degrees of violence: exploratory data for the …...international peace research institute oslo...

Degrees of violence: exploratory data for

the Brutalisation project

Using the Global Terrorism Database and other

data(sets) to assess brutalities and degrees of

brutalisation by Chechen and Albanian insurgents in

1979 – 2001 and beyond

A WORKING PAPER

By Caspar ten Dam

Adapted version, updated in March 2012 and April 2015

Based on Chapter 3 of the original 2009 PhD-thesis Ways to Rebel: Testing a Theory of

Brutalisation on the Chechen and Albanian Insurgents, 1979 - 2001

© 2009, 2012, 2015 Caspar ten Dam

Master of Arts (MA) in Political Science

Leiden, the Netherlands www.ctdamconsultancy.com

http://www.ctdamconsultancy.com/

2

Introduction

What brutalises rebels? What makes them cruel, or do things we consider cruel? That is a

primary question of my research, and of prime importance to the field of conflict studies:

arguably most conflicts are internal, insurgent, and separatist in nature (see section

‘Relevance: conflict patterns’), and one wishes to prevent or curtail the suffering involved. A

secondary yet crucial question precedes this: do rebels brutalise all the time, increasingly so,

or at all? And if so, to what quantifiable degrees? At first glance the answer to that seems

affirmative – indeed, rather obvious. Reputations of armed opposition groups plummeted

following the end of the Cold War. The ideals of a ‘people’s war’ propounded by Ché

Guevara, Mao Tse-tung and Frantz Fanon lost appeal among the young, gained ridicule when

people observed the atrocities from Afghanistan to Sierra Leone, from Colombia to Congo.

So-called ‘freedom fighters’ brought little liberation but plenty of savagery and crime; Ché,

Mao and Fanon held no sway among them. The remaining ideologues seem according to

many observers to be Islamic terrorists who show little regard to human life. Their violence is

the more frightening, because of their so-called catastrophic terrorism i.e. violence intended

to kill as many people (civilians) as possible. This trend arose in the early 1980s, superseding

a classical terrorism intended to gain media attention and its objectives with as few casualties

as possible.1 Indeed, it seem as if “even the old guerrilla struggles have grown more awful.

Increasingly, the rebel – Irish or Arab, urban or rural – has appeared cruel, a new barbarian.

… The romantic rebel is dead and gone”.2 In order to determine whether that bleak

assessment is true, and if so, why it has come about, one needs to ask the following

questions:3

1. Has the decent liberation fighter become extinct? Has it ever existed?

2. Many studies observe the ‘degeneration’ of the freedom fighter into a criminal, bandit

or terrorist. Is this observation correct?

1 Marianne van Leeuwen, ‘Catastrophic Terrorism: Elusive Phenomenon, Deadly Threat’ in: P. van Ham, K.

Homan, M. van Leeuwen, D. Leurdijk & F. Osinga, Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Insights and Perspectives

after September 11 The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, December 2001,

esp. pp.7,11-12.

2 J. B. Bell, The Dynamics of the Armed Struggle London/Portland (Oregon): Frank Cass, 1998, p.4.

3 I need to thank my former supervisor Prof. Adrian Guelke for helping me to formulate these first probing

questions during the early phase of my PhD research at Queen’s University Belfast in 2005-2006. I added the

eight research question in later years, when I studied the literature on combat-stress.

3

3. Have these studies focused too much on ‘new’ conflicts, overlooking the

commonalities with Cold War and pre-Cold War conflicts?

4. Why do regulations such as The Hague and Geneva conventions seem to have so little

impact? Do local values and customs deviate so much from international law? Or do

premature and unfair condemnations of rebels as ‘terrorists’ and ‘bandits’ lie at the

root of their later brutalisation, as they have nothing to lose by violating basic norms?

5. Can we determine what constitutes a ‘just revolt’, given that there may be different

‘just war’ notions in different cultures?

6. Do motivations like anger about pain, humiliation and injustice or greed for power,

prestige and riches not just spawn rebellions per se, but also terrorism, banditry, and

other (war) crimes by rebels?

7. Apart from motivations, do the pressures and horrors of battle brutalise rebels – and

any other kinds of combatants for that matter?

8. Do all kinds of combatants exhibits similar kinds and degrees of brutality and

brutalisation (if any)? Or does the type, status and circumstance of the armed actor in

question at least partially determine his or her resort to brutalities i.e. violations of

local and/or norms of violence (if any)? We focus on the nature and behavior of rebels

and other non-state actors, but in the end we also need to analyse the nature and

behavior of soldiers and other state and semi-state actors like paramilitaries.

The first three first research questions are about whether and how much brutalisation, i.e.

increasing resort to violence that violates local and/or international norms, occurs. The next

four questions are about why and how brutalisation occurs for so far it does occur, and the last

one is about whether it occurs similarly or differently among all kinds of combatants – even

though our present research focus is on insurgents. A good way to answer these questions is

by testing a Brutalisation theory4 I have developed myself, by incorporating what I consider

to be the best concepts available in cultural anthropology, military psychology and other

4 I have developed and first tested my Brutalisation theory in my initial PhD-research project titled ‘Ways to rebel: violence values, aims and methods of Chechen and Albanian insurgents 1979-2001’. An adapted and

updated version of the original manuscript will appear as Ways to Rebel: Values, Aims and Methods of Violence –

Testing a Theory of Brutalisation on the Chechen and Albanian insurgents 1979-2001 (Cambridge Scholars

Publishing, forthcoming). Actually, a major part of the analysis and findings is already appearing as a Series in a

peer-reviewed journal: Caspar ten Dam, ‘How to Feud and Rebel: 1. Violence-values among the Chechens and

Albanians’ Iran and the Caucasus (Brill) Vol.14 No.2, November 2010, pp.331-65; ‘2. Histories, Cultures and

Grievances of the Chechens and Albanians’ Vol.15 Nos.1-2, June 2011, pp.234-73; ‘3. Combat-stress and

Violence-values among the Chechens and Albanians’ Vol.16 No.2, July 2012, pp.225-45; ‘4. Conflict

Motivations among the Chechens and Albanians’ (forthcoming). For this Series, I seek to receive a PhD degree

at the History department of Leiden University, the Netherlands.

4

disciplines. My theory is thus made up of the variables violence-values (my composite term)

on proper and improper violence; conflict-inducing motivations, in particular grievances,

avarices, interests and ideologies that bring about i.e. cause or trigger the conflict; combat-

stresses like fear, fatigue and rage resulting from or leading to trauma’s (and hypothetically to

brutalities as well); and conflict-induced motivations, in particular grievances, avarices,

interest and ideologies that happen by, through and during the conflict.5 The theory thus

assumes rebels or other armed non-state and state actors to increasingly violate local and/or

international norms, in a cycle of escalating and worsening violence. As a first preliminary

test of this theory, I compare recent rebellions by Chechens and Albanians, particularly in

Chechnya (1994-96, 1999-present) and Kosovo (1997-99).

One must keep in mind, however, that my overarching Brutalisation project is a wide-ranging

and ongoing one. The current study for a PhD concerns an early phase of that project: it

presents a number of my publications that assess, primarily in an exploratory thick-

description manner, the saliency of some of the theory’s (sub-)variables among Chechen and

Albanian insurgents and their wider communities in their often little known, understood,

researched and archived histories.6 Therefore, the project will know many more phases,

including:

a) expanding the analysis of brutalisation characteristics among non-state actors like the

typically anti-regime rebel communities (my composite term) of the Chechens and

Albanians, to an equally in-depth treatment of such characteristics among (semi-)state

actors like the typically incumbent regime communities (ibid) of Russians and Serbs;

b) expanding the comparative analysis to several more cases on the Eurasian continent

between 1979 and 2001, like the 1992-97 civil war in Tajikistan and one or more

distinguishable conflicts in Afghanistan, to see whether brutalisation i.e. increasing

violations of proper or justifiable violence has occurred in any of these cases (as well);

5 From 2005 till 2013, I have described my brutalisation theory, with some minor modifications, as “a cycle

of violence involving four main variables: “values on “good” and “bad” violence (variable 1); grievances

leading to armed conflict (variable 2); combat stress leading to atrocities (variable 3); and new conflict

grievances emanating from such atrocities (variable 4), spawning counter-atrocities and eventually hardening or

debasing the original violence-values (the cycle returns to the first variable)”: C. ten Dam, ‘How to Feud and

Rebel: 1. Violence-values among the Chechens and Albanians’ Iran and the Caucasus Vol.14 No.2, November

2010, p.332. Yet since then, I have widened and reformulated the theory’s variables, so as to more equally

represent different motivations as explanations of brutal behaviour, taken from or inspired by diverse theories

propounding particular kinds of motivations as the primary causes of such behaviour.

6 See note 4.

5

c) testing the Brutalisation theory through both qualitative and quantitative analyses on

several and eventually dozens of past and present conflicts on other continents like

Africa (e.g. in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo, Sudan), in order to arrive at a general if

contestable assessment of the overall validity of the theory.

The second basic question of the project’s current phase – do rebels brutalise and by ‘how

much’ – is exceedingly difficult to answer. Quantitative analysis will be partial and contested,

as no global dataset with commonly agreed suppositions, concepts and data-readings appears

to exist. Thus Ted Robert Gurr’s Minorities at Risk, J. D. Singer’s Correlates of War and

other projects do not present the discrete incidents one needs to quantify brutalisation over

time.7 Monty G. Marshall & Ted Robert Gurr detected an increase of attacks and fatalities by

‘high profile’ terrorists between 3 November 1998 and 3 October 2005, and suggested that

Chechens did brutalise. Yet even they rarely distinguish incidents in their research findings.8

Most variables in most conflict datasets are too aggregated to reliably reflect particular

actions and actors, let alone their causes, dynamics and effects. Fortunately, as Clionadh

Raleigh & Håvard Hegre point out, the “fundamental unit of observation .. is the event” in the

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project; at the time, this project, at the

International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) from 2003 until 2012, was still in its

infancy, initially covering eight African countries between 1960 and 2004; but they intended

to “expand the data to cover the remaining conflict countries in West Africa, Sudan and the

Balkans”.9 In ACLED, the “politically violent event is a single altercation where often force is

used by one or more groups for a political end, although some instances – including protests

and non-violent activity – are included in the dataset to capture the potential pre-cursors or

7 In 1963 J. D. Singer founded the Correlates of War project to accumulate data on wars since 1816.

However, e.g. the COW Intra-State War and Non-State War datasets contain no variable denoting or

distinguishing between discrete violent incidents, only the start and end dates of sustained combat. See

www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war (as first noted on 19-08-2009; last visited on 2-04-2015).

8 Increase high-profile terrorism (at least 15 deaths in one or more coordinated attacks) mainly by militants in

“Iraq (Sunni and pan-Arab), Israel (Palestinian), Pakistan (Sunni and Shi’a), Philippines (Moro), and Russia

(Chechens)”: M. G. Marshall & T. R. Gurr, Peace and Conflict 2005 Center for International Development and

Conflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland, May 2005, p.73 (figure 9.2); ‘onset events’ Africa:

figure 7.3, p.47.

9 Clionadh Raleigh & Håvard Hegre, Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset Centre for the Study of Civil War (2003-2012), International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Paper at

conference ‘Disaggregating the Study of Civil War and Transnational Violence’, University of California

Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation, San Diego, CA, 7–8 March 2005, pp.7 (1st quote; most events

“battles, but .. dataset [also] records on other activities”), 24 (2nd

quote). See

www.prio.org/Projects/Project/?x=1022 (last visited 2-04-2015). See further www.acleddata.com.

http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-warhttp://www.prio.org/Projects/Project/?x=1022http://www.acleddata.com/

6

critical junctures of a conflict”.10

Such conceptualisations make the ACLED project and

datasets potentially the most promising to use for studying, tabulating and (re) interpreting

whole ranges of discrete violent actions, incidents and events by and among Chechen and

Albanian insurgents and other actors. As far as I have been able to determine, there are (still)

no ACLED figures on Chechnya or any other countries or regions in which Chechen actors

may have played a role across the 1979-2001 period or beyond. Nowadays, ACLED data

cover “all countries on the African continent from 1997-2014”, and earlier and/or upcoming

data on “South and South East Asian states” and “additional countries” like “Haiti, Laos,

Cambodia, Nepal, Myanmar” and “Afghanistan and Pakistan”11

– but still hardly any if

anything on countries in the former Soviet Union. Fortunately, the “ACLED Version 1 (1997

– 2009/2010) dataset” does contain detailed data on violent incidents in Kosovo and FYR

Macedonia (and Bosnia and Croatia).12

Other ready-made datasets like those by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

(SIPRI) and Jane’s Intelligence Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JITC; more recently called

Jane’s World Insurgency & Terrorism) 13

may seem well-suited as well. Yet their data, on for

instance arms exports and transfers (SIPRI) 14

, are at most indirectly related or interpretible to

violence by armed non-state actors; and their access costs are often (far too) steep for

individual researchers like me. It may thus be necessary to collect own data from sources

specialised in daily reporting, like BBC’s BBC’s Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) and

10 Clionadh Raleigh & Caitriona Dowd, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook 2015 University of Sussex (formerly at PRIO), 2015, p.7; see www.acleddata.com/wp-

content/uploads/2015/01/ACLED_Codebook_2015.pdf.

11 Ibid, p.3; see www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ACLED_Codebook_2015.pdf. 12 See www.acleddata.com/data/versions-1-4-data-1997-2013/archived-data/. Yet the Balkan data “were not coded by an ACLED coder, but by a separate project under Ola Listhaug at NTNU” (www.acleddata.com/wp-

content/uploads/2011/documents/Balkans_note.pdf). Also relevant is the “Actor information”: see ‘Balkan data

descriptions’, www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/documents/Balkans_description.pdf.

13

JTIC, http://jtic.janes.com (first visited 20-12-2007), later at later at www.ihs.com/products/janes-

terrorism-insurgency-intelligence-centre.html (last visited 2-04-2015; unclear what IHS stands for). In 2007,

access to JTIC data cost well over £7,700 annually. JTIC/JWIT datasets and reports probably remain very

expensive, though the expenses are not immediately apparent to prospective customers; some sample reports are

freely available, like the “Analysis of the Threat Posed by Imarat Kavkaz in Central Asia and the Caucasus

Region”, www.ihs.com/pdf/IHS-Janes-World-Insurg-Terror_Imarat-Kavkaz_146073110913052132.pdf (acc. 3-

04-2015).

14

SIPRI, www.sipri.org (first visited 9-10-2007; last visited 2-04-2015). The SIPRI Yearbook 2007 alone

cost £85 at the time. Fortunately, nowadays most SIPRI reports and other documents are freely downloadable.

See e.g. Gennady Chufrin, ‘Russia: separatism and conflicts in the North Caucasus’, Chapter 3 in: SIPRI

Yearbook 2000, www.sipri.org/yearbook/2000/files/SIPRIYB0003.pdf. Pál Dunay, ‘Appendix 1A. Status and

statehood in the Western Balkans’, SIPRI Yearbook 2006,

www.sipri.org/yearbook/2006/files/SIPRIYB0601a.pdf.

http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ACLED_Codebook_2015.pdfhttp://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ACLED_Codebook_2015.pdfhttp://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ACLED_Codebook_2015.pdfhttp://www.acleddata.com/data/versions-1-4-data-1997-2013/archived-data/http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/documents/Balkans_note.pdfhttp://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/documents/Balkans_note.pdfhttp://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/documents/Balkans_description.pdfhttp://jtic.janes.com/http://www.ihs.com/products/janes-terrorism-insurgency-intelligence-centre.htmlhttp://www.ihs.com/products/janes-terrorism-insurgency-intelligence-centre.htmlhttp://www.ihs.com/pdf/IHS-Janes-World-Insurg-Terror_Imarat-Kavkaz_146073110913052132.pdfhttp://www.sipri.org/http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2000/files/SIPRIYB0003.pdfhttp://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2006/files/SIPRIYB0601a.pdf

7

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL).15

Then one needs not to ‘deconstruct’ already

collected and classified data from preconceptions I do not share. I have started to collect

violence-and-casualty data from BBC’s SWB and RFE/RL, and put these in annual tables

between 1979 and 2001. Naturally, this task proves to be gargantuan and is still in its infant

stage; still, I try to complete this particular part of the Brutalisation project for future

publications in the not too distant future. Given the complicated, expensive and/or time-

consuming obstacles that the aforementioned datasets pose, I have thought it best to first do

some exploratory data (re)interpretations and (re)classifications of violence by Chechen and

Albanian actors from the more easily accessible and pliable Global Terrorism Database

(GTD).

1. Testing the Global Terrorism Database

The freely accessible Global Terrorism Database (GTD) from the National Consortium for the

Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terror (START) at the University of Maryland, United

States, offers a suitable backdrop to identify, however tentatively, ‘terrorisation’ levels and

trends through my own concepts. The database consists of two datasets, GTD1 and GTD2,

covering ‘terrorist’ incidents in practically all countries over 1970-1997 (not 1993) and 1998-

2004 respectively. For Chechens and Albanians, I reinterpreted the GTD1 data from 1992 till

1997 (no data for 1979-1991), and all GTD2 data till 2004 so that one also captures post ‘9-

11’ patterns (see the Appendix for the original data reinterpretations).16

The table reproduced

below summarises the main differences between the two datasets.

15 BBC’s SWB is freely accessible through www.lexisnexis.com for researchers at Leiden University.

RFE/RL reports are freely accessible for all at www.rferl.org. My qualitative two-case study uses both sources as

well. However, RFE/RL’s online archives for the Balkans and the ex-USSR now only go back to the year 2000

at most (back to mid-1990s when I first extensively used its site in 2005-2007); I have downloaded hundreds of

individual articles and reports over the years, yet many of their online-identifications have become outdated or

fully defunct. For earlier articles and reports, one needs to gain access to the “archives of the RFE/RL Research

Institute and its successor, the Open Media Research Institute, .. in the custody of the Open Society Archive in

Budapest”, which seems to involve quite complex procedures (www.rferl.org/info/archive/1854.html; see

www.hoover.org/library-archives/collections/open-society-archives-budapest-hungary; acc. 2-04-2015).

16

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terror (START), University of

Maryland, Global Terrorism Database (GTD), www.start.umd.edu/start/data. Accessed 16-09-2007, 27-10-2007,

27-04-2009 and (?)-04-2012 (relevant texts and data found unchanged at least until 2009).

http://www.lexisnexis.com/http://www.rferl.org/http://www.rferl.org/info/archive/1854.htmlhttp://www.hoover.org/library-archives/collections/open-society-archives-budapest-hungaryhttp://www.start.umd.edu/start/data

8

Table 1.1 Two Global Terrorism Databases compared

GTD1 GTD2

Period Covered 1970 – 1997 (not 1993)

1998 – 2004 (expanding to 2007 by May 2008)*

Definition of Terrorism

The threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation.

No set definition; configurable approach covering several definitions of terrorism.

Criteria for Inclusion

Incidents that substantially concur with the above definition.

Two necessary criteria and two out of three sufficient criteria required to be met (see GTD2 Methodology).

Required Sources Single open-source report. Multiple independent open-source reports or single "highly credible" source.

Number of Fields Collected

Approx. 44 descriptive records per incident. The same as for GTD1 plus an additional 84 records.

Total Number of Incidents (May 2007)

68,986 10,000

Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terror (START), University of

Maryland, Global Terrorism Database (GTD), www.start.umd.edu/start/data/GTD/gtd1_and_gtd2.asp.

*: ‘by Spring 2009’ when re-accessed on 27 April 2009.

In my book Conceptualising Brutality and Violence (Cambridge Scholars, forthcoming) and

other publications, I will amply criticise definitions as applied for the GTD1 and GTD2

datasets. Suffice to say here that one might best define terrorism as violence against unarmed

and otherwise defenceless people for whatever reason by either state or non-state combatants.

Otherwise, conceptual confusion and partisan bickering may reign. In the near future, I plan

to reinterpret the additional GTD data for the Chechens and Albanians after 2004, at least

until 2011. Then I will verify whether the relevant GTD data between 1992 and 2004 have

been modified in any shape or form since I last checked in 2009; in that case these data

require another round of reclassifications and reinterpretations and reclassified datasets. I plan

to do this in collaboration with Pawan Kumar Sen, consultant at Interdisciplinary Analysts

(www.ida.com.np) in Kathmandu, Nepal17

; he will help me to apply more advanced statistics

(for so far as this is possible) on the selected GTD datasets according to my concepts and

consequent reclassifications and reinterpretations.

17 I worked with Pawan Kumar Sen in the past; thus I helped to publish, offer comments on and/or edit his

following publications: P. K. Sen, ‘Ethnicity-Based Federalism: An Issue of State Restructuring in Nepal’

Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics Vol.1 No.1, Spring 2013, pp.40-43 (see www.ethnogeopolitics.org); ‘Dynamic of

Nepali public’s opinion on the linguistic issue’ Nepalese Linguistics, Vol. 28, 2013, pp.199-210; ‘Should Nepal

be a Hindu State or a Secular State?’ Himalaya - Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies

Vol.34 No.2, forthcoming.

http://209.232.239.37/gtd2/methodology.htmhttp://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/GTD/gtd1_and_gtd2.asphttp://www.ethnogeopolitics.org/

9

Chosen dataset, own concepts

Just as with the ‘White Book’ data on National Liberation Army violence in FYR Macedonia

(see next chapter), it will be interesting to see how many GTD incidents, supposing they are

correctly described, are ‘terrorist’, or violate other humanitarian and human rights principles.

My terrorism concept covers certain human rights violations such as sudden kidnappings and

killings of non-combatants. It refers to violence during the act, like bomb explosions, not

violence after the act, like abuses after arrest. Most violations one finds in the GTD1 and

GTD2 data took place in battles, military operations or during the wider conflict; these

usually do not refer to arrests, disappearances and other violence outside the conflict zone, or

during a cease-fire or lull. GTD researchers do not count incidents falling outside their

terrorism definition(s), meaning they do not count most violent events. This brings me to

concepts by which one needs to reinterpret and reclassify their data.

Table 1.2 Reinterpreting GTD1 and GTD2 data on alleged Chechen and Albanian violence

Main concepts

TER: Terrorism, i.e. lethal violence without warning of the act for whatever purpose against (groups

of) unarmed and thereby defenceless civilians, unarmed off-duty soldiers, policemen and other

defenceless non-combatants. 18

HRV: any gross human rights violation (GHRV) other than terrorism, i.e. torture and ill-treatment

(including slavery); extrajudicial executions; disappearances; arbitrary arrests and detentions without

trial; forced deportation or expulsion and political murders and mass killings (including genocide and

crimes against humanity). For simplicity’s sake the concept also covers Geneva’s main out-of-battle

18 This definition, formulated in 2009, has been modified several times since then. The latest formulation is as

follows: “Terrorism: sudden lethal violence without preceding warning of the act for whatever purpose against

(groups of) unarmed or weakly armed and thereby effectively defenceless civilians, unarmed off-duty soldiers,

policemen and other defenceless non-combatants”. See http://www.ctdamconsultancy.com/wp-

content/uploads/Definitionsidentityviolence2014.pdf.

http://www.ctdamconsultancy.com/wp-content/uploads/Definitionsidentityviolence2014.pdfhttp://www.ctdamconsultancy.com/wp-content/uploads/Definitionsidentityviolence2014.pdf

10

treatment provision (Geneva C.art. 3.1; artt. 4 to 6 Protocol II).

Simplified violence classifications*

HRV: gross human rights or humanitarian violation other than terrorism**

TER: terrorist

NTR: non-terrorist and not violating other humanitarian or human rights (otherwise HRV).

*: incidents left blank are certainly or likely non-Chechen (North-Caucasian) or non-Albanian (Balkan) cases; or

conflict contexts cannot be determined, and are not counted.

**: incident descriptions are so minimal that HRV classifications will be rare; indeed they are virtually absent.

Certainty and reliability levels of classifications

Bold-and-cursive only, e.g. ‘ter’: certainly, practically certain

( ): apparently, allegedly, probably

[ ]: partially (only for HRV or TER)

? : uncertain

?? : unknown bias, or biased, partisan

NB: all partial ‘[ ]’ cases are categorised as uncertain ‘?’ in all final tabulations.

Incidents against non-combatants with no fatalities are classed as ‘probable’ or ‘certain’

terrorist incidents – even though my definition involves lethal violence against non-

combatants, and thus likely fatalities. Only a closer look at these incidents will tell us whether

they really fall within our terrorism concept. For now, they are classified as ‘terrorist’ –

though closer scrutiny may diminish the number of terrorist incidents. The same applies for

labelling attacks against combatant personnel as ‘non-terrorist’: in some cases these personnel

may be unarmed or off-duty – making these terrorist cases (incident descriptions are too

minimal to determine this). Hopefully both biases cancel each other out. Finally, in most

cases the perpetrators are unknown; many involve alleged culprits from (pro-)regime forces.

The next table is an example of just one of the GTD ‘data-strings’ shown in the Appendix,

with my classifications put in the ‘perpetrator’ column (which I did during September-

October 2007), just to show how the summary tables and diagrams came about.

11

Table 1.3 A GTD ‘data-string’

For Chechen case http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/browse.aspx?what=location (GTD1)

Country: Russia

Event

ID Date Country City Perpetrator Fatalities Injured Target Type

874 12/28/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown (ter)

0 0 Business

875 12/28/1997 Russia Vladikavkaz Unknown (ter)

0 0 Business

990874 12/28/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown ter

0 0 Journalists & Media

873 12/24/1997 Russia Kazbeksky District Dagestanis ter?

0 0 Government

870 12/22/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 1 2 Unknown

871 12/22/1997 Russia Dagestan/Chechen border

Chechens ntr

0 0 Police

872 12/22/1997 Russia Dagestan People's Militia of Dagestan ter


868 12/21/1997 Russia Buinaksk [Dagestan mil. base]

Unknown ntr

0 4 Military

869 12/21/1997 Russia Chechnya Unknown ntr

1 0 Police

867 12/19/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 2 0 Diplomatic

866 12/10/1997 Russia Unknown 0 0 Airports & Airlines

865 11/13/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 3 0 Business

864 11/9/1997 Russia Khasavyurt Unknown ntr

1 0 Police

863 9/30/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown ntr

2 1 Military

862 9/13/1997 Russia Zapadny Unknown 0 0 Private Citizens & Property

861 9/11/1997 Russia Nazran Unknown ntr

0 0 Police

860 9/9/1997 Russia Chechnya Unknown ter

0 2 Private Citizens & Property


0 0 Police

857 8/31/1997 Russia Chechnya/Dagestan border

Unknown ntr

0 0 Military

858 8/31/1997 Russia Khasavyurt Chechens ntr

1 11 Police

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ...

javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$EventID')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$EventID')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$IncidentDate')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$Country')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$City')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$TotalNumberOfFatalities')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$TotalNumberOfInjured')http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=874http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=875http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=990874http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=873http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=870http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=871http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=872http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=868http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=869http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=867http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=866http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=865http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=864http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=863http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=862http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=861http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=860http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=859http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=857http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=858javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$2')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$3')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$4')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$5')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$6')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$7')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$8')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$9')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$10')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$11')

12

NB: one can click on the case-numbers in the leftmost column, and via the Ctrl button (PC keyboard) get an

internet link to more detailed incident descriptions (though even those remain quite succinct).

The incident diagrams and tables below may not exclusively depict Chechen violence in

Chechnya or Albanian violence in Kosovo; some militants operated outside these areas, or

were not solely ethnic Chechens or Albanians; GTD data lack the depth to make these

distinctions. Thus many ‘ter’ incidents may be rather classified as ‘hrv’, like non-sudden

revenge attacks; all this one can verify at a later stage only by delving into the original

incident reports or further investigating these incidents.

Summary incident diagrams and tables

Chechen and/or North-Caucasian rebel violence, 1992-2004

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Nonterrorist Terrorist Other violators

Diagram GTD1 N-C violence, 1992-97 (not 93): incidents, own concepts N = 119

certain

probable

uncertain

13

Kosovar-Albanian and/or Balkan-Albanian rebel violence, 1992-2004

0

50

100

150

200


Diagram GTD2 N-C violence, 1998-2004: incidents, own concepts N = 383

certain

probable

uncertain

0

5

10

15

20

25


GTD1 Alb violence, 1992-97 (not 93): incidents, own concepts N = 39

certain

probable

uncertain

14

Albanian rebel violence in FYR Macedonia, 1998-2004

NB: just four GTD1 incidents in FYR Macedonia between 1994 and 1997, too few to deduce any

meaningful trends.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80


GTD2 Alb violence, 1998-2004: incidents, own concepts N = 177

certain

probable

uncertain

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16


GTD2 FYROM violence, 1998-2004: incidents, own concepts N = 31

certain

probable

uncertain

15

NB: diagram 2.1 from chapter reproduced here for direct comparison.

Incident tables


Table GTD1.92 Chechen a/o N-Caucasian violence

N= 11 in 1992 Certain Probable Uncertain

Non-terrorist* 5 1 0

Terrorist** 2 0 3

Non-terrorist yet other

violations**

*: generally or fully respects humanitarian and human rights law

**: generally or gravely violates humanitarian and human rights law. GTD cannot distinguish non-terrorist

human rights violations from terrorist ones; ‘hrv’ category remains empty and is deleted in subsequent tables.

NB 1: In most incidents perpetrators unknown; many cases must involve culprits from (pro-) Russian forces.

NB 2: GTD1 did not collect data for 1993.



Non-terrorist 1 1 1

Terrorist 3 2 6

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70


Diagram 2.1 'Whitebook' NLA violence, 2001: incidents, own concepts N = 129

certain

probable

uncertain

16



Non-terrorist 4 2 2

Terrorist 0 0 6



Non-terrorist 4 4 4

Terrorist 5 1 8



Non-terrorist 19 3

Terrorist 13 6 13

Summary table GTD1 Chechen a/o North-Caucasian (rebel) violence, 1992-1997

N= 119 Certain Probable Uncertain

Non-terrorist 33 8 10

Terrorist 23 9 36




Non-terrorist 7 0 0

Terrorist 5 1 5




Terrorist 10 2 8

17


N= 114 [113] in 2000 Certain Probable Uncertain


Terrorist 21 4 32


N= 60 [61] in 2001 Certain Probable Uncertain


Terrorist 15 0 14




Terrorist 7 1 11




Terrorist 11 2 20



Non-terrorist 5 1 1

Terrorist 6 0 6

Summary table GTD2 Chechen a/o North-Caucasian (rebel) violence, 1998-2004



Terrorist 75 10 96


Table GTD1 Kosovo: Kosovar a/o Albanian violence, 1992-1997

N= 18 in 1992-97 Certain Probable Uncertain


Terrorist** 1 1 1

Non-terrorist yet other

violations**

18


**: generally or gravely violates humanitarian and human rights law. GTD cannot distinguish non-terrorist

human rights violations from terrorist ones; ‘hrv’ category remains empty and is deleted in subsequent tables.

NB: in most incidents perpetrators unknown; many cases must involve culprits from (pro-) Serbian/Slavic

forces.

NB 2: both tables GTD1 ‘Kosovo’ and ‘Yugo’ are added up for summary GTD1 1992-97 table and diagram.

NB 3: GTD1 did not collect data for 1993.

Table GTD1Yugo: Kosovar a/o Albanian violence outside Kosovo, 1992-1997


Non-terrorist 9 0 1

Terrorist 5 4 2

Summary table GTD1: Albanian violence in the Balkans, 1992-1997



Terrorist 6 5 3


Table GTD2 Yugo/Kosovo: Kosovar a/o Albanian violence, 1998-2004

N= 170 [177] Certain Probable Uncertain


Terrorist 74 15 23

NB 1: after a recount seven extra cases are added to the total count, from next table ‘GTD2 Kosovo’.

NB 2: in most incidents perpetrators unknown; many cases must involve (pro-) Serbian/Slavic forces.

NB 3: 4 GTD1 incidents in FYR Macedonia in 1994-97: 1 ntr, 2 tr?, 1(tr); too few to deduce meaningful trends.

Table GTD2 Kosovo: Kosovar a/o Albanian violence, 2003-2004


Non-terrorist 3 0 1

Terrorist 2 0 1

Summary table GTD2 Kosovar a/o Albanian violence, 1998-2004



Terrorist 76 15 24

19

Summary table GTD2 FYROM: Kosovar a/o Albanian violence, 1998-2004



Terrorist 6 3 4

Findings

Remarkably, the Chechen-North-Caucasian diagrams suggest that the relative frequency of

terrorism was lower in the later 1998-2004 period, directly contravening the degeneration

premise. While certain, probable, and uncertain terrorist incidents added together make up

roughly 57% of all violence in 1992-97, such incidents altogether constitute just 47% of all

violence in 1998-2004. The percentages for both periods will be much lower if the largest

‘uncertain terrorist’ categories turn out to be (mostly) non-terrorist after all.19

Even then

terrorism will likely be counted a rarer occurrence in the later period. However, the Global

Terrorism data are so constrained that they exclude most violent incidents that actually

happened during, between and after the Russo-Chechen wars – many of which we would

classify as either terrorist, non-terrorist or violating other norms. So we can hardly conclude

that the reinterpreted GTD data (can) disprove the degeneration theory. All one can say is that

Chechen rebels and other Mountaineers who joined them were only ‘half-terrorist’ according

to our conception (43% and 53% non-terrorist in the first and second periods respectively for

all certain, probable and uncertain cases), and may have debrutalised during and after the

second war. The latter suggestion remains questionable, as the qualitative research has

generally shown increasing if still partial brutalisation throughout the 1990s and beyond.

One needs to be even more careful in interpreting the Albanian-Balkan diagrams. The Global

Terrorism database counts 177 incidents over 1998-2004, but just thirty-nine over 1992-97. It

also counts just thirty-one incidents in FYR Macedonia over 1998-2004, and a mere four

incidents in that country over 1992-97. Compare this to the 129 incidents we discern in

Skopje’s White Book on Terrorism (2001) on alleged rebel atrocities in mainly 2001 alone.

Nevertheless, the GTD2 FYROM 1998-2004 and the reproduced ‘Whitebook NLA violence,

2001’ diagrams exhibit roughly similar distributions. Moreover, the apparent trend reversal

19 Categories are not fully exclusive, with a particularly thin line between the uncertain ‘non-terrorist?’ and

‘terrorist?’ categories. This alone requires one to be cautious about the data interpretations.

20

outside FYR Macedonia – 64% non-terrorist and 36% terrorist incidents (certain, probable

and uncertain) in 1992-97, as opposed to 35% non-terrorist and 65% terrorist incidents (ibid)

in 1998-2004 – give credence to the degeneration premise. Be as it may, these findings do not

tally with the picture emerging from the qualitative research that Chechen separatists started

out with higher moral standards yet degenerated more fully than their Albanian counterparts.

21

2. National Liberation Army ‘terrorism’: a case study in

data reinterpretation

Right after a short yet sharp ‘near-civil war’ ended in the Former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia (FYROM)20

in August 2001, a detailed yet partisan Interior Ministry report

describes and condemns alleged atrocities of the National Liberation Army (Ushtria

Çlirimtare Kombetare, ‘NLA’); its shadowy predecessor, the Macedonia National Liberation

Army (MNLA); the former Kosova Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës, ‘KLA’)

including its successor the Kosovo Protection Corps; and other Albanian armed groups.21

The

report provides an ideal backdrop to apply my terrorism conception, reinterpret and reclassify

its data through that conception, and determine the degree of ‘terrorisation’ among NLA

fighters in particular.

Between 22 January and 10 August 2001, the National Liberation Army allegedly killed sixty,

injured seventy and kidnapped six security force members; murdered ten, wounded over a

hundred, and abducted thirty-six civilians; and forced over a hundred-thousand people to flee

their homes in or near Tetovo and Sar Planina.22

Even if the numbers are correct – which one

must seriously doubt as hardliner Boskovski then led the interior ministry – we have serious

issue with the ministry’s all-encompassing and one-sided terrorism conception: thus the

National Liberation Army “took responsibility for the terrorist attacks of police objects and

police officers”.23

It considered all armed NLA attacks terrorist acts, suggesting that only the

enemy’s violence is ‘terrorist’, i.e. heinous. It made no mention of any army or police

brutality. If I apply my terrorism definition (see Table 1.2) on the interior ministry’s NLA-

inflicted casualty numbers (supposing the descriptions are correct), only killings and injuries

of civilians and off-duty security personnel – not distinguished in White Book’s data –

constitute terrorist acts, and all abductions and expulsions as well if we relax our delineation

20 The United Nations recognised the country under the provisional name Former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia (FYROM) on 8 April 1993 (UNRES/47/225), given objections by Greece on the name and symbols

considered part of the Greek heritage. I usually refer to ‘FYR Macedonia’.

21

Ministry of the Interior of the ‘Republic of Macedonia’, White Book: The Terrorist attack of (on the

Terrorism by) the so-called NLA Skopje, August 2001, www.macedonia.org/crisis/ (download difficulties).

22

Interior ministry FYR Macedonia, White Book on Terrorism by so-called NLA August 2001, p.8.

23

Interior ministry FYROM, White Book on Terrorism, August 2001, p.7; pp.55-7,69,73. It cobbles security

forces together with civilians as being all ‘terrorist’ targets. It tries to formulate its terrorism concept in part V

(esp. pp.91,97-106), yet its citing of multiple legal and political definitions dilutes and skews the concept.

http://www.macedonia.org/crisis/

22

somewhat.24

If in a single day armed, violent actions occurred in separate areas without

apparently belonging to a single campaign or battle, these actions are numbered as separate

incidents. Such actions are not always easily distinguishable; such cases are treated and

numbered as a single incident.25

The diagrams and tables below show the interior ministry’s

data on NLA violence recategorised through our concepts: well over three quarters of NLA’s

actions appear not to have been terrorist, nor violated human rights or humanitarian norms.

24 My terrorism concept is very narrow: it refers only to lethal and sudden violence; abductions may not

necessarily take place with lethal weaponry or force, or may not necessarily end with the deaths of the abductees.

25

I counted 129 incidents, with 4 incidents in 2000 I consider belonging to the 2001 conflict: FYROM, White

Book on Terrorism, 2001, pp.109-135. Raw data available in: http://sites.google.com/site/tristansolutions.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70


Diagram 2.1 'Whitebook' NLA violence, 2001: incidents, own concepts N = 129

certain

probable

uncertain

http://sites.google.com/site/tristansolutions

23

NB: presumes all police and army casualties were armed and/or on-duty

Nt = non-terrorist; t = terrorist; v = other violation of humanitarian and human rights law

(*): total casualty numbers from 129 incidents in table 3.5 (violence-distributions simplified)

Source tables & diagrams: Interior Ministry ‘Republic of Macedonia’, White Book: The Terrorist

attack of the so-called NLA Skopje, 2001, pp.109-135. Report labels all 129 incidents as ‘terrorist’.

Table 2.1 Incidents of non-terrorist, terrorist & other improper NLA violence

N= 129 (Diagram

2.1)

Certain Probable Uncertain


Terrorist** 6 5 13

Non-terrorist yet

other violations**

3 3 1


**: generally or gravely violates humanitarian and human rights law

NB: almost all cases certainly or probably involve NLA-insurgents; break-down at that dimension insignificant.

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

police (nt) army (nt) civilian(t) civilian(v)

Diagram 2.2 'Whitebook' NLA violence, 2001: casualties, own concepts N = 452 (* N = 280)

killed

wounded

killed (*)

injured (*)

24

Table 2.2 Casualty distributions in 129 counted NLA incidents

N = 280* Police Killed Police

wounded

Military

killed

Military

wounded

Civilians

killed

Civilians

wounded

N-ter

(N-ter)

N-ter?

9

2

56

18

12 8

1

2

12

Ter

(Ter)

Ter?

11

1

11

14

4

3

6

2

9

HRV

(HRV)

HRV?

10

1

3

1 abd

1 1 26 abd; 52

2 abd

2

Totals 34 102; 1 abd 17 13 10 75; 28 abd

* Nearly half of 129 incidents do not describe precise and/or certain casualty numbers. Casualty total of 280 is

much lower than the 452 the ‘Whitebook’ report (table 3.6) comes up with.

N-ter = non-terrorist; Ter = terrorist; HRV = non-terrorist, yet other violations

( ): probable; ?: uncertain; neither ( ) or ?: certain NB: abd = abducted

Table 2.3 Whitebook’s numbers on non-terrorist, terrorist & other NLA violence

N= 452 (Diagram

2.2)

Police Army Civilians

Non-terrorist 15 k + 150 w

(34 k + 103 w)

43 k + 119 w

(17 k + 13 w)

Terrorist 12 k* + 75 w

(10 k + 75 w)

Non-terrorist yet

other violations

38 mal/abd

(28 abd) *: incl. two abductees certainly ‘murdered’ as known by late August 2001

k = killed; w = wounded; mal = attacked/mistreated; abd = abducted

NB: FYROM interior ministry’s numbers, not from 129 incidents we counted. Numbers between

brackets are from those 129 incidents (table 3.5), put in this table’s simplified violence-distributions.

Findings

The results in table 2.1 are staggering: given our definitions and classifications, almost half

(47%) of all incidents are unambiguously non-terrorist, well over two-thirds (69%) together

with likely non-terrorist cases. The numbers of certain and probable terrorist incidents are

almost negligible; only the uncertain ‘terrorist’ category (10%) may be significant. If all

certain, probable and uncertain terrorist incidents are added up, one arrives at a respectable

25

number of cases representing 19% of the total. Even then the result is too meagre to call the

National Liberation Army generally or even partially terrorist. Still, apparent terrorist acts

occurred too often to call these rare or incidental.26

Notably, almost half of the twenty-four

cases falling in the ‘terrorist’ rubric happened during the last two months of the conflict,

perhaps a sign of incipient brutalisation. Finally, just a few cases seem to consist of atrocities

of a non-terrorist nature. Diagram 2.1 presents the findings in a sharper contour.

The interior ministry’s casualty numbers in table 2.3 are much higher than from the 129

incidents in table 2.2 – except that in the latter case many more police were apparently killed

(or many described as ‘police’ were in fact soldiers).27

The numbers from the 129 incidents

are less complete (or more incomplete), as many descriptions fail to indicate if and how many

people were harmed or expired. In both cases we assume that all killed and wounded soldiers,

policemen and other security personnel have been armed and on duty; probably some must

have been unarmed and/or off-duty, but one cannot discern them in the data. For now, I

consider all civilians killed and wounded as victims of terrorism (plus the two murdered

abductees), and all those missing as victims of atrocious yet non-terrorist violence. One must

assume the same for table 2.3, though fifty-two civilians were injured by disproportionate

shelling (violating humanitarian law) rather than deliberate targeting (also terrorism).

Diagram 2.1 and its table 2.1 show patterns roughly similar to those of diagram 2.2 and its

table 2.3. Yet the latter diagram put the National Liberation Army in a less favourable light:

though according to the ministry’s casualty numbers 72% of all killed and wounded are armed

targets, the civilian targets make up 19% of all casualties (due to many civilians injured) –

almost identical to the percentage of all certain, likely and uncertain terrorist incidents in table

2.1. Close to a third (28%) of all fatal and non-fatal casualties fell victim to both terrorist and

non-terrorist atrocities. The National Liberation Army was hardly a restrained, disciplined

force even if it concentrated on military, police and other security targets. The findings may

be less painful for the former rebels if we assign a greater measuring weight to fatalities; that

would increase the relative size of non-terrorist casualties.

26 Categories are not fully exclusive, with a thin line between ‘non-terrorist?’(uncertain) and ‘terrorist?’(ibid).

Some or all 9 cases of the ‘uncertain non-terrorist’ category in table 2.1 may belong to the terrorist category, and

some or all 13 cases of the ‘uncertain terrorist’ category may fall under that category too. All 22 cases may be

terrorist; with the 11 ‘old’ certain/possible ones that could be 33 altogether.

27

In table 2.3: 15 police officers killed, 150 wounded; 43 soldiers and senior military officers killed, 119

wounded; 10 civilians killed, 75 wounded, 20 attacked and maltreated, and 20 missing after kidnapped by

(allegedly) the NLA (at least two murdered). FYROM, White Book Terrorism, p.8. Casualty lists on pp.139-153

give generally higher numbers, usually from early March till a few days after 10 August 2001.

26

Appendix: original data reinterpretations from GTD1 and GTD2

Copyright © 2007 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA 301.405.6600

[email protected] http://www.start.umd.edu/data/gtd/ Last Updated: July 17, 2007

Accessed 27-10-2007

http://www.start.umd.edu/data/gtd/

Re-access attempt 27-04-2009: ‘page cannot be found’;

http://www.start.umd.edu/start/ accessible:

About START

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terror

(START) is a U.S. Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence, tasked

by the Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate with using state-of-the-art theories, methods, and data from the social and behavioral sciences to improve understanding of the origins, dynamics, and social

and psychological impacts of terrorism. START, based at the University of Maryland, College Park, aims to provide timely guidance on how to disrupt terrorist networks, reduce the incidence of terrorism, and enhance the resilience of U.S. society in the face of the terrorist threat.

To achieve this goal, START has assembled a team of more than 30 researchers from institutions across the United States and around the world to conduct cutting-edge research related to the terrorist threat. These researchers represent the full range of disciplines within the social and behavioral sciences, including sociology, criminology, political science, psychology, communication, geography, economics, and anthropology. Adding to this truly interdisciplinary endeavor are the

efforts of experts in public policy, history, public health, foreign languages, and engineering working as part of the START research team.

Through individual research projects and in-depth collaborative efforts, this research team provides the homeland-security community as well as the public at large with insights about how and why terrorist groups form, about the decisions and behaviors of individual terrorists and terrorist groups, and about how societies can best respond to and prepare for known and unknown terrorist threats.

START researchers use a variety of approaches in their projects, ranging from analyses of statistical data to in-depth examinations of individual case studies, from survey-based analyses to reviews of public documents, and beyond. This range of methods will help to provide both a broad and deep understanding of the dynamics of terrorism and terrorists, allowing for more effective counter-terrorism measures.

mailto:[email protected]://www.start.umd.edu/start/http://www.umd.edu/http://www.orau.gov/DHS_RE_Summit07/factsheet/START.pdf

27

START will also launch a wide-ranging educational program and plans to serve as a clearinghouse for resources on teaching about terror and counter-terrorism to all audiences.

Global Terrorism Database (GTD)

The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is an open-source database including information on terrorist events around the world since 1970 (currently updated through 2004). Unlike many other event

databases, the GTD includes systematic data on international as well as domestic terrorist incidents that have occurred during this time period and now includes almost 80,000 cases. For each GTD incident, information is available on the date and location of the incident, the weapons used and nature of the target, the number of casualties, and -- when identifiable -- the identity of the perpetrator.

Go to the GTD

Use of the Global Terrorism Database

© 2008 drs. Caspar ten Dam,

Master of Arts in Political Science

Tel.: (31-523) 649 949

Email: [email protected]

Belfast, 16 September 2008

Washington DC, 19 September 2008

Belfast, 27 April 2009

Original classification scheme of violence & types of violence respecting or violating

humanitarian law and human rights (2007)

ter: terrorism (nonter: non-terrorism); liq: liquidation; asin: assassination; gang: gangsterism i.e.

violent criminality; bnd: banditry (ibid); brg: brigandry;

jbel: jus in bello (‘justice in war’) i.e. violence that honours laws of war as (partially) set in the

Geneva Conventions, like not targeting non-combatants;

hhr: ‘honouring human rights’ i.e. violence that honours universal human rights for so far distinct

from humanitarian law principles;

vjbel: violence that violates one or more jus in bello principles, especially “a) .. murder .., mutilation,

cruel treatment and torture; b) taking of hostages; c) … humiliating and degrading

treatment”(Com.Art.3, GC);

hrv: human rights violations, particularly ‘gross human rights violations’ like torture and ill-treatment;

extrajudicial executions; disappearances; arbitrary arrests and detentions; and genocide and other

‘mass killings’ (though latter category often not formally designated as GHRVS).

NB: much overlap between vjbel and hrv; for so far possible we use former category for ‘war’

situations and latter category for ‘peace’ situations.

Note: overall type of conflict, such as rebellion or coup d’état is mentioned under table heading or in

full at the incident(s) that change the nature of the conflict.

http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/gtd/http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/gtd/

28

Simplified violence classifications for GTD1 & 2 (2008)* HRV: Gross human rights or humanitarian violation other than terrorism**

TER: Terrorist

NTR: Non-terrorist and not violating any other humanitarian or human rights (otherwise HRV).

*: ones left blank are certainly or likely non-Chechen (N-Caucasian) cases, or their conflict-context

cannot be determined, and are not counted.

**: the incident descriptions are so minimal that HRV classifications will be rare.

Level of certainty and reliability***

( ): apparently, allegedly, probably

[ ]: partially (only for HRV or TER)****

? : uncertain

?? : unknown bias: biased, partisan

***: Incidents against non-combatants with no fatalities will be classed as ‘probable’ or ‘certain’

terrorist incidents – even though our definition involves lethal violence against non-combatants (and

thus likely fatalities). Only a closer look at these incidents will tell whether they really fall within our

terrorism concept. For now they will be classified as ‘terrorist’ – though closer scrutiny may diminish

the number of terrorist incidents. The same is true for labelling attacks against combatant personnel as

‘non-terrorist’: in at least some cases the personnel may be unarmed and/or off-duty – making these

terrorist cases (incident descriptions are too minimal to determine this). Hopefully both biases cancel

each other out. Last but not least, in most incidents the perpetrators are unknown – so many cases

must involve culprits from pro-Russian and Russian forces. So the GTD data are not exclusively

limited to Chechen separatists.

****: all partial ‘[ ]’ cases are categorised as uncertain ‘?’ cases in all final tabulations.

Explanation of main concepts

HRV: any gross human rights violations (GHRV) other than terrorism, i.e. torture and ill-treatment

(incl. slavery); extrajudicial executions; disappearances; arbitrary arrests and detentions without trial;

forced deportation or expulsion and political murders and mass killings (incl. genocide and crimes

against humanity).

NB: for simplicity’s sake we include the main out-of-battle treatment provision of humanitarian law,

as it prohibit acts roughly corresponding to GHRVS: “a) violence to life and person, in particular

murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; b) taking of hostages; c) outrages upon

personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment”(C.Art. 3.1; see esp. Artt. 4 to 6

Protocol II). It also prohibits summary executions (C. Art. 3.1(d)).

TER: Terrorism, i.e. lethal violence without warning of the act for whatever purpose against (groups of) unarmed and thereby defenceless civilians, unarmed off-duty soldiers, policemen and other

defenceless non-combatants. Our terrorism definition covers certain human rights violations such as sudden kidnappings and

killings of non-combatants. Terrorism refers to violence during the act, like bomb explosions, not

violence after the act, like abuses after arrest. Incidentally, most HRVS we identify in the GTD1 and

GTD2 tables took place in battles, military operations or during the wider conflict; the data usually do

not refer to arrests, disappearances etc. outside the conflict zone, or during a cease-fire or other

29

peaceful lull. Finally, the GTD data are limited in the sense that they do not count armed, violent

incidents falling outside their terrorism definition(s).

Table General: Incidents non-terrorist, terrorist & other violence

N= Certain Probable Uncertain

Non-terrorist*

Terrorist**

Non-terrorist yet

other violations**


**: generally or gravely violates humanitarian and human rights law.

NB: in most incidents perpetrators are unknown – so many cases must involve culprits from pro-Russian and

Russian forces.

Global Terrorism Database

Open GTD1 | Open GTD2 (best viewed using Internet Explorer)

See also the differences between GTD1 and GTD2

Overview

The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is an open-source database including information on terrorist events around the world since 1970 (currently updated through 2004). Unlike many other event databases, the GTD includes systematic data on international as well as domestic terrorist incidents that have occurred during this time period and now includes almost 80,000 cases. For each GTD incident, information is available on the date and location of the incident, the weapons used and nature of the target, the number of casualties, and -- when identifiable -- the identity of the perpetrator.

The START Center is making the GTD available to government policy makers and academics in an effort to increase understanding of terrorist violence so that it can be more readily defeated.

Characteristics of the GTD

Contains information on over 80,000 terrorist attacks

The main types of information found in the GTD are items that you would expect to find in a well written newspaper story about a terrorist attack: the type of attack, the number of persons killed, the group claiming responsibility, the date of the event and so on

The GTD is currently the most comprehensive unclassified data base on terrorist events in the world

It includes information on more than 27,000 bombings, 13,000 assassinations, and 2,800 kidnappings

The original data include information on over 45 variables; the new data include over 120 variables

http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/http://209.232.239.37/gtd2/http://www.start.umd.edu/data/gtd/gtd1_and_gtd2.asp

30

More than 75 data collectors with expertise in six language groups are currently engaged in collecting GTD data

Data collection is supervised by an advisory panel of 12 terrorism research experts

Over 2,000,000 news articles and 25,000 new sources were reviewed to collect GTD from 1998 to 2004 alone

The goal of START is to make all GTD data available to government employees immediately and to release all data to researchers approximately one year after the end of data collection

The original GTD data base (1970-1997) is available to researchers through the Inter University Consortium for Political and Social Research

(http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/NACJD/STUDY/04586.xml)

The GTD Story

The Global Terrorism Database -- or GTD -- began in 2001 when researchers at the University of Maryland obtained a large database originally collected by the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services, a relative of the famous Irish detective agency.

From 1970 to 1997, Pinkerton trained researchers -- mostly retired Air Force personnel -- to identify and record terrorism incidents from wire services, government reports, and major international newspapers. With funding from the National Institute of Justice, the Maryland team finished computerizing the original Pinkerton data in December 2005, making corrections and adding additional information wherever possible.

In April 2006, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), working with the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), received additional funding from the Human Factors Division of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to extend the GTD beyond 1997. By June 2007 data collection was completed through 2004.

During the next year the new data will be systematically integrated with the original data to form a single source of information on terrorist attacks, covering the entire period 1970 to 2007.

See also the differences between GTD1 and GTD2

NB 27-04-2009: text practically unchanged.

Open GTD1 | Open GTD2 (best viewed using Internet Explorer)

http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/NACJD/STUDY/04586.xmlhttp://www.start.umd.edu/data/gtd/gtd1_and_gtd2.asphttp://209.232.239.37/gtd1/http://209.232.239.37/gtd2/

31

For Chechen case http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/browse.aspx?what=location (GTD1)

Country: Russia

Event



0 0 Business

875 12/28/1997 Russia Vladikavkaz Unknown (ter)

0 0 Business



873 12/24/1997 Russia Kazbeksky District Dagestanis ter?

0 0 Government

870 12/22/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 1 2 Unknown

871 12/22/1997 Russia Dagestan/Chechen border

Chechens ntr

0 0 Police

872 12/22/1997 Russia Dagestan People's Militia of Dagestan ter


868 12/21/1997 Russia Buinaksk [Dagestan mil. base]

Unknown ntr

0 4 Military


1 0 Police

867 12/19/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 2 0 Diplomatic

866 12/10/1997 Russia Unknown 0 0 Airports & Airlines



1 0 Police


2 1 Military

862 9/13/1997 Russia Zapadny Unknown 0 0 Private Citizens & Property


0 0 Police




0 0 Police

857 8/31/1997 Russia Chechnya/Dagestan border

Unknown ntr

0 0 Military

858 8/31/1997 Russia Khasavyurt Chechens ntr

1 11 Police

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ...

Country: Russia

Event


856 8/26/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 1 0 Journalists & Media

855 8/24/1997 Russia St. Petersburg

Unknown 1 0 Business

http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/browse.aspx?what=locationjavascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$EventID')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$EventID')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$IncidentDate')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$Country')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$City')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$TotalNumberOfFatalities')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$TotalNumberOfInjured')http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=874http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=875http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=990874http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=873http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=870http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=871http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=872http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=868http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=869http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=867http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=866http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=865http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=864http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=863http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=862http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=861http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=860http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=859http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=857http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=858javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$2')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$3')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$4')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$5')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$6')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$7')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$8')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$9')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$10')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$11')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$EventID')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$EventID')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$IncidentDate')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$Country')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$City')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$TotalNumberOfFatalities')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$TotalNumberOfInjured')http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=856http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=855

32


Unknown 1 1 Government

852 8/6/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown ntr 0 0 Police

853 8/6/1997 Russia Nazran Unknown (ter) 0 0 Business Business

851 8/3/1997 Russia Dagestan Unknown ntr 0 0 Military


850 7/30/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown ter? 3 1 Transportation


847 7/17/1997 Russia Prigorodny District

Unknown ter? 0 17 Transportation

846 7/13/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown ter? 0 0 Government

844 7/11/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown ter 0 0 Private Citizens & Property

845 7/11/1997 Russia Urus-Martan Unknown ter 0 0 Private Citizens & Property

841 7/10/1997 Russia Nazran Unknown (ter) 0 0 Business

842 7/10/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown ter 0 0 Private Citizens & Property

843 7/10/1997 Russia Nazran Unknown ntr? 0 0 Unknown

838 7/8/1997 Russia Khasavyurt Unknown ntr 7 13 Police

839 7/8/1997 Russia Beslan (North Ossetia)

Unknown ter? 0 0 Transportation

840 7/8/1997 Russia Dagestan Unknown ntr 9 0 Police

837 7/6/1997 Russia Moscow Revolutionary Military Council ter?

0 0 Government

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ...

Country: Russia

Event



0 0 Military

836 7/3/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 0 1 Government

834 7/2/1997 Russia Nazran (Insushetia) Unknown 0 0 Military


0 0 Military


0 0 Military

831 6/27/1997 Russia Jorbino Unknown 5 11 Airports & Airlines

830 6/26/1997 Russia Batakoyurt Chechens ntr

0 0 Police


0 2 Business



827 5/28/1997 Russia Makhachkala Unknown ter?

3 3 Government

826 5/26/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 0 1 NGO

825 5/10/1997 Russia Chechnya Chechens 0 0 Journalists &

http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=854http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=852http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=853http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=851http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=849http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=850http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=848http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=847http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=846http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=844http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=845http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=841http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=842http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=843http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=838http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=839http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=840http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=837javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$1')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$3')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$4')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$5')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$6')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$7')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$8')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$9')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$10')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$11')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$EventID')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$EventID')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$IncidentDate')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$Country')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$City')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$TotalNumberOfFatalities')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$TotalNumberOfInjured')http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=835http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=836http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=834http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=833http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=832http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=831http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=830http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=829http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=828http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=827http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=826http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=825

33

ter Media


823 4/30/1997 Russia between towns of Malgobek and Sagatshi

Unknown ter?

2 0 Government

822 4/28/1997 Russia Pyatigorsk Unknown (ter)

2 12 Airports & Airlines

820 4/23/1997 Russia Armavir Unknown 3 8 Airports & Airlines

821 4/23/1997 Russia North Caucasus region

Unknown ter?

2 0 Government

819 4/22/1997 Russia Omitrov Unknown 1 1 Business

818 4/21/1997 Russia Gekhi-Chu Unknown ntr?

0 0 Other

817 4/9/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown ter?

0 1 Government

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ...

Country: Russia

Event



813 3/17/1997 Russia Chechnya - N. Ossetia border

Unknown ntr

0 0 Military


0 0 Government

812 3/15/1997 Russia Chechnya Unknown ntr?

0 0 Unknown




0 0 Journalists & Media Journalists & Media



808 2/7/1997 Russia Almetyevsk Unknown ntr

2 11 Police

809 2/5/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 0 1 Private Citizens & Property



0 0 Government


805 1/19/1997 Russia Chechnya region

Unknown ter




801 1/9/1997 Russia Urus - Martan Unknown ter

0 0 Religious Figures/Institutions

800 1/8/1997 Russia Nalchik Unknown ter?

0 0 Government

1997

3344 12/19/1996 Russia St. Petersburg Unknown 0 1 Transportation

3343 12/18/1996 Russia Grozny Unknown 6 0 Private Citizens &

http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=824http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=823http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=822http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=820http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=821http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=819http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=818http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=817javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$1')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$2')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$4')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$5')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$6')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$7')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$8')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$9')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$10')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$11')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$EventID')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$EventID')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$IncidentDate')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$Country')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$City')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$TotalNumberOfFatalities')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$TotalNumberOfInjured')http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=815http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=813http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=814http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=812http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=816http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=811http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=810http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=808http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=809http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=807http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=806http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=804http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=805http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=803http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=802http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=801http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=800http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=3344http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=3343

34

ter Property

3342 12/17/1996 Russia Novye Atagi Unknown ter

6 1 NGO

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ...

Table GTD1.97 Incidents non-terrorist, terrorist, other N-Caucasian (reb) violence


Non-terrorist* 19 3

Terrorist** 13 6 13

Non-terrorist yet

other violations**


**: generally or gravely violates humanitarian and human rights law.

NB: in most incidents perpetrators are unknown – so many cases must involve culprits from pro-Russian and

Russian forces.

Country: Russia

Event


3341 12/14/1996 Russia Unknown 0 0 Military

3340 11/20/1996 Russia Tyumen Unknown 2 0 Business


Unknown 1 0 Business

3338 11/16/1996 Russia Kaspiysk Unknown ntr

43 8 Military


0 0 Government


0 4 Police



3333 10/31/1996 Russia Moscow Unknown 0 0 Police

3332 9/26/1996 Russia Unknown 0 0 Military



3329 8/22/1996 Russia Moscow Unknown 0 0 Religious Figures/Institutions

3327 8/20/1996 Russia Makhachkrin Unknown 0 0 Private Citizens & Property

3328 8/20/1996 Russia Markachkala Unknown ter?

4 8 Government

3326 8/15/1996 Russia Pyatigorsk Unknown ter

0 0 Business

3325 8/13/1996 Russia Manhackala Unknown 0 1 Unknown

http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=3342javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$1')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$2')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$3')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$5')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$6')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$7')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$8')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$9')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$10')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$11')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$EventID')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$EventID')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$IncidentDate')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$Country')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$City')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$TotalNumberOfFatalities')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$TotalNumberOfInjured')http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=3341http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=3340http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=3339http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=3338http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=3336http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=3337http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=3335http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=3334http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=3333http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=3332http://2

degrees of violence: exploratory data for the …...international peace research institute oslo...

Documents