deception final project

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Dawn of Deception: An Examination of the Spectrum of Deception 1

Dawn of Deception:An Examination of the Spectrum of Deception

Chauncey DevinBrendhan GeraghtyMatt Baran-Mickle

Francesco PassalacquaPatrick Skarupa

Hampshire College

Other Minds Final

Laura Sizer December 9th, 2011




Table of Contents

1. Title Page«««««««««.«..«.«««««««...1

2. Table of Contents«««««««..«.««««««.«..2

3. Introduction««««««««..«.«««««««.«...3Matt Baran-Mickle

4. Non-Human Animal Deception««««««««..«.... 5

Brendhan Geraghty

5. Development of Theory of Mind and Deception«««..12Chauncey Devin

6. Confabulation«««««««««««««««««..16Matt Baran-Mickle

7. Deception in Groups and Culture«««««««««.22Patrick Skarup

8. Dynamics of Dream Deception««««««««««..27

Francesco Passalacqua

9. Concluding««««««««««««««««««..37Francesco Passalacqua

Introduction

This paper is an investigation of deception and its relationship to other minds.

Each chapter covers a relevant sub-topic with the goal of illuminating the spectrum of

deception and some of the challenges that come with attempting to define a concept as

broad as ³deception.´




During our research we ran into some difficult questions. One of the main

sticking points has been intent as a necessary condition for deception; if we include intent

to deceive as a condition, the question of ascribing minds to animals comes to the fore,

and difficult choices have to be made about who or what can deceive. A more descriptive

approach may be to view deception as a spectrum phenomenon that varies based on the

complexity of the deception and the level of intent behind it; in this way, we can view a

gradation of intent and complexity ranging from deceptive behavior in some non-human

animals to full-blown, intentional, interpersonal deception amongst human adults.

The study of deception goes hand-in-hand with the investigation of other

minds. After all, there has to be an other mind present to be deceived (though this brings

the question of animal minds to the fore once again; it may be more accurate to say other

consciousness instead of other minds). Interwoven with this is the importance of theory of

mind, which is necessary for deception to be successful, though this applies only to

deception proper and not to deceptive behavior . Each chapter touches on the importance

of theory of mind to different aspects of deception.

Self-deception, as a sub-genre of deception, is also a common theme. Self-

deception involves holding contradictory beliefs and rejecting the stronger of two or more

hypotheses despite superior evidence for one of them. This contradiction can be said to

generate a ³tension´ in the mind of the self-deceiver, and the phenomena seems most

accurately described as a spectrum running from a complete lack of tension, as seen in

the minds of brain-damaged confabulators, to a level of tension that overwhelms the

holder and breaks the deception; the self deception seen in dreams may lay somewhere in

the middle.




This paper will explore different manifestations of deception (of self and other)

at different levels of complexity, beginning with non-human animal minds, progressing

to the development of deception in humans, confabulation and deception in instances of

brain damage and the general population, the presence of deception in cultural or

religious groups, and the relationship of dreaming to the development of theory of mind

and deception. We hope the proceeding chapters will shed some light on the complex

phenomenon that is deception.

Non-human Animal Deception - Brendhan Geraghty

In many cases with non-human animal minds, deception is a concept that has been

used as a jumping off point for discussion. Deception is brought up in several research

essays pertaining to animal minds, because the assumption, or generally accepted




hypothesis, within the scientific community is that for an animal to properly, deliberately

deceive, it must have a mind. This is because it takes a substantial amount of brainpower

to adequately deceive another member of your own, or another species. Deception

requires an ability to get inside the head of another being, determine its state of mind, and

come up with a course of action best suited to helping the deceiver on it¶s journey to have

its own wants or desires satisfied. Yet, while deception is considered to be at the very

least partial evidence for a theory of mind, it is not accepted as a complete, be-all end-all

requirement; that is to say that just because an animal can be said to deceive, that does

not mean we can say with all assurance the animal does in fact have what we call a

³mind.´ This is because intent is an issue. We cannot with all certainty know an animal¶s

intention in all of its actions. We could, after all, be anthropomorphizing, assigning

humanlike features or behavior-patterns to something non-human; and if we are doing

this, we are elevating non-human animals to our level rather than appropriately trying to

understand where they lie in the world. Furthermore, by anthropomorphizing, we are

injecting our own perspectives into a given situation, and we cannot do this if we intend

to properly analyze animals to determine whether or not they have minds; we need to be

completely objective. This is difficult, however, and has often been the flaw in articles

that ascribe feelings or a mind to animals. In the case of deception, anthropomorphizing

can get scientists into trouble in that we may think the animals are actively deceiving

each other, when in reality, things of that nature may be very base, automatic responses

programmed into the animals as a survival technique. Overall, intentionality in deception

looms large as a hurdle to jump in determining for sure whether or not non-human

animals can be said to have minds. That said, deception is still a very valid theory to




bring up in a discussion on non-human animal minds, as deception as we know it, at least

effective deception, does require a fairly well developed brain. Because of this, it can be

said to be something of a prerequisite or at the very least be considered evidence of the

possibility of a mind.

In Deception, Perspectives on Human and Nonhuman Deceit , Robert W. Mitchell

& Nicholas S. Thompson discuss the concept of different ³levels´ of deception. At the

first level, an organism may deceive simply by means of an automatic reaction to a given

situation. Some examples of a first level deception may be a kind of mimicry performed

by an organism to gain the upper hand survival-wise. This is often not a conscious

decision, so some may argue that first level deception does not serve as evidence of

having a mind. The second-level deception as described by Mitchell and Thompson can

be boiled down to ³do p given that q is the case´ (Mitchell & Thompson, 24). Second-

level deception is where most can agree a mind is present, because it requires an ability

on the behalf of the deceiver to process information received and perform an action

resulting in something beneficial. One example of level-two deception would be the

actions of the male scorpionfly, which, according to Dorothy L. Cheney and Robert M.

Seyfarth¶s essay ³Truth and Deception in Animal Communication´ from Carolyn A.

Ristau¶s Cognitive ethology: the minds of other animals: essays in honor of Donald R.

Griffin, ³can only copulate with a female if he first provides her with the gift of a dead

insect. Some males catch insects on their own, while others steal insects by approaching

males who already have them and adopting the posture and behavior of females´ (Cheney

& Seyfarth, 128). Though the given organism needs to receive and process some sort of

stimuli for the deception to take place, some are skeptical to see this as true evidence of a




mind; it can after all be an automatic reaction. It is usually when an organism is capable

of third-level deception that naysayers change their opinion and declare that a being has a

mind. Third-level deception is described as ³do any action p given that this p has resulted

in some desired consequence q in our past´ (Mitchell & Thompson, 25). That is to say

that there is a learning process with level-three deception . It is more than something

programmed to simply work flawlessly time and time again, it requires an ability to

adapt, to change the formula around to ensure that you not only get your way, but also

continue to do so in the future. One example in the article cites of the work of Krebs, who

recorded that ³some birds¶ singing of a variety of learned song-repertoires evolved

because, by creating the illusion of a crowded habitat, it dissuaded new birds from

nesting nearby´ (Mitchell & Thompson, 25). Though most commonly found among

humans, there is a fourth level of deception, in which the organism is seen as having

complete control; being ³capable of programming and reprogramming itself based on the

past and present actions of the organism being deceived´ (Mitchell & Thompson, 26).

With these distinctions made, it is important to note that most instances of deception at

level three, and many at level two, are considered to be intentional, though not

necessarily ³intentionally deceptive´ (Mitchell & Thompson, 25). The problem of

intentionality is what serves as the most glaring problem in seeing deception as evidence

for a theory of mind in nonhuman animals. We cannot know for sure if the deceiving

animal is tricking another organism deliberately or if it¶s simply an automatic reaction to

external stimuli. ³Whether any animal is conscious of its own attempts to deceive, and

thus practices deception in the human sense, remains an open question´ (Cheney &

Seyfarth, 128). Cheney and Seyfarth¶s paper goes on to state that deceptive signaling in




nonhuman animals is extraordinarily evolutionarily successful, as ³in any population in

which animals use threat displays to signal their intentions, natural selection will favor

those individuals who µcheat¶ and threaten others at the highest level of intensity

regardless of their actual intentions´ (129-30).

Whether or not deception can be said to be intentional or not somewhat depends on the

type of deception presented. For instance, it can be hard to deceive another being in the

same social group as oneself over and over again, because the individuals may ³recognize

one another and remember past interactions«in groups, deceptive signals will probably

have to be more subtle and occur at lower frequencies if they are to go undetected´

(Cheney & Seyfarth, 130). Furthermore, some animals have an innate inability to vocally

deceive ± in the case of certain toads, ³when a male hears his rival peeping, he is more

likely to continue fighting if the rival¶s pitch is higher and less likely to continue fighting

if the rival¶s pitch is lower than his own. Because their acoustic features are so closely

linked to anatomical structures that cannot be altered, signals like the toads¶ peeps will

always be truthful´ (131). In this case, though the intent to deceive to avoid a fight may

be there for some toads, they are incapable of actually doing so due to body type. The

best way it seems to deceive in a large group would be to simply withhold information

from another being rather than to try to point it in one direction or another . A deliberate

attempt to mislead could be either suspected upon the first try, or, if attempted again, may

not be as successful, as the other beings in one¶s community, may not trust a known

deceiver . Though withholding information is widely considered the most effective way to

deceive in a group, we still cannot necessarily confirm the intent of the deceiver: ³it could

be argued,́ state Cheney and Seyfarth, ³that signal concealment cannot strictly be




interpreted as deception unless the signaler intends to manipulate others or unless others

have the expectation of being informed. Not only are these issues difficult to study, but

they also demand far greater cognitive abilities on the part of animals because they

require that animals have some ability to attribute motives or intentions to others´

(Cheney & Seyfarth, 135). R . Haven Wiley writes in ³Errors, Exaggeration, and

Deception in Animal Communication´ from Leslie Real¶s Behavioral Mechanisms in

Evolutionary Ecology: ³Cognitive ethnologists have tended to insist that true deception

requires intention, an awareness by the signaler of its influence on the receiver¶s state of

mind´ (Wiley, 161). Because of this, it is difficult to say for certain whether or not

animals can be said to be truly ³deceiving´ one another in the same sense of the word we

use.

But, hypothetically, if the intent is there, can we use deception as evidence for

theory of mind in nonhuman animals? As Donald R . Griffin points out in the chapter

³Communication as Evidence of Thinking´ from his book Animal Minds: ³one reason

that has discouraged ethnologists from using the communicative behavior of animals as a

source of evidence about their feelings and thoughts is a conviction that all animal

communication is a direct result of internal physiological states that are not under any

sort of conscious control´ (Griffin, 155). That is to say that it is difficult for ethnologists

to accept with all certainty that animals have minds even when they communicate,

because this communication could be nothing more than instinctual rather than a thought

out and planned response. That said, there have been experiments that demonstrate

certain animals¶ ability to learn to better communicate, and even, in some cases,

communicate well with humans. Specifically, I¶m referring to the case of Alex, a parrot




who was trained to respond correctly to questions such as ³what color is X?´ Alex could

not have learned inadvertent cues from the woman giving messages, as the second trainer

was not present when the primary trainer taught Alex how to respond, and this second

trainer performed tests solo as well. Alex has been an example of evidence to support a

theory of mind in non-human animals, as he was able to ³learn both to understand and

communicate, and«[give] every evidence of meaning what he says´ (Griffin, 174). What

this means, is that the communication presented here is not the result of a base, automatic

response; there is a more complex process at work . Is this necessarily a mind? It is

difficult to properly define, but for some animals, communication is clearly the result of

something more than just reactions.

So if the intent is there, and we accept that the form of communication as put

across by a given organism is voluntary more than simply reactionary, can we accept

deception as a case for theory of mind in nonhuman animals? It is difficult to say,

because there are so many complex biological processes at play. Is the deceiver

deliberately going out of its way to belittle another? Does it realize exactly what it is

doing? These are all questions that are difficult to answer within the context of deception

and other minds. Overall, certain levels of deception seem to show evidence to the fact

that there can be more going on inside the mind of a nonhuman animal rather than just

animal instincts, but is this the work of a mind as we know it or is it not? Perhaps there is

not enough in-the-field research being done to properly say, within the context of other

animals if a given organism is capable of deliberate deception. Perhaps we are

anthropomorphizing when we suggest certain agendas a given animal may have. It is a

difficult concept to conceive of, let alone answer, but as the research has shown, clearly




there is more to the thought processes of several animals than just reactions, clearly they

are more complex beings than we once assumed, and could, depending on whose

definition we use, be said to have what we call a mind.

R eferences

Mitchell, Robert W., and Nicholas S. Thompson. Deception, Perspectives on Human and

Nonhuman Deceit . New York: State University of New York Press, 1986. Google

Scholar . Web. 29 Nov. 2011.

Ristau, Carolyn A. Cognitive ethology: the minds of other animals: essays in honor of

Donald R. Griffin. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.,

1991. Google Scholar . Web. 29 Nov. 2011. This is the book from which I pulled

information from the chapter "Truth and Deception in Animal Communication"

by Robert M. Seyfarth & Dorothy L. Cheney

Real, Leslie. Behavioral Mechanisms in Evolutionary Ecology. Chicago: University

of Chicago Press, 1994. Google Scholar . Web. 29 Nov. 2011. This is the book

from which I pulled information from the chapter "Errors, Exaggeration, and

Deception in Animal Communication" by R . Haven Wiley

Griffin, Donald R . Animal Minds. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, n.d.

Google Scholar . Web. 29 Nov. 2011.

Development of Theory of Mind and Deception - Chauncey Devin

Children are a very interesting case when it comes to theory of mind and

deception. Babies do not seem to be born with a theory of mind and even if they could

talk, deception would be out of the question. But still, even when children start talking,




lying is impossible or very rudimentary and obvious. When do children develop a theory

of mind? Typical adults all have a theory of mind, but how they develop a theory of mind

is unclear . Research has shown that the age when children are able to start lying is a

similar time to when they begin to develop a theory of mind.

A theory of mind is developed in a human as a child. Often, false belief tests are

used to study theory of mind in children. Helen Tager-Flushberg (2007) used a false

belief test on children in which two dolls were shown sitting by two baskets. A marble

was hidden in one basket. Then one doll was removed and the marble was moved to the

other basket. The child was then asked if when the doll returned, which basket would the

doll look into in order to find the marble. If the child answered the second basket, the

child failed the test. If the answer was the original basket, then the child demonstrated

that he understood the doll has a different mind that did not know the marble had been

moved. Essentially, the child put himself in the shoes of the doll in order to make an

inference about the doll.

MacKenzie, J. (2008) found that 5 year olds performed better on theory of mind

tasks then 3 year olds. This means that theory of mind starts forming around 3 years old

and develops through the age of 5. MacKenzie (2008) makes the assertion that

³children¶s ability to understand different intellectual concepts increases´ with age.

Theory of mind is developed as the child starts institutionalized education (in a

typical, Western situation.) The question how is theory of mind develops is still being

answered. Research done on Australian children by Shahaeian, Peterson, Slaughter &

Wellman (2011) found that children with older siblings had ³faster overall [theory of

mind] progress.´ This makes sense, as the child interacted with an older child that




probably had a more developed theory of mind. The younger sibling therefore had

another mind to relate to and interact with that was more developed but not as

sophisticated and complex as an adult mind.

Flavell, J. (1999) summarizes a few theories on how development of theory of

mind takes place. First theory is called the theory. This theory is very informal and is

³framework¶ or µfoundational,´ opposed to our mind being comprised of an ³actual

scientific theory.´ (Flavell, (1999) First of all, children begin to have emotions towards

things and understand that other people have emotion towards things. These emotions

include wanting, fearing or needing something. These are desire emotions and they tend

to appear at age 2. At age 3, children begin to understand that beliefs can be wrong and

that other people may believe different things, though at this age, children still have not

made the connection between beliefs and desires. At about age 4, children begin to

realize that beliefs effect desire and desires effect beliefs . Theorists believe that mind

development happens because of experience. Children see how other people act and

through watching and experiencing, children are able to develop a theory of mind in the

three stages described above.

The modularity theory suggests that theory of mind comes from the brain

maturing. Modular theorists believe that experience helps bring out a theory of mind but

does not affect the nature of the theory of mind.

The last theory Flavell (1999) puts forth is the simulation theory. This theory

states that children simulate other people¶s mental states and beliefs, just as typical adults

do. In this case, what improves is the ³ability to make increasingly accurate simulations.´

Simulation theorists believe children become better simulators through experience.




Important to theory of mind is 2nd order belief . To be able to comprehend 2nd

order beliefs, one must be able to belief that another person believes something . An

example of this is that a person can believe that he is correct but he cannot understand

that another person may believe something that is opposite. This person has no concept of

2nd order beliefs. An individual able to understand 2nd order beliefs is able to reasonably

assess other peoples mental states and beliefs. Being able to infer 2nd order beliefs is

crucial in deception.

In light of the information above, it is obvious that a person must have a theory of

mind in order to deceive. Talwar, V., Lee, K . & Gordon, H. (2007) conducted a study that

related theory of mind to children¶s skill in deception. They found children with a higher

2nd order belief scores were better able lie. Not only were they able to lie but also to keep

a series of lies consistent longer over a series of question. Children played a trivia game

in which the proctor left the room before the last question. The children were told not to

peek but half of the children did peek . The children who peeked were asked a series of

questions involving the paper the trivia question and answer was written on. The children

who were better liars were able to keep a consistent lie over the series of questions. It was

found that children with high 2nd order belief scores were able to maintain a consistent

lie better than children with a low 2nd order belief score. With these findings, Talwar et

al. inferred that children¶s ability to lie is directly related to 2nd order belief

understanding and is therefore related to their theory of mind.

The findings of Talwar et al. make the connection between deception and theory

of mind very clear . A person must be able to assess and understand other mental states in

order to deceive that mental state. One must be able to understand and simulate a mental




state of another before being lying and trying to deceive. This comes natural to adults but

to developing children, understanding other mental states can be difficult .

R eferences

MacKenzie, J. (2008). Children¶s Development of the Theory of Mind. Development

Psychology. 1-10 people.stfx.ca/x2006/x2006mfj/Children.doc. Accessed

11/20/11.

Tager-Flusberg, H. (2007). Evaluating the theory-of-mind hypothesis of autism. Current

Directions In Psychological Science, 16 (6), 311-315. doi:10.1111/j.14678721.2007.00527.x

Talwar, V., Gordon, H. M., & Lee, K . (2007). Lying in the elementary school years:

Verbal deception and its relation to second-order belief understanding.

Developmental Psychology, 43(3), 804-810. doi:10.1037/0012-1649.43.3.804

Confabulation - Matt Baran-Mickle

Over the years, observers of neurological patients have come to identify a special

class of cases that exhibit strikingly strange behavior: they seem to lie, with perfect

confidence, about things they ought to know. Moreover, they seem to have no idea that

their claims are untrue, and when told, quickly move on and forget. These patients are




known as confabulators, and are often victims of brain damage via trauma or, in some

cases, alcoholism. A confabulation is a narrative report or claim that should be

recognizable by the subject as inconsistent with reality, but whose inconsistency goes

unrecognized and is reported with unshakable confidence; young children, for instance,

will often ³recall´ memories that are untrue, but seem unable to identify them as false

memories (Hirstein, 2005).

Clinically, there are a variety of conditions that are confabulatory. One of the first

to be consistently identified was Korsakoff¶s syndrome, a condition marked by chronic

short- to medium-term amnesia and usually observed in alcoholic patients (Hirstein,

2005; Schnider, 2003). Patients with Korsakoff¶s syndrome, when asked what they did

yesterday, might present a quite plausible account of a business summit they attended,

including relevant details about accommodations, people they met, and conversations

they had; the inaccuracy of their narrative is belied by their presence in a hospital,

however, and upon informing them of the reality of the situation most patients will either

refute the premise or momentarily accept it before ³forgetting´ and resuming

confabulatory behavior (Hirstein 2005). Confusingly, Korsakoff¶s patients normally

demonstrate fully intact logical capacities, despite their inability to properly locate

themselves in time and space. Careful observation has revealed a frequent atemporal

shuffling of memories, such that subjects will talk about past events as if they are

presently relevant, and place themselves in situations previously experienced (Schnider,

2003); recovery from Korsakoff¶s syndrome is typically slow and sometimes incomplete.

A better-known cause of confabulatory behavior is split-brain syndrome, which

results from severing a patient¶s corpus collosum (functionally the bridge between the




right and left hemispheres of the brain), often to stop the spread of seizures in epileptic

patients from one hemisphere to the other (Hirstein, 2003). A common experimental set

up for split-brain patients is to show pictures to each eye separately (each eye sends

information to the corresponding hemisphere: right eye to left hemisphere and vice versa)

and then ask subjects to point to images that relate to images that were seen earlier . In a

famous example, a patient saw a snow scene with his right hemisphere and a chicken

claw with his left; he then identified a snow shovel with his left hand and a chicken with

his right hand. When asked to explain why he chose as he did, he explained that ³the

chicken claw goes with the shovel because you need a shovel to clean out the chicken

shed;´ the left hemisphere, which controls most conscious logical processes, explained

the choice of the left hand (controlled by the right hemisphere) by confabulating ± in

reality, it had no idea why the left hand (and right hemisphere) chose what it did

(Hirstein, 2003).

Denial of illness is a frequent confabulatory behavior in stroke patients, most

commonly with anosognosia, a condition that presents as partial paralysis (of an arm or

limb, for instance) accompanied by denial of the injury and use of confabulation to

explain the inability to use it (Hirstein, 2005). A patient with paralysis of her left arm, for

example, will not be able to touch her nose with her left hand, and might explain this be

saying that her arthritis is particularly bad at the moment and the pain is too great to

complete the task . To test how genuine this denial was, researchers gave patients with

paralysis of one arm a choice between completing a task that required one arm for 5$ or a

task that required two for 10$; without fail, patients with anosognosia chose the task that

required two hands, and confabulated to explain their inability to complete the task




(Hirstein, 2005). A similar condition is Anton¶s syndrome, which presents as denial of

blindness. Patients with Anton¶s will offer confabulations to explain the inaccuracy of

their reporting of visual information (Hirstein, 2005).

What these patients have in common is a blatant disconnection between their

claims and reality, accompanied by a confidence that is completely genuine. There seems

to be a breakdown in patients¶ epistemological processing, in that they demonstrate a

limited ability to gather and sort information that is relevant to the present moment and

feel comfortable making claims that normal populations would reject as absurd. This

begs the question: are confabulatory patients engaging in deception?

First we must define deception. Hirstein (2005) presents a list of qualifications for

deception (paraphrased here):

1. Deceptions must make a claim that is false;

2. Be intentionally false;

3. Take actions that represent a claim as true (for example, lying to someone

verbally in order to deceive them);

4. Appeal to reason (this requires a representation of the victim¶s mind)

5. Be successful (unsuccessful deceptions can be classified as attempted deceptions)

An important feature of these qualifications is the use of a theory of mind by the person

doing the deceiving. In order to appeal to a victim¶s reason, the deceiver must actively

model the beliefs and tendencies of his victim; the more information the deceiver has,

and the more accurate his theory of mind, the more successful he will be in his deception.

Based on these qualifications, confabulators do not seem to meet the criteria for

deception of others. A key criterion is that of intent , and confabulators do not intend to




deceive others: they genuinely believe their claims.

This leaves open the possibility of self-deception, however . Self deception

requires that someone simultaneously believe p and not- p, or, more descriptively, that he

has evidence for and against p, and despite evidence for p that outweighs that for not- p he

refuses to accept the hypothesis (Hirstein, 2005). It has been noted that in self deception a

tension is present in the mind of the subject that arises from the concomitant belief of p

and not- p, and that the amount of tension corresponds to the level of intentional deception

(Hirstein, 2005). A sociopath, for instance, exhibits less tension in his deceptions than a

man who suspects his wife is having an affair; the man requires more work to ignore the

evidence of the affair, while the sociopath deceives easily and without remorse or

consideration.

In these cases, the cognitive checking systems that normally correct for

unlikely beliefs are malfunctioning, and seem to be able to keep the subject from

accurately assessing their beliefs. One model is that clear representations have to be

formed in order for the mind to check them, and a focusing of attention away from the

situation (in the case of the man, for example) disallows the creation of clear

representations and bypasses the checking system (Hirstein, 2005).

Confabulation, compared to other cases of self-deception, seems to be

accompanied by a complete lack of tension in the subject. A succinct explanation of this

phenomenon is that the cognitive checking systems normally in place are completely

dissociated from the creative systems. Hirstein (2003, 2005) suggests that these two

tendencies, creation and checking, normally lie in a balance that allows the mind to

precisely tune output, much like the autonomic nervous system¶s sympathetic and




parasympathetic branches. When one of the systems is damaged, it becomes hard for the

mind to maintain homeostasis and one side or the other predominates; Hirstein (2005)

suggests that damage to the creative system (or an overpowered checking system) may be

behind certain aphasias. In confabulation, the checking system appears to be damaged,

allowing belief (or claim) creation to run wild.

Confabulation is not limited to clinical cases; when pressed, many people will

confabulate to explain their actions. A study performed in the 1970s had people choose

between four kinds of nylon stockings, and then asked them to explain their choices.

Most people cited texture and color as criteria for their choice. There was a strong

preference for stockings to the right of the assortment, and when informed that the

stockings were the same, most people stood by their criteria for choice and refused to

believe that the stockings were the same (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). This is a perfect

example of confabulation in the general population: subjects created claims that passed

their checking systems without adequate epistemological grounding, and were completely

genuine in their assertions. In the everyday sense, confabulations like these indicate a

certain amount of self-deception. Hirstein (2005) posits that the tendency to confabulate

in these situations can be explained by the treatment of claims as having positive or

negative reward values by the orbitofrontal cortex. False claims can have negative

rewards values, but a lack of explanation for behavior often has negative social

consequences as well, and can lead to a bypass of the checking system. This process is

largely unconscious, however, and seems to be a subtle form of self-deception.

It would seem, then, that confabulation is not, in the end, a matter of deception in

the overt sense. The lack of intention to deceive is a key criteria missing from




confabulators, especially in the clinical setting. But the existence of confabulation should

give us pause; a process that so clearly demonstrates the otherness of our own minds

reveals the limits of introspection as an epistemologically sound process. Given that we

are all capable of confabulation, can we know for certain our own motivations and be

certain of our present perception of reality? Confabulation serves as a cautionary tale, and

reminds us that we are all capable of deception.

R eferences

Hitstein, W. (2005). B

rain Fiction: self deception and the riddle of confabulation.

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Hirstein, W. (2000). Self-deception and confabulation. Philosophy of Science, 67 , S418±

S429. JSTOR . Retrieved from http://www. jstor .org/stable/10.2307/188684

Nisbett, R . E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: verbal reports on

mental processes. Psychological review, 84(3), 231. American Psychological

Association. Retrieved from http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/rev/84/3/231/

Schnider, A. (2003). Spontaneous confabulation and the adaptation of thought to ongoing

reality. Nature reviews. Neuroscience, 4(8), 662-71. doi:10.1038/nrn1179

Deception in Groups and Culture - Patrick Skarupa

Theory of Mind is an idea that attributes a mind to one or multiple people other

than oneself . Self-deception is misconceiving the self so that one's consciousness or

knowledge is in a favorable state. It is a great possibility that these two concepts are

meshed together all too often in everyday life. What if it were said that the subcultures,




religions, political parties, and other social groups we have today were the product of

mass self-deception. People are deceiving themselves about the minds of other people

while the other people are deceiving themselves about more people. All the deception

revolves around one central idea that everyone has their own opinion on. Religion and

culture, two of the biggest social implications, provide people with not only the reason,

but also the means of deceiving themselves and others.

A culture is something that every person belongs to in some way. How and where

people belong is completely up to them. In a paper by Harry Triandis "Culture and Self-

Deception a Theoretical Perspective," correlations are made between different types of

cultures and possible reasons and ways for people to deceive themselves and others.

Triandis describes how cultures can be collectivist or individualist; the self is either seen

as part of a collection or the self is seen as separate from this collection. In being part of

this collection, one's theory of mind becomes a crutch holding them up towards

maintaining a positive outlook on the ideals of the group rather than the individual . By

this is it meant that people are more likely to deceive themselves about decisions or

beliefs when it is for the good of the group. They change or refuse to acknowledge

certain negative aspects that pertain to situations at hand. A similar theory of mind is

assumed to be present in tight-knit cultural or religious groups.

Not only does group self-deception fall under the guise of a group having similar

self-deceptions, but also the idea of interpersonal self-deception. This refers to a much

more personal form of self-deception in which ones perception of the self is dependent on

how their theory of mind interprets the judgment of others. This would be a case in which

one's self-image is more deception driven the more perceptions from outside sources




differ from one's wanted or preferred self-image. In practice, acts of suppression or

sensitization can be the start of self-deception. The act of self-deception is not

necessarily brought on for no reason. The suppression, avoidance, or over-interpretation

of some facts are different ways of both defense and self-deception towards a norm or

expectation that is threatened.

This deception based on the possible judgment of others also falls onto those who

have a high, rather than low, self-esteem. To have such high self-esteem is to have some

defensive line against negativity or a strong self-deceptive image. In a paper by Rudy

Nydegger, Louis Zurcher, and Kenneth Monts, the correlations between self-esteem and

self-deception along with suppression and self-deception are tested. Both results came to

match the ideas expressed above.

If someone is more apt to self-deceive based on a personality trait, it can be

argued that this trait originated or developed from some initial stimuli and became more

prominent because of continuous or regular stimuli. With this said, the hypothesis to pose

would be that the more people there are to present a negative stimuli or challenge a

personal self-image over time, the greater or the more deep-seeded the self-deception is .

This hypothesis can be interpreted in two ways. The first is the development of self-

esteem, either positive or negative, and also the development of a suppressive or

selectively ignorant personality. The second way to interpret this is the development of a

compliant personality. A compliant personality would fit in a collectivist view. It would

fit to be someone who is compliant to the ideals of the group rather than the individual,

and so will self-deceive about their own and/or other's beliefs.

The idea of self-deception seems concrete enough when just considering the




conjecture of someone deceiving themselves about a truth. Interpersonal self-deception

brings in an outside or public eye as one is not just deceiving themselves, they are then

deceiving someone else about themselves. Theory of mind is not just brought into this as

some side note. It is necessary for self-deception and interpersonal self-deception to take

place. A deception is based off of an opposing judgment; a judgment made by an outside

source. This source is another person. I believe it can be argued that one would not

believe or need to deceive if they did not attribute some type of consciousness,

intelligence, or thought to another being. In order for there to be an opposing perception,

true or otherwise, a conscious awareness or mind must be present.

Group self-deception is an extension of interpersonal self-deception. Similar

deceptions among groups of people lead to unity by belief . Self-deceptions that are

publicly presented as truths, or merely understood, become interpersonal . This then leads

to groups of similar interests that are based on deception which are based opinions . Once

groups of similar interest are formed people are likely to begin to deceive themselves

about the beliefs of others within the group to familiarize and match beliefs . Once this is

established the idea of a collectivist group resurfaces. Collectivism promotes self-

deception on a large scale to the point that interpersonal self-deception is no longer based

on the ideas of others, but the ideal or otherwise that the group is based around.

Considering the use of the words group and culture, one example to use and help

clarify is to apply these ideas to religion. A paper by Ava Chamberlain examines the

writings of Jonathan Edwards, a preacher and theologian. This examination of work

brought up a term which Edwards used to describe a form of self-deception, "evangelical

hypocrisy." This view of self-deception had shown two forms; there are those who are




deceived by their own willingness to believe something they are told and those who fool

themselves into believing ideals they assemble themselves. Both of these deceptions lead

to outward profession of personal belief . Profession of belief, in a religious context

especially, leads to followers and other believers who are then being deceived . Personal

beliefs become self-deceiving as one reasons or convinces the self to make sense of the

deceptive belief . This is not to say that religion is an institution based on deception, but it

is something heavily based on both personal and public belief . I believe it would be fair

to argue that there are some people that have such a strong belief in the religious

institution itself that their belief matches and changes with the institution. That said,

changes in belief based on an outside source leads to the mind possibly making up some

justification. This justification may conflict with the individual's belief yet their reliance

on the institution requires a self-deception to continually agree with the institution.

Group self-deception is something that sounds odd at first in the context that self-

deception is personal and groups are not. Honestly at its core, group self-deception is

interpersonal self-deception on a grand or even more personal scale. The idea is that

interpersonal self-deception is something that happens on a daily basis and could happen

with anyone. Family, friends, strangers, the barber, that guy at the supermarket desk; they

can all be influences to your deception. The idea of group is that it takes the deception to

a much more personal and much more integrated level . By personal I mean that the

interpersonal deception and self-deception is happening between individuals who have

some closer tie to each other . It is something that gives their judgment more weight. By

integrated I mean that the closely tied deception, self or otherwise, is happening on a

grander and more intertwined scale. Multiple people are interpersonally self-deceiving




each other at the same time and grows hand in hand with the closeness of the group.

R eferences

Chamberlain, A. (1994). Self-deception as a theological problem in Jonathan Edwards's

Treatise Concerning Religious.. Church History, 63(4), 541.

Monts, J., Zurcher Jr ., L. A., & Nydegger, R . V. (1977). INTERPERSONAL SELF-

DECEPTION AND PERSONALITY CORRELATES. Journal Of Social

Psychology, 103(1), 91.

Patten, D. (2003). How do we deceive ourselves?. Philosophical Psychology, 16(2), 229.

TRIANDIS, H. C. (2011). CULTURE AND SELF-DECEPTION: A THEORETICAL

PERSPECTIVE. Social Behavior & Personality: An International Journal, 39(1),

3-13. doi:10.2224/sbp.2011.39.1.3

von Hippel, W., & Trivers, R . (2011). The evolution and psychology of self-deception.

Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 34(1), 1-16. doi:10.1017/S0140525X10001354

Dynamics of Dream Deception: Francesco Passalacqua

Dreaming is undoubtedly a universal phenomenon among human beings, which

engages our imagination, as well as challenges our conception of reality. In terms of

deception, dreaming also challenges our belief systems because of the effortlessness




involved in being deceived of the reality of the dream. The Social Mapping Hypothesis

proposed by Derek P. Brereton states that dreaming has played a pivotal role in the

evolutionary development of conscious and social skills in hominids. Furthermore, it has

led to the emergence of the social traits that we ascribe to consciousness, such as

intelligence, emotionality, symbolic communication, and theory of mind²the unique

human ability to attribute mental states to conspecifics. According to Brereton (2000),

deception and self-deception arise from using theory of mind to manipulate others for

advantageous social ends. Illustrated lucidly, ³an individual who can read the facial

expressions of another has an advantage, one who can mask those expressions gains it

back ́ (Brereton, 2000, p. 392). Individuals, who could rehearse and enact these aspects

of consciousness within the low-risk environment were provided a selective advantage.

This allowed individuals to gain a more confident capability to manipulate their

environment in complex social milieu.

In order for the hypothesis to have universal biological innateness among

Homo sapiens, Brereton recognized that dreaming, as a neurophysiological process, must

be distinguished from the subjective interpretation of the dream. Among a number of

neurologically significant areas in dreaming and theory of mind is the Pre-frontal Cortex

(PFC). The PFC is attributed to the executive faculties that correlate to theory of mind

such as ³problem solving, planning, the initiation and inhibition of behaviors, and the

manipulation of useful data in conscious working memory.´ (Farrow et al., 2004, p.

1756) A number of fMRI studies have also demonstrated that the PFC is directly

implicated in deception. Subjects who were fabricating imaginative and deliberate lies

showed greater activation of the PFC compared to truthful subjects . The same study

Comment [RJ1]: Y ay! I love this area of the

brain.

Comment [RJ2]: Add mirror neurons here

those are SUPER important to theory of mind,

mimicking behavior. Of course, youll have to

a separate source.




revealed that subjects who withheld truthful information also exhibited similar increased

activation of the executive inhibitory control regions of the PFC (Farrow et al., 2004, p.

1758). According to other brain imaging research, the dorsolateral and orbital pre-frontal

cortex are both inhibited during REM sleep, thereby impeding the ability to respond to

the external environment (Brereton, 2000, p. 384). This causally inhibits the normal

executive processes that ordinarily protect us from potentially hazardous environments.

The suppressed activity of the PFC is thereby what gives the sometimes bizarre and

improbable substance of our dreams credibility. The inhibition of rational control in a

dreamer, particularly gives them credence of the existence of a mind in dream characters.

Fascinatingly enough, dreamers still exhibit Theory of Mind (ToM), regardless

of the inhibition of the PFC, originally assumed to be necessary in executing ToM. This

was indicated in a dream study out of Harvard Medical School where not only did 94% of

324 recorded dream reports communicate that particular feelings were evoked by

interaction with dream characters, but also that dreamers were concerned or aware of

dream characters¶ intentions and/or thoughts (Kahn & Hobson, 2005). Consequently,

dreamers were more involved in emotionally relating to the dream characters in ways that

reinforced their ontological credence of the characters rather than in r ationally attempting

to deceive them. These findings parallel the belief that the limbic structures have a higher

priority within dreams. These structures include the amygdala (emotional salience),

hippocampus (memory gating, search and survival activity), fusiform gyrus (face

recognition, individual recognition), thalamus (multisensory coordination), cerebral

vermis and basal ganglia (movement), and the right parietal operculum (spatial location)

(Brereton, 2000, p. 385). In concordance with Brereton, I propose that the inhibition of

Comment [RJ3]: That is VERY cool.

Comment [RJ4]: Alrightso youre making

your FINAL point in this paragraph. Avoid

abstractions and ground your readerwhat d

you mean by otherness of the minds?

Comment [RJ5]: Very, very nice paragraph

Comment [RJ6]: Sothe PFC is not workin

here, and neither is deception. Isnt this what

expectedrelate back to your topic sentence.

Comment [RJ7]: Y AY , I love this structure.

Comment [RJ8]: This one is okay.

Comment [RJ9]: Huh?

Comment [RJ10]: Y UM.




the PFC consolidates energy in the nervous system, given the low-stakes of biological

harm within dream scenarios. In place, the limbic system, attributed to emotion, behavior

and long-term memory, takes precedence. In relation to ToM, the activation of the

fusiform gyrus induces the familiar, relationship-dependent existence of individuals,

giving them the believable façade of alterity enough for the dreamer to speculate about

and predict their emotions and intentions. Through what Brereton calls ³the mapping of

the self in emotionally salient social space´ (Brereton, 2000, p. 386) the dreamer

essentially deceives themselves, of the reality of their environments for the fortification

of the self .

Self-deception seems to be a more prominent experience in dreams because of

lack of rational faculties and prevalence of emotionally capacity. Deception involves

higher cognitive processes of the PFC, which involves planning the lie, imagining the

subject¶s response, and reacting accordingly. Self-deception, inversely, is portrayed in a

scenario in which the deceiver and the object of deception are the same. This implies, to

some extent, that the deception upon the self is directed from an unconscious dimension

of mind,. When we consider the fact that individuals in REM sleep exhibit a decrease of

PFC activity, we can reasonably assume that dreaming involves a decrease in the

executive abilities of conscious deception. In non-lucid dreams, the dreamer takes the

scenery, individuals, and experiences within his dream to be ontologically true . It has

been previously addressed that this process is evolutionarily feasible for it allows the

dreamer to simulate social scenarios as a way to develop experience in how to deal with

potential future conflicts (Brereton, 2000). This belief at µface value¶, though, also

depends on and reinforces the dreamer¶s sense of self . The promotion of the self is

Comment [RJ11]: Cool! I like this theory.

Comment [RJ12]: Not the word to use here

maybe In relation to ToM

Comment [RJ13]: FUCKING WILD. SO COO

Comment [RJ14]: Dont use to meit sou

like you are trying to say In my opinion, i.e. co

your tracks. Assert yourself! Be confident.

Comment [RJ15]: ? I know what youre say

but this wording is off.

Comment [RJ16]:Y

es! Find a new article acite this fact. Reinforce it.




socially viable as ³the capacity to create social maps, [which] necessarily entails

positioning the self in relation to other .´ (Brereton, 2000, p. 387)

The fusiform gyrus participates in another mechanism through which the

individuality of the self is fostered. Fundamental patterns of interaction between an infant

and their caregiver before a critical period promote cerebroneuronal growth that plays a

crucial role in emotional salience in the context of face recognition (Brereton, 2000, p .

389). The emotional quality of the early bonding experiences have also been

demonstrated to later play a role in the child¶s capacity to relate to others (Schore, 1994) .

Essentially, the perception of facial expression within a waking experience, the

neurological activation of the fusiform gyrus during dreaming, and our experience of

inferring the mental states of the other in dreams are all inter-related. Particularly

important is the phenomena of recognition. Research has demonstrated that the

representations of a mother¶s face, which maintains eye contact with her child fosters the

experience of recognition in her child, and is stored in the amygdala (Schore, 1994, p .

181, 187). The interpersonal environment during cognitive development thereby shapes

the neurological relation of the self to others. The abundance of fusiform gyrus and

amygdalar activity during dreaming, then, also insinuates that dreaming neurologically

enforces and develops the conception of self in relation to others.

Dreaming, as this paper suggests, is an evolutionary mechanism not only

for social cognition, but also for the representation of a distinctive abstract self . Through

this self-concept, and corollary ability to attribute mental states to others, the individual

fosters the cognitive capacity to confidently develop and utilize a theory of mind for

social adaptive purposes. Although the development of the representational self is

Comment [RJ17]: Nope. Evolutionary

psychology is ALL narrative, not fact. There is

research done in this field!

Comment [RJ18]: Do you mean self-

conceptas in viewing oneself with abstract

terms? Thats a commonly used psychological

worduse it instead, its more reader-friendly

and scientific.




important in this respect, I believe it is a self-deceptive evolutionary mechanism that

contributed to the development of our ability to survive in complex social schemas.

Among these abilities is deception. Culture, Brereton suggests, ³is a constantly oscillating

dialectic between subjective meaning and objective realization, neither pole of which is

ever fixed«ambiguity is not a shortcoming to be worked out of the model, but the

essence of what the model must convey´ (Brereton, 2000, p. 394). Therefore,

neurologically, the world is represented to us not as correspondence, but by analogy;

perceptions turned into symbols when conceptual representation fails. Brereton here

brings up a crucial point, stating,

This process is tantamount to an intrasubjective complicity, one of thekey experiential features of consciousness, which then serves as the

basis for intersubjective complicity, that is, the tacit agreement to goalong with a symbolically encoded interpretation of events. (Brereton,2004, p. 399)

Given that we live in an ambiguous world, this provides us with the ability to µchange our

mind¶, or alter a symbolic relationship based on µobjective realization¶ . This also leads to

a change in the view of the representational self . I learn early that I have a body that is

very much analogous to my caregiver; we share hair, hands, feet, belly buttons and so on.

This knowledge then becomes a part of my representational self²identifying with the

relationship with the other . Consider, hypothetically of course, that one day my caregiver

takes off their human suit to reveal an amorphous blob with thousands of blinking eyes.

How drastically would my representational self-concept alter? I would admit, quite a bit.

Thereby, our ³experience is cognized - rendered meaningful ± as being "like" something;

things are both perceived and comprehended in terms of each other ́ (Brereton, 2000, p.

395). In dreams we generally do not have a vantage for perception of the outside world.

Comment [RJ19]: arent symbols concept

Clearly the dreamer is invested emotionally by

the image-concepts in the dream.

Comment [RJ20]: Do you mean your prima

caregiver here?

Comment [RJ21]: Y ou should answer this

question.




Consequently, our dream world is inherently a symbolic, representational model of our

relationship with ourselves, our world, and other minds. In dreaming then, the re-

cognition of the symbolical self that is depicted, according the Brereton, acts to develop

the µself-as-body-in-relational-space¶. Evolutionary wise, this representation contributes

to adaption, ³via the enhancement of plasticity´ (Brereton, 2000, p. 400), or our ability to

react to new environments in an efficient manner . The idea that ³the core of the self lies

in pattern of affect regulation that integrate a sense of self across state transitions, thereby

allowing for a continuity of inner experience´ (Schore, 1994, p. 316) then implies that the

recognition of pattern inherently ignores data outside of this pattern . This notion produces

a model of self-deception in which the µself¶ is deceived into believing it exists based on

the symbols it renders affectively meaningful. In terms of deception then, dreaming

develops the symbolic µself-as-body-in-relational-space¶ for the maintenance of the

conception of a persona with agency, with intention, which can then deceive.

The evolution of consciousness, we can safely assume, depended on the ability

of self-awareness to lead to self-representation. Consciousness, ³on the one hand,

[enables] us to know what we know, but on the other, quite possibly, [also keeps] us from

knowing certain things, especially things regarding our own motivations´ (Brereton,

2000, p. 391). Consciousness then µprotects¶ the individual from the knowledge of certain

information by neurologically deeming it irrelevant for conscious processing. Could we

call this protection self-deception, which implies a withholding of information from the

conscious self? It appears so. Self-deception grants the ability to portray a convincing

front, interact with the environment, and deceive if necessary. And these capabilities are

crucial for survival in terms of social interaction and thereby reproductive success .

Comment [RJ22]: What is this?

Comment [RJ23]: Semi-colons are for two

incomplete sentences to be stringed together

Comment [RJ24]: Sweet!

Comment [RJ25]: FUCK Y A. Interesting.




Dreaming, Brereton suggests, incorporates key functions of consciousness, self-

awareness, mental scenario building, and the capacity for ToM, in dreams by the double

portrayal of self (dream self, and panoptical observer), the connective flow of a dream

narrative, and the ability to make inferences of dream character¶s intentions . I suggest

that the ability to self-deceive precludes the ability to deceive. For without the confident

notion of a separate, volitional self, ecological survival stakes are high in terms of social

adaptation, and survival in the hierarchical structure of our hominid ancestors.

Biologically, the individual is impaired in reproductive fitness and in their fight or flight

instincts which are connected with the protection and proliferation of the self,

individually and in terms of species.

The trajectory of this work has led me to one final aspect of evolution,

dreaming and deception, which is more conducive to experiential consideration than

conclusion: the phenomenon of Dream Yoga. Dream Yoga is a Tibetan Buddhist practice

developed as a method for the individual to attain enlightenment. Dream Yoga is

distinguished from the western conception of lucid dreaming precisely for its spiritual

intention. Dreams are a remarkably manifest representation of Buddhist doctrine because

of their ephemeral substance, their psychologically projecting nature, our fleeting grasp

on the validity of the sensory experience, as well as the dual perspective of self and

observer . It utilizes practices that allow the dreamer to become aware and fundamentally

detach from the phenomenological body. We have previously acknowledged that normal

REM sleep involves the de-activation and inhibition of the PFC, specifically the

dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). (Maquet et al., 1996) Following this

understanding, researchers have hypothesized that the DLPFC becomes re-activated




during lucid dreaming. (Hobson, 2009, p. 43) Furthur research and experimentation

ensuing this speculation have yet to be conducted. Yet, the implications are monumental.

Practicing lucid dreaming or dream yoga would essentially neurologically alter the

mechanism through which we self-deceive during dreaming. Not only could this be

applied to the Buddhist practice of disengaging the belief in the representational µego¶,

but, congruent with the Social Mapping Hypothesis, could also be an emerging/current

influence of the co-evolution of dreaming and consciousness. In terms of psychology and

mental illness, I suggest that lucid dreaming could provide a method of insight through

which self-deception and deception can be personally realized, deteriorated and

discouraged.

The Social Mapping Hypothesis has proclaimed that the co-evolution of

dreaming and consciousness brought with it the faculties of consciousness that allow for

the attribution of mental states to conspecifics. Through this potential for theory of mind,

humans also developed the capability to manipulate their perception of others intentions

for their own adaptive means. This makes evolutionary sense, considering the

increasingly complex social dynamics and competitiveness in primates and hominids.

Yet, this paper proposes, that deception itself necessarily emerges from the association

with a self-deceptive representation of the self . The evolution of human consciousness

has hitherto led to the accelerating emergence of highly complex scientific, biological,

psychological, and philosophical laws and theories which have depended on precise

empirical observations. These leaps in consciousness have endowed mankind with the

ability to gaze deep into our universe, communicate nearly instantaneously via a mass

interconnecting web of information we have come to know as the internet, and have




begun to understand the human mind and body to such an extent as to be able to prescribe

effective treatment for countless ailments. All of this could only have been possible

through the agency of the self, and collaboration of selves. Does the ability for lucid

dreaming and our increasing understanding and practice of it then reflect a furthur

advance in consciousness? Are we, through this increase in awareness, learning to reverse

the neurological impulse to self-deceive?

R eferences

Abu-Akel, A. (2003). A neurobiological mapping of theory of mind. B

rain Research Reviews, 43, 29-40. Retrieved from

http://www.cogsci. bme.hu/DoCS/oktatas/kurzusok/misc/olvasoszem/TomMappin

g. pdf

Brereton, D. (2000). Dreaming, adaptation, and consciousness: The social mapping

hypothesis. Ethos, 28(3), 379-409. Retrieved from

http://www. jstor .org/stable/640649

Farrow, T. F., Ganesan, V., Green, R . D., Hughes, C. J., Hunter, M. D., Leung, D. H., &

Spence, S. A. (2004). A cognitive neurobiological account of deception: Evidence

from functional neuroimaging. Philosophical Transactions: Biological

Sciences,359(1451), 1755-1762. Retrieved from

http://www. jstor .org/stable/4142160

Hobson, A. (2009). The neurobiology of consciousness: Lucid dreaming wakes up.

International Journal of Dream Research, 2(2), 41-44. Retrieved from

http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/ojs/index. php/IJoDR/article/view/403/pdf_1

Kahn, D., & Hobson, A. (2005). Theory of mind in dreaming: Awareness of feelings and

thoughts of others in dreams. Dreaming , 15(1), 48-57. Retrieved from

http://proxy2.hampshire.edu/login?url=http://search .ebscohost.com/login.aspx?dir

ect=true&AuthType=ip&db=pdh&AN=drm-15-1-48&site=ehost-live

Maquet, P., Peters, J., Aerts, J., Delfiore, G., Degueldre, C. Luxen, A. et al. (1996)

Functional neuroanatomy of human rapid-eye-movement sleep and dreaming.

Nature, 383: 163-166 Schore, A. N. (1994). Affect regulation and the origin of




emotional development . Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Final Thoughts

Throughout our project, we have demonstrated various ways in which deception

and self-deception can be modeled and developed. We have been able to understand that

the ability for deception emerges as a first step from the connections between beliefs and

emotions/desires, and then from our ability to recognize and manipulate others beliefs




and desires. The question of intentionality that we originally posed seems to remain. We

have explored, in the terrain of non-human animal deception that the notion of intention

can vary in degree from the unconscious deception that animals perform for survival

purposes, to the conscious deception that we encounter in children through adults in their

development of Theory of Mind. Yet, in terms of the limits of subjectivity, we cannot

make definite conclusions in terms of where intention originates. Many of our models of

deception, although, are manifest unconsciously in a subject as self-deception. We see

this in confabulation, group self-deception, as well as dreaming. This has led us to

investigate the extent and possible causes of self-deception.

We noticed throughout this exploration that deception, self-deception, group-

deception, and dream deception all necessarily depend on the way that one views

themselves in relation to another . In more primal forms of deception the self is viewed as

a competitive agent, using deception as a survival mechanism for the proliferation of their

unconscious sense of self . In dreams, the projected image of the representational self can

be taken to be the 'actual' identity of the dreamer . Similarly, group deception depends on

the projection of a self-deceived image becoming a shared false belief . Confabulation

likewise depends on an authentic, neurological belief of what the 'deceiver' themselves

say.

At the level of full-blown intentional deception, we have observed, through the

neurobiological mechanisms of dreaming, and through the Social Mapping Hypothesis,

that deception itself inherently depends on a self-deceptive identification with a

representational self . This has led us to suggest that self-deception is a precursor for

deception, in terms of the evolution of consciousness. This becomes apparent in the

deception final project

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