current fa doctrine for deep battle

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IS CURRENT FIRE SUPPORT DOCTRINE FOR THE DEEP BATTLEEFFECTIVE IN THE POST. ESERT STORM ENVIRONMENT?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College in partialfulfillment of the requirements for thedegreeMASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

EDWARD J. FRANCIS, MAJ, USAM.A., U.S. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, Monterey, CA, 1992

Fort Leavenworth, KS1992

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCETHESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate: Major Edward J. FrancisThesis Title: Is Current Fire Support Doctrine for the DeepBattle Effective in the Post Desert Storm Environment?

Approved by:

, Thesis Committee Chairman

, Member

, Member, Consulting Faculty

Accepted this 4th day of June 1993 by:

&&& , Director, Graduate DegreePhilip JI Brookes, Ph.D. Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of thestudent author and do not necessarily represent the views ofthe U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any othergovernmental agency. (References to this document shouldinclude the foregoing statement.)


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ABSTRACTIS CURRENT FIRE SUPPORT DOCTRINE FOR THE DEEP BATTLEEFFECTIVE IN THE POST DESERT STORM ENVIRONMENT? by MAJEdward J. Francis, USA, 110 pages.

This study investigates the role of Fire Support Coor-dination Measures during Desert Storm. Desert Stormindicated the need make changes in how the fire supportsystem interfaces with the deep battle conducted at thecorps and EAC levels. This study analyzes both theframework of the deep battle at corps and echelon abovecorps levels as well as how the deep battle was fought inthe Persian Gulf. It recommends significant change in thefire support system. Specifically, it recommends that thecontrol of the deep battlefield be more clearly delineatedbetween the air and the ground commander. The way to dothis would be to eliminate both the Fire SupportCoordination Line and the Reconnaissance Planning andInterdiction Line, and replace them with a new Fire SupportCoordination Measure called the Fire Control Line (FCL).

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSI would like to thank the members of my thesiscommittee for their assistance in the preparation of thisstudy. The committee chairman, LTC James Forlenzo,continually provided just the right amount of push to keepmy thoughts on track and to ensure that I met my suspenses.

H ~ Sroofreading skills continually assured that my thesismet the CGSC standard.I would also like to thank my wife, Sylvia, forallowing me to monopolize our computer for hours at a time

and for ignoring the mess I continually made in our den byspreading papers and books all over the floor.Finally, I would like to thank Major Stanley Simsand Captain John Siggelow for their assistance. Stan andJohn were both co-workers of mine in the ARCENT G-3 DeepOperations section during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.Stan provided invaluable assistance to me by clarifyingvarious issues and by obtaining file copies of ARCENTbriefing slides from 3rd Army Headquarters at FortMcPherson, Georgia. He also coined the term "Fire ControlLine" to describe a concept that I was developing. John, atrue Redleg, provided timely input on the formulation of my

conclusions.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE PAGE........................................... iAPPROVAL PAGE........................................ i iABSTRACT............................................. iiiACKNOWLEDEGMENTS..................................... ivTABLE OF CONTENTS.................................... VLIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS................................ viLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS................................ viiCHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION................................... 12. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY..... 253. DEEP OPERATIONS................................ 354. DESERT STORM................................... 60

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS................ 95APPENDIX

IUUSTRATIONS...................................... 121BIBLIOGRAPHY. ....................................... 134INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST. .......................... 138


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ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure1.2. Fire Support Coordination Line ............ 121Reconnaissance and InterdictionPlanning Line ........................... 121

Boundaries ................................ 122Coordinated Fire Line ..................... 122Free Fire Area............................. 123Restrictive Fire Line ..................... 123No Fire Area............................... 124.................irspace Coordination Area 124CAS. BAI. and A1 Geometry.................. 125BCE Interrelationships .................... 126.................RCENT Command and Control 127..............II Corps Command and Control 128XVIII Airborne CorpsCommand and Control ................ 129KT0 Geometry............................... 130Deep Operations Cell ...................... 131Phase Line Ripper ......................... 132Fire Control Line ......................... 133


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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AARAAFCEABCCCACAADAAFMA1AOCARCENTAFtFORASOCATACMSAT0A' c2BAIBCECALLCAFMSCASCENTAFCENTCOMCINCCPCOMMZc2C'c31c

DODD~EACFMFMFMFLOTFSCLFSCMFSCOORDFSEHPT

After action reviewAllied Air Forces Central EuropeAirborne command and Control centerAirspace coordination areaAir defense artilleryAir force manualAir interdictionAir operations centerArmy Central CommandArmy forcesAir support operations centerArmy tactical missile systemAir tasking orderArmy airspace command and controlBattlefield air interdictionBattlefield control elementCenter for Army Lessons LearnedComputer assisted fight management systemClose air supportCentral Air ForcesCentral CommandCommander in chiefCommand postCommunications zoneCommand and controlCommand, control, and communicationsCoalition coordination communication integrationcenterDepartment of DefenseDecide, detect, deliverEchelon above corpsField manualFleet Marine field manualForward line of own troopsFire support coordination lineFire support coordination measureFire support coordinatorFire support elementHigh payoff target

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JEh'CJFACCJFCJFC-N

LNOLOCMARCENTMLRSNATONBCNFAOPCONOPORDRFARFLRIPLRGFCSOCCESOFTACP

High value targetJoint Electronics Warfare CenterJoint forces air component commanderJoint forces commanderJoint forces command-northKuwait theater of operationsLiaison officerLine of communicationMarine Central CommandMultiple launch rocket systemNorth Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNuclear, biological, and chemicalNo fire areaOperational controlOperations orderRestrictive fire areaRestrictive fire lineReconnaissance and interdiction planning lineRepublican guard forces commandSpecial operations command and control elementSpecial operations forcesTactical air control party

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CHAPTER 1INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the useand applicability of fire support coordination measures(FSCMs) in light of lessons learned during Desert Storm. Ofparticular interest are the FSCMs that are used in themanagement of the corps and echelon above corps (EAC) deepfight. As a corollary to the analysis of these measures,this thesis will also make recommendations and suggestionsas to how the corps and EAC fight should be conducted interms of using fires to shape and influence the battlefield.Those recommendations will also include the appropriatestructure of the corps and EAC deep fight for contingencyoperations and mature theaters. The need to relook theFSCMs in question is long overdue. The publication of the1982 version of FM 100-5 Operations, placed a greateremphasis on deep operations, non-linearity of futurebattlefields, and the importance of combined operations.

A year after its publication, Operation Urgent Furydrove these points home as U.S. forces executed a combinedairborne, amphibious, air, and naval attack on numerousobjectives located on the small island of Grenada. Despitethe non-linearity of this operation, the well-publicized


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difficulties involved in obtaining timely fire support, andthe joint nature of the attack, there was little push toreform the fire support system. Six years later, U.S.forces launched Operation Just Cause where over 20,000service personnel conducted a swift and violent assault onPanamanian forces. Again, despite the non-linearity of theattack, there seemed to be little push to reexamine thelinear nature of the FSCMs that were a key part of Armydoctrine. The lack of ground fire support in the operation,which was mostly characterized by simultaneous assaults ofinfantry and air assets on numerous objectives, was probablythe reason why questions concerning FSCMs did not arise. Itwas not until U.S. Forces were committed in Southwest Asiathat the shortcomings in the traditional measures used infire support coordination finally were brought to theforefront.

On August Znd, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait.Five months later time ran out for Saddam Hussein and theU.S. led coalition forces launched a massive air attackagainst Iraq. After thirty eight days of bombardment, theground phase of the campaign was initiated and one hundredhours later, with the President declaring that all militaryobjectives had been met, the war ended. During the courseof the ground and air campaigns, there were numerous issuesto be resolved both among and within the services that wereprosecuting the war. Among them were control, coordination,


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and use of fire support assets. Indeed, in some ways theconflict concerning fire support had started prior to thefirst aircraft being launched on the 16th of January.

Of primary concern during the planning stages wasthe nature of the targeting effort: who was to determinewhich targets were going to be attacked during the aircampaign? In terms of joint operations, the ideal solutionwas for the air component (Air Force Central Command--CENTAF) and the ground components (Army Central Command--ARCENT and Marine Central Command--MARCENT) to create ajoint targeting cell. This cell would develop, inconjunction with the ground campaign plan, courses of actionwhich it would then present to the joint commander (in thiscase, CINCCENTCOM, General Schwarzkopf). He would thenchose the best solution and order the Joint Forces AirComponent Commander (JFACC) to implement it. However, aswill be discussed in chapter four of this thesis, this didnot happen. Within the services, the same issue was notdealt with in an effective manner either. The manager ofthe targeting effort in both the ARCENT and Joint ForcesCommand North (JFC-N) areas of operation was the ARCENT G-3Deep Operations Cell. Ideally this element was to allocateblocks of targets to its subordinate units: VII Corps,XVIII Airborne Corps, and (for targeting purposes) JFC-N; itwas also to prioritized and deconflict the nominated targetsvice its own targeting effort, and then submit the refined


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plan to the joint targeting cell. Unfortunately, this didnot occur either. The failure to adequately coordinate firesupport efforts did not improve once the air campaignstarted.

The commencement of the air war served to onlyexacerbate the coordination problems within the fire supportsystem. Of immediate concern was the continuous problemrevolving around the targeting effort and who was gettingthe bulk of targets on the Air Tasking Order (ATO). Much ofthe debate was focused upon a nondoctrinal targeting C*measure, the Reconnaissance and Interdiction Planning Line(RIPL). This measure, established by ARCENT, served as alimiting factor on Corpsa targeting efforts.

The northward expansion of the RIPL, and thecorresponding increase in Corps1 targeting authority, wasresisted by ARCENT Headquarters. Simultaneously, a similarconflict was on-going between ARCENT and CENTAF, with theground component vigorously lobbying for inclusion oftargets on the ATO. Conflicts among services also extendedto matters of airspace control where ARCENTas desire toengage deep targets beyond the Fire Support CoordinationLine (FSCL) with the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS)were stymied by CENTAF objections to the delivery ofordnance into what it defined to be its own airspace. Inmany ways this dispute epitomized the conflict between theair and ground component: ARCENT saw the FSCL as a


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permissive FSCM where no coordination was required for firesdelivered beyond it and CENTAF viewed the FSCM asrestrictive because it could not deliver ordnance short ofit and ground forces could not deliver fires long of it ifthey would interfere with tactical air operations. Thecontroversy surrounding the FSCL intensified during theground war as the three subordinate elements to ARCENT (VIICorps, XVIII Airborne Corps, and JFC-N) each progressed atdifferent rates and established different FSCLs. The impactof this was to create a disjointed battlefield whereadjoining FSCLs were not close to each other, causing--dueto the lack of identifiable terrain features upon which todraw the FSCLs--much confusion among air force pilotsattempting to engage targets.

The net effect of these problems was to create aconsiderable amount of confusion for all involved andreinforce the need to reexamine the structure of the firesupport coordination system in the deep battle.

Research OuestionThe primary research question of this thesis is:

Does current fire support doctrine for the deep battle meetthe needs of the military in light of the lessons learned inthe Persian Gulf War?

Subordinate to this primary question are severalsecondary and tertiary questions which should be answered aspart of this research. The geographical focal point of the


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questions center on the area of the battlefield that liesbetween the FSCL and the RIPL. Specifically:

Who should exercise primary control over this

area? The Corps commander or the air componentcommander or both--but at different times--duringa phased campaign?How should FSCMs change as a result of newtechnologies that allow the corps and EAC groundcommander to see and attack at longer ranges thanin the past?Prior to analyzing these questions, it is necessary

to define each of the terms used. However, even this processleaves room for ambiguity in the fire support arena, since thedefinitions come from multiple authoritative sources, that donot always agree with one another.

DefinitionsThe presence of specific terminology in the

military has always required that those who discuss andexecute doctrine be familiar with the accepted definitionsthat these terms carry with them. This is most certainlytrue in the case of analyzing FSCMs. Definitions for thesemeasures are found in several doctrinal manuals. Chiefamong them is Joint Pub 1-02, Dictionary of Military andAssociated Terms. The preface for this manual clearlystates that Department of Defense activities will "use the


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terms and definitions without alteration unless a distinctlydifferent context or application is intended."' The caveatallows for changes in the definition by joint commanders andorganizations, such as NATO. Therefore, NATO publicationssuch as Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE) Manual 80-2Offensive Air Support, are also useful in establishingdefinitions for the terms used in this thesis. Since manyof the FSCMs are not defined in JCS publications, it is alsonecessary to examine service publications such as U.S. ArmyField Manual 6-20 Fire Support in the AirLand Battle.

Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL)The Department of Defense definition of this FSCM

(figure 1) is found in Joint Publication 1-02:A line established by the appropriate groundcommander to insure coordination of fire not underhis control but which may effect current tacticaloperations. The fire support coordination line is

to used coordinate fires of air, ground, or seaweapons using any type of ammunition againstsurface targets. The fire support coordinationline should follow well defined terrain features.The establishment of the fire support coordinationline must be coordinated with the appropriatetactical air commander and other supportingelements. Supporting elements may attack targetsforward of the fire support coordination line,without prior coordination with the ground forcecommander, provided the attack will not produceadverse effects on, or to the rear of, the line.Attacks against surface targets behind this linemust be coordinated with the appropriate groundforce commander.'

This definition places an emphasis on severalcriteria. First, it indicates that the overall purpose ofthe FSCL is to safeguard U.S. ground forces from the effects


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of fires delivered by weapon systems not under the groundforce commander's control. Second, it stresses the jointmanner of the measure and specifies that it will only beestablished after coordination with the tactical aircommander. Third, it emphasizes that the line must followwell-defined terrain features, the implicit point here beingthat it is extremely difficult for pilots to fly at highspeeds and discern which terrain falls on either side of agrid line, as opposed to a river or a major highway system.NATO publications define the FSCL in largely the samemanner, albeit with some differences. The followingdefinition is taken from AAFCE Manual 80-2 Offensive AirSupport and is primarily addressing air force personnel.

'. The FSCL is a line established by theappropriate ground commander to ensurecoordination of fire not under his control, butwhich may effect current tactical operations. TheFSCL is used to coordinate fires of air, ground orsea weapon systems using any type of ammunitionagainst surface targets. The FSCL should followwell- defined terrain features. The establishmentof the FSCL must be coordinated with theappropriate tactical air commander and othersupporting elements. Supporting elements mayattack targets beyond the FSCL without priorcoordination with the ground force commanderprovided that the attack will not produce adverseeffects short of the line. Attacks againstsurface targets short of this line must becoordinated with the appropriate ground forcecommander. The FSCL should be as close to theforward elements of the land forces as possibleconsistent with the tactical situation. One ofthe factors considered by the land forces whenestablishing the FSCL is the area over which theground commander has a direct influence. Normallythis is limited by the range of organic armyweapon system^.^


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This definition is largely the same as that foundin the joint publication cited earlier, indeed it isidentical in much of its language. There are some obviousdifferences however. The first is that it mandates wherethe line should be drawn i.e, as close as possible to theforward land forces. Next it narrows this to the actualdistance, which it sees as being equivalent to the reach ofthe army weapon systems that belong to the ground commanderwho is establishing the FSCL. The nature of the weaponsystems themselves are not discussed, and it would be easyto assume that the definition is referring primarily toindirect fire systems, such as conventional artillery.However, the vagueness of the definition does not discountthe placing of the FSCL at the operational limit of attackhelicopters which would significantly lengthen the size ofthe area short of the FSCL. Another NATO definition of theFSCL can be found in NATO STANAG No. 2934 ArtilleryProcedures. While this definition largely mirrors thatfound in AAFCE 80-2, it does contain a significant addition.It specifies that "When detached forces are beyond (the)FSCL, another FSCL should be placed around the detachedfor~e.'~' This additional information acknowledges that thebattlefield is not linear in nature and that forces couldeasily be committed deep, necessitating additional FSCMs toprotect them and/or to allow them to shape their area withfires. U.S. military doctrine has traditionally had a


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significant impact upon NATO doctrine so it is of littlesurprise that U.S. service definitions of the FSCL areclosely related to their NATO counterparts, as we havealready seen by comparing U.S. joint doctrine with NATOdoctrine.

The U.S. Army's primary source for doctrinaldefinitions is Field Manual 101-5-1 Operational Terms andSymbols. The definition found within this manual for theFSCL is an exact copy of the one in Joint Publication 1-02.It concentrates on establishing an FSCM that is designed tocompartmentalize the battlefield for execution purposes. Itallows unrestricted fires long of the line but prohibitsfires short of the line (without coordination) that mayadversely effect friendly forces. Another source for firesupport definitions is Field Manual 6-20-30 Fire Support forCorps and Division Operations.

This fire support manual is a product of the U.S.Army's Field Artillery School and serves not only as aprimary reference source for corps and division combatoperations but also Itas a guide for echelon above corpsregarding the organization, capabilities, and employment offire support.ttsThis is a noteworthy point since the lack

of EAC doctrine was a shortcoming during Desert Storm. Inaddition, FM 6-20-30 is often used by Army personnel as afavored source for definitions concerning fire supportmatters because the artillery community normally serves as


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the doctrinal proponent for this area. There are numerousdifferences between the definitions found in this documentand the definitions found in those documents previouslycited, since the material is covered in greater detail.

One of the key points of the FSCM definitionprocess in this manual is the separating of measures intotwo categories: permissive and restrictive. Permissivemeasures are designed t o facilitate the attack of targets.Conversely, restrictive measures are those that placecertain limiting factors upon delivery units for the areaaffected by the restrictive fire measure. These limitingfactors may prohibit fires altogether, restrict certaintypes of ammunition from being expended, or require specificcoordination prior to the engagements of targets. The FSCLis placed in the category of a permissive fire coordinationmeasure because it is designed to facilitate the engagementof targets that are beyond the FSCL.

The definition of the FSCL is both lengthy anddetailed in this manual and differs significantly from thosedefinitions discussed earlier. Portions of the definitionthat are not critical to its understanding (e.g., means ofdissemination and portrayal on maps and overlays) isomitted.An FSCL may be established by the corps withinits area of operation to support its concept of theoperation. It must be coordinated with theappropriate tactical air commander and othersupporting elements. The purpose of this permissivefire control measure is to allow the corps and its


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subordinate and supporting units (such as the AirForce) to expeditiously attack targets beyond theFSCL. The attack of targets beyond the FSCL withArmy assets should be coordinated with supportingtactical air. This coordination is defined asinforming and/or consulting with the supportingtactical air component. However, the inability toeffect this coordination does not preclude theattack of targets beyond the FSCL...Three conditionsshould be met before an FSCL is established by acorps:0 A portion of the corps deep operation area doesnot require selective targeting to shape the deepoperations fight.0 The expeditious attack of targets beyond the FSCLwill support the operations of the corps, theattacking unit, or the higher headquarters of theattacking unit.0 The corps ..( s) willing to accept the possibleduplication of effort which may result from dualtargeting beyond the FSCL.

The primary consideration for placement of theFSCL is that it should be located beyond the area inwhich the corps intends to shape its deep operationsfight. The deep operations fight is shaped byrestricting the movement of enemy follow-on forcesto influence the time and location of their arrivalinto the close operations area. This usuallyrequires selective targeting and coordinating offires in the area where the shaping is expected tooccur. Normally, the FSCL is established wellbeyond the range of cannon and (MLRS) .. n this caseonly corps missile systems [e.g., ATACMS] andpossibly attack helicopters have the range to attacktargets beyond the FSCL. However, the corps deepoperations concept may not seek to shape the fightbut only focus on maximizing the destruction ofenemy units...the corps (should then) establish theFSCL as close as possible to its close operationsarea. This maximizes the number of fire supportsystems capable of firing beyond the FSCL.'

There are several major points in this definitionthat should beFSCL as a toolby using it to

readily clear. First is thefor affecting the outcome ofshape the deep battlefield.

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emphasis on thethe close fightThis differs


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from the previous discussions of the FSCL which implied thatthe primary purpose was to protect friendly forces fromindiscriminate fires which could be fired withoutcoordination beyond the FSCL. By allowing a free engagementof targets the design of the FSCL would then result in themaximum destruction of enemy units that were beyond it. Thedefinition from FM 6-20-30 tends to focus more on the firesthat are delivered short of the FSCL and states clearly thatthe corps commander should place the FSCL far beyond thearea which would simply create a safe area for soldiers onthe battlefield. He should place it where it best serveshis purpose in shaping the battlefield to the corps1 'advantage.

Another difference in this definition is that itspecifically states that the FSCL should be placed I1wellbeyond the range of cannon and multiple rocket FA systems.t17This implies that the FSCL should be drawn 40km or morebeyond the forward line of troops (FLOT), depending upon theinterpretation of the phrase I1well beyond.** Yet anotherdifference revolves around the issue of Army fires deliveredbeyond FSCL, a problem that is not even addressed in theother definitions of the subject. Under the conceptdescribed FM 6-20-30, the corps commander should, but doesnot necessarily have to, coordinate fires delivered beyondthe FSCL with supporting commander(s), i.e., the Air Force.The meaning of this then is that required coordination is a


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one-way street: fires delivered short of the line must becoordinated, even if they do not affect friendly forces(because they may still adversely affect the corps*

commanders desired shaping of the battlefield). On theother hand, the corps commander is not required (onlyadvised) to coordinate fires delivered beyond the FSCL, eventhough the lack of coordination may result in a hazardoussituation for Air Force personnel in operating in that area.

Finally, this definition of the FSCL states thatthe duplication of targeting effort beyond the FSCL is asituation that is tolerable. Again, this matter is notdiscussed in previous definitions. This violates thesynchronization principle of the AirLand Battle by statingthat unsynchronized fires are tolerable. That thissituation may not be tolerable was one of the reasons why anon doctrinal measure called the **RIPL1*as established byNATO.

Reconnaissance and Interdiction Planning Line (RIPL)This term (figure 2) refers to a planning line that

is not a fire support coordination measure, but instead adelineation of the battlefield that results in assignedareas for the corps, EAC, and air component to use in theirtargeting efforts. The RIPL is not a doctrinal term,instead it is a measure that was adopted in Europe to givethe corps commander the power to conduct deep targeting inorder to support future operations. Allied Air Forces

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Central Europe Manual 80-2 Offensive Air Operations, givesthe following definition of this measure:

The RIPL is a planning line which is determinedby and coordinated between army groups. It isnormally sited so as to segregate the leadingarmies of the Warsaw Pact from the reserve armiesand follow-on elements. It will usually be located80-100 kilometers from the FLOT, concurrent withthe corps limit of intelligence and planningresponsibility. Short of the RIPL the corpscommander has the primary responsibility fornominating targets which have a direct bearing onthe land battle. However, air interdiction sortiesmay also be flown in the area short of the RIPLwhen coordinated with the appropriate corps. Airinterdiction mission (in this area) should bejointly ~lanned.~

The line assists in the prevention of duplicativetargeting efforts and, as such, helps synchronize fireassets on the battlefield. The fact that it does notfunction as either a permissive or restrictive fire controlcoordination measure means that its presence on thebattlefield does not impede delivery of ordnance beyond theFSCL. Air assets can still engage targets, particularlytargets of opportunity at will so long as the effects of thefires do not adversely affect operations on the other sideof the FSCL. The corps commander then, does not holdownership of this area, he only controls the targetingprocess: i.e., he has the primary responsibility for theacquisition, attack, and nomination of targets for airattack. Air interdiction can be planned by the air forcesin this area, but only after coordination with the corpscommander. Failure to effect coordination withthe corps


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commander does not preclude target engagement by the airforces.

Other Fire Support Coordination ~easures.'There are numerous other FSCMs than the FSCL and a

basic understanding of them is necessary for the adequateanalysis of the research question.

The basic fire support coordination measure is theboundary (figure 3.) It is both permissive and restrictivein nature. They are restrictive in that fires cannot bedelivered across them unless those fires have been coor-dinated with the force operating within the limits of thatboundary, unless a permissive FSCM such as an FSCL is ineffect that would allow the firing without coordination.Boundaries are permissive in nature because the maneuvercommander has freedom of fire within his own boundaries.

The coordinated fire line (CFL) is a permissivefire coordination measure (figure 4.) The CFL is a linebeyond which fires may be delivered without the coordinationof the CFL establishing authority. The applicable fires aresurface to surface only and include mortars, fieldartillery, and naval gunfire. It does not include air toground fires from Army attack aviation or Air Force assets.The purpose of the CFL, much like the FSCL is to expeditethe delivery of fires beyond the measure while requiringcoordination for fires delivered short of it. Thiscoordination limitation protects soldiers operating short of

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the CFL from fires and allows for the maximum destruction ofenemy forces long of the measure. It is normally located asclose as possible to the as possible to the establishingunit. The CFL is designated by brigade level units and thenconsolidated at division level into a consolidated divisionCFL.

Another permissive fire coordination measure is theFree Fire Area (FFA). The FFA (figure 5) is an area inwhich fires may be delivered without coordination. Theapplicable fires include all fires: surface-to-surfacenaval gunfire, and tactical air. It is usually establishedat division level or above and is often located onidentifiable terrain so that aircraft can readily identifyit and use it as an undeliverable ordnance "dump site1# hennecessary. Unlike other FSCMs which tend to be linear, theFFA is a continuous line: a circle, or an oval shaped area.The remaining permissive fire measure is the FSCL which hasalready been discussed in detail.

A restrictive fire support coordination measure.places limitations on delivery units in terms of the time,place, and/or types of ordnance that can be delivered. ARestrictive Fire Line (RFL) is an example of a restrictivefire measure (figure 6.) The purpose of the RFL is toprotect converging friendly forces by prohibiting thedelivery of fires across it. It is established by the nexthigher commander common to the converging forces and is


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usually located on readily identifiable terrain. Firesacross the line can only be delivered after the deliveryunit has coordinated with the affected unit on the otherside of the line.

A second type of restrictive fire measure is the NoFire Area (NFA). An NFA (figure 7 ) is an area where nofires can be delivered with two exceptions: 1) On a case-by-case basis of approval by the establishing authority, 2)If friendly forces operating within the NFA are engaged byenemy forces. In this case the friendly forces can fire todefend themselves. It is usually established by a divisionor a corps on identifiable terrain. Like the FFA, the shapeof the NFA is continuous in nature.

A similar measure is the Restrictive Fire Area(RFA) which is an area that limits the delivery of ordnanceinto a certain area. As an example, an RFA may restrict thedelivery of ordnance which is composed of submunitions ifthe terrain is to be occupied by friendly forces before the'area can be cleared by ordnance disposal teams; The RFA canbe established by a battalion or higher level command andlike the NFA and FFA, it is continuous in nature.

The final restrictive fire support coordinationmeasure is the Airspace Coordination Measure (ACA). The ACA(figure 8) is a three dimensional block of airspace thatprotects friendly aircraft from indirect fires on a targetwhile allowing both the aircraft as well as the indirect


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fire assets to simultaneously engage the target. Toaccomplish this, restrictions are usually placed upon themortars, artillery, or naval gunfire assets that areengaging the target, normally in the form of a maximumordinate for the delivery of munitions. Aircraft may alsohave restrictions placed upon them in the form of minimumand maximum altitudes within which aircraft can operate in.Implementation of this restrictive fire measure usuallytakes a significant amount of time and requires considerablecoordination. Because of this, the formal ACA is oftensupplanted by an informal ACA which uses time, lateralseparation, or altitude to segregate indirect fires fromaircraft operating in proximity to each other. In additionto these FSCMs, other measures have been used to control theapplication of surface-to-surface and air-to-surface fires.

Non-Doctrinal MeasuresDuring Desert Storm, one of these non-doctrinal

measures used was the RIPL, which has already been definedand will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.Another method utilized was the "kill boxv technique ofemploying tactical air assets. Kill Boxes were establishedon maps as two-dimensional boxes that measured approximately15x15 miles, and were identified alphanumerically, e.g.,Kill Box AB32, BD14, etc. All of the boxes were drawnbeyond the corps FSCLs. They were mostly used in the latterportion of the air campaign to assign aircraft to

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geographical areas to engage targets of opportunity orplanned targets that had not been sufficiently attritted.They were also used by the Airborne Command and ControlCenter (ABCCC) to assist aircraft unable to find theirpreviously assigned targets because of bad weather, ortarget displacement.1

Air SupportThe use of air assets played a major role in deep

operations during Desert Storm. Close Air Support (CAS) and

Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) (figure 9) were bothterms used extensively during the conduct of operations,despite that the latter of these terms is not part of U.S.doctrine (the Air Force, for example, use "air interdiction"to describe interdiction operations; the Army differentiatesbetween "air interdiction" and "battlefield airinterdiction.

Close air support is defined in Air Force Manual 1-1 as "Air action against hostile targets which are in closeproximity to friendly forces and which require detailedintegration of each air mission with the fire and movementof those force^.^^" This definition is the same that isfound in Joint Publication 1-02 as well as FM 101-5-1.

Defining BAI is not as easy. First, neither theDepartment of Defense, or the U.S. Air Force recognize theterm. The Army, however, does recognize the validity of theBAI concept, primarily because of its use in NATO.

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Like the RIPL, BAI is a term that is doctrinallyaccepted in Europe, but not in the U.S. AAFCE Manual 80-2gives the following definition of BAI:

Battlefield Air Interdiction is air actionagainst hostile surface targets which are in aposition to directly affect friendly forces butwhich does not require the detailed integration ofeach air mission with the fire and movement ofthose forces. These air missions can have a directeffect on the enemy's ability to continueoperations and may be conducted on either side ofthe FSCL. While BAI missions require coordinationand joint planning they may not require continuouscoordination during the execution stage. Executionof BAI short of the FSCL must be coordinated withthe appropriate corps.=The Army definition (FM 101-5-1) of BAI is similar

and notes that the term is "NATO usage." The definitionfound in FM 6-20-30 is similar to the NATO definition:

BAI is an Air Force task within the frameworkof an of the A1 mission. The A1 attacks conductedagainst hostile land forces that are not in closeproximity to friendly forces are referred to asbattlefield air interdiction if the hostile forcescould have a near term effect on the operation orscheme of maneuver of friendly forces. Priorcoordination id required between the Army and theAir Force for attack of BAI targets. BAI has adirect or near-term effect on surface operations.13All three sources of information used in describing

air interdiction (AI) use the same definition:Air operations conducted to destroy,neutralize, or delay the enemy's potential beforeit can be brought to bear effectively againstfriendly forces at such distance from friendlyforces that detailed integration of each missionwith the fire and movement of friendly forces isnot required."This final part of the definition section deals

with the method of targeting employed by the U.S. Army. The21


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11Decide-Detect-Deliver81D') targeting process determinesthe following information:

What targets are to be acquired and attacked.0 When they are to be acquired and attacked.

What is required to defeat the target."The first step, decide, develops target priorities

to support the commander's intent. The end product of thisphase is the commander issuing targeting guidance, PIRs, andhigh-payoff target list. These products drive the focus ofthe collection assets during the detect phase.

The second step is the detect phase, where thetarget acquisition assets available to the commander searchfor those targets whose acquisition and subsequentdestruction support the execution of the mission.

The final step is the deliver phase where thosetargets that had been detected in step 2 are attacked. Thisattack may come from artillery, mortars, attack aviation,tactical air, or naval gunfire. If subsequent battle damageassessment shows that the commander's guidance has not beenmet, then the D process continues focusing upon thosetargets deemed vital to mission accomplishment.

SummaryAs a result of our recent experiences in combat,

most notably in Desert Storm, there has developed a need toreexamine fire support doctrine. Of particular concern is

2 2


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the area where the corps and EAC units conduct their deepbattle and use the D' method of targeting.

Because of the heavy focus on doctrinal terms, itis necessary to adequately define those terms in theintroduction of this thesis so as to avoid confusion duringthe analysis and recommendations chapters of this thesis.Of particular concern is the definition of the Fire SupportCoordination Line and the Reconnaissance and InterdictionPlanning Line since these terms are at the very.heart of theproblems encountered by units during the war.


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Endnotes1. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02,Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and AssociatedTerms (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1989), iii.2. Joint Publication 1-02, 144.3. Allied Air Forces Central Europe, AAFCE Manual80-2 Offensive Air Support (Ramstein, Germany: AAFCEHeadquarters, 1986), 18.4. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO STANAGNo. 2934 Artillery Procedures (n.p, n.d.), 1.5. U.S. Army, FM 6-20-30 Fire Support for Corpsand Division Operations, (Washington D.C.: Department ofthe Army, 1989) xi.

6. FM 6-20-30, F-4 to F-5.7. FM 6-20-30', F-4.8. AAFCE Manual 80-2, 18.

10. VII Corps Fires After Action Review (Letterdistributed to subordinate VII Corps units, March 1991.)11. U.S. Air Force, AFM 1-1 Basic Aerospace

Doctrine of the United States Air Force" (Washington D.C.:Department of the Air Force, 1992) 276.12. AAFCE Manual 80-2, 31.

14. AFM 1-1, 271.15. U.S. Army, FM 6-20-10 Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for the Targeting Process (Washington D.C.: U.S.Department of the Army, 1989) 1-3.


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- CHAPTER 2LITERATURE REVIEW AM) RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Literature ReviewA great many of books have been published about the

Persian Gulf War since 1991. Among these, there are severalthat stand out as factually accurate, non-polemic works thatdescribe in detail the nature of the military effort. Twoof these books, Desert Victory: The War For Kuwait andTriumph Without Victory are perhaps the best of the genre.While they do not address fire support issues in particular,they do provide an accurate accounting of the majoroperations conducted as well as a historical background onthat area of the Middle East. Nonetheless, dissecting thewar in military (as opposed to political) terms, is not thestrong point of either one of these otherwise excellentworks.

Government documents provide a more descriptiveaccount of the war in general and shed more light on thevarious contentious issues that arose during the course ofthe war. They are also a reliable primary reference source.An excellent unclassified overview of the war can be foundin Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: An Interim Report toCongress. This document, submitted to Congress by the

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Department of Defense, addresses twenty-six questionssubmitted to the Secretary of Defense by the members of theHouse and Senate Armed Services Committees. Again, whilefire support is not among the issues discussed in thedocument, it provides much information about: the air andground campaign, and the disposition of forces. A finalreport, submitted to Congress in May of 1992 is classifiedand is therefore not referenced in this thesis.

Along the same line is Defense For a New Era:Lessons of the Persian Gulf War written by the House ArmedServices Committee. It also provides an analysis of themany issues that arose during the course of the war: theeffectiveness of the air campaign and the ground campaign,the role and use of the reserve components, problemsencountered in coalition warfare, and maintenance andtraining issues. Like the DOD document, this study is moreof a general overview and does not address in detail theissues analyzed in this thesis.

The concerns raised in this thesis addressed inmany of the unit after actioi reviews (AARs) conducted inthe war's aftermath. Also, much information is found in theanalyses prepared by the Center for Army Lessons Learned(CALL). Prior to reviewing these, the doctrinal foundationof fire support must be laid and this can be accomplished byanalyzing numerous manual and publications printed by theDOD and the individual services.


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A logical place to begin a literature review onthis subject is at the joint level. The Joint Chiefs ofStaff have published several manuals that address the firesupport and deep battle issues that are analyzed in thisthesis. Certainly, one of the most useful of the jointpublications is Publication 1-02 The Department of DefenseDictionary of Military and Associated Terms. This manual, asits name implies, places subordinate services--theoreticallyat least--in a common frame of reference. However, as hasalready been shown in Chapter One, this is not exactly thecase, even though that was DOD1s intent. The differentdefinitions of the FSCL are prime examples of this. Thedefinition found in Pub. 1-02 should be applicable to allservices without modification. This has not stopped theArmy from greatly expanding upon the DOD definition.However, why this is so is not clear and it would obviouslybe unwise to assume that there is any malicious intent onthe part of any service to ignore DOD policy. A moreplausible explanation may be that the services, and brancheswithin the services, are the actual generators of thedefinitions and may have simply pushed out in front ofhigher headquarters in developing and revising the meaningsof the terms involved.

Joint Publication 3-03, Doctrine for JointInterdiction Operations and Joint Publication 3-52, Doctrinefor Joint Airspace Control, are also very useful


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publications in that they provide an excellent frameworkfrom which to start the thesis. Another source of jointpublications is NATO.

Of particular importance among NATO documents isAAFCE Manual 80-2 Offensive Air Operations which providesthe NATO definition for the RIPL which was used during thePersian Gulf War, butfor U.S. forces. NATOalso cited in Chapterof the FSCL'and other

is otherwise a nondoctrinal measureSTANAG 2934 Artillery Procedures isOne as it provides its own definition

The individual U.S. services publish doctrinalmanuals which address numerous warfighting issues, amongthem fire support matters and issues related to the firesupport arena. The service that deals with this issue in thegreatest detail is the Army. This is not surprising sincethe majority of fire support assets (artillery, mortars,missiles, attack helicopters) are found in the Army.

The Army manual that provides definitions for theforce is FM 101-5-1 Operational Terms and Symbols. Thisfield manual mainly uses the same definitions as those foundin Joint Publication 1-02, but also provides definitions forterms that are relevant, but not joint per se, and thereforenot found in the joint publications. The primary source ofinformation concerning U.S. Army fire support doctrine isfound in the FM 6-20 series of manuals. FM 6-20 provides ageneral overview of the fire support system and how it


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operates in the AirLand Battle. Both FMs 6-30 and 6-40address fire support issues pertaining to corps, division,and brigade operations. These manuals, in particular, FM 6-20-30 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Supportfor Corps and Division Operations, are among the most usefulsources of doctrinal information found for this thesis. Theremaining manual in this series, 6-20-10 discusses targetingmethodology and provides a useful and concise definition forthe decide-detect-deliver targeting process.

There are numerous other Army field manuals thatare relevant to the analysis. Among them are FM 100-7 TheArmy in Theater Operations (Coordinating Draft), and FM 100-15 Corps Operations. Both of these manuals discuss the deepbattle at corps and EAC levels. A more useful manual inthis area is the Corps Deep Operations Handbook--1990published by the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth,Kansas. This manual, being updated in late 1992, is not astand alone document, but instead one meant to be used inconjunction with FM 100-15. It focuses upon intelligenceand weapon systems that are available to the corps in its D'targeting process. Other relevant manuals include FM 90-28Tactical Air Planning of Ground Operations, FM 71-100Division Operations, and FM 100-103 Army Airspace Commandand Control in a Combat Zone.

While the Army has produced most of the relevantmanuals, it does not have a doctrinal monopoly on the fire


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support issue. Basic Air Force doctrine is found in AirForce manual 1-1 Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the UnitedStates Air Force. This manual does not specifically addressthe fire support system, but does give doctrinal guidance onthe meaning and use of air interdiction and close airsupport. That there is not more specific information in theAir Force system on the interrelation of fire support andtactical air is somewhat surprising and might be consideredto be somewhat of a doctrinal gap in the Air Force.

Marine Corps doctrine concerning fire supportcoordination is found in Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 7-1 Fire Support Coordination and FMFM 7-2 Naval GunfireSupport.

Since the experience of the Persian Gulf Waruncovered many of the doctrinal problems involved in thefire support arena, it is useful to review the governmentliterature available in this category. Chief among theseresources are the various After Action Reviews (AARs)conducted by the units involved in the war. The VII CorpsAAR located in the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) atFt. Leavenworth, is probably the most useful of all sourcesused in the formulation of this thesis. It provides adetailed overview, including pertinent staff duty officerlogs, of the Desert Storm ground campaign. The AARsconducted by the major U.S. Army service schools (infantry,artillery, aviation, etc.) are also of high value.


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Shortly after the conclusion of the war, all U.S.Army units were directed to prepare a set of lessons learnedconcerning the combat operations conducted. The individuallessons were then combined into the Joint Uniform LessonsLearned (JULLS) master data base. Unfortunately, many ofthese JULLS are of poor quality and never spend more than aparagraph stating a problem and recommending a solution.They have the distinct appearance of something that was puttogether to satisfy an administrative requirement and meet acorresponding suspense date.

Finally, an important source of information forthis thesis is the body of articles, including previoustheses, that have been produced in the past two years. Manyof these articles are found in popular military journalssuch as the Military Review, Field Artillery Journal,Airpower Journal, and the AirLand Battle Bulletin. Inaddition, there are a number of unpublished articlesproduced by Command and General Staff College students thatare referenced. Captain John Bonsellls article #'The Sky isthe Limit,I1 is particularly useful in that it offersoriginal recommendations in improving the various problemsin the fire support system and how it relates to the deepbattle.

This thesis is not the first thesis that hastackled the fire support issue in light of lessons learnedduring Desert Storm. Major David H. Zook 111's thesis "The


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Fire Support Coordination Line: Is It Time to ReconsiderOur Doctrine?' is particularly useful because of itshistorical thoroughness in describing the FSCL and how it

has been used by the military over the years. MajorFrederick Gisler8s hesis "Joint Fire Support: Who is theCoordinator?" is also of great use in providing a concisesource of information concerning the joint targeting arena.Both theses have a common weakness: however, in that whilethey excel in stating the problem, neither goes very far indeveloping recommendations. That is where this thesis hopesto pick up the challenge.

MethodoloayThe methodology used in this thesis is primarily

that of a review of existing literature in order to definethe problem and then developing recommendations to correctthe shortcomings in the fire support system. Given thenature of the problem, it is not practical to test thesolutions in any scientific sense, and thus, the only optionis to offer them up in the hope of moving the decisionmaking process along. As discussed in the previous sectionthe existing literature falls into three basic categories:(1) Current doctrine at the joint level and the individualservice level, (2) Persian Gulf War documents that arerelevant to the problem being analyzed, and (3) The thoughtand opinions of others who have dealt with this issue.


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To lay the groundwork for the thesis, Chapter threewill focus upon deep operations conducted at corps and EAClevel using the literature discussed in the previous sectionof this chapter. Chapter four will review the actions ofunits during Desert Storm. Included in chapter four will bea review of major combat operations, primarily of VII Corps,and the actions that were taking place at the EAC levelwhile VII Corps was conducting the fight. The focus will beon the targeting methodology, and the placement of the RIPLand FSCL during the air and ground war. Included in thischapter will be the opinions of several people who took partin the operation. Some of these opinions will be culledfrom JULLS and VII Corps documents, and others will be frominterviews conducted with Desert Storm participants who arestationed at Ft. Leavenworth. Chapter five will focus onrecommendations for the future and summarize the majorpoints of the thesis.

SummaryThere exists a significant body of relevant

literature on the topic of fire support and the problemsthat the fire support system(s) encountered in the PersianGulf War.

The literature reviewed in the preparation of thisthesis fall into three major categories: doctrinalliterature, Desert Storm primary source materials, and


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various articles and theses that have been published byothers who have dealt with this issue in the past two years.

The methodology employed in the formulation of thethesis will be to review the 'literature available and thenattack the problem in three steps: (1) Describing the deepfight, in particular how the fire support system operates inthe deep battle, (2) Reviewing the major relevant actionsthat occurred in Desert Storm, and ( 3 ) Developingrecommendations and conclusions.


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CHAPTER 3DEEP OPERATIONS

Close. Rear. and Deew O~erations--An verviewThe purpose of this chapter is to lay a doctrinal

foundation for the analysis of the deep fight during DesertStorm and to assist in the derivation of doctrinally soundrecommendations in the final chapter of this thesis. To dothis, a brief overview of close, rear, and deep operationswill be provided, followed by a more in-depth look at thedeep fight conducted by echelon above corps and corps levelunits. As an integral part of the deep operation overview,the chapter will briefly describe the joint interdiction

fight--that is, how the air component conducts the deepfight and how the ground component interfaces with thataspect of the battle.

Air Land Battle doctrine states that U.S. Armyunits fight close, deep, and rear operations.' While thesetypes of operations are conducted at different levels, theyappear to be truly distinct only at division level andhigher. Conversely, at brigade level and lower, close deepand rear operations begin to blur and become indistin-guishable with one another. These nature of theseoperations should be viewed in both terms of space and time.

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Close operations are where the battle is either wonor lost. These operations are normally characterized bymaneuver, close combat (including close air support), andindirect fire support. The close operations of a unit atany echelon includes the close, deep, and rear operations ofthe next subordinate echelon, e.g., the close operations ofa division inherently include the close, deep, and rearoperations of each committed brigade.' The majority ofFSCMs are applicable to close operations. Included are:boundaries, brigade and division level coordinated firelines, airspace coordination areas, no-fire and restrictivefire areas, and where friendly forces are converging,restrictive fire lines. The fire support coordination linealso applies to the close battle since it requires thatfires delivered short of it be coordinated with theestablishing headquarters prior to the engagement oftargets.

Rear operations are those activities conducted tothe rear of units in contact that assure freedom of maneuverand continuity of support and command and control. Rearoperations are normally characterized by the followingactivities: assembly and movement of reserves, redeploymentof fire support assets, the maintenance and protection ofsustainment efforts and command and control, establishmentand maintenance of lines of communication (LOCs), medicaland field services, traffic and refugee control and the


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maintenance of civil order. The measure of success of rearoperations is determined by whether the close fight issuccessful.3 The fire support coordination measures thatare associated with close operations, for the most part, donot apply to rear operations which are usually short of theboundaries surrounding the delivery units. Those FSCMs thatdo apply to rear operations are normally restrictive, (toprevent fratricide and damage to friendly material) such asthe restrictive fire line and the no-fire area.

Deep operations are those activities that focusupon enemy units that are not in contact with friendlyforces. The objective of deep operations is to favorably'influence the future close battle. Deep operations arecharacterized by deception, deep surveillance and targetacquisition, electronic warfare, command and controlcountermeasures, and interdiction by a variety of assetsincluding: surface to surface fires, air to ground fires,ground or aerial maneuver, and the use of special operationsforces. At the operational level these activities aredesigned to isolate current battles from enemy follow-onforces and supplies and influence the nature and shape offuture battles. At the tactical level, deep operations

shape the battlefield so that subsequent engagements can befought on advantageous terms. The key concept involved inunderstanding deep operations, whether they are conducted atthe operational or the tactical level, is the concept of


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88time.88 n each case the deep fight is being waged with thethought that if it is successfully prosecuted then thefuture close fight can be more easily won. There areseveral FSCMs that are applicable to deep operations. Ofprimary concern is the FSCL. The placement of this FSCM isdriven by numerous factors, as stated in the definitionlocated in first chapter. Primarily, the FSCL is placedbeyond the range of the conventional cannon and rocket firethat is available to the corps commander. It is also placedbeyond the area that the corps commander wants to shape hisdeep fight, i-e., targets engaged beyond the FSCL will notadversely affect the maneuver scheme. Finally, the FSCL8srequirement that coordination be made for fires deliveredshort of it gives the corps commander an important tool foravoiding casualties and damage caused by friendly fire.

There are several other FSCMs that apply to deepoperations. Boundaries, by their very nature, affect theway in which deep operations are conducted. No fire andrestrictive fire areas also affect deep operations sincethey limit the engagement of targets on the deepbattlefield. Normally this is done to prevent injury tonon-combatants, and to prevent damage to churches,

hospitals, and other protected structures. Since friendlyforces may be operating deep, these restrictive firemeasures also protect them from fratricide.


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As a result of the military's experience in DesertStorm, the conduct of deep operations indicate that thereare problems that need to be addressed. These problemsapply to U.S. Army units at the corps and EAC levels sincethese are the echelons where the FSCL is (or should be)established.

SummaryThis portion of chapter three has provided a brief

overview of close, rear, and deep operations. Of concern inthis thesis is the manner in which both close and deepoperations are conducted in terms of integrating firesupport assets. Of particular concern is the conduct ofdeep operations, i.e., those operations conducted againstenemy forces not in direct contact but having an influenceon how close operations are, or will be, conducted.

Deev O~erations t Echelon Above CorDs LevelThe senior Army commander in a joint organizationsupports the Joint Forces Commander (JFC) by conductingArmy operations to support or obtain the objectives ofthe JFC. The Army contributes armored, light, andspecial operations forces to perform combat, combatsupport, and combat service support activities intheater. The Army organizes, trains, and equips theseland forces to accomplish all assigned missions.

The U.S. Army component commander in a theater(COMARFOR) has three roles in his mission as a subordinateservice commander operating in a joint theater. First, hemust establish a relationship with the joint headquarters.


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Second, he must conduct combat operations as directed.Third, he conducts support operations for his subordinateunits.5

The first of these roles, establishing the linkagewith the joint headquarters entails numerous activities.Initially the Army component receives direction and guidancefrom the joint headquarters. This step involves receivingspecific missions and tasks which are an integral part ofthe JFC's plan for the joint command. Once the guidance isreceived the Army commander advises the joint hsadquarterson the employment of Army forces in accordance with thedirected plan and designates specific forces to jointoperations as required. To ensure proper coordination, theArmy commander establishes liaison links with the jointheadquarters and the sister services as applicable.

The second role of the Army in the joint theater is

to conduct combat operations. In this role the Army plansand conducts operations that are part of a campaign or majoroperation. This aspect of the Army component's involvementin the joint arena usually revolves around the use of acorps or more than one corps that is subordinate to the Armyheadquarters, and focuses on the operational level of war.

The third role for the Army is to support its ownforces through the Army's own chain of command regardless ofwhether those units fall under the Army service componentheadquarters or directly under a joint headquarters. The


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support functions that are included in this role includelogistics: personnel, health, and legal services.

Of particular concern in this thesis is the secondrole of the Army component headquarters functioning in thejoint arena, that is, the role that it plays in conductingcombat operations. Historically, the operations that havebeen conducted subokdinate to the joint headquarters wereeither joint operations or single service operation^.^However, more recent experiences in Panama and in SouthwestAsia indicate that future operations will most certainly beless single service and more joint service.

The integration of operational fires by the Armycomponent commander is one of the primary examples of howthe future battlefield is becoming more joint and lesssingle service oriented. As part of his operational fireplan, the Army component commander has a variety of lethaland non-lethal fire at his disposal. Those lethal firesinclude conventional, nuclear, and chemical fires. The meansof delivery for those fires include field artillery, navalgunfire, tactical air support, and Army aviation. Thesemeans are not necessarily exclusive of one another and maybe used simultaneously as in the case of a Joint Air Attack(JAAT) where artillery, Army aviation, and tactical airassets may simultaneously engage a target or target group.The objective of lethal fires is to delay, disrupt, destroy,or degrade enemy forces and facilities. The non-lethal


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fires at the Army commander's disposal include electronicwarfare, psychological operations, and non-lethal chemicalwarfare. The means of delivery may be either surface-to-surface or air-to-surface.' The objective of these non-lethal fires is somewhat similar to the objective of lethalfires: to delay, impair, and disrupt the enemy'scapabilities. In either case these objectives do notusually serve as an endstate in themselves, but ratherfulfill one or more of three primary tasks on thebattlefield for operational fires: facilitate maneuver,isolate the battlefield, and to destroy enemy units andfacilities.'

Operational fires can facilitate the maneuver offriendly units to operational depths by creating gaps in theenemy's tactical defenses. The massing of artillery andtactical air on a linear obstacle and the enemy weaponsystems covering that obstacle would be an example of usingoperational fires to create an exploitable gap so tacticalforces could conduct deep operations. Operational firesalso serve to isolate the battlefield by interdicting enemyfollow-on forces, curtailing their freedom of maneuver, andthereby preventing their entry into the close battle. Thesefires can also be used to destroy specific facilities suchas, bridges, airfields, and logistics sites.'

Although operational fires may come from a varietyof sources, many of which are organic to the Army, the


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primary tool that the Army component has to deliver thesefires comes from the tactical air support provided to him bythe air component. This results from the relatively shortrange of conventional artillery, usually no more than 30km.(ATACMS has altered this arrangement somewhat, giving theArmy component commander the ability to use organic deepoperational fires for the first time).

Much of the same can also be said about theMarines, that is, they use much of the same equipment thatthe Army uses (except the Multiple Launch Rocket System(MLRS)and ATACMS) and are also dependent upon tactical airfor delivery of most of their deep operational fires (muchof their tactical air support is comprised of fixed-wingaircraft that are organic to their service or to the Navy,but may fall under a joint air component in a majorcampaign). Since both the Marines and the Army may beassigned to the same theater, they may both come under thesame land component commander should the joint forcecommander decide to designate one.

Alternatively, he may retain the title of landcomponent commander and establish a joint commander for theair component only. This is what occurred in DesertShield/Storm where the joint force commander (JFC),CINCCENTCOM, established service component commands; CENTAF,ARCENT, MARCENT, and Navy Central Command (NAVCENT) and onejoint subordinate command, the Joint Forces Air Component


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Command, whose commander was dual-hatted as both commanderCENTAF and the Commander Joint Forces Air Component command(JFACC)." For the remainder of this chapter, it will beassumed for simplicity purposes that an air componentcommander (the JFACC) controls the theater's air assets andthat the senior Amy commander, as in Southwest Asia,functions as COMARFOR.

The first step in determining how air power isgoing to shape COMARFOR8s eep battle is to determine howmuch tactical air will be available for his use. This isdone by consulting with the JFACC and recommending anapportionment plan based upon the guidance that COMARFORreceived from the JFC. The JFACC after having receivedinput from COMARFOR and the remaining service componentcommanders, will make his apportionment recommendation tothe JFC." The JFC will then apportion air assets basedupon his mission from the Secretary of Defense and hisassessment of the situation. His apportionment decisionwill assign a percentage of the air assets to the varioustactical air operations; air interdiction, counter-air,airlift, reconnaissance, and close air support.12 Hisdecision nay not be static: it may change over time,particularly if the joint command is conducting a phasedoperation.

Once the JFC has made his apportionment decision,the JFACC will allocate air assets by translating the


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apportionment into numbers of sorties available for eachtask. The actual number of sorties will be based upon themission, availability of aircraft, aircrews and munitions,and the rate of sortie generation. The Air Tasking Order(ATO) will provide information on the specifics of thesorties to be flown in any given 24 hour period.13

After receiving his allocation of tactical airassets from the JFACC, COMARFOR will distribute the sortiesto his subordinate units. COMARFOR and his subordinatecommanders will then use their tactical air assets as partof their operational fires plan to facilitate maneuver offriendly units, interdict follow-on enemy units, and destroyenemy units and facilities.'"

COMARFOR also has the option of nominating targetsto the JFACC for engagement by tactical air assets.COMARFOR may elect to do this when he has no sortiesavailable, a situation that can arise if there is a distinctIfair campaign" where all air assets are under the control ofthe JFACC. Or he may decide to nominate targets if he feelsthat he has insufficient sorties available to execute hisoperational fires plan.

The JFACC, as part of the joint interdictioncampaign team will integrate nominated targets into the airtasking order in accordance with the JFC's guidance. Toassist him in this task he may rely his own staff toprioritize and deconflict targets. Alternatively, the JFC


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may establish a joint targeting coordination board (JTCB)that will deconflict and prioritize targeting from bothCOMARFOR and the JFACC's own targeting personnel. The JTCBwould meet daily to provide timely input to the AT0 planningcycle by means of a joint target list. The target listwould then be used to construct the ATO. l5

Internally, COMARFOR will have establishedprocedures and common reports to facilitate the nominationof targets and the eventual delivery of operational fires.The ARFOR G-3 will normally be responsible for the Armycomponent target development plan. As such, the ARFOR G-3serves as the army component level Fire Support Coordinator(FSCOORD). This is a task normally filled by the seniorartillery commander at corps level and below. However,since there is no organic fire support at the ARFOR level,it is up to the ARFOR 6-3 to fill this role.''

As the ARFOR FSCOORD, the G-3 is responsible forintegrating Army and other services1 fires into COMARFOR1sOperations Order (OPORD). He does this by developing Armyfire support requirements, coordinating requirements withsubordinate units, higher headquarters, and sister services;prioritizing targets and air support assets, and nuclear andchemical fire planning. To assist him in this task, a deepoperations cell is established within the ARFOR 6-3 sectionand is staffed by representatives from G-3 plans, G-2, AirDefense Artillery (ADA) element, G-5, and Liaison Officers


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(LNOs) from Special Operations Forces (SOF) and thesubordinate corps. Within that cell, a fire support sectionmay also be established.''

The deep operations cell (and fire support section,if established) develops the targeting plan for the G-3.The targeting plan is based upon the ARFOR ground scheme ofmaneuver and utilizes the decide-detect-deliver methodology.The process is continual and dynamic. It is also performedin coordination with the subordinate corps requirements andtheir own target development plan.''

The deep operations cell will develop an ARFOR firesupport plan for the 6-3 based upon the process describedabove. Within the plan ARFOR may direct subordinate corpsto provide deep fires on targets which ARFOR has deemedcritical to the success of the deep battle. Subordinatecorps may also be directed to provide fires to an adjacentcorps for a specified purpose such as the adjacent corpsbeing designated as the main effort. The fire plan willalso provide details on the allocation of tactical airassets and guidance on the nomination of targets fromsubordinate corps to ARFOR. Target nominations from corpsto EAC may be necessary if the corps does not have

sufficient assets to engage necessary targets. Thesenominated targets will be submitted to ARFOR for approvaland then passed to the Battlefield Control Element (BCE),the Army interface at the Air Operations Center (AOC)."


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The BCE serves as COMARFOR1s oordination elementwith the JFACC and is collocated with the AOC. The BCEsynchronizes the ARFOR Operations Order (OPORD) with the AOCby coordinating targeting and intelligence data.Specifically the BCE coordinates the deep battle with theAOC, provides the AOC with information concerning ARFORplanning directives, current operations, targetingobjectives and priorities. As part of the targetingprocess, the BCE provides target nominations to the AOC atleast seventy-two hours prior to the implementation of theATO, deconflicts nominated targets with the AOC1s owntargeting section when possible, and requests other airsupport (reconnaissance and airlift) as necessary. The BCEalso coordinates and deconflicts airspace requirements andintegrates ARFOR1s air defense activities into JFACC1s lanfor area counter-air operations. To facilitate Command andControl (c2)efforts, the BCE also coordinates battlefieldgeometry with the AOC. This includes passing informationconcerning boundaries, forward line of troops, forward edgeof the battle area, and fire support coordination measuressuch as NFAs, RFAs, and the FSCL."

SummaryThis section of Chapter Three has discussed EAC

deep operations. A major facet of EAC (ARFOR) deepoperations is the manner in which it integrates operationalfires into COMARFOR1s scheme of maneuver. Since EAC does


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not have organic fire assets, it directs corps fire assetsto conduct specified missions and requests air support fromthe air component to engage targets critical to the successof COMARFORfs lan. Targets are nominated from ARFOR to theAOC when ARFOR has no air assets or insufficient air assetsto engage the applicable targets. The nomination processuses the D' targeting methodology and is carried out by thedeep operations cell that is subordinate to the ARFOR G - 3 .The targeting requirements are passed from ARFOR to the AOCby means of the BCE which is COMARFORfs ethod ofinterfacing with the air component.

Corws Deew OwerationsCorps deep operations are those activities whichare directed against enemy forces not currentlyengaged in close operations, but capable of engagingor influencing future close operation^.^^The objectives of corps deep operations are

determined by the corps commander with input from his staff.Generally, the objective of attacking the enemy deep is todisrupt the tempo of their operations and set the conditionsfor success in future close operations. This isaccomplished by isolating the follow-on forces from theclose operation by attacking them in depth and therebycreating favorable conditions for the close fight. It isnot necessary to completely destroy enemy forces in depth toaccomplish this objective. A synchronized plan of delayingand disrupting enemy forces can yield the desired effects."


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The primary method of conducting deep operations isthrough the use of deep fires. Another method is throughthe use of deep maneuver of forces, which may include thedeep maneuver of army aviation assets.

The corps FSCOORD, normally the corps artillerycommander, is given the responsibility to control deepfires. This includes artillery fires, tactical air support,naval gunfire, and electronic jamming operations. TheFSCOORD and his staff use the decide-detect-delivermethodology in selecting high-payoff targets as part of thedeep operations plan. Typical targets that arise from theuse'of the D~methodology are: enemy forces (such asindependent tank regiments and/or battalions, attackhelicopter units, and air defense systems) not in contactwith friendly forces; enemy command, control and com-munications (c3)centers, fire support and fire supportintelligence collection centers, and logistics facilities.23Othe~targets uch as bridges, railyards, chokepoints, andairfields may also be targeted even if enemy troops are notpresent, if they are vital for successful enemyoperations. 4

The corps fire support cell assists the corpscommander in planning and integrating fires delivered bycorps fire assets, subordinate fire assets, and those assetsbelonging to the sister services. The fire support cellincludes representatives of the following agencies: 6 - 2 , G-


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3, engineer, army aviation, air defense, field artilleryfire support element (FSE), tactical air control party(TACP), air support operations center (ASOC), naval gunfire,and army airspace command and control (A*C~). The rep-resentatives are not always co-located and their input isoften provided on a request or as needed basis. 5

The corps commander has a variety of fire supportassets available to assist in the prosecution of the deepbattle. Within his corps artillery, his two primary methodsof engaging deep targets are with the MLRS, and ATACMS.These two systems allow the corps commander to engagetargets at ranges of 30km and 100+km respectively. Alsoavailable to the commander are corps and division aviationassets which include (depending upon the particular make-upof the corps and its subordinate divisions) the AH-64 Apacheand the AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters. Both of theseaircraft are capable of delivering a variety of munitionsout to ranges of 230km and beyond (depending upon themunition/fuel configuration chosen for the particularaircraft) 6

The corps commander may have tactical air assets athis disposal as well, unless the CINC reserves all assetsfor the JFACC's use which may occur in a phased campaign.If air assets are apportioned to the ground commander anumber of platforms may be available to him for the deliveryof lethal fires. Chief among these is the A-10 Thunderbolt,


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an aircraft specifically designed to be employed in thesupport of ground troops. Fighter-bombers and multi-roleaircraft such as the F-15E and F-16D may also be usedagainst enemy forces within the corps zone of maneuver.Although not normally thought of as a ground supportaircraft, the F-111 bomber was used successfully duringDesert Storm against enemy tank formations in the ARCENTzone. (Their mission of dropping laser-guided munitions ontanks was referred to as "tank plir~king~~.)"

The fire support cell serves as the focal point forcorps' coordination for and use of tactical air assets.Corps requests for air support fall into one of threecategories: air interdiction, battlefield air interdiction,and close air support. (It should be noted that the AirForce does not recognize the concept of battlefield airinterdiction.

Corps requests for tactical air support are eitherplanned or immediate. Planning for air support flows fromthe decide and detect functions of the D~ targetingmethodology. First, the corps commander must conduct targetvalue analysis and decide which enemy targets are high-valuetargets (HVTs), i.e., which targets are essential to theenemy's successful accomplishment of their mission. Fromthis target set the commander determines which HVTs must besuccessfully engaged to ensure success of the friendlyscheme of maneuver. These targets are referred to as high-


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payoff targets (HPTS.)~' Once the HPTs have beendetermined, they must be accurately located--the detectfunction of the D~ process. Underlying this process is theassumption that the corps commander has been given aspecific area in which to focus his targeting effort.

This area will normally be defined as that areafalling within his corps boundaries. However, because hiscorps boundary may extend beyond the range in which hissensors can detect enemy units, his targeting authority maybe restricted by ARFOR. The delineation of that restrictionis portrayed as the RIPL. While this c2 measure is not partof U.S. doctrine it is part of NATO doctrine. The JFCdetermines whether or not it will be used in theater. Theestablishment of the RIPL or the use of some other guidancewill allow the corps commander to execute the decide anddetect function of the D3 process.

The final step in the D3 process is the delivery ofordnance on target. For the delivery of planned fires totake place, the targeting information must be passed to theAOC which will ultimately pass the information to theplatforms that will engage the targets. Target nominationsfor planned air strikes are forwarded to the AOC in one ofseveral ways. If the JFC is conducting a phased campaignand air assets have not been allocated to the landcomponent, then target nominations are passed from the corpsFSE to the ARFOR deep operations cell. After prioritizing


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the nominated targets vice other corps nominations and itsown nominations, ARFOR will transmit a revised target listto the BCE which, in turn, will coordinate the informationwith the AOC. The BCE must be in receipt of these targetsat least seventy-two hours in advance for their inclusioninto the ATO. If there is no EAC in the theater, then theASOC, located at the corps command post (CP), will transmitthe corps nominations directly to the AOC and the FSE willpass the same targeting information to the BCE. In effect,the targets will be simultaneously worked through parallelchannels.O

If the theater campaign is not phased, or if it isin the ground phase, the corps will have air assetsallocated for its use. Coordination for target engagementis performed directly with the ASOC which, along with theTACP, controls the use of air in the corps zone. The ASOCand the corps FSE communicate directly with the AOC and theBCE. There is no established doctrine as to how requestsfor attacks on targets beyond the resource capability of thecorps are passed to the AOC. An assumption would be thatthe corps FSE would coordinate directly with the BCE,however, COMARFOR could direct that these requests be routedthrough the deep operations cell at ARFOR. Regardless ofthe coordination, delivery of any strikes must be executedin conjunction with limitations imposed by FSCMs.


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The proper positioning and use of FSCMs attempts tobalance the dual needs of controlling the battlefield andfacilitating the attack of enemy targets. The properlocation and use of the FSCL highlights this dilemma. TheFSCL is primarily used by the corps commander tocompartmentalize the battlefield: to give him exclusivecontrol of the area short of the FSCL so that he canappropriately shape the area, and to relinquish control ofthe area beyond the FSCL so that ground and air basedweapons delivery systems can inflict maximum destructionupon enemy units and facilities. The 'ashaping" f thebattlefield may take a variety of forms. It may seek toblock, divert, or delay enemy movements or canalize enemyforces into restricted terrain or chokepoints. Shaping mayalso deny the enemy use of terrain by the use of mines or bythe destruction of road networks and bridges. Regardless ofthe objective of the shaping, the process will normallyrequire selective targeting to ensure that the effort issuccessful.31 Although the placement of the FSCL impliesthat the corps commander does not wish, or does not have thecapability to shape the area of the battlefield beyond theFSCL, he still maintains some control over the area throughthe use of other FSCMs. Both RFAs and NFAs can be usedbeyond the FSCL to protect areas that the corps commanderdoes not want engaged. Short of the FSCL he may establishFFAs to facilitate the attack of time sensitive targets.


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While the engagement of targets beyond the FSCLdoes not require coordination with the JFACC, it isrecommended that it be done. For the corps commander, theco-location of Army and Air Force personnel within his firesupport cell expedite this process. Not only should theattack of targets beyond the FSCL be coordinated within thefire support cell, but the very placement of the FSCL andother FSCMs should be accomplished with the consultation ofthe air component.''

SummaryCorps deep operations are designed to delay,

destroy, and disrupt enemy activities and thereby setfavorable conditions for the future close battle. The corpscommander has a number of assets at his disposal in which t owage the deep battle. The control and coordination of theseassets is primarily the responsibility of the corps firesupport cell which include the corps fire support element,and representatives from the ASOC, the TACP, the G-3, andother staff officers.

Requests for tactical air assets to be used in deepoperations are normally planned well in advance using the D3targeting methodology. The coordination for the final stepin the D~ process--delivery--may be direct from the corps tothe AOC,

current fa doctrine for deep battle

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