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Asian Education and Development StudiesCurbing police corruption in Singapore: lessons for other Asian countries

Jon S.T. QuahArticle information:

To cite this document:Jon S.T. Quah , (2014),"Curbing police corruption in Singapore: lessons for other Asian countries", AsianEducation and Development Studies, Vol. 3 Iss 3 pp. 186 - 222Permanent link to this document:http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/AEDS-07-2014-0029

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POLICING IN ASIA REFORMS AND

CHALLENGES

Curbing police corruptionin Singapore: lessons for

other Asian countriesJon S.T. Quah

Anti-Corruption Consultant, Singapore

Abstract

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explain why Singapore has succeeded in curbing theproblem of police corruption and to identify the six lessons which other Asian countries can learn from

Singapores experience.Design/methodology/approach The paper analyzes the causes of police corr uption in Singaporeduring the British colonial period and describes the measures adopted by the Peoples Action Partygovernment after assuming office in June 1959 to curb police corruption. The effectiveness of thesemeasures is assessed by referring to Singapores perceived extent of corruption according to threeinternational indicators and the reported cases of police corruption from 1965 to 2011.Findings The Singapore Police Force has succeeded in minimizing police corruption by improvingsalaries and working conditions, cooperating with the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau,enhancing its recruitment and selection procedures, providing training and values education for itsmembers, and adopting administrative measures to reduce the opportunities for corruption. Other Asiancountries afflicted with rampant police corruption can learn six lessons from Singapores success.Originality/value This paper will be of interest to those policy makers, scholars, and anti-corruptionpractitioners, who are interested in learning how Singapore has succeeded in curbing police corruption.

Keywords Training, Singapore, Meritocracy, Police corruption, Salaries, Values education

Paper type Research paper

IntroductionPolice corruption is one of the oldest and most persistent problems in Americanpolicing because for as long as there have been police, there has been police corruptionand misconduct (McElreath et al., 2013, p. 187). While a great deal of research wasconducted on police corruption in the USA during the 1960s-1980s[1], much moreresearch is available in recent years on police corruption in other countries[2]. Indeed,police corruption is not confined to the USA as Transparency InternationalsGlobal Corruption Barometerfor 2010-2011 has found that the police is perceived as acorrupt institution in these 31 countries: Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cameroon,Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico,Moldova, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, SierraLeone, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Taiwan, Uganda, Venezuela,Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Transparency International, 2010).

In Indonesia, the 2,300 respondents in the 2001 national survey identified the trafficpolice as the most corrupt institution (Partnership for Governance Reform inIndonesia, 2001, pp. 10-11). Similarly, a 1992-1993 survey of 2,243 respondents inBangkok and four regions identified the Police Department as the most corrupt agency(33.7 percent), followed by the Ministry of Defense (27 percent), the Ministry of theInterior (26 percent), and the Department of Transport (22.5 percent) (Pasuk and

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Sungsidh, 1996, pp. 155-156). In Malaysia, the Royal Commission found that thedivisions in the Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) that were more susceptible to corruptpractices were traffic police personnel, investigating officers and their supervisors,detectives, prosecuting officers and police enquiry office personnel (Royal Malaysia

Police (RMP), 2005, p. 279). Furthermore, corruption was prevalent in the policelockup as there were many complaints that detainees had to pay for additional food, toreceive and make telephone calls, to see family members or friends, and to be placed ingood cells. Finally, many police officers have bribed other officers to facilitatetheir transfer to such gold-mine postings as the Commercial Crime Department,Traffic Branch, Criminal Investigation Department (D7 covering secret societies,anti-vice and gambling), Narcotics Department, Logistics Department (Procurementand Development) and Deployment and Promotions Divisions (RMP, 2005, p. 280).

In Indonesia, the police are involved in three levels of organized corruption. Thefirst level is the large scale protection racket where police provide protection to payingbusinesses. Second, police corruption occurs at the street level, where citizens paybribes to policemen to avoid arrest, citations or for filing a police report. The third level

involves the purchase of positions in the police force. As a candidate has to pay twoyears salary up front to join the police force, he hopes to recoup his investmentwithin six months of employment (Goodpaster, 2002, p. 15). Indeed, according toSaputra Pane, the Head of Indonesia Police Watch, a nongovernmental organizationthat monitors corruption, the going rate to join the Jakarta police force, for example,can amount to 80-90 million rupiah ($9,750-$11,000) (quoted in Allard, 2010).

Table I shows the perceived extent of police corruption in 21 Asian countriesaccording to Transparency Internationals Global Corruption Barometer 2010-11.

Country Scorea

Pakistan 4.5Bangladesh 4.4India 4.1Malaysia 4.1Mongolia 4.0Sri Lanka 4.0Taiwan 3.9Vietnam 3.8Cambodia 3.7Japan 3.7South Korea 3.7Philippines 3.6Thailand 3.6Indonesia 3.5Papua New Guinea 3.5China 3.4Hong Kong 3.4Afghanistan 3.2Nepal 3.2Maldives 3.0Singapore 2.8

Note: aThe score ranges from 1 (not at all corrupt) to 5 (extremely corrupt)Source:Transparency International (2010)

TablePerceived extent of poli

corruption in 21 Asicountries in 20

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Corruption was also rampant in Singapore during the British colonial period,especially in the Singapore Police Force (SPF). However, police corruption is no longera serious problem today as reflected in Singapores ranking as the least corruptAsian country according to various international surveys on corruption and its lowest

score of 2.8 in Table I. Why has Singapore succeeded in curbing police corruption?Table I also confirms that police corruption is a serious problem in Pakistan,Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Vietnam, with theirscores ranging from 3.8 to 4.5. What lessons can these eight Asian countries, which areplagued with police corruption, learn from Singapores success in minimizing policecorruption? This paper addresses these two questions by first defining police corruptionand identifying its major forms before analyzing the extent and causes of policecorruption in colonial Singapore and explaining why it is no longer a problem today.

Definition and forms of police corruptionPolice corruption, according to Gerald E. Caiden (1977, p. 155), is a complex social andorganizational phenomenon which has been used differently to cover many things.For example, it has been defined in terms of a multitude of sins, which includesbrutality, fabrication of evidence, sleeping on duty, nepotism, racism, bribery andtheft. Lawrence W. Sherman (1974, p. 5) has rejected this broad definition in favor ofequating police corruption with bribery. However, four years later, Sherman (1978,p. 30) replaced his narrow definition of police corruption as bribery with an illegal useof organizational power for personal gain.

While Knapp (1972, p. 65) did not define police corruption, it identified two types ofcorrupt policemen: the grass-eaters and meat-eaters thus:

The overwhelming majority of those who do take payoffs are grass-eaters, who acceptgratuities and solicit five- and ten- and twenty-dollar payments from contractors, tow-truckoperators, gamblers, and the like, but do not aggressively pursue corruption payments.

Meat-eaters, probably only a small percentage of the force, spend a good deal of theirworking hours aggressively seeking out situations they can exploit for financial gain,including gambling, narcotics, and other serious offenses which can yield payments ofthousands of dollars.

In other words, the grass-eaters are those junior policemen who focus on pettycorruption and passively accepted graft or kickbacks, while the meat-eaters refer tosenior police officers who are proactive carnivores in search of grand corruption[3].In addition to the grass-eaters and meat-eaters, there are also birds or thosepolice officers who avoid deviant practices because they are honest or because theydont have any good opportunities (Punch, 2009, p. 21).

Unlike Sherman et al. (1974, p. 118) have provided a more useful definition of policecorruption as any type of proscribed behavior engaged in by a law enforcement officer

who receives or expects to receive, by virtue of his official position, an actual or potentialunauthorized material reward or gain. On the basis of their research in the USA, Roebuckand Barker (1974, pp. 119-125) have identified these eight types of police corruption:

(1) Corruption of authority, which occurs when a policeman receives officiallyunauthorized, unearned material gain by virtue of his position as a policeofficer without violating the lawper se.

(2) Kickbacks in the form of goods, services or money are accepted by police officersfrom legitimate businessmen as a reward for referring business to them.

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(3) Opportunistic theft refers to those acts of confiscating money, merchandise(including liquor and drugs) or other property by police officers in the course oftheir routine duties.

(4) Shakedowns or bribes arise when policemen witness or are aware of criminalviolations and violators, and accept bribes later for not making arrests.

(5) Protection by police officers for those involved in illegal activities in return forpayment. The owners of such vice operations as gambling, narcotics andprostitution, pay bribes to police officers so that they can continue theiractivities without any harassment.

(6) The fix refers to the quashing of prosecution proceedings following theoffenders arrest or the taking up of traffic tickets. Offenders rely on thefix to avoid court action and those found guilty of traffic violations resortto the same method to avoid blemishing their driving records.

(7) Involvement of police officers in such direct criminal activities as burglary

and robbery.(8) The internal payoff occurs when police officers buy, barter or sell certain

prerogatives (work assignments, off-days, holidays, vacation periods, controlof evidence, and promotions) from or to their colleagues[4].

Police corruption in colonial SingaporeSingapore was a British colony for almost 140 years from its founding by Stamford Rafflesin January 1819 until its attainment of self-government from the British in June 1959. In

July 1826, Singapore became part of the Straits Settlements together with Malacca andPenang. The pre-colony phase ended in 1867 when control of the Straits Settlementspassed from the India Office to the Colonial Office. British colonial rule was briefly

interrupted by the Japanese Occupation (February 1942-August 1945). Singapore becamea crown colony in April 1946 and its constitutional status was transformed to a ministerialform of government under the Rendel Constitution in 1955 (Quah, 2001, p. 291).

The large influx of immigrants from the neighboring countries to Singapore after itsfounding in January 1819 required the establishment of a police force to maintain lawand order. As there was no budget to support the formation of a police force, MajorFarquhar, the Resident, recommended the setting up of a License Fund from the sale oflicenses for opium, arrack and gambling (Pearson, 1953, pp. 98-99). Stamford Rafflesaccepted Farquhars proposal and in May 1820 Farquhar formed a police force of sortswith his son-in-law, Francis Bernard, as the Superintendent (Turnbull, 1977, pp. 17-18).Superintendent Bernard was assisted by a team of 11 men, consisting of a Malaywriter, a jailor, a sergeant, and eight constables (Buckley, 1965, p. 68). The SPF has

grown from 12 personnel in 1820 to 4,301 personnel in June 1959 with the attainment ofself-government from the British (Quah, 1979, p. 16).

Police corruption was rampant in Singapore during the British colonial period. Ananalysis of press reports on police corruption in the Straits Times from 1845-1921found that the five most important forms of police corruption were bribery, directcriminal activities, opportunistic theft, corruption of authority, and protection of illegalactivities, as shown in Table II.

On September 22, 1877, theStraits Timesreported on the system of bribery in theSPF which involved not only the Indian and Malay constables but also the European

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Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors. The analysis of the 109 cases of bribery shows thatamong the 60 cases with data on the ethnic group of the offenders, Malays were theworst offenders (33 percent), followed by the Indians (9 percent), the Chinese (7 percent),the Europeans (4 percent) and the Eurasians (2 percent). In terms of rank, the police

constables were the chief offenders (58.7 percent), followed by the peons (7.3 percent),detectives (6.4 percent), corporals (4.6 percent), sergeants and Chinese interpreters(3.7 percent each), inspectors (2.8 percent), and lance-corporals (1.8 percent). The fourgroups who offered bribes to the policemen were the hawkers, opium shop-keepers,rikisha-pullers, and bullock-cart drivers. However, while the amount of bribes received bythe policemen ranged from one cent to S$300, the usual amount received as bribesby policemen was less than S$1 (Quah, 1979, pp. 18-19).

In addition to bribery, there were 42 reported cases of policemen who wereprosecuted for engaging in such direct criminal activities as theft and robbery. Theworst offenders were the 17 police constables, most of whom were Malays, who werearrested for theft or robbery. The amount of money stolen ranged from 40 cents toS$400. Among the property stolen by the policemen were a small pig, jewelry, brass

pots, a silver watch, a walking stick, two platinum cups worth S$4,000, and theclothing of their colleagues (Quah, 1979, pp. 20-21).

The ten cases of opportunistic theft involved five Malays, two Europeans, oneIndian, and two policemen whose ethnic group was not reported in the Straits Times.In terms of rank, four of the offenders were constables, two were lance-corporals, twowere peons, one was a sub-inspector, and a policeman whose rank was not recorded.Two cases of opportunistic theft occurred when a police peon on duty at Boat Quayrobbed a sailor of S$6, and when a Malay lance-corporal stole a brooch from a ladyduring his duty at the Tanglin Club. Another two Malay policemen committedopportunistic theft in connection with gambling activities: one stole S$1 whilesearching a gambling house, and the other stole a pouch containing S$3 whilearresting some robbers. Finally, two policemen were found guilty of stealing the

personal belongings of dead men (Quah, 1979, pp. 21-22).The nine reported cases of corruption of authority involved criminal breach of trust

(CBT). For example, in September 1887, a European sub-inspector was charged withCBT for keeping a sum of S$133.81 which was received by him for licenses. AnotherEuropean police officer was jailed for two years for CBT in his capacity as a publicservant. Apart from these CBT cases, there were other cases of abuse of authorityby policemen. On August 17, 1872, the Straits Times reported the mistreatment ofa hawker by a policeman for not complying with his order to avoid obstructingthe roadside. When the hawker did not comply because he did not understand thepolicemans request, he was beaten by the policeman and dragged to the police station.

Form of police corruption Number %

Bribery 109 63.4Direct criminal activities 42 24.4Opportunistic theft 10 5.8Corruption of authority 9 5.2Protection of illegal activities 2 1.2Total 172 100.0

Source:Quah (1979, p. 24)

Table II.Reported cases of policecorruption in Singaporeby form, 1845-1921

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Fifteen years later, in August 1887, the Straits Times highlighted several cases ofoppressive treatment of laborers by the native police constables (Quah, 1979, pp. 22-23).

Finally, the two reported cases of protection of illegal activities dealt with gamblingand a secret society. In September 1845, an Indian police sergeant was discharged

from the SPF for connivance with gambling houses for the purpose of protecting themfrom police harassment in return for payment. He was caught because he was able tobuy property in spite of his low salary. The other case involved seven membersof the Red Flag Society, an Indian secret society, who testified in October 1865 thattheir society had regularly paid S$10 a month to the police officer in charge of theTelok Ayer Police Station for their cooperation and avoidance of police harassment(Quah, 1979, p. 23).

The small number of reported cases of protection of illegal activities amongpolicemen is surprising in view of the prevalence of gambling and secret societyactivities in Singapore during 1845-1921. However, the Straits Timeshad reported onfour occasions on the involvement of policemen in gambling activities in Singapore.First, theStraits Timesreported on October 17, 1846, on the SPFs participation in the

abominable gambling houses, nests of corruption and vice which serve to foster everyspecies of enormity. Second, on September 16, 1848, the Straits Times noted thatgambling had resumed in some major streets in Singapore, without the knowledgeof the police peons who were patrolling these streets. Third, on June 13, 1849, theStraits Timesasked why the SPF allowed gambling within 50 yards of a police stationin town and explained that the policemen were paid for their silence. Finally, theStraitsTimes criticized the SPF on July 27, 1861 for not taking strong action against thegambling houses, which had faithful emissaries in the SPF who passed informationto their owners (Quah, 1979, p. 23).

In April 1846, a European constable, Charles Cashin, was convicted of receivingbribes from illicit gambling dens and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment and a fineof S$1,000. Cashin revealed that for the past three years all the constables in the SPF

had received S$20 each monthly from the gambling houses, and that the constable whohad accused him of bribery had also received bribes himself. Thomas Dunman, theDeputy Superintendent of Police, admitted in Court that it was difficult to rectify thesituation because the police were in the pay of the owners of the 191 gambling housesin Singapore (Quah, 1979, p. 25). In his book,Some Glimpses into Life in the Far East,

John Turnbull Thomson mentioned the payment of bribes by the Chinese owners ofgambling houses in Singapore to the wife of the chief of police in order to avoid policeharassment (quoted in Moore and Moore, 1969, p. 207).

The British colonial government appointed a Commission of Inquiry in 1879 toidentify the causes of inefficiency in the SPF. The Commission found, inter alia, thatcorruption existed among the European inspectors and was rife among the Malay andIndian policemen (Braddell, 1921, pp. 250-251). In April 1886, another Commission ofInquiry was appointed to investigate public gambling in the Straits Settlements ofMalacca, Penang and Singapore. Among the 44 witnesses who testified before theCommission in Singapore, ten of them provided convincing proof of the SPFsinvolvement with the illegal gambling houses. For example, the Chief Inspector of Police,Craven Harry Ord, indicated that the orderlies and constables in the SPF took bribesfrom the gambling house owners. However, his superior, the Inspector-General of Police,Samuel Dunlop, believed that it was more likely for the inspectors than the constables toreceive bribes from the gambling houses (Straits Settlements, 1887, pp. 6-7, 9-10, 22,26, and 31-32).

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Perhaps the most damning evidence was given by a gambling informer, whoexplained why the gambling house owners were not afraid of the police:

The gambling was done openly: men used to sit at the door and call out, but since the end oflast year [1885] they only sit at the door. [y] The Police on their rounds can see the people at

the doors. Any one can see. These men are not afraid of the Police. [y

] The gambling iscarried on day and night. [y] The reason the gambling-house keepers are not afraid of thePolice is because the Police are in their pay. I have seen it myself, and have given money to theInspectors. The policeman on beat where the gambling-houses are receives three cents fromeach house. When a Constable relieves another on the beat he receives the same (StraitsSettlements, 1887, p. 8).

An important witness who gave evidence of police corruption was the SecondAssistant Colonial Secretary, Ernest Woodford Birch. As the Secretary to the PoliceCommission from 1879-1880, he had accompanied police officers on their raids ofgambling houses. Birch told the Commission:

I have been informed by persons who should know that the Police had been bribed to shut theireyes. I have been told by the headman of one of the houses [y] that there was a regular scale ofpay given to the Police. [

y] I have heard the same thing on several occasions, notably from a

Police orderly. He said the Police were regularly subsidized. He said Inspectors got $30 a month,Sub-Inspectors $20, and so on on a scale. [y] The Orderly gave me to understand that all theEuropean Officers were bribed with some exceptions (Straits Settlements, 1887, p. 5).

On the basis of the testimonies provided by the witnesses, the 1886 Commissionconcluded that:

[y] there has been a systematic arrangement, both in Singapore and Penang, for corruptingthe Police Force, and that in a large degree this has been successful and has reached theInspector class. [y] The system in Singapore seems to be that of two or three kongsis[cooperative groups] levying subscriptions from the gambling-houses to bribe the Police toabstain from arresting them [y] (Straits Settlements, 1887, pp. i-ii).

It is surprising that even though the 1886 Commission of Inquiry had confirmed theexistence of widespread police corruption in gambling activities, nothing was done bythe SPF to prevent the policemen from getting involved in such activities.

Causes of police corruption during the colonial periodLow salariesThe most important cause of police corruption during the British colonial period inSingapore was the low salaries of members of the SPF, especially those in the lowerranks. Table III provides details of the monthly salaries for both European and localpolicemen in 1887. The discrimination in monthly salary between the European andnon-European local policemen can be seen from Table III as the European officersearned much more than their local counterparts. For example, the monthly salaryof the most junior rank of constable among the European contingent was S$40 ornearly three times that of the monthly salary of the highest rank of sergeant (S$15)for the local contingent.

Apart from earning less than their European counterparts, the local policemen werenot provided with rations. On the other hand, all the European officers, except for thosewith the rank of Inspector 1st class, received between S$5 to S$10 worth of rations.The lack of provisions of rations for the local policemen made life more difficult forthem with the increase in food prices (Straits Times, 1878). To make matters worse, thelocal policemen had to pay for their own uniforms, which were relatively expensive in

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view of their low salaries. For example, a peon (first class) had to pay S$3.50 for hisuniform from his monthly salary of S$5 (Straits Times, 1848). With such conditionsprevailing in the SPF, it is not surprising that the Straits Timesobserved that: It is atonce evident that the native constables and the European police of the Inspector classare so underpaid that scandals are unavoidable (Straits Times, 1887).

The unfavorable working conditions of the local policemen were further manifestedin the lack of provision of housing accommodation, pension or medical care for them.Hence, it was not surprising that many policemen were forced by their low salaries andpoor working conditions to be corrupt.

Another important consequence of the SPFs low salaries and unfavorable workingconditions was that it could not attract suitably qualified candidates to join its ranks.As police work was arduous, dangerous and badly paid, it only attracted thoseunemployed men in desperate financial straits, such as stranded sailors, who joinedthe SPF as a temporary stopgap occupation (Turnbull, 1977, p. 59). Thus, the SPFhad to be satisfied with those who applied for employment regardless of their characteror eligibility. On December 28, 1852, theStraits Timesidentified the SPFs chief defectas the absence of choice in the selection of men for the force because men turned tothe police force when they failed in other sources of employment. This weakness wasacknowledged by the Inspector-General of Police, Samuel Dunlop, in his report on theStraits Settlements Police for 1879 thus:

The difficulty of obtaining eligible recruits on the present pay is yearly increasing, and the

Superintendents are, as a rule, obliged to take any one who presents himself, provided he isup to the standard in height, and is known not to have been imprisoned (Straits Times, 1880).

When Dunlop was asked by the 1886 Commission of Inquiry whether he hadconsidered character in recruiting constables to the SPF, he admitted that he couldnot get enough policemen without characters [character reports] even though theregulations required such reports (Straits Settlements, 1887, p. 25). Consequently,the SPF had a high turnover rate and a large number of vacancies. In November 1856,the Deputy Superintendent of Police, George Wahab, informed the Sitting Magistratethat the SPF experienced difficulty in filling its vacancies because those who applied

Rank Monthly salary

European contingentInspector 1st class S$100 (no rations)Inspector 2nd class S$80 (S$5 rations)Inspector 3rd class S$60 (S$10 rations)Sergeant S$50 (S$10 rations)Constable S$40 (S$10 rations)

Local contingentSergeant S$15Corporal S$12Constable 1st class S$10Constable 2nd class S$9Constable 3rd class S$8Peon 1st class S$5Peon 2nd class S$4

Source:Straits Times (1887) quoted in Quah (1979, p. 28)

Table IMonthly salary in t

SPF by rank in 18

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were generally men from the jungle or servants discharged from many places throughmisconduct. Those who applied to join the SPF were either sailors addicted to drinkor men of doubtful character from the colonies (Straits Times, 1856).

The problem of corruption deteriorated during the Japanese Occupation because the

rampant inflation made it difficult for civil servants to live on their low wages. The lowvalue of the Japanese military currency forced many civil servants to supplement theirincomes by accepting bribes or doing business on the side line to prevent their familiesfrom starving (Yoong, 1972, p. 55). Trading in the black market seemed to be a way oflife as everyone was surviving on some sort of black marketing. Moreover, nepotismand corruption were perfectly acceptable because everyone resorted to connections,friends and relatives in order to get jobs (Lee, 2005, p. 142).

The Japanese Occupation bred corruption into Singaporean society, as practices ofbribery, blackmail, and extortion grew out of the violence and fear that the Japaneseused to rule their occupied territories (Lee, 2005, p. 205). According to Lee Gek Boi(2005, p. 205):

Bribery worked wonders. From generals to the ordinary soldier, gifts and money smoothedthe way. Nothing was transparent and everything was about connections and payoffs.Nothing was impossible with the right connections. [y] Shortages created the black marketand a culture of thievery to fuel the market. Everyone the Japanese included did blackmarketing. The Japanese Occupation culture brought out the basic survival instincts inpeople and produced a society where all manner of evils could be justified because it was allabout survival. [y] It would take years to undo the corruption and address the social evilsthat Japanese military occupation bred in Singapore.

Conditions worsened after the Second World War and corruption spread among civilservants as a result of their meager salaries and inflation, as well as their inadequatesupervision by their superiors, which provided them with many opportunities forcorruption with a low probability of being caught (Quah, 1982, pp. 161-162). The

Japanese Occupations worst legacy was the corruption of public and privateintegrity as reflected in the flourishing gambling dens and brothels, which werelegalized by the Japanese, and the resurgence of opium smoking, universal profiteeringand bribery (Turnbull, 1977, p. 225).

Corruption became a way of life for many Singaporeans to enable them to cope withtheir low salaries and rising inflation during the post-war period (Yoong, 1972, pp. 55-56).The British Military Administration (BMA), which took over after the Japanese surrenderin August 1945, was described pejoratively as the Black Market Administrationbecause its junior officials were unscrupulous and requisitioned private propertyarbitrarily and grossly mismanaged the distribution of rice. The BMAs financialinefficiency and scandalous corruption was criticized publicly by the advisory council(Turnbull, 1977, p. 225).

Ample opportunities for corruptionIn addition to low salaries and poor working conditions, the lack of control overpolicemen in areas that were most susceptible to corruption also providedmany opportunities for them to engage in corrupt practices. The cases of policeinvolvement in illegal gambling mentioned in the previous section reflected thelack of control over those inspectors and constables who accepted bribes fromthe gambling house owners.

Another reason why the local policemen had ample opportunities for corruptionwas that even though they were not legally permitted to take on second jobs in addition

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to their duties, their low salaries forced them to seek alternative sources of income tosupplement their meager salaries from the SPF. Those local policemen who ownedbuffalo carts and food stalls were unable to perform their official duties impartiallybecause of a conflict of interest (Quah, 1979, p. 29).

Tee Kim Leng, a Peoples Action Party (PAP) Legislative Assemblyman for PasirPanjang in 1959, observed that corruption was so widespread in governmentdepartments that even office boys requested for tips of 10 or 20 cents for handling outapplication forms. According to him, as the police were corrupt, the public had to payofficers to get them to investigate crimes and those who were rich and powerful wereable to bribe the police to get people out of jail (Yap et al., 2009, p. 175).

The SPF was not the only corrupt organization in Singapore during the colonialperiod, as government agencies such as the customs, immigration, and internalrevenue departments, provided more opportunities for corruption than those publicagencies that had limited contact with members of the public, did not issue licenses orpermits, or collected fees and taxes. A former Director of the Corrupt PracticesInvestigation Bureau (CPIB) noted that corruption was widespread not only in those

areas involved in licensing activity and food and price control action, but also in thoseprotection rackets connected with the smuggling of gold bars and opium, andgambling (Yoong, 1972, p. 56). In the view of a former journalist, Felix Abisheganaden,the years preceding the PAP government were the most corrupt period in Singaporeshistory because the bureaucracy, the police, the immigration and the politiciansthemselves were corrupt (Yapet al., 2009, p. 176).

Ineffective anti-corruption measuresSingapore initiated its battle against corruption in 1871, when corruption was madeillegal with the enactment of the Penal Code of the Straits Settlements of Malacca,Penang, and Singapore. As mentioned earlier, two Commissions of Inquiry wereappointed by the British colonial government in 1879 and 1886 to investigate the SPFs

inefficiency and public gambling in the Straits Settlements respectively. However,nothing was done by the British colonial government to curb corruption in the StraitsSettlements even though both Commissions had documented convincingly theprevalence of police corruption in Singapore.

The British colonial governments reliance on appointing Commissions of Inquiry todelay the implementation of political reforms was an important feature of Britishimperialism. According to K.B. Krishna (1939, p. 306), whenever British imperialism isfaced with a major or minor crisis in the colonies, it responded by appointing RoyalCommissions and conferences. However, the purpose of appointing these Commissionswas political and not to find facts. The British colonial government establishedCommissions of Inquiry for three reasons. First, these Commissions served to registerthe benevolent intentions of British imperialism. Second, the Commissions were used

to discredit the demands of political parties opposed to British imperialism. The thirdand most important reason was that the Commissions were a delaying tactic to gainand bide time, to carry on the same exploitation with a promise of thoroughinvestigation (Krishna, 1939, pp. 307-309).

The British colonial governments lack of political will in combating corruptionwas reflected in the 66-year delay in enacting the first anti-corruption law, thePrevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO), in December 1937 after the enactmentof the Penal Code in 1871. In addition to the delay in enacting the POCO, the Britishcolonial government made a serious error because the POCO made the SPFs

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Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) responsible for corruption control even though policecorruption was widespread in Singapore.

The POCO was enacted to prevent bribery and secret commissions in public andprivate business. However, it was ineffective for two reasons. The first reason was

that the POCOs offenses were not seizable and limited the powers of arrest, searchand investigation of police officers as warrants were required before arrests could bemade. The second reason for the POCOs ineffectiveness was that the penalty ofimprisonment for two years and/or a S$10,000 fine for corrupt offenders did not detercorrupt behavior. This weakness of the POCO was only rectified in 1946 when it wasamended to increase the penalty to imprisonment for three years, thus making corruptoffenses seizable and automatically giving police officers more powers of arrest, searchand investigation (Quah, 2007, pp. 12-13).

As it was located within the SPFs Criminal Investigation Department (CID), theACB failed to curb corruption because its small staff of 17 personnel was inadequate toperform its functions effectively. Since the CID was mainly concerned with thedetection and investigation of serious crimes like murder and kidnapping, the task of

corruption control was given much lower priority. This meant that the ACB had tocompete with other branches of the CID for limited personnel and other resources.Apart from its limited staff, the ACB was also not a specialized anti-corruption agency(ACA) because it was saddled with many functions, and corruption control was onlyone of the 16 duties of the Assistant Commissioner of the CID in May 1952[5]. Hence, itwas not surprising that combating corruption was not the CIDs top priority, especiallywhen the police were corrupt themselves. The most important reason for the ACBsineffectiveness was the prevalence of police corruption. In 1950, the Commissionerof Police, J.P. Pennefather-Evans, confirmed the existence of widespread policecorruption, which was documented by the 1879 and 1886 Commissions of Inquirywhen he reported that corruption was rife in government departments in Singapore(Quah, 2007, pp. 14-15).

The Opium Hijacking scandal and the CPIBs formationAs the ACB was ineffective in curbing corruption in Singapore, it was not surprisingthat Mrs Elizabeth Choy, a member of the Second Legislative Council, had criticized theBritish colonial government for its weak and feeble attempt to fight corruption inSingapore. In her speech to the Second Legislative Council on February 20, 1952, sheurged the government to implement quickly the ACBs proposals to amend the POCOto allow senior police officers to investigate the bank accounts of civil servants, toseparate the ACB from the SPF, and to increase the ACBs personnel (Colony ofSingapore, 1952a, p. B68).

The catalyst or triggering mechanism[6] for the CPIBs creation was the discoveryby the British colonial government that some police officers were implicated in the

Opium Hijacking scandal in October 1951. A gang of robbers, which included threepolice detectives, hijacked a shipment of 1,800 pounds of opium worth S$400,000(US$133,333) at Punggol Beach. The ACBs investigations revealed that some seniorpolice officers were involved with both the hijackers and the importers of the opium.However, these investigations resulted in the dismissal of only two senior policeofficers because the ACB did not have sufficient evidence to prosecute the other officers.The colonial government was dissatisfied with the results of the investigations andformed another special team in April 1952 to ascertain what went wrong with theACBs investigations. When the special team completed its investigations in September

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1952, the British colonial government decided to replace the ACB with the special team,which became the CPIB (CPIB, 2012, p. 18; Tan, 1999, p. 59).

Thus, the Opium Hijacking scandal made the British colonial government realizethat it had made a major policy mistake in December 1937, when the ACB was

entrusted with the task of curbing corruption even though police corruption wasrampant in Singapore.

The CPIB began its operations in October 1952 with 13 personnel, comprising ofeight seconded police officers and five support staff (CPIB, 2012, p. 18). However, theCPIB was ineffective during its first eight years because:

[y] the officers short secondment and limited time and capacity to conduct thoroughinvestigations, coupled with the social stigma of investigating fellow police officers,undermined the effective operations of CPIB. Thus, corruption, especially in its syndicatedform amongst law enforcement officers, continued to thrive in the colonial society (CPIB,2012, p. 18).

Lee Kuan Yew, Singapores first prime minister, explained in his memoirs why hisgovernment was committed from the outset to keep Singapore free from corruption:

When the PAP government took office in 1959, we set out to have a clean administration.We were sickened by the greed, corruption and decadence of many Asian leaders. [y]We had a deep sense of mission to establish a clean and effective government. When we tookthe oath of office [y] in June 1959, we all wore white shirts and white slacks to symbolizepurity and honesty in our personal behavior and our public life. [y] We made sure from theday we took office in June 1959 that every dollar in revenue would be properly accountedfor and would reach the beneficiaries at the grassroots as one dollar, without being siphonedoff along the way. So from the very beginning we gave special attention to the areas wherediscretionary powers had been exploited for personal gain and sharpened the instrumentsthat could prevent, detect or deter such practices (Lee, 2000, pp. 182-184).

Learning from the British colonial governments lack of political will in combatingcorruption as reflected in the CPIBs lack of legal powers, manpower, and budget during

its first eight years, the PAP government, which assumed power in June 1959, realizedthe critical importance of enhancing the CPIBs powers and providing it with therequired personnel and budget for performing its functions effectively. Accordingly,the PAP government initiated a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy by enacting thePrevention of Corruption Act (POCA) on June 17, 1960 to strengthen the CPIB.

The POCA eliminated the deficiencies of the POCO and gave the CPIB additionalpowers to perform its functions. Apart from defining corruption explicitly in terms of themany forms of gratification, the POCA has given the CPIB officers powers of arrestand search of arrested persons (section 15) as well as the authority to investigate thebank and other accounts of those suspected of committing corrupt offenses (section 17).Section 27 enabled the CPIB to deal with offenders effectively by making all offensesunder the POCA seizable offenses. In short, the CPIB has been given a new lease of life bythe additional powers entrusted to it by the POCA (Quah, 2007, pp. 19-20).

The CPIB enforces the POCA by performing these three functions: (1) to receive andinvestigate complaints concerning corruption in the public and private sectors; (2) toinvestigate malpractices and misconduct by public officers; and (3) to examine thepractices and procedures in the public service to minimize opportunities for corruptpractices (CPIB, 2004, p. 3). In addition to these functions, the CPIB is also responsiblefor screening candidates selected for appointments in the Singapore Civil Service(SCS) and statutory boards to ensure that only those candidates without any taint ofcorruption or misconduct are actually recruited (Republic of Singapore, 1995, p. 638).

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Tackling police corruption in contemporary SingaporeThe PAP governments comprehensive anti-corruption strategy is based on this logicof corruption control: as corruption is caused byboththe incentives and opportunitiesto be corrupt, attempts to eradicate corruption must be designed to minimize or

remove the conditions of both the incentives and opportunities that make individualcorrupt behavior irresistible (Quah, 1989, p. 842). As police corruption was rampantduring the colonial period, it was not surprising that substantial efforts were made toreduce the opportunities for corruption in the SPF as part of the PAP governmentsstrategy for minimizing corruption.

Improving salaries and working conditionsAs low salaries and unfavorable working conditions contributed to the widespreadpolice corruption during the British colonial period, these two aspects had to beimproved to redress the problem. When Singapore attained self-government fromthe British in June 1959, the SPF had 4,301 personnel (Quah, 1979, p. 16). If the SPFduring the colonial period is compared with its counterpart today, it is obvious

that the contemporary SPF is in a better condition. Apart from being larger, the SPFtoday enjoys more favorable working conditions than its colonial counterpart.

The most important difference is that salaries in the SPF have gradually improvedsince the Second World War. In 1951, the Police Pay Committee recommendednew pay scales and allowances for policemen below the rank of Inspector. For example,recruits to the SPF in 1951 received a monthly salary of S$450, unlike theircounterparts who were only paid a low monthly salary of S$4 in 1887 (Colony ofSingapore, 1951, p. 4). Two decades later, the Lee Soo Ann Salary Review Committeeof 1971 suggested between 20 and 25 percent pay rises for junior police officers.It also recommended that the salary increases should be accompanied with freemedical aid, instead of paying a certain percentage of ones salary for such treatment.Furthermore, free accommodation should be provided for married personnel, and

dialect and educational allowances should be reintroduced (Straits Times, 1971, p. 15).The government accepted the Committees recommendations and implemented thesein April 1972.

With the improvement in their salaries and working conditions, membersof the SPF today are not allowed to keep other jobs, unlike their colonial counterparts.Table IV provides details of the current salary scales of entry rank junior andsenior officers in the SPF. Compared to the low monthly salaries of the police officersin 1887 shown in Table III, the monthly salaries of Corporals, Sergeants, Inspectors,and Assistant Superintendents of Police (ASPs) in the SPF are much more attractivein 2014.

Entry rank Educational requirements Monthly salary scalea

Corporal O levels S$1,790-S$2,060Sergeant A levels/diploma S$1,920-S$2,430Inspector Bachelors degree in any discipline S$3,180-S$4,010Assistant superintendent of Police Bachelors degree in any discipline S$3,710-S$4,470

Note: aUS$ 1S$1.24127 on July 18, 2014 (www.xe.com/currencyconverter)Source:Compiled from information provided in SPF (2014a)

Table IV.Salary scales of entryrank junior and seniorSPF officers in 2014

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Joint CPIB-SPF task forceIn December 1966, the Political Secretary to the Minister of Culture described the SPFas an efficient, small and honest force. Referring to the subject of corruption, hestated that the Government wants every citizen and every Government officer to be

clear of corruption because we will not forgive anybody who is involved in corruptpractices (Straits Times, 1966). Ten years later, members of the SPF were remindedby Police Life, the SPFs newsletter, to show the public that corruption did not pay(Straits Times, 1976b). In short, unlike the British colonial period, corruption isno longer tolerated or condoned by both the PAP government and population incontemporary Singapore.

In December 1976, the SPF and the CPIB established a joint task force to weedout corrupt elements and practices in the SPF. This task force had two objectives:to identify existing corruption hazards and devise measures to prevent them; andto examine the policy aspects which might have an impact on the prevention ofcorruption. The task force reiterated that no form of corruption would be tolerated andcorrupt officers would be severely punished or prosecuted in court. Those policemen

found to be living beyond their means would be watched by the task force because,if these officers knew that they were under surveillance, their chances of being corruptwould be reduced (Straits Times, 1976a). As the SPF maintains a high standard ofdiscipline, any policeman found guilty of misconduct has to face disciplinary action.

Improving the SPFs recruitment and selection proceduresKnapp (1972, pp. 31-32) had recommended these two approaches to reduce thesusceptibility of police officers to corruption: the improvement of screening andselection methods and standards; and the reliance on training to change the attitudesof police officers. As discussed in this and the following sub-section, the SPF hasrelied on both approaches to minimize police corruption.

The British colonial government introduced meritocracy in Singapore in January

1951 when the Public Service Commission (PSC) was established to acceleratelocalization in the SCS and to ensure that recruitment and promotion were based onmerit and not patronage. The PSC relies on interviews to select qualified candidates tothe SCS. To qualify for appointment to the SCS in general, and the SPF in particular,candidates must satisfy these six criteria: citizenship, age, education, experience,medical fitness, and character (meaning no criminal conviction, no record ofcorruption, and not a security risk). Candidates for Divisions I and II appointments tothe SCS and SPF who meet these criteria are interviewed by the PSC members and therelevant personnel boards.

Arising from the PSCs heavy workload, the Constitution of Singapore was amended inMarch 1990 to help the PSC cope by increasing the number of its members from 11 to 15and by establishing the Educational Service Commission (ESC) and the Police and Civil

Defense Services Commission (PCDSC). This move was designed to reduce the PSCsworkload as the ESC would be responsible for appointing and promoting 21,000 teachers,and the PCDSC would take care of the appointment and promotion of 10,000 police,narcotics, prisons, and civil defense officers, thus leaving the PSC to deal with theremaining 34,000 civil servants (Quah, 2010a, p. 84). However, as shown in Table V, theestablishment of the ESC and PCDSC did not reduce the PSCs workload significantlybecause the PSC interviewed 9,993 candidates (67.4 percent) for appointment during1990-1994, in contrast to the 4,254 candidates (28.7 percent) interviewed by the ESC,and the 573 candidates (3.9 percent) interviewed by the PCDSC.

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As the creation of the ESC and PCDSC did not alleviate significantly the PSCsworkload in appointing candidates to the SCS during 1990-1994, the ESC and PCDSCwere dissolved and amalgamated into a single PSC on April 1, 1998 (Public ServiceCommission, 1999, p. 9).

To enhance the SCSs ability to compete with the private sector for talentedpersonnel, the public personnel management system was further decentralized in

January 1995 with the establishment of a system of 31 personnel boards. Unlikethe ESC and PCDSC, the 31 personnel boards have reduced considerably thePSCs workload from 1995 to 2010 as the PSC considered 1,724 candidates forappointment, 308 candidates for promotion, completed 832 disciplinary cases, andgranted 2,305 scholarships and training awards during this period (Quah, 2013a,p. 409). In short, the PSC serves as the gatekeeper to the SCS by ensuring fairnessand impartiality in recruiting and selecting candidates for appointment to DivisionsI and II on the basis of merit.

The entry requirements for a senior police officer are the same as those for a juniorpolice officer, except for the educational requirement of a Bachelors degree in any

discipline. Male Singapore citizens are also required to have completed their full-timenational service and be physically fit. Candidates interested in applying for the SPFscholarships must be Singapore citizens or permanent residents who intend to becomecitizens, with strong leadership qualities, good GCE A levels or equivalent, goodrecord of extra-curricular activities in school, and an excellent record in the OfficerCadet School. Letters of appointment are only issued to successful candidates if theypass their medical examination and security screening (by the Internal SecurityDepartment, the CPIB, and the Criminal Record Office) and after their educationalcertificates and relevant documents are verified.

The former Commissioner of Police, Khoo Boon Hui (2005, p. 4) revealed thatapplicants to the SPF are subjected to integrity-based psychological assessment,stringent screening and interviews to ensure that the right persons are selected for the

Force. As there are many difficulties surrounding selection and the use of psychologicaltesting, the SPF has wisely relied on psychological testing as an additional method forrecruiting and selecting candidates because psychological tests can provide useful andobjective information about a candidate and can help identify those most and least suitedto the complex job of law enforcement (Ainsworth, 1995, pp. 130, 145).

Training of SPF officersDuring the first six decades of the SPFs existence (1820-1880), there was no formaltraining for police officers, except for drill and physical education. Training began in

Year PSC ESC PCDSC Total

1990 2,604 655 30 3,2891991 2,602 6 102 2,7101992 2,235 1,160 139 3,5341993 1,289 1,272 147 2,7081994 1,263 1,161 155 2,579Total 9,993 4,254 573 14,820

(67.4%) (28.7%) (3.9%) (100%)

Source:Quah (2010a, p. 85)

Table V.Workloads of the PSC,ESC and PCDSC,1990-1994

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the SPF with the introduction of classes for police constables and inspectors during1881-1904. From 1905-1922, training was conducted at the Police Training School(PTS) in Malacca for the police forces in the Straits Settlements. To avoid theinconvenience of sending the SPF recruits to Malacca for training, a Police Depot

was established in Singapore in 1923 to take care of training efforts in the SPFuntil 1942. The Police Depot was renamed the PTS after the Second World War(Quah, 1976, pp. 103-104).

The Japanese invasion of Singapore claimed many casualties and reduced the sizeof the SPF from 4,173 personnel in 1942 to 3,204 personnel in 1948 (Quah, 1979, p. 16).Consequently, to cope with the SPFs serious shortage of manpower during theimmediate postwar period, the PTS launched a crash training program in December1945 by organizing these courses: refresher and promotion courses for detectives anduniformed men; training courses for recruits and regular members of the SingaporeHarbor Board Police; and the six-month training courses for SPF recruits (Quah, 1976,p. 104). In 1955, the six-month basic training course for recruits to the SPF wasincreased to eight months and the recruits were instructed in 22 subjects[7]. In 1957,

the length of the basic training course for recruits was further extended by anothermonth to nine months and the curriculum of the training program was reduced toinclude instruction in only 13 subjects[8].

When Singapore attained independence on August 9, 1965, the withdrawal of theMalaysian Police Reserve Units resulted in another serious manpower shortage inthe SPF. Accordingly, the PTS was expanded to take in 850 constables for trainingby December 1965 (Quah, 1976, p. 107). In 1968, the SPF was reviewed to improve itsperformance in law enforcement in a modern and independent Singapore. To enhancethe SPFs training efforts, the British police adviser, I.S. Proud, had recommended thetransformation of the PTS into a Police Academy. The PAP government acceptedProuds recommendation and the Police Academy was officially opened on August 2,1969 (Quah, 1976, p. 108).

Today, recruits to the SPF are required to attend a residential six-month PoliceOfficers Basic Course (POBC) at the Home Team Academy (HTA). The POBC isdesigned to equip new officers with the skills, knowledge and values required forpolice work. These trainees undergo physical training and are taught criminal law,community policing, on-scene investigation, police defensive tactics, and weaponry. Incontrast, senior police officers have to attend a nine-month basic residential trainingprogram at the HTA to equip them with the knowledge and skills to perform theirduties. In addition to both physical and classroom training, the senior police officers arealso required to attend a Leadership Program. As all trainees are paid their fullmonthly salaries during the training period, they are bonded for two years on thecompletion of their basic training. All new junior and senior officers are confirmed afterone years probation (SPF, 2014a, b).

Values educationIn 1999, the CPIB initiated Operation Restricted Zone to investigate an illegal oney-lender,Chua Tiong Tiong, who was nicknamed Ah Long San[9]. The CPIBs investigationsresulted in the arrest and conviction of Chua for ten years and the charging of 17 policeofficers in court for corruption. Ten of them were cultivated by Chua and one of them,ASP Hassan Ahmad, who had known him since 1994, had borrowed S$20,000from him to complete his legal education in England. Hassan joined the SPF aftergraduating from the University of Buckingham and remained in close contact with

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Chua. Hassan was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment and fined S$8,000 after beingfound guilty of corruption and for using his position as an ASP to provide informationon police investigations involving Chuas brother (CPIB, 2012, p. 75).

The Ah Long San case is important because it was the triggering factor

responsible for introducing values education in the SPF in 1999[10]. The valueseducation component included in the basic training courses for both junior and seniorpolice officers consists of 40 hours of instruction in the code of conduct, policeregulations, and government instruction manuals. Case studies of police officers foundguilty of corruption are also included in the training. Khoo Boon Hui, the formerCommissioner of Police, has highlighted values education as an important measureadopted by the SPF to combat corruption thus:

Recruits are then put through integrity-based lessons during their basic training to buildresilience to corruption. Such training continues throughout their career to ensure that ourcore values, including loyalty and integrity, are inculcated in each of our officers. Officers witha strong sense of loyalty take pride in being officers of the [Singapore] Police Force. With theinterest of the Force at heart, officers with the right values not only have the will to resist

corruption, they are also able to keep fellow officers in check against misdemeanors. Regularin-service training at front line units, which are more susceptible to corruption, is conducted.Case studies of actual cases of police officers charged in court for criminal offenses andcorruption form part of our continuous integrity training program (Khoo, 2005, p. 4).

To reinforce the values training of police officers in Singapore and to enhance theirawareness of disciplinary-related issues including corruption, an annual EthicsSeminar has been conducted by the SPF since 2002. This seminar is usually attendedby 300 police officers, including all the directors, commanders and ground supervisors.During the inaugural Ethics Seminar on March 7, 2002, the SPFs ManpowerDepartment launched a values handbook entitled Guide to Ethical Decisions, which wasdesigned to provide a set of general rules of conduct for officers of the SPF[11](Singapore Police Force (SPF), 2002, pp. 2-3). This pocket-sized handbook is based on

the six guiding principles of ethos, the law, honor, conflict of interest, consequence, andscrutiny. These guiding principles are defined in the form of questions (see Table VI)and illustrated with six scenarios based on actual cases to encourage desired behavior.

Each guiding principle is first defined and illustrated with a scenario based on anactual case. For example, Table VII shows how the two guiding principles of honor andconsequence are defined and explained and illustrated with the respective twoscenarios involving Cpl. Jims misconduct with an unlicensed masseuse, and Sgt.

Guiding principles Questions

Ethos Is the decision or conduct in line with the SPFs mission, vision and core values?

The Law Is the action or decision in accordance with the law and approved guidelines?Honor Does your decision or action bring dishonor to the SPF?Conflict of interest Does the outcome of the decision highlight a conflict of interest or lead

to private gain?Consequence What will be the consequences of the action or decision to yourself,

your colleagues, the SPF and above all, your family?Scrutiny Would you be able to justify your decision to police management and would

it withstand public scrutiny?

Source:SPF (2002, pp. 4-5)

Table VI.Guiding principlesfor Singapore policeofficers in makingethical decisions

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James offense of obtaining loans from three persons with whom he had officialdealings. As police officers might have to make decisions on their own without gettingadvice from their superiors or peers, reference to these six guiding principles will helpthem to ensure that their decisions are ethical (SPF, 2002, p. 3).

Administrative measuresThe SPF has also adopted several administrative measures to minimize the opportunitiesfor corruption and to socialize its members to resist such opportunities. The first measurerequires all police officers in sensitive and vulnerable posts, such as investigators, fieldintelligence officers, traffic enforcement officers, and anti-vice and gambling suppressionofficers, to be rotated every three or four years to reduce the opportunities for corruption.According to the CPIBs Assistant Director, Wong Pong Yen, the SPFs system of rotating

Guiding principle 3 HonorDefinition andexplanation

Every officer can play a role in maintaining the integrity and public image of theSPF. The 2001 World Competitiveness Report listed Singapore as the third safestcountry in the world to live in. The Corruption Perceptions Index 2001 ranked

Singapore 4th out of 99 nations in terms of being corrupt-free. The SPF remainsone of the most honest police forces in the world and we can take pride in that.Indeed this recognition is one of our most cherished assets. A high standard ofpersonal conduct is expected of SPF officers at all times. A police officer mustaccept that discipline is necessary to preserve the integrity of the SPF and toinspire honor within us

Scenario 3 Cpl. Jim got acquainted with a lady, Nikita, through the internet and the latteroffered him a massage for a fee. Cpl. Jim agreed and they met at a hotel. Aftermassaging for about 10 minutes, Cpl. Jim whipped out his police security pass,identified himself as a police officer and told Nikita that she had committed anoffense for providing an unlicensed massage service. Nikita pleaded with Cpl.Jim not to arrest her and offered the massage free. However, a dispute broke outand Nikita called for the police. Departmental action was taken against Cpl. Jimfor conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline. He was subsequently

dismissed from the SPF. The misconduct of the officer adversely affected thehonor of SPF

Guiding principle 5 ConsequenceDefinition andexplanation

Police officers regardless of rank and status had been taken to task wheneverthey breached any laws. These officers have been made to answer for theiractions. Many have paid a very high price for their misdeeds. Officers who havebeen convicted for criminal charges and serious misconduct are liable to beremoved from office. They would stand to lose in financial and emotional terms.They would also lose their self-esteem. Cases of officers involved in corrupt,criminal acts and acts of serious misconduct will continue to be highlighted inthe media. This would not only bring shame upon the officer but also to hisfamily and the SPF. Officers must think of the consequences to themselves, theirfamily and SPF in whatever decisions they make

Scenario 5 Sgt. James was attached to the Height Permits Section of the Traffic Police,

granting approvals to motorists applying for height permits. Sgt. James obtainedloans ranging from S$300 to S$2,000 from three of the applicants of heightpermits as he was in financial difficulties. As a consequence, Sgt. James wascharged in court for four counts of corruption, for obtaining loans from personswith whom he had official dealings with. He was sentenced to a total of 12months imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of S$2,900 by the court

Source:SPF (2002, pp. 13-14, 19-20)

Table VGuiding principles

honor and consequen

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the duties of its officers ensures that they do not remain in a particular departmentfor too long in order to prevent them from forming relationships with criminals(CPIB, 2012, p. 76).

The Public Service Division (PSD) announced on September 30, 2013 that, from

January 2014, those civil servants in positions that are vulnerable to bribery andexploitation would be rotated every five years, and those officers involved intransactional work are required to take at least a block leave of five consecutivedays during a calendar year to enable those officers covering their work to scrutinizetheir work processes and procedures. These new measures apply to those civil servantsresponsible for finance and procurement and their colleagues in regulatory roles wherethe risk of bribery is high (Chang, 2013, p. A6).

A second administrative measure requires all police officers to submit their credit statusreports from the Consumer Credit Bureau for the assessment of their debt situation. Thoseofficers who are indebted may be removed from their positions. Furthermore, like othercivil servants in Singapore, all police officers are required to make an annual declaration ofindebtedness for unsecured debts of more than three months of their monthly salary. Those

officers who fail to submit an honest declaration of their unsecured debts are investigatedand are liable to be disciplined. Some police officers were dismissed or retired in thepublic interest in the past for not declaring their debts as required (Khoo, 2005, pp. 4-5).The former Commissioner of Police, Khoo Boon Hui, explained that these administrativemeasures are necessary to select the right people to join the [Police] Force, to educate ourofficers on ethical conduct from the early days of their careers and to prevent indebtedofficers from turning to bribes to overcome their financial woes (Khoo, 2005, p. 5).

In 2002, random testing of police officers for drug abuse was also introduced to deterthem from an unacceptable lifestyle, which is likely to lead to corruption and criminalbehavior (Khoo, 2005, p. 5). The final restriction on police officers is that they mustdeclare their visits to the two casinos in Singapore. To avoid a conflict of interest, thosepolice officers with direct dealings with the casinos on law enforcement matters are

banned from visiting the casinos to avoid a conflict of interests (Lau, 2013). Thismeasure was highlighted recently after the CPIBs Assistant Director, Edwin Yeo, wascharged in court on July 24, 2013, for misappropriating more than S$1.7 million fromthe CPIB from 2008 to 2012 to fund his gambling habit at the Marina Bay Sands Casino(Singh, 2013, p. A1). Arising from Yeos arrest, from October 1, 2013, all civil servants inSingapore who visit the two local casinos more than four times a month, includingthose with an annual pass (which allows them unlimited access) are required to declaresuch visits to their superiors within seven days (Chang, 2013, p. A6).

Evaluating the effectiveness of measures for curbing police corruptionHow effective are the measures initiated by the SPF for curbing corruption amongits members? To answer this question, it is necessary to examine Singapores

performance on these three international indicators: Transparency InternationalsCorruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from 1995-2013; World Banks Control ofCorruption indicator from 1996-2012; and Political and Economic Risk Consultancy(PERC) annual survey of corruption from 1995-2014; and the number of reportedpolice corruption cases in Singapore from 1965-2012.

International indicatorsTable VIII shows first, that Singapore has been consistently ranked as the least corruptcountry in Asia from 1995 to 2014. In 2010, Singapore was jointly ranked first with

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Denmark and New Zealand with a score of 9.3 among the 178 countries included in theCPI for that year. Singapore retained its ranking as the fifth least corrupt country in theCPI from 2011 to 2013. Second, PERCs annual surveys of corruption from 1995 to 2014also confirm Singapores status as the least corrupt Asian country. Third, it can be seenfrom Table VIII that for the World Banks Control of Corruption indicator from 1996 to2012, Singapore has the highest percentile rank among all the Asian countries includedin the surveys.

Transparency Internationals Global Corruption Barometer assesses, among otherthings, the perceived extent of corruption in various national institutions and sectors,including the police. It can be seen from Table IX that the perceived extent of policecorruption in Singapore is low, with its scores ranging from 1.7 in 2004 to 2.8 in 2010.

Number of reported police corruption casesSingapores success in combating police corruption is also reflected in the decrease inthe number of reported police corruption cases after independence. Table X indicatesthat there were 67 reported cases of police corruption in Singapore during 1965-1977,with the protection of illegal activities being the most important form, followed by thefix, bribery, direct criminal activities, opportunistic theft, and corruption of authority.

Similarly, the number of reported cases of police corruption in Singapore, as shownin Table XI, has also declined to 75 from 1996 to 2011, with 1996 and 2009 having ten

Year CPI rank and scorea PERC rank and scorebControl of corruption

percentile rank

1995 3rd (9.26) 1st (1.20) na1996 7th (8.80) 1st (1.09) 96.61997 9th (8.66) 1st (1.05) na1998 7th (9.1) 1st (1.43) 96.11999 7th (9.1) 1st (1.55) na2000 6th (9.1) 1st (0.71) 96.62001 4th (9.2) 1st (0.83) na2002 5th (9.3) 1st (0.90) 98.52003 5th (9.4) 1st (0.38) 98.02004 5th (9.3) 1st (0.50) 98.52005 5th (9.4) 1st (0.65) 98.02006 5th (9.3) 1st (1.30) 97.62007 4th (9.3) 2nd (1.20)c 98.12008 4th (9.2) 2nd (1.13)c 98.1

2009 3rd (9.2) 1st (0.92) 98.12010 1st (9.3) 1st (0.99) 98.62011 5th (9.2) 1st (0.37) 96.72012 5th (87) 1st (0.67) 97.12013 5th (86) 1st (0.74) na2014 na 1st (1.60) na

Notes: aThe CPI score from 1995 to 2011 ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean). The CPIscore for 2012-2013 ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean); bthe PERC score ranges from0 (least corrupt) to 10 (most corrupt); cAustralia was first in 2007-2008 but Singapore was still the leastcorrupt Asian countrySources:Compiled from www.transparency.org; PERC (2001, 2008, p. 7; 2012, p. 4; 2013, p. 6; 2014,p. 1); and http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports

Table VISingapores performan

on three internationindicators, 1995-20

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cases each for both years, and 1999, with 13 cases because of the Ah Long Sanscandal. This means that there was an average of five reported police corruption casesper year during 1996-2011. In terms of the SPFs size, these 75 cases constituted only0.74 percent of its personnel during this period.

A recent study of corruption cases investigated by the CPIB from 2008 to 2012,which was commissioned by the Prime Ministers Office, found that an average of 80percent of the cases investigated by the CPIB came from the private sector, with theremaining 20 percent originating from the public sector. Indeed, Table XII shows thatthe number of public sector corruption cases investigated by the CPIB ranges from 31in 2011 to 49 in 2009, with an average of 39 cases during 2008-2012. However, thenumber of private sector corruption cases has decreased from 194 in 2008 to 144 in2012. Among the 197 public sector corruption cases investigated by the CPIB from2008 to 2012, 51 percent involved front-line officers with enforcement powers from theHome Team[12], Housing and Development Board, National Environment Agency,Ministry of Manpower, and Urban Redevelopment Authority. This implies that thenumber of police corruption cases investigated by the CPIB during 2008-2012 is also

small (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2013).

Six lessons for other Asian countriesSingapores experience shows that it is possible to minimize police corruption if theincumbent government has the political will to implement the required reforms. Aspolice corruption is a serious problem in many Asian countries, what lessons can thesecountries learn from Singapores success story in curbing police corruption?

Year Scorea

2004 1.7

2005 2.02006 1.92007 2.02009 nab

2010 2.8

Notes: aScore ranges from 1 (not at all corrupt) to 5 (extremely corrupt); bThe perceived extent ofpolice corruption was excluded in 2009Sources:Transparency International (2004, p.18; 2005, p. 18; 2006, p. 21; 2007, p. 22; 2010)

Table IX.Perceived extent of policecorruption in Singaporeon the Global CorruptionBarometer, 2004-2010

Form of police corruption Number %

Protection of illegal activities 33 49.3The fix 14 20.9Bribery 8 11.9Direct criminal activities 5 7.5Opportunistic theft 4 6.0Corruption of authority 3 4.5Total 67 100.0

Source:Quah (1979, p. 36)

Table X.Reported cases of policecorruption in Singaporeby form, 1965-1977

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Leadership and political willIn his analysis of corruptive influences in local government police managementin the USA, Patrick V. Murphy (1982, p. 61) identified the attitude of the policechief as an important cause of police corruption because even a personally honestpolice chief would shield from public exposure their corrupt colleagues for fear that hewould lose his job if the public perceived that his whole department was corrupt.Many police chiefs were either friends of the corrupt officers or tolerated corruptbehavior among their colleagues. Indeed, police chiefs had not been concerned withhow they could combat corruption within their departments because they wereunable or unwilling to deal with corruption among their colleagues seriously(Murphy, 1982, p. 62).

Similarly, Gerald E. Caiden (1977, p. 169) highlighted the importance of boldleadership in the effective control of police corruption in the USA. After the exposureof corruption within a police department, the lead had to come from the top because

Sector 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total Average

Public sector cases 45 49 37 31 35 197 39

(18.8%) (20.9%) (18.0%) (22.5%) (19.6%) (19.8%) (20%)Private sector cases 194 185 169 107 144 799 160(81.2%) (79.1%) (82.0%) (77.5%) (80.4%) (80.2%) (80%)

Total 239 234 206 138 179 996 199(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)

Source:Ministry of Home Affairs (2013)

Table XCorruption cas

investigated by the CPby sector, 2008-20

Year Reported casesNo. of cases as a percentage

of the SPFs personnel

1996 10 0.121997 3 0.041998 8 0.101999 13 0.162000 4 0.052001 5 0.062002 na na2003 5 0.032004 3 0.022005 1 0.0062006 1 0.0072007 7 0.0512008 1 0.0062009 10a 0.065

2010 1

b

0.0062011 3c 0.019Total 75 0.74

Notes: aThis includes a national service officer; bThis is a volunteer police officer; cThis includesa national service officerSource:Data provided by courtesy of the SPFs Manpower Department

Table XReported cases of policorruption in Singapo

1996-20

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the police chiefs task was to impress on all that corruption would not be tolerated byimplementing these measures: strict accountability, internal investigation, regularizeddiscipline, spot checks, staff shuffles, revamped reward structures, and elimination ofknown soldiering, payoffs, and fraternalization with underground figures.

Leadership and commitment can make a considerable difference in combatingpolice corruption because there is considerable evidence from the organizationalliterature that the top person, with his or her team, is vital to the success of institutionalchange (Punch, 2009, pp. 239-240). Following the advice of James S. Bowman (1983,p. 95), public sector managers (including police chiefs) should not only be committedto curbing corruption in their organizations, but also communicate their commitmentto their subordinates by explaining why they should not engage in unethical practicesand why training programs, codes of ethics, and professional ethics would bedeveloped and supported. To ensure fundamental change in their organizations, thosemanagers who do not support these policies should be asked to resign. On the basis oftheir analysis of past police scandals in the USA and other countries, David Bayley andRoberto Perito (2011, p. 10) have concluded that for police corruption reforms to

succeed, there must be leadership from the top because reform starts at the top asit does not percolate up from the bottom. Indeed, according to them: If the topleadership in the police does not visibly and persistently lead reform, then changewill not occur.

The SPFs success in curbing corruption also reflects Singapores effectiveness inminimizing corruption. Corruption was rampant during the colonial period because ofthe British colonial governments lack of political will and its reliance on the ineffectiveACB and POCO. Police corruption was widespread because of the low salaries ofpolicemen, their unfavorable working conditions, and the ample opportunities forcorruption. Hence, it was not surprising that the poorly-staffed and funded ACB, whichwas part of the CID in the SPF, failed in its efforts to curb corruption in the SPF andother government departments in Singapore.

The PAP government learnt from the mistakes of the British colonial government incurbing corruption and demonstrated its political will by enacting the POCA in June1960 to enhance the CPIBs ability in corruption control. As the SPF was perhaps themost corrupt institution in Singapore then, the government not only focussed itsefforts on combating police corruption but also initiated measures to improve thesalaries and working conditions in the SPF.

Why is political will or the commitment of the political leaders so important inensuring the success of an anti-corruption strategy? According to Ian Senior (2006,pp. 184, 187), the principal people who can change a culture of corruption if they wishto do so are politicians because they make the laws and allocate the funds that enablethe laws to be enforced. Consequently, corrupt political leaders will not be concernedwith minimizing corruption but in maintaining their power instead.

Singapore succeeded in curbing corruption because of the political will of its firstprime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, and his colleagues to build a clean and effectivegovernment. As the police was corrupt during the colonial period, the British rectifiedtheir mistake by transferring the function of corruption control from the ACBto the CPIB in October 1952. As the CPIB was inadequately staffed and funded,the PAP government strengthened the CPIB from 1960 onwards with more personnel,budget and legal powers to enhance its effectiveness. At the same time, measureswere initiated to address these major causes of corruption in the SPF: low salaries,unfavorable working conditions and ample opportunities for corruption.

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In sum, the first lesson for combating police corruption effectively in other Asiancountries is the commitment of their political leaders and police chiefs orcommissioners to corruption control. As the police are a reflection of society,measures to minimize police corruption can only succeed if there is also a nation-wide

anti-corruption effort embracing the civil service and other public agencies too, and notonly the police. The SPF was corrupt during the British colonial period becausecorruption was a way of life then. However, the PAP governments commitment tofighting corruption after it assumed power in June 1959 has transformed the SPF into aclean and effective organization because of the improvement in its salaries andworking conditions as well as its enhanced recruitment and selection procedures, andits improved training program and values education.

Reliance on comprehensive anti-corruption measuresThe logic of corruption control requires effective anti-corruption strategies to reduce theincentives and opportunities for corrupt behavior and the costs of noncorrupt behavior,and increase incentives and opportunities for noncorrupt behavior and the costs of

corrupt behavior (Gardiner and Lyman, 1989, p. 827). This means that corruption canonly be curbed if comprehensive measures are initiated to rectify the various causeswhich contribute to the incentives and opportunities for corrupt behavior.

Gerald E. Caiden (1977, p. 168) has acknowledged that in the USA, effective policecontrol required a combination of reducing opportunity, cutting down the potentialgains, strengthening norms of honesty, and tracking the miscreants. Similarly, inSingapore, the SPF has succeeded in minimizing police corruption through theimplementation of its comprehensive anti-corruption measures, which include theimprovement of the salaries and working conditions of its members, working closelywith the CPIB in a joint task force, improving its recruitment and selection procedures,enhancing its training program with the introduction of values education in 2002 topromote ethical decision making by its officers, and initiating several administrative

measures to reduce their opportunities for corruption.In other words, the second lesson which other Asian countries can learn from the

SPFs success in curbing police corruption is the importance of adopting acomprehensive strategy instead of relying on incremental or piecemeal measures.

Meritocracy and quality control of personnelRecruitment is the process of attracting and selecting qualified candidates with thenecessary skills and talent to apply for advertised positions in the civil service,including the police. Peter G. Richards (1963, p. 11) has identified four methods forrecruiting persons to positions of public responsibility, including civil servants:chance, heredity, competition, and patronage. As chance and heredity are seldomrelied on today, the remaining options are patronage or merit. Patronage refers to the

power vested in political leaders and elected officials to make partisan appointmentsand to confer licenses, contracts, franchises, honors, and other benefits on politicalsupporters, friends, and relatives (Chandler and Plano, 1988, p. 291). The powerto select stems from law, tradition, political, or social influence. However, unlikeselection by competitive interview, a post filled by patronage is not subject topublic advertisement, which is the common pre-condition of competitive interview(Richards, 1963, p. 16).

Patronage originated in England in the fiftteenth century as there was no generalpattern of organization and the [civil] service was based on patronage, absence of

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accepted appointment criteria, and of a standard payment pattern (Barber, 1972, p. 60).During the eighteenth century, the system of patronage allowed politicians to find secure

jobs (sometimes sinecures posts with no real duties) for friends and acquaintances(Pyper, 1991, p. 8). Government departments were largely independent fiefdoms with

different recruitment methods, ample opportunities for patronage and corruption, andreliance on favoritism rather than competence for determining promotion (Pyper, 1995,p. 6). In short, patronage was essential to the maintenance of the Constitution to preventconflict between the Crown and Parliament (Richards, 1963, p. 20).

The consequences of the reliance on patronage in eighteenth century England weredescribed by Hilton M. Power (1967, pp. 119-120) in these words:

English society in the eighteenth century was exemplified by corruption, privilege andinefficiency. In so far as administration existed it was exercised through a system ofpatronage with offices granted or sold by the aristocracy, much in the same fashion as theyconducted their large landed estates. Though many government or administrative serviceswere efficient, there was an overwhelming tendency to provide places for the friends, relativesor retainers of the privileged landed aristocracy and frequently the appointee was far from

qualified either mentally or physically to occupy what was often a sinecure.Charles Trevelyan was appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gladstone, towork with Stafford Northcote to review the recruitment method employed by theBritish Civil Service (BCS) in the nineteenth century (Hennessy, 1990, pp. 36-37).The Northcote-Trevelyan Report, which was completed in February 1854, criticized theselecti

curbing police corruption

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