fa doctrine development 1917 to 45

8/13/2019 FA Doctrine Development 1917 to 45

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FI ELD ARTI LLERY DOCTRI NEDEVELOPMENT 1917 1945

A t hes i s pr esent ed t o t he Facul t y of the U.S. Ar myCommand and Gener al Staff Col l ege i n par t i alf ul f i l l ment of t he r equi r ement s f or t hedegr eeMASTER OF MI LI TARY ART AND SCI ENCE

SCOTT R. MCMEEN MAJ USAB. A. Uni ver s i t y of Nebr aska Li ncol n. 1979

Fort Leavenwor t h Kansas1991

Appr oved for publ i c r e l eas e; di s t r i but i on is unl i m t e d.


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tiASTEP OF H i L i T A R Y APT N D SCI Etl CETHESI S r?PPPO . AL PAGE

l l ane of cmdi dj t e: N k J Scot: P. EcMeenTi ci e of t hes i s :i l:-iGA5*

Pi el a Ar t i i l er y Doct r i ne Qe- e opment

Thesi s Ccmm t t ee Ch3i r r nm

. Accept ed thi s 3 h dsy of . J une 1 91 b y :

Di r ect or, Gr aduateP n i i i p J Br ookes, Pn D Progrm sThe opi ni ons m d concl usi ons expr essed her ei n x e

Degr ee

t hose of t hest udent aut hor and do not necessar i l y repr esent t he vi evs of t heU. S. Ar my Commsnd and General St s f f Col l ege or 3n; ot her go' vernment3gency.st st ement .( Ref er ences t o thi s stud;' shoul d i ncl ude t he f oregoi ngi i .


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ABSTRACTSI ELD ARTI LLERY DOCTRI NE DEVELOPMENT 1917-1945 by MAJ Scott R.McMeen, USA, 90 pages.Thi s t hesi s exam nes t he devel opment of U. S. Army f i el d art i l l erydoctr i ne f r om 1917 to 1945. I t compar es f i el d ar t i l l er yor gani zat i on, l i ai son methods, t arget acqui si t i on methods,m ssi ons, command and cont rol pr i nci pl es, and f i r e di r ect i ont echni ques empl oyed i n Wor l d War I , t he i nt erwar per i od, and Worl dWar 11.The st udy reveal s t he r emar kabl e cont i nui t y of t he ar t i l l er ydoct r i ne devel oped i n Wor l d War I . I n spi t e of t r emendoust echnol ogi cal change f r om 1917 t o 1945 Wor l d War I 1 art i l l erydoct r i ne r emai ned very si m l ar t o t he doct r i ne of 1918. The studyconcl udes that t he basi c pr i nci pl es of ar t i l l er y doctr i neest abl i shea i n Wor l d War I were the basi s for art i l l ery doct ri ne i nWor i d War 11 and w l l probabl y remai n the basi s for f ut ur eart i l l ery doctr i ne.

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ACEEI OWLEDGEMEf I TSI vi sh to t hank t he member s of m y t hesi s comm t t ee, Dr . Chr i st opherR Gaoel , LTC M chael T. Chychoda, and MAJ Gary D. Ph3.p f o r thei ri nval uabl e assi st ance snd i nsi ght.I . a l s o - i sh t o t nank Dr . Boyd Dast r up, Fl el d Ar t i l l er y Br anchai st or i an, and CPT St eve McGeor ge f o r t hei r sssi stsnce vi t hresearch on Wor i d ar t i l l er y doctr i ne.My t hanks go to t h e s t a f f s of the Combi ned Arms Pesexch Li br ar y a tFor t Le3*J en. . l Ort h, snd t he Mor r i s Suet t Techni cs1 Li br ar y t FortS i I Oki ahom3, ..:ho pr ovi ded a vesi t h of vai uabl e document s anbi ni or mst on,Si nai i y I vi sh t o t . ha. nk my Jife, gebr a, vhose advl ce, lovlngp3t i ence, md under st mdi ng made thi s t hesi s possi bl e.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1 IMTRODUCTIOM

CHAPTER 2: WORLD WAF ICHAPTER 3: BETWEEN WARS

CIi.4PTSR : WO?iD W R 11

CHAPTER 5: COEICLUSIOEIS

B I BL IOGRAPHY

6

7

8

6

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CHAPTEE I I EITPODUCTI OEIJ ne of t he most i mport ant m ss i ons of any wm' is t o devel op

ef f ect i ?e doct r i ne. Si nce the emergence of pr of essi onal arm es i nt he 17t h and 18t h cent ur i es, l esder s have st r uggl ed t o pr oduce themost ef f ect i ve vays of empl oyi ng m l i t ar y f or ce. The sear ch f oref f ecti ve doct r i ne has i nt ensi f i ed i n t he 20t h cent ur y. I n thi ser 3 of cont i nuous t echnol ogi cal change. arm es have f ound i tnecessx- y t o al most const m l y r eexam ne t hei r doct r i ne, t act i cs,t echni ques, and pr ocedur es f or f i ght i ng.

Thi s study exm nes the devel opment of f i el d ar t i l l er ydoct r i ne i n t he U.S. Army f r om I017 t o 1045. I t i s desi gned t ocet er m ne vhet her the Ar my' s xt i l l er y doct r i ne of Wor l d War I i ~357 ~ e i l evel oped bef ore the : J a r , o r l argel y i mpr o*?i sed f r omcombatexperi ence. The st udy i nvest i gat es the f i e i d art i l l ery becwse i t.?asamong the most successf ul and ef f ect i ve of t he Army' s combatel ement s i n Wor d ar 11. Russel l F . Wei gl ey, one of t he l eadi nghi st or i ans on U.S. m l i t a r y af f ai r s , char act er i zed the f i el dar t i l l ery as " t he out st andi ng combat branch of t he Amer i can groundf orces. " He St t r i but ed muc h of t he xt i l l er y ' s success t osuper i or doctr i ne:

. ._. . .. .

. . .Amer i can ar t i l l er y ( excel l ed) i n t he abi l i t y of asi ngl e f or - mr d observer- - of t en f l yi ng i n a Pi per or St i nsonl i ai son ai r pl ane- - t o r equest and r ecei ve the f i res of a l lt he bat t er i es ui t h i n r ange of a target i n a s i ngl e,concent r at ed, barr 3ge. The Amer i can guns speci al i zed i n"TOT" - - t i me on t ar get - - concent r at i ons of mul t i pl e bat t er i es,or even o i numerous bat t al i ons, upon desi gnated t arget s f ordesi gnat ed peri ods of t i me. To t he cat ast r ophi c ef f ect s ofa TOT, German pr i soners gave uni ver sal t est , i mony. On a i lI


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f r ont s, art i l l er y caused mor e t han hal f the casual t i es ofWor l d War I1 bat t l es; but the art i l l er y was t he Ameri canarmy, . s speci al st r ong sui t . =By examni ng t he or i gi ns and devel opment of a successf ul doct r i ne,the study r eveal s l essons whi ch may prove useful to f ut ur e doct r i nedeve opment ef for ts .

The st udy begi ns i n 1017 because Wor l d War I exper i ence wasthe basi s or the U.S . Ar my' s ar t i l l ery doctr i ne I n Wor l d War 11Despi t e the apparent di ssi m l ar i t y of t he t uo conf l i cts, t hecont i nui t y of doct r i ne bet ween Worl d War s I and I is unm st akabl esnd st r i ki ng. The st udy shows that ar t i l l er y doct r i ne remai nedremarkabl y si m l ar f rom 191? t o 1 45 i n spi t e of greattechnol ogi cal change. These f i ndi ngs suggest that as we modi f y ourdoct r i ne fo r t he f utur e, we shoul d not l i ght l y abandon theest abl l shed methods of t he past .

What exact l y i s meant by the term "doctr i ne?' Fi el d Manua100-5: er at i nng FM 100-5) provi des the commonl y accepteddef i ni ti on:

An i rmy, ' s f undament al doct r i ne is t he condensedexpressi on of i ts approach t o f i ght i ng campai gns, maj oroper at i ons, bat t l es, and engagement s. Tact i cs, t echni ques,pr ocedur es, or gni zat i ons, suppor t st r uct ur e, equi pment andt rai ni ng must l l der i ve f r o m i t . I t must be r oot ed i nt i me- t ested t heor i es and pr i nci pl es, yet f orwar d- l ooki ng andadapt abl e t o changi ng technol ogi es, t hr eat s, and mssi ons.I t must be def i ni t i ve enough t o accommodate a w de vari et yof vor l dw de si t uat i ons. Fi nal l y, t o be usef ul , doctr i nemust be uni f orm y known and underst ood. s

Not e t hat the def i ni t i on makes a di st i nct i on bet weendoct r i ne on the one hand, and t act i cs, t echni ques and pr ocedur es on

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the ot ner . Doct r i ne I s very Dr oad and gener al . I t does notpr ovi de speci f i c gui dance f o r part i cul ar tactl cai sl t uat i ons: thi sis t he rol e pl ayed Dy t act i cs, t echni ques, and pr ocedur es. Thet er ms ar e never t hel ess cl osel y rel ated. As FM 100-5 poi nts out ,t act i cs, t echni ques, and pr ocedur es ar e al l der i ved f rom doct r i ne.

Whi l e r ecogni zi ng the great er pr eci si on of t he FM 100-5def i ni t i on, thi s st udy uses doct r i ne i n a more general sense.Ai t hougn t he st udy f ocuses pr i mar i l y on doctr i ne 3s def i ned by FM100-5, i t deal s w th r el at ed t opi cs as wel l . I n order t o di scussana compar e ar t i l l er y oper at i ons dur i ng the wor l d wars, i t isf r equent l y necessary t o descend to the l evel of t act i cs,t echni ques, and pr ocedur es. Many of t hese ' l ower order' met hodshad a pr of ound i mpact on ar t i l l ery operat i ons. I n mor e t han onei nst ance, methods t hat coul d be cat egor i zed as mere ' procedures'ui t i mat ei y changed t act i cs and doct r i ne. Fur t hermore, tcat egor i ze a par t i cul ar met hod as doctr i ne, t acti c, t echni que, orpr ocedur e is ext r emel y di f f i cul t , and s ul t i mat el y uni mport ant tthe t hesi s.

The st udy br eaks down t he doctr i nal anal ysi s i nto si x maj orareas: or gani zat i on of art i l l ery uni ts: l l ai son pr ocedur es andor gani xt i on; t arget acqui si t i on pr ocedur es and or gani zat i on; f i el dar t i l l ery mssi ons: command and cont r ol ; and f i re di r ect i on. Uni torgani zat i on, command and cont r ol , and m ssi ons are common f eat uresof the doct r i ne for any ml i tary el ement . The ot her t hree areasare pecul i ar to f i el d ar t i l l ery and bear some f ur ther expl anat i on.


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Li ai son and t srget acqui si t i on ar e subset s of ar t i l l eryorgani zat i on. An i ndi rect f i r e syst em a syst emof weapons t hat donot ' see' the t arget s they engage) must have separate el ement s tof i nd and observe t ar get s for them When f i el d ar t i l l ery became ani ndi rect f i r e syst emearl y i n thi s cent ur y, target acqui si t i onbecame an i nherent component of art i l l ery uni t s. Li ai son el ement sal so became a st andar d f eat ure i n art i l l ery uni ts. The arti l l ery' spr i mary mssi on, t o pr ovi de suppor t i ng f i r es t o t he i nf ant ry,demanded const ant communi cat i on and coordi nat i on wth t he support edf or ce. Ar t i l l ery l i ai son par t i es assumed thi s r ol e earl y i n Wor l dWar I and r emai n a f eat ur e of cur rent art i l l er y doctr i ne. Fi r edi r ect i on descr i bes t he tact i cal empl oyment of ar t i l l er y f i r ei tse l f : i t s t he crux of al l art i l l er y oper at i ons.

The st udy examnes each of t he si x doctr i nal ar eas at threepoi nt s i n t l me. Chapter 2 examnes doctr i ne at t he cl ose of Worl dWar I Chapter l ooks at doct r i ne i n ear l y 1941 near t he end oft he I nt erwar per i od. Chapt er anal yzes ar t i l l er y doct r i ne at theclose of Wor l d War 11. I n addi t i on, Chapt er s 2 3 and 4 descr i bet he backgr ound and hi st ory of maj or doct r i nal devel opment s dur i ngWor l d War I , t he i nt erwar per i od, and Worl d War I 1 respecti vel y.Chapter 5 present s t he study' s concl usi ons and f i ndi ngs.

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CHAPTER ONE ENDNOTES

Russell F. Weigley, Eisenho er s Lie utenants: The ampa sngf Fr nce and Germanv I 944-1945 (Bloomington: Indiana UniversityPress) 127.3 1 b i d . 28.=U.S. Army, Field Manual 00-5: ODer3.t ons, (Washington:Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1986 , 6.

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Thi s wor ked wel l enough unt i l t he i nt r oduct i on of hi gh expl osi veshel l s and machi ne guns. I f i nf ant r ymen i n t he open wer e easy toki l l , ar t i l l er y bat t er i es wer e even mor e vul ner abl e t ar get s.bat t er y posi t i on typi cal l y i ncl uded not onl y guns and gunner s, butal so hor ses i n har ness, l i mber s, and cai ssons. A bur st i ng shel l o rpl ungi ng bul l et s i n t he mdst of al l thi s qui ckl y r educed bat t er i est o chaos. I n t he openi ng bat t l es of 1914, ar t i l l er y f i r i ng f r omexposed posi t i ons was qui ckl y swept 3way by enemy f i re. ' I n ordert o surv i ve, the ar t i l l ery l ef t the front l i nes and adopt ed i nai r ectf i r e t echni ques.

I ndi rect f i r e was not new to Wor l d War I arm es. Most oft nem had al r eady devel oped pr ocedur es f or i ndi r ect f i r e. TheJ apanese had made ext ensi ve use o i ndi r ect f i r e dur i ng t heRusso- J apanese War (1904-05). But t hese procedures wer e notw dei y pract i sed. Pri or to 1914. most ar t i l l er ymen f el t t hati ndi rect f i r e was too compl i cat ed, and pr obabl y unnecessar y.Vi r t ual l y al l of t he maj or power s expect ed t he next war to be oneof r api d movement , i n whi ch mobi l i t y, not f l r epower, woul d be th?supr eme vi r t ue. I n such a conf l i ct , t her e woul d be no t i me f orest abl i shi ng obser vat i on post s, st r i ngi ng communi cat i ons wi r e, andper f or m ng che compl ex cal cul at i ons r equi r ed f or i ndi r ect f i r e.But t he shock of combat qui ckl y dest r oyed t hese assumpt i ons. Thesur vi val i nst i nct woul d soon mot i vat e even the most hi deboundgunner s to l earn t he newf angl ed t echni ques.

Thr ee year s of st al emat e on t he West er n Fr ont gavear t i l l er ymen t he oppor t uni t y to devel op ef f ect i ve i ndi rect f i r e


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suppor t t echni ques. By 1917, and U. S. entry i nto t he war , i ndi rectf i r e was a hi ghl y devel oped art . The arm es devel oped accurat egri d maps and mast ered survey techni ques fo r det er m ni ng accur at ebat tery and observat i on post l ocat i ons. Ar t i l l erymen l earned t osegregate ammuni t i on by manuf acturer ' s l ot, t o mai nt ai n uni f ormper f ormance f romr ound to round. They l earned to compensat e f ort he erosi on of worn cannon t ubes and r esul t i ng l oss of muzzl evel oci t y. They rout i nel y appl i ed cor r ect i ons to compensate for t heeffects o weather and powder t emperature. I n shor t , pr ocedur esonce r egarded as prohi bi t i vei y compl i cat ed became commonpl ace.

More i mpor t ant l y, the ar t i l l ery l earned t o coor di nat e itsef f ort s w t h the i nf ant ry. Cooper at i on bet ween t he var i ous armshad been l argel y i gnored i n prewar t rai ni ng. But the hard schoolof combat rapi dl y f orced the arm es on the West ern Front t o f i ndsol ut i ons to t he di f f i cul t pr obl ems of f i r e coor di nat i on. To besur e, nei t her si de had f ound a compl et el y sat i sf act or y syst emby1917.1914, when i nf ant ry- ar t i l l ery cooper at i on, i f i t exi sted at al l ,was of t en a mat t er o pur e chance. 5

But both s i des had pr ogr essed t remendousl y f r omthe days of

Then came t he U S. Army. The Amer i cans had pl ayed no partwhat ever i n t he t act i cal r evol ut i on that began i n 1914. Our mostrecent comDat exper i ence had been agal nst Phi l i ppi no and Mexi canguerr i l l as, a f ar cr y f rom t he massed arm es of t he West er n Fr ont .The ar t i l l ery of t he Regul ar Army was i nsuf f i ci ent t o out f i t asi ngl e di vi si on. ' Gi ven t hi s, i t is not sur pr i si ng t o l earn thatnear l y a i l U.S. f i el d art i l l ery uni t s that f ought i n Wor l d War


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were t r ai ned l argel y by Fr ench of f i cers3 and equi pped w t h Frenchmat er i el . & i n f act , a si gni f l cant port i on of t he Amer i canExpedi t i onar y Force' s (A.E.F) art i l l ery suppor t was provl ded byFr ench' uni t s. Dur i ng t he gr eat Meuse- Ar gonne Of f ensi ve, t hel ar gest Amer i can attack of t he War , Fr ench uni t s made up mor e t hanhal f of t he corps and ar my art i l l ery t hat suppor t ed U.S. Fi r s tArmy. 7 Because t he U. S. Ar my was w t hout exper l ence at handl i ngl arge amount s of ar t i l l er y i n moder n war , most of t he doct r i nal andt act i cal pamphl et s pr epared by t he U. S. War Depar t ment f o r t hear t i l l er y wer e si mpl y copi es of French and Br i t i sh t r ai ni ngci r cul ars. Thus, t he f i el d ar t i l l er y doct r i ne t hat emer ged f r omWor l d War I and woul d f orm t he basi s of U.S. doct r i ne dur i ng Worl dWar 11 was l argel y i nher i t ed f r om th e French and Br i t i sh. Thedoct r l ne t hat t he U.S. woul d appl y so successf ul l y i n t he mobi l ebat t l es of Wor l d War 11 had i ts or l gl ns i n t he deadl ocked t r enchesof 1914-1918.

I . ORGANI ZATI ONI n or gani zi ng its ar t i l l ery, the U. S. had the advant age of

Al l i ed exper i ence. Ar t i l l er y or gani zat i on i n Wor l d War I wasdesi gned to pr ovi de bot h r esponsi veness and f l exi bi l i t y. Eachmaneuver echel on had i ts own dedi cat ed f i r e support . The l i ghtar t i l l er y, nor mal l y depl oyed wel l f orward i n support of t hei nf ant r y r egi ment s, pr ovi ded t he r api d r esponse. Medi um and heavyar t i l l er y, under t he cont rol of t he di vi si on, cor ps, and ar myneadquar t er s, pr ovi ded t he f l exi bi l i t y. The ar t i l l er y under hi s


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di rect cont rol was general l y t he commander s pr i mary means ofi nf l uenci ng a bat t l e. He coul d use i t t o wei ght hi s own mai nef fo r t , o r hel p out a subordi nate uni t t hreatened by enemy act i on.

D vi si onal ar t i l l ery or gani zat i on par al l el ed the squaredi vi si on st r uct ur e used by U.S. f or ces throughout Wor l d War I . Thedi vi si on was bui l t around two i nf ant ry br i gades, each br i gadeconsi st i ng of two r egi ment s of t hree i nf ant ry bat t al i ons each. Thedi vi si on had an or ganl c ar t i l l ery br i gade, consi st i ng of two l i ghtar t i l l ery regi ment s and one medi um ar t i l l ery regi ment . Li ght andmedi um r egi ment s each cont ai ned two bat t al i ons of t wel ve guns each.The t wo l i ght r egi ment s, equi pped w t h French 75mm guns, normal l ypr ovi ded cl ose suppor t i ng f i r es to t he t wo i nf ant ry br i gades. Themedi um r egi ment , t ypi cal l y equi pped w t h i 55mhow t zer s, pr ovi dedaddi t i onal suppor t t o t he di vl si on wherever needed. But a frontl i ne di vi si on usual l y had much more art i l l ery t han thi s. The U.S.1st Di vi si on conduct ed a t rench rai d, a small scal e, l i mt edobj ect i ve at tack. at Rem er es, Fr ance on 11 March, 1918. For thi sr ather modest at t ack, the 1st Di vi si on had the equi vi l ent of ei ghtar t i l l ery r egi ment s i n support , more than t w ce its organi c amountof ar t i l l er ~. ~ or was thi s l evel of suppor t par t i cul ar l y l avi sh.On I November , 1918, the V Cor ps ar t i l l ery pr ovi ded an ent i r eregi ment of l i ght guns t o suppor t each f ront l i ne bat t al i on ofi nf ant ry, or S X t i mes what or gani c ar t i l l ery al one coul dpr ovi de. 1o

These addi t i onal asset s came f r omcor ps and/or armyar t i l l ery. Cor ps and army ar t i l l er y, unl i ke the di vi si onal

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br i gades, had no t i xed st r uct ur e. An Al l i ed cor ps or ar my woul dr ecei ve as much addi t i onal ar t i l l er y as the hi gh command f el t wasnecessar y t o support t he uni t' s m ssi on. Then, t hrough a processknown as organi zat i on f or combat , t he chi ef of art i l l ery f o r t hecorps or army woul d assi gn m ss i ons t o hi s bat t al i ons, r egi ment s,and br i gades. He woul d general l y at tach the l i ght art i l l erydi r ect l y t o the di vi si ons, but woul d keep most of t he medi um andheavy cal i ber weapons under hi s cont rol . The subor di nat e uni t w t hthe most c r i t i c a l mssi on nor mal l y r ecei ved the heav i es t ar t i l l erysuppor t . Commanders wer e qui t e f l exi bl e i n empl oyi ng thi sar t i l l er y. Uni t s wer e f r eel y at t ached, det ached, and moved f r omsector t o sect or , based on t acti cal need.

I f t he cor ps or army' s span of cont rol gr ew t oo l arge, i tcoul d f ormsubordi nat e el ement s i nt o ' groupi ngs' o r ' groupments. 'Gr oupi ngs were ad hoc organi zat i ons consi st i ng o several art i l l eryuni t s br ought t oget her to per f or m a par t i cul ar m ssi on. Dur i ng t hel att er hal f of t he Meuse- Ar gonne Of f ensi ve, Fi r st Army f ormed theAI SNE Gr oupi ng, consi st i ng of a U. S. ar t i l l er y r egi ment , a Frenchar t i l l er y regi ment , and an avi at i on squadr on. Thi s uni t pr ovi dedsupport to both I and V Cor ps I n l ate Oct ober and ear l y November .The f i el d or der s of t he 1st Army Ar t i l l er y f or November i ncl ude awar ni ng or der f or t he di ssol ut i on o t he AI SNE Gr oupi ng, and t her eassi gnment of t he U.S. ar t i l l er y r egi ment t o I11 Cor ps. 1i

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11. LI AI SONAdopt i on of i ndi rect f i r e made l i ai son of f i cer s and l i ai son

par t i es absol ut el y essent i al to ar t i l l er y or gani zat i on. Back i nt he di r ect f i r e days, when cannon l i ned up next to i nf ant ry andcaval r y, l i ai son was a si mpl e mat t er . But i n Wor l d War I w th thei i ght ar t i i i er y a thousand met er s or more behi nd the l i nes, and theheavi er guns even f ur t her back, t he ar t i l l er y was now out ofshout i ng di st ance.det ai l i ng ar t i l l er y of f i cer s and a par t i es of communi cat i onsspeci al i st s t o al l f r ont l i ne i nf antr y uni ts, and the Amer i cansadopt ed thi s pr act i ce as wel l . Typi cal l y, i nf ant ry commanders downto bat t al i on l evel had an ar t i l l er y l i ai son of f i cer . The l i ai sonof f i cer' s j ob was to assi st t he i nf ant ry commander i n usi ng hi sart i l l ery support ef f ect i vel y. He assi st ed the i nf ant ry i n

The French and Br i t i sh sol ved the pr obl emby

devel opi ng its i ndi rect f i r e pl an, and coor di nat ed i t w th thear t i l l ery. He kept the ar t i l l er y up t o dat e on the Inf antr y' sl ocat i on, st at us, and act i vi t i es, and vi ce versa. One of hi sbi ggest r esponsi bi l i t i es was to i nsure that f ri endl y art i l l ery f i redi d not endanger t he i nf antry. ' =

111. TARGET ACQUI SI TI ONI t was qui t e common for l i ai son of f i cers to doubl e as

observer s. Observer s were t he most w del y used target acqui si t i onmeans of t he war . They were another obvi ous r equi r ement f or ani ndi rect f i r e syst em They I dent i f i ed t ar get s f or the art i l l ery

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and cor r ect ed f al l of shot . The bul k of t hese observer s wereground obser vers, depl oyed i n the front l i nes w th t he i nf ant r y.But many wer e aer i al ObSer VerS, mounted i n bal l oons and ai r pl anes.

Bal l oon observat i on of f ered some obvi ous advant ages overground and ai r pl ane observat i on. Fi rst , l i ke t he ai r pl aneobserver , the bal l oon observer coul d vi ew an i mense sect or togreet dept h. Unl i ke the ai rpl ane obser ver , he was st at i onar y,maki ng t arget l ocat i ons much easi er t o det erm ne. Fi nal l y, abal l oon observer had t el ephone communi cat i ons w t h t he gr ound. Ocour se, bal l oons di d have one ser i ous di sadvant age: t hei r ext r emevul ner abi l i t y to enemy ai r cr af t . Of t en, the mer e approach of anenemy ai r pl ane was enough t o make a bal l oon observer t ake t o hi schut e .

Ai rpl ane Observers wer e al so subj ect to at t ack by enemypl anes.targets on t he ground. They communi cat ed w th the art i l l eryt hrough an ext r emel y compl i cat ed and cl umsy syst emof one wayr adi ot el egr aphy ( ai r pl ane to ground stati on) , and gr ound- t o- ai rmarker panel s and f l ares. Yet t he val ue of ai r pl ane- mountedobservers was i mmense. Ai r pl anes had the one t hi ng that ever yt hi ngel se on the West ern Front l acked: mobi l i t y. Al r pl anes coul d swoopdi rect l y over enemy l i nes and enemy r ear areas to f i nd t argets.Havi ng f ound the t ar get s, t hey coul d di rect art i l l ery f i r es on t hemt hrough radi ot el egr aph si gnal , or t hey coul d si mpl y t ake pi ct ur es.Aeri al phot ographs wer e among th e most val uabl e sour ces ofi nt el l i gence t o r the , ar t i l l er y. i 5

Bei ng i n const ant mot i on, t hey had a harder t i me obser vi ng

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Whi l e gr ound and ai r obser vers pr ovi ded the bul k of targeti nt el l i gence dur i ng the war, t he need to l ocate enemy bat t er i espr ompt ed some new and i nnovat i ve sol ut i ons to the pr obl emofl ocat i ng host i l e ar t i l l ery. One of t hese was f l ash r angi ng, i nwhi ch t wo or more obser vers at separ at e obser vat i on post s t r i ed t omake si mul t aneous obser vat i ons of enemy art i l l ery muzzl e f l ashes.The observer s measur ed and report ed t he di rect i on t o t he f l ash,whi ch was then pl ott ed on a gr i d sheet , t he i ntersect i on of theazi muths r eveal i ng the enemy battery' s l ocat i on. Sound r angi ng wasal so devel oped dur i ng Wor l d War I . Usi ng thi s t echni que,speci al i st s measur ed the di f f er ence I n t i me of a sound wave' sarr i val at a ser i es of mcrophones. W t h t he speed of sound aknown const ant , and the l ocat i ons of t he m cr ophones a knownval ue, the battery' s l ocat i on coul d be deduced. Both t echni queswere empl oyed w t h some success dur i ng the war. But once agai n,t he Amer i can Ar my had a hard t i me organi zi ng and t r ai ni ng suchuni t s i n suf f i ci ent numbers. Both the sound r angi ng and f l ashr angi ng sect i on assl gned to the V Corps Ar t l l l ery dur l ng the Meuse-Ar gonne Of f ensi ve were French.

The need for i nt el l i gence on enemy art i l l ery pr ompt ed theFrench to devel op an or gani zati on excl usi vel y devot ed to ar t i l l er ytarget acqui si t i on, an organi zat i on whi ch the Ameri cans prompt l ycopi ed. I n t he U.S. Ar my, i t was known as the Ar t i l l er yI nf or mat i on Ser vi ce, o r A. I . S. Both the cor ps and army ar t i l l eryheadquart ers had an A. I . S. sect i on, commanded by an ar t i l l eryi nf ormat i on of f i cer , o r A. I . O The A. I . S. sect i on at army l evel

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di st r i but ed i nf or mat i on recei ved f romcor ps t o the army ar t i l l er y,and gat her ed adai t i onal i nf or mat i on f r o m army sources. But mosti nt el l i gence gener ated at thi s l evel was t oo ol d t o pr ovi de usef uit arget i nf or mat i on, i .e. t arget l ocat i ons t h a t coul d be i mmedi atel yf i red on. The corps A. I . S. provl ded most of t he i mmedi atel yuseabl e t arget i nt el l i gence. i s The cor ps A I S had onl y oneorgani c asset : t he sound and f l ash r angi ng sect i ons. But i tgat hered target i nf ormat i on f r om numerous sources, i ncl udi ng aer i alphotogr aphs, ai r pl ane, bal l oon, and gr ound obser ver s, sound andf l ash r angi ng, si gnal s i nt el l i gence, and the anal ysi s of dudshel l s. 19 The A. I . S. al so assi sted i n adj ust i ng f r i endl y f i r e, anddi ssemnat ed met eorol ogi cal i nf or mat i on.

I V . ARTI LLERY M SSI ONSThe first and most obvi ous quest i on doct r i ne must address is

that of mssi on. j ust what is i t that the f or ce is supposed to do?8y 1917 Al l i ed doctr i ne i dent i f i ed f our basi c ar t i l l er y m ssi ons.Fi r st and f oremost was the di rect suppor t m ssi on, whi ch i ncl udedal l f i r es del i ver ed i n pr oxi mt y to and i n support of f ront l i nei nf ant ry. Second, count er bat t er y f i r e encompassed a l l f i resdi rected at enemy ar t i l l er y, i ncl udi ng ar t i l l er y obser vat i on post sand muni t i on dumps as wel l as bat t ery posi t i ons. Thi r d,i nt er di ct i on f i r e was meant to deny t he enemy access to an area o rr out e. t i arr assi ng f i r e was a var i at i on on i nt er di cti on. I t wasnot i nt ense enough to compl et el y i nt erdi ct an area, but byoccassi onal i y pl aci ng f i r e on i mpor t ant r out es and l ocat i ons, made

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l i f e mor e di f f i cul t f or the enemy. The f our t h mssi on was t opr ovi de deep f i r es- - + r es on non- ar t i l l ery t arget s beyond the mai nbat t l e area.

These t asks were l ogi cal ly di vi ded among the di vi si onal ,cor ps, and army ar t i l l ery. The di vi si onal ar t i l l er y br i gades,consi st i ng pr i mar i l y of l i ght ar t i l l er y, handl ed the di r ect suppor tmssi on.cal i ber s, had count er f i r e as i ts pr i mary mssi on. The armyar t i l l er y, whi ch i ncl uded super heavy r ai l way guns and the l i ke,pr ovi ded most of t he deep f i res. Al l t hr ee echel ons f i r edhar r assi ng and i nt er di ct i on mssi ons, dependi ng on t he r ange to t het arget . Thi s st andar d di vi si on of dut i es shows up cl ear l y i nar t i l l er y operat i ons orders f rom the Meuse-Ar gonne Of f ensi ve. 2nBut t hese r ul es were not hard and fast. Those same order s r eveali nst ances of count erbat t ery t ar get s assi gned t o di vi si onart i l l er i es, and of a heavy ar t i l l er y bat tery at t ached to t hei nf ant ry f or di rect support . 2' Tact i cal need was the over r i di ngconsi der at i on i n assi gni ng ar t i l l er y uni t s t o tasks.

The cor ps ar t i l l ery, w t h a mx of medi um and heavy

Wor l d War I al so saw the begi nni ngs of t he art i l l ery' s' standard tact i cal mssi on' concept . Dur i ng Wor l d War 11,ar t i l l er y commander s used f our st andar d tacti cal m ssi ons todescri be a uni t s f i r e suppor t r esponsi bi l i t i es. Uni t s assi gned a' di rect suppor t mssion' pr ovi ded i mmedi at e f i r e support fori nf ant ry regi ment s and br i gades. ' General support ' uni t s pr ovi dedf i r es to suppor t the di vi si on, cor ps, or army. ' Rei nf orci ng' uni t ssuppl ement ed t he f i r es of a desi gnat ed ar t i l l er y uni t . The

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general suppor t - r ei nf or ci ng m ssi on, as the name i mpl i es, was acomni nat i on of t he pr evi ous t wo m ssi ons.

Thr ee of these f our mssi ons wer e cl ear l y vi si bl e i n theV Cor ps Ar t i i l erys or gani zat i on f or combat of 29 Oct ober , 1918.The corps at t acned al l of i ts l i ght , and some of i ts medi umar t i l l ery to the di vi si ons. For thi s oper at i on, each i nf ant rybat t al i on had an ent i r e l i ght ar t i l l er y r egi ment i n di rect suppor t .Next , the corps est abl i shed t wo gr oupi ngs, of four and f i vebat t al i ons r espectl vei y, t o pr ovi de addi t i onal f i r e support to thecor ps t wo att acki ng di vl sl ons. These gr oupi ngs were under cor pscont r ol , but each est abl i shed di rect communi cat i ons w th one of t hedi vi si onal art i l l er y headquar t er s, and pr ovi ded rei nf or ci ng f i r esto the di vi si ons; a general suppor t - r ei nf or ci ng m ssi on. Next camet wo bat t al l ons of heavy ar t i l l ery excl usi vel y under cor ps cont rol :a generai suppor t m ssi on. Fi nal l y. Fi rst Army gave one of itsheavy ar t i l l er y br i gades a general suppor t - r ei nf or ci ng mssi on i nsupport of V Cor ps.

V. COMMAND AND CONTROLThe stati c condi t i ons of t rench warf are and the pr i mt i ve

st ate of communi cat i ons technol ogy det erm ned the natur e of Wor l dWar I ar t i l l er y command and cont r ol . St at i c condi t i ons al l owedheadquar t er s t o devel op and i ssue very detai l ed or der s. Chart s,over l ays, t i me schedul es, and det ai l ed i nst r uct l ons pr escr i bed thear t i l l er y s act i ons i n bat t l e. Cont rol was hi ghl y cent r al i zed.Fi r e suppor t pl ans were t ypi cal l y consol i dated and appr oved at

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corps or even army level. The maJo rity of the targets engaged wereplanned targets, identified and assigned to a battery hou rs or evendays before they were fired. Thi s system did result in veryefficient use of artillery assets, and could be very effective. On1 November, 1918, the V Corp s Artillery fired a mass ive preparatorybombardment on the German lines, which as sisted the V Corps inadvanc ing some eight ki lomete rs that day, a prodigi ous rate byWorld War I standards. German prisoner s of war attested to theeffectiveness of the bombardment.

Many of the prisoners capture d on the 1st (of November,1918 stat e that th e reason they were taken is that ourartillery concentrations were so effect ive that they wereconfin ed to their shelt ers and isolated in small groups.Artillery pris oner s state that they were unabl e to servetheir guns. In several instances, batter ies were unab le tofire a shot. There were cases of officers who w ere entirelycut off from communication with their troops.23

The system of centra lized control through detailed planni ngdid have some obvi ous weaknesses, however. I f the attackinginfantry ran into unanti cipate d resistance, or if the enemyartillery began firing from previously unknown locations, or if therolling barrage got too far in front of the advanc ing infantry, theattack could fail. Th e immobile nature of telephone communicationsmade it extremely difficult t o engage unplanned target s, or modifya schedu le of fires. Comman ders certainly recognize d the need fora more flexible and responsive system, and tried many metho ds forimproving communications with the artillery. Radio was the obviousanswer to mobile communications, but the sets available in1917-1918 were too heavy and fragil e to carry forwar d over no-mans

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- l and. Pyr ot echni c si gnal s wer e usef ul f or cal l i ng i n prear r angedbar r ages and concentr at i ons, but once agai n t he need had to beant i ci pat ed and i ncl uded i n t he f i re pl an.f o r cont r ol l i ng art i l l ery f i r es was an ef f ecti ve f i re support pl an,det ai l ed enough t o meet l i kel y cont i ngenci es.

The onl y proven met hod

The art i l l ery' s desi r e f or cent r al i zed cont rol coupl ed w t ht he i nf ant ry' s desi r e f or r esponsi ve suppor t r esul t ed i n a dualchai n of command for art i l l ery uni t s. Art i l l ery at al l echel onsserved two mast er s. The ar t i l l er y br i gade, f or exampl e, was ani ntegral part of t he di vi si on, yet its commander was answer abl e tobot h t he di vi si on commander and the cor ps chi ef of ar t i l l er y. 24the same t oken, the corps chi ef of ar t i l l er y worked f or bot h t hecor ps commander and the army chi ef of ar t i l l ery. At f i rst gl ance,thi s seems a l ess than i deal arrangement w th obvi ous potent i al f orconf l i ct . Yet the syst emappear ed to work wel l . I n wr i t i ng hisaccount of ar t i l l er y empl oyment i n the Meuse- Ar gonne Of f ensi ve,Maj or W E. Shepher d, chi ef of staf f of the V Cor ps Ar t i l l er y, hadnot hi ng but pr ai se f or the suppor t of t he Fi rst Army Ar t i l l er y.The V Cor ps commander , Maj or General C. P. Summeral l , was al soef f usi ve i n hi s prai se of t he ar t i l l ery at al l echel ons i n t h a t~ampai gn. ' ~

By

Why di dn' t conf l i ct s ar i se bet ween t he demands of ar t i l l er yand maneuver commanders? Per haps i t was due to the art i l l ery' scl ear r ecogni t i on of i ts ul t i mat e purpose: t o hel p t he i nf ant ryachi eve its m ssl on. Gi ven t hi s vi ew, the proper r ol e of an armyar t i l l er y was t o hel p Its cor ps reach t hel r obj ect i ves. The rol e

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of t he cor ps ar t i l l er y was to hel p t he di vi si ons reach thei robj ect i ves, and so on. I t was st andard pr act i ce to l ocateart i l l ery command post s next to t he support ed maneuverheadquart ers , w th l i ai son at the subordi nat e maneuverheadquar t er s. Hence, t he vi ews of i nf ant ry and ar t i l l erycommanders wer e gener al l y I n cl ose accord. I n t hi s way, t hear t i l l er y achi eved cent r al i zed cont r ol , yet was stil l r esponsi ve tot he support ed f orces needs.

VI . FI RE DI RECTI ONWhat gui dance di d doctr i ne pr ovi de on the actual conduct of

art i l l ery f i re? Thi s is the r eal mof f i r e di r ecti on, whi chcompr i ses the t acti cal empl oyment of ar t i l l er y f i r e to i ncl ude the

l ocat i on and sel ect i on of t ar get s on whi ch to f i r e is to be pl aced,t echni que of del i ver y of f i r e t her eon, and al l ocat i on of ammuni t i onto f i r e mssions.' * I n ot her wor ds, f i r e di r ecti on det erm nedwhere ( whi ch targets) t o engage, what t o shoot i n t erms ofammuni t i on t ype and amount , and how t o engage, e. g. f i r e a l ot ofammuni t i on at a t arget al l at once, or f i r e i t over an ext endedper i od.

The method f or engagi ng a t arget was nor mal l y a f unct i on oft he ef f ect desi r ed. U.S. doctr i ne i dent i f i ed two basi c t ypes ofef f ect s, dest ruct i on and neut r al i zat i on. Dest r uct i on meant thetotal anni hi l at i on of t he t ar get ; a desl r abl e goal , but veryexpensi ve i n t erms of ammuni t i on. Dest r uct i on f i r e al so r equi r edf ai rl y pr eci se t arget Neut r al i zat i on f i r e achi eved

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onl y t emporary ef f ect s. But when properl y synchroni zed wi t h otheract i ons, neut r al i zat i on coul d be j ust as ef f ecti ve as dest r ucti on,and much easi er t o achi eve. Dur i ng an at t ack, f or exampl e,ar t i l l ery woul d neut r al i ze enemy bat t er i es unt i l the I nf ant ryadvance was compl et e, t hus el i m nat i ng enemy art i l l er y f romacri t i cal phase of the bat t l e w t hout physi cal l y dest r oyi ng theenemy guns. Or der s f or neut r al i zat i on f i r e wer e of t en verypr eci se, speci f yi ng the amount and type of ammuni t i on t o be f i r ed,t he r ate of f i r e, and t he t ype and number of weapons t o use. '

I n the of f ense, the ar t i l l ery general l y f i r ed el aborat e andext ensl ve pr eparat i ons. These ai med at ( a) the overpoweri ng ofthe hosti l e ar t i l l er y, and (b) t he physi cal and moral reduct i on ofthe enemy' s i nfantry. ' 9 For great est ef f ect , doct r i ne pr escri bedt he use of massed f i r es, w t h al l avai l abl e ar t i l l ery f i r i ng atonce. The V Cor ps Ar t i l l ery order f or t he at t ack of 1 Novemberstat es: At ti m nus two hours, the enemy' s ent i r e f ront l i neposi t i on w l l be subj ect ed t o an i ntense bombardment by al l guns att he di sposal of t he corps, except t hose r equi r ed f or count erbat tery. = Even t he most ef f ect i ve pr eparat i on coul d notel i mnat e al l enemy r esi st ance, however . To suppl ement preparat oryf i r es, commanders pl anned f or addi t i onal ' on cal l ' concent r at i onson l i kel y areas of enemy resi st ance. I nf ant ry commander s orart i l l ery l i ai son of f i cer s coul d cal l f or t hese f i r es rel at i vel yeasi l y, by usi ng pyr ot echni c si gnal s or code wor ds over thet el ephone. These concent r at i ons were very usef ul f or def eat i ngenemy count eratt acks. 3i

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The great f ai l i ng of ar t i l l er y i n t he of f ense was i tsi nabi l i t y t o keep up w th a r api d advance and pr ovi de cont i nuousf i r e support . Once the i nf ant ry got beyond the r ange of t he guns,ar t i l l ery uni ts had to di spl ace f or war d.worked out det ai l ed pl ans f or movi ng bat t er i es and pr ovi di ngcont i nuous upp por t . ^ * But movi ng guns, cai ssons, and horsesf orward t hrough t rench syst ems and ove r t he devastat i on of no-man s- l and was ext r emel y sl ow and di f f i ~ul t . ~Once i n pl ace, art i l l eryuni t s had to r eest abl i sh communi cat l ons, whi ch meant i nst al l i ng newt el ephone w r e w t h both f orward el ement s and hi gher headquart ersto t he rear. Fi nal l y, get t i ng muni t i on f or war d t o the newposi t i ons was a daunt i ng chal l enge, not onl y because of t hedevastated t err ai n, but al so the crush of men and vehi cl es t r yi ngto get f orward. Ar t i l l ery t r ucks and wagons had t o compete w t hi nf ant ry t r ucks and wagons, i nf ant ry r eser ves, engi neers , si gnalt r oops, ambul ances, headquart ers and ot her combat support t r oops,al l compet i ng f or the same i nadequate roads.

Ar t i l l er y headquar t er s

I n t he def ense, art i l l ery commanders pl annedcount er pr eparat i ons- - f i r es desi gned t o di sr upt enemy preparat i onsand at t acks. When an enemy attack was di scovered, pref erabl y J ustbefor e the enemy i nf ant ry got underway, t he l i ght art i l l ery openeda vi ol ent f i r e on t he enemy f r ont l i ne wor ks t o di srupt and destr oythe assaul t i ng t roops.art i l l ery, command post s, communi cat i ons t r enches, and roads, i naddi t i on t o r ei nf or ci ng the f i r es of the l i ght ar t i l l er ~. ~

Medi um and heavy guns opened f i r e on enemy

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For cl ose i n def ense, the a r t i l l e r y executed ' st andi ngbarrages. ' When pr oper l y execut ed, t hese cr eat ed a wal l ofshrapnel f i r e bet ween f r i endl y posi t i ons and at t ackl ng I nf ant ry.Fi r es wer e i ni t i at ed by rocket si gnal or t el ephone command f r omt hef ront l i nes. Cr ews kept t hei r pi eces i n const ant r eadi ness toexecut e t hese f i r es, so t h a t the del ay between the command t o f i r eand r ounds expl odi ng coul d be measur ed i n seconds. Unl ess t heenemy neut r3i i zed t he def endi ng ar t i l l er y, bar r age f i res sel domf ai i ed t o stop an attack.

VI I . CONCLUSI ONSBy November , 1918, t he U.S. Army had a successf ul ar t i l l er y

doctr i ne. I t had devel oped an ef f ecti ve art l l l ery or gani zat i on,massi ve enough t o over whel m i ts enemes, and f l exi bl e enough t oadapt to changi ng t actl cai si t uat i ons. I t had acqui r ed ef f ec t i vel i ai son and target acqui si t i on el ement s, usi ng the most advancedt echnol ogy avai l abl e. Its command and cont r ol systemwas wel laaapt ed t o t rench war f ar e. Detai l ed pl anni ng, cent r al i zed commandand cont r ol , and thor ough I nt egr at i on w t h t he i nf ant ry were i tsessent i al char acter i sti cs.

The art l l l ery i n Wor l d War I had t wo chi ef f ai l i ngs: i tsi nabi l i t y t o engage unpl anned t ar get s, and its l ack of mobi l i t y i nthe of f ense. aet ween t he two war s, advances i n t echnol ogy woul dpr ovi de sol ut i ons t o bot h of t hese pr obl ems, and woul d account fortire most si gni f i cant changes in ar t i l l er y doct r i ne i n Wor l d War 11.

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CHAPTER TW ENDNOTES' J . B. A. Bai l ey, Fi el d Art i l l erv and Ff r eDo c (Oxf ord:M l i tary Press, 1989 , 129.J onathan M House, Towar d Combi ned s War f are: A S udv o f20th Cent urv Tact i cs. Doct r i ne and Or saQzat i on (Fort Leavenwor t h:U.S. Army Command and General Staf f Col l ege, 1984 , 17.

a C. T. Lanhamand Edw n F. Har di ng, J nf ant r v i n Ba t t l e( Ri chmond: Garr et and Massi e, 1939 262.4Wl l i am J . Snow, Si snPosts of EXDer ence ( Washi ngt on: US.Fi el d Art i l l ery Associ at i on, 1941 11.Ybi d. , 101- 103.*J ohn J . Per shi ng, Hunter Li gget t , Boor t of t he Fi r st Ar mv,Amer i can EXDedi t i onar v For ce: Or sani zati on and ODerat i ons ( For tLeavenwort h: The General Servi ce School s Press, 1923 95.71bi d. , 117-118.' John W Weeks, BeDor of t he Secretarv o f War to t hepr esi dent . 1922 (Washi ngton: Government Pr i nt i ng Of f i ce, 1922302' Memorandum Commander , 1st F.A. Br i gade t o Commander , 1stDi vi si on, 12 March, 1918, Subj ect : Report Upon Oper at i ons of 1st

Di vi si on. A.E.F. (Reaul ar) : ODer at i ons ReD or t s. 1s F. A. Br i qade( Vol ume XIV) (Whn 919).F. A. Br i gade Dur i ng Rai ds Execut ed March 11 , Wor l d War Records. 1s

l oAnnex I t o Operat i ons Or der No. 5, V Army Cor ps Ar t i l l er y,29 Oct ober, 1918, r epr i nt ed i n an ar t i cl e by W E. Shepherd, J r . ,The Bnpl oyment of t he Ar t i l l er y- - Fi f t h Army Corps Ar gonne- - MeuseOperat i ons, Fi el d Act l erv J our nal 9 ( Apri l - J une 1919 177.Cor ps Monograph. Documents Col l ect i on. Combi ned Ar ms ResearchLi br ar y, For t Leavenwor t h, Kansas ( ci t ed hereaf t er as CARL) No.M9403 H6 C73 G3 CI D.

Fi el d Or ders No. 53, 1st Army Ar t i l l er y, 9 November 1918, V

IWar Depar t ment , Fi el d Ar t i l l erv Notes No. 2, ( Washi ngt on:I 3Horat i o Rogers, Worl d War I Throush Mv Si sht g (San Raf ael ,

Of f i ce of t he Adj ut ant General , August , 1917 35-36.CA: Pr esi di o Press, 1976 71-72.

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' *War Depar t ment , Fi el d Ar t i l l e r v Notes No . 1, ( Washi ngt on:' W E. Shepher d, J r . The Empl oyment of t he Ar t i l l er y- - Fi f t h

Of f i ce of t he Adj ut ant General , May, 1917 71-86.Army Corps Ar gonne- - Meuse Oper at i ons, Fi el d Ar t l l l er v J o u W 9( Apri l - J une 1919 160.

' & bi d. , 161.I 7War Depar t ment , The Ar t i l l erv Inf ormat i on Servi ce.I eI bi d. , 8-9 .I 9I bi d. , 10-11.

Shepherd, The Empl oyment of the Ar t i l l ery, 173.' Memor andum No. 15, Fi rst Army Art i l l ery, 12 November 1918,

( Washi ngt on: Of f i ce of t he Adj ut ant General , Sept ember , 1918 7.

V Corps Monogr aph.' =Shepherd, The Empl oyment of the Ar t i l l ery, 167.= I bi d. , 155-156.2'Shepherd, The Empl oyment of the Ar t i l l ery, 172.zzI bi d. , 148-151.2*War Depart ment , Fi el d Manual -20. F i el d Ar t i l l erv T ~ Ci cs. and Techni sug, ( Washi ngt on: War Depar t ment , 1940 111.z7War Depar t ment , General Notes on the Use of Ar i l ery,( Washi ngt on: Of f i ce of t he Adj ut ant General , November , 1917 14.2aShepherd, The Empl oyment of the Ar t i l l ery, 169, 175.23War Depar t ment , Ar t i l l ery i n Of f ensi ve ODer at i ons,( Washi ngt on: Of f i ce of t he Adj ut ant General , August , 1917 23.= Shepherd, The Empl oyment of t he Ar t i l l ery, 168-169.= Lanham Lnf an r y I n 8 t t l e, 271-272.

3hepher d, The Empl oyment o the Ar t i l l ery, 174.3sMemor andum No. 14, Fi rst Army Art i l l ery, 7 November 1918, VCorps Monogr aph I

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4Feneral Notes an the Use o f Artillery, 25.asRussell G. Carter, n e Olst Field Artillery (Cambridge:Riverside Press. 1940 66.

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CHAPTER : BETWEEN WARSI mmedi at el y f ol l ow ng Wor l d War I t he Ar my began

demobi l i zi ng. The nat i onal desi r e f or a r etur n t o nor mal cyr esul t ed i n a l i ght ni ng f ast r educt i on i n ml i t ar y st r engt h. On I 1November , 1918, the U. S. Arm' s ar t i l l ery had a total personnelstrength of 462,163,' By 3 J une, 1919 i t had f al l en to 25,519.One year l ater, thi s modest st rengt h was hal ved to 1 2 5 ~ 5 0 . ~Never t nel ess. t he ar t i l l ery was i n consi derabl y bet t er shape thani t had been when the war began. I t had acqui r ed subst ant i alamount s of modern weapons and equi pment , al ong w t h pr i cel esscombat experi ence. The ar t i l l er y di d a good j ob of r ecor di ng itswar t i me exper i ence. Maj ot Gener3l W l l i am J . Snow, Chi ef of Fi el dArt i l l ery f rom 1918 to 1927, or gani zed t hree boar ds of of f i cers t or esearch l essons l earned on the Western Front , and maker ecommendat i ons f or t he f ut ure.

The Hero Board, named for i ts seni or of f i cer , Bri gadi erGeneral Andr ew Her o, convened i n December of 1918: . . . to make ast udy of the exper i ence gai ned by the Art i l l ery o f t he A.E.F. andsubm t r ecommendat i ons based upon such st udy.r esear ched numerous subj ect s, i ncl udi ng or gani zat i on of ar t i l l eryuni t s and staffs, t ypes of ordnance, mot or t r anspor t ,communi cat i ons, aer i al observat i on, f l ash rangi ng, sound r angi ng,l i ai son, ammuni t i on suppl y, mai nt enance, and t rai ni ng. The Boar dgat hered i ts data by vi si ti ng vet eran uni t s and by sol i ci t i ngopi ni ons f romexper i enced ar t i l l er y commanders and ot her ar t i l l er y

The Her o Board

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of f f cers. Many of t he Board s recor nendat i ons f ound thei r wayi nto ar t i l l er y doctr i ne f o r t he next war .

The West ervel t Board, named for i ts seni or member , Br i gadi erGeneral W l l i am I . West ervel t , was per haps t he best known and mosti nf l uent i al of t he t hr ee post war boards. I ts mssi on was moreci r cumspect : . . . to make a st udy of t he armament , cal i bers, andt ypes of mat er i el , ki nds and pr opor t i on of ammuni t i on, and met hodsof t ranspor t of t he ar t i l l er y t o be assi gned to a Fi el d Ar my. 4The Board s r ecommendat i ons on ar t i l l ery weapons match very cl osel yw th the mater i el actual l y f i el ded dur i ng Wor l d War 11. The Armyeventual l y devel oped and empl oyed seven of t he ei ght weaponsr ecommended by the Board. I n Wor l d War I the U.S. Ar my had r el i edal most excl usi vel y on French mat er i el . I n Wor l d War 11, t hanksl argel y t o the wor k of t he West er vel t Board, moder n ar t i l l er ypi eces wer e avai l abl e i n substant i al quant i t i es bef or e U.S. t r oopsent ered combat .

The thi r d board, al so chai r ed by Br i gadi er GeneralWest ervel t , was l argel y i gnored by the Army. Thi s was t he TrenchArt i l l ery Boar d, desi gned to do f o r t rench mor t ar s what theWest ervel t Board had done for cannons. The Board r ecommended theadopt i on of l i ght and medi ummort ars, of 160mm and 240mmcal i berr espect i vel y, t o suppl ement cannon ar t i l l er y f i r epower i n the f i el darmy. The Board al so r ecommended cr eat i on of an i ndependent t r enchar t i l l er y br anch, and establ i shment of a tr ench ar t i l l ery t r ai ni ngcenter. & I n t he general rush to pare down the Ar my, however , theWar Depar t ment di d not hi ng t o i mpl ement the Board s

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r ecommendat l ons. No exi st i ng branch was w l l i ng t o accept sti l ldeeper per sonnel and budget cut s t o pr ovi de money and manpower f oran ent i r el y new br anch. As a resul t, l ar ge cal i ber mort arsdi sappeared f r om the U.S. Army s i nvent ory.

Al l t hr ee of t he boards recogni zed t he t r emendous pot ent i alof motor t r anspor t for f i el d ar t i l l er y, and al l r ecommendedshi f t i ng f r omani mal t o motor t r anspor t . Bot h t he Hero andWest ervel t Boar ds r ecommended f ul l mot or i zat i on of medi um and heavyar t i l l er y, al t hough t hey st opped shor t of compl et el y el i m nat i nghor se- dr awn t ranspor t for l i ght ar t i l l er y. Thei r r eser vat i ons wer ebased sol el y on the i nadequacy of t he vehi cl es then avai l abl e,however , and not on any desi r e t o keep horses:

I f , af t er t horough exper i ment , a sat i sf act or y means oft ract i on f or 75mm mat er i el can be f ound, t he ent i r edi vi si onal r egi ment s shoul d be mot ori zed. The di f f i cul t i esof ani mal dr awn ar t i l l er y as devel oped i n France areadm t t ed by everyone. Poor t ype of ani mal s, l ack ofr epl acement s, l ack of f or age, and above al l , l ack of car eand underst andi ng f or t hei r hor ses on the part of t heper sonnel , a l l combi ned t o render t he servi ce precar i ousunder t he best condi t i ons encount ered. The l ast namedobst acl e, t hat i s , of f i cer ? and men t ot al l y i nexper i enced i nt he car e of ani mal s, w l l be met w th whenever t he Amer i canArmy is expanded. I n consi der at i ons of r oad space, f or agesuppl y f or ani mal s, ser vi ceabi l i t y under f i el d condi t i ons,t he advant ages are al l i n f avor of the tractor ...ar t l i l er y t hat can be successf ul l y adapt ed to mot or t r act i onshoul d be motori zed. 2

The consensus of opi ni on i s t ha t every pi ece of

I n addi t i on to mot or t r anspor t , t he West er vel tBoard r ecommended f ur t her devel opment of sel f - propel l ed ar t i l l ery.Duri ng t he war , t he French achi eved modest success w t h l i ght gunsand how t zers mount ed di r ect l y on t r act ors. Al t hough t hese weapons

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were qui t e sl ow and heavy, t he Board r ecognl zed the great potent i alof thi s f orm of ar t i l l er y, whi ch onl y had to park t o go i ntoactl on. o I n spi t e of t he Board' s endor sement , budget const r al nt sand l ack of ent husi asm f r o m ar t i l l er y of f i cer s woul d prevent l arge-scal e pr oducti on of sel f - pr opel l ed ar t i l l er y unti l 1942.

The Army' s senl or art i l l eryman pushed hard f or expandedmot or i zat i on. I n 1921, Maj or General Snow ordered t he experi mentalmot or i zat i on of f our r egi ment s of l i ght ar t i l l er ~. ~ e was f or cedt o abandon the exper i ment j ust t wo year s l ater, however, f or l ackof f unds. a0 The ar t i l l er y cont i nued smal l scal e exper i ment at i onw t h t ruck and t r actor t r anspor t t hr oughout t he i nterwar per i od,and woul d event ual l y mot or i ze most of its weapons.

But the peaceti me' Ar my was unw i ng t o compl etel y abandonhorse- dr awn t r anspor t . Under peacet l me condi t i ons, horse transportwas about as ef f ect i ve as mot or i zed t r anspor t , and of f er ed someuni que advant ages. Horses were not subJ ect t o mechani calbr eakdown; sol di ers coul d obt ai n f orage more cheapl y and easl l ythan gasol i ne and repai r par t s: and the r egul ar army had pl ent y ofsol di ers f aml i ar w th t he care and handl i ng of horses. The greatadvant age of i ndef at i gabi l i t y enj oyed by mot or t ranspor t over horset ranspor t was l ess apparent under t he l ess arduous condi t i ons ofpeacet i me t rai ni ng. Ar t i l l er ymen cont i nued t o debat e the r el at i vemer i t s of horse and motor wel l i nto t he 1930's. As l ate as 1938,al most hal f of t he regul ar arm' s ar t i l l er y was s t i l lhorse-drawn. The 1940 edi t i on of Fi el d Manual 6-20 stil l t al kedabout l i mber s, cai ssons, vet er i nar y ai d st at i ons, and ot her mat t er s

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pecul i ar t o hor se- drawn ar t i l l er y. Not unt i l 1941 and the r api dexpansi on of t he Ar my, di d the t r u th of the Hero Board' s r eportbecome apparent once agai n.

J ust as t r ucks and t r act or s pr om sed the ar t i l l er y gr eat ermobi l i t y, advances i n r adi o t echnol ogy pr om sed t o sol ve t henet t l i ng pr obl emof communi cat i ons and f i r e coor di nat i on i nof f ensi ve combat . Ar t i l l er ymen r ecogni zed t he t r emendous benef i tr adi o communi cat i ons woul d conf er on ar t i J l er y oper at i ons, andanxi ousl y awai t ed new advances i n r adi o t echnol ogy. The f ol l ow ngent husi ast i c endor sement of radi o' s pot ent i al came f r oma 1921i ssue of the Fi el d r t i ery J our nd:

Al t hough these devel opment s i n r adi o w l l r ender t ofenormous val ue t o t he Army as a whol e, i t is bel i eved t hati t w l l be of especi al and utmost i mport ance t o t he theFi el d Art i l l ery i n part i cul ar- - especi al l y t o Di vi si onalAr t i l l ery. I t is bel i eved that t he great est pr obl emofDi vi si onal Art i l l ery w l l be sol ved by t he ai d of Radi o:i . e. t he accompanyi ng of t he i nf ant ry w t h fi re.' =W t h r adi o, gr ound observer s coul d adj ust bar r ages t o t he

i nf ant r y' s pace, and cal l or addi t i onal f i r es on pocket s ofr esi st ance unaf f ect ed by pl anned f i r es. Aeri al observer s coul dabandon thei r cl umsy r adi otel egr aph t r ansm t t ers and enj oy t wo- wayvoi ce communi cat i ons w th suppor t i ng bat t er i es, great l y speedi ngand si mpl i f yi ng aer i al observat i on and adj ust ment of f i r e . I nmobi l e si t uat i ons, r adi o woul d el i m nat e t he need to i nstal l wi r ecommuni cat i ons, al l owi ng ar t i l l er y uni t s t o go i nto act i on al mosti mmedi atel y. 13

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As w t h mot or t r ansport , Maj or General Snow st r uggl edm ght i l y t o get modern radi o sets f or the ar t i l l ery. I n 1920, hei ni t i at ed a j oi nt vent ur e w th t he Sl gnal Corps t o produce at wo- way r adi otel ephone for aer i al observers. ' 4 The ar t i l l er ycont i nued to acqui r e i mpr oved r adi o set s thr oughout the i nt erwarper i od, r i ght up to t he very eve of combat depl oyment .1942 di d ar t i l l er y uni t s recei ve the f r equency modul at ed (FM) r adi oset s that t hey woul d use w t h such success i n Wor l d War 11.'

Not unt i l

I n addi t i on to t echnol ogi cal advant ages, the ar t i l l er y ofWor l d War I 1 woul d al so enj oy a great advant age over i ts Wor l d WarI f or ebear s i n t he qual i t y and uni f or m t y of its --rai ni ng. Dur i ngWor l d War I t he Army bui l t i ts ar t i l l er y branch al most f romscrat ch. Amer i can ar t i l l er y uni t s r el i ed to a l arge ext ent onf or ei gn exper t i se f or t hei r t rai ni ng. The f or ei gner s, i n t urn,wer e teachi ng a doct r i ne f or i ndi rect f i r e suppor t that t heyt hemsel ves had l argel y i mprovi sed i n batt l e. As a resul t , U.S.uni t s l earned a w de var i ety of t act i cs and procedures. ' d ' : , Short l yaf t er t he war , Maj or General Snow appoi nt ed a dri l l r egul at i onsboar d to publ i sh a common set of t r ai nl ng r egul at i ons f or f i el dart i l l ery uni ts.t he Arm' s f i r st compr ehensi ve doct r i nal manual f or f i el dar t i l l er y, i n 1922.

-

\. .

Thi s boar d pr oduced Trai ni ng Regul at i on 430-85,

Publ i shi ng thi s document was cer t ai nl y an i mport ant st ep i nt he gr owt h of ar t i l l ery doct r i ne. Equal l y i mpor tant was t heest abl i shment of an i nst i t ut i on to t each the doct r i ne. The U.S.Ar my' s Fi el d Ar t i l l ery School at For t Si i I , Okl ahoma, est abl i shed

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i n 1911, had not been around l ong enough to have an appr eci abl ei mpact on the Army pri or to Wor l d War I . Dur i ng the war , i t becamea maJ or f i el d art i l l ery t r ai ni ng cent er , and by Oct ober , 1917, wast urni ng out t r ai ned ar t i l l ery br i gades f o r servi ce i n Fr ancei e Hadt he war cont i nued, t he Army woul d have acqui r ed whol l yAmer i can- t rai ned ar t i l l ery uni t s. The School gai ned val uabl eexper i ence i n mobi l i zi ng and tr ai ni ng uni t s, and achi eved permanentst atus af t er t he war. By 1940, near l y al l of t he Army' s ar t i l l er yof f i cer s, i ncl udi ng Nat i onal Guar dsmen and Reservi st s, r ecei vedt hei r f ormal t r ai ni ng at Fort Si l l . Thi s st andar di zed t r ai ni ngwoul d be of great i mpor t ance t o the ar t i l l ery of Worl d War 11, andwoul d al l ow i t to mai nt al n its f l exi bl l i t y i n spi t e of thei ncreased t empo of combat . 19

Cont rary t o its experi ence i n Wor l d War I , t he Amer i can Armyemphasi zed mobi l e war f are i n t he i nt erwar per l od. Whi l e mostof f i cers r ecogni zed the i mpor t ance of posi t i on warf are, they t endedto vi ew i t as an aber r at i on, whi ch may or may not be r epeat ed i nf ut ur e conf l i ct s. The Ar t i l l er y School demonst r at ed its i nt eresti n mobi l e warf are by its r evi si ons to uni t or gani zat i ons, and byits aevel opment of i mproved f i r e di rect i on techni ques.

Dur i ng Wor l d War I sur veyor s bel onged to the Engi neer s, andmet eorol ogi cal sect i ons to t he A. E. F. Headquar t ers. 20 Gi ven thestat i c nat ure of oper at i ons, art i l l ery uni t s had l i t t l e di f f i cul tyobt ai ni ng t he necessary survey and met eorol ogi cal suppor t . I n af ast - movi ng envi r onment , however , t hese assets woul d have to bei mmedi at ei y avai l abl e to be of any use . By 1937, art l l l ery uni ts

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had organic survey and meteorolog ical assets.2 T o improve thespee d of artillery fi re direct ion, the Artillery School introducedtwo major innovations: simpli fied observation/conduct of fireproced ures, and t he battalion fire direction cen ter (FDC).

In World War I battery commande rs were generallyrespon sible for the conduct of f ire (compu ting the data necessaryto aim artillery piec es at indirect fire targets). In the ory , thebattery commander occupied a command observation post, where hecould observe targets through an elaborate periscope device knowna s the battery commander s (B.C.) scope. Usi ng hi s B.C. sco pe anda firing table, the battery commander computed the appropriate datato aim his guns at t he select ed target. But becau se of the manyvariab les affect ing the artillery round s tra Ject ory , it w a snormally necess ary to adjust roun ds onto the target. The batterycommander ordered a single gun to fire using the initial data hecomput ed, and then observed t he fall of shot. He then correctedthe firing data as necessary to place the fall of shot on target.By applying this correction to data for subsequent targets in thevicinity, the battery c ommand er could normally engag e themeffectively without adjustment. Th is system wa s generally adequatein static situat ions, but had two chief drawbacks. First, thecormnander could adjust only hi s own battery; there was no simpleway for him t o bring additional fire s to bear on the target, or toobserv e for other batteries. Second , the battery command er had toobserv e the target.

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I f the bat t ery commander coul d not observe the t ar get , hef ol l owed a di f f erent pr ocedur e. He r ecei ved t he target l ocat i on,normal l y i n t erms of map coor di nat es, and t hen perf ormed a sl ow andcompl ex set of cal cul at i ons. These cal cul at i ons cor r ect ed f or t heef f ect s of weather, non- st andard ammuni t i on char act er i st i cs, andnon- st andar d muzzl e vel oci t i es, on the t r aj ect or y, and al l owed f orr easonabl y ef f ect i ve f i r e on the t arget w t hout adj ust ment . Thi ssystemwas adequat e, so l ong as no one was i n a hur ry to engage thetarget.2'

Gi ven the st at i c natur e of warf are on the West ern Fr ont ,t hi s syst emo f i r e di r ect i on wor ked wel l enough. The great bul kof a r t i l l ery f l res wer e pl anned i n advance. Hi gher headquart ersdevel oped det al l ed t arget l i st s, and sent t hem t o the bat t er i es i nt i me for them t o comput e accur ate f l r i ng dat a beforehand. But t hl ssystemwas i nt ol erabl y sl ow at engagi ng unant i ci pated t arget s. Thecompl exi t y of computat i on procedur es and the ext r eme di f f i cul t y ofmai ntai ni ng communi cat i ons w t h advanci ng i nf ant ry made f or hugel ag t i mes, as descr i bed by member s of t he post - war I nf ant ry Schoolstaff:

Any i nt ervent i on of di r ect - support ar t i l l er y, whi ch hasnot been f oreseen and prepared for usual l y r equi r es mucht i me. And once i nf ant ry has asked for the f i re, i t mustwai t unt i l i t mat er i al i zes, or run t he ri sk of bei ng f i r edon by i ts own ar t i l l er y ...I nf ant ry r equest s f or f i r e mght i ncl ude a st at ementl i mt i ng t he durat i on of the request . I f at t he end of arequest f or f i r e made, say, at :OO a. m, t he message addedRequest good unt i l 1O:OO a. m , t hat woul d mean t hat thear t i l l er y woul d not compl y w t h the request at all i f i t hadnot been abl e to do so by 1O:OO a. m Then at 1O:OO a. m t hei nf ant ry woul d be f r ee to go ahead, i f t he si t uat i on had

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changed, w t hout bei ng exposed to the f i r e of its ar t i l l er y,or i t coul d make a new request . 23Fi r e di r ecti on thi s sl ow was cl ear l y i nadequat e for mobi l e

war f ar e. I n a f ast movi ng si t uat i on, near l y al l of t he t ar get swoul d be unant i ci pat ed, and woul d not r emai n st at i onary. Bat t er ycommander s of t en woul d not be i n a posi t i on to observe when targetsappeared.of t he t argets. And the support ed i nf ant ry o r caval r y coul dcer t ai nl y not af f or d to wai t an hour o r mor e f or f l r es tomat er i al i ze. Wt hout r api d communi cat i ons and r api d f i r edi r ecti on, ar t i l l er y was ef f ecti vel y out of the batt l e.

Radi o pr ovi ded t he r api d communi cat i ons.

Massed f i r es woul d be needed to ef f ect i vel y engage many

The set s avai l abl egrew st eadi l y more port abl e and rel i abl e. Now observer s coul d moveabout w t hout r eel s of w r e, and coul d communi cat e w th severaldi f f er ent stati ons. The bat t al i on f i r e di r ecti on cent er pr ovi dedmor e r api d and ef f i ci ent f i r e di r ect i on. The FDC pl ot t ed al lbat tery l ocat i ons on an obser ved f i r e char t , and regi stered( adj usted) the bat t er i es ont o a si ngl e t ar get , r ecor di ng thechanges i n f i r i ng data necessar y to cor r ect t hei r f i res. The FDCcoul d now rapi dl y comput e accurate f i r i ng data for any of t hebat t er i es. Anyone w th a r adi o coul d cal l t he FDC and report atarget l ocat i on. The FDC, i n t ur n, conver t ed the l ocat i on i ntof i r i ng dat a for a sel ect ed bat tery. I f the FDC consi der ed thet arget i mport ant enough, i t coul d r eadi l y comput e data f or al lbatt eri es and mass the bat tal i on s f i r es on t he t arget .To enabl e any observer to adj ust f i r e or any uni t , t he

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Art i l l ery School adapt ed aer i al observer pr ocedur es f o r use byground observers. The observer no l onger comput ed f i r i ng dat a, butsi mpl y sensed the f a l l of shot r e l at i ve to t he t ar get l ocat i on.The FDC pl ott ed t hese sensi ngs on t he obser ved f i r e chart , andconver t ed t hem i nt o cor r ect ed f i r i ng dat a f or the bat t er i e~. ' ~ Tof ur t her speed t he comput at i on of f i r i ng data, t he Ar t i l l er y Schooli nt r oduced the graphi cal f i r i ng t abl e (GFT) i n l ate 1940. Pr i or t ot he GFT, FDC personnel had to extr act dat a f r oma f i r i ng t abl e, andmake several ar i t hmat i c cal cul at i ons for each c or r ec t i on. The GFTwas essent i ai l y a sl i de r ul e, f r omwhi ch a sol di er coul d si mpl yr ead the answer , great l y speedi ng comput at i on t i me. 2s

Wt h t he i nt r oducti on of t hese new f i r e di r ect i ont echni ques, t he ar t i l l ery made what can f ai r l y be descr i bed as aquantum l eap f or war d i n Its abi l i ty to par t l ci pat e i n mobi l ewar f ar e. Yet ai l of t hese i mprovement s wer e bui l t on Wor l d War Iexper i ence. The Ar t i l l ery School di d not i nvent new pr ocedur es f orgr ound observers, but si mpl y adapt ed procedures devel oped in Wor l dWar I f or aer i al obser vat i on and cor r ect i on of f i r e t o gr oundobser vat i on. Li kew se, t he obser ved f i r e char t was not r eal l y anew i dea, but si mpl y an i mprovement on ol der i deas. The GFT wasmer el y the l atest i n a st eady st r eamof mechani cal comput at i ondevi ces t hat began i n Wor l d War I w t h the art i l l er y rul er. z* Thebat t al i on FDC devel oped l ogi cal l y f rom the arti l l ery' s desi r e t oi mpr ove r esponse t i me and mai nt ai n centr al i zed cont rol i n mobi l ecomba .

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The key t o al l of t hese devel opment s was t he technol ogi caldevel opment of radi o. Radi o communi cat i ons made i t possi bl e fo rar t i l l ery to engage t arget s of oppor t uni t y. Wt hout t hei nst antaneous communi cat i ons pr ovi ded by r adi o, i mproved f i r edi r ect i on woul d have been meani ngl ess.

ARTI LLERY UOCTRI NE ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR I 1What exact l y was U.S. ar t i l l ery doct r i ne pr i or t o Wor l d War

I I ? The War Depar t ment document for f i el d art i l l ery doctr i ne wasFi el d Manual 6-20. The Army publ i shed FM 6- 20 i n J une of 1940, andi ssued a shor t r evi si on (change 1) i n J anuar y, 1941. Thi s manualdi scussed ar t i l l er y uni t oper at i ons at al l echel ons, f r ombat t eryt o f i el d ar my, al t hough i t emphasi zed bri gade and l ower l eveloper at i ons. The publ i cat i on dat e f or thi s r evi si on t o t he manualmakes a conveni ent poi nt t o st op and exam ne f i el d ar t i l l erydoct r i ne bef ore Worl d War 11.

I . ORGANI ZATI ONAt f irst gl ance, ar t i l l ery or gani zat i on appear s t o have

changed si gni f i cant l y f romWorl d War I . The Arm's adopt i on of t het r i angul ar di vi si on st r uct ur e caused a cor r espondi ng change i n t hedi vl si onal ar t i l l ery br i gade. The di vi si on went fromtwo medi umand f our l i ght ar t i l l er y bat t al i ons to one medi umand three l i ghtbat t al i ons . The squar e di vi si on ar t i l l ery was or gani zed i ntor egi ment s of t wo bat t al i ons each. I n t he t r i angul ar di vi si on, t heregi mental headquart ers di sappear ed compl etel y.

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Al t hough art i l l er y organi zat i on changed somewhat , t he basi ci nf ant r y- ar t i l l er y r el at i onshi p and l evel of support r emai ned t hesame. J ust as I n the squar e di vl si on, each i nf ant ry r egi ment hadone di r ect suppor t l i ght ar t i l l er y bat t al i on. 27 The medi umart i l l er y bat t al i on pr ovi ded general suppor t t o the ent i r edi vi si on. The r at i o of medi um ar t i l l er y bat t al i ons t o i nf ant ryr egi ment s fel l somewhat w t h t he t r i angul ar di vi si on 1:3 vs 1 : Z .But w t h the di vi si on depl oyed i n st andar d f ashi on, w th t wor egi ment s i n l i ne and one i n r eser ve, the rati o of medi um ar t i l l er yt o i nf ant ry was arguabl y t he same as i n t he squar e di vi si on. Theorgani zat i on of t he bat t al i ons t hemsel ves was al so very s i m l a r ;each stil l consi st ed o t hree bat t eri es of f our guns each.

Cor ps and army art i l l er y organi zat i on, as i n Wor l d War Iwas ext r emel y f l exi bl e. FM 6- 20 pr escr i bed no f i xed or gani zat i onf or cor ps or army ar t i l l er y. Rat her , ar t i l l er y uni t s wer e at t achedt o a f i el d army accordi ng t o i ts t acti cal needs. Commander sor gani zed t he ar t i l l er y f o r combat much as t hey had i n Wor l d War I .The army at t ached ar t i l l er y uni t s t o its cor ps, r et ai ni ng somespeci al - pur pose uni t s under its di rect cont r ol . The cor ps, i nt u r n , at t ached art i l l er y uni t s to i ts di vi si ons accor di ng t o t hei rr el at i ve needs, r et ai ni ng some ar t i l l er y under i ts di rectcont rol . ze To ease span of cont rol probl ems, cor ps and armycommander s st i l l or gani zed t hei r ar t i l l er y i nto gr oupi ngs, orgroupment s, as i n Wor l d War I 2 9

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11. LI AI SONAf ter Wor l d War I t he ar t i l l er y cl ear l y under st ood the

cri t i cal i mpor t ance of l i ai son w t h suppor t ed i nf ant r y.I nf ant ry-art i l l ery l i ai son, and l ater, armor- art i l l ery l i ai sonr emai ned a maj or concern t hroughout t he i nt erwar per i od. Duri ngWor l d War I l i ai son par t i es wer e str i ctl y ad hoc af f ai r s, w t houtpr escr i bed or gani zati on or equi pment . I n 1936 the Fi el d Art i l l erySchool publ i shed a recommended t abl e of or gani zat i on f or l i ai sonsect i ons whi ch i ncl uded ni ne per sonnel , a r adi o, two f i el dt el ephones, and two vehi cl es. 0

The l i ai son of f i cer' s dut i es, as def i ned by FM 6-20 wer evi r tual l y i dent i cal t o t hose of hi s Wor l d War I count er par t :

... he l i ai son of f i cer acts as art i l l ery advi ser t o thesupport ed uni t commander , keeps hi m i nformed of t hepossi bi l i t i es of ar t i l l er y suppor t , and communi cat es to thear t i l l ery commander the desi r es of t he support ed t r oops f orar t i l l ery f i re. I n addi t i on, t he l i ai son of f i cer keeps theart i l l ery commander advi sed at al l t i mes of t he l ocat i on oft he el ement s of t he suppor t ed t r oops and of t he enemysi t uat i on, assi sts i n obser vat i on, and when necessary i n t headj ust ment of f i re. 3i

The di r ect suppor t art i l l er y bat t al i on provi ded al l frontl i ne i nf ant ry bat t al i ons w t h l i ai son sect i ons. 32 The manual al sospel l ed out pr ocedur es f or l i ai son bet ween ar t i l l er y uni t s. Amedi um ar t i l l er y bat t al i on at t ached to a di vi si on, f or exampl e, di dnot establ i sh l i ai son wi t h t he suppor t ed i nf ant r y, but sent al i ai son par t y t o the i nfantry' s di rect suppor t ar t i l l er ybat tal i on. 33

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I I I . TARGET ACQUI SI TI ONGr ound and aer i al observer s r emai ned the ar t i l l ery s pr i mary

means of t arget acqui si t i on. But advances i n r adi o t echnol ogy madeboth t ypes of observers f a r mor e ef f ect i ve.obser vers, t he ar t i l l ery managed t o i mpl ement one of i tsl ongst andi ng desi r es. Duri ng Wor l d War I aer i al observer s weresi mpi y det ai l ed f r o m observat i on squadr ons to work w th ar t i l l eryuni t s. The avi at or s gener al l y had no know edge of ar t i l l er yadj ust ment , and had l i t t l e chance t o gai n pr of i ci ency, becauseobservat i ons dut i es were const ant l y r ot at ed among pi l ots.al l evi ate the pr obl em the Hero Boar d st r ongl y recommended maki ngaeri al obser ver s par t of t he art i l l ery.= I n ear l y 1942, t heArt i l i ery School began its fi rst experi ment al cour se or aeri alobservers. as The cour se pr oved to be a great success. Ai robser vat i on sect i ons soon became or gani c t o al l f i el d ar t i l l er yuni t s, and perf ormed i nval uabl e servi ce dur i ng Worl d War II 3d

Wt h regar d t o aer i al

To

The ar t i l l er y r eal i zed another Hero Board r ecommendat i onw t h t he creat i on of f i el d ar t i l l er y obser vat i on bat t al i ons andbat t er i es. 37 These uni t s were t he descendant s of t he Wor l d War IAr t i l l er y I nf or mati on Ser vi ce, est abl i shed to manage the sound andf l ash rangi ng sect i ons f ormer l y cont r ol l ed by t he cor ps A. I . S.Sound and f l ash rangi ng pr ocedur es had changed very l i t t l e si nce1918, but t he sect i ons now had i mproved equi pment , and were muchmor e mobi l e and sel f suf f i ci ent . The observat i on bat t al i on was

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completely motorized, and had organic survey, maintenance, andadministrative support

I V . M SSI ONSArtillery missio ns described in FM 6-20 were essentially

unchan ged from the miss ion s of 1918. Direct support fire wa sdelivered in support of front line forces; counterbatt ery fireatt ack ed the enemy s artillery ; interdicti on fire den ied acce ss toselected areas and routes; harassing fire was still designed toannoy the enemy.39 Division of dut ies amo ng the artilleryechelons also remained unchanged. The division light artilleryperformed the direct fire mission, while the corps conductedcounterfire. The army artillery attacked special hard to killtargets, counte rbatte ry target s, and distant targets. The manualcontinued to emphasize flexiblllty, and allowed for substantialoverlap in the missions assigned to the various

FM 6-20 did rai se some new issues, however. I t contained abrief discussion of artillery in the anti-tank role. The auth orsof the manual did not display great enthusiasm f or this missio n,but they did at least provide som e general guidan ce for using lightartillery to cou nte r enemy tanks.41

FM 6- 20 further developed the standard tactical missionconcept. The manual listed and define d two of the standardtactical missions: direct support and general support. I t alsomentio ned, without precisely defining, the reinforci ng and generalsupport-reinforcing missions. The introduction of these terms was

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a si gni f i cant r ef i nement of U.S . art i l l ery doct r i ne. These t ermsdi d not change t he way art i l l er y uni t s di d busi ness; t hey cont i nuedto per f orm tne same tasks as bef ore. But t he use of common t er ms,w t h commonl y under st ood def i ni t i ons, gave commander s a morepr eci se and ef f i ci ent way of descr i bi ng an ar t i l l er y uni t' sresponsi bi l i t i es. *2

V. COMMAND AND CONTROLAs di scussed i n chapt er t wo, ar t i l l er y command and cont rol

i n Wor l d War I was based on hi ghl y cent r al i zed cont r ol , det ai l edpl anni ng, and a dual ( i nf ant r y- ar t i l l er y) chai n of command. Theser emai ned t he pr i mary f eat ures of ar t i l l ery command and cont rol i n1941. The aut hor s of FM 6-20 cl ear l y f avor ed cent r al i zed cont roland t horough pl anni ng, but r ecogni zed t hat t he t act i cal si t uat i onmght not al ways perm t them*a They al so descr i bed t hei nf ant r y-ar t i l l er y chai n of command at some l engt h:

The f orce commander t hrough hi s art i l l er y of f i cer makesdet ai l ed pl ans f or t he use of t he ar t i l l er y hel d under hi sdi rect cont r ol ; i n addi t i on, he makes general pl ans f or t hecoordi nat ed empl oyment of al l ar t i l l er y w th the f orce. I nsubordi nat e echel ons t he same met hods ar e appl i ed.Ar t i l l er y bat t al i on commander s of di r ect - suppor t bat t al i onsper f ect t he det ai l s of support i n conf erence w th t hesuppor t ed i nf ant ry commander . ^V I . FI RE DI RECTI ON

Al l of the t erms associ ated w th Wor l d War I f i re di rect i onwer e stil l f ound i n t he 1940 edi t i on of FM 6-20. Dest r uct i on andneut ral i zat i on f i r e, pr epar at i on, count er pr epar at i on,

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concen tratio n, and barrage ( box, standing, and normal), all h ad thesa me mean in gs they (lid in 1918. The manual placed overwhelmingemphasis on prearranged fires, devoting less than a page to targetsof opportunity.4s Although the artillery had vastly improved itsability to engage unanticipated targets, the aut hors of FM 6-20clearly expected the majority of fires to be planned in advance ofan operation, as in 1918.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

In most r espect s, artillery doctr ine as descr ibed by FM 6-20in 1941 was very much what i t had been in 1918. Radiocommunications and motorization had slightly altered artillerytact ics and techniques, but they had virtually n o impact on thebroad outlines of doctrine. In the next chapter, we will examinehow this doctrine, developed under position warfare conditions,served the Army on the mechanized battlefields of World War 11.

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CHAPTER THREE ENDNOTES

' Wi l i am J . Snow, Repor t of t he Ch i e f of Fi el d Art i l l erv tothe Secr et arv of War . 1919 ( Washi ngt on: Gover ment Pr i nt i ng Of f i ce,1919) 7.

ZWl l i arn J . Snow, Repor of t he Chi ef of Fi el d Ar t i l l er v t Qt he Secretarv of War. 1920 ( Washi ngt on: Government Pr i nt i ngOf f i ce, 1920) 30.War Depar t ment , Repor t of t he Hero Boar d, (9 December ,1919, CARL No. AD A161 150) 1.

4War Depar t ment , Repor t of t he West ervel t Boar d, (23 May,1919, CARL No. AD 951 841) 1.Dr dnance Depart ment : Pl anni ns Muni t i ons for War , ( The U.S Armv i n=Const ance M Gr een, Har ry C. Thomson, Peter C. Roots,. .Wor l d War 11: The Techni cal Ser vi ces) ( Washi ngt on: Of f i ce of t heChi ef of M l i tary Hi story, 1955) 325-326.March, 1919, CARL No. AD 951 851-2) 9.12-13.War Depar t ment , Report of t he Tr ench Ar t i l l er y Boar d, (22

7' HeroBoard, 14-15.sUWest ervel t Boar d, 51-52.' Snow a W 9 0, 25.l oJ ohn W. Weeks, Report of t he Secretarv of War to t hepr esi dent . 19 Washi ngt on: Gover nment Pr i nt i ng Of f i ce, 1922)302.

Way, 203.Gr een, Muni t i ons f o rI 2 D . M Beer e, Lessons of t he War as Af f ect i ng Ameri can

. .Art i ery Part i cul ar y Di v i si onai Ar t i ery I1 Fi el d Art i ery .J our na 1 1 ( Sept ember- Oct ober, 1921) 443.

I bi d. , 444-445.i 4Snow, Repor t t o t he Secretarv of War 1920, 25.I sGeor ge R. Thompson, Di xi e R. Har r i s, Paul i ne M Oakes,Dui aney Ter r et t , The Si anal Corps: The Test . December 1941 t o J ul yJ943. (U.S. Armv in Wor l d War 11: The Techni cal Ser vi ces)( Washi ngt on: Of f i ce of t he Chi ef of M l i tary Hi s tory, 1957) 72-73.

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3 4 U H e r ~ oard, 15.3sSunderland, Art erv School 235.3*War Department, Study #62: Gunnery (Report of the GeneralBoard, U.S. Forces, European Theater). (4 February, 1947, CARL No.R-12885.62) 30.l 'YHero Board, 16.=QWar Department, Field Ma ual 6 120: The Field Art illecy

Observation Battalion (Washington: War Department, 1939 3.2 4 M 6 20 (1940), 105-107.*OIbid., 108, 112, 118 119.*'Ibid., 73.*'Ibid., 71.'aIbid., 119.++Ibid.' Ibid., 102.

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hi s scheme of f i r e support w th the def ensi ve pl an. By the mor ni ngof t he 226, a l l batt eri es were r eady to mass t hei r f i r es on theGermans. The i ni t i al Ger man attacks drew devast at i ngconcent r at i ons of art i l l ery f i re. The great vol ume and i nt ens i t yof the Al l i ed f i r e sur pr i sed the Germans, and l ed them t o bel i evethat the Al l i es were about t o l aunch a count erat t ack. The Al l i esr esponded to al l subsequent German at t acks w t h t he same heavyf i r es, f i nal l y causi ng t he Germans to abandon t he of f ensi ve andw t hdr aw,

The Thal a bat t l e and subsequent act i ons qui ckl y r eaf f i r medt he val ue of art i l l er y f i r epower and the soundness of pr ewarart i l l ery doctr i ne. As t he Amer i can f orces gai ned exper i ence, t heymade much gr eater use of t hei r pot ent ar t i l l er y arm andscrupul ousl y observed the pr i nci pl es of cent r al i zed cont rol andmass. i n l at e March, at El Guet t ar , massed cor ps and di vi si onar t i l l er y f i r es def eat ed yet anot her at t ack by the 10th PanzerDi vi si on. At Mateur , on 23 Apr i l , the I1 Cor ps massed el evenar t i l l er y bat t al i ons under one ar t i l l er y headquar t er s, al l i nsuppor t of t he cor ps mai n ef f or t . =

Whi l e exper i ence i n Nor t h Af r i ca gener al l y conf i r med prewarart i l l ery doct r i ne, i t al so l ed t o one of t he war s chi ef newdoct r i nal aevel opment s: the cor ps f i r e di r ecti on cent er . Dur i ngthe E Guet t ar bat t l e, t he I 1 Corps Ar t i l l er y di scover ed a newappl i cat i on f or an exi st i ng command and cont rol st r uct ur e. I npr epar i ng t o def end E Guet t ar , t he cor ps ar t i l l ery headquart er sestabl i shed a count erbat t ery net whi ch l i nked the sound and f l ash

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ranging sections, division artillery headquarters, and designatedcor ps artillery battalion s, to the counte rbatte ry officer at thecorps artillery command post. The counterbattery officer was t oreceiv e target intelligence from the sound and flash sections overthe net, along with requests for counterbattery fire from thedivisions.design ated cor ps artillery battalions.arrangement was taken directly from FM 6-20, and closely resembledstandard counterbattery procedures from World War I . & This systemworked well for its intended purpose of rapidly engagi ng enemyartillery, but a s the battle progressed, the counterbat tery officerreceiv ed not only reque sts for counte rbatte ry fire, but al soreques ts for fire against armor concentrations. Although adeparture from standard procedure, the counterbattery officer soonfound himself ordering fire s against German tanks with considerablesuccess. In one instance, the corp s artillery mass ed fourbattalions against a group of 32 German tanks, destroying ordisabling 16 of them.

He would then assign these as fire missions to theThis command and control

For the action at Mateur, the I 1 Corps redesignated itscounterbattery net a s the corp s fire direction net. Thecounterbattery officer was replaced by a fire direction officer,who, with the help of th e corps flre direction center (FDC),decided how to engage targets of all categories.Q Th e corps FDCgave the corp s artillery great flexibillty. The comman der now hada means of achieving centralized control and massing f ires in fluidsituations, without extensive fire planning. During World War I ,

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commanders had r el i ed al most excl usi vel y on pr ear r anged f i r es,because of t he near i mpossi bi l i t y of mass i ng f i res on unant i ci pat edt ar get s.di r ect i on t echni ques had made the i mpossi bl e commonpl ace. Cor psf i r e di r ect i on cent er s became a st andar d component of t he cor psar t i l l ery headquart er . ^

Now advances i n communi cat i ons t echnol ogy and f i r e

The Wor l d War I ant ecedant s of f i el d ar t i l l er y doct r i ner emai ned cl ear l y vi si bl e i n t he doct r i ne of Wor l d War 11. Thebasi c or gani zat i on, m ssi ons, command and cont rol pr i nci pl es, andmet hods of f i r e di r ecti on cl ear l y had thei r or i gi ns i n Wor l d War I .Subsequent act i ons i n Wor l d War I 1 di d, however, i nt r oduce a numberof addi t i onal doctr i nal r ef i nement s, whi ch ar e di scussed i n detai lbel ow.

I . ORGANI ZATI ON

Ar t i l l er y organi zat i on changed somewhat dur i ng the cour se ofWor l d War 11, but the changes were gener al l y consi st ent w t h t r endsapparent si nce Wor l d War I . The ar t i l l er y bat t al i on became f ul l ymotori zed, and acqul r ed a ser vi ce bat t ery to mai nt ai n i ts vehi cl es.The desi r e f or f ul l mot or i zat i on had been cl ear l y ar t i cul at ed byt he Hero Board back i n 1918, based on Wor l d War I experi ence. ' 'Some uni t s empl oyed six gun bat t er i es, part i cul arl y i n t he ar moreddi vi si on ar t i l l er i es, but t he maj ori t y of art i l l ery bat t al i onsr etai ned the f our - gun- bat t ery st r uct ur e of Wor l d War I . The

i ghtdent i f i ed a l l

105mmhow t zer r epi aced the 7 5 m g