobbesian challenges from non-Kantian rising powers. Russia has sometimes positioned her against the system, for example in the case of Serbia, Iran or most recently in the Syrian case. Russia defended the regime of Milosevic against international condemnation due to the violation of human rights and developed a nuclear cooperation with Iran, which has been suspected of intentions to develop a nuclear weapon. Recently, Russia, together with China, defended the ruling authorities of Syria against the international involvement to the crisis.

Russia is one of the most important political and military powers in the Baltic Sea region, but she is also a rising economic power as the one most prominent fuel and gas provider. There are some historical paradoxes that make Russia’s political intensions more difficultly to be predicted that can still cause troubles and misperceptions for her neighbours. Proximity to Russia, the only unconsolidated democracy in the region, still strongly favours the presence of various security dilemmas in the Baltic Rim. Russia is the only country in the Baltic Sea security environment, which is not involved with the Kantian integration in Europe. Although no country in the region officially recognizes Russia as a security threat, in the daily security discourse the country is often named as a potential security concern, especially in the Baltic countries owing their fundamental historical disputes with Russia and balancing themselves between the Kantian West and the Hobbesian Russia.

The dilemma of recognition and the border treaty between Estonia and Russia

The story of border agreement between Estonia and Russia has a long history of destabilisation and mutual misperceptions. In 1996, Estonia dropped a reference to the Treaty of Tartu of 1920 in the border agreement, which was a significant development towards progress. After approximately ten years of bilateral negotiations, the finalization of the agreement has been hindered by various obstacles that mostly came from the Russian side, but also Estonia was somehow inconsistent in handling the border issue. Up to the 2005, Russia did not show up much interest to the conclusion of the treaty considering that after the treaty Estonia will get a much easier path towards the Western institutions that may decrease the Russia's influence in Estonia and takes this country conclusively out from the Russia's sphere of influence, while Estonia has been more interested to demonstrate hear readiness to find suitable solutions for the agreement because of her intentions to join the European Union and NATO.

However, in 2004, after Estonia joined the EU and NATO, and the situation changed. After the Baltic States joined the European Union and NATO, Russia has taken a position that this act would threaten Russia’s security. Russian politician and diplomat Mikhail Demurin (2005, 130) wrote that “the Baltic capitals have used their membership in the major Western associations not to improve relations with their eastern neighbour. On the contrary, they are using their new status to aggravate relations.” Nevertheless, the text of the

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agreement has been finally agreed by the parties and the border agreement that fixed the status quo has been signed by the Foreign Ministers of both countries in May 2005 in Moscow. Next, the Estonian Parliament ratified the agreement but unilaterally added a preamble to the agreement, in which the Parliament stated that they continuously recognize the Tartu Treaty of 1920 as a cornerstone of bilateral relations, causing a harsh response from Russia, which abandoned her signature from the treaty. This act significantly aggravated good-neighbourly relationship between Estonia and Russia, which trend culminated in 2007 with a so-called “Bronze Soldier” crisis, when the Estonian authorities transferred a monument dedicated to the Soviet Army to the military cemetery from its original location in the centre of the Estonian capital Tallinn.

Normally countries without territorial claims against each other do not relate the border agreements with political statements, as this is a technical agreement that fixes the border line between neighbouring countries. For example, neighbouring Latvia has negotiated in quieter style and dropped the demand the 1920 treaty to be referred in the preamble, after that they finally reached an agreement with Russia in 2007. Estonia strongly relates its statehood to the recognition given by Russia with the Peace Treaty of ´Tartu of 1920. In the public discourses, the treaty expresses two important national sentiments: 1) the Soviet Russia recognized the statehood of Estonia; 2) the borderline between Estonia and Russia has been fixed accordingly to the results of War of Independence, which did not completely followed the ethnic border between two nations. In 1944, after the Soviet Union annexed Estonia, the mostly Russian-speaking parts in the eastern border have been included to the Russian FSR. Afterwards, the Estonian speaking population has left from these areas and currently in these areas live no more than around 1000 ethnic Estonians.

The loss of Petserimaa County to Russia during the World War II is historical evidence still painfully remembered. Estonia as a small nation, which highly concerns on her small population and loss of the territory. The increase of population and the maintenance of the Estonian language and culture often appear in public debates in Estonia. Similarly, the meaning of territory has been very important for Estonians throughout their history. The significant role of territory in the national identity building also implies that occupation of the Estonian territory has been frequently considered a main security threat against Estonia. Land ownership was not allowed for the Estonian peasants until the 19th century, which influenced the Estonian self-consciousness and the development of the Estonian society.

President Lennart Meri has deemed the Tartu Peace Treaty as a birth certificate of the Republic of Estonia and a cornerstone of the Estonian statehood. Such a strong connection between the treaty and the statehood generates a spiritual barrier between Estonia and Russia, which makes difficult to introduce rational arguments in order to overcome critical points in their bilateral relationship. The recognition given through the Tartu Peace Treaty has been sometimes more valued in the Estonian public discourses than the declaration of independence in February, 24, 1918, the official birth certificate of a new country. The case of Treaty of Tartu of 1920 would be a manifestation of appetite: a small nation wishes to be bigger, stronger and more seriously taken by possible adversaries. The independence achieved through defeated war characterizes more the glory of mythologized past.

After the independence was restored, some expectations raised in public discourses that Estonia has to claim back lost territories and Russia has to recognize Estonia within the borders of 1920. Nevertheless, these public expectations never appeared in the official discourses and statements. These public expectations never disappeared from public discourses, which if reinforced through media can achieve much powerful images. In 2005, just before the agreement was signed, statements against the border treaty and for the territorial claims appeared again in the Estonian media, and established a respective social delivery supported by nationalist and conservative parties that resulted the inclusion of preamble to the treaty, which was a political act, stressing motives of honour and fear. For example, Tõnis Lukas (2005), one leader of the nationalist-conservative Fatherland Union, declared that Russia would be more interested in border agreements because of her gains from the relationship with the European Union. Therefore, by Lukas, Estonia should wait with the signing procedures.

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The Treaty of Tartu has its own vulnerabilities. It was a comprehensive bilateral treaty with a general purpose to end the war, in which the mutual recognition and border agreement were just particular issues among others. For example, accordingly to the Tartu Peace Treaty, Estonia also agreed to maintain neutrality. Russia argues, that the Treaty has expired, after Estonia was merged with the Soviet Union, which is another contrasting issue in bilateral disputes. As the Treaty of Tartu is strongly related to birth of the Estonian statehood, but not recognized by post-Cold War authorities of Russia, it has an ability to produce a permanent status conflict relying on culture of fear, in which Estonia has security concerns towards Russia's intentions to harm Estonia's statehood.

The securitization of the Nord Stream case

The construction of gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea has also produced serious security concerns in Estonia, which have been revealed in official and public discourses in Estonia. On September 8, 2005 Russian oil and gas company Gazprom signed a basic agreement with German companies BASF and E.ON on the construction of the North European Gas Pipeline. Later this year the Northern European Gas Pipeline Company (Nord Stream AG) was established, where the shareholders are Gazprom (51%); Wintershall (owned by BASF) (15,5%); E.ON Ruhrgas (15,5%); N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie (Netherlands) (9%); GDF Suez (France) (9%). The establishment of an offshore natural gas pipeline between Russia and Germany was strongly supported by the Russian Government and President Putin. The project, promoted by the government of Russia and supported by the government of Germany, has been contested in the Baltic Sea countries for various reasons, including increasing European energy dependence on Russia and potential environmental damages. The pipeline was officially inaugurated by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and French Prime Minister Francois Fillon on November 8, 2011.

In August 2012, Nord Stream AG applied to Finnish and Estonian governments for route studies in their exclusive economic zones for the third and fourth lines of the pipeline. While the Scandinavian countries have concentrated on environmental influences in manifesting their concerns about the project, the Baltic countries have focused on the potential military threat from Russia this pipeline may cause. However, the pipeline project continuously maintains arguments against it, including political and military perceptions. President Vladimir Putin stated in 2006 that the ecological safety of the pipeline project will be ensured by using the Baltic Fleet of the Russian Navy.Norwegian researcher Bendik Solum Whist (2008) argues in his research that as Nord Stream AG is incorporated in Switzerland outside of the European Union, Swiss banking secrecy laws may influence the whole transparency of the project. In 2006, the Minister of National Defence of Poland Radoslaw Tomasz Sikorski applied for parallels of the project to the Nazi-Soviet Molotow-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. Also, several Swedish and Finnish experts (see Bakst 2006, Larsson 2007, Postimees 2009) have paid attention to the gas pipeline as a possible security threat. In 2006, President Vladimir Putin declared that if the situation requires, the Russian Baltic Fleet will be involved for the purpose of exploring the seabed and for protection purposes (Larsson 2007, 35-36). These words have been widely translated into language of Russia’s intentions to increase hear military ambitions in the Baltic Sea region.

Estonia has been against any attempts to develop the project in the Estonian economic zone. Estonia’s main concern is that Russia may use her security concerns over the safety of the pipeline for strengthening her military presence in the Baltic Sea region. Simultaneously, environmental concerns have been used in supporting the security narrative. Also, concerns that Nord Stream AG may achieve information about the possible supplies at the Baltic Sea, has been argued against to permitting any research in the Estonian economic zone. The problem for Estonia is that a strong rejection with excluding any cooperation with the Nord Stream AG did not produce any strong argument, which may stop the further development of the project, but Estonia loses an opportunity for direct involvement to the project. This may

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favour the flourishing a classical security dilemma between Estonia and Russia on that issue. At the same time, by using popular narratives stressing on security concerns may enhance the culture of fear in the Estonian society.

The fear against possible indications to use the project on behalf of military intervention from the Russian side has been a general motive for Estonia to accomplish policy in the Nord Stream gas pipeline case. The Baltic countries did not initiate cooperative alternatives to the project or did not take significant steps for international cooperation in order to prevent the project, but the anti-pipeline rhetoric sounded more powerfully in internal debates catching popular consent. For example, the Centre Party, which is popular among the Russian-speaking population and generally advocates more friendly relationship with Russia, has taken very critical position against the gas pipeline and related it with security issues, attempting to increase its electorate among the Estonian population. Fear against Russia's possible military intentions against has been often used by various and distinctively positioned parties in order to gain more popularity in the electorate.

The attitude how different countries manifest their attitudes towards the Nord Stream gas pipeline can reflect the influence of fundamental motives to international paradigms. Countries of the Baltic Sea region have followed different motives in making their assessments towards the project. Driving motive of Russia and Germany is appetite. Driving motive of Nordic countries in handling the Nord Stream case is reason. Driving motive of Baltic countries and Poland in shaping their attitude towards the project is fear. In the Estonian case, ecological and economic arguments support the constructed security misperceptions that rely on Russia’s intention to use economic projects on behalf of their security interests. Therefore, as the main focus comes from irrational motives of fear and honour, the pragmatic approach to the Nord Stream case is mostly excluded.

As the reaction to the Nord Stream case is different in individual countries, it would be possible to conclude that Estonia and other Baltic countries have shaped their political narrative about the case following the culture of fear. The Nordic countries, even they manifested their security concerns in some scenarios, have taken more pragmatic approach, which bases on reason. Dominant concerns in the Baltic countries were security concerns, while the Nordic countries mostly highlighted environmental concerns. Distinctive motives that shaped approaches in the region negatively impacted the regional cooperation in these matters.

How to manage emotional motives creating perceptions

Methodologically, the motives examined in official discourses may be different from motives of public discourses, promoted by media, leaders of opinion, political parties and interest groups. Public discourses are naturally guided by emotions, which make public discourses more affective to irrational motives like appetite, spirit or fear. The connections with public discourses and social delivery may sometimes appear in official policy guidelines, but these connections may exist simultaneously in multiple environments and manifested by separate discourses. Therefore, studying only official discourses cannot always give an adequate picture about social deliveries in the particular society. Pragmatic outcomes of governments manifest specific responsibilities that public discourses do not have. There would be a dilemma for international actors, either to follow public expectations produced by appetite, spirit and fear in their political decision-making-process or to seek rational political outcomes and make compromises with other international actors. As governments in the democratic society are dependent on public expectations influencing results of elections, these responsibilities would direct them to follow irrational motives instead of pragmatic ones.

Renshon and Lerner (2012) make difference between expected and immediate judgements in the decision-making. In the first case, decision-makers may engage in a cognitive calculation to predict how outcome will make them feel. In the second case, aspects of decisions can cause decision-makers to experience a certain emotion in the present or while faced with a choice, decision-makers may experience an emotion

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normatively unrelated to the decision at hand. Fear is still a powerful motive in international politics, which does not support the implementation of Kantian principles to the international system, which often rely on pragmatic calculations. Therefore, the Kantian international system still experiences the Hobbesian and Lockean security environments, which can impact to the stability of the system. In its consistent appearances, this may be manifested by the culture of fear, in which fear is developed into a national strategy used to justify popular actions satisfying needs of appetite, spirit or fear.

The examination of influence of irrational motives to international politics can give us more complete picture of political trends depending on particular issues, which would be emphasized in research. There might be a difference between a state policy and social deliveries, which are generated through public discourses and all these discourses may use contrasting languages. The official political documents and doctrines do not always consider the influence of social deliveries to the political outcomes. Social deliveries may be influenced by powerful motives of interest, honour and fear. States in their reactions to social deliveries based on emotional and irrational motives may produce preconditions easily developed into conflicts. Official discourses would be different from manifestations of public discourses and the involvement by media can change these manifestations in a curved mirror, depending on the accents the media has emphasized. Media is also dependent on public expectations, which would ensure them more profit than rational arguments. Therefore the role of media in promoting general understandings (public expectations) and social deliveries cannot be underestimated. Fear is an important incentive to influence general understandings that form social deliveries.

Lebow (2008, 488) concludes: “Psychological and political science literature indicates that fundamentalist formulations of others are more ideology than they are description of reality”, used to promote political projects, of which some may be identified as malevolent (e.g. Huntington, Schmitt). At the same time, the establishment of collective identities may foster contrasting understandings between Self and Others. There is an identity dilemma between Estonia and Russia, which would reflect to status claims, by which these state position themselves in the framework of the international system. The Estonians identify Russians as Others opposing to Self, the hostile power, which has a permanent interest to harm the Estonian identity and nation-state. Russians identify the Estonians as a part of the Western civilization, which has been a competitive power to the Russian civilization accordingly to their security narrative, and consequently would feel enmity towards Russia. Accordingly to the Russian security narrative, which recognizes NATO as a hostile military power in the Hobbesian means and applies to general understandings formed during the Cold War, Estonia would be a tool in the hands of the West in order to harm the Russian ambitions to becoming a great power in the international system. The European Union has been identified by the Russian security narrative rather as a competitive power in the Lockean means than a hostile opponent.

Table 2 Motives in Estonia-Russia identity dilemma.

Motives Fear Interest(appetite)

Honour(spirit)

Reason

Estonia Russia To maintain independence and Estonian nation

Nation-state CooperationInternational organizations

Russia West/NATO To be a great power

Nation-state Cooperation with the WestInternational system

The problem of "silent surrender" that refers to the threshold of the World War II, when Estonia was occupied by the Soviet Union without any armed resistance from the Estonia's

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military units has caused the problem of "historical guilt", which turned the Estonian society more vigorously anti-Russian even after the statehood was restored in 1991. For example, Finland has taken risks, which concluded with the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union in 1939/1940. Finland, differently from Estonia, survived territorial losses, but maintained her statehood. Implications of "historical guilt" have been revealed in the current controversies related to the border treaty and the Nord Stream gas pipeline case.

The identity dilemma between Estonia and Russia can be developed into a classical security dilemma, in which both sides have security-related misperceptions against intentions of each other, if fear becomes a general motive in the particular security environment. Russia, while attempting to defend itself against hardly imaginable NATO’s attack, may be forced to build up military capabilities in her western borders, even the real security risks to Russia come from south and east, but the security narrative created by social delivery, strengthens motives related to fear against NATO, supported by the official narrative for 40 years. The emergence of security dilemma is strongly related to the motive of fear. Therefore, relying on Thucydides, the final conclusion to the Estonia-Russia identity dilemma would be: that what made security dilemma inevitable was the growth of the Western power and the fear this caused in Russia. From the Estonian side, what made security dilemma inevitable was the growth of the Russian power and the fear this caused in Estonia.

Conclusions

Fear has been a dominant motive in shaping Estonia-Russia relationship since 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Security narratives the countries use in building up their power capabilities in order to justify the use of fear as a dominant motive. Fear is often supported by other irrational motives as honour or appetite, which makes possible to use it for securitisation of each other's actions as it would be seen in the cases of border treaty and Nord Stream gas pipeline. Fear is related to the emergence of classical security dilemmas, when the increase of power of the potential adversary may produce misperceptions among the other nation. There is a status-related identity dilemma between two countries, which may take a form of a classical security dilemma. The identity dilemma, in which fear is a part of identity-building, is influenced by emotions promoted by respective social deliveries.

Estonian national identity is strongly influenced by her past experiences. Somehow it would be a consequence of a long-time occupation, because the national identity of the Estonians still fights for higher status, which makes it vulnerable to the problems related to the recognition of her statehood. Estonia is a member of the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO, but her political and security narratives are still influenced from the imagined requirements to prove her eligibility for independent statehood. Due to her past, Estonia is not ready to become free from misperceptions that Russia continuously tries to rebuild the Soviet empire. The possibility of inevitable military attack from Russia does not disappear from the historical memory of Estonians and thus, there might appear a dilemma – where is an appropriate balance between a paranoia and a real threat?

Russia in her turn continuously follows the guidelines of the Cold War, where the United States, the West, and NATO are treated the main enemies of the state in the international arena, which promotes respective social deliveries in her society. Russia’s conception of successor state of the Soviet Union is inconsistent and sometimes illogical, where the main difference between the Soviet Union and Russia is the ideology: while the Soviet Union followed the expansive and extreme form of marxism, Russia is ideologically built on the Russian nationalism. Extreme ideologies (marxism, nationalism, religious fundamentalism etc) often use fear as a consolidating motive for their societies.

Manifestations applying for honour, but representing fear can be powerful images for shaping Hobbesian security environments in international politics. Fear-based social deliveries can affect emotional motives in the political decision-making of individual countries and produce polarities. The motives of honour and fear can easily generate security dilemmas into the Kantian security environment. The Estonia-Russia case proves that the

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Hobbesian and Lockean misperceptions may survive in the Kantian international system, in which it can form culturally distinctive security environments from the system.

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