current issues in public administration

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: CONCEPTS ANDPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE

IV. CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONADMINISTRATION

Graduate School of Asia and Pacific StudiesUniversity of Waseda, Tokyo-JAPAN

20082008

CONTENTSCONTENTS

1. INTERDICIPLINARY INTERFACE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

2 PUBLIC POLICY2. PUBLIC POLICY3. PUBLIC CHOICE4. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW5. BUREAUCRATIC POWER6. ACCOUNTABILITY AND ETHICS7 BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICS7. BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICS8. DECENTRALIZATION9. DIGITAL (E) – GOVERNANCE9. DIGITAL (E) GOVERNANCE

www.ginandjar.com 2

INTERDICIPLINARY INTERFACE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

LAW

• ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

• DISCRETIONARY POWERS

LAW

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION BUSINESS

POLITICS

MANAGEMENT

ECONOMICS

PUBLIC CHOICE

PUBLIC POLICY

www.ginandjar.com 3

PUBLIC POLICYPUBLIC POLICY

THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY AND POLICY ANALYSIS IS NOW A WELL ESTABLISHED PART OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.PUBLIC POLICY IS A COURSE OF ACTION ADOPTED AND PURSUED BY GOVERNMENT (HENRY 2004)PURSUED BY GOVERNMENT (HENRY, 2004). PUBLIC POLICY REFERS TO THE DECISIONS MADE BY GOVERNMENT, TO A PURPOSIVE COURSE OF ACTION TAKEN BY GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS IN PURSUINGTAKEN BY GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS IN PURSUING SOLUTIONS TO PERCEIVED PROBLEMS (LEMAY, 2002). PUBLIC POLICY CAN BEST BE VIEWED AS A PROCESS, A ,SET OR SERIES OF STAGES THROUGH WHICH POLICY IS ESTABLISHED AND IMPLEMENTED. THE POLICY PROCESS CONSISTS OF A SUCCESSION OF ANALYTICAL STAGES

www.ginandjar.com 4

CONSISTS OF A SUCCESSION OF ANALYTICAL STAGES (LEMAY, 2002)


FOR MANY YEARS, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS WERE SEEN AS NEUTRAL IMPLEMENTORS OF PUBLIC POLICIES SHAPED AND DESIGNED ELSEWHERE IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. SINCE THE 1960s, WITH THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS, BOTH THE POLICY PROCESS ITSELF AND THE ,ROLE OF PUBLIC A RATION IN IT HAVE BEEN REEVALUATED.PROCEEDING FROM THE PREMISE THAT POLITICS IS MESSY AND IMPRECISE PROPONENTS OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSISAND IMPRECISE, PROPONENTS OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS ARGUE THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF RIGOROUS ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGIES AND DECISION TOOLS WILL DRAMATICALLY IMPROVE BOTH THE DEFINITION OF PUBLICDRAMATICALLY IMPROVE BOTH THE DEFINITION OF PUBLIC PROBLEMS AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THEM.

www.ginandjar.com 5


FURTHER, IT IS ARGUED THAT MORE RATIONAL DECISION PROCESSES WILL NOT ONLY BE MORE EFFICIENT BUT ALSO MORE RESPONSIVE TO CITIZENEFFICIENT, BUT ALSO MORE RESPONSIVE TO CITIZEN NEEDS AND PREFERENCES. THIS VERSION OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS VALUES OBJECTIVITY ANDPOLICY ANALYSIS VALUES OBJECTIVITY AND NEUTRALITY; IT IS BASED ON AN ABIDING BELIEF IN TECHNICAL ANALYSIS AND ABILITIES.

www.ginandjar.com 6

PUBLIC POLICY

IT MAKES USE OF TECHNIQUES DEVELOPED IN THE FIELDS OF

PUBLIC POLICY

IT MAKES USE OF TECHNIQUES DEVELOPED IN THE FIELDS OF ECONOMICS, MATHEMATICS, STATISTICS, OPERATIONS RESEARCH, AND SYSTEMS DYNAMICS, AMONG OTHERS, TO PROVIDE DECISION MAKERS WITH ADVICE IN THEPROVIDE DECISION MAKERS WITH ADVICE IN THE FORMULATION OF PUBLIC POLICY. IN APPLYING THOSE TECHNIQUES, THE ANALYST MAY ALSO DRAW ON KNOWLEDGE FROM FIELDS SUCH AS SOCIOLOGY, POLITICAL SCIENCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS, LAW, ORGANIZATION - THEORY, THE PHYSICAL AND BIOLOGICAL ,SCIENCES, AND ELSEWHERE. POLICY ANALYSIS MUST TAKE THE ANALYST WHEREVER THE POLICY ISSUE LEADS, MAKING ANALYSIS THE MULTI DISIPLINARY ACTIVITY PARANALYSIS THE MULTI DISIPLINARY ACTIVITY PAR EXCELLENCE.

www.ginandjar.com 7


POLICY ANALYSIS INCLUDES:1) IDENTIFYING THE “PROBLEM” TO BE RESOLVED, 2) SPECIFYING THE GOAL(S) TO BE SOUGHT THROUGH PUBLIC POLICY, 3) IDENTIFYING OR INVENTING THE AVAILABLE POLICY ALTERNATIVES, 4) ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF EACH OF THE ALTERNATIVES, BOTH ) ,

FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE, 5) IMPUTING VALUES IN A SINGLE, COMMENSURABLE MATRIX TO THOSE

EFFECTS, AND 6) CHOOSING THE “BEST” POLICY ALTERNATIVE ACCORDING TO AN

EXPLICIT DECISION RULE.

www.ginandjar.com 8

PUBLIC CHOICEPUBLIC CHOICE

IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE LAST CENTURY, THE DISCIPLINE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION DEVELOPEDDISCIPLINE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION DEVELOPED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK SET BY WILSON. THE ENDS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION WERE SEEN AS THE "MANAGEMENT OF MEN AND MATERIAL IN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE PURPOSES OF THE STATE."

www.ginandjar.com 9


IN HIS BOOK: ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (1945), HERBERT SIMON, SUSTAINED A DEVASTATING CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY IMPLICIT IN THE TRADITIONAL STUDYOF THE THEORY IMPLICIT IN THE TRADITIONAL STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. SIMON ELUCIDATED SOME OF THE ACCEPTED ADMINISTRATIVE PRINCIPLES AND DEMONSTRATED THE LACK OF LOGICAL COHERENCE AMONG THEM.

www.ginandjar.com 10

PUBLIC CHOICE

DURING THE PERIOD FOLLOWING SIMON'S CHALLENGE

PUBLIC CHOICE

DURING THE PERIOD FOLLOWING SIMON S CHALLENGE, ANOTHER COMMUNITY OF SCHOLARS HAS GRAPPLED WITH MANY OF THESE SAME INTELLECTUAL ISSUES. THIS COMMUNITY OF SCHOLARS COMPOSED PREDOMINANTLY OF POLITICAL ECONOMISTS HAVE BEEN CONCERNED WITH PUBLIC INVESTMENT AND PUBLIC EXPENDITURE DECISIONS. ONE FACET OF THIS WORK HAS BEEN MANIFEST IN BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS AND THE DEVELOP-MENT OF THE PLANNING PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING (PPB)THE PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING (PPB) SYSTEM.


PUBLIC CHOICE

ONE OF SIMON'S CENTRAL CONCERNS WAS TO

PUBLIC CHOICE

ONE OF SIMON S CENTRAL CONCERNS WAS TO ESTABLISH THE CRITERION OF EFFICIENCY AS A NORM FOR EVALUATING ALTERNATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS. SIMON ARGUED THAT THE "CRITERION OF EFFICIENCY DICTATES THAT CHOICE OF ALTERNATIVES WHICH PRODUCE THE LARGEST RESULT FOR THE GIVEN APPLICATION OF RESOURCES." IN ORDER TO UTILIZE THE CRITERION OF EFFICIENCYIN ORDER TO UTILIZE THE CRITERION OF EFFICIENCY, THE RESULTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS MUST BE DEFINED AND MEASURED CLEAR CONCEPTUALDEFINED AND MEASURED. CLEAR CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS OF OUTPUT ARE NECESSARY BEFORE MEASURES CAN BE DEVELOPED.



PUBLIC CHOICE REPRESENTS ANOTHER FACET OF WORK IN POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR THEIN POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THEORY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. MOST POLITICAL ECONOMISTS IN THE PUBLIC CHOICE TRADITION BEGINECONOMISTS IN THE PUBLIC CHOICE TRADITION BEGIN WITH THE INDIVIDUAL AS THE BASIC UNIT OF ANALYSIS. THE TRADITIONAL "ECONOMIC MAN" IS THEN REPLACED BY "MAN: THE DECISION MAKER "REPLACED BY MAN: THE DECISION MAKER.



THE SECOND CONCERN IN THE PUBLIC CHOICE TRADITION IS WITH THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OFTRADITION IS WITH THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF PUBLIC GOODS AS THE TYPE OF EVENT ASSOCIATED WITH THE OUTPUT OF PUBLIC AGENCIES. PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY IS ALSO CONCERNED WITH THE EFFECT THAT DIFFERENT DECISION RULES OR DECISION-MAKING ARRANGEMENTS WILL HAVE UPON THE PRODUCTION OF THOSE EVENTS CONCEPTUALIZED AS PUBLIC GOODS AND SERVICESAS PUBLIC GOODS AND SERVICES.



FOUR BASIC ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR ARE NORMALLY MADE:BEHAVIOR ARE NORMALLY MADE:

FIRST, INDIVIDUALS ARE ASSUMED TO BE SELF-INTERESTED (NOT EQUIVALENT TO “SELFISH”). THE ASSUMPTION OF SELF-INTEREST IMPLIES PRIMARILY THAT INDIVIDUALS EACH HAVE THEIR OWN PREFERENCES WHICH AFFECT THE DECISIONS THEY MAKE, AND THATWHICH AFFECT THE DECISIONS THEY MAKE, AND THAT THOSE PREFERENCES MAY DIFFER FROM INDIVIDUAL TO INDIVIDUAL.



SECONDLY, INDIVIDUALS ARE ASSUMED TO BE RATIONAL. RATIONALITY IS DEFINED AS THE ABILITY TO RANK ALL KNOWN ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO THE INDIVIDUAL IN A TRANSITIVEALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO THE INDIVIDUAL IN A TRANSITIVE MANNER. THIRD, INDIVIDUALS ARE ASSUMED TO ADOPT MAXIMIZING STRATEGIES MAXIMIZATION AS A STRATEGY IMPLIES THESTRATEGIES. MAXIMIZATION AS A STRATEGY IMPLIES THE CONSISTENT CHOICE OF THOSE ALTERNATIVES WHICH AN INDIVIDUAL THINKS WILL PROVIDE THE HIGHEST NET BENEFIT AS WEIGHED BY HIS OWN PREFERENCES AT TIMES THEAS WEIGHED BY HIS OWN PREFERENCES. AT TIMES THE ASSUMPTION OF MAXIMIZATION IS RELATED TO THAT OF SATISFYING, DEPENDING UPON ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO AN INDIVIDUAL IN A DECISION-MAKING SITUATION.



FOURTH, AN EXPLICIT ASSUMPTION NEEDS TO BE STATED CONCERNING THE LEVEL OF INFORMATIONSTATED CONCERNING THE LEVEL OF INFORMATION POSSESSED BY A REPRESENTATIVE INDIVIDUAL. THREE LEVELS HAVE BEEN ANALYTICALLY DEFINED AS INVOLVING CERTAINTY, RISK, AND UNCERTAINTY.



THE CONDITION OF CERTAINTY IS DEFINED TO EXIST WHEN:

1) AN INDIVIDUAL KNOWS ALL AVAILABLE STRATEGIES;2) EACH STRATEGY IS KNOWN TO LEAD INVARIABLY TO

ONLY ONE SPECIFIC OUTCOME ANDONLY ONE SPECIFIC OUTCOME, AND;3) THE INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HIS OWN PREFERENCES FOR

EACH OUTCOME. GIVEN THIS LEVEL OF INFORMATION,EACH OUTCOME. GIVEN THIS LEVEL OF INFORMATION, THE DECISION OF A MAXIMIZING INDIVIDUAL IS COMPLETELY DETERMINED.



UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK, THE INDIVIDUAL IS STILL ASSUMED TO KNOW ALL AVAILABLE STRATEGIES. ANY PARTICULAR STRATEGY MAY LEAD TO A NUMBER OF POTENTIAL OUTCOMES, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IS ASSUMED TO KNOW THE PROBABILITYINDIVIDUAL IS ASSUMED TO KNOW THE PROBABILITY OF EACH OUTCOME. THUS, DECISION MAKING BECOMES WEIGHTING PROCESS WHEREBY HISBECOMES WEIGHTING PROCESS WHEREBY HIS PREFERENCES FOR DIFFERENT OUTCOMES ARE COMBINED WITH THE PROBABILITY OF THEIR OCURRENCE PRIOR TO A SELECTION OF A STRATEGY.



DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY IS ASSUMED TO OCCUR EITHER WHERE (1) AN INDIVIDUAL HAS A KNOWLEDGE OF ALL STRATEGIESINDIVIDUAL HAS A KNOWLEDGE OF ALL STRATEGIES AND OUTCOMES, BUT LACKS KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE PROBABILITIES WITH WHICH A STRATEGY MAY LEADPROBABILITIES WITH WHICH A STRATEGY MAY LEAD TO AN OUTCOME, OR (2) AN INDIVIDUAL MAY NOT KNOW ALL STRATEGIES OR ALL OUTCOMES WHICH ACTUALLY EXIST.



UNDER CONDITIONS OF UNCERTAINTY, THE DETERMINATENESS OF SOLUTIONS IS REPLACED BYDETERMINATENESS OF SOLUTIONS IS REPLACED BY CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE RANGE OF POSSIBLE "SOLUTIONS "SOLUTIONS. ESTIMATIONS ARE MADE ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF STRATEGIES.CONSEQUENCES OF STRATEGIES.

(VINCENT OSBORNE & ELEANOR OSBORN 1971)(VINCENT OSBORNE & ELEANOR OSBORN, 1971)



PUBLIC CHOICE IS ONE OF A NUMBER OF MODELS OF DECISION-MAKING IN ADMINISTRATION.OTHER MODELS INCLUDEOTHER MODELS INCLUDE:

RATIONAL COMPREHENSIVE MODEL;BARGAINING MODEL;BARGAINING MODEL;INCREMENTAL MODEL;PARTICIPATIVE MODEL.

(LEMAY, 2002)


ADMINISTRATIVE LAWADMINISTRATIVE LAW

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REFERS TO THOSE LAWS AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE CREATED BY THE ACTIVITIES OF GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES THAT MAKE RULES ANDOF GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES THAT MAKE RULES AND ADJUDICATE CASES CONCERNING PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS AND THE LIMITS NEEDED TO CONTROLOBLIGATIONS AND THE LIMITS NEEDED TO CONTROL SUCH AGENCIES. INCLUDED IN THE BODY OF LAWS (OR RULES AND REGULATIONS) OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES THAT COLLECTIVELY MAKE UP ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ARE INTERPRETATIVE RULES—THOSE RULES THAT SPECIFYINTERPRETATIVE RULES THOSE RULES THAT SPECIFY AN AGENCY'S VIEWS OF THE MEANING OF ITS REGULATIONS OR OF THE STATUTES IT ADMINISTERS.


ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IS RESTRICTED TO AGENCY ACTIONS THAT COVER THE RIGHTS OF PRIVATE PARTIES. IT EXCLUDES THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS AMONGIT EXCLUDES THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS AMONG GOVERNMENT OFFICERS AND DEPARTMENTS OR THE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT (MATTERS COVERED IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW). ADMINISTRATIVE LAWIN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW). ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CONCERNS THE QUASI-LEGISLATIVE AND QUASI-JUDICIAL ACTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES. THE ADMINISTRATORS OF SUCH AGENCIES ARE POLICY MAKERS—BUT WITH A LIMITED RANGE OF AUTHORITY WHEN MAKING RULES.


'ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES' FORMAL POWERS INCLUDE:1) INVESTIGATING COMPLAINTS;1) INVESTIGATING COMPLAINTS;2) ORDERING THE ELIMINATION OF CERTAIN PRACTICES;3) SETTING STANDARDS;) ;4) PROSECUTING FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF LAWS AND

STANDARDS, INCLUDING ISSUING CEASE-AND-DESIST ORDERS AND IMPOSING FINES;ORDERS AND IMPOSING FINES;


5) SETTING FORTH RULES AND REGULATIONS;6) HOLDING HEARINGS BEFORE ISSUING RULES AND

REGULATIONS;REGULATIONS;7) HOLDING ADJUDICATION HEARINGS;8) ISSUING, WITHHOLDING, AND REVOKING LICENSES;9) PROVIDING FOR APPEAL PROCEDURES;10) ORDERING TEMPORARY CESSATIONS OF ACTIVITIES;

ANDAND11) SEIZING PROPERTY AND IMPOSING FINES AND

PENALTIES.


LIMITATIONS OVER REGULATORY AGENCY DISCRETION ARE BUILT INTO THE RIGHTS AND PROCEDURAL RULE SAFEGUARDS DESIGNED INTO AN ADMINISTRATIVESAFEGUARDS DESIGNED INTO AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY'S ORGANIZATION, PROCEDURES, OR PRACTICES AS WELL AS THROUGH JUDICIAL REVIEW. OTHER CONTROL DEVICES ALSO LIMIT AGENCY DISCRETION. ONE SUCH DEVICE IS MEDIA SCRUTINY. INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING AND THE ABILITY OF MEDIA MEMBERS TO HOLD AGENCIES UP TO PUBLIC RIDICULE DOES SERVE AS SOMETHING OF A CHECK ON AGENCYDOES SERVE AS SOMETHING OF A CHECK ON AGENCY ABUSE OF POWER.


ANOTHER DEVICE IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OMBUDSMAN, OR AN OFFICIAL WHO IS CHARGED WITH PROCESSING AND EXAMINING COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE BUREAUCRACY. OMBUDSMEN TYPICALLY REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURES OR OTHER OFFICE THAT HOLDSTHE LEGISLATURES OR OTHER OFFICE THAT HOLDS AUTORITY. CITIZEN ACTION GROUPS SUCH AS COMMON CAUSECITIZEN ACTION GROUPS SUCH AS COMMON CAUSE ALSO CAN SERVE AS INFORMAL WATCHDOGS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.


TYPICALLY AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY WITH REGULATORYTYPICALLY, AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY WITH REGULATORY POWERS IS ESTABLISHED BY STATUTORY AUTHORITY. THE STATUTE CREATES THE AGENCY, DESCRIBES ITS PRIMARY MISSION OR GOALS (OFTEN IN QUITE BROAD AND GENERALMISSION OR GOALS (OFTEN IN QUITE BROAD AND GENERAL TERMS), AND LAYS OUT ITS JURISDICTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES-AND, IN SO DOING, SOMETHING OF ITS LIMITATIONS AS WELLLIMITATIONS AS WELL. THE LEGISLATURE AT THE SAME TIME MIGHT PASS A GENERAL REGULATORY STATUTE STATING THE BROAD OUTLINES OF THE LAW; THE AGENCY THEN DEVELOPS APPROPRIATE RULES, REGULATIONS, STANDARDS, OR GUIDELINES THAT IT INTENDS TO USE TO IMPLEMENT OR GU S S O US O OMODIFY THE LAW OR TO MEET NEW SITUATIONS.


ALTHOUGH ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES ENJOY WIDE DISCRETION IN DEVELOPING THE MASSIVE BODY OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, RULES OR REGULATIONS, THEIR DISCRETION HAS ITS LIMITS. THESE LIMITS MAY BE IMPOSED BY THE LEGISLATURE WHEN IT ESTABLISHESIMPOSED BY THE LEGISLATURE WHEN IT ESTABLISHES AN AGENCY OR WHEN IT ENACTS AMENDING LAWS REGARDING AN AGENCY'S JURISDICTION, AS WELL AS BYREGARDING AN AGENCY S JURISDICTION, AS WELL AS BY THE COURTS THROUGH THEIR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTIONS AND RULINGS.

(LEMAY 2004)(LEMAY, 2004)


BUREAUCRATIC POWER

AS SOCIETY BECAME MORE COMPLEX ANDAS SOCIETY BECAME MORE COMPLEX AND ORGANIZATIONS GREW LARGER, ORGANIZATIONS (BOTH PRIVATE AND PUBLIC) INCREASED THEIR(BOTH PRIVATE AND PUBLIC) INCREASED THEIR DIVISION OF LABOR INTO MORE AND SMALLER SPECIALIZED UNITS.SPECIALIZED UNITS.LARGER INSTITUTIONS BEGAN TO DEFER TO THE JUDGMENTS OF THESE UNITS, WHICH SHOWS THAT AJUDGMENTS OF THESE UNITS, WHICH SHOWS THAT A MAJOR FOUNDATION OF BUREAUCRATIC POWER IS EXPERTISE, OR SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE.


AS SOCIETY BECAME MORE COMPLEX AND SPECIALIZED, DECISION MAKERS RELIED ON EXPERT ADVICE SOME BUREAUCRATIC AGENCIESEXPERT ADVICE. SOME BUREAUCRATIC AGENCIES, THEN, DEVELOPED A NEAR MONOPOLY ON THE TECHNICAL DATA OR CRITERIA USED TO DECIDETECHNICAL DATA OR CRITERIA USED TO DECIDE POLICY.DEPENDING ON THE TYPE OF POLICY THEYDEPENDING ON THE TYPE OF POLICY THEY IMPLEMENT, BUREAUCRACY HAVE DISCRETIONARY POWER, EITHER MORE OR LESS.DISCRETIONARY POWER, EITHER MORE OR LESS.


IN THE MINDS OF MOST OBSERVERS THE ISSUE IS NOTIN THE MINDS OF MOST OBSERVERS, THE ISSUE IS NOT WHETHER BUREAUCRACIES HAVE POWER BUT THE MAGNITUDE AND OMINOUS NATURE OF THAT POWERMAGNITUDE AND OMINOUS NATURE OF THAT POWER. BUREAUCRACIES ARE SEEN AS TOO INFLUENTIAL, TOO UNCHALLENGED, AND SUBSEQUENTLY DANGEROUS. , QBURCAUCRATS ARC THOUGHT OF AS ASSUMING A PREMINENT, EVEN UNCHECKED ROLE IN THE FORMATION AND EXECUTION OF PUBLIC POLICYFORMATION AND EXECUTION OF PUBLIC POLICY. THE DEDUCTIVE CASE FOR WHY BUREAUCRACIES ARE TOO POWERFUL CAN BE MADE ON AT LEAST FOURTOO POWERFUL CAN BE MADE ON AT LEAST FOUR GROUNDS.


FIRST, THE WEBERIAN ORGANIZATIONAL FROM SEEMS TO BE AN INHERENTLY POWERFUL INSTRUMENT BECAUSE OF ITS PROPERTIES: ITS UNIFIED HIERARCHY CONCENTRATES CONTROL ITS HIGH DEGREE OF SPECIALIZATION PROVIDESCONTROL, ITS HIGH DEGREE OF SPECIALIZATION PROVIDES GREAT EXPERTISE, ITS PERMANENT RECORDS ACCUMULATE VAST QUANTITIES OF INFRMATION AND OFFICIALLY INTERPRET THE PAST AND ITS TENURED WORKFORCEINTERPRET THE PAST, AND ITS TENURED WORKFORCE CANNOT BE REMOVED AND HENCE IS NOT ACCOUNTABLE. SECOND THE PRINCIPAL FUNCTION OF PUBLICSECOND, THE PRINCIPAL FUNCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW AND POLICY, PUTS BUREAUCRACY IN THE POSITION OF REPRESENTING THE SOVEREIGN STATE TO CITIZENS IN CONCRETE, EVERYDAY TERMS. TO THEM, THE STATE IS BUREAUCRACY


BUREAUCRACY.

THIRD, THE TECHNICAL NATURE OF MODERN ADMINISTRATION MEANS THAT LEGISLATORS AND OTHERADMINISTRATION MEANS THAT LEGISLATORS AND OTHER ELECTED OFFICIALS MUST DELEGATE DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY OR EVEN RULE-MAKING POWER TO THE BUREAUCRATS, WHO THUS ARE "LEGISLATORS" OF SORTS. FOURTH FROM THE STANDPOINT OF PRINCIPAL-AGENTFOURTH, FROM THE STANDPOINT OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY, INFORMATION ASYMMETRY FAVORING THE AGENTS GIVES THEM THE ABILITY TO OUTMANEUVER THEIR PRINCIPALS AND PURSUE THEIR OWN OBJECTIVES.


TO SUM UP, BUREAUCRACIES ARE CHECKED BUT NOT CHAINED. THEY ARE RESPONSIVE TO EXTERNAL POLITICAL CONTROL BUT NOT POLITICALLY SUPINE. THEY REACT NOT MERELY TO STATIC INSTRUCTIONS BUT TO CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES THEY NOT ONLYBUT TO CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES. THEY NOT ONLY IMPLEMENT POLICY BUT SHAPE AND ADVOCATE IT.


ACCOUNTABILITY AND ETHICSCORRUPTION

ACCOUNTABILITY AND ETHICS

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AS BOTH PROFESION AND SCIENTIFIC STUDY FROM THE BEGINNING HAS BEEN VERY MUCH CONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEMS OF CORRUPTION OR ABUSECONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEMS OF CORRUPTION OR ABUSE OF POWER.A CORRUPTED BUREAUCRACY, BY DEFITION, IS ONE THAT, DOES , , ,NOT DO WHAT IT IS SUPPPOSED TO, SINCE ILLEGAL PAYMENTS TO OFFICIALS ARE PRESSUMABLY NOT MADE UNLESS THOSE WHO RECEIVE PAYMENT CAN AND DO CONTRAVENE THE INTENTWHO RECEIVE PAYMENT CAN AND DO CONTRAVENE THE INTENT OF THE LAWS THEY ARE SUPPOSED TO APPLY. ALTHOUG FORMALLY SALARIED, BUREAUCRATS IN SUCH QUASI-SALARY SYSTEMS INDULGE IN SELF ENRICHMENT ON A LARGE SCALESYSTEMS INDULGE IN SELF-ENRICHMENT ON A LARGE SCALE (RIGGS,1995).


THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION IS ENDEMIC TO POLITICS AND TO GOVERNMENT SIMPLY BECAUSE ITS DECISIONS INVOLVE SO MUCH POWER AND WEALTHSO MUCH POWER AND WEALTH. IT BECOMES COMMON PLACE AT ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT--IN THE WAYS CONTRACTS ARE AWARDED, JOBS ARE CREATED AND FILLED PEOPLE ARE HIRED OFFICESJOBS ARE CREATED AND FILLED, PEOPLE ARE HIRED, OFFICES ARE SOLD, FAVORED POLITICAL ALLIES ARE REWARDED, POWER IS EXERTED, AND THE NEEDS OR PLIGHT OF OTHERS ARE IGNORED. THE DEMAND FOR GOVERNMENT'S REWARDS FREQUENTLY EXCEEDS THE SUPPLY, AND ROUTINE DECISION-MAKINGEXCEEDS THE SUPPLY, AND ROUTINE DECISION MAKING PROCESSES ARE LENGTHY, COSTLY, AND UNCERTAIN IN THEIR OUTCOME.


FOR THESE REASONS LEGALLY SANCTIONED DECISION-MAKINGFOR THESE REASONS, LEGALLY SANCTIONED DECISION MAKING PROCESSES CONSTITUTE A "BOTTLENECK" BETWEEN WHAT PEOPLE WANT AND WHAT THEY GET. THE TEMPTATION TO GET AROUND THE BOTTLENECK TO SPEEDTHE TEMPTATION TO GET AROUND THE BOTTLENECK—TO SPEED THINGS UP AND MAKE FAVORABLE DECISIONS MORE PROBABLE—IS BUILT INTO THIS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETYSOCIETY. TO GET AROUND THE BOTTLENECK, ONE MUST USE POLITICAL INFLUENCE—AND CORRUPTION, WHICH BY DEFINITION CUTS ACROSS ESTABLISHED AND LEGITIMATE PROCESSES, IS A MOST EFFECTIVE FORM OF INFLUENCE.

(MICHAEL JOHNSTON, 1982)( , )


CORRUPTION, IS A FORM OF PRIVELEDGE IDULGED IN BY THOSE IN POWER IT CONCENTRATES POWERIN BY THOSE IN POWER. IT CONCENTRATES POWER IN THE HANDS OF A FEW WHO CAN MAKE DECISIONS BASED NOT ON THE GOOD OF THE WHOLE BUT ONBASED NOT ON THE GOOD OF THE WHOLE BUT ON THE INTERESTS OF THE FEW. POWER TENDS TO CORRUPT, AND ABSOLUTE POWERPOWER TENDS TO CORRUPT, AND ABSOLUTE POWER CORRUPTS ABSOLUTELY.


ACCOUNTABILITYACCOUNTABILITY

ACCOUNTABILITY IS THE DEGREE TO WHICH A PERSON MUST ANSWER TO SOME HIGHER AUTHORITY FOR ACTIONS IN THE LARGER SOCIETY OR IN THE AGENCYLARGER SOCIETY OR IN THE AGENCY. ELECTED PUBLIC OFFICIALS ARE ACCOUNTABLE TO VOTERS. PUBLIC AGENCY MANAGERS ARE ACCOUNTABLE TO ELECTED EXECUTIVES AND LEGISLATURES. AGENCY LEADERS ARE HELD ACCOUNTABLE TO THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF SOCIETY WHICH HOLDS GENERALPOLITICAL CULTURE OF SOCIETY, WHICH HOLDS GENERAL VALUES AND IDEAS OF DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC MORALITY.


ACCOUNTABILITY IS DETERMINED BOTH EXTERNALLY (BY CODESACCOUNTABILITY IS DETERMINED BOTH EXTERNALLY (BY CODES OF ETHICS, LEGAL MANDATES CONTAINED IN A CONSTITUTION AND AUTHORIZATION LAWS, AND PROFESSIONAL CODES OR STANDARDS) AND INTERNALLY (BY AGENCY RULES ANDSTANDARDS) AND INTERNALLY (BY AGENCY RULES AND REGULATIONS OR PERSONALLY INTERNALIZED NORMS OF BEHAVIOR AND MORAL ETHICS). DEMOCRACY REQUIRES A SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY: CHECKS AND BALANCES ON GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES, THE SECURITY OF REGULAR AUDITS, AND THE INQUISITIVE EYE OF COMMUNITY ANDREGULAR AUDITS, AND THE INQUISITIVE EYE OF COMMUNITY AND MEDIA WATCHDOGS.

(ROOSENBLOOM, KRAVCHUCK, 2005)


ETHICS

ETHICS CONCERN WITH WHAT IS RIGHT AND WHAT IS WRONG.

(FREDERICKSON 1994)(FREDERICKSON, 1994)

ETHICS CAN BE CONSIDERED A FORM OF SELF-ETHICS CAN BE CONSIDERED A FORM OF SELFACCOUNTABILITY, OR AN “INNER CHECK” ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS CONDUCT.

(ROOSENBLOOM, KRAVCHUCK, 2005)


ETHICS ARE IMBEDDED IN THE VALUES AND NORMS OF SOCIETY, AND IN AN ORGANIZATION IN ITS ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE.VALUES ARE ANY OBJECT OR QUALITIES DESIRABLE AS MEANS OR ENDS THEMSELVES, SUCH AS LIFE, JUSTICE EQUALITY HONESTY EFFICIENCYJUSTICE, EQUALITY, HONESTY, EFFICIENCY, FREEDOM. VALUES ARE BLIEFS, POINTS OF VIEW, ATTITUDESATTITUDES.


STANDARDS AND NORMSSTANDARDS AND NORMS

STANDARDS AND NORMS ARE DEFINED AS PRINCIPLES OFSTANDARDS AND NORMS ARE DEFINED AS PRINCIPLES OF RIGHT ACTION BINDING UPON THE MEMBERS OF A GROUP AND SERVING TO GUIDE, CONTROL, OR REGULATE PROPER AND ACCEPTABLE BEHAVIORPROPER AND ACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR. STANDARDS AND NORMS ARE THE CODIFICATION OF GROUP ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNITY ORGROUP, ORGANIZATIONAL, COMMUNITY, OR GOVERNMENTAL VALUES. LAWS, REGULATIONS, CODES OF ETHICS. RULES ARE TYPICAL OF STANDARDS AND NORMS.

(FREDERICKSON, 1994)


ADMINISTRATIVE ETHICS

ADMINISTRATIVE ETHICS INVOLVES THE APPLICATION OF MORAL PRINCIPLES TO THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIALS IN ORGANIZATIONSCONDUCT OF OFFICIALS IN ORGANIZATIONS.BROADLY SPEAKING, MORAL PRINCIPLES SPECIFY

1) THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES THAT INDIVIDUALS SHOULD RESPECT1) THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES THAT INDIVIDUALS SHOULD RESPECT WHEN THEY ACT IN WAYS THAT SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE WELL-BEING OF OTHER INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY; AND

2) THE CONDITIONS THAT COLLECTIVE PRACTICES AND POLICIES2) THE CONDITIONS THAT COLLECTIVE PRACTICES AND POLICIES SHOULD SATISFY WHEN THEY SIMILARLY AFFECT THE WELL-BEING OF INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY.

(DENNIS THOMPSON, 1985)


THE CONVENTIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ETHICS HOLDS THATADMINISTRATIVE ETHICS HOLDS THAT ADMINISTRATORS SHOULD CARRY OUT THE ORDERS OF THEIR SUPERIORS AND THE POLICIES OF THE AGENCY AND THE GOVERNMENT THEY SERVE.


THE ETHIC OF NEUTRALITY DOES NOT DENY THAT ADMINISTRATORS OFTEN MUST USE THEIR OWNADMINISTRATORS OFTEN MUST USE THEIR OWN JUDGMENT IN THE FORMULATION OF POLICY. BUT THEIR AIM SHOULD ALWAYS BE TO DISCOVER WHAT POLICY

S O S ( C O C S) OTHEIR SUPERIORS (ELECTED OFFICIALS) INTEND OR WOULD INTEND; OR IN A DEMOCRACY IN THE CASE OF CONFLICTING DIRECTIVES TO INTERPRET LEGALLY ORCONFLICTING DIRECTIVES TO INTERPRET LEGALLY OR CONSTITUTIONALLY WHO HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE POLICY.


ON THIS VIEW, ADMINISTRATORS MAY PUT FORWARD THEIR OWN VIEWS ARGUE WITH THEIR SUPERIORSTHEIR OWN VIEWS, ARGUE WITH THEIR SUPERIORS, AND CONTEST PROPOSALS IN THE PROCESS OF FORMULATING POLICY. BUT ONCE THE DECISION ORFORMULATING POLICY. BUT ONCE THE DECISION OR POLICY IS FINAL, ALL ADMINISTRATORS FALL INTO LINE, AND FAITHFULLY CARRY OUT THE POLICY. FURTHERMORE, THE DISAGREEMENT MUST TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE AGENCY AND ACCORDING TO THE AGENCY'S RULES OF PROCEDUREAGENCY'S RULES OF PROCEDURE.


THE ETHIC OF NEUTRALITY PORTRAYS THE IDEAL ADMINISTRATOR AS A COMPLETELY RELIABLE INSTRUMENT OF THE GOALS OF THE ORGANIZATION, NEVER INJECTING PERSONAL VALUES INTO THE PROCESS OF FURTHERING THESE GOALS. THE ETHIC THUS REINFORCES THE GREAT VIRTUE OF ORGANIZATION ITS CAPACITY TO SERVE ANY SOCIALORGANIZATION-ITS CAPACITY TO SERVE ANY SOCIAL END IRRESPECTIVE OF THE ENDS THAT INDIVIDUALS WITHIN IT FAVORWITHIN IT FAVOR.


FOUR LEVELS OF ETHICS

IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION THERE IS A HIERARCHY OF LEVELS OF ETHICS, EACH OF WHICH HAS ITS OWN ,SET OF RESPONSIBILITIES. 1) PERSONAL MORALITY—THE BASIC SENSE OF RIGHT AND

WRONG. THIS IS A FUNCTION OF OUR PAST AND IS DEPENDENT ON FACTORS SUCH AS PARENTAL INFLUENCES RELIGIOUS BELIEFS CULTURAL AND SOCIALINFLUENCES, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, CULTURAL AND SOCIAL MORES, AND ONE'S OWN PERSONAL EXPERIENCES.


2) PROFESSIONAL ETHICS. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS INCREASINGLY RECOGNIZE A SET OF PROFESSIONALINCREASINGLY RECOGNIZE A SET OF PROFESSIONAL NORMS AND RULES THAT OBLIGATE THEM TO ACT IN CERTAIN "PROFESSIONAL" WAYS. OCCUPATIONS SUCH AS LAW AND MEDICINE, WHILE OPERATING WITHIN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, ALSO HAVE THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL CODESOWN INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL CODES.


3) ORGANIZATIONAL ETHICS. EVERY ORGANIZATION HAS AN ENVIRONMENT OR CULTURE THAT INCLUDES BOTH FORMAL AND INFORMAL RULES OF ETHICAL CONDUCT. PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS TYPICALLY HAVE MANY SUCH RULES PUBLIC LAWS EXECUTIVE ORDERS ANDRULES. PUBLIC LAWS, EXECUTIVE ORDERS, AND AGENCY RULES AND REGULATIONS ALL CAN BE TAKEN AS FORMAL ORGANIZATIONAL NORMS FOR ETHICALAS FORMAL ORGANIZATIONAL NORMS FOR ETHICAL BEHAVIOR.


AN ORGANIZATION'S CULTURE IS COMPOSED OF THE ". . . BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AND BELIEFS THAT ARE SHARED BY MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION THAT OPERATEMEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION, THAT OPERATE UNCONSCIOUSLY, AND THAT DEFINE IN A BASIC TAKEN-FOR-GRANTED' FASHION AN ORGANIZATION'S VIEW OF ITSELF AND ITS ENVIRONMENT" ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE IS A SOCIAL FORCE THAT CONTROLS PATTERNS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR BYCONTROLS PATTERNS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR BY SHAPING MEMBERS' COGNITIONS AND PERCEPTIONS OF MEANINGS AND REALITIES, PROVIDING EFECTIVE ENERGY FOR MOBILIZATION AND IDENTIFYING WHO BELONGS ANDFOR MOBILIZATION AND IDENTIFYING WHO BELONGS AND WHO DOES NOT.


ETHICS IS NOT ONLY THE HEART OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE IT IS ALSO THEORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, IT IS ALSO THE FULCRUM FOR PRODUCING CHANGE. SINCE ETHICS IS THE FULCRUM FOR CHANGING CULTURE, CHANGING CULTURE WITHOUT ETHICS IS AKIN TO CHANGING A TIRE WITHOUT A JACK.

(PASTIN, 1986)


4) SOCIAL ETHICS. THE REQUIREMENTS OF SOCIAL ETHICS OBLIGE MEMBERS OF A GIVEN SOCIETY TO ACT IN WAYS THAT BOTH PROTECT INDIVIDUALS ANDACT IN WAYS THAT BOTH PROTECT INDIVIDUALS AND FURTHER THE PROGRESS OF THE GROUP AS A WHOLE. SOCIAL ETHICS ARE FORMAL TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY CAN BE FOUND IN THE LAWS OF A GIVENTHEY CAN BE FOUND IN THE LAWS OF A GIVEN SOCIETY, INFORMAL TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY ARE PART OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S SOCIAL CONSCIENCE.

(SHAFRITZ, RUSSEL, CHRISTOPHER, 2007)


THE ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF DECISIONTHE ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF DECISION MAKING

WHEN MAKING DECISIONS, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS INEVITABLY PURSUE CERTAIN GOALS, WHETHER ,PERSONAL, ORGANIZATIONAL, OR SOME MIXTURE OF BOTH. THE PURSUIT OF GOALS INVOLVES STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL CHOICES TO ACHIEVE THEM (MEANS AND ENDS)TACTICAL CHOICES TO ACHIEVE THEM (MEANS AND ENDS). SUCH DECISIONS RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PROPRIETY OF THE MEANS USED IN IMPLEMENTING APROPRIETY OF THE MEANS USED IN IMPLEMENTING A COURSE OF ACTION TO DEAL WITH A PUBLIC PROBLEM.


INSTITUTIONAL ETHICSINSTITUTIONAL ETHICS

WHEN AN INSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT PURSUES ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS AND SETS ON A COURSE OF ACTION TOWARD REACHING THOSE GOALS THE END ITSELF MAY BETOWARD REACHING THOSE GOALS, THE END ITSELF MAY BE SEEN AS SO COMPELLING AS TO SEEMINGLY JUSTIFY ANY MEANS.ORGANIZATIONS HAVE OFTEN STRIVEN TO CLARIFY SUCH DILEMMAS IN DECISION MAKING BY ARTICULATING CODES OF ETHICS TO GUIDE THE BEHAVIOR OF THEIR MEMBERSETHICS TO GUIDE THE BEHAVIOR OF THEIR MEMBERS.


PERSONAL ETHICSPERSONAL ETHICSOFTEN AT ISSUE IN DECISION MAKING ARE PERSONAL ETHICSETHICS. THE TEMPTATION TO DIVERT SOME OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR RESOURCES TO PERSONAL USE CAN BE GREAT AND THE RISKRESOURCES TO PERSONAL USE CAN BE GREAT AND THE RISK OF EXPOSURE OFTEN SMALL.THE MAIN REASON FOR THE WORLDWIDE PRESENCE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION IS THAT PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS HAVE SOMETHING TO ALLOCATE THAT OTHER PEOPLE WANTOTHER PEOPLE WANT.


ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AND PERSISTING CHALLENGES O O GO S O O CO COF MODERN GOVERNMENT IS HOW TO RECONCILE THE DEMANDS OF DEMOCRACY WITH THE IMPERATIVES OF BUREANCRACY. BUREAUCRACIES ARE HIERARCHICAL INSTITUTIONS THAT CAN PROVIDE THE CAPACITY AND EXPERTISE TO ACCOMPLISH COMPLEX SOCIAL TASKS BUT THEY ARE FREQUENTLYCOMPLEX SOCIAL TASKS, BUT THEY ARE FREQUENTLY CHARACTERIZED AS UNDEMOCRATIC AND EVEN THREATENING TO DEMOCRACY. DEMOCRACIES ARE SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT THAT ARE BASED, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULAR CONTROL THEY ATTEND IN DIFFERING MEASURESPOPULAR CONTROL. THEY ATTEND IN DIFFERING MEASURES TO PRINCIPLES OF MAJORITY RULE AND DEFERENCE TO THE PERSPECTIVES OF INTENSE INTERESTS AMONG THE PUBLIC.


BUT AS SUCH THEY NEED NOT NECESSARILY SHOW KEENBUT AS SUCH, THEY NEED NOT NECESSARILY SHOW KEEN ATTENTION TO THE VALUES OF EFFICIENCY, EFFECTIVENESS, OR SPECIALIZED EXPERTISE. BUREAUCRACY MAY BE O S C S U UC CTHOUGHT OF AS GOVERNMENT'S TOOL TO EXERCISE COERCION AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR PRODUCTIVE ACTION. AS INSTITUTIONAL FORMS DESIGNED TO EMPHASIZE DIFFERENTINSTITUTIONAL FORMS DESIGNED TO EMPHASIZE DIFFERENT VALUES, BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY SIT IN AN UNEASY RELATIONSHIP WITH EACH OTHER.


BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICSBUREAUCRACY AND POLITICSONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AND PERSISTINGONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AND PERSISTING CHALLENGES OF MODERN GOVERNMENT IS HOW TO RECONCILE THE DEMANDS OF DEMOCRACY WITH THE IMPERATIVES OF BUREAUCRACYIMPERATIVES OF BUREAUCRACY. BUREAUCRACIES ARE HIERARCHICAL INSTITUTIONS THAT CAN PROVIDE THE CAPACITY AND EXPERTISE TOTHAT CAN PROVIDE THE CAPACITY AND EXPERTISE TO ACCOMPLISH COMPLEX SOCIAL TASKS, BUT THEY ARE FREQUENTLY CHARACTERIZEDAS UNDEMOCRATIC AND EVEN THREATENING TO DEMOCRACY. DEMOCRACIES ARE SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT THATDEMOCRACIES ARE SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT THAT ARE BASED, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULAR CONTROL.


THEY ATTEND IN DIFFERING MEASURES TO PRINCIPLES OF MAJORITY RULE AND DEFERENCE TO THE PERSPECTIVES OF INTENSE INTERESTS AMONG THE PUBLIC BUT AS SUCH THEY NEED NOT NECESSARILYPUBLIC. BUT AS SUCH, THEY NEED NOT NECESSARILY SHOW KEEN ATTENTION TO THE VALUES OF EFFICIENCY, EFFECTIVENESS OR SPECIALIZED EXPERTISEEFFECTIVENESS, OR SPECIALIZED EXPERTISE.BUREAUCRACY MAY BE THOUGHT OF AS GOVERNMENT'S TOOL TO EXERCISE COERCION AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR PRODUCTIVE ACTION. AS INSTITUTIONAL FORMS DESIGNED TO EMPHASIZE DIFFERENT VALUES, BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY SIT IN AN UNEASY RELATIONSHIP WITH EACH OTHER.


Regime b ea c ac inte actionsRegime bureaucracy interactions

Power Distribution in Society

Power Distribution in Government

Democratic political regime controls

Executive ascendant1

Bureaucracy dominates democratic

Executive sublated2

Democ ac regime controls bureaucracy

dominates democratic political regime

Democracy

Bureaucracy subordination to authoritarian political

3

Authoritarian political regime shares power with Bureaucracy

4

Authoritarianismauthoritarian political regime

with Bureaucracy

Sources: modified from Cariño, L.V. (1992) Bureaucracy for Democracy (Quezon City: University of Philippines Press).

(TURNER AND HULME 1997)


(TURNER AND HULME, 1997)

ONE BASIC APPROACH TO THE BUREAUCRACY-DEMOCRACY PROBLEM IS TO CONCEIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC IMPULSE AS ESSENTIALLY EMANATINGDEMOCRATIC IMPULSE AS ESSENTIALLY EMANATING FROM "ABOVE." THE "TOP" OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THIS VIEWTHE TOP OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, IN THIS VIEW, CONSISTS OF THE CENTRAL OR MOST FORMALLY AUTHORITATIVE' POSITIONS AND ORGANS OF THEAUTHORITATIVE POSITIONS AND ORGANS OF THE GOVERNING SYSTEM: THOSE DIRECTLY CHOSEN BY THE ELECTORATE AND THOSE ENTAILING THE BROADEST AND MOST ENCOMPASSING JURISDICTION.


BECAUSE OF THE DIRECT LINK TO THE PUBLIC VIA PERIODIC COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS, BODIES LIKE PARLIAMENTS AND ELECTED CHIEF EXECUTIVES HAVE A SPECIAL CLAIM TO REPRESENT THE AGENDA OF THE PEOPLEPEOPLE. ONE CHALLENGE FACING THESE POLITICAL LEADERS, THEN IS TO MONITOR AND CONTROL THETHEN, IS TO MONITOR AND CONTROL THE BUREAUCRACY SO THAT THE AGENTS DO NOT REPLACE THE DEMOCRATICALLY CHOSEN PRINCIPALS AS THE KEY DECISION MAKERS.


THE OTHER BROAD NOTION OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IS WHAT MIGHT BE CALLED BOTTOM-UP DEMOCRACY. THE LOGIC IS THAT POPULAR CONTROL IS MOST EFFECTIVELY ACHIEVED THROUGH CHANNELS OTHER THAN THE POLITICAL "TOP“.


IN OTHER WORDS THE BUREAUCRACY AS A POLITICALIN OTHER WORDS, THE BUREAUCRACY AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION MIGHT BEST BE CHECKED BY DIRECT POPULAR OVERSIGHT (CITIZENS’ REVIEW BOARDS MONITORING POLICE DEPARTMENTS, CLIENTS CONTROLLING SOME ASPECTS OF AGENCY DECISIONS) OR BY INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS THAT DEVIATE FROM A STANDARDARRANGEMENTS THAT DEVIATE FROM A STANDARD MONOCRATIC AUTHORITY STRUCTURE AND INSTEAD INCORPORATE INCENTIVES FOR BUREAUCRATIC ACTORS TO BE DIRECTLY ATTUNED TO POPULAR PREFERENCESBE DIRECTLY ATTUNED TO POPULAR PREFERENCES.ONE WAY THAT THESE OPERATE IS VIA OPENNESS OF THE BUREAUCRACY ITSELF TO PRESSURE AND CONTROL BY ORGANIZED INTERESTS THAT MAY CARE GREATLY ABOUT THE ACTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS.


NEITHER LINE OF REASONING ABOUT DEMOCRACY AND BUREAUCRACY OFFERS A FULLY SATISFACTORY PICTUREBUREAUCRACY OFFERS A FULLY SATISFACTORY PICTURETHE TOP-DOWN ARGUMENTS FRAMED IN THE LOGIC OF POLITICAL CONTROL OFFER AN IMPORTANT PIECE OF THE PUZZLE, BUT AN INCOMPLETE ONE. BOTTOM-UP ANALYSTS ALERT AS TO CRUCIAL MODES AND CHANNELS OF POPULAR INFLUENCE BUT LIKEWISEAND CHANNELS OF POPULAR INFLUENCE BUT LIKEWISE OMIT ELEMENTS THAT MUST BE INCLUDED. ANY VALID PERSPECTIVE MUST NECESSARILY BE GROUNDED IN THE EMPIRICAL FEATURES OF ACTUAL GOVERNING SYSTEMS.


A GOVERNANCE APPROACH SEEKS TO INTEGRATE POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC FORCES AT MULTIPLE LEVELS TO INDICATE HOW PROGRAMS ARE DESIGNEDLEVELS TO INDICATE HOW PROGRAMS ARE DESIGNED, ADOPTED, IMPLEMENTED, AND EVALUATED IN TERMS OF BOTH EFFECTIVENESS AND DEMOCRACY. SUCH A POINT OF VIEW CLEARLY RECOGNIZES THAT ONLY WITH EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTING INSTITUTIONS CAN SOCIETIES GENERATE THE FAIRNESS AND SLACKSOCIETIES GENERATE THE FAIRNESS AND SLACK RESOURCES THAT PERMIT DEMOCRACIES WITH THEIR LARGE TRANSACTION COSTS TO EXIST AND PROSPER.LARGE TRANSACTION COSTS TO EXIST AND PROSPER.


PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN A DEMOCRACY

CHIEF EXECUTIVEEXECUTIVE STAFF

AGENCIES

LEGISLATURE

CHIEF EXECUTIVE

OUTSIDE AUDITORS

SOCIOCULTURAL NORMS

LEGISLATIVE STAFF AGENCIESMEDIA

AUDITORS

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS:

DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY HEAD

OTHER AGENCIES POLITICAL PARTIES

COURTS

OTHER AGENCIES,

INTEREST GROUPS

AGENCY HEAD

(ROSENBLOOM KRAVCHUCK 2005)

OTHER AGENCIES, DIFFERENT

LEVELS

POLITICAL PARTIESSAME LEVEL


(ROSENBLOOM, KRAVCHUCK, 2005)

ABOVE FIGURE PRESENTS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK THAT SEES PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION TAKING THE CENTRAL ROLESEES PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION TAKING THE CENTRAL ROLE OR STAGE IN A BROADER POLITICAL SYSTEM (THE CONVERSION PROCESS IN THE SYSTEMS MODEL). )THE MODEL EMPHASIZES THE INTERRELATED NATURE OF THE PARTS AND HOW CHANGE IN AN EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT (CULTURAL ECONOMIC POLITICAL SOCIAL) CAUSES CHANGE(CULTURAL, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, SOCIAL) CAUSES CHANGE IN THE STRUCTURES AND INTERNAL PROCESSES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. THESE CHANGES, IN TURN, INFLUENCE THE OUTPUTS OF THE BUREAUCRACY; THAT IS, WHAT GOODS, SERVICES, POLICY PROGRAMS RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE IMPLEMENTED BYPROGRAMS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS ARE IMPLEMENTED BY BUREAUCRACY.


AS IN ANY SYSTEM, A FEEDBACK LOOP DEVELOPS IN WHICH THE OUTPUTS AFFECT THE ENVIRONMENT, ,WHICH CAUSES FURTHER CHANGE AND OFTEN NEW DEMANDS FROM THE ENVIRONMENT TO CONTINUE, INCREASE OR DECREASE MODIFY OR OCCASIONALLYINCREASE OR DECREASE, MODIFY, OR OCCASIONALLY EVEN CEASE A PUBLIC POLICY OR PROGRAM.


PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM: THE CONVERSION PROCESS

ENVIRONMENT• CULTURAL CHANGES

AND EVENTS

INPUTS

• DEMANDS FOR PROGRAMS AND

ADMINISTRATIVE LINE AGENCIES

“WITHIN-PUTS”

OUTPUTS

• GOODS

• SERVICE• ECONOMIC CHANGES AND EVENTS

• POLITICAL CHANGES AND EVENTS

• SOCIETAL CHANGES AND EVENTS

SERVICES

SUPPORT

• MONEY

• STAF

• RULES

• PROCEDURES

• GOALS

• STRUCTURE

• SERVICE

• POLICIES

• PROGRAMME

• INFORMATION

AND EVENTS ROLES PLAYED BY

• PARTY

• INTEREST GROUP

• STAFF AGENCIES

• PERSONAL

• EXPERIENCE LEAD TO

(ROSENBLOOM KRAVCHUCK 2005)


(ROSENBLOOM, KRAVCHUCK, 2005)

DECENTRALIZATION

ALL SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT INVOLVE A COMBINATION OF CENTRALIZED AND DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITY. HOWEVER, FINDING A COMBINATION OF CENTRAL CONTROL AND LOCAL AUTONOMY THAT SATISFIES REGIME NEEDS AND POPULAR DEMANDS IS A PERSISTENT DILEMMANEEDS AND POPULAR DEMANDS IS A PERSISTENT DILEMMA FOR GOVERNMENTS. CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION ARE NOTCENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION ARE NOT ATTRIBUTES THAT CAN BE DICHOTOMIZED; RATHER THEY REPRESENT HYPOTHETICAL POLES ON A CONTINUUM THAT CAN BE CALIBRATED BY MANY DIFFERENT INDICESCAN BE CALIBRATED BY MANY DIFFERENT INDICES.


MOST AUTHORS ARE AGREED THAT DECENTRALIZATION WITHIN THE STATE INVOLVES A TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY TO PERFORM SOME SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC FROM ANPERFORM SOME SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC FROM AN INDIVIDUAL OR AN AGENCY IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO SOME OTHER INDIVIDUAL OR AGENCY WHICH IS 'CLOSER' TOSOME OTHER INDIVIDUAL OR AGENCY WHICH IS CLOSER TO THE PUBLIC TO BE SERVED. THE BASIS FOR SUCH TRANSFERS IS MOST OFTEN TERRITORIAL, THAT IS GROUNDED IN THE DESIRE TO PLACE AUTHORITY AT A LOWER LEVEL IN A TERRITORIAL HIERARCHY AND THUS GEOGRAPHICALLY CLOSER TO SERVICEHIERARCHY AND THUS GEOGRAPHICALLY CLOSER TO SERVICE PROVIDERS AND CLIENTS.


HOWEVER, TRANSFERS CAN ALSO BE MADE FUNCTIONALLY, THAT IS , ,BY TRANSFERRING AUTHORITY TO AN AGENCY THAT IS FUNCTIONALLY SPECIALIZED. SUCH TRANSFERS OF AUTHORITY ARE OF THREE MAIN TYPES.OF THREE MAIN TYPES. THE FIRST IS WHEN THE DELEGATION IS WITHIN FORMAL POLITICAL STRUCTURES (FOR EXAMPLE WHEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DELEGATES ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY TO LOCALGOVERNMENT DELEGATES ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT).THE SECOND IS TRANSFER WITHIN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE OR PARASTATAL STRUCTURES (FOR EXAMPLE FROM THE HEADQUARTERS OF A MINISTRY TO ITS DISTRICT OFFICES). THE THIRD IS WHEN THE TRANSFER IS FROM AN INSTITUTION OFTHE THIRD IS WHEN THE TRANSFER IS FROM AN INSTITUTION OF THE STATE TO A NON-STATE AGENCY (FOR EXAMPLE WHEN A PARASTATAL NATIONAL AIRLINE IS SOLD OFF TO PRIVATE SHAREHOLDERS)


SHAREHOLDERS).

SOME IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS

DECENTRALIZATION IS THE TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR PUBLICAUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR PUBLIC FUNCTIONS FROM THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO SUBORDINATE OR QUASI-INDEPENDENT QGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS AND/OR THE PRIVATE SECTOR

(WORLD BANK, 2001)


DECENTRALIZATION IS THE EXPANSION OF LOCAL AUTONOMY THROUGH THE TRANSFER OF POWERSAUTONOMY THROUGH THE TRANSFER OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AWAY FROM NATIONAL BODYBODY

(HEYWOOD, 2002)


LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAN BE SAID TO BELOCAL GOVERNMENT CAN BE SAID TO BE AUTONOMOUS IF THEY ENJOY A SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE, ALTHOUGH AUTONOMY ,IN THIS CONNECTION IS SOMETIMES TAKEN TO IMPLY A HIGH MEASURE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT, RATHER THAN SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENCE

(ADAPTED FROM HEYWOOD 2002)(ADAPTED FROM HEYWOOD, 2002)


WHY DECENTRALIZE?

A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO THE EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE OFA MAJOR OBSTACLE TO THE EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC BUREAUCRACIES IN MOST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IS THE EXCESSIVE CONCENTRATION OR DECISION-MAKING AND AUTHORITY WITHIN CENTRAL GOVERNMENTAND AUTHORITY WITHIN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. PUBLIC SECTOR INSTITUTIONS ARE COMMONLY PERCEIVED TO BE GEOGRAPHICALLY AND SOCIALLY REMOTE FROMTO BE GEOGRAPHICALLY AND SOCIALLY REMOTE FROM 'THE PEOPLE' AND TO TAKE DECISIONS WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OR CONCERN ABOUT ACTUAL PROBLEMS AND PREFERENCES.


THE POPULAR REMEDY FOR SUCH CENTRALIZATION IS DECENTRALIZATION, A TERM WHICH IS IMBUED WITH POSITIVE CONNOTATIONS-PROXIMITY, RELEVANCE, AUTONOMY, PARTICIPATION, ACCOUNTABILITY AND EVEN DEMOCRACYACCOUNTABILITY AND EVEN DEMOCRACY. SO GREAT IS THE APPEAL OF DECENTRALIZATION THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO LOCATE A GOVERNMENTTHAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO LOCATE A GOVERNMENT THAT HAS NOT CLAIMED TO PURSUE A POLICY OF DECENTRALIZATION IN RECENT YEARS.


THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKS ARGUE THAT DECENTRALIZATION WILL LEAD TO BETTER DECISION MAKING AND HENCELEAD TO BETTER DECISION-MAKING AND HENCE GREATER EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDSFOLLOWING GROUNDS.


LOCALLY SPECIFIC PLANS CAN BE TAILOR-MADE FOR LOCAL AREAS USING DETAILED AND UP-TO-DATE INFORMATION THAT IS ONLY LOCALLY AVAILABLE. INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION CAN BE ACHIEVED AT THE LOCAL LEVEL. EXPERIMENTATION AND INNOVATION, FOSTERED BY DECENTRALIZATION INCREASES THE CHANCES OF MORE EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES BEING GENERATED, AND SUBSEQUENTLY DIFFUSED.MOTIVATION OF FIELD-LEVEL PERSONNEL IS ENHANCED WHENMOTIVATION OF FIELD LEVEL PERSONNEL IS ENHANCED WHEN THEY HAVE GREATER RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROGRAMMES THEY MANAGE.WORKLOAD REDUCTION AT AGENCIES AT THE CENTRE OFWORKLOAD REDUCTION AT AGENCIES AT THE CENTRE OF GOVERNMENT WILL RELIEVE THEM FROM ROUTINE DECISION-MAKING AND GIVE THEM MORE TIME TO CONSIDER STRATEGIC ISSUES SO THAT THE' QUALITY OF POLICY SHOULD IMPROVE.


SSU S SO QU O O C S OU O

TYPES OF DECENTRALIZATION

1. POLITICAL2. ADMINISTRATIVE3. FISCAL

4. MARKET


POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION

POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION AIMS TO GIVE CITIZENS OR THEIR ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES MORE POWER IN PUBLIC DECISION-MAKING

(WORLD BANK, 2001)


FISCAL DECENTRALIZATIONFISCAL DECENTRALIZATION

FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION INVOLVES SHIFTING SOME RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EXPENDITURES AND/OR REVENUES TO LOWER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENTREVENUES TO LOWER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT

THE EXTENT TO WHICH LOCAL ENTITIES ARE GIVENTHE EXTENT TO WHICH LOCAL ENTITIES ARE GIVEN AUTONOMY TO DETERMINE THE ALLOCATION OF THEIR EXPENDITURE

(WORLD BANK, 2001)4


LOCAL FINANCE IN INDONESIASOURCES

LOCAL REVENUES EQUITY FUND OTHERS

LOCAL TAXES SHARING REVENUES GIFTLOCAL TAXES

RETRIBUTIONS

REVENUES FROM

SHARING REVENUES

GENERAL ALLOCATED FUND

GIFT

EMERGENCY FUND

LOANREVENUES FROM LOCAL ASSETS

OTHERS

SPECIAL ALLOCATED FUND

LOAN


ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION

ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION SEEKS TO REDISTRIBUTE AUTHORITY RESPONSIBILITY AND FINANCIALREDISTRIBUTE AUTHORITY, RESPONSIBILITY AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOR PROVIDING PUBLIC SERVICES AMONG DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT

(WORLD BANK, 2001)


ECONOMIC OR MARKET DECENTRALIZATION

ECONOMIC OR MARKET DECENTRALIZATION WILL CO O C O C OINCLUDE PRIVATIZATION AND DEREGULATION. THEY SHIFT RESPONSIBILITY FOR FUNCTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR

(WORLD BANK, 2001)


FORMS OF DECENTRALIZATIONFORMS OF DECENTRALIZATION

FORMS OF DECENTRALIZATION INCLUDE:1. DECONCENTRATION2. DELEGATION TO SEMI-AUTONOMOUS AGENCIES3. DEVOLUTION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT

TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS FROM PUBLIC TO4. TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS FROM PUBLIC TO NONGOVERNMENT INSTITUITION

(CHEEMA & RONDINELLI, 1984)


DECONCENTRATION

DECONCENTRATION INVOLVES THE REDISTRIBUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVEREDISTRIBUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES ONLY WITHIN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENTGOVERNMENT

(CHEEMA & RONDINELLI 1984)(CHEEMA & RONDINELLI, 1984)


DELEGATION TO SEMI-AUTONOMOUS AGENCIES

ANOTHER FORM OF DECENTRALIZATION IS THE DELEGATION OF DECISION-MAKING AND MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY FOR SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS TO ORGANIZATIONS THAT ARE NOT UNDER THETO ORGANIZATIONS THAT ARE NOT UNDER THE DIRECT CONTROL OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT MINISTRIESMINISTRIES



DEVOLUTION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT

ANOTHER FORM OF DECENTRALIZATION SEEKS TO CREATE OR STRENGTHEN INDEPENDENT LEVELS ORCREATE OR STRENGTHEN INDEPENDENT LEVELS OR UNITS OF GOVERNMENT THROUGH DEVOLUTION OF FUNCTION AND AUTHORITYFUNCTION AND AUTHORITY.



TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS FROM PUBLIC TO NON-GOVERNMENT INSTITUITION

DECENTRALIZATION TAKES PLACE IN MANY COUNTRIES THROUGH THE TRANSFER OF SOMECOUNTRIES THROUGH THE TRANSFER OF SOME PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY, OR OF PUBLIC FUNCTIONS FROM GOVERNMENT TOOR OF PUBLIC FUNCTIONS, FROM GOVERNMENT TO VOLUNTARY, PRIVATE, OR NON-GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS.



Forms of decentralization

Nature of Delegation Basic for Delegation

Territorial Functional

Within formal political structures Devolution (political decentralization, local government, democratic

Interest group representation

g ,decentralization

Within public administrative or parastatal structures

Deconcentration (administrative

Establisment of parastatals and quangosparastatal structures (administrative

decentralization, field administration

and quangos

From state sector to private sector Privatization of developed Privatization of nationalFrom state sector to private sector Privatization of developed function (deregulation, contracting out, voucher schemes)

Privatization of national functions (devestiture, deregulation, economic liberalization)

(TURNER AND HULME, 1997)


IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES OFIMPORTANT OBJECTIVES OF DECENTRALIZATION:

1. BETTER MATCH BETWEEN SERVICE PROVISION AND VOTER PREFERENCES

2. BETTER ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH CLOSER LINKAGES OF BENEFITS WITH COSTS

3 INCREASED MOBILIZATION OF LOCAL REVENUES3. INCREASED MOBILIZATION OF LOCAL REVENUES 4. BETTER PARTICIPATION OF CLIENTS IN SELECTION

OF OUTPUT MIX(GERVAIS, 1999)


IT MUST BE NOTE THAT THE DECENTRALIZATION DOESIT MUST BE NOTE THAT THE DECENTRALIZATION DOES NOT IMPLY THAT ALL AUTHORITY SHOULD BE DELEGATED. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT MUST RETAIN A CORE OF FUNCTIONS OVER ESSENTIAL NATIONAL MATTERS ANDFUNCTIONS OVER ESSENTIAL NATIONAL MATTERS AND ULTIMATELY HAS THE AUTHORITV TO REDESIGN THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT AND TO DISCIPLINE OR SUSPEND DECENTRALIZED UNITS THAT ARE NOT PERFORMING EFFECTIVELY.HOW EXTENSIVE THIS CORE OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENTHOW EXTENSIVE THIS CORE OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS SHOULD BE REMAINS A MAJOR IDEOLOGICAL AND INTELLECTUAL DEBATE OF THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURYCENTURY.


DECENTRALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE

DECENTRALIZATION IN SOME COUNTRIES HAS BEENDECENTRALIZATION IN SOME COUNTRIES HAS BEEN SEEN AS POLITICALLY EXPEDIENT FOR DEALING WITH REBELLIOUS REGIONS. IT HAS HOWEVER MORE BASIC VALUE TO DEMOCRACYIT HAS HOWEVER, MORE BASIC VALUE TO DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION. MANY SCHOLARS HAVE PRESENTED THE ARGUMENT THAT DECENTRALIZATION ENHANCES THE LEGITIMACY ANDDECENTRALIZATION ENHANCES THE LEGITIMACY, AND HENCE, STABILITY OF DEMOCRACY.


DIAMOND (1999) RAISES FIVE BROAD POINTS ABOUT HOW AUTONOMOUS LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNDER A DECENTRALIZATION SCHEME CAN IMPROVE AND STRENGTHEN DEMOCRACY.

1) GREATER AUTONOMY TO THE REGIONS HELPS DEVELOP DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND SKILLS AMONG CITIZENS.DECENTRALIZATION INCREASES ACCOUNTABILITY AND2) DECENTRALIZATION INCREASES ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS TO LOCAL INTERESTS AND CONCERNS.

3) IT OPENS UP ACCESS TO POWER OF TRADITIONALLY MARGINALIZED GROUPS AND THUS IMPROVES THEMARGINALIZED GROUPS AND THUS IMPROVES THE REPRESENTATIONAL ASPECTS OF DEMOCRACY.

4) IT STRENGTHENS CHECKS AND BALANCES VIZ-A-VIZ POWER AT THE CENTER.THE CENTER.

5) IT PROVIDES OPPORTUNITIES FOR PARTIES AND POLITICAL GROUPS IN OPPOSITION IN THE CENTER TO EXERCISE SOME MEASURE OF POLITICAL POWER.


FROM THE ARGUMENTS ABOVE IT CAN BE CONCLUDED THAT DECENTRALIZATION ENHANCES THE EFFICACY, QUALITY AND LEGITIMACY OF DEMOCRACY; HENCE DECENTRALIZATION IS A NECESSITY FOR DEMOCRACY. IT IS EVEN MORE SO FOR LARGE AND PARTICULARLYIT IS EVEN MORE SO FOR LARGE—AND PARTICULARLY MULTIETHNIC AND MULTICULTURAL—COUNTRIES SUCH AS INDONESIA AND CHINA, AS DECENTRALIZATION WILL CLOSE THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE CITIZENS, THE STAKEHOLDER, AND THE POWER AND THE PROCESS OF POLICY MAKINGPOLICY MAKING.


DECENTRALIZATION IS NOT JUST A POLITICAL NECESSITY FOR KEEPING THE COUNTRY FROM FALLINGNECESSITY FOR KEEPING THE COUNTRY FROM FALLING APART OR FOR FOSTERING DEMOCRACY. IF MANAGED WELL DECENTRALIZATION CAN BRINGIF MANAGED WELL, DECENTRALIZATION CAN BRING IMPORTANT BENEFITS TO THE COMMUNITIES AND THE ECONOMY AS A WHOLE. HOWEVER, IF MANAGED BADLY, IT COULD HARM THE PEOPLE AND SQUANDER RESOURCES AND BRING INSTABILITY INSTEADINSTABILITY INSTEAD.


RICH REGIONS ARE DOING FINE, IN FACT THEY MAY HAVE MORE MONEY THAT THEY CAN SPEND WHICH CAN POSE A THREAT TOMONEY THAT THEY CAN SPEND, WHICH CAN POSE A THREAT TO NATIONAL SOLIDARITY BECAUSE OF SOCIAL-JEALOUSY THERE ARE ALREADY SOME INDICATIONS THAT REVENUES NOT BEING USED EFFECTIVELY AND EFFICIENTLY, ON THE OTHER HAND, POOR REGIONS ARE CHAFING UNDERREGIONS ARE CHAFING UNDER. THE RISKS OF AN INCREASE IN CORRUPTION FOLLOWING DECENTRALIZATION ARE HIGH. IT HAS BEEN WIDELY OBSERVED THAT SO FAR NOT ONLY POWER AND REVENUE THAT HAVE BEENTHAT SO FAR NOT ONLY POWER AND REVENUE THAT HAVE BEEN DECENTRALIZED BUT ALSO CORRUPTION. SOME ANALYSTS COMMENT THAT DECENTRALIZATION HAS STRENGTHENED THE POSITION OF THE LOCAL ELITES AND THEIRSTRENGTHENED THE POSITION OF THE LOCAL ELITES AND THEIR CLIENTELISTIC NETWORKS IN SOME LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

(HUBER, RUESCHEMEYER AND STEPHENS, 1999).


TRANSFERS OF REVENUE TO THE AUTONOMOUS DISTRICTS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY TRANSFERS OF EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITY AND ITS ASSOCIATED FUNCTIONS. THEY ARE IMPORTANT TO PREVENT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL DEFICIT TO INCREASE UNABATEDLY CAUSING SEVERE FINANCING AND DEBT PROBLEMS FOE THE COUNTRY IN THE FUTURE.

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ALSO NEED TO HAVE THE APPROPRIATE CAPACITY AND SKILLS TO TAKE ON THE RESPONSIBILITY THAT COMES WITH AUTONOMY. BUDGETARY CONTROL ANDCOMES WITH AUTONOMY. BUDGETARY CONTROL AND SUPERVISION SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED TO PREVENT CORRUPTION AND WASTAGE OF RESOURCES.

IN SHORT EFFECTIVE DECENTRALIZATION WILL ENHANCEIN SHORT, EFFECTIVE DECENTRALIZATION WILL ENHANCE DEMOCRACY BUT IT REQUIRES ALSO GOOD GOVERNANCE, I.E. CLEAN, TRANSPARENT AND COMPETENT GOVERNANCE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL


LOCAL LEVEL.

GOVERNMENT SYSTEM OF INDONESIA

People’s Consultative

Assembly

HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-

TIVESTHE PRESIDENT

• JUDICIAL COMMISSION

•CENTRAL BANK

SUPREME AUDIT BOARD

SUPREME COURT

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

HOUSE OF REGIONAL

REPRESENTA-TIVES

CABINET

DECENTRALIZATIONDECONCENTRATION DELEGATION(FUNCTIONAL DECENTRALIZATION)

ASSISTANCE TASKS(FUNCTIONAL DECENTRALIZATION)

AUTONOMOUS REGIONS

GOVERNORSSTATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

ADMINISTRATOR, ETC.

REGIONAL ADMINISTRATION

RURAL ADMINISTRATION


ETC.

DECENTRALIZATION IN INDONESIA

DECONCENTRATIONADMINISTRATIVE

GOVERNMENT /REGIONAL GOVERNMENT

• REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES• REGIONAL GOVERNMENT

CHIEFS• ETC.

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

DELEGATIONPRIVATIZATION

• SPECIAL AUTHORITY• PRIVATE CORPORATION• BOT• ETC.

AUTONOMOUS REGION

PROVINCE

DECENTRALIZATION


PROVINCEDISTRICTCITY

Six tasks (Absolute)1. Foreign Policy2. Defense

DECENTRALIZATION PRINCIPLES IN INDONESIA• Partly by the central

government;

P tl b d3. Security4. Religion5. Justice6. National Fiscal and Monetary Affairs

Central

Government

• Partly based on deconcentration principles;

• Partly based on assistance principle

Outside the six tasks:

AdministrativePartly

ConcurrentMandatory Tasks (Province, District, City) 1. Planning and control of development2. Planning, use, and control of space;3. Public security;4. Facilities and infrastructure;5 Health;

Administrative Tasks

Concurrent

5. Health;6. Education and potential human resources; 7. Solution to social problems;8. Manpower (incl. interregional mobility);9. Cooperatives and SMEs;10. Environment;11. Land administration;

Regional Governments

Partly based on decentralization principles

11. Land administration;12. Civil administration; 13. General government administration;14. Investment;15. Other basic services (not yet implemented); 16. Other tasks.

Governments


Elective (Province, District, City) Based on the potentials and characteristics of each region (mining, fishery, agriculture, plantation, forestry, tourism)

DIGITAL (E)-GOVERNANCE( )

INFORMATION IS A CENTRAL RESOURCE FOR ALL ACTIVITIES. IN PURSUING THE DEMOCRATIC/POLITICAL PROCESSES, IN MANAGING RESOURCES, EXECUTING FUNCTIONS, MEASURING PERFORMANCE AND IN SERVICE DELIVERY, INFORMATION IS THE BASIC INGREDIENT' (ISAAC-HENRY 1997: I 32)HENRY 1997: I 32).


INFORMATION IS NO LONGER “WALLED IN” NO LONGERINFORMATION IS NO LONGER WALLED IN , NO LONGER CONSTRAINED BY TIME AND SPACE. INFORMATION IS WIDELY AVAILABLE TO PEOPLE REGARDLESS OF STATUS, ,POSITION, WEALTH, LOCATION, RACE, ETHNIC OR CULTURE.INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY GIVES A NEW IMPETUS TO DEMOCRACY AS IT OPENS UP AND WIDENS THE WAY AND MEANS FOR POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN PUBLICAND MEANS FOR POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC DECISSION MAKING PROCESSES.


THE MAJOR STEPS HAVE INCLUDED:USING COMPUTER NETWORKS AS A NEW CHANNEL FOR SERVICE DELIVERYFOR SERVICE DELIVERY, BEGINNING TO REENGINEER SERVICES AND CREATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR SELFSERVICE, EXPANDING RELIANCE ON SERVICES OUTSOURCEDEXPANDING RELIANCE ON SERVICES OUTSOURCED TO OTHER AGENCIES AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR,SHOWING ANXIETY—BUT NOT MUCH ACTION YET—ABOUT SOCIAL EQUITY AND COHESION, ANDBEGINNING TO CONTEMPLATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF NEW FORMS OF ELECTRONIC MONEY.


IN THESE FIRST YEARS OF THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURYIN THESE FIRST YEARS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, GOVERNMENTS AROUND THE WORLD ARE PREPARING FOR E-GOVERNMENTFOR E GOVERNMENT. WEBSITES HAVE BEEN CREATED FOR MANY GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, AND THE PUSH IS ON FORGOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, AND THE PUSH IS ON FOR BROADER AND MORE EASILY NAVIGATED PORTALS. TRANSACTIONS ARE BEING OFFERED OVER THE INTERNET. POLITICIANS AND THE PRESS ARE BEGINNING TO TALK ABOUT "DIGITAL DEMOCRACY."


THE INFORMATION AGE IS CREATING NEW CHALLENGES FOR GOVERNANCE BY ENCOURAGING A MORE COMPLEX DIVISION OF LABOR AND A FLOOD OFMORE COMPLEX DIVISION OF LABOR AND A FLOOD OF NEW THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES. MODERN COMMUNICATIONS ARE REDUCING THEMODERN COMMUNICATIONS ARE REDUCING THE POWER OF GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY IN SHAPING OUR SENSE OF COMMUNITY AND DETERMINING WHO HAS THE LEGITIMACY NEEDED TO GOVERN.


IN THE LONGER TERM, COMPUTER-BASED COMMUNICATIONS COULD SIGNIFICANTLY RESTRUCTURE POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE AS WELLRESTRUCTURE POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE AS WELL AS ECONOMICS. COMPUTER NETWORKS ARE MAKING IT MORECOMPUTER NETWORKS, ARE MAKING IT MORE CONVENIENT TO PARTICIPATE IN CONVERSATIONS THAT WERE FORMERLY HARD TO JOIN. THIS MAY

O S O O CWELL LEAD TO NEW PATTERNS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND PARTICIPATION.


THE E-GOVERNMENT PROMISES A NEW HORISON IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AS IT WILL CUT COSTS AND IMPROVE EFFICIENCY; MEET CITIZEN EXPECTATIONS;IMPROVE EFFICIENCY; MEET CITIZEN EXPECTATIONS; IMPROVE CITIZEN RELATIONSHIP; ENHANCE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES; ;INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUBLIC CONTROL; FACILITATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.


THE START OF SOMETHING BIG?

OVER THE NEXT TEN TO FIFTEEN YEARS, THE EXPANSION OF NETWORK-BASED COMMUNICATIONS SHOULD EXERT A STRONG INFLUENCE ON HOW COMMUNITIES ARE FORMED AND GOVERNEDAND GOVERNED.


GOVERNMENTS ARE BUILDING HUGE ANDGOVERNMENTS ARE BUILDING HUGE AND INTERCONNECTED COMPUTER NETWORKS, BUT WE HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO BEFORE THESE BECOME UBIQUITOUSLY AVAILABLE TO ALL WORKERS ANDUBIQUITOUSLY AVAILABLE TO ALL WORKERS AND CITIZENS. THE MOMENTUM IS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED, HOWEVER, AND NOTHING IS LIKELY TO STOP IT.HOWEVER, AND NOTHING IS LIKELY TO STOP IT.OUTSOURCING WILL CONTINUE TO EXPAND. IN ADDITION, MORE GOVERNMENTS WILL BEGIN TO WORK WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO REFORMWORK WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO REFORM ENTIRE INDUSTRIES AND ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURES.INFRASTRUCTURES.


PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS ARE RAPIDLY BECOMINGPUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS ARE RAPIDLY BECOMING NETWORKED, AND THEY ARE USING THESE NETWORKS TO PRODUCE AND DELIVER SERVICES. THIS WILL ULTIMATELY LEAD TO EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS, MUCH AS HAS HAPPENED IN THE PRIVATE SECTORY. GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES WILL GRADUALLY BECOMEGOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES WILL GRADUALLY BECOME FLATTER, FASTER, AND MORE CUSTOMER FRIENDLY. SERVICES WILL BECOME BETTER INTEGRATED AND CUSTOMIZED, WITH RICH SELF-SERVICE OPTIONS. FEES RATHER THAN TAXES WILL BE USED MORE EXTENSIVELY TO RAISE REVENUES AND COORDINATE PRODUCTION ANDTO RAISE REVENUES AND COORDINATE PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION.


AS WE PROCEED MORE DEEPLY INTO THE INFORMATION AGE, THE NEW CORE VALUE AND CHALLENGE FOR GOVERNANCE-AT BOTH ORGANIZATIONAL AND SOCIETAL LEVELS WILL BE TO LEARN HOW TO ADAPT TO NEW CONDITIONS AND NEEDS. TO GOVERN SUCCESSFULLY, WE MUST FIGURE OUT HOW ,TO PROTECT PUBLIC SAFETY AND PREVENT ABUSES OF POWER WHILE WE SIMULTANEOUSLY PROMOTE GOVERNMENTAL FLEXIBILITY AND LEARNING. WE HAVE MADE SOME PROGRESS ON THIS PROBLEM, BUT OUR STATUS AS WE ENTER THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY MIGHT BEST BE DESCRIBED AS "JUST AT THE START OF SOMETHING BIG“.

(KAMARACK AND NYE JR., 2002)


THE ROLE OF THE INTERNET

THE INTERNET IS A NETWORK OF NETWORKS OFTHE INTERNET IS A NETWORK OF NETWORKS OF ONE-TO-ONE, ONE-TO-MANY, MANY-TO-MANY, AND MANY-TO-ONE, LOCAL, NATIONAL, AND GLOBAL INFORMATIO. AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES WITH RELATIVELY OPEN STANDARDS AND PROTOCOLS AND COMPARATIVELY LOW BARRIERSPROTOCOLS AND COMPARATIVELY LOW BARRIERS TO ENTRY.


Estimated Global Internet Users in 2002 and 2004Survey Global Users 2002 Global Users 2004y

ITU 627 million 676 million

CIA World Factbook 604 million Not updated

ll d dNUA 606 million Not updated

Internet World Stats 587 million 798 million

Computer Industry Almanac 665 million 945 millionp y

Mean 618 million 806 million

Sources: Analysis of data from ITU, 2004a; U.S. Central Intelligent Agency (CIA), 2003; Computer Industry Almanac, 2004; NUA, 2004Note: * Based on 2003 projections.

(CHADWICK, 2006)


ALL OF THIS HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE KINDS OF AUTHORITY AND CONTROL THAT MAY BE EXERCISED OVER THE INTERNET AND THE LEVELS OF RESISTANCE THAT MAYTHE INTERNET AND THE LEVELS OF RESISTANCE THAT MAY BE ACHIEVED BY LESSPOWERFUL GROUPS, WHOSE VOICES MAY BE ABSENT FROM MAINSTREAM CHANNELS LIKE THE PRESS AND TELEVISION. ORDINARY CITIZENS AND THE POLITICALLY MARGINALIZED ARE NO LONGER WHOLLY DEPENDENT UPON THE WAYS INARE NO LONGER WHOLLY DEPENDENT UPON THE WAYS IN WHICH THE TRADITIONALLY DOMINANT BROADCAST MEDIA CONSTRUCT THEIR IDENTITIES OR SELECTIVELY FRAME POLITICAL GRIEVANCES.


POLITICAL COMMUNICATION ON THE INTERNET BECOMES INPOLITICAL COMMUNICATION ON THE INTERNET BECOMES, IN THE WORDS OF DOUGLAS KELLNER (1999), "MORE DECENTERED AND VARIED IN ITS ORIGINS, SCOPE AND C S O G S, SCOEFFECTS". THE RELATIVE SPEED AND FLUIDITY OF CYBERSPACE SOMETIMES ALLOWS MARGINAL GROUPS TO THRUST THEIR AGENDA INTO THE POLITICAL MAINSTREAM (MITRA, 2001). THE AUTHORITATIVE STATUS OF POWERFUL INSTITUTIONALTHE AUTHORITATIVE STATUS OF POWERFUL INSTITUTIONAL PLAYERS, BE THEY GOVERNMENTS, CORPORATIONS, OR MAINSTREAM MEDIA, HAS BEEN LOOSENED.


POLITICAL ACTORS ARE INCREASINGLY ATTEMPTING TO USE THE INTERNET TO ENHANCE THEIR PRESENCE AND LEGITIMIZE THEIR ACTIVITIES IN WAYS THAT ARE GENUINELY NEWGENUINELY NEW. STATES ARE INCREASINGLY REQUIRED TO REGULATE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR ONLINE AND ARE MONITORING THE USE OF THE INTERNET for ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (SUCH AS PORNOGRAPHY), GROUPS AND MOVEMENTS CONSIDERED TO BE A THREAT TOAND MOVEMENTS CONSIDERED TO BE A THREAT TO POLITICAL STABILITY AND SECURITY (SUCH AS TERRORISM).


A WEB PAGE MAY APPEAR AT FIRST GLANCE TO BE A SIMPLE ONE-TO-MANY DEVICE, BUT OFTEN WEB PAGES ARE COMPOSED OF INFORMATION SUCH ASPAGES ARE COMPOSED OF INFORMATION, SUCH AS NEWS FEEDS, FROM MANY DIFFERENT SOURCES THAT HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TOGETHER BY AUTOMATEDHAVE BEEN BROUGHT TOGETHER BY AUTOMATED SCRIPTS THAT DYNAMICALLY UPDATE CONTENT WITHOUT HUMAN INTERVENTION. WEB PAGES MAYWITHOUT HUMAN INTERVENTION. WEB PAGES MAY ALSO CONTAIN DISCUSSION FORUMS ALONGSIDE MORE TRADITIONAL FORMS OF CONTENT.


DIGITAL DIVIDEDIGITAL DIVIDE


Internet penetration by region, 2002. Sources: Analysis and adaptation of data from ITU, 2004b. The CIA World Factbook 2004 was used to feel a small number of gaps in the 2002 data.

(CHADWICK 2006)


(CHADWICK, 2006)

current issues in public administration

Technology