Description of document: National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) United States Cryptologic History, Special Series Crisis Collection Volume 2, The Suez Crisis: A Brief Comint History, 1988

Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) appeal 2013 ISCAP release date: 05-March-2018 Posted date: 14-May-2018 Source of document: Mandatory Declassification Review Request

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MEMBERS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Garry P. Reid DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Lionel Kennedy DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Eric F. Stein OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Patricia M. Gaviria NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

David Mengel NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

John P. Fitzpatrick, Chair

March 5, 2018

Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel

c/o Infonnation Security Oversight Office 700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Room 100

Washington, D.C. 20408 Telephone: (202) 357-5250

Fax: (202) 357-5907 E-mail: iscap@nara.gov

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Mark A. Bradley, Director INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE

Reference: ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-117 NSA MDR No. 68546/Appeal 3756

Please be advised that the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) has concluded its consideration of the mandatory declassification review appeal number 2013-117 filed by you and that the 60-day period during which an agency head may appeal an ISCAP decision to the President has expired. Enclosed is a copy of the document and a chart that outlines the ISCAP decision. With the exception of any information that is otherwise authorized and warranted for withholding under applicable law, we are releasing all information declassified by the ISCAP to you. If you have questions about this appeal, please contact William C. Carpenter at (202) 357-5250.

Sincerely,

f'fn ~A. p,,Jly MARK A. BRADLEY Executive Secretary

Enclosures

Cc: Mr. Steven E. Thompson; Chief, Strategy, Plans and Policy; National Security Agency

special series crisis collection .. volume 2

national security agency central security service

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united states cryptologic history

The Suez Crisis:

A Bri.ef Comint History (U)

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL, E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-117, document no. 1 DECLASSIFICATION DATE: March 05, 2018

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

Classified By NSAJCSSM 123-2 Declassif-tOn: Originating Agency's Determination Required

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Contents o( this publication should not be reproduced, or further disseminated outside the U.S. Intelligence Community without the pennisaion of the Director. NSA/CSS. Inquiries about reproduction and dissemination should be direct.eel to the Office of Cryptologic Arebives and History, T64.

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UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

Special Series Crisis Collection

Volumie2

The Suez Crisis: A Brief Comint History (U)

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P .L. 86-36)

OFFICE OF ARCHIVES AND HISTORY

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE

1988

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Table of Contents

Foreword -------.. -----'----------.. ---------·----------------------------

Background -------------------------------------------------------------------------The Rise of Nasser ---------------------------------------------A Search for Weapons ------------------­The Soviet Factor - -------------------------------Soviet Surprise and Vacillation ------------------Nasser's Answer to Superpower Ambivalence

Israel Grows Anxious ----- ----------- -----------------­British-French Fears - Real and Imagined -----------------------------------------------Eisenhower as Peacemaker -----------------------------------NSA Spots a Plot ----------------------------------------------The Plot Thickens -----------------------------------------­Contradiction ----------------------------------------Attack ----· ------------------- ______________ _

Not with a Bang, But a Wimper ---------------------------­Suez: A Sobering Reflection for Politics and Intelligence ------------------Shift in Perspective -- ----------------------------------------------------­NSA's Performance ---------------------------------------------- ·------------------. ---A Diligent, Delicate Endeavor --------------------------------­ -----------------Lessons Learned, Lessons Ignored --------------------------------------------

Notes --------------- ----------------------------------------------

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Foreword

~-NF) The Suez Crisis is another addition to the Special Series Crisis Collection published by the NSA History and Publications Division. The Suez crisis of 1956 is an interesting study of U.S. intelligence, especially its Sigint aspect, during a "brushfire" situation. The crisis prei;ented United States policymakers with a unique intelligence dilemma. Two U.S. allies, Britain and France, opposed American policy objectives, Working with Israel, they conspired to take the Suez Canal and preserve their influence in the area. This. study, by I I provides remarkable insights into Anglo­American relations, U.S. relations with Egypt, France, and [srael, and American concerns over the· Soviet Union and its reaction to the crisis; The study is based c,n a review of over three thousand intercepted messages.

~-NF) Ms.! !traces the crisis from its historical roots with the construction of the Suez Canal in 1869 through the rise of Nasser to negotiations over arms and aid in constructing the Aswan Dam, to Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, to British-French-Israeli plots, to the actual invasion. She clearly shows that "the attack

• occurred without our knqwledge and came as a complete surprise to 4s" - despite President Eisenhower's public statements to the contrary. U.S. intelligence, especially Sigint, provided key clues to the coming offensive: U.S. Comint closely followed the allied invasion and closely monitored Soviet reaction. ! !study also reveals that despite British-United States estrangement, the United States was dependent on British collection efforts on most Middle East targets and that the close working relationship between the Anglo poseurs in the Sigint area was never seriously threatened. In fact, during the height of the crisis U.S. and British elements continued to exchange the most sensitive information. I !study is an important contribution to our understanding of the Second Party relationship and to the use of Sigir;it in a brushfire situation.

Henry F. Schorreck NSA Hist.orian

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• The Suez Crisis: A Brief Comint History

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

(U) The Suez crisis of 1956, which- erupted only days before the S011iet in11asion of Hungar;y on 4 November, was the first major test of the National Security Agency (NSA) during a short-term, "brU8h/iren crisis. The war for Suez also presented th~ United States with. a uniqtU political and intelligence dilemma: two close U.S. allies, Britain and France, opposed American policy objectives. The Suez crisis raised many provocative questions about wh€n and how m1.1Ch the United Stat.es knew about British, French, and Israeli plan.a for the invaswn of Egypt and how U.S. officials reacted to these.plans. Jn addition, the Suez war provided a fascinating case study of the role of Communications Intelligence (Comin.t) in tlu! U.S. decision-making process. Finally, the battle for Suez served as a model for e~mining the effect of political dissension and conflict on the intimat.e Anglo-American. intelligence relation.ship. How this strange and troubling crisis developed, what role Comint played in U.S. planning and policy, and how the S1.Uz conflict a/fecte!/, Anglo-American relations are the issues this poper addresses.

f,f{.CCO) Before and dwing the Suez crisis, NSA analyzed more than three thousand dipltmwlic and se11en hundred military messages from Near and Middle Eastern nations as well as from other countries worldwide.1 Even coMidered in isolation. from other intelligence, this intercept provided U.S. officials with. a remarkable in.sight into euenl.s leading to the surprise attack on Egypt by IUllion.s friendly to the United States.

(U) The Suez crisis created a painful predicament for U.S. policymakers. Without American support or RTl()wledge, two staunch U.S. allies, iii collusion with Israel, plotted t.o go to war for a cal.Uie the Eisenhower administration believed was rash, unjustified, and potentially ver;y dangerous. Ultimately, France, Britain, and Israel would become the overt aggressors against EIJYpt. As a result, tlu! United States was in the awkward position c>/ siding with Nasser again.st its allies. The Soviet factor further complicated the situation, especially for the United States. The U.S. allies implicitly relied upon America to counter any belligerency by the Russian "Bear." The U.S. administration was never i;ure how far the Soviets would go to assist Nasser or resist Western aggression in the region .. Eisenhower described the Souiets as both 7urious and scared" by the concurrent crises fr1 Ectstern Europe and the Middle East. This, he averred, made for "the most dangerous possible state of mind. "9 For this reason, Soviet mouement8 and actions were of primary interest to the U.S. intelligence community.

Background {U)

(U) The roots of the 1956 Suez crisis can be traced at least to the construction of the Suez Canal, which opened on 17 November 1869, and to the original Suez Canal Company ownership agreements. The Viceroy of Egypt {then part of the Oltoma.n Empire) granted the Suez Canal C<>mpany, founded by French engineer Ferdinand de Lesseps, a concession to operate the canal. In exchange, the Canal Company agreed t.o pay certain taxes, rents, and percentages of gross profits t.o Egypt. Furthermoi;e, Egypt retained an agreement for · the canal to revert to Egyptian control after 99 years.

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(U) Although British ships were the largest ~ingle users of the canal, Britain did not obtain its interest in the Suez Canal Company until 25 November 1875 when, in an attempt to avoid bankruptcy, Egypt turned over 177,642 shares in the company to the British Oovernment.3 An 1888 agreement between major canal users and the Turkish government guaranteed free passage for ships of all nations, made the company responsible for operating the canal impartially in war and peace, and placed responsibility for the canal's protection with Egypt. 4

(U) [n 1936 the British negotiated a new treaty with Egypt. In exchange for a British naval base at Alexandria, Egypt would regain representation on the Suez Canal Company's board of directors and receive annual rental payment for use of company facilities. World War II interrupted the normal course of business between Britain and Egypt, and it was not until after the war, in 1949, that Egypt was effectively reinstated as a board member and also began to receive seven percent of the company's gross profits. However, beginning in 1936, Egypt became a real factor in the Suez Canal Company for the first time since 1875.0

(lJ) Before the First World War, much of the Middle East was under the control or influence of the Ottoman Empire. With the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and Germany, British and French influence greatly expanded during the postwar period. After World War II the region again underwent radical changes brought about in part by a weakening of the major colonial powers, especially Great _Britain and France, the ·birth of the nation oflsrael, and an explosion of Arab nationalism.

(U) France, Britain, and the United States drew up a Tripartite Declaration in 1950 in recognition of the growing threat to Western power and influence in the region, the importance ofoil shipments to the West, and the potential impact of the Cold War on the Middle East. Under the terms of this accord, the three nations agreed to act in concert to thwart any seizure of Middle Eastern territory by an outside force. The allies also

. promised to ensure a balance between arms shipped to Arab countries and to Israel. Further, the three agreed the number of weapons shipped to either side would be only enough to maintain internal order.

The Rise ofNasser(U)

(U) The 1952 Egyptian coup that overthrew the monarchy of King Farouk also set the stage for the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the 1956 crisis. The real power behind the coup was Gama! Abdel Nasser, who formally assumed the Egypiian presidency in October 1954. Nasser vocalized and manipulated pent-up Egyptian resentment over the occupation of the Suez Base by nearly eighty thousand British troops. After lengthy negotiations, the British agreed to withdraw their forces from the Canal Zone by June 1956.

(U) During the winter and spring preceding the nationalization, Egypt also negotiated new agreements with the Canal Company. The accords specified greater company investment in Egypt and increased employment of Egyptian pilots. In return, Egypt agreed to exempt the company from certain Egyptian taxes.6

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Gamal Abdel Nasser

A Search for Weapons (U)

(U} While he solicited agreements with the Canal Company and the British government, Nasser·atso began to seek arms from the United States. In early 1955 the U.S. State Department responded to Nasser's request for $27 million worth of weapons by demanding payment in ea.sh - knowing full well Nasser did not have the money. The Eisenhower administration was not then a major weapons dealer in the region and did not wish to become one. Furthermore, administration officials reasoned that such an arms sale would drastically disturb the balance of power in the Middle East. Nasser also threatened to purchase weapons from the Soviets if the United States refused to sell him the arms he had requested. Nasser's warning "sounded suspiciously like blackmail" to Eisenhower, who was nQt about to play into Nasser's hands.'

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(U) Spurned by the Americans, Nasser, during the summer of1955, secured an arms deal with the Soviet. Union estimated to be worth between $80 and $200 million. An Egyptian military delegation concluded the deal in August 1955 during a meeting in Prague, Czechoslovakia, with its Soviet counterpart. The Czechoslovak role was arranged at Moscow's request in order to creat.e the fiction that the arms wet<e Czechoslovak and not Soviet.

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The Soviet Factor (U)

(U) It was, however, the Egyptian-Soviet arms deal that complicated the negotiations for Western financing for the Aswan High Dam project. 17 Initially, the Soviet arms deal intensified Western resolve to provide financing for the High Dam project and thus counter Soviet influence. In November 1955 the United States, Britain, and the World Bankjointly offered $70 miliion for the first stage of the dam .

...(!PSC-NF) The Eisenhower Administration gradually backed away from the financing plan, however, as it became convinced that Nasser was playing the West against the East. He probably was. In April 1956 Nasser publicly stated he was considering a Soviet offer to build the dam.18 United States officials were annoyed and apprehensive. They reasoned that Egypt would have difficulty meeting its financial obligations to the dam project with the added burden of an expensive new arms debt. In addition, the administration feared that, given Nasser's overtures to the Soviets, it would be unable to convince Congress to go along with the long-term financing such an arrangement necessitated. Whatever the ultimate reasons for the deal's collapse, events moved quickly upon Egyptian Ambassador Dr. Ahmed Hussein's return to Washington on 17 July. Journalists who met Hussein at the ai rt reseed him fi r E ' siti n vi - -vi t Hi h Dem project.

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(U) On the morning of 19 July, Ambassador Hussein went to the State Department for a meeting with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. According to published accounts of that meeting, Dulles began the discussion with an explanation, in "tones.rather sad and firm," of the many difficulties he was encountering in securing the loan. Ambassador Hussein reportedly became agitated as Dulles droned on. Finally, the ambassador blurted out, "Don't please say you· are going to withdraw the offer, because we have the Russian offer to finance the Dam right here in my pocket!"· According to these accounts, Dulles immediately retorted, "Well, as you have the money already, you don't need any from us! M offer is withdrawn!"20

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(U) The real reasons behind the Eisenhower adminstration's rescission of the High Dam deal remain unclear. It does not appear, with the benefit of hindsight, that pulling out of the agreement was a wise decision for the United States. In effect, the United States and Britain left ,Egypt largely in the hands of the Soviets. Both the Egyptian military and the Egyptian economy were under Moscow's sway. As Dulles suggested, at least part of the U.S. administration's reluctance to follow through on the agreement may be explicable as fear of failure. That is, with any vast undertaking there is an enormous danger of the deal going sour. The country responsible for financing a bad risk would be held liable for its failure and could become enshrined in Egypt's collective memory as the cause of great misery, misfortune, and humiliation. Another factor must have been the impending U.S. elect.ions. The High Dam financing was not a very popular issue with the American public. Eisenhower, in the throes of an election campaign, was not eager to press for massive funding for a country flirting with Moscow during the ·height of the Cold War. Moreover, U.S. officials did not believe the Soviets would come through with the funds if the Western nations revoked their offer. This assumption was not wholly unjustified. Moscow immediately started to hedge when Dulles rescinded the U.S. offer, and in fact, the Soviet-Egy tian deal took several more years to complete.

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Soviet Surprise and Vacillation (U)

J:l'SC-NF) The Egyptian g9vernment was certainly much less surprised by the U.S. act.ion than was Moscow. The U.S. revocation apparently caught the Soviet Union totally off guard, as its contradictory and confused behavior attests. On 21 July Soviet Foreign Minister Dmitri Shepilov told newsmen that his government was not considering aid to Egypt for constructio of the . The E tians were shocked and an ered b · this a ent betrayal.

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(U) Soviet Ambassador to Cairo, Yevgeni Kise ev, contradicted Shepilov's statement with an announcement on 23 July that the Soviet government was willing to finance the High Dam scheme if Egypt requested such assistance. That evening, however, Kiselev issued a formal denial of the remarks attributed to him. The CoJlowing day, 24 July, Kiselev again reversed himself, telling foreign correspondents, "We are now ready to finance the dam if Egypt wishes."29 It .took three more years, however, before the Soviet. Union and Egypt finalized a contract providing for the construction of the first stage of the HighDam.30

(U) In the interim, Egypt was lefl; in the lurch by both the East and the West. The rescission of the U.S. aid offer and the tenuity of the Soviet position, as well as the withdrawal of British troops f'rom the Canal Zone, undoubtedly influenced Nasser's decision to nationalize the canal. If' either superpower had agreed in 1956 to assist Egypt with the High Dam construction, Nasser might very well not have nationalized the canal, which, in any event, was scheduled to revert to Egyptian ownership in 1968.

Nasser's Answer to Superpower Ambivalence (U)

.,CllSC-NF) When Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company in a fiery speech on 26 July 1956, he precipitated a crisis that was to preoccupy his country and much of the world f'or months. Nasser's decision came as a com lete shock to U.S. officials.

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(U) Nationalizing the canal elevated Nasser's stature among the Arabs. At the same time, Nasser's action plee.S<!d Moscow, which saw in Egypt's inevitable alienati.on from the West an even greater opportunity for expanding its influence in the region. The British and French, however, were outraged. They feared freedom of' passage through the canal might not be guaranteed by Nasser, thus threatening Western Europe's oil supplies. Both London and Paris took steps to ensure that tolls would continue to be paid to the Canal Company and not to the Egyptian government. In response, Egypt issued an

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ultimatum demanding that all users begin paying tolls .to the newly nationalized company within one week.

Israel Grows Anxious (U)

(U) Western Europe and the United States were not the only parties made apprehensive by Nasser's action. The nationalization also intensified Israeli anxieties. Israel's primary concern was that Nasser's decision presaged a renewal of hostilities with its Arab neighbors. Israel had never been permitted passage through the Suez Canal; King Farouk had instituted prohibitions against Israeli shipping on the day Israel declared its independence in May 1948.3a Moreover, Egypt subsequently blockaded the Straits ofTiran at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel's only other seaway to Asia and Africa.3:1

(m The evacuation of British troops from the canal in June 1956 only served to heighten Israeli fears, despite Israel's mistrust of the British, which dated back to the bitter Israeli fight for independence from the British mandate. The Suez base represented the last large Western outpost in the region, and Israel felt even more isolated in the midst of the Arab world. Moreover. Fedayeeniu raids from neighboring countries were taking a continually higher toll on Israel. '.fhe formation of a joint Egyptian-Syrian command in October 1955, coupled with the new command's rapid acquisition of Soviet­bloc weapons, c.ompounded Israeli fears.

British-French Fears-Real and Imagined (U)

(U) Brite.in and France each had its own motive for imbuing the Suez issue with major international overtones. The British claimed Nasser had iltegally·seized control of the Suez Canal Company in which the British government was the largest single shareholder. The French, as wen as the British, viewed the seizure as a direct threat to their strategic interests, especially their oil-supply routes.

(U) France had a special reason for wanting to see Nasser humiliated. In addition to strategic considerations, many French leaders placed blame for France's troubles in Algeria squarely with Nasser. The chimerical theory in French circles was that if Egyptian moral and material support to the Algerian rebels could be stopped, the rebellion in Algeria would magically disappear. This same mentality helped justify major new French arms sales to Israel.

(U) When he nationalized the canal, Nasser promised to pay for any property seized if the Suez Canal Company's assets were turned over to Egypt. Naturally, the company's British- and French-dominated Board of Directors refused to surrender assets that extended far beyond the Suez Canal itself. On 29 July Nasser seized the Canal Company's offices in Egypt, imposed martial law in the Canal Zone, and forbade all Canal Company employees to leave their jobs.

(U) The British and the French immediately began agitating for active measures to ensure the uninterrupted operation of the canal. They asserted that the Egyptiar1s lacked the technical expertise necessary to keep the canal functioning smoothly, President Eisenhower.soon suspected that Britain and France were forwarding this argument only as a pretext for military intervention on their part. The President warned British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, a few days after the nationalization, that his claim of Egyptian · inability to operate the canal would "never be considered ... as a legitimate cause for immediate occupation by force."35

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British Prime Minister Anthony Eden

Eisenhower as Peacemaker (U)

(U) On 31 July a portentous message from Prime Minister Eden arrived in Washington. The message warned the United States that Britain was determined to "break ·Nasser" and was already developing military plans toward this purpose. Eisenhower, who firmly believed the British decision was mistaken and based more on "emotion than on fact and logic,"'e responded swi.fUy and unequivocally. He warned Eden that no U.S. help could be expected if Britain resorted to force. The President made it clear to tne British Prime Minister that the United States was convinced of tne "unwisdom even of contemplating the use of military force.''3

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$CCO) Meanwhile, Seeretary Dulles flew to London on 1 August to convince the British and French tD settle the Suez dispute peaceably. There, he secured an agreement with the allies for a multinational conference aimed at resroring international authority over the Suez Canal. On 12 August, Nasser formally declined the invitation to attend the conference. This refusal could hardl hav come as a su rise to U.S. or British fficials.

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(U) Despite Nasser's efforts; 22 of the 24 nations invited did attend the conference, which opened in London on 16 August. The conference resulted in an agreement among 18 of the participants for a U.S.-sponeored plan that included respect for the sovereignty of Egypt, just compensation to Egypt for the use of the canal, and international supervision of the canal.

(m A peaceful resolution of the crisis seemed within reach when Nasser agreed to meet with a five-nation committee, headed by Australian Prime Minister Robert Gordon Menzies. The Menzies mission traveled to Cairo to present the "Dulles plan" to the Egyptian President. Nasser, however, quickly rejected the plan, and the crisis intensified.

cm Even as the negotiations continued, U.S. suspicions about. Anglo-French intentions increased. Before the Menzies mission reached Egyptian soil, the British had granted the French permission to station French troops on Cyprus - a highly unusual step and hardly a sign ofnonbelligerency. Moreover, both the French and the British ordered their nationals to begin evacuating Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. ' 0

(!llSC-NF} With the Menzies mission a failure, Secretary of State Dulles next turned his efforts to a plan for a Suez Canal Users Association (SCUA). The idea behind SCUA was to organize the using nations to ensure free pa~ge should the canal be blocked or blockaded, or should the flow of Middle Eastern oil be disrupted. SCUA members would use their own pilots to transit the canal and would collect their own users' fees, out of which Nasser would be reimbursed for use of the canal. Although it is now widely known that Dulles originated the SCUA plan, at the time Anthony Eden was credited with devising the Users Association, This deception W8-S part ofan effort to keep the United States out of the limelight. Nonetheless, the E tians were sus icious that DuHes was the man behind SCUA.

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Cl!SC-NF) The Egyptians believed that U.S. acceptence o£SCUA was an ominous sign because it indicated the depth of U.S. anger with Egypt and placed t.be United States squarely in the British-French ca.mp. Moreover, Cairo labeled SCUA "an open and flagrant aggression on Egyptian sovereignty" and publicly proclaimed that "'its implementation means war.""" As expected, Nasser rejected the SCU A plan. Within days . events in Egypt made SCUA a dead issue.

{U} On 15 September, Egyptian pilots not only took charge of operating the canal but· did so with increased efficiency. With one of their major arguments for international control of the canal underIQ.ined, Britain and France now took the issue to the United Nations without first consulting their U.S. ally. Eisenhower was disturbed and deeply mistrustful of Anglo-French intentions. As he recorded in his memoirs, he wondered about Britain's and France's true purpose in going to the United Nations. Was it "a sincere desire to negotiate a $atisfactory peace settlement ... or was this merely a setting of the stage for eventual use of force in Suez?""

(U) Whatever the reality, negotiations at the United Nations dragged on throughout the month of October without conclusive results. The British, French, and Israelis used the time to finalize their plans. for resolving the Suet problem by .means of military intervention.

--WSr In September 1956 Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), submitted to the National Security Council two Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIE) on possible Anglo-French military action in the Suez Canal. In the first, Probable Repercussions of British-French Military Action in th11 Suez Cdsis, dated 5 September, the Intelligence Advisory Committee ([AC)45 began with the assumption t.ha·t indications were sufficient to warrant an estimate of the possible repercussions of British-French military action in Suez. The IAC members concluded that Britain and France were mc1st likely to resort to the military option if they were.confronted with another direct and major Egy.ptian challenge. However, the SNIE pointed out that, even without further provocation, Britain and France might resort to force if convinced that negotiations were not going to produce a prompt settlement satisfactory to them. In these circumstances, the assessment continued, London and Paris would attempt to document Nasser's refusal to negotiate such a settlement. The British and French would then dramatize the refusal before world opinion as justification for the use of force. 46

~The second SNIE, The Likelihood of a British-French Resort to Military Action . Against Egypt in the Suet Crisis, was published on 19 September and evinced awareness in the U.S. intelligence community of the potential for imminent c9nflict. The SNIE concluded that "'the U:K. and France will almost certainly seek to keep the way open for the use of force." Although the report concluded that the British and French were likely to resort to force only in the event of "some new and violent provocation," the SNIE clearly stated that, should this happen, the two U.S. allies would ttprobably use force against Egypt even without U.S. support." Clearly, then, the Eisenhower administration was cognizant of the possibility of joint British and French action behind the back of the United States. The SNIE also averred that it was possible, though unlikely, a renewal ,of Arab-Israeli hostilities might "furnish an occasion for U .K.-French military intervention against Nasser. ""7 Taken together, the conclusions of the various intelligence estimates submitted before the Israeli attack on Egypt and the subsequent Anglo-French intervention clearly illustrate that the United States actively considered the possibility of an Anglo-French plot.

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Allen Dulles, Director o( Central Intelligence

NSA Spots a Plot (U)

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(U) The Anglo-French role in the conspiracy began with the news that Nasser had nationalized the canal. The British and French immediately undertook war preparations. General Hugh Stockwell, commander of the 1st Corps of the British Army, was summoned to London on 3 August t.o prepare secret war plans, code-named "Operation Musketeer."'"

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{U) Meanwhile, without Britain's knowledge, France took steps to include Israel in the conspiracy. On the day a.ft.er the nationalization, Israel quietly requested and was granted a substantial increase in French arms shipments in violation of the 1950 Tripartite Agreement. Simultaneously, French Defense Minister Maurice Bourges­Maunoury approached Israeli Director General or the Defense Ministry Shimon Peres about a joint Franco-Israeli assault against Egypt. Peres responded positively to the suggestion. Further action on the issue, however, was suspended until 1 September when the French told Israel about Operation Musketeer. iSD

(U) Not until 13 October did France inform Britain about plans for Israeli participation. On 16 October, British Prime Minister Eden, French Prime Minister Mollet, Bx-itish Foreign Secret.ary Selwyn Lloyd, and French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau met secretly in Paris to put the finishing touches on the Anglo-French portion of the conspiracy. A crucial element in the agreement was a guarantee that Israel would not attack Jordan, with whom Brita.in had a defense treaty. The Frenchmen assured their British counterparts that Israel would move against Egypt and not against Jordan.51

(U) Finally, on 21 October, representatives of all three colluding nations met in Serres, just outside Paris, to finalize arrangements. Their plan called for Israel's first moves against Egypt to mimic raids against Fedayeen camps in Egypt. These raids would mask a full-scale invasion by British and French troops. In the event the Anglo-French forces failed to live up to their agreement to invade Egypt, Israel could then quickly withdraw its troops.~2

(U} Despite their deep mistrust of the British, the Israelis agreed to this plan because they were convinced that the blockading of the Straits of Tiran, the recent addition of Jordan to the Arab Joint Command, ,:i and the massive influx of arms into Egypt indicated Arab plans for a full-scale war against Israel.54

·

(U) Another important decision agreed upon in Paris was to keep the circle of those knowledgeable about the plan very small. In France and Britain, only the Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers, and a very few of their closest eonfida:nts knew of the plot.~3 Who in the Israeli government knew about the plan is much less clear. At the very least, Prime Minister David Ben Gurion, Foreign Minister Golda Meir, Chief ofStalr Moshe Dayan, and Shimon Peres knew the details of the plot. SI!.

The Plot Thickens (U)

(U) On 15 October, Eisenhower was briefed on U-2 flights that revealed the presence in Israel of 60 French Mystere jets - a clear violation of an earlier agreement whereby France was allowed to sell 24, not 60, Myst.eres to Israel.~7 Eisenhower's worst fears were confirmed. France was maneuvering behind the back of the United States. The President recalled in his m moirs that at hi m ment he felt "w were cut off from our allies.'>ff

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(U) During the last two weeks of October, communications between Paris and Tel Aviv were extremely heavy. Simultaneously, there was a "virtual blackout on communication between the United States on the one side and the French and the British on the other . ..a1 Regular reports from London and Paris to the U.S. State Department suddenly disappeared.61 Moreover, the British, French, and Israeli ambassadors to the United States were all rather mysteriously and conveniently out of the country .

.(ll'St;-NF) An even more ominous development now arose. According to Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose, American Sigint collectors began to pick up unusually heavy radio traffic between Britain and Frarice. U.S. codebreakin efforts against the interce t re rtedl were unsuccessful. 63

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Contradiction (U)

(U) Despite all the evidence provided by U.S. inte Uigence that some kind of British­· French operation was in the works, U.S. officials avowed ignorance of the plot. Eisenhower, in his memoii:s, asserted that as late as 15 October, when Israel began to mobilize its forces, the administration "could not fathom the reason" for the mobilization.e11 Eisenhower claimed the United States did not fully realize that Israel planned offensive action until the day of the attack. Even then, until Israeli troops actually crossed into the Sinai, the administration expected Israel to attack Jordan and not Egypt. According to Eisenhower, the administration still did not believe Israel's attack was part of an orchestrated plot involving Britain and France. On SO October, the day after the Israeli invasion of Egypt, Eisenhower met with Secretary Dulles and other advisers. According to Eisenhower, "One thing the conference reflected: our lack of clear understanding as to exactly what was happening in the Suez area due to our break in communications with the French and British. We were in the dark about what they planned to do."66

(U) Moreover, Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose asserts that White House Press Secretary James Hagerty told reporters the attack came as a complete surprise.67

Worse still, Secretary Dulles, in a 16 December 1956 press conference, stated: "It is quite true that the actual ~ttack occurred without our knowledge and came as a complete surprise to us.61 These reports infuriated Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director Allen Dulles who, a month later, leaked stories to the press that the intelligence community had predicted Suez. Allen Dulles told reporter Anthony Tully, ftMy brother

· said the State Department was taken by surprise. That was only technically correct. What he meant was that the British, French, and Israeli governments had not informed · our ambassadors. But we had the Suez operation perfectly taped. We reported that there would be a three-nation attack on Suez. And on the day before the invasion, CIA reported it was imminent." 69

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p;5'.-NF) Contrary to published accounts of U.S. ignorance preceding the Suez w;a.r, the U.S. intelligence community rapidly pieced together the bits of information it had acquired. On 28 October, the IAC sent the findings of its Watch Committee meeting to the National Security Council.73 The Watch Committee, after an "examination of new evidence of heavy Israeli mobilfaation," concluded that an Israeli offensive against its Arab neighbors was imminent. The report stated that Israeli mobilization was "on a scale which would permit Israel to occupy Jordan west of the Jordan river, penetrate Syria as far as Damascus ... penetrate Egypt to the Suez Canal and hold parts of [the] Sinai for [al considerable time." The Watch Committee concluded that

past Egyptian provocations, the ltey role ~fEgypt.inthe Arab threat.and U.K. involvement with Jordan indicate the attack will be la1111ched against Egypt in the very near future under the pretext of retaliation and e:cceeding past raids in strength ...• Possible motivations for such an Israeli mobilization were considered to be ••• to provide a diverlrionsry threat against Egypt in order to afford greater freedom of action for Franc~ and the U.K. in th• Suez situation and to relieve Egyptian p~eseurea:on France in Non:h Afri~a.74

The Watch Committee report proved prophetic. Within days, Israeli forces attacked Egypt, crossed the Sinai, and were virtually poi.se<f on the banks of the Suez C{lnal.

Attack(U)

(!PSC) The surprise attack began on 29 October 1956 when Israeli columns with an estimated strength of at least six brigades thrust into the Sinai at Kuntilla and Ras al Naqb. The Israelis overran relatively small Egyptian defense forces and raced unopposed almost to the banks of the Suez. The swiftness of the Israeli advances placed the detenders of Gaza, Rafah, al Arish, and Abu Aweigila in indetensible positions. The Egyptian troops were faced with a large Israeli force which had not yet been committed and outflanked by the Israeli columns that had s ed from Elath to NakhL

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(U) On 30 October, Britain and France concurrently issued an ultimatum demanding a cease-fire and the withdrawal of all combatants from the canal zone. The ultimatum was the cornerstone of the tripartite plot. France and Britain warned that, unless hoth Israel and Egypt agreed to a cease-fire and withdrew ten miles on either side of the canal. an Anglo-French forCi! would intervene to keep the warring parties apart. The conspirators of course were certain Egypt would reject the demand and were equally sure Israel would comply. An Israeli "withdrawal" to within 10 miles of the canal would in fact constitute an advance. If their plan succeeded, fsrael would gain the Sinai, the French and British would ~upy the canal, and Nasser would be neutralized.

(U) The Eisenhower administration was outraged by the ultimatum. The President sent Eden and Mollet a warning. In his message, Eisenhower told the allies, "[ feel I must urgently express to you my deep concern at the prospect of this drastic action. . . . It is my sincere beUef that peaceful processes can and should prevail to secure a solution.'' Eisenhower put Britain and France on notice that the United States could not be counted on to come to their assistanee.77

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I I The Soviets, embroiled in their own conflict in Eastern Europe, offered only moral support to E t.

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(U) At the same time, the ·u.s. Ambassa~or to the Unired Nations, Henry Cahot Lodge, informed the U.N. General Assembly of U.S. plans to introduce a resolution that called for an immediate cease-fire, Israel's withdrawal to its borders, all U.N. members refraining Crom the use of force, and an embargo against Israel until it withdrew its troops.84 British Prime Minister Eden essentially ignored the United States and refused to have anything to do with the U.N. resolution.

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. UNCLASSIFIED

MAPII TIIE BATTUFIELD Ouobor-N•••inher 1951l • r-A -.t. ~h--.fftlldi laqWi:I Oonlir•!W...... Q4• ..... .:::::---

~·-······ Jf'lltll

Tbe Battlefield October-November 19156

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...._ 1 The following day, the first ' British troops disembarked on the beaches of Port Said, whi1e French troops landed at

Port Fuad.37

(U) The Soviet Union delivered a strongly worded protest to the British and French on 5 November. In its complaint; the Soviet Union denounced British and French actions and threatened to intervene on behalf of the Egyptians.38 Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin's letters to the French, British, and Israeli governments declared that Moscow was ttfully resolved to use force to crush the aggressors and to restore peace in the Middle East" and even contained a veiled threat to use nuclear weapons against London and Paris if hostilities continued.89

(U) Bulganin's letter to Eisenhower had an entirely different tone. The Soviet Premier suggested that a joint Soviet-American force intervene in the Middle East if Britain, France, and Israel refused to agree to a cease-fire. The United States not orily rejected this proposal but threatened nuclear retaliation if London or Paris were attacked.90 Despite strong U.S. disagreement with its allies' position, President Eisenhower would not stand by and let his old friends and NATO partners be intimidated.

-i:&=CCO) Moreover, the U.S. administration had reason to believe the Soviets were bluffing. NSA reports disclosed that the Soviets, while quietly advising Egypt to appeal for volunteers, arms, and assistance from all countries, provided nothing more than verbal support to the Egyptians. Comint indicated there was no movement of Soviet· fighters into Syria or any other Middle Eastern country. Early on 6 November, the U.S. presidential election day, Eisenhower ordered U-2 fl,ights over Syria and Israel .to ascertain whether there were any Soviet fighters at Syrian bases. By noon, the U-2 flights had confirmed that there were no Soviet fighters in Syria. 51

Not with a Bang, But a Wimper (U)

{U) Just as the British troops at Port Said were preparing to advance southwards into lsmailia and Abu Suweir, the British government, under heavy U.S. and international pressure, agreed to a eease-fire at midnight on 6 November. The French and Israelis reluctantly followed suit. Thus ended the Suez war of 1956.

) I Israel was especially bitter about the outcome.

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Suez: A Sobering Retlection for Politics and Intelligence (U)

W-CCO) The Suez crisis highlighted not only discord between the United States and its allies but also the lack of Arab unity-a recurrent theme in recent Middle East history. The fractious Arab "allies" never managed to agree on any coordinated plan of attack. Instead, they expended most of their time and energy worrying about being sabotaged by one another. Throughout the crisis, Comint clearly illustrated their disarray.

,Cl'SC) For example, Comint reflected Syrian and Egyptian suspicion abot\,t pro­Western Iraq. The presence of Iraqi troops in proximity to British forces in Jordan gave rise to an anti-Iraq propaganda campaign. Syria and Egypt spread rumors that Iraq was working in league with Israel and Great Britain to partition Jordan, and Syria reported interc_epting Iraqi arms shipments to dissident Syrian tribes.n The Jordanian General Staff ordered units to observe closely all activities of Ira i troo s in Jordan es ciall those encamped near the British base in Mafraq.94

L.---.-....------------'In early December l956, Iraq withdrew its troops rom o an.

(U) Perhaps a more ominous and far-reaching effect of the Suez crisis was the erosion of Western influence in the Middle East and the deepening of Soviet penetration into the region. Before the war there was some hope that Nasser's professed policy of non­alignment might translate into an evenhanded approach toward Western and Soviet-bloc nations. However, the aggression against Egypt by two close U.S. allies ensured that both Egypt and Syria would rely much more heavily on Soviet and Soviet-bloc countries for both economic and military assistance. Egyptian suspicion of the West deepened. The Suez crisis helped ·set the stage for years of conflict-by-proxy between the United States and the USSR in the Middle East.

WSC) The Suez crisis also illuminated a significant weakness in the U.S. Comint effort. Unquestionably, NSA made a major contribution to the U.S. intelligence effort during the crisis. The United States, nonetheless, was profoundly deficient in the Cornint" resources it devoted to the Middle East and relied instead on British interce t.

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Shift in Perspective (U)

J:llS-CCO) As early as the spring of 1956, U.S. policymakers recognized the potential dangers inherent in U.S. dependence on British sites and the lack of U.S. intereept stations devoted to Middle Eastern targets. 1n response to the growing tensions in the region, the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB)1111 decided on 17 April 1956_ to emphasize Middle Eastern targets at the expense of the Soviet Black Sea

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coverage. Central to this plan was the conversion of the. CIA site at:ll t-0 an "all Middle East. station" effect;ive 3 May 1956.99 The USCIB decision al~ that NSA would request GCHQ, as an allied agency, to make concurrent changes in their Middle East and Black Sea coverage. · Soon after the USCIB directive, NSA and Britain's GCHQ/London Communications Security Agency (LCSA) convened a Middle East Planning Conference. The first formal conference meeting was held on 7 May 1956.

(TSC) Even before the conference began, GCHQ and NSA had already agreed to certain changes in coverage. The Senior U.S. Liaison Officer in London (SUSLOL), Captain Prescott H. Currier, USN, informed the Director, NSA, Lieutenant General Ralph Canine, on 16 April that the British had decided to increase their Middle East intercept effort at UKM-257 by eight teams (about. 40 operators) "immediately." Previously, there were only three people involved in the processing effort at UKM-257. In addition, GCHQ agreed in principle to the transfer of U.S. naval personnel from USF-61 to provide continuityofcover?,ge of Black Sea naval and naval air targets. 100

Major General Ralph J. Canine

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~NF) As had been agreed upon at the conference, two Arabic linguists from NSA (David B. Nuckols and Gene M. McKee; USA) were ordered roe=]for a 90-day period beginning 22 June 1956. In addition, Emanuel Azar, Chief of NSA's Near and Middle Eastern Branch, went toc=Jon temporary duty from 1-8 July as an expert linguist. 1°"

rys..CCO) In order to augment USF-61 as quickly~ble, Canine, with CIA and State Department concurrence, planned to dispatch toL__J'carefully screened" Army personnel as well as operators from the NSA civilian program. no Although there was space for 80 operators at USF-61, at that time only 47-48 positions-were manned, and the number of positions wired and installed was 64.

(~CC!) Becar5e the CIA did not have a pool of intercept operators available for duty at the site, in May NSA requested the Army Security Agency (ASA) oo supply 35 OJ;l:!!illllm~ to bolster the station's personnel strength. In July, the men began arriving on ~~~in increments of five enlisted men and two officers per week for six­month tours of duty. This, however, did not entirely alleviate the personnel problems at USF-61, and NSA was required to furnish five additional communications experts to the· s• llL

CO) On 15 August, CIA Director Dulles indicated his desire to phaseout CIA's roe at USF-61 because the CIA had neither a rotation program nor a personnel pool to properly maintain this station on a continuing basis. With the growing tensions in the Middle East and USCIB's decision to make USF-61 the primary U.S. Sigint site targeting that region, the CIA believed ·it would be unable to meet these increased demands. Representatives of NSA, CIA, and tl}e Navy Security Group met and decided that the best course of action was to transfer control of USF-61 to the Navy. The military personnel would be overtly associated with the U.S. Navy but purportedly in support of a State De rtment Communication (Radio Relay) Station.1u

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...(.118C-NF) Whether or not NSA targeted and exploited British communications remains an enigma. Following the Suez crisis, George Wigg, a Labor Member of Parliament, claimed in a news conference that the United States had broken British, French, and [sraeli codes. 120 Wigg did not reveal his sources or justify his claim, and no NSA records can be found to substantiate his accusation.

NSA 's Performance (U)

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not share some of its most valuable and revealing intelligence data with the British. What the British kept from the United States remains purely in the realm of speculation.

A Diligent, Delicate Endeavor (U)

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-NF Despite the closeness of the Anglo-American Comint relations 1p, NSA was very interested in GCHQ's unilateral response to the Suez operation. On 2 November Canine requested Currier's assessment of any changes in GCHQ cover assignments in the area; any changes in GCHQ's effort and processing; the possibility of GCHQ diverting

· cover to close support; any other changes made by GCHQ during the previous two weeks; or any changes GCHQ was contemplating. In response, Currier reported on 5 November that the 2d Wireless Regiment at Famagusta, Cyprus, had raised all Egyptian traffic to full 24 hour-a-day coverage· and added four additional full positions on Egyptian targets. New positions were manned by troops from the 128th Close Support Training Group. Some extra cover of Arab Joint Command traffic was also added, but no further cover changes were noted. ! I In Currier's opinion, there was no evidence that the British would implement close support plans because virtually all troops that could be used for close support were stationed at UKM--257.1~

mf;} In spite of the strain in relations between their respective go1rernments, NSA and GCHQ apparently managed to maintain a close working relationship throughout the crisis. According to one of NSA's Deputy Liaison Officers, John J. Keenan, who was in Cheltenham, England, during the Suez crisis, his British counterparts went out of their way to reassure the Americans there that the friction between Washington and London

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would not damage or curtail the NSA-GCHQ working relationship. Keenan added that he did not detect any change in the U.S.-British partnership. Most U.S. and British personnel at Cheltenham regarded the crisis as a high-level tiff that did not affect day-to­day relationahips.1:rr Mark Pattie echoed Keenan's sentiments. According to him, there was no detectable decrease in either the quantity or the quality of British intercept provided to NSA during the Suez crisis. w Moreover, Canine told Currier on 5 November the consensus at NSA was that UKM-257 was doing an "excellent job" and that current U.S. requirements from Britain were being "fully met."l2!1

~CO) Regardless of the generally harmonious Comint relationship between the ·United States and Britain, the Suez crisis revealed numerous problems in the processing and reporting of intelligence within the U.S. Com.int establishment. As the volume and scope of the crisis increased, U.S. communications became overburdened, inefficie11t, and erratic. Despite these handicaps, NSA provided in valuable intelligence to its customers .

.(S.CCO} NSA's shortcomings as well as its strengths quickly became apparent during the critical months in the autumn of 1956. The Suez crisis was the first major test of the Comint Alert System outlined in NSA •Circular Number 53-2 (Revised). Basically, the circular defined the four Comint Alert categories (Alpha, Bravo, X-ray, and Yankee) and delineated the conditions.requiring that an alert be instituted. A Yankee Alert was indicated when a "planned U.S. or Allied activity may stimulate a foreign communications reaction or provoke military or paramilitary action by a foreign nation with respect to the U.S."uo Once an alert was declared, all U.S. Comint units involved were responsible for ensuring that the facilities under their control continuously analyzed foreign communications developments in order to keep abreast of significant or abnormal conditions. Moreover, all units were responsible for "rapid and secure forwarding of information" to DIRNSA and other agencies in accordance with a special time and distribution schedule contained in the NSA Circular. For example, in a Yankee Alert, intelligence reports were to be issued every six hours at "immediate" precedence, while a periodic summary was to be issued every 24 hours.131

CJ;'5C-NF) [n reaction to Israel's attack on Egypt, USF-61 declared "Alert Yankee Egypt/Israeli" at 2048Z on 30 Oetober. In less than three hours, Canine requested the Army Security Agency, Europe (ASAE} and USN-40 (Bremerhaven, West Germany) to initiat.e a Yankee Alert to cover possible Soviet reaction to the Middle East, crisis. The. Office of General Studies (GENS}1a1 assumed the role of Executive Agent within NSA Headquarters. On the following day, the alert was expanded'to include Hungary, Poland, and East Germany. The alert was "so extensive in time, geographical scope, and areas of activity that the Comint community was provided with a test of Comint operational and reporting capabilities and limitations as close as possible to actual war conditions."133

%CCO) The alert pushed an already~saturated Comint communications net over the edge. Canine quickly discovered that the alert instructions contained in NSA Circular 53-2 did not envii;ion an alert of the scope and complexity necessitated by the simultaneous Suez and Hungarian crises. 134 As a result, at l650Z on 6 November, the Director canceled all previous Yankee Alert instructions and issued new instructions adapted to this unique situation. Comint units were ordered to issue spot reports as the situation developed, not at fixed times. Furthermore, only the Executive Agent was allowed to release negative reports, that is, reports showing a lack of activity.

$-CCO) The technical procedures by which alerts were declared and implemented also revealed their insufficiencies. There was, for e:,i:ample, a seven-hour delay between the time DIRNSA's alert declaration message was drafted and the time it was actually released. This distressing time lag largely resulted from a lack of specific instructions for declaring an alert. The failure of some elemen,s to eliminate or lower the precedence of

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normal, daily reports generated other problems. Consequently, some important alert materials were delayed while regular reports were cleared. m

(l!S!:CCO) The primary U.S. concern vis-a-vis the Middle East situation was clearly the possibility of Soviet intervention there. U.S. Sigint sites in Europe were tasked to watch for any signs of Soviet reaction or iinpending intervention. A DIRNSA message on l November 1966, illustrated the U.S. fear of Soviet involvement in the tense Middle East arena:

25Xl and 6, E.0.13526

(S'-CCO) In particular; NSA was so concerned about a stand-down of Soviet long-range bomber forces that a special NSA emergency processing team was set up at USM-I {Vint Hill, Virginia) with the sole purpose of scanning civil traffic for any positive or negative reflections of Soviet long-range air force activity. 137 By 6 November, however, the consensus was that the stand-down was related to an annual Soviet holiday celebration and not to an intended intervention in the Middle East. 1aa

Lessons Learned. Lessons Ignored (U)

(J!BC) The worldwide $igint alert implemented in the -fall of 1956 provided the impetus for certain changes in alert and reporting procedures within NSA. The novel concept of"decentralized reporting," that is, reporting capability as close as possible to the source of intercept, proved to be the most timely and efficient means of disseminating reports. NSA Headquarters encouraged and expanded the use of "canned" (i.e., predetermined) distribution indicators, usually designated by digraphs, that substituted for lengthy addresses on reports. In addition, the Director of NSA clarified the chain of command of those authorized to declare alerts, required field sites to prepare a set of emergency procedures for future crises, and, most importantly, reviewed and upgraded communicationscapabilitiesY9

•

CP'SC) According to the Critique of the 1956 Yankee Alert, "inadequacy of communications· represented the major problem of the entire alert."110 Overloading was due to communications facilities inadequate to handle the volume of data produced, greatly increased demands on circuit time, and faulty reporting procedures. w The alert critique stated unequivocally that "the Y.ankee Alert made it appallingly apparent that an investigation of the communications capabilities of the National Comint Establishment is urgently needcd."1

•2

p;BC) Despite this caveat and the other lessons of "Yankee Alert: Egypt/Israel," NSA once again faced a crisis in the Middle East as the Lebanese and lraqi situations brought the United States into direct military involvement in the region during the summer of 1958. Again, the U.S. Comint establishment experienced annoying and dangerous delays caused by inadequate communications capability and unclear alert instructions.

JfJf Even though the United Sta'tes' closest ally had maneuvered behind its back to take military action against another sovereign nation, the U.S.-U.K. Comint relationship continued without interruption. This patent British deception of the United States might have been expected to inspire a U.S. effort t.o establish a reliable, well-equipped, and independent intelligence-gathering operation vis-A-vis the Middle East. It did not. NSA was again heavily dependent upon British .intercept during another Middle East crisis

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less than two years after the Suez imbroglio. In 1958 the U.S. Navy's collection facility at r----7was still small, understaffed, and ill-equipped, and NSA continued to rely upon tlii'B'rirtsh as its prime source of Middle East Comint. ·

(U) Perhaps one lesson to be derived from· the Suez crisis is that whether by dint of loyalty or the inertia inherent in any established system or bureaucracy. the Anglo­American Sigint alliance was easily strong enough to continue unabated despite a disruption in the political relationship: In spite of British duplicity before and during the Suez crisis, our Sigint interdependence was untouched by the temporary "spat" between allies. The interesting question raised by this phenomenon is, At what point is the Sigint relationship between allies affected by the current politkal environment? Evidently the Suez crisis was not of sufficient political magnitude to warrant any disruption in the Sigint relationship.

(U) The other important lesson of Suez is a familiar one: intelligence is valuable only to the extent that those in power not only have access to it but use it wisely. Those at the highest levels of the Eisenhower administration did receive intelligence data warning them of the Anglo-French-Israeli conspiracy. Thia information was either ignored, mistrusted, or covered up for the sake of political expediency. Despite public denials and disavowals in the aftermath of Suez, the fact remains that the intelligence dat.a. was made available to top U.S. policymakers. The intelligence community fulfilled its commitment to provide timely and accurate information. Beyond this, intelligence officials relinquish their authority to political decision-makers. However, as the Suez crisis showed, intelligence is not an end in itself but a tool to be wisely employed, badly mishandled, or simply.ignored.

CONflDEN'RAI: 32

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NOTES

1. (Ul "NSA Report to the President's Soard ofConsultantll on Foreign Intelligence Ac:tivitiea." 9 January 195'7, Crises Filu, Boz N wnbec 6, Historical Colleetion,NSA; pp. 11, l 6; hereafterreferred to"" "NSA Report" '4'SC). 2. (Ul Stephen E. Ambrose,Ei.ae11ho1Wr the Prtsid.ent, Volume Ir (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), p. 368. 3. (U) Although this made lhe British government the largeat _.Jngle shareholder in the Suez Canal Company (with 44 percent or the shares), private French citizens held more than 50 percent of'tbe shares. Chester L. Cooper. The Li,Jn'# Li:u,t Roar: Suiz:, 1956 {New York: Harper&. Row, 1965), pp. l3-f4. 4.(U) Terence Robertson, Crisis: The Inside Story(New York: Atheneum, 19641, pp. xiii-xiv. 6. (Ul Cooper, Tiu/' Lion's/Ast Roar, p. 33. 6. (U)_ Kenneth Love,Siuz: Tlut Twice fi'ought War I New York: McGr~w-Hill, 1969), p.160. 7. (U) Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace: 1956-1961 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1965), p.24. 8. (U) Diplomatic Summary, 19 October 1955;Serlal Number 2311, p, 14, Accession Number 9597, Location CBSF 23, CAHA, NSA. These reports were included in an executive summary prepared every week.day by the State Department's Spe;::ial Projects Staff (SPS) liaison at NSA Headquarters. Known ae the "Diplomatk: Summary," t.hey included the most important repot'!.!I and translation& ofthe day with commentary added by the SPS. 9. (U) Diplomatic Summary, 12 October 1955, Serial Number 2306, pp. 4-5, Ae<:ession Number 9697, Locati-On CBSF 23, CAHA, NSA CPS'C). 10.(U) Diplomatic Summary, 17 October 1955, Sf:rial Number 2309, p. 1 l, Accession Nwnber 9597, Location CBSF 23, CAHA, NSA ~C). II. (U) Diplomatic Summary, 20 Oct.Qber l955, Serial Number 2312, p. 2, Accession Number 9597, Location CBSF 23, CAHA, NSA <!16C). 12. (U) "NSA Report," p. 12 Cl?SCl. 13. !Ul •NSA Report," pp. 13, 25 f.l8C>, 14. 4.U) ·NSA Raportt pp. 5, 6, 12 aaci. l fi, (U) Diplomatic Suznmary, 12 J u.ne 1956. Serial Number 24 74, p. 15, Aeeessio11 Number 9597, Locatior, CBS.!' 27, CAHA, NSA(TSC). Ul. (U) Diploma tie Summary, 12 June 1956, Serial Number 247 4, p. 18,Accession Number 9597, Location CBSF 27, CABA. NSA (TSC). 17. (U) The corrett appellation iG "Higli Dam~; British engineers built the Aswan Dam between 1898 and 1902 about four miles north of the present Hirh Dam. Love, Twice-Foughl, p. 299. 18. (U) Eisenhower, Wl16'i"8 Pea«, p. 31. 19. <U) Diplomatic Swnmary, 19 July 1956, Serial Nwnber 2500, pp. 4-14, Accession Number 9597, Location CBSF 27. CAHA, NSA CTSC}. . 20. (U) Herman Finer, Dulu• Ouer Suez: (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), p,p. 47-48. This account agrees substantially with other publiahed accounts of the meeting. 21. (U) Diplomatic Summary, 23 July 1956, Serial Number 2502, pp. 4-5. Aceession Nwitber 9697, Location CBSF 27, CAHA., NSA <l!Sel. . 22. (U) Diplomatic Summaey, 26 July 1956, Serial N1.1mber 2504, pp. 4-5, Accession Nwnber 9697, Location CBSF 27, CAHA, NSA c:P!!C). 23. !U) Diplomatic Swnmary, 25 July 1956, Serial Number 2504, pp. 4-9, Accession Number 959'/, Location CBSF 27, CABA, Archives NSA re3{;). 24. CU) Diplomatic Swnmary, 25 July 1956, Serial Nwnber 2504, p.10, Accession Number 9597, Location CBSF 27, CAHA, NSA <'.13tl. 25. !U) Diplomatic Summary, 24 July 1956. Serial Number 2603, p. 8, Accesion Number 9597, Location CBSF 27,CAHA,NSA(:.FSCI: . 26.(Ul OiplomatkSwnmary, 26July 1956, Serial Numl>er 2505, p. 10,Accession Number 9597, Location CBSF 27,CAHA, NSAcrBC>. 27 . .ci:&e:NF) Love, Twic,-Fough.!, p. 319.

I 25Xl and 6, E.0.13526

28. {UJ Diplomatic Summary, 24 July 1956. Serial Number 2503, J>, 4, Accession Nwnber 9597, Location CBSF 27, CA.liA,NSA (1SC). 29.(U) Robertson, Crisis, pp. :tiii-dv.

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SO. (U) Oleg M. Smolanaky, Tise Soui,:t Unwr, and the An:tb Etut Un.dltr Klt.rua~u (Lewisburg: Bw:knell Univaniity Presa, 1974), pp. 45-46. 31.(U) DiplomaticSummary,26July 1956,Senal Nu.m.bar 2505, p. 16,Aeceuion Number 9597, Location CBSF 27, CAHA, NSA <.:esc). 32. (U) Love, Twit!4•Fougltt, p. 163. 33.(U) Donald Neff, WanioraatSue.c(NewYork: LindenPr11A,198ll,p. 103. 34. (U) "Fedayeen,a which in A.-e.bic means "they who eacrifi« theme;ilves," is th,i term generally applied t.o Paleetiniane engaged in attacks against Israel in an eff'on to regain the homeland they lost during the l$1'aeli war oflndependence. To the Israelis, "Fedayeen" is a synonym for ~terrorist.&"; to the Paleetiniall)I and their supporter&. "Fedayeen~ is an honorific term meaning "freedom fight.era.~ 35.(U) Eisenhower, Wasin.gP.,o«,p.40. 36. I Ul Eisenhower, Wa,til'l8 Peace, p. 40. 37. (U} Eisenhower, Wo.sing Peace, Ap!Hlndis. S, p. 664. 38. (U) Diplomatic Summary,3 August 1956, Serial Number 2511. p. 5, Accession Nwnber 9697, Location CBSF 28, CARA, NSA l!PBC>. 39. (Ul Diplomatic Summary. 6 August Serial Number 2512, p. 8, Accession Number 9597, Loeation CBSF 28, CAHA. NSA ($SC).

40. (U) Ei&enhower, Waging Pea,;e, p. 48. 41. IUl Diplomatic Summary. 14 September 1856, Serial Number 2540, p. 6, Accession Number 9687, Location CBSF 28, CAHA, NSA <!l'Sel. 42. (UJ Diplomatic Summary, 17 Sept.ember 1956, Serial Number 2541. pp. 9-10, Accession Number 9597, Location CBSF 28, CAHA, NSA <:f8C>. 43. (U) Diplomatic Summary, 17 September 1956, Serial Number 2541, pp. &-7, Accession Number 9597, Location CBSF 28, CAHA, NSA Archivesci:scl. 4-4. (U) Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 52. 45. (U) The IAC wu created by the National ·Security Council in 1947; it was originally composed of the principal uitelligence officet'll from State, Army, Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I.be Atomic Energy Commission to provide coordination between the Central [ntelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies. The Director of the FBI joined the JAC in 1949. The Director of Cenlral lnteUigence wu the IAC chairman, although he was not technically a committee member. One responsibility of the IAC was to draft National lntelligen« Estimates that were then submitted by the DCI to the President and the National Security Council. The IAC and the United Stat.ea Conuimnications Intelligence Board (USC1B) were combined in 1958 to form the United St.at.ea Intelligence Board (USIB). NSA and the Armed Forces Security Agency before it were always memben, of USCIB and NSA became a member of USIB in 1958. S1<1ve L. Reardon, Histcry of t1i.e Office of 1/w Secretar-y of De{enu, Thll Formo/JU<t Years 1947-1951), !WB&hington, D.C., Historical Office, Offi~e of the Secretary of Defense: 1984), p. 143. 46. (U) SNIE 30.40-66, 5 September 1956, Safe Number 15Z3 l 1. Drawer 4, Archiveil, NSA ('f8)':. ft is impossible to determine NSA's contribution to either SNfE. 47. (U) SNIE 30-5--56, 19 September 19f>6, Safe Number 152311. Drawer 4, Archives, NSA (:fS>. ,48. (Ul •NSA Report." p. 13. 49. (U) Love, Twi<:'!.fi'ousht, p. 392, 50, (U) Love, Twice-Foughc, p. 433. 51.CU) Finer, DuUesOr,erSMz,p.328. 52. (U) Chaim Henog, Th.eArab-lsraeliWar,<New York: HandomHouse, 1982), pp.113, 114, 117. 53. (U) Thuuo•called •Pact or Amman" was an es.tension oftlie Egypti&.n-Jardauian agreement of the previous year, It publicly called for increased military cOOpe"8tion and, in the eveni.<1f a war with Israel, the placement of Jordanian and Syrian forces under an Egyptian commander. Eisenhower, Wa,ing Pn«, p. 66. 54.(IJ) Henog,An:tb•l•ro.•liWcr&,pp. U3-14. 65. (IJ) Finer, DuiksOuer Su..:.,pp. 330-3 l. 56.(IJJ Henog,Arab•lsraeli Wars, p.114, 57. (U) Arnbroae,EiHnhower,pp.351-52. 58. (U} Eisenhower, Waging P..ace, p. 56. 59. (Ul ~NSA Report,w p. 13 CPSCl. 60. tm "NSA Report,w p. 13 CllSCJ. 6L (U) Ambrose,Eisenhowcr, p. 353. 62. (Ul Finer, Dulk• Over Suu, p. 335. 63. (U) Ambrose, Eisenhower, p. 353. 64. (U) Memorandum from Richard E. Curl, SPS, 10 September 1956, Field Branch Correspondence, July-December, 1956Spe<:ia1Sl.ate Department Collection, History Collection, NSA (TSC). 65.(Ul Eisenhower, WasiflllP-,e,p. 56. 66. (U} Eiaenhower, Was ins £'_11.ac,:. p. 75.

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<I.I c.3 ..:: - 00 i.. ~ <I.I

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<I.I ..... i.. 0

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67. <Ul Stephen !. Ambrose, 11:e'll Spies: Eisenhower 11,ul tile Espiilnage Establiahnu,it CGe.rden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1981), p. 266. , 68. (U) New Yorl Times, 19l>ecernber 1956, page l4,eolumn 2. Empbaeisedded. 69. CU) Ambrose, Ilt•'a Spie1, p. 256. 70. <Ul Cover Letter to "NSA Report,• G. B. Erskine, G<ln., USMC (Ret.l, Allaistant to the Secretary of tnfemie (Special OpecatioRII). . 71. C'O) Diplomatic Summe.ry, 27 September 1956,Serial Number 2549,p. 19, Accession Number 9597, LocaUon CBSF 28, CAHA. NSA~l. 72. CUI "NSA Report,• p. 26.

25Xl and 6, E.0.13526

to y UMNwnber. Emph.ui.sadded. 75.(U) "NSAReport," p.17m5Cl. 76. CU) OPSUM Number 177-56 (:ffiC).

71.<m Eisenhower, W.agingPeace,pp. 71-78. 78. (U) "NSA Report," p. 1 ~>. 79. (U) "NSA Report,• p.13 ClSCl. 80. <Ul "NSA Report," p. l 'l CJ!SCJ. 81, (U> "NSA Rep0rt," p. 14 E'PSCl. 82.(U) OPSUMNwnber 178-66(4'6Cl. 83.!U) OPSUMNumber 177-56(lfSC). 84. (UI Ambroae,Ei.unhoiut. p. 361 • 86. (Ul OPSUM Number 180-56mi3Cl. 86. (Ul OPSUM Number 180-56 (ll.'SC). 87. <U) "NSA Report,• p. 17 +'FSe). 88. (U) Smolansky, Khrushcheu, pp. 4,S...46. 89. (Ul Ten of Bulganin's letter was printed in Prot.Jd4, 6 November 1959. 90. (U) Smolaneky, Khrua/aclt.eu, p. 46. 91. (U) Ambrose, Eiunhower, p. 368. • 92. (Ul Copy of message 3/0IZ-QOOftl 216-56, Criais Files, Box Number 6, CAHA, NSA t'.J!SC-NFl. 93. (U) "NSA Report." p. 18 t'l'SGJ. 94.(U) "NS.A RepGrt,8p.18(ll'SC). 96. IUl OPSUM Nwnber 186-56 ('i'SC). 96. (U) l!:rskit111 cover letter, NSA Report& WSC). 97. (Ul Interview Mark T. Pattie, 24January 1986, by Robert Farley and.._ ___ _,OH 05-86, NSA Cl'SC:· NF). 98. (!Riel Formed on 13 June 1946, USCIB originally col:l.&isted of representatives of the Armed Senieea, the Stat& Dllpsrtment, the CIA, and the FBI. National Security Council lntelligence Directive (NSCID) Nwnber 9, i81.1ued on 1 July 1948, became USCIB'11 charter. It design&.ted the Board aa the Cou.ncil'a agent to coordinate and provide policy guidance for U.S. Comint activities. When NSClD 9 We.8 revised in 1952, USClB's membemltip waa es:panded ta i11elude the Director of the newly eatablished NSA, the DCl (as Chairman), the FBI, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the .CIA, and the Departmente of State and Defellll8. In 1955 USCIB also bees.me the national policy body for Electronic Intelligence !Elint). ~orge F. Howe, The Norroliue Hitltory of AFSAINSA, Part l, pp. 24-29; Part II, pp. 239,240,253,254, NSA Historical Collection, V.A.1 a:8C•NFJ. 99. (Ul Moaap from DIRNSA to SUSLO, London, 20 April 1956, Accession NUmber A62-144, Box Nwnber 43949, Retired Records, NSA('l?SCl. 100. (U) Mei;sage fromSUSLO, London, to DIRNSA, 16 April 1956, Accesaion Number A62-l44, Box Nu,nber 43949, Retired Records, NSA ('l'SC). 101. (U) Meuage from Commander, 6901 Special Communications Group, to SUSLO, London, 21 AprjJ 1956, Acceesion Number A62-l 44, Box Number 43949, Retired Recorde, NSA t'J:SCl. 102. (Ul Message from Chief, NSA Europe, to SUSLO. GCHQ, 2 May 1956, Acce.SBion Number A62·144, flo:c Number 43949,Retired &cords, NSA 11:SCl.

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103. (U) Manage from OIRNSA to SUSLO, London, 9 April 1956, Accession Number A62-144., Box Nwnber 43949, Ret..irl!d Records, NSA !!I/SCI. 104. <U) Message from Director, GCHQ, to DISU'SLO, 2 May 1956, Accession Nwnber A62-144. Box Nwnber 43949, Bet.ired Records, NSA ('ffiC).

105. tU) MeHage from SUSLO, London, to DIRNSA, 12 April 1956, Accession Number A62-144, Bo:t Nwnbet 439~9. Retired Records, NSA (T,8tl. 106.eCCO) NSA-GCHQ Middle East Comint Planning Discussions, 14 May 1956, p. 1, Acces6ion Nwnber A62-144,Box Number43949,Retired Records,NSA~). 107. fG'-CCO) NSA-GCHQ Middle East Comint Planning Discussions. p. 2 CPSC). 108. (6,CCO) NSA-GC!-£Q Middle East Com int Planning Discw.sions, Anner 2 <;t8C), 109.iU) LettedromSUSLO. London, to Colonel W, B. Rowett, MIS Office, 28 May 1956, Accession Number A62· 144,801 Number 43949, Retired Records, NSA i'RK:->. ll0.{U) Me,isa.ge from NSA to SUSLO, London, 25 April 1956, Accession Nwnber A62-144, Bo~ Number 4.3949, Retired Records, NSA (~). 111. (U) W. H. Jester. LCDR, USN, DCS, "Tralllifet of Operations of USF-61t 26 November i956, p. 1. Box Number 43613,St.ored Records, NSA p:BCl. 112. {Ul Mcs;;agc from DIRNSA to SUSLO, London. 8 June 1956, Accession Number A62-144. Box Number 43949, Retired Records, NSA aBC). 118. {UJ Message from· USF-61 to DIRNSA, 6 October 1956, Accession Number A.62-144, Box NWnber 43949, Retired Records, NSA ('.Rie).

I 14. (U} Jester, ~Tral!llferofO'perationst p.3cr8CJ. 115. CU) Messag<1 from GCHQ to SUKLO. Washington, 27 August 1956, Accessioo Number A62-144, Box Number 43949, Retired Record!!, NSA l!P&:l. Emphasis added. 116. (U) Memorandum from GCHQ to SUKLO, Wuhington, 29 August 1956, Accession Number ASS-062. Box Number 43613, Retired Re<:ords, NSA{:JlBC). 117. !U) Message from SUKLO, WashingtOn, to GCHQ, 27 August 1956, Accession Number ASS-062, Box Number 43613, Retired Records, NSA tl8Cl. SUKLO put the le.st phrase in quotes. 118. (U) Message from Deputy Director LCSA transmitted by SUSLO, London, to DIRNSA, 23 August 1956, Accession Number A62-l 44, Box Number 43949, Retired Records, NSA ~l. 119. (Ul Personal message from Deputy Director, LCSA, to DIRNSA, routed by SUSLO, London, 23 August 1956, Third Party (Comint/Comsee)French,Accession Number A62-144, Box Number 43949, Retired Records, NSA !.:F8C>. 120. (Ul David _Kahn, The Codebrealters !New York: Macmillan, 19671, p. 729. 121. {Ul Panie interview (J:SC-NFJ. 122. (U) Pattie interview<:J'SC-NF). 123.HJ) Patt.ie1nterviewC!P.'!C-NFI. 124. iU) OPSUM Number 178-56 <:fflC). 125. IUJ Pattie interview t\PSC•NFl. 126. (U) Message from SUSLO, London, to DlRNSA, 5 November 1956, AeceS&ion Number A62-144, Box Number 43949,Retired Records, NSA-!1fSCl. 127. (IJ) Interview John J. Keenan, by .. , -----,LJanuary 1986, NSA CE5C). 128. (U) Pattie interview a:ac-NF). 129. tU) Message from DtRNSA to SUSLO,London, 5 November 1956,Accession Number A62-l44, Box Number 43949, Retired Records, NSA ('tBC).

130. (Ul NSA Circular 53-2 (Revised), October 1953, p. 3, Accession Number 10938-39, Location CBRI 72-73 ,llPSC). 131. <Ul NSA Circular 53-2 !Revised), Appendix A, C.:l'Bel. 132. (.G<CCO) GENS was responsible for exploit.able Soviet and Soviet..bloe targets. 133 . ..e--CCO! "Executive Agent's Critique of Yankee Alert, 30 October to 20 November 1956," p. 5, Crisis Files, Box Number 6. NSA,hereafter referred to u "Crit.ique• <TSC-NFl. 134. !Ul "Critique," p. 8 aac-NFJ. 135.tU) "Critique." pp.11-12{~-NFl. 136. (Ul "Critique," Appendix 1, p. 6 (l'-BC-NF). 137. (Ul •Critique,"pp. 6-7 !:r.6e-NF1. 138.(Ul OPSUM i41183-56,Supplement,;i:8C-NF). 139.(U) "Critique,"pp.13-15asC'-N'Fl. 140. !U) "Critique," p. 10 ('ff;S.Nf>. 141. (Ul "Critique," p. 13,a:ac.NF).

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