01 PENNOYER v. NEFF95 U.S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1878)

FactsMitchell brought suit against Neff to recover unpaid legal fees. Mitchell was a lawyer from Oregon. Neff was a resident of California.In the original suit, jurisdiction over Neff was obtained by service of summons by publication. Mitchell published notice of the lawsuit in an Oregon newspaper but did not serve Neff personally.Neff failed to appear and a default judgment was entered against him. To satisfy the judgment Mitchell seized land owned by Neff located in Oregon. The land was sold on auction. Mitchell purchased it and later assigned it to Pennoyer.Neff sued Pennoyer in federal district court in Oregon to recover possession of the property, claiming that the original judgment against him was invalid for lack of jurisdictionover both him and the land. The court found that the judgment in the lawsuit between Mitchell and Neff was invalid and that Neff still owned the land. Pennoyer lost on appeal and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

IssueW/N a state court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident who has not been personally served while within the state and whose property within the state was not attached before the onset of litigation?

HoldingNo. A court may enter a judgment against a non-resident only if the party 1) is personally served with process while within the state, or 2) has property within the state, and that property is attached before litigation begins (i.e. quasi in rem jurisdiction).A personal judgment is without any validity if it be rendered by a State court in an action upon a money demand against a nonresident of the State who was served by a publication of summons, but upon whom no personal service of process within the State was made, and who did not appear; and no title to property passes by a sale under an execution issued upon such a judgment.In an action for money or damages where a defendant does not appear in the court, and is not found within the State, and is not a resident thereof, but has property therein, the jurisdiction of the court extends only over such property. The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits would be deemed in every other forum, as has been said by this Court, an illegitimate assumption of power, and be resisted as mere abuse. In the case against the plaintiff, the property here in controversy sold under the judgment rendered was not attached, nor in any way brought under the jurisdiction of the court. Its first connection with the case was caused by a levy of the execution. It was not, therefore, disposed of pursuant to any adjudication, but only in enforcement of a personal judgment, having no relation to the property, rendered against a nonresident without service of process upon him in the action or his appearance therein.Substituted service by publication, or in any other authorized form, is sufficient to inform a nonresident of the object of proceedings taken where property is once brought under the control of the court by seizure or some equivalent act, but where the suit is brought to determine his personal rights and obligations, that is, where it is merely in personam, such service upon him is ineffectual for any purpose.Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the validity of judgments may be directly questioned on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law. Due process demands that legal proceedings be conducted according to those rules and principles which have been established in our systems of jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights.To give legal proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal with legal authority to pass judgment, and a defendant must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process within the state, or by his voluntary appearance.The substituted service of process by publication in actions brought against non-residents is valid only where property in the state is brought under the control of the court, and subjected to its disposition by process adapted to that purpose, or where the judgment is sought as a means of reaching such property or affecting some interest therein; in other words, where the action is in the nature of a proceeding in rem.The Oregon court did not have personal jurisdiction over Neff because he was not served in Oregon. The courts judgment would have been valid if Mitchell had attached Neffs land at the beginning of the suit. Mitchell could not have done this because Neff did not own the land at the time Mitchell initiated the suit. The default judgment was declared invalid. Therefore, the sheriff had no power to auction the real estate and title never passed to Mitchell. Neff was the legal owner.

DispositionJudgment for Neff affirmed.

02 MULLANE v. CENTRAL HANOVER

FactsCentral Hanover Bank and Trust Co. established a common trust fund according to New York Banking Law. Section 100-c of this law provides that a trust company may, with approval of the State Banking Board, establish a common fund and, within prescribed limits, invest therein the assets of an unlimited number of estates, trusts or other funds of which it is trustee. Each participating trust shares ratably in the common fund, but exclusive management and control is in the trust company as trustee. Provisions are made for accountings twelve to fifteen months after the establishment of a fund and triennially thereafter. In this way, donors and testators of moderately sized trusts are not be denied the service of corporate fiduciaries, which service would not have been extended to them based on their capital standing alone.

In March 1947, Central Hanover Bank petitioned the Surrogate Court for settlement of its first account as common trustee. At this time, it already had 113 trusts (half inter vivos and half testamentary) with a gross capital of nearly $3 million. The only notice given to the beneficiaries (some of whom did not reside in New York) of the application was by publication in a local newspaper in strict compliance with Section 100-c (12) of New York Banking Law, "'After filing such petition (for judicial settlement of its account) the petitioner shall cause to be issued by the court in which the petition is filed and shall publish not less than once in each week for four successive weeks in a newspaper to be designated by the court a notice or citation addressed generally without naming them to all parties interested in such common trust fund and in such estates, trusts or funds mentioned in the petition, all of which may be described in the notice or citation only in the manner set forth in said petition and without setting forth the residence of any such decedent or donor of any such estate, trust or fund.

This is in contrast to the notice it gave to the beneficiaries back when the first investment in the common fund was made, at which time they had been notified by mail.

Appellant Kenneth Mullane appeared specially, objecting that notice by publication was inadequate to afford due process under the 14th Amendment. The Court thus had no jurisdiction to render a final and binding decree.

Issue: w/n the notice by publication given by Central Hanover and Trust Co. to its known beneficiaries is constitutional

Held: NO. We hold the notice of judicial settlement of accounts required by the New York Banking Law 100-c(12) is incompatible with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment of due process as a basis for adjudication depriving known persons whose whereabouts are also known of substantial property rights.

RatioJustice Jackson did not explicitly determine what type of jurisdiction was being exercised here, but held that the Fourteenth Amendment applied to all of them regardless of how the state classified the action. As long as the procedure accords the claimants, resident or non-resident, the full opportunity to appear and be heard, then the Court has a right to hear the case.

When notice is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process. The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected, or, where conditions do not reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes.It would be idle to pretend that publication alone as prescribed here, is a reliable means of acquainting interested parties of the fact that their rights are before the courts. It is not an accident that the greater number of cases reaching this Court on the question of adequacy of notice have been concerned with actions founded on process constructively served through local newspapers. Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home outside the area of the newspaper's normal circulation the odds that the information will never reach him are large indeed. The chance of actual notice is further reduced when as here the notice required does not even name those whose attention it is supposed to attract, and does not inform acquaintances who might call it to attention.

The Court held that those beneficiaries KNOWN to the trustee should have been informed personally of the accounting by ordinary mail. Since the trustee periodically remits income to them, it is reasonable to expect them to give such notice. The statutory notice to known beneficiaries is inadequate, not because in fact it fails to reach everyone, but because under the circumstances it is not reasonably calculated to reach those who could easily be informed by other means at hand. Publication may theoretically be available for all the world to see, but it is too much in our day to suppose that each or any individual beneficiary does or could examine all that is published to see if something may be tucked away in it that affects his property interests.

Mr. Justice BURTON, dissenting.These common trusts are available only when the instruments creating the participating trusts permit participation in the common fund. Whether or not further notice to beneficiaries should supplement the notice and representation here provided is properly within the discretion of the State. The Federal Constitution does not require it here.

03 SHAFFER v. HEITNER (1977)433 U.S. 186APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF DELAWARE MARSHALL, JBackground: The controversy in this case concerns the constitutionality of a Delaware statute that allows a court of that State to take jurisdiction of a lawsuit by sequestering any property of the defendant that happens to be located in Delaware. Appellants contend that the sequestration statute as applied in this case violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment both because it permits the state courts to exercise jurisdiction despite the absence of sufficient contacts among the defendants, the litigation, and the State of Delaware and because it authorizes the deprivation of defendants' property without providing adequate procedural safeguards.FACTS: Greyhound, a Delaware corporation, lost a large antitrust judgment and Heitner initiated a shareholder derivative suit in Delaware against 28 officers and directors of the corporation (i.e. Shaffer,et al). Heitner owned one share of Greyhound stock and was a nonresident of Delaware. Heitner filed a motion for sequestration of stock owned by 21 of the defendants in order to obtain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. The legal situs of the stock was deemed to be in Delaware.The Delaware sequestration statute allowed property within the state to be seized to allow the Delaware court to obtain personal jurisdiction over the owner. Shaffer et al. made a special appearance to challenge the courts jurisdiction on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional. Shaffer also asserted that there were insufficient contacts to confer jurisdiction. The District Court found that the statute was valid, and did not address the minimum contacts argument due to the finding that the legal presence of the stock in Delaware conferred quasi-in rem jurisdiction.ISSUES: 1. Can a state obtain personal jurisdiction over a party based on that partys ownership of property in the state? NO. A state cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over a party based merely on that partys ownership of property in the state.2. Is quasi in rem jurisdiction subject to the constitutional requirements of minimum contacts? YES. It is subject to the constitutional requirements of minimum contacts.HOLDING AND RATIO: Judgement REVERSED. 1. Whether or not a State can assert jurisdiction over a nonresident must be evaluated according to the minimum-contacts standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington.a. In order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exercising "jurisdiction over the interests of persons in the thing." The presence of property in a State may bear upon the existence of jurisdiction by providing contacts among the forum State, the defendant, and the litigation, as for example, when claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and defendant, where it would be unusual for the State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction. b. But where, as in the instant quasi in rem action, the property now serving as the basis for state court jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of action, the presence of the property alone, i.e., absent other ties among the defendant, the State, and the litigation, would not support the State's jurisdiction.c. Though the primary rationale for treating the presence of property alone as a basis for jurisdiction is to prevent a wrongdoer from avoiding payment of his obligations by removal of his assets to a place where he is not subject to an in personam suit, that is an insufficient justification for recognizing jurisdiction without regard to whether the property is in the State for that purpose. Moreover, the availability of attachment procedures and the protection of the Full Faith and Credit Clause also militate against that rationale. 2. In rem jurisdiction: Due process under the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exercising jurisdiction over the interests of persons in the thing. The presence of property in a State may allow jurisdiction by providing contacts among the forum State, the defendant, and the litigation; for example, when claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy.3. Where, as in this case, the property serving as the basis for jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the plaintiffs cause of action, the presence of the property alone, i.e., absent other ties among the defendant, the State, and the litigation, would not support the States jurisdiction.4. Delawares assertion of jurisdiction over appellants, based solely as it is on the statutory presence of appellants property in Delaware, violates the Due Process Clause, which does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations. Appellants holdings in the corporation do not provide contacts with Delaware sufficient to support jurisdiction of that States courts over appellants.5. Delaware state-court jurisdiction is not supported by that States interest in supervising the management of a Delaware corporation and defining the obligations of its officers and directors, since Delaware bases jurisdiction, not on appellants status as corporate fiduciaries, but on the presence of their property in the State.6. Though it may be appropriate for Delaware law to govern the obligations of appellants to the corporation and stockholders, this does not mean that appellants have purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State. Appellants, who were not required to acquire interests in the corporation in order to hold their positions, did not by acquiring those interests surrender their right to be brought to judgment in the States in which they had minimum contacts.

04 DE HOYA v. REYES (2006)

(1) Chester De Hoya is an alleged co-conspirator in a syndicated estafa case filed against several directors and officers of State Resources Development Management Corp. by complainant Manuel Dy Awiten.(2) State Prosecutor found probable cause to file an information and the respondent judge likewise found probable cause to issue an arrest warrant for De Hoya.(3) De Hoya has evaded arrest and refuses to submit to the jurisdiction of the trial court.(4) ACTION: De Hoya filed Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to declare null and void the arrest warrant for lack of probable cause.

ISSUES:(1) WON there was probable cause to issue arrest warrant (YES)(2) SYLLABUS: WON De Hoya could avail of remedies from the court without submitting to its jurisdiction (NO).

SC:RE Arrest Warrant: There was sufficient evidence to show probable cause probable cause:(1) Complainant was enticed to invest a large sum of money.(2) Checks were issued to him as return on capital which were dishonored.(3) Accused De Hoya is an incorporation and director and that he had knowledge of its activities and transactions.

RE type of Jurisdiction (citing Regalado):(1) Over the plaintiff: This is acquired by the filing of the complaint, petition, or initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner.(2) Over the defendant: This is acquired by voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or by coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by the service of summons.(3) Over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction over the parties, cannot be conferred on the court by voluntary act or agreement of the parties.(4) Over the issues of the case: This is determined and conferred by the pleadings filed in the case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at times by their implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as provided in ROC 10.5.(5) Over the res: This is acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the thing in question, thus placing it in custodial egis, as in attachment or garnishment; or by provision of law which recognizes in the court the power to deal with the property or subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in land registration proceedings or suits involving civil status or real property in the Philippines of a non-resident defendant.

RE right of accused to seek relief:There is no reason in this case to allow the petitioner to obtain relief from the courts without submitting to its jurisdiction. His continued refusal to submit to jurisdiction should give the Court more reason to uphold the warrant of arrest so as to place him in the custody of the law and on trial for charges against him. It should be remembered that he who invokes the jurisdiction of the court should first submit to its jurisdiction.

05 REYES v. DIAZMORAN,J.Nov. 26, 1941Topic: Jurisdiction over subject matter

FACTS:The case was appealed to the SC from the CA on the ground that the jurisdiction of the trial court is in issue (no facts were explicitly indicated in the case itself)

DISCUSSION ON JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER:It has been held that the word "jurisdiction" as used in the constitutions and in the statutes "means jurisdiction as to the subject-matter only, unless an exception arises by reason of its employment in a broader sense."

Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its powers. WON a court has jurisdiction over the subject-matter calls for interpretation and application of the law of jurisdiction which distributes the judicial power among the different courts in the Philippines, and since the ruling on the matter affects the very life and structure of our judicial system, the law placed the power and authority to act thereon in the highest court of the land.

In order that a court may validly try and decide a case, it must have jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. But in some instances it is said that the court should also have jurisdiction over the issue.

Jurisdiction on Subject MatterJurisdiction on the Issues

conferred by lawConferred by the pleadings

Cannotmay be conferred by consent either express or implied of the parties

CannotAlthough an issue is not duly pleaded it may validly be tried and decided if no timely objection is made thereto by the parties.

Jurisdiction over the issue is an expression of a principle that is involved in jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. At any rate, whether or not the court has jurisdiction over a specific issue is a question that requires nothing except an examination of the pleadings, and this function is without such importance as call for the intervention of the SC.

ISSUES (allegedly related to jurisdiction):WON there is sufficient to show that the protestant has duly filed his certificate of candidacyWON the trial court has or has no authority to pass upon the validity of the ballots adjudicated to the protestant which have not been challenged by the protestee in his counter-protest.

HELD:ISSUE 1: this is not a question of jurisdiction but a question of factBoth parties agree that if the due filing of the protestant's certificate of candidacy is proven, the trial court has no jurisdiction except to dismiss the case. There is, therefore, no question between the parties as to what the jurisdiction of the trial court is according to law in either case. The real question between them is one of fact. And until this is proven, the question of jurisdiction cannot be determined.

ISSUE 2: this is also not a question of jurisdiction but of relevancy of evidenceAn erroneous ruling on the matter may encroach upon issues completely foreign to those defined in the pleadings, but in such case, it is a question of jurisdiction on the issue and not on the subject matter

DISPOSITIVE:Wherefore, this case is hereby remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

06 BERNABE v. VERGARA EN BANC G.R. No. L-48652 September 16, 1942MORAN,J.:

Facts: Victoriano Zafra died and was survived by his children: Benito, Apolonia and Dominga. Benito (leaving a daughter named Irinea) and Apolonia (leaving 3 children: Lucia, Hipolito, and Barbara) died. This action for partition of the inheritance left by Victoriano was filed by the heirs of Benito and Apolonia against Dominga and the persons to whom she had sold her share in the common property (Brigida Martinez, Amadeo Landicho and Marcelina Landicho).

Domingas Counterclaim: She had paid certain debts contracted by Apolonia which constituted an equitable lien upon the property left by Apolonia.

CFI: Awarded Lucia, Hipolito, and Barbara 1/3 of the common property and ordered them to pay the debts of their mother, Apolonia (Php 350).CA: Referred the case to SC since issues involved are questions of law.

Issue: WON CFI had jurisdiction to render its judgment for Php 350.

SC: CFI had jurisdiction not only because there was a counterclaim wherein the amount adjudged was within the amount pleaded, but because the proceeding was in the nature of one for liquidation and partition of inheritance wherein debts left by the deceased ancestors may be determined and ordered paid if the creditors are parties. The jurisdiction involved is not one over the subject matter but at most over the issue or over the persons of the parties. A CFI has jurisdiction over the case involving P200 or more, and therefore the CFI of Nueva Ecija had jurisdiction to render judgment in the amount of P350. The question of WON there was a proper issue raised in the pleading as to said amount, is not a question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, but jurisdiction over the issue.

Reyes v. Diaz: Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines the court and defines its powers. In some instances it is said that the court should also have jurisdiction over the issue, meaning thereby that the issue being tried and decided by the court be within the issues raised in the pleadings. This kind of jurisdiction should be distinguished from jurisdiction over the subject matter, the latter being conferred by law and the former by the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the issue, unlike jurisdiction over the subject-matter, may be conferred by consent either express or implied of the parties. Although an issue is not duly pleaded it may validly be tried and decided if no timely objection is made thereto by the parties. This cannot be done when jurisdiction over the subject-matter is involved. Jurisdiction over the issue is an expression of a principle that is involved in jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. Where, for instance, an issue is not duly pleaded in the complaint, the defendant cannot be said to have been served with process as to that issue. WON the court has jurisdiction over a specific issue is a question that requires nothing except an examination of the pleadings, and this function is without such importance as to call for the intervention of this court.

Question of jurisdiction raised in the case is not only unsubstantial but is also not the kind of question that may deprive the CA of its appellate jurisdiction over the case. It is hereby ordered that this case be returned to the CA for hearing and decision on the merits.

07 PANTALEON v ASUNCIONMay 22, 1959ConcepcionTopic: Jurisdiction over the person

Facts:On June 12, 1953, Vicenta Pantaleon instituted in the CFI of Nueva Ecija an action to recover from Asuncion the sum of P2, 000. The summons was returned by the sheriff unserved, with the statement that Asuncion is residing in B-24 Tala Estate, Caloocan, Rizal. However, the alias summons was also returned unserved, with information that he had left the Tala estate and diligent efforts to locate him proved to no avail.

On March 1955, the court ordered that Asuncion be summoned by publication, and the summons was published in the Examiner, a newspaper of general circulation in Nueva Ecija. Asucion failed to appear or give an answer, so he was later declared in default. Subsequently, the court rendered judgment against Asuncion for the sum of P 2, 300 with interest.

46 days later, Asuncion filed a petition for relief from the order of default and judgment on the ground of mistake and excusable negligence. His affidavit and verified answer were annexed to his petition.

He stated that: He received in his residence in Quezon City a notice of a registered letter at the Post office in Nueva Ecija. He went to claim the letter, which contained a copy of the order of default and the judgment against him. Had the copy of the summons and order for its publication been sent by mail, he would have received such. The copy of the summons and the order for the publication thereof were not deposited in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by ordinary mail to his last known address, in violation of ROC Rule 7 sec. 21.

Pantaleon argues that the provision applicable is Sec. 16 which provides that when the defendant is an unknown owner or the like, or whenever the address of a defendant is unknown, service may, by leave of court be effected by publication. She also argues that the requirement in Sec. 21 refers to extraterritorial service of summons.

Asuncions petition for relief was denied, and he appealed.

Issue:WON the CFI had jurisdiction over the person of the defendant NO

Ratio:

Section 21 requires proof of service by publication whether the defendant is a resident or not. Sec 16 and Sec. 21 should be read in relation to each other.Strict compliance with the terms of the statute is necessary to confer jurisdiction through service by publication, thus, the court had no authority to issue the default order or render judgment. Both are null and void. Also, since the suit is an action strictly in personam, personal service of summons within the forum is essential to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. Summons by publication cannot confer upon the court jurisdiction over such defendant. The defendants verified answer contains allegations, if true, constitute a good defense, from the viewpoint of substantial justice.

The order declaring defendant in default and the subsequent decision against him are set aside and annulled.

08 DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC.,v. CA

FACTS:Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money and damages against Queensland Hotel, etc. and Teodorico Adarna. The complaint contained anex parteapplication for a writ of preliminary attachment. Judge Nartatez issued an Order granting the ex parteapplication and fixing the attachment bond at P4,600,513.37. Davao Light submitted the attachment bond; writ of attachment was issued.The summons and a copy of the complaint, as well as the writ of attachment and a copy of the attachment bond, were served on defendants Queensland and Adarna; and pursuant to the writ, the sheriff seized properties belonging to the latter.Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to discharge the attachment for lack of jurisdiction to issue the same because at the time the order of attachment was promulgated (May 3, 1989) and the attachment writ issued (May 11, 1989), the Trial Court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the cause and over the persons of the defendants.

ISSUE: whether or not a writ of preliminary attachment may issueex parteagainst a defendant before acquisition of jurisdiction of the latter's person by service of summons or his voluntary submission to the Court's authority

HELD: Yes. Writ of preliminary attachment may issueex parteagainst a defendant even before acquisition of jurisdiction of the latter's person by service of summons or his voluntary submission to the Court's authority

RATIO:

1. There is ordinarily some appreciable interval of time between the day of the filing of the complaint and the day of service of summons on the defendant. During this period, different acts may be done by the plaintiff or by the Court, which are of unquestionable validity and propriety. Among these, for example, are the appointment of a guardianad litem,the grant of authority to the plaintiff to prosecute the suit as a pauper litigant,the amendment of the complaint by the plaintiff as a matter of right without leave of court, authorization by the Court of service of summons by publication,the dismissal of the action by the plaintiff on mere notice.This, too, is true with regard to the provisional remedies of preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction, receivership or replevin. They may be validly and properly applied for and granted even before the defendant is summoned or is heard from.

2. A preliminary attachment may be defined as the provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or other party may, at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party taken into the custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered.

3. It is incorrect to theorize that after an action or proceeding has been commenced and jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff has been vested in the court,but before the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant (either by service of summons or his voluntary submission to the court's authority),nothing can be validly done by the plaintiff or the court.It is wrong to assume that the validity of acts done during this period should be defendant on, or held in suspension until, the actual obtention of jurisdiction over the defendant's person. The obtention by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is one thing; quite another is the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or over the subject-matter or nature of the action, or theresor object hereof.

4. No hearing is required on an application for preliminary attachment, with notice to the defendant, for the reason that this "would defeat the objective of the remedy . . . (since the) time which such a hearing would take, could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property before a writ of attachment issues." Such a procedure would warn absconding debtors-defendants of the commencement of the suit against them and the probable seizure of their properties, and thus give them the advantage of time to hide their assets, leaving the creditor-plaintiff holding the proverbial empty bag; it would place the creditor-applicant in danger of losing any security for a favorable judgment and thus give him only an illusory victory.

5. Whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of defendant, as above indicated issuance of summons, order of attachment and writ of attachment (and/or appointments of guardianad litem,or grant of authority to the plaintiff to prosecute the suit as a pauper litigant, or amendment of the complaint by the plaintiff as a matter of right without leave of court30 and however valid and proper they might otherwise be, these do not and cannot bind and affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by the court, either by service on him of summons or other coercive process or his voluntary submission to the court's authority.

6. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the defendant not only a copy of the applicant's affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of attachment, as explicity required by Section 5 of Rule 57, but also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the complaint and order for appointment of guardianad litem,if any, as also explicity directed by Section 3, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Service of all such documents is indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also upon considerations of fairness, to apprise the defendant of the complaint against him, of the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and the grounds therefor and thus accord him the opportunity to prevent attachment of his property by the posting of a counterbond in an amount equal to the plaintiff's claim in the complaint.

IN SUMMARY: Writs of attachment may properly issueex parteprovided that the Court is satisfied that the relevant requisites therefor have been fulfilled by the applicant, although it may, in its discretion, require prior hearing on the application with notice to the defendant; but that levy on property pursuant to the writ thus issued may not be validly effected unless preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service on the defendant of summons, a copy of the complaint (and of the appointment of guardianad litem, if any), the application for attachment (if not incorporated in but submitted separately from the complaint), the order of attachment, and the plaintiff's attachment bond.

09 BANCO ESPANOL-FILIPINO v. PALANCAG.R. No. 11390; March 26, 1918; Street, J.

DoctrineIn proceedings in rem or quasi in rem against a nonresident who is not served personally within the state, and who does not appear, the relief must be confined to the res, and the court cannot lawfully render a personal judgment against him. In an action to foreclose a mortgage against a nonresident, upon whom service has been effected exclusively by publication, no personal judgment for the deficiency can be entered.

Facts Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng (Engracio) executed a mortgage over various parcels of real property as security for a debt he owed to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. His debt amounted to P218,294.10 and was drawing interest at the rate of 8% per annum. The value of the property was P292,558, about P75,000 in excess of the indebtedness. After the execution of the mortgage, he returned to China, his native country, and there he died on January 29, 1910. On March 31, 1908, Banco Espanol instituted an action to foreclose the mortgage. It gave notice to the defendant by publication, who was a nonresident at the time, pursuant to Sec 399, Code of Civil Procedure. The court further directed the clerk of court to deposit in the post office in a stamped envelope a copy of the summons and complaint directed to Engracio at his last place of residence in China. Whether the clerk complied with the order does not affirmatively appear. There is, however, an affidavit signed by an employee of the attorneys for the bank showing that he had deposited in the Manila post office a registered letter addressed to Engracio, containing the other documents. Engracio not having appeared, judgment was taken by the CFI against him by default. He was found indebted to the bank in the amount of P249,355.32 with interest from March 31, 1908. He was ordered to satisfy the amount on or before July 6, 1908, else the mortgaged property shall be exposed to a public sale. He never made payment and so the court ordered the sale of the property, which was bought by the bank with P110,200. On June 25, 1915, Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of Engracio, requested the court to set aside the order of default, arguing that the order and the judgment rendered were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action and yet it entered a personal judgment against the absent debtor for the full amount of the indebtedness. Lower court denied the application to vacate the judgment.

Issues/Held/Ratio1. W/N CFI acquired the necessary jurisdiction to enable it to proceed with the foreclosure of the mortgage YES0. Jurisdiction may refer to (1) the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation. The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.0. Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, (ACTUAL SEIZURE) or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective (POTENTIAL JURISDICTION). In the latter case the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all.0. In American law, foreclosure of mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem. Action in rem refer to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based. Actions quasi in rem are those where an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property.2. In proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. Where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem.0. In an ordinary attachment proceeding, if the defendant is not personally served, the preliminary seizure is to be considered necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the court. If a lien already exists, whether created by mortgage, contract, or statute, the preliminary seizure is not necessary; and the court proceeds to enforce such lien in the manner provided by law precisely as though the property had been seized upon attachment. Either way, the court is exercising a jurisdiction over the property in a proceeding essentially in rem.0. Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person.4. If, however, the defendant is a nonresident and, remaining beyond the range of the personal process of the court refuses to come in voluntarily, the court never acquires jurisdiction over the person at all. The property itself is the sole thing which is impleaded and is the responsible object which is the subject of the exercise of judicial power. 4. The jurisdiction of the court in such case is based exclusively on the power which, under the law, it possesses over the property. No other relief can be granted in this proceeding than such as can be enforced against the property. 0. In proceedings in rem or quasi in rem against a nonresident who is not served personally within the state, and who does not appear, the relief must be confined to the res, and the court cannot lawfully render a personal judgment against him. In an action to foreclose a mortgage against a nonresident, upon whom service has been effected exclusively by publication, no personal judgment for the deficiency can be entered. 5. In a foreclosure proceeding against a nonresident owner it is necessary for the court, as in all cases of foreclosure, to ascertain the amount due, as prescribed in section 256 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and to make an order requiring the defendant to pay the money into court. This step is a necessary precursor of the order of sale. It is not a personal judgment.5. Whatever may be the effect in other respects of the failure of the clerk to mail the proper papers to the defendant in China, such irregularity could in no wise impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court, for that jurisdiction rest upon a basis much more secure than would be supplied by any form of notice that could be given to a resident of a foreign country. 1. W/N the proceedings were conducted in such manner as to constitute due process of law YES1. The requirement of due process in judicial proceedings are as follows: (1) a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it, (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property, (3) defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard, and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.1. To be given opportunity to be heard, it is essential that there must be some notification to the nonresident owner prescribing the time within which his appearance must be made. The requirement is that the judge shall direct that the notice be deposited in the mail by the clerk of the court, not that the notice must be deposited in the mail. Notice by publication in a newspaper is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. When the court made the order to send notice by mail, the requirement was complied with.1. W/N Engracio was prejudiced by the irregularity NO2. There is a presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary habits of life in the Code of Civil Procedure. It is permissible to consider the probability that the defendant may have received actual notice of the proceedings from the unofficial notice mailed by the bank attorneys. The defendant voluntarily abandoned all though of saving his property from the obligation which he had placed upon it.1. W/N there are grounds which support the proposal to unsettle judicial proceedings NO3. Palanca argues that the clerk failed to send the notice by post as required by the order of the court. However, there is a legal presumption that the clerk performed his duty as the ministerial officer of the court, which presumption is not overcome by any other facts. Every act of a court of general jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly done.1. W/N a motion to vacate judgment is admissible as a proceeding to obtain relief in this case NO4. The proper remedy was by an original proceeding (Secs 113 and 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure) and not by motion to vacate judgment.

Judgment affirmed.

Dissent (Malcolm, J): The defendant received no notice and had no opportunity to be heard, certainly there was no due process of law.

10 SIEVERT v. CA (1988)Feliciano, J | Dec 22, 1988

FACTS: Alberto Sievert, a citizen and resident of the Philippines received by mail a Petition for Issuance of a Preliminary Attachment filed with RTC Manila had not previously received any summons and any copy of a complaint against him Come hearing, petitioner's counsel went before the trial court and entered a special appearance for the limited purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court petitioner prayed for denial for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner (defendant therein) since no summons had been served upon him on the main case RTC denied RoC 57.1, it is clear that a plaintiff or any proper party may "... at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party attached as the security for the satisfaction of any judgment ..." This rule would overrule the contention that this Court has no jurisdiction to act on the application. Same day, petitioner filed a Petition for certiorari with CA CA dismissed Rule 57.1; Moran, citing American jurisprudence on this point, stated thus: "Commencement of action. Action is commenced by filing of the complaint, even though summons is not issued until a later date." Thus, a writ of preliminary attachment may issue upon filing of the complaint even before issuance of the summons Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC

ISSUE: WoN a court which has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in the main case, may bind such defendant or his property by issuing a writ of preliminary attachment (NO)

HELD: petition granted, CA reversed

There is no question that a writ of preliminary attachment may be applied for a plaintiff "at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter" in the cases enumerated in RoC 57.1 The critical time which must be identified in the case at bar is, when the trial court acquires authority under law to act coercively against the defendant or his property in a proceeding in attachment. That critical time is the time of the vesting of jurisdiction in the court over the person of the defendant in the main case. Attachment is an ancillary remedy. It is not sought for its own sake but rather to enable the attaching party to realize upon relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action. A court which has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendant, cannot bind that defendant whether in the main case or in any ancillary proceeding Notice of the separate attachment petition is not notice of the main action. Jurisdiction whether ratione personae or ratione materiae in an attachment proceeding is ancillary to jurisdiction ratione personae or ratione materiae in the main action against the defendant. If a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant in the principal action, it simply has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary attachment against the defendant or his property. CAB: It is not disputed that neither service of summons with a copy of the complaint nor voluntary appearance of petitioner Sievert was had in this case. Want of jurisdiction of the trial court to proceed in the main case against the defendant is quite clear. The requirements of the Rules of Court for issuance of preliminary attachment must be strictly and faithfully complied with in view of the nature of this provisional remedy: Salas v. Adil: a rigorous remedy which exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance, such [that] it should not be abused as to cause unnecessary prejudice