DEATH, BEING, AND OTHER: HEIDEGGER, LEVINAS, AND

TOLSTOY ON DEATH

_______________

A Thesis

Presented to the

Faculty of

San Diego State University

_______________

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

in

Philosophy

_______________

by

Justin R. Murray

Summer 2011

iii

Copyright © 2011

by

Justin R. Murray

All Rights Reserved

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to those who still believe the question, “what is the good life

and how can I live it?” is an important one.

v

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

Death, Being, and Other: Heidegger, Levinas, and Tolstoy on Death

by Justin R. Murray

Master of Arts in Philosophy San Diego State University, 2011

In the twentieth century, the topic of death plays an important role for some philosophers. The German philosopher Martin Heidegger places the understanding of one’s death as a turning point in his philosophy. Referencing Leo Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilych as an example, Heidegger argues that most people go through life in avoidance of the reality of death. Heidegger believes that by “anticipating” death one can recover an “authentic” way of being. Much of Heidegger’s philosophy provides an account of what goes on in The Death of Ivan Ilych, but there is a real difficulty for Heidegger to explain the end of the novella. In the work of the French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, a contemporary of Heidegger, one finds a different understanding of death. Levinas argues that death reveals the importance not of recovering oneself but, rather, the importance of others. The work of Levinas stands in direct opposition to Heidegger’s and this is particularly evident in how each philosopher approaches the topic of death. By first examining how philosophy has historically understood death, this paper will then turn to how both of these philosopher’s understand of death, we then be able to turn and examine how Heidegger and Levinas’ philosophies relate to the characters and situations in Tolstoy’s novella. By the end of this paper, it will be shown that Levinas gives the more complete account of death. It is Levinas that is able to provide a not only a philosophical attestation of the final chapter of The Death of Ivan Ilych, but also an answer to Tolstoy’s question of what meaning can be established in the face of death.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................... v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... viii

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1

2 PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLICATIONS OF DEATH .................................................... 4

Ancient Greek: Plato ............................................................................................ 4

Hellenistic: Epicurus ............................................................................................ 6

Early Christianity: St. Paul ................................................................................... 8

Medieval: Augustine ............................................................................................ 9

Renaissance: Montaigne ..................................................................................... 11

Enlightenment: Spinoza ..................................................................................... 14

Twentieth Century: Heidegger and Levinas ........................................................ 14

3 HEIDEGGER: BEING-TOWARDS-DEATH .......................................................... 16

Authenticity and Others ..................................................................................... 16

The Analysis of Death ........................................................................................ 21

Encounter with Death ......................................................................................... 22

Inauthenticity and the They ................................................................................ 24

Anxiety Shatters ................................................................................................. 28

Anticipating Death ............................................................................................. 30

4 LEVINAS: BEING AGAINST DEATH .................................................................. 33

Separation and Transcendence ........................................................................... 34

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Critique of Heidegger ......................................................................................... 35

The Limits of Knowing Death ............................................................................ 36

Passivity Against Death ..................................................................................... 38

Death and Relationship to the Other ................................................................... 41

The Other and Transcendence ............................................................................ 42

Meaning Beyond Death ...................................................................................... 44

5 THE DEATH OF IVAN ILYCH ............................................................................. 47

A Heideggarian Reading .................................................................................... 48

A Levinasian Reading ........................................................................................ 52

Tolstoy’s Question Answered ............................................................................ 55

6 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 59

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................... 61

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My thanks to my chair, Peter Atterton, whose mentorship and careful critique guided

me through this process. My gratitude also goes out to my readers, Steve Barbone and

Rebecca Moore, whose attentiveness, comments, and time spent in discussion were

invaluable in completing this project. Lastly, and most importantly, to my wife, Melissa,

whose support was unwavering, though not unquestioning. I am grateful for each of these

individuals helping me to complete this thesis.

1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

At the age of 51, the Russian novelist Leo Tolstoy found himself in the midst of a

deep depression. He had fame and fortune from having written the great novels Anne

Karenina (1877) and War and Peace (1869) but he believed these accomplishments meant

nothing in the face of his impending death. In his autobiographical work, Confession, Tolstoy

puts his concerns into the form of a question:

What will come of what I do today and tomorrow? What will come of my entire life? Expressed differently, this question may be: Why should I live? Why should I wish for anything or do anything? Or to put it still differently: Is there any meaning in my life that will not be destroyed by my inevitably approaching death?1

The questions raised by Tolstoy have vexed philosophers for centuries as well.

Tolstoy writes in the Confession of how he studied philosophy, but found no consolation,

“my wanderings among the fields of knowledge not only failed to lead me out of my despair

but rather increased it.”

The question and finding an answer to it come to consume Tolstoy. This was a man who had

reached the pinnacle of success, from a writer’s point of view, yet, to him, all of it amounted

to nothing when faced with the inevitability of his death. The inexorable approach of death

makes him question his entire life and its meaning.

2

1 Leo Tolstoy, Confession, trans. David Patterson (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1983), 34-35. 2 Ibid., 48.

From ancient Greece, through the Middle Ages, and on into the

Enlightenment, many great thinkers have sought answers to questions such as those raised by

Tolstoy. In the twentieth century, the topic of death plays another important role for some

2

philosophers. The German philosopher Martin Heidegger places the understanding of one’s

relationship with death as a turning point in his philosophy. Heidegger believes that by

“anticipating” death one can recover an “authentic” way of being.

In 1886, Tolstoy published his first major work since falling into depression, The

Death of Ivan Ilych. This novella is the tale of a man who, after a life of some success, has to

face the fact he is slowly dying. For much of the story, Ivan is in avoidance of this fact and

when he is no longer able to do that, he merely laments his existence. However, by the end of

the story, Ivan is able to find peace in the face of his death. It seems that Tolstoy places many

of his own difficulties of understanding the meaning of life in the face of death into the

character of Ivan Ilych. Tolstoy’s story becomes a literary account of how one comes to

relate with death and dying. Referencing The Death of Ivan Ilych as an example, Heidegger

argues that most people go through life in avoidance of the reality of death. Much of

Heidegger’s philosophy provides an account of what goes on in The Death of Ivan Ilych, but

there is a real difficulty for Heidegger to explain the end of the novella.

In the work of the French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, a contemporary of

Heidegger, one finds a different understanding of death. Levinas argues that death reveals the

importance not of recovering oneself but, rather, the importance of others. The work of

Levinas stands in direct opposition to Heidegger’s and this is particularly evident in how

each philosopher approaches the topic of death. By first examining how both of these

philosopher’s understand of death, we then be able to turn and examine how their

philosophies relate to the characters and situations in Tolstoy’s novella. By the end of this

paper, it will be shown that Levinas gives the more complete account of death. It is Levinas

that is able to provide a not only a philosophical attestation of the final chapter of The Death

3

of Ivan Ilych, but also an answer to Tolstoy’s question of what meaning can be established in

the face of death.

4

CHAPTER 2

PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLICATIONS OF DEATH

ANCIENT GREEK: PLATO The philosophic discussion of death starts, as with most long running discussions in

philosophy, in ancient Greece. In Plato’s works, death is the main topic of the Phaedo and is

also present in sections in the Apology. In the latter work, Socrates states that death is one of

two things, “either it is annihilation, and the dead have no consciousness of anything, or, as

we are told, it is really a change–a migration of the soul from this place to another.”3

3 Plato, Apology, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, trans.

Hugh Tredennick (New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1961), 25.

According to Socrates’ assessment, death is either an end or perhaps a new beginning. The

suspicion that death may not be an end is present even at the earliest stages of the

philosophical exploration of death. Both of these interpretations on what may come with

death are presented as being acceptable views. In the Apology, there is no discussion of the

stance one should take towards the possibility of an afterlife; whether to understand death as

an end or a new beginning becomes a recurring fork on the road to understanding death’s

significance. Why might this be significant to the present investigation of how one should

relate to death? From one’s standpoint as a living being, death presents itself as an end. As no

credible reports have come from the dead as to what the end is like, there is no first-hand

knowledge of what happens at and after death. The question remains as to what stance one

should take in the face of death. In the discussion of the Apology, Socrates leaves the

5

decision up to us. The reasons are not given to favor one interpretation or the other. Death is

something each individual ought to come to terms with.

It is in the Phaedo where Socrates discusses how he comes to terms with his own

death. Socrates’ friends and family are gathered around, yet the only one who is not filled

with grief or is even the least bit somber, is Socrates. If anything, Socrates seems at least

complacent and at most, excited at his impending death. Those who have come to pay their

last respects are far more fearful, depressed, and apprehensive than Socrates, but he uses his

usual enthusiasm to dispel these concerns. Most of the arguments presented are in

consideration of the immortality of the soul, and each of them are lacking in one way or

another. Early on in the dialogue, Socrates makes a claim that marks one of the seminal

remarks in the discussion on death:

Those who really apply themselves in the right way to philosophy are directly and of their own accord preparing themselves for dying and death. If this is true, and they have actually been looking forward to death all their lives, it would of course be absurd to be troubled when the thing comes for which they have so long been preparing and looking forward.4

The key thought presented here is that philosophy, when done correctly, is a preparation for

death. The philosopher, as represented by Socrates, is ever ignorant. Knowledge is not what

he possesses but rather that which he seeks. The philosopher who applies philosophy “in the

right way,” is searching for the wisdom which is recognized to be lacking. There is a

certainty in every mature individual of death. One’s mortality is guaranteed. That which is

lacking in this instance is a proper relationship towards death. Philosophy in this way

becomes a life in pursuit of wisdom and not about the possession of wisdom; a continual

4 Plato, Phaedo, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, trans.

Hugh Tredennick (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), 49.

6

endeavor to understand and adequately relate to the task of dying. Death, for Socrates, brings

us to terms with the limits of the body and the recognition of a means to get beyond it, what

he calls his soul. The “preparing” for death represents the position that the philosopher takes

to life as a whole. The soul is the part of the individual that is able to transcend the limits of

the body and access the realm of being beyond this one. It is a cultivation of the soul such

that when death comes, it will not perish or be any less for the demise of the body. The

philosopher’s goal is to separate the body from the soul. Death, as the ultimate unknown and

end, gives the philosopher a ground with which to practice her craft. The study of

philosophy, as pursuit of wisdom, lends itself to casting out the fear of death by making it the

project of one’s life preparation for dispelling the limit and ignorance that death represents.

Life becomes a rehearsal for death, and if one has properly rehearsed, there should be no fear

of the final show.

HELLENISTIC: EPICURUS That death is something not to be feared was an important part of many of the Greek

and Hellenistic schools, which came later. Philosophy as being a preparation for death was

crucial to the thought of philosophers that followed Plato and Aristotle. Death is problematic

for some because it represents an unknown. Not all philosophers were ready to accept Plato’s

idea of death as the soul’s escape from the body. Rather than the prospect of the

transmigration of the soul, one is faced with the daunting prospect of death as annihilation. It

is Epicurus who responds to this with an argument on why we should not fear death:

Get used to believing that death is nothing to us. For all good and bad consists in sense-experience, and death is the privation of sense experience. […] So death, the most frightening of bad things, is nothing to us; since when we exist, death is not present, and when death is present, then we do not exist. Therefore, it is

7

relevant neither to the living nor to the dead, since it does not affect the former, and the latter does not exist.5

5 Epicurus, “Letter to Menoeceus,” in The Epicurus Reader, trans. and ed. Brad Inwood and L.P. Gerson

(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1994), 29.

Epicurus was a materialist who believed that all things were composed of simple indivisible

particles or atoms. The combination of these atoms is not only responsible for the body but

also the soul. The delicate atoms that form what is called “the soul” also control our

perception of pleasure and pain. On his view, we only can experience pleasure and pain

while the collection and configuration of atoms that make us alive remain in that

configuration. At death, the atoms that make us how we are disperse. After death there is

nothing that affects a person, because there is no more “person.” There is a collection of

atoms that would be called a body, but the atoms that animated it have dispersed. When

viewed in this way, death can cause us no pain, and since it cannot do so, we have no reason

to fear. If I am dead, then “I” am no longer, and death does not pose a problem. If I am alive,

then my death is not yet real and I need not worry about it.

Epicurus’ view is very much focused on what is observable in this world. A

materialistic interpretation of the world makes sure that there is no need to worry about an

afterlife. The soul dies along with the body. It is a waste of time and energy to worry about

our death. Instead of lamenting a pain that most likely we will never experience, we should

be enjoying life. Philosophy here is used to a practical effect. It assuages one’s fear of death.

Rather than lamenting the coming of the end, Epicurus is able to provide a sound reason that

one should get past our fear and focus on living the good in life.

8

EARLY CHRISTIANITY: ST. PAUL The close relationship of philosophy, death, and life becomes a theme in the ancient

period of philosophy. The writings of the Stoics (Seneca, Horace, and Cicero) and

Epicureans (Lucretius) for the most part build on the major ideas in the presentations of death

by Plato and Epicurus respectively. The influence of the ancient period also has an impact on

the thought of the Middle Ages. However, with the rise of Christianity in the Middle Ages,

the discussion of death shifts with a greater significance on resurrection and immortality. The

significance of the resurrection of Jesus and the promise of an afterlife begins to permeate

more completely the discussion on death. In the writings of St. Paul, we see that the doctrine

of resurrection is crucial to Christianity. In his letter to Corinthians, St. Paul makes this clear,

“If the dead are not raised, then Christ is not risen: and if Christ be not risen, then our

preaching is in vain, and your faith is also in vain […]. Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we

die.”6 Paul is emphasizing the importance of the concept of resurrection to the Christian

message. If resurrection, whatever it entails, is not true, then the Christian faith is futile and

the Epicurean response to death would seem to be best answer. At the end of Paul’s remarks

he uses a statement from Isaiah7

The belief that the resurrection of Christ signals that there will be immortality for all

who worship Jesus becomes central to Christianity’s message. Even so, it should be noted,

that Paul is responding to the doubts of his followers about the possibility of resurrection, and

that would seem to affirm the belief that without

resurrection and the promise of immortality, life loses a dimension of meaning.

6 1 Cor. 15:13-14, 15:32. KJV. 7 “And behold joy and gladness, slaying oxen, and killing sheep, eating flesh, and drinking wine: let us eat

and drink; for tomorrow we shall die.” Isaiah 22:13. KJV

9

thereby the hope of immortality. St. Paul, in this same section, again reaffirms the importance

of immortality by citing the Old Testament when he says,

When the perishable has been clothed with the imperishable, and the mortal with immortality, then the saying written will come true: “Death will be swallowed up in victory.” “Where, O death, is thy victory? Where, O death, is thy sting?”8

MEDIEVAL: AUGUSTINE

Through a belief in the resurrection of Christ, what is being offered is a pathway to escape

the finality of death.

While it can be debated if Augustine is a representative of the medieval period, there

little doubt that his thinking greatly influenced that period. In the thought of Augustine, there

arise two significant developments in the philosophical discussion of death. On one hand,

there is a more philosophical understanding of the possibility of an afterlife. On the other,

there is the account from Confessions, where Augustine describes the profound effect that

death has on him. These two insights are both important developments but for very different

reasons.

In Confessions, Augustine recounts both his intellectual and spiritual maturation. A

major turning point for Augustine occurs after one of his close friends dies suddenly and the

experience throws him back on himself. He says, “I became a great riddle to myself, and I

asked my soul, why was she so sad, and why she disquieted me sorely: but she knew not

what to answer me.”9

8 1 Cor. 15: 54-55. KJV. In Otherwise than Being, Levinas will respond to this same statement in his

thoughts on death. 9 St. Augustine, The Confessions, trans. R.S. Pine-Coffin (New York: Penguin Group, 1961), 75.

As is the case with many people, the death of someone close gives

pause to consider our own life, or more correctly, our death. For Augustine, the death of the

10

other opens up a space for something that he had not considered and to which he does not

have an answer. Death becomes Augustine’s “most cruel enemy,”10

To cope, Augustine seems to turn to philosophy to help him grapple with this

“enemy.” The hope of the Christian resurrection is a means of perhaps escaping death’s

grasp. However, even if the resurrection is possible, death is still something that happens to

the living. Augustine has the insight that it is the dead who have lost their life, but the living

experience death.

an idea that gnaws at

him.

11

In City of God, Augustine further develops his thoughts on death and afterlife, to

troubling ends. In particular, Augustine discovers that with the promise of an afterlife, there

is a possibility for a “double death.” Just as the body dies when abandoned by the soul, “the

On one level, what is revealed here is that after someone has died, he is

gone and it is those left behind that must pick up the pieces and go on. Epicurus would agree

that the dead do not concern themselves with experiencing death. The dead experience

nothing. The death that Augustine has touched on is the recognition of his own mortality. As

a living, reasoning being, he must carry the weight of his coming death. He experiences the

double meaning of “to die.” On the one hand, there is death, the final occurrence; on the

other, there is also the understanding of “to die” as dying as a process one moves towards.

Augustine is confessing that he now has to live with the recognition of that possibility. As

Augustine states, the promise of Christianity and the consolation of philosophy provide for

him a means to assuage these deep concerns.

10 Ibid., 76. 11 Ibid., 80.

11

death of a soul [is] when God abandons it.”12 The first death to which one is subject to is the

death of the body. The second death comes after the first and is the one that is somewhat in

question. Through God, one can attain immortality, and be free from death or be subject to a

second death, death of the soul. Augustine grounds this belief in a quotation from the book of

Matthew, “Do not be afraid of those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul. Rather, be

afraid of the One who can destroy both soul and body in hell.”13

RENAISSANCE: MONTAIGNE

Augustine here associates

the punishment of hell with the abandonment of the soul by God, thereby creating a new

death to grapple with. Through belief in the resurrection, there arises the possibility of

escaping the finality of death. In bringing forth the possibility of a second death, the death of

the soul without God, Augustine reopens the possibility for not only annihilation in death but

something worse, eternal punishment as perpetual separation from God. This thought opens

the ground to a new problem in the later medieval understanding and orientation of death.

The tensions raised by Augustine are perpetuated throughout the thought of the

Middle Ages. Christianity had presented itself as an answer to the problem of death; its

doctrines became its own problem in dealing with death. Jacques Choron writes on this same

tension saying:

It is in part the unbearable tensions that developed in connection with the Christian answer to death have not only led to the undermining of the Christian answer, but contributed to the decline of the absolute domination of Christianity over Western thought. […] The hereafter has become, through the efforts of the

12 St. Augustine, The City of God. in Thinking Through Death, eds. Scott Kramer and Kuang-Ming Wu

(Malabar, FL: Robert E Krieger Publishing Company, Inc., 1988), 143. 13 Matthew 10:28. NIV.

12

Church, a source of terror and not consolation. Instead of reward, most people could expect only retribution.14

By the late Middle Ages, the focus has been shifted from death being a problem in this life to

one where the promise of immortality is becoming a burden rather than a salvation. Death in

this period had become an obsession. As historian Huizinga notes, “No other epoch has laid

so much stress as the expiring Middle Ages on the thought of death.”

15

In his work The Essays, Montaigne picks up the discussion of death where ancient

philosophy left off. Although Montaigne attributes the meditation on this thought to Cicero,

one of his entries into The Essays, “To Philosophize Is to Learn How to Die,” clearly harkens

back to Socrates’ statement in Phaedo. Quotations from ancient Hellenistic philosophers on

the topic of death are peppered throughout this particular essay. While in previous

philosophical writings there is a kind of theoretical detachment from the issue, in Montaigne,

it becomes deeply personalized. For Montaigne, death is not an abstract topic but something

The fear that so many

writers in ancient thought had rallied against now rises up and permeates society. The need to

understand death in a different way from what medieval thought had come up with marks the

beginning of the turn that will come about in the Renaissance. In response to this tension,

there is a need to bring the understanding of death away from a discussion of an afterlife to

what death means in this life. The writings of some early Renaissance writers, and in

particular those of Michel de Montaigne, mark the start of the response to the medieval

notions and a return to the discussion of what death means for life.

14 Jacques Choron, Death and Western Thought (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), 91. 15 Johan Huizing, The Waning of the Middle Ages (Mineola: Dover Publications, 1999), 124.

13

that he must come to terms with. Death must be understood if one is to live life well.16 As

commentator Graham Parkes notes in his study of the work of Montaigne and death, “There

is a distinctive strain in [Montaigne’s] thinking about death that, as it were, brings it back to

life.”17 Montaigne takes the ancient formulation of death and reworks it into a call to action,

“To practice death is to practice freedom. A man who has learned to die has unlearned how

to be a slave.”18 It is through death, Montaigne indicates here, that we can know how to cast

off the fears that would hold us back. Rather than preparing oneself for the possibility of

eternal reward or punishment, Montaigne indicates that one would be better suited living life

against death: “We must learn to stand firm and fight [death].”19

One’s death is not cause for despair but rather a call to action. Montaigne is trying to

grapple with his own concerns of death, and in doing so shows the way death can reorient

life. He writes, “The usefulness of living lies not in duration, but in what you make of it. […]

Whether you have lived enough depends not on a count of years but on your will.”

The possibility of death as

an end marks out the time that we have to make life worthwhile.

20

16 Heidegger argues a similar point some 400 years later. 17 Graham Parks, “Death and Detachment: Montaigne, Zen, Heidegger and the Rest,” in Death and

Philosophy, eds. Jeff Malpas and Robert C. Solomon (New York: Routledge 1998), 86. 18 Michel de Montaigne, “To Philosophize is to Learn How to Die,” in The Essays: A Selection. trans.

M.A. Screech (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 24. 19 Ibid., 24. 20 Ibid., 34.

Montaigne would have us take ownership of death and in doing so take charge of life. It is

not just that there is no reason to fear death; rather there is a call to action to live against

death. In doing so, one is able to maximize life in the face of death.

14

ENLIGHTENMENT: SPINOZA With Montaigne, a shift begins in Western thought as it relates to death. This shift in

understanding is seen clearly in the work of Benedict Spinoza. In his Ethics, Spinoza states

that “A free man thinks of death least of all things, and his wisdom is a meditation, not on

death, but on life.”21

TWENTIETH CENTURY: HEIDEGGER AND LEVINAS

This stands in sharp contrast to what was argued by Montaigne, but it

does contain some of his insight. Rather than keep death at the front of the mind and use it to

press boldly into life, Spinoza seems to suggest one think about death as little as possible. It

is not that one should strike the thought of death from the mind but rather that the free

person, namely the philosopher, is concerned about how to make life best. To live in fear of

death would not be living out of pursuit of the good but rather to avoid the evil seen in death.

To live in fear of death would be to remain passive against it. Life, then, becomes a servitude

to that fear of death, rather than living life for its own sake. Spinoza would have us be active

in the face of death in a way Montaigne might find agreeable. To live well, one must

remember that death is coming but not be fearful of it. Use the time given to live, to do what

one can to make life meaningful before death comes.

The historical development of death takes another turn in the twentieth century. The

German philosopher Martin Heidegger has maybe the most to say on death. Heidegger places

death as one of the most important components in the philosophical presentation of Being

and Time. Perhaps the only other philosopher who made the understanding of death so

central to his philosophy is Emmanuel Levinas. For Levinas, death is at the heart of his

21 Benedict Spinoza, The Ethics, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 192.

15

concept of ethics. This is most apparent in his work Totality and Infinity, but it is also a

recurrent theme through many of his other works. These two philosophers represent some of

the most significant writings on the importance of death in the more recent discussion.

They are also significant in their proximity to one another. Levinas was for a short

time a student of Heidegger. However, Heidegger’s and Levinas’ philosophies could not be

more dissimilar. Heidegger was primarily concerned with tracing the ontology of being, how

the world is in its existence. Levinas, on the other hand, interpreted the whole of Western

philosophy as an ontology. Instead of looking at what is reducible to the common concept of

“being” (something Heidegger was very concerned to do), Levinas’ philosophy focuses on

how the “otherness” of another individual interrupts my being and calls me into question.

After examining each of these two philosophers’ thoughts on life and death, I intend to argue

that it is Levinas who gives a more complete account of one’s relationship to death. The

historical accounts will inform each of their understandings, and with that in hand, one can

be able find an answer to Tolstoy’s question that he asks at the turn of his own life: “Is there

any meaning in my life that will not be destroyed by my inevitable approaching death.”22

22 Tolstoy, Confession, 35.

Levinas’ insights show how short-sighted Heidegger’s understanding of death is and that a

complete understanding of death must include with it a way not only to ensure a good life but

also a good death.

16

CHAPTER 3

HEIDEGGER: BEING-TOWARDS-DEATH

To begin understanding Heidegger’s work and how death becomes central to it, we

should first gain some understanding of his philosophy. The discussion in Being and Time

depends on understanding the use of the term, “Dasein.” At a basic level, it could be said that

“Dasein” is an individual human being. Rather than using terms like “persons” or “humans,”

which are already laden with traditional metaphysical interpretations, Heidegger uses

“Dasein” to draw out what is particular about our way of being in the world. The German

word “Dasein” is commonly translated as “existence” or more literally as “being there.”

Heidegger explains that Dasein is “this entity which each of us is himself and which includes

inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being.”23

AUTHENTICITY AND OTHERS

As Dasein, we are each an existing entity

and have the ability to consider how we shall be in the world. What the concept of being

there points out is that each of us is in a world surrounded by particular things, equipment,

goals, and activities that make up our particular situations. Heidegger’s project is to

understand Dasein by looking into how it is in its world.

Heidegger states that it is our possibilities and how we are oriented towards them that

define how we are in the world. As he says:

23 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper &

Row, 1962), 27.

17

In each case Dasein is its possibility, and “has” this possibility but not just as a property, [...] And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility it can, in its very Being, “choose” itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only “seem” to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic—that is something of its own—can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. […] As modes of being, authenticity and in- authenticity are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness.24

With all this talk of the individual that is a Dasein, it is important to note that

Heidegger mentions that “Dasein in itself is essentially being-with [others] (Mitsein).”

By “authentic,” Heidegger is asserting that there are possibilities that are more proper

or original to a Dasein. An authentic possibility would be one that is distinctly one’s own in

the sense that it takes into account the particulars of one’s situation. There are also

possibilities that are not Dasein’s own and by taking them up, Dasein loses itself and

becomes inauthentic. Inauthentic possibilities would include types of arbitrary social

pressures, like the need to marry by a certain age. Heidegger comes to argue that death is the

most authentic of our possibilities.

25

Another essential characteristic of Dasein is that its existence implies a world with others.

Dasein does not exist alone. Even when Dasein is empirically alone, that still shows that

Dasein is first with others. As Heidegger says of one’s relation to others, “Dasein’s Being-

alone is Being-with in the world. The Other can be missing only in and for a Being-with.

Being alone is a deficient mode of Being-with; its very possibility is proof of this.”26

24 Ibid., 68. 25 Ibid., 156. 26 Ibid., 157.

When

one is alone, it is only in reference either to wanting to escape from others or to being away

from others.

18

An important feature of Dasein is the action one takes with regard to other Daseins.

This Heidegger calls “solicitude,” which is another type of concern for Dasein. Solicitude is

the way in which one interacts with others. Solicitude shows itself in two positive forms: it

can “leap in” and “leap ahead.”27 By “leaping in,” Dasein takes over what would otherwise

concern the Other. We can see this kind of mode readily in the relation of parents to children.

Parents generally can provide and care for children in such a way that the children are not

concerned with how the food gets to the table. The other type of solicitude, “Leaping ahead,”

is the concern which can be seen when something is provided for the other, but in a way that

the doing is such that the individual is now open to make an authentic choice. The distinction

between “leaping in” and “leaping ahead” can be seen as the way between giving someone

something and educating someone. Heidegger explains “leaping ahead” as helping “the Other

to becomes transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it.”28

In the analysis of death, Heidegger makes the remark “One says, “Death certainly

comes, but not right away.” With this “but…,” the “they” Denies that death is certain”

Leaping ahead

opens the possibility of an authentic way of being. Solicitude as a way of being becomes a

constitutive mode for Dasein. Thus, concern for others ends up contributing to how one

relates to and understands oneself in the world. This is true both in the sense of those that

show solicitude towards us and those one shows solicitude towards. This sense of authentic

relation is odd because on the way to the discussion of death, Heidegger gives the sense that

others and being-with makes one inauthentic.

29

27 Ibid., 158. 28 Ibid., 159.

In

29 Ibid., 302.

19

order to comprehend the point that is being made here, it is important to understand

Heidegger’s notion of the They. Heidegger describes the They as “distantiality, averageness,

and leveling down.”30 Dasein’s uniqueness or authenticity would seem to get lost

somewhere along the way through interaction with the world. While the translators of the

most commonly used version of Being and Time, Macquarrie and Robinson, translate das

Man as “They,” other commentators use other terms, like “the One”31 or “Anyone”32

Dasein, as everyday Being-with-one-another, stands in subjection to Others. It itself is not; its being has been taken away by the Others […] These Others, moreover, are not definite Others. On the contrary, any Other can represent them […] One belongs to the Others oneself and enhances their power. “The Others” whom one thus designates in order to cover up the fact of one’s belonging to them essentially oneself, are those who proximally and for the most part are there in everyday Being-with-one-another. The “who” is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the sum of them all. The “who” is the neuter, the “they” [das Man].

to put

some distance between possible misinterpretations, such as the thought of “me versus them.”

As this is an important concept for Heidegger’s account of death, I will be using this

traditional translation. Moreover, the use of “They” matches up well to the expression, “they

say x” where x is some kind of normative claim and in many ways seems to capture best the

notion that Heidegger seems to intend.

33

The They has an influence such that Dasein’s possibilities come from what others

present. Heidegger points out that by and large we understand others in a way that they “are

30 Ibid., 165. 31 Hubert Dreyfus, Being in the World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time Division I

(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 152. 32 William Blattner, Heidegger’s Being and Time (New York: Continuum, 2006), 15. 33 Heidegger, 164.

20

what they do.”34 Rather than examining what possibilities may be available as one’s own,

Dasein takes up those of the They. As William Large puts it, “I end up thinking and doing

what everyone else thinks and does, but if someone were to ask me who was the origin of

these ideas and behavior I would not know.”35

Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the ‘world’ and the way things have been publicly interpreted. Anxiety throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about – its authentic potentiality-for-being-in-the-world. Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its own-most Being-in-the-world, which as something that understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities. Therefore, with that which it is anxious about, anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible, and indeed as the only kind of thing which it can be of its own accord as something individualized in individualiza-tion.

Dasein depends upon the norms presented by

the They in order to understand how to be and how to interact with others and with the world

in general. Through this, Dasein begins to lose touch with its authentic possibility and instead

gets absorbed in how it is understood by the They. Heidegger would seem to have set a stage

for the idea behind the cliché of “Keeping up with the Joneses.” Rather than being worried

about what may or may not actually be fulfilling one’s life, the focus is instead on what is

perceived by others to create a meaningful life.

In the everyday mode of the They, Dasein understands its being in terms of what the

crowd has presented as possibilities. Rather than examining what possibilities may exist as

one’s own, (one’s authentic ways of being) Dasein has more often than not been living with

the possibilities not proper to it. Dasein disowns its being without even realizing it. Anxiety

throws Dasein back on itself. Once again, to use Heidegger’s point:

36

34 Ibid., 163. Heidegger’s italics. 35 William Large, Heidegger’s Being and Time (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008), 125. 36 Heidegger, 232.

21

One is anxious about being an individual. Anxiety is one’s primary mood because

fundamentally one must figure out who one is as a distinct individual. Anxiety is what first

drives one to the They. The weight of one’s individual existence causes Dasein to flee for the

comfort of being given something by which one can understand oneself. Anxiety can also,

however, offer a way for Dasein to recover itself from absorption in the They. In anxiety,

Dasein’s everyday or inauthentic way of understanding itself is shattered. For Heidegger, this

offers an opening for Dasein to recover something that is its own.

THE ANALYSIS OF DEATH Heidegger’s analysis of death is central to his work Being and Time, in which the

project is how to understand Being. In attempting to understand our particular kind of being

in its entirety, Heidegger is faced with the following seemingly insurmountable problem, “As

long as Dasein is as an entity, it has never reached its ‘wholeness’. But if it gains such

‘wholeness’, this gain becomes the utter loss of Being-in-the-world.”37

Death has an important significance in the realm of possibilities. When Dasein is at

the end of its being and has all the items checked off the “bucket list,” death still awaits.

There will always remain one final possibility for Dasein. For Heidegger, death presents

itself as the “possibility of impossibility.”

To get a complete

picture of my place in the world I must gain some awareness of its entirety, but as soon as

that entirety arrives, I am no longer!

38

37 Ibid., 280. 38 Ibid., 307.

It is the possibility of the end of all possibility,

the possibility of the end of Dasein’s being there. Furthermore, as was seen with the

22

Epicurean account of death, the event of death is ultimately not able to be actualized because

when death is, Dasein is no more. Instead the focus becomes on how to comport oneself

towards death. In Heidegger’s analysis, there is a shift from an analysis of death as an event,

to an explication of the reality that we are dying. For Heidegger “Death is a way to be, which

Dasein takes over as soon as it is.”39

ENCOUNTER WITH DEATH

While this seems contrary to say that while living we

are always dying, as soon as one has come into being (i.e., birth), there is the ever present

possibility of the end, which is death. While we cannot know what death itself will be like,

we can look ahead towards our dying. Through the realization that one is constantly moving

towards death, Heidegger argues that through understanding death, something authentic is

uncovered, a moment that will truly be one’s own. Even so, how are we to come to

understand our position that will end in death?

It is often said that death is a fact of life. This is commonly experienced in the death

of a friend or family member. Often when faced with this, it gets interpreted in terms of loss.

When one is present during the final moments leading to death of another, there is the

experience of being with another Dasein. Immediately following death, that same individual

who was just previously present and dying is somehow reduced to a thing and is no longer a

Dasein. Yet, Heidegger notes the no-longer-a-Dasein of the deceased still gives us cause for

much concern. Those left behind “are with”40

39 Ibid., 289. 40 Ibid., 282.

the deceased, though the deceased is no longer

with them. Heidegger points out that this concern for the deceased by those left behind can

23

be seen, “in the ways of funeral rites, internment, and the cult of graves.”41 In this dimension

of death, one becomes distanced from it and is only looking at the biological event, not

experiencing personal loss of being. This is not to say that they do not have importance to

Dasein. The experience of the death of another can have the significance on one hand of a

major personal loss or on the other, a mere social inconvenience. While the death of another

is often tragic, it is not the same as the personal event of one’s own death. In speaking

directly to this point, William Large responds, “Is not the death of the other part of my life

[…] rather than theirs? I no more experience the transition from life to death through the

other than I do in my own life.”42

Through this insight, Heidegger shows that death is a distinctive occurrence in that it

is something that each individual must go through. It is unique to each one of us. Heidegger

states in very clear terms, “No one can take the Other’s dying away from him.”

Watching someone else die will not tell me about what it is

going be like for me to die. Instead, death is an essential feature of our own being, not

something that can be shared.

43

41 Ibid. 42 Large, 75. 43 Heidegger, 284.

To each it

is given and cannot be refused, taken away, transferred, or otherwise escaped. There are

cases of sacrifice and martyrdom where one individual has gone to death in the place of

another. One soldier on the battlefield takes a bullet for another or a bomb in a public place is

found and diffused before it can go off, sparing lives that would have been otherwise lost.

This in no way absolves the saved from death; it just postpones the inevitable. Each person

24

will die; whether that death is in battle, by accident, or in a comfortable bed, it will happen at

some point. Death is certain.

As long as Dasein is, death is not-yet. This not-yet of death should not be looked at

like other things that are unresolved. The unresolved nature of death is not the consummation

of life, nor is it like a debt to be paid. The sum of the events and moments of our lives is not

our death. One can die without ever having accomplished much of anything, yet that same

individual will still face death. To each death is a fundamental feature that makes clear

Dasein’s uniqueness. There is nothing more intimate than death. As Heidegger lays out

earlier, death is authentic in that we can choose to recognize the possibility of our

impossibility. That death is an authentic possibility to each Dasein is clear, but it also opens

the space for one not to take up this possibility. The unresolved nature of death, that it is a

possibility in the distance, it can be a possibility that one can opt not to accept, indeed

Heidegger feels that this is the case more often than not.

INAUTHENTICITY AND THE THEY The They is able to “level death off” to another occurrence. The dying and the event

of death becomes something others do. Death, of course, is a constant occurrence, and the

They has its own way of interpreting death. “Death gets passed off as always something

‘actual’; its character as a possibility gets concealed.”44

44 Ibid., 297.

Death and dying are constantly

happening but not to me and not now. The certainty of death is used to place conceptual

distance between oneself and the reality of death. The everyday mode of interpreting death is

that it is an actually and not a possibility. The phase, “one dies,” encapsulates Heidegger’s

25

argument for this point, “because everyone else and oneself can talk himself into saying that

“in no case is it I myself,” for this “one” is the “nobody.””45

45 Ibid.

Heidegger points this out to

show how death becomes understood but in a way that is distant. The inauthentic

understanding of death removes for Heidegger what is most important about it, that death is

an ever-present possibility. The distance created by the They may be one way to account for

why there are so many euphemisms for death. Death becomes a kind of social inconvenience,

albeit one which has to be shown a certain amount of social deference.

This distanced posture towards death becomes so commonplace that those individuals

who have fallen into the everyday mode of the They are able to go through life without

coming to terms with death as their own. As was stated earlier, the first encounter with death

is often the loss of someone in our lives. Sometimes death is not at first understood as a

possibility that is distinctly individual. The death of the other is a loss in my life, not the loss

of my life. This is the feature of it that Heidegger wants us to see. In the realm of everyday

being with the They, there is a falling away from the most particular feature of our lives.

Rather than facing the reality of dying, Dasein flees from it, back into absorption in the

everyday world of the They. One flees from the possibility of non-existence because it is not

yet but, at the same time, is ever present and certain. Our death could very well happen at any

time. This all-important moment anxiously grips in such a way that one would rather run

away from it and be concerned with other possibilities which do not carry the same weight.

What is developed in this preceding movement is that death can bring forth anxiety in

Dasein’s being.

26

In Heidegger’s account of death, our interactions with others only seem to make us

inauthentic. Through interaction with the They, one takes up possibilities and ways of being

that are not one’s own. In the everyday world, one falls out of a way of being that is one’s

authentic. There is almost no discussion about what authentic relationship to others in the

face of death would be like. This is in contrast to Levinas’ account, which claims that it is in

being for the Other that one can be relieved of some of the fear that comes with dying and

death. For Levinas, as we will come to see, it is not that the Other makes one fall out of being

one’s self but rather the Other lets one get beyond the self. Perhaps there is something in

Heidegger’s thought that can help to explain what an authentic relationship with others

would be like.

Yet, is it true that it is always the case that being with others collapses into a mode of

inauthentic being-with? The They is the impersonal other. The They is a general form where

one finds cultural attitudes and social pressures. The importance of being a good student and

getting a good job would be examples of common attitudes of the They. There is another

sense of others that is not considered: one’s friends and family. These are the individuals one

has daily interactions with and come to shape the meaning in one’s life as much as anything.

Nonetheless, this is not the being-with that comes to light in the death discussion. It would

seem that most interaction with others has a negative effect. This fine line between authentic

and inauthentic interaction is best understood in Being and Time through the discussion of

“Being-with (Mitsein)” 46

46 Heidegger, 514 & 529. The index of German terms lists only Heidegger’s page 263 as the instance of

Mitsein or Being-with. The translator’s index on page 529 includes many more instances of “Being-with” which include chapters 26 & 27, which are largely devoted to the concept. It would seem that if someone was concerned with what should be understood from Mitsein, the preparer of the German index only cared that one

that appears in the section on death,

27

[Death] makes manifest that all Being-alongside things which we concern ourselves, and all Being-with Others will fail us when our own-most potentiality-for-being is the issue […] Dasein is authentically itself only to the extent that, as concernful Being-alongside and solicitous Being-with, it projects itself upon its own-most potentiality-for-being rather than on the possibility of the They-self.47

It is odd that Heidegger devotes so much of his analysis to the concept of Being-with,

the interpersonal dimension of Dasein, just to have it undermined by the They. To be

charitable to Heidegger, those who have had close encounters with death, either in illness or

in accident, will attest to the clarity of what is important in life. For these individuals, death

brings to the forefront that which is important, and in many cases, this will include others as

a significant part of the renewed meaning to life. These are perhaps instances of authentic

being-with because death is part of the calculation of their significance. However, the line

Heidegger indicates in this quotation that even if one has an authentic relationship with

others, in the end, Dasein still dies alone. Any projects that are taken up, whatever is done for

others, if it is not related to one’s “own-most possibility,” in other words with the

consideration of that ultimate authentic moment, death, it is an inauthentic mode of being.

Even so, our primary experience of being in the world is one in which we undeniably deal

with individuals. These individuals of one’s concern do not seem to hinder meaning in one’s

life but rather improve it. One’s relationships with friends, family, or mentors do not

necessarily have a negative effect on one’s being. Often one feels more than she would

otherwise because of interaction or relationship with another. One must first face the

nothingness that comes by recognizing one’s dying before there can be any hope of

interacting with others in a way that does not detract us from our authenticity.

see it in light of its relation to the death analytic, not in the actual development of concept.

47 Ibid., 308.

28

between what would be authentic and inauthentic being-with would be a fine one indeed.

There is little way of telling, without a constant recognition of death’s proximity, of when

one is relating in one way or another. Only with the recognition of death’s being able to

happen at any moment can a Dasein have an authentic relation to the Other.

Early in Heidegger’s analysis, Dasein comes to know itself through its interactions

with others. By the time we get to the analysis of death, Heidegger seems to argue that

interactions with others can mainly come to make Dasein inauthentic unless one remains

removed from them. In a way that harks back to Montaigne, one must first be concerned with

death, which is the possibility that is one’s own-most; otherwise one is merely in the mode of

the They-self and diffused into the crowd. It is only through being-towards-death that one can

be sure that one’s undertakings are authentic. Regardless of authenticity, all of these relations

will come to nothing in death. This would include authentic Dasein’s participation in its

being-there.

ANXIETY SHATTERS One can take up an inauthentic relationship with death. The reality of death still is

acknowledged; it is just that it gets reduced to another occurrence, death gets overlooked.

Heidegger states that death gets “leveled off to an occurrence which […] belongs to nobody

in particular.”48

48 Ibid., 297.

The event of a death is registered on the same level as births and weddings.

As has been discussed, death is the authentic possibility par excellence. Death is significant

for Heidegger because it shatters the way of being-in-the-world that has fallen into the

leveling of the They. In turning towards death, there is a basis by which Dasein can begin to

29

understand how to be authentic. In the anxiety that marks the anticipation of death, there is an

uncovering not only of the possibility for Dasein to find its own authentic particularity but

also those which do not belong. In the facing one’s possibility of impossibility, one’s

nothingness, that is death, one finds a deeper understanding of one’s existence as an

individual and shows how to be in an authentic way. That our death is certain only reaffirms

this and it creates an anxiety that is natural to us. Anxiety brings closer attention to the way

one relates to life and even more so to death. Heidegger says that “the They do not permit us

the courage for anxiety in the face of death.”49

Even so, authentic Dasein still has to face the anxiety of being. Death remains a

problem for Dasein. Even if one can face death freely and courageously, one must come to

terms with the fact that death will take it all. Dasein would seem to collapse into itself by

being authentic. In death, one has indeed found that which is truly one’s most singular

possibility, but in doing so, Dasein recognizes the way it is separate from the world and must

They would rather not think about the

possibility of death. Death is seen by the They as something that makes one morbid or

insecure in thinking about it. Heidegger shows that being able to look towards one’s death in

a way that does not shrink from its possibility is essential to the attainment of an existence

that is truly one’s own. If one is to view one’s death from the point of view of fear or

indifference, that stance disowns that which is most one’s own-most. Yet, there remains an

opportunity to be an authentic Dasein in Being-towards-death. In turning towards death and

the anticipation for it, one can realize the true possibility for life, to be truly oneself more

than just another one among many.

49 Ibid., 298.

30

deal with death alone. Heidegger suggests that this is in fact the nature of the situation. Death

is such that when it is, the self no longer is. To admit the not-yet of death is to fall into an

inauthentic relationship with death.

ANTICIPATING DEATH It should be clear by this point that Heidegger sees fleeing in the face of death as a

inauthentic way of being. Why would one want to hide from death or pretend that it is not

coming? For Heidegger, death is to be viewed as one’s own-most authentic possibility, it

does begin to show a way to think about the situation. Much like a calculus problem

searching for a limit, the point, death, cannot be met, but one can draw very close to it. One

can project oneself towards death. Through recognition of one’s own dying, there is the

chance to recognize what is truly one’s own possibility for being. In doing so, the inauthentic

ways of being are stripped away and one can recover the authentic self. In getting closer to

death through projecting oneself into the possibility of it, it can be anticipated. Heidegger

says, “Being towards this possibility, as Being-towards-death, is so to comport ourselves

towards death in this Being, and for it, death reveals itself as a possibility.” 50

As Dasein is able to anticipate or “run ahead” (vorauslaufen)

Much as was

seen in the writings of Montaigne, the anticipation gives the proper orientation towards that

which is being expected: namely, our death.

51

50 Ibid., 306. 51 Ibid., 307.

in being-towards-

death, Heidegger finds that Dasein is able to recover itself from the acquired ways of being

brought forth by the They. This is due to the prospect of our not being any longer. Authentic

31

possibilities begin to arise in the face of death. In standing before the realization of the

annihilation of my being, there is a lessening of significance to those ways of being that are

not one’s own. In that particular moment of death, the moment that cannot be shared or given

to anyone else, one finds something that is one’s own. Through projecting oneself into the

prospect of death, one is able to find what is most fundamental, the possibility of being

uniquely a self.

In anticipation of death, that which is our own-most potentiality for being becomes

the issue. Heidegger states that one’s personal relation to death does not just belong to one in

an undifferentiated way but that “death lays claim to it as an individual Dasein.”52

In his analysis of death, Heidegger finds that one’s end is a key feature to our being.

Death is not something that is foreign or separate from a Dasein; it is one of the few things

that makes one, as Dasein, a particular individual. To put it in Heideggarian terms: my death

cannot be represented by any other Dasein. Death is the one thing that cannot be substituted

by another. It is what makes existence one’s own because ultimately one’s own life is at

As one is

able to be towards one’s death, there opens the possibility to be a free authentic self. If we are

able to approach death lucidly, the fallen stance towards death that is acquired from the They

is stripped away. The freedom that comes with this stance uncovers possibilities that are

original. At the same time, Dasein is able to recognize those ways of being that are not

original. Death approaches in one’s individuality and in being close to death, there arises

awareness of what that individuality actually consists. Death makes clear to each one that

which is most authentically possible.

52 Ibid., 308.

32

stake. The fact of our death brings into question our being and possibilities by presenting us

with the possibility of our not being at all. In the certainty of death we find all other things

get cast aside and only that which is authentic to us can be revealed. The revelation of our

death, in our anticipation of it, is always available to us. This affords us the opportunity to

examine ourselves and be assured that to our own selves we are being true.53

53 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act I, Scene III.

Being-towards-

death gives the freedom to recover oneself. In recognizing our dying and anticipating it, one

is able to find the ground of how to orient oneself towards being an authentic self.

For Heidegger, death brings our lives into focus. Through death, one is able to find

the ground of being an authentic individual. In being-towards-death, life becomes oriented to

that which is the most authentic possibility. The problem for Heidegger, then, becomes how

to stay in this relation. Death is something that one faces, and doing so allows one to recover

oneself. Yet, how can one remain in this relation? Also, what is the significance of being

authentic? What does the prospect of death mean for an authentic Dasein? It would seem that

an authentic individual would still have to face death’s annihilation of all that is meaningful.

Lastly, there is a question as to what role others have in relation to one’s death. Heidegger

only indicates the other in the sense of the They, an impersonal force, rather than individuals.

To try to gain some different perspective on death, our examination will now turn to Levinas.

Levinas’ account not only deals with Heidegger and these questions, but Levinas also

provides a different, more ethical, insight to understanding death and how one should orient

oneself towards it.

33

CHAPTER 4

LEVINAS: BEING AGAINST DEATH

The work of Emmanuel Levinas provides a different perspective on death, however,

few discussions on Levinas can proceed without first gaining an understanding of his concept

of “the Other.” When face to face with another person, I am able see this individual in terms

of how he relates to my own needs; but this way of relating to another does not exhaust the

otherness of the Other. In the face to face, thought is never fully able to capture the Other.

The idea of this other individual “overflows” and is never complete. One can never fully get

into the Other’s perspective. The otherness of the Other cannot be completely reduced to the

“same” of one’s own understanding, and this marks a kind of break with a simple, egoistic

way of being. This inability of consciousness to contain the otherness of the Other and its

implications becomes the main theme in Levinas’ work. While his project can be somewhat

difficult to pin down, Levinas presents a short summary of what he is up to early in Totality

and Infinity:

A calling into question of the same—which cannot occur within the egoist spontaneity of the same—is brought about by the other. We name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics. The strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possessions is precisely accomplished as a calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics. Metaphysics, transcendence, the welcoming of the other by the same, of the Other by me, is concretely produced as the calling into question of the same by the other, that is, as the ethics that accomplishes the critical essence of knowledge.54

54 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh,

PA: Duquesne University Press, 2007), 43.

34

What occurs in the face to face, Levinas calls “ethics.” Encounter with the Other creates a

separation within oneself and is a calling into question of one’s own freedom. The ability of

the other to question what one does with her freedom will prove important in understanding

Levinas’ thoughts on death.

SEPARATION AND TRANSCENDENCE To the degree that one can understand the Other, one first must know something

about oneself. Knowing the look of hunger in the eyes of the Other is dependent on knowing

that same hunger first in oneself. The ability to respond consists in one knowing the

importance of the food. One must first be a self before one can adequately respond to the

Other.

Here, it is important to understand Levinas’ idea of how one comes to be an

individual (or as he may say a “separated”) self. Levinas argues in Totality and Infinity that

one is individualized through enjoyment. This is not to be understood as a claim about the

sum of one’s enjoyments being a person; rather one “lives from”55 the things one enjoys. The

paradigmatic example for Levinas is that of eating, “Nourishment, as a means of

invigoration, is the transmutation of the other into the same, which is the essence of

enjoyment.”56

55 Ibid., 110. 56 Ibid., 111.

No doubt enjoyment is not limited to eating food, but the process is the same.

The needs for food, shelter, water, security are dependencies on a biological level, but as one

is able to find the means to satisfy those needs, one can flourish and become independent.

Levinas, as someone who was a P.O.W. during WWII, is very sympathetic to the notion that

35

sometimes even these basic needs cannot be met. Sometimes, one can be in the “midst of a

disorganized society,”57 where mere survival is a struggle. However, in the normal course of

events, “Man is happy to have needs”58 because in the satisfaction of needs one is able to

separate from the environment in meeting those needs. One is able to understand one’s self as

an individual through satisfaction of needs. By using one’s will and power, one is able utilize

the world around to suit one’s needs. The ego of a self is able to “crystallize”59

CRITIQUE OF HEIDEGGER

through

enjoyment and become a unique structure.

In some sense, one could interpret what Levinas is up to as an attempt to overturn

Heideggarian thought. This is particularly true when it comes to discussing death. Whereas

with Heidegger, death was seen as the “possibility of impossibility,” Levinas defines death as

the “impossibility of possibility.”60

57 Ibid., 116. 58 Ibid., 114. 59 Ibid., 144. 60 Ibid., 57 & 235. This marks but a few examples of the many times that Levinas uses this formulation

throughout his works when discussing death. The first appears in Time and the Other (Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, Trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, PA : Dunquesne University Press, 1987), 70) where he notes that Jean Wahl used the “impossibility of possibility” formulation in describing Heidegger’s account. Levinas sees a fundamental difference between how other philosophers on the topic approach the subject and his own treatment of it.

This represents more than a reformulation of Heidegger’s

understanding of death; it is an outright opposition to it. Death represents the negation of all

possibility. There is a closing off of all experience and possibility in death that renders

everything void. Death, for Levinas, is not something that one can take up as a project to

further one’s own life. It is much like the Epicurean formulation, which sought to dispel the

36

fear of death: as long as I am, my death is not; when my death is, I am not.61

THE LIMITS OF KNOWING DEATH

As long as one

is alive, death has not yet arrived. One neither has access to death nor power over it. It gives

nothing that can be taken hold of to understand it completely. Whereas with Heidegger, death

was an ever present reality, for Levinas death is always future. As Levinas will show, this

gives time to act, time to do something that will potentially have meaning beyond death.

The “impossibility” of death places it at a considerable distance as an object of study.

To gain an understanding of death is not the same as learning about the surface of some

distant planet or the bottom of the ocean. Death does not open itself to an empirical search.

Nor is one able, with the possibility of some technological advance, to access it. That sort of

approach may open an understanding of death as a medical or biological event but does not

further a phenomenological inquiry. As Levinas says, “the unforeseeable character of the

ultimate instant is not due to an empirical ignorance, to the limited horizon of our

understanding, which a greater understanding would overcome.”62 Death is infinitely

removed from our understanding. By definition, no one who has ever experienced death has

survived to give an account of it. It is much like Hamlet’s “undiscovered country” from

which no traveler returns.63

Not only are we unable to acquire a basic knowledge of our death, but one is not able

to know when it will happen. There is a chance that under natural circumstances my death

61 Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, PA : Dunquesne

University Press, 1987), 71. Here Levinas quotes from Epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus marking an ancient way to explain away the fear of death.

62 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 233. 63 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III. Scene I.

37

may come in twenty minutes or twenty years. Even in cases of impending death, like

terminal illness or even suicide, the final moment is not able to be finely marked. As Ze’ev

Levy points out, “Death is not predictable,” and going further he notes, “A fixed time for

execution of a person condemned to death or a diagnosis with regard to a terminal patient do

not refute this fact for people in ordinary circumstances of life.”64 One’s final moment is not

foreseeable. Even for the suicide or the person condemned, there is always a gap between

death and the soon to die. Death’s shadow can be found over all moments, looming just

further than we are able to perceive. Several times in his discussion on death, Levinas uses

the phrase, “Ultima latet,”65 which seems to be referring to the inscription written on some

medieval sundials that reads, “Ultima latet ut observentur omnes (The last is hidden so that

we have to watch them all).”66 One’s last moment is not revealed, though it does seem as

though it exists as a prefigured moment. Death as a final event would seem to be marked

down somewhere because of the certitude of which it will come. Levinas states that “the

unwonted hour of [death’s] coming approaches as the hour of fate fixed by someone.”67

64 Ze’ev Levy, “Emmanuel Levinas on Death and Hope,” Prima Philosophia 14 (2002): 402. 65 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 233-235. 66René R.J. Rohr, Sundials: History, Theory and Practice, trans. Gabriel Godin (Buffalo, NY: University

of Toronto Press, 1970), 127.

It is

as though there is a schedule for my death but I never have access to it. One can only

recognize the inexorable approach of death, not the time of its arrival. Even when death

draws close, death is still off in the distance. The relationship with death is one that

paradoxically seems to be simultaneously certain and unknowable. So, one is left to watch

the clock for death’s arrival.

67 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 233.

38

This leaves room for a bit of ambiguity in the understanding of death. If one’s death

is not able to be marked, it could come at any minute. This is how Heidegger saw death, as

an ever present possibility that could happen at any moment. For Heidegger to think of death

as a not yet would be to avoid death’s reality and potentially fall into They-thinking. For

Levinas, death’s coming is a threat, but it also affords a time to act. He tells us that death’s

“imminence is at the same time menace and postponement. It pushes on, and still leaves

time.”68

PASSIVITY AGAINST DEATH

One’s dying could loom close, but as long as it has not taken hold, there is still time

to act. His point is directly related to the one seen in the Epicurean formulation that holds if I

am, then my death is not. The last is and will remain hidden from us as long as we are. This

means there is still time while one is still living to make time for something meaningful in

the face of death. Ultima latet reveals that the moment of death will remain a mystery up

until the very end. One must always be on watch for death’s coming, and this along with its

infinite distance from our understanding, is, for Levinas, like the Other. In the same way that

the face to face encounter with the Other can call the ego into question, so too does death.

Levinas agrees with Heidegger that the common first encounter with death, the death

of the Other, does not provide the needed insight into death. No matter how much one thinks

about death, one is still nowhere near a full conception. Levinas says, “My death is not

deduced from the death of the others by analogy; it is inscribed in the fear that I can have for

my own being.”69

68 Ibid., 235. 69 Ibid., 233.

One does not have to see something else die to know that a person can

39

undergo harm and sense the fragility of life. Furthermore, one of the first things that is given

in the face to face encounter with the Other is a sense of death. Levinas claims that the

countenance of the Other, “is the primordial expression, is the first word: ‘You shall not

commit murder.’”70

For Levinas, this sense of death reveals that all remain passive against death’s

approach. Whereas for Heidegger it was a power, Levinas sees it as privation. Generally

speaking, death is not something we can know or even expect at any particular moment.

Commenting on this point, Adriaan Peperzak notes that death, “comes from a dimension

beyond life and world: from the dimension of invisibility and otherness over which we do not

have any power.”

The face of the Other presents us with a prohibition against using our

power in an attempt to annihilate him or her. The infinite otherness of the Other is not able to

be destroyed even in murder. The Other still affects us even in spite of ourselves. The

possibility (or interdiction) of murder is in its own way the first encounter with death.

71

[Death] is not open to grasp. It takes me without leaving me the chance I have in a struggle, for in reciprocal struggle I grasp what takes hold of me. In death I am exposed to absolute violence, to murder in the night […], The Other, inseparable from the very event of transcendence, is situated in the region from which death, possibly murder comes.

Levinas indicates that it would seem to have its own intentions. It is

much like a thief in the night that creeps in and strikes when one is least aware. The seeming

intentionality of death, with its sudden and sure movement, strikes Levinas as murder:

72

In this statement, Levinas brings together the various elements that we have been building to

this point. Death is here shown to be possessed of a will that is all its own. This “foreign

70 Ibid., 199. 71 Adriaan Peperzak, To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (West

Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1993), 188. 72 Levinas, Totality and Infinity. 233.

40

will”73

The passivity against death shows how one comes to learn of it. Levinas argues that

in suffering, one unmistakably experiences the reality of finitude and mortality. Suffering

exposes one’s own limitations. In pain, what is revealed is that which interrupts the flow of

life. By “suffering,” Levinas is referring mainly to physical pain and the subsequent mental

anguish that follows. One becomes a victim of one’s own being in suffering. When one is in

physical pain or suffering there is no escape. One can only wait for the pain to subside. Even

in taking medication, one must wait for it to take effect. This realization puts a new

perspective on death. Levinas contends, “In suffering the will is defeated by sickness. In fear

death is yet future, at a distance from us; whereas suffering realizes in the will the extreme

proximity of the being menacing the will.”

schemes against me; it is willing to pounce if I let down my vigilance. One is not able

to bring death into one’s power: it is not something that can be controlled but exerts a total

control.

74

73 Ibid., 234. 74 Ibid., 238.

In merely thinking about dying, we are not

given the space to reflect on the true power that it has over us. In suffering, however, one

feels the closeness of death. There is something worse than death, to be made to suffer with

no escape. The inability to escape from suffering shows how far one’s freedom and influence

extend. It is not annihilation that one fears the most but rather not being able to escape from

suffering.

41

DEATH AND RELATIONSHIP TO THE OTHER The presentation of mortality in Totality and Infinity highlights the menace that death

represents, a threat that is represented as just off in the darkness, where death is very near and

demands attention. There is a definite tension that builds in Levinas’ account of death. The

dénouement in Levinas’ discussion of death marks the most striking difference between him

and Heidegger. One of the important points for Heidegger is that Dasein dies utterly alone,

whereas Levinas shows that one dies with the Other. In facing death, one is not removed

from society but rather it is when death draws close that the Other becomes most significant.

The following statment marks the strength of Levinas’ claim:

The solitude of death does not make the other vanish, but remains in a consciousness of hostility, and consequently still renders possible an appeal to the Other, to his friendship and his medication. The doctor is an a priori principle of human mortality. Death approaches in the fear of someone, and hopes in someone […]. A social conjuncture is maintained in this menace.75

Unlike Heidegger’s account of death in which Dasein is stripped down into its

singularity and removed from all ties, Levinas presents death’s menace as always happening

within the world that is shared with others. Death remains as a will that stands against one’s

own will but as long as one is still alive, one is in a world with others. One’s death, as

Richard Cohen remarks, “always retains its social and hence, its ethical character: I can be

saved, and in the meantime of dying, in the ever future futurity of death, hope remains for a

cure or recovery.”

76

75 Ibid., 234. 76 Richard Cohen, “Levinas: Thinking Least About Death—Contra Heidegger,” International Journal of

the Philosophy of Religion (2006): 34.

As death is not yet, one is able to call to the Other for assistance against

that which menaces. This is a light that shines through what would seem to be a gathering

darkness in the discussion, and it presents the first glimpse of getting around the closing off

42

that death represents. One learns about death in the fact that the Other could use his power

against me (i.e., murder) or to help to postpone my death (i.e., medicine). Levinas contends

that the very presence of a profession devoted to the fighting of death is evidence that

goodness can be found against death. In the face of death, there remains an opportunity for a

coming together of individuals in an attempt to postpone its inexorable approach.

THE OTHER AND TRANSCENDENCE Levinas argues that the approach of death does not take away the Other. In dying,

there is still time left to do something that may be able to transcend one’s own finitude. This

attempt at transcendence is found in being for the Other. Levinas says, “the will […] on the

way to death but a death ever future, exposed to death but not immediately, has time to be for

the Other, and thus recover meaning despite death.”77 Dying may remove the significance of

one’s acquisitions and projects. In the space between now and the future that is death, there is

still time to act or be-for-the-Other. In the face to face encounter, one is called to respond to

and be responsible for and to the Other. Hence, Levinas will make the claim that “To

recognize the Other is to recognize a hunger. To recognize the Other is to give.”78

77 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 236. 78 Ibid., 77.

One is

called upon to respond and to do all that can be done to satisfy the Other’s hunger and need.

The opportunity to be-for-the-Other is significant because something can be done that may

outlast one’s own mortality. Though death removes the dying person from this world, the

world does not end. In being for the Other, there is a chance that a will could create or sustain

something that goes on beyond death.

43

For Levinas, to be able to do something in the face of death that can go beyond one’s

death happens in patience. By “patience” he has something more in mind than the usual

notion of waiting. In spite of the passivity of death and suffering, consciousness can reflect

upon its situation and thereby become patience, “the passivity of undergoing, and yet mastery

itself.”79 Death is future; it is not yet and I still am (again in the Epicurean sense). The threat

against my being by the specter of death, which seeks to annihilate, does not stop one from

acting with the time that remains. Levinas is able to make claim, “Thus alone does the

violence remain endurable in patience. It is produced only in a world where I can die as a

result of someone and for someone.”80

To be-for-the-Other is to get beyond one’s egoism. This activity is a selflessness that

is marked as a kind of goodness. Levinas states in Section III of Totality and Infinity,

“Goodness consists in taking up a position in being such that the Other counts more than

myself.”

The violence implicit in death has a double meaning.

On the one hand there is murder and on the other sacrifice. In the latter sense, to-be-for-the-

Other establishes a meaning that is not centered in the ego. There is something created that

does not end with the death of self.

81

79 Ibid., 238. 80 Ibid., 239. 81 Ibid., 247.

Instead of being self-centered, one becomes other-focused in activity to the Other.

In putting one’s will beyond egoistic concerns, beyond something that simply confirms the

ego and separation from the world one exists in, there is something that death is not able to

destroy. One gives to the Other and, in doing so, one gains a meaning for life that does not

disappear in death. To be-for-the-Other one places part of oneself beyond itself and creates

44

something in giving that is not taken away in death. Levinas concludes that in patience, the

will “displaces its center of gravity outside of itself” and thus creates something in goodness

that death does not strip meaning from at death.

It would seem that Levinas’ account addresses many of the issues associated with

Heidegger’s analysis. In coming to understand death, there is a qualitative shift. Death is

something that strikes not on a surface level but in the depth of one’s being. By calling one

into question, it has the force that requires one to respond. The response to death requires not

vocalization but an impetus to act. There is a figuring out what to do while there is still time

left. Levinas clearly points in the direction of being for the Other.

Whereas Heidegger sees death as the opportunity to find what is most our own,

Levinas insists that the ethical response to death is to be found in giving ourselves up to the

Other. The call to goodness requires that one forget himself in the giving. How is one to

understand what it means to give ourselves up to the Other in response and responsibility,

while at the same time remaining that self?

MEANING BEYOND DEATH In knowing the reality that is death, in its inevitable approach, one can recognize that

there is some time that remains. There is nowhere to run and no way to hide; only what can

be done before it arrives. All actions that are done in the service of the self will certainly be

undone with by death. What would it matter if one were to do something that was

authentically related, if it will only come to be undone by death? To separate oneself further

and serve the ego and its desire for pleasure that highlights the futility of ego’s projects when

one feels the approach of death. In actions which are placed beyond the self, meaning can be

found in the face of death. Levinas is able to show that the use of one’s freedom can establish

45

something that will last beyond death. Herein is the greater opportunity to find meaning. This

can be established by being for the Other.

Goodness in this life is obtained when one is able to go beyond one’s self in being for

the Other. Mere authenticity cannot attain that meaningfulness for itself. If one intends to

make life meaningful only by projects and actions that serve oneself, then that individual is

doomed to fail. Death will come, remove her from this world, and render her projects futile.

Although, by doing something for the Other in goodness, one must forget the source of that

action in the giving; there double movement that is attained. In this giving up of self,

something returns to that was unexpected. One finds in going beyond oneself that the self is

confirmed and even extended beyond one’s mortality. In spite of the fact that death will take

everything, there is something that can be done that death cannot reach. In giving up our

limited selves to the Other, what is returned goes far beyond the limits of mortality. Meaning

is attained in the face of death.

The recognition of one’s mortality shows one the limit of the self. Death calls into

question the use of one’s power and makes a call for one to account for his life. The final

judgment for each of us is that we will all have to face this fact. The point being presented is

that a good death is one that has some purpose. This is the strength of Levinas’ position over

Heidegger. A good death is one that has meaning that extends beyond the limits of that same

dying individual’s life.

The literary attestation of this can be found in Tolstoy’s Death of Ivan Ilych. The

story of Ivan Ilych is seemingly a reply to Tolstoy’s own question of meaning in the face of

death. Ivan is collapsed into his own mundane worries. He is too busy with the concerns he

has for maintaining his perceived “well and good” life. Death is a menace him because it

46

threatens to undo everything he has built. It is through the realization of acting not in a way

that leads back into himself but one that extends out into the Other, in response to his son,

that Ivan’s passivity in the face of death is able to be surpassed. His life attains a meaning

that even in that last moment with the pressure of the darkness surrounding him, frees him

from dread. Heidegger makes a direct reference to the The Death of Ivan Ilych in Being and

Time, and much of Heidegger’s philosophy can account for what goes on in the novella.

However, it is actually Levinas that is better equipped to understand and give a philosophical

account of Tolstoy’s point.

47

CHAPTER 5

THE DEATH OF IVAN ILYCH

In the novella The Death of Ivan Ilych, Leo Tolstoy gives a troubling account of a

man’s life and death. The story brings to light some interesting questions about how one

should approach not only life but also death. In the story, the main character, Ivan Ilych, has

built a very successful life for himself. Serving as a judge, Ivan has a career with power and

prestige, a good family, and a wonderful home. Then one day he falls off a chair and injures

his side. Though he does not realize it, he has inflicted a mortal wound on himself. The story

follows the course of his slowly deteriorating condition and his inability (and also that of his

friends and family) to deal with the looming specter of death. He tries for a long time to look

away from it, but he cannot; he begins to see how others avoid it. As he begins to feel the

inexorable approach of death, it brings him to the point where he asks the question of the

meaning of his whole life. Ivan wonders, “Maybe I did not live as I ought to have done.” 82

82 Leo Tolstoy, The Death of Ivan Ilych in The Kreutzer Sonata, ed. Stanley Appelbaum, trans. Louise and

Aylmer Maude (New York: Dover, 1993), 57.

Death calls his life into question, both its meaning and content.

There are many ways one could approach The Death of Ivan Ilych. To Heidegger, the

story offers an account of an inauthentic being-towards-death. From a Levinasian

perspective, the story is an account of how one can go beyond his death by being for the

Other. These two philosophers have penetrating accounts of the importance of death, and it is

a worthwhile exercise to examine how both address to this tale.

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A HEIDEGGARIAN READING Heidegger made explicit use of Tolstoy’s story in his own examination of death. In

Being and Time, he says in a footnote, “In his story ‘The Death of Ivan Ilych’ Leo Tolstoy

has presented the phenomenon of the disruption and breakdown of having ‘someone die.’” 83

In the first chapter of the novella, death is presented as an inconvenience. Ivan’s

colleagues are more concerned with what effect his death will have on their own personal

careers or the possibility that they will have to go through the “very tiresome demands” of

going to the funeral and giving condolences to the family.

For Heidegger, the story of Ivan Ilych presents a case of someone that has an inauthentic

Being-towards-death. From a Heideggerian perspective, Ivan, his wife and family, his

friends, and even the doctors all have missed the point. Namely, that death is certain and an

ever present possibility, Ivan is not able to escape the inevitability of his death. It is perhaps

only Gerasim, the simple servant boy, who is able to see that we each will have to face death.

Gerasim alone is able to maintain an authentic stance towards death.

84 His wife saw his deteriorating

condition as “his own fault and was another of the annoyances he caused her.”85

83 Heidegger, 495 footnote xii. 84 Tolstoy, The Death of Ivan Ilych, 16. 85 Ibid., 39.

His brother-

in-law is so disturbed upon seeing him later in his condition that he is unable to be in his

presence. Ivan’s death is a kind of burden upon his friends and family: they are forced to

watch him suffer while alive, and he is just as much a burden for them when they have to go

through the rituals associated with his death. This very much parallels Heidegger’s thoughts

on the everyday encounter with death. In this case, going to funerals and caring for others is

49

shown to be a kind of social inconvenience. It is something that interrupts the everyday

being-in-the-world. Death is not something that anyone wants to be bothered with.

From a worldly point of view, Ivan has achieved everything that he would need to be

called successful but just as he attains the success he wanted, he is struck by the impending

arrival of his own end. For a long time, he pretends as if little is wrong. His condition slowly

worsens, yet he goes about his life as if nothing were any different. Even when his condition

becomes something that he can no longer ignore and begins to slow his life down, he is still

being told that he will get better. Ivan and those around him will not accept that he will die –

and soon.

At a certain point, however, begins to ask, “Why deceive myself?”86 Ivan often feels

this way when he laments the “deception” of everyone else that he will be able to get better.87

Ivan eventually realizes that his death is coming. He begins to be tormented by his family’s,

friends’ and doctors’ belief “that he is not dying but was simply ill.”88

The evasive concealment in the face of death dominates everydayness so stubbornly that, in being with the one another, the “neighbors” often still keep talking the “dying person” into the belief that he will escape death and soon return to the tranquilized everydayness of the world of his concern.

For them, if he is only

sick, then he will surely get better in time. Heidegger lets us understand this when he says,

89

Though they are apparently trying to comfort him, in reality they are only further denying

what Ivan has now realized as a fact. He is dying, and there will be no return to the way life

was. It is this that Ivan is finally able to recognize. He will soon have his own death, and he

86 Ibid., 42. 87 Ibid., 48. 88 Ibid., 48. 89 Heidegger, 297.

50

is isolated in that moment. It holds him in such a way that he tries to escape from it by

longing to be coddled like a child. Ivan’s not wanting to face death is where the power of the

They is most conspicuous. Neither he nor those around him are willing to face the reality that

he is dying.

It is no surprise that Ivan is able to see that his life had become something that was a

burden to him. For the most part, he chose to look away and live not facing death. When his

death is forced upon him, only then is he able to see the folly of his life. His choices were not

his own but those that would make him well thought of. In falling into the projects of the

They rather than the authentic possibilities appropriate to him, his own life becomes torment

to him. If Ivan could have made some movement toward his death before or early in his

suffering, the concern of it probably would not have led him back to health but at very least

he would not have suffered as much. He could have had a chance in the time of the not-yet of

his death to find some authenticity. Heidegger would seem to imply that he instead remains a

coward, fallen into the inauthentic view of the They, unable to face his death with courage.

There is, however, one character in the story that does seem to have an authentic

stance towards death, the servant boy Gerasim. Ivan recognizes that Gerasim has a different

attitude towards death. “Gerasim alone did not lie,” Ivan remarks. “Everything showed that

he alone understood the facts of the case and did not consider it necessary to disguise

them.”90

90 Tolstoy, The Death of Ivan Ilych, 49.

As noted in the article, “Literary Attestation in Philosophy: Heidegger’s Footnote

on Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilych,” by Robert Bernasconi, “Gerasim understood more of

death than the others, so that his words – “we shall all come to it someday” – are not another

51

form of the “one dies” but an expression of Being-towards-death.” 91

“Caius is a man, men are mortal, therefore Caius is mortal” had always seemed to be correct to him when applied to Caius, but certainly not as applied to himself. That Caius – man in the abstract – was mortal, was perfectly correct, but he was not Caius, not an abstract man, but a creature quite, quite separate from all others.

The servant boy is not

interested in upholding the quiet propriety that everyone else seems to. For each one of us,

death will be a reality and Gerasim recognizes this as fact. This alone makes him the only

character with a redeemable quality in the story, as read through a Heideggerian lens.

Early on when Ivan first truly understands his condition is one that will be fatal, he

has a reflection from his youth on a logical presentation of death,

92

The most significant problem with a Heideggerian reading is that it is unable to

account for Ivan’s final moments where Ivan is able to find something that lets him get

beyond his apprehension of death. After spending three days wailing in agony of death, Ivan

has a moment where his hand comes down and is caught by his son. Ivan’s final hours of

Death was not a reality to Ivan. Surely, he had seen death in his life to this point, but the

concreteness of the thought of it had not yet reached him. Death was unable to call him into

question from his thinking about it. The absolute otherness of death is not able to affect Ivan

when approached from an abstract point of view. For Heidegger, this statement is seen as a

moment of Ivan’s falling into an everyday attitude towards death. Caius can be seen as the

perfectly impersonal, and thereby distant person who, for Heidegger, is no one (i.e. the They).

It makes sense in Heidegger’s account that Ivan is unmoved by this.

91 Robert Bernasconi, “Literary Attestation in Philosophy: Heidegger’s Footnote on Tolstoy’s “The Death

of Ivan Ilyich,” in Heidegger in Question: The Art of Existing (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1993), 91.

92 Tolstoy, The Death of Ivan Ilych, 44.

52

agony are interrupted by the presence of his son and wife and their suffering seeing him in

that state. Ivan recognizes their suffering and he is able to understand what he must do. He

feels sorry for them and recognizes that there is something that can be done with the time he

still has.

A LEVINASIAN READING It is the final moments of the novella that the Levinasian reading offers the most force

to understanding The Death of Ivan Ilych. Ivan’s pain plays a significant role in explaining

what he is up against. The pain that begins after his accident provides evidence that the

specter of death is near. Ivan has an glimpse of this after one of his early trips to the doctor:

“it is not a question of appendix or kidney, but of life and…death. Yes, life was there and

now it is going, going and I cannot stop it, […] it is only a question of weeks, days…it may

happen this moment.”93 If death’s coming was merely an unknown moment in some far off

future for Ivan, he might be able to look away from it. But he can no longer look away. It is

clear that death throws Ivan back onto himself. He feels that his fate has been fixed and there

seems to be nothing that can be done. It is through his own suffering, when he, as Levinas

would say, is “backed up into being,”94 that Ivan comes face to face with his own mortality.

Ivan realizes “resistance is impossible”95

While he continues to lament his condition, thinking that he is being punished and

cannot understand why, his dread at the prospect of his death confirms that he must have

against death. At this point, it has become obvious

that Ivan is face to face with his own death. His suffering has inexorably drawn him to it.

93 Ibid., 42. 94 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 238. 95 Tolstoy, The Death of Ivan Ilych, 59.

53

gone wrong somewhere: “he had not spent his life as he should have done.”96 Ivan is being

forced to deal with the situation and give an account of his life. The pain that Ivan goes

through even begins to become embodied, “It would come and stand before him and look at

him.”97 Death begins to appear to him much like the face of the Other. In Ivan’s first

discussion with the voice of his death, it asks him what he wants and Ivan responds that he

wished to live as he had, “well and pleasantly.” The voice responds mockingly, “As you

lived before, well and pleasantly?”98

He opened his eyes, looked at his son, and felt sorry for him. His wife came up to him and he glanced at her. […] He felt sorry for her too. “Yes, I am making them wretched,” he thought. “They are sorry, but it will be better for them when I die.” He wished to say this but had not the strength to utter it. “Besides, why speak? I must act,” he thought. […] He was sorry for them, he must act so as not to hurt them: release them and free himself from these sufferings.

The response from “it” at the end marks the questioning

of Ivan to himself. He is being asked here to give an account of his life. Was it really was

what he thought it to be?

Instead of wondering how he might be able to recover the pleasant life that he

believed he had lived, or deluding himself that he would be able to recover, Ivan acts to be

for someone other than himself. This happens in the final hours of Ivan’s life.

99

Ivan recognizes that the proper response in this moment is to die. Rather than fighting and

extending the pain for him and those close to him, he must face up to the fact that it is better

for him to meet death. Facing up to death is something that he had been avoiding for his

whole life. In being for the Other, the terror of death indeed melts away. Ivan is able to let go

96 Ibid., 60. 97 Ibid., 45. 98 Ibid., 56. 99 Ibid., 62.

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of his pain. Instead of a Heideggarian account that has Ivan looking away from death at all

moments and ends up a failure (or at best inauthentic), the Levinasian account offers one of

redemption. By being able to sacrifice himself for the suffering of his son and wife, his fear

and suffering in the face of death are lifted. He is able to pass through the “black sack” of

death without suffering or worry. His life recovers meaning in spite of his death. Ivan knows

that with the patience he finds in those final moments, he will make life better for his son and

wife. Ivan can take control of his life by letting death do its work. Ivan remarks, “How good

and how simple!”100 This recognition of what he can do with his life in the face of his death

frees Ivan from his pain because he knows this act will have an effect that will go on after his

death. With a Levinasian interpretation, one can understand how Ivan’s life is redeemed. To

carry on only delays the suffering, but by letting death do its work, Ivan frees himself and

those who are suffering with him. Ivan’s asking for forgiveness is enacted by the “forgo”101

The role of Gerasim too, takes on a new meaning when interpreted from the

Levinasian perspective. Instead simply being authentically towards death, Gerasim is better

understood as being for the Other. Unlike Heidegger, the social dimension is not able to be

marginalized for Levinas. Gerasim is able to respond to the call of Ivan’s suffering. Many

times, Gerasim holds up Ivan’s legs all night solely to comfort him. If it provides comfort to

his dying master, Gerasim is supposed to do it. He says, “why should I grudge a little

trouble?”

of his life, which lets those others get on with the living of their own lives.

102

100 Ibid. 101 Ibid.

This is the most basic instance of being-for-the-Other; Gerasim provides Ivan

102 Ibid., 49.

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the simple comfort of not being alone in the face of death. More than anybody Gerasim

knows that “we shall all of us die,”103

TOLSTOY’S QUESTION ANSWERED

and sometimes comfort in the face of death is all one

can offer to an Other. This is a critical moment that can be used to understand what Levinas

called the “social conjecture” that remains in the menace of death. Gerasim’s staying with

Ivan is the simple ethical action of being with someone while that individual is dying.

The Heideggarian reading is ill equipped to respond to this action. Perhaps one could

say that it is a type of “solicitude” that Gerasim is providing. Yet, on any Heideggarian

interpretation, Gerasim’s actions are understood as consoling Ivan against the coming of his

death, which would amount to a falling into an inauthentic relation with death. It weakens

Heidegger’s view of death that it does not seem to be able to give an account of why Gerasim

would be doing this.

What is it about this story that is able to resonate with us and our own experience?

For Heidegger, death shatters Dasein and allows for an escape from the They. Death presents

an opportunity to find an authentic way of being. By showing that death removes one from

everything known, one’s way of being is called into question. Everything that matters to

Dasein proves to be insignificant when faced with death. While much of this is also true for

Levinas, in being for the Other, one is able to recover some meaning that will go beyond

death. In death, the self is removed from the projects and objects that matter to the isolated

ego. However, in being for the Other, the locus of the ego is no longer centered on self but

rather someplace beyond one’s self.

103 Ibid.

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In this case, the example of Ivan and his family draws the point clearly. Death and the

threat of total annihilation from that distant shore are not able to conquer one totally. There is

an answer to Tolstoy’s question of what can be done that will have meaning in spite of death.

The inability of most of the characters to face death can be interpreted by both. It is true that

the Heideggerian touches on the fear and how in everyday mode of the They looks away from

death, but there is also a dimension of death in this story that the Heideggarian is unable to

account for. That is the ability for others to have a meaning in one’s life that does not consist

in making us inauthentic. In the moment where Ivan is crying out in despair, he is able to

recognize the call to responsibility that comes to him in the face of his son. The strong

difference between Heidegger’s and Levinas’ accounts of death is mainly present in that the

Levinasian interpretation takes precedence in the final chapter. Ivan is able to let go of his

suffering by acting not for himself but for another. In being for the Other, Ivan’s fear over the

imminence of death is lifted and it no longer menaces him. His life while slowly dying on the

couch is transformed and gains a meaning. This matches up quite well with Levinas’ account

of how we can get beyond our own deaths.

It is Ivan’s son who is able to reach him and make him give an account of the way

that he was living. For the most part, rather than using the time Ivan has left to establish

something that would survive after his death, he had been too self absorbed, lamenting his

unfortunate condition. After all the time spent on the couch, slowly wasting away, it is the

look on the face of Ivan’s wife and child allows him to transcend himself and in those final

moments, he is able to recover meaning in spite of his proximity to death. Even though Ivan

is dying, there is still time for him to be for the Other. On his final day, Ivan sees the pain in

his son and wife and knows that he must respond but cannot muster the strength to explain

57

himself. This does not hinder him: “Besides, why speak? I must act.” 104 His condition is

such that he is limited in the actions that he can take. Ivan realizes this, that his continued

fight in this particular instance is only for his own self-interest and nothing is being gained

from it. When Ivan was cloistered by himself waiting for death, he was unable to see what he

should do. Ivan says to himself, “Yes, I am making them wretched, he thought, but it will be

better for them when I die.”105 He takes up responsibility for the pain he is causing his son

and by being responsible to his son, Ivan’s center of being becomes displaced. Ivan realizes

that he must act in the time he has left. Dying is this “act.” Rather than causing further pain,

he recognizes that the ethical thing to do is not to continue to fight a losing battle for his own

sake, but to do what Ivan has avoided. Rather than overstay his time, bringing further misery

to himself and his family, Ivan chooses to stop fighting and becomes for-the-Other. In this

action, the pain, fear, and suffering begin “dropping away at once.”106 Part of Ivan’s life

becomes imbued with a meaning that becomes other focused. This explains why when he

searches for “his former accustomed fear of death and [he] did not find it.”107 Death is no

longer a menace: “there is no fear because there is no death.”108

This story brings to light the significant power that death has in our lives. Ivan lives

the majority of his life in an unquestioning manner. By and large, he is only concerned with

what affirms his own sense of self. His wife and children are in one way symbols of the

image that he wishes to convey. After his accident, the approach of death calls him into

104 Ibid., 62. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid., 63. 108 Ibid.

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question. His life withers in the face of death. It is Gerasim’s compassion towards him that

first draws him to ask the question of whether he could have lived his life another way. What

eventually redeems his life is his taking responsibility for his wife and child. In seeing their

suffering, he is moved to action. Even if this action is only to give up his fight against his

coming death, it is an action that is not self oriented but other directed. Ivan acts to release

the others from their suffering, and in doing so is relieved of his own. This could not have

happened as the act of a selfish will. It is only in forgetting himself in the action that he is

relieved of his being.

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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Heidegger showed us that in death there is an opportunity to be more than we are in

the average, everyday mode. All too often we do not worry about the situations of others and

get caught up in projects that only seek to make one the self that the They want us to be. In

being able to stand before our death, and not hide from it, one has a chance to recover

something that is one’s own. Yet, even in gaining an authentic way of being, one still must

face death and do so alone.

Levinas provides a correction to Heidegger’s approach, giving a more ethical

understanding death. In being for the Other, one is able to attain a sense of meaning and

purpose in our lives that extends beyond the ego, which is focused on simply its own desires.

Death becomes the motivation for this. In realization of one’s mortality, is the recognition

that the things that are done to satisfy one’s simple needs and egoistic desires will be undone

by death. Through doing something that does not benefit me but the Other, that which is

retuned has a meaning for my existence that cannot be limited by that same existence. One

can do something that has meaning even in the face of death. In forgetting oneself and acting

for the other person, one’s egoism becomes displaced. By being for the Other, I can establish

meaning that does not end with death; it goes on in the world for a time after I die. One can

establish meaning in one’s life that does not end with that life.

In Tolstoy’s Death of Ivan Ilych is an attestation of this. Although for most of the

story Ivan flees from the inexorable approach of his death, in the end, he is able to come to

60

the realization of what he must do. Ivan recognizes the call of the Other in the face of his son.

In it he sees that it is not an explanation that he must give but rather that he must act and give

up what he wants, to live as he had before, and do something for them. He recognizes that it

is now his responsibility to die. Though Ivan is sacrificing himself in this action, he is

disburdened of the agony of death. He is relieved of his pain and suffering. Finally, Ivan is

able to die on quietly, comforted in that he has done what he needed and that something

worthwhile will go on without him.

Tolstoy, a great writer who had achieved much in his life, found that he could not

answer the question: Is there any meaning in my life that will not be destroyed by my

inevitably approaching death? The story The Death of Ivan Ilych was written after he seemed

to find an answer to this question. This story is a parable for what meaning can be found in

the face of our death. Meaning can be found in the face of death by being for the Other.

Actions that only reaffirm what one thinks to be important, one’s own self-interests and self-

serving projects, death renders insignificant. Possessions and positions become pointless in

the face of death because one will be separated from them totally. There is a chance to do

something to maintain meaning that will matter beyond one’s life. By acting in a way that is

a response to the call of the Other, one assumes responsibility that mitigates some of the fear

towards death. Death removes one from the world, but the world will continue on. Whether it

be in caring directly for another or establishing institutions, one can do something that will

have meaning that goes beyond death.

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