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ABSTRACTS 263

Designing the Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula: Problems and Prospects

Tae-Hwan Kwak

With the emergence of a new world order in the post-Cold War era, the four major powers’ relations with the two Koreas are rapidly changing. The rapidly changing political-security environment in Northeast Asia will eventually lead to cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the four powers, creating essential conditions for a peace system in Northeast Asia.

The Cold War on the Korean peninsula is still continuing, although positive developments in inter-Korean relations are encouraging. The two Koreas entered the United Nations in September 1991 and signed an accord on reconciliation, non-aggression, and exchanges and cooperation in December 1991. Since North Korea reluctantly promised to abandon a nuclear arms development program, the North agreed to sign the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency for inspections of its nuclear facilities. They also agreed to sign the joint declaration for a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, positively contributing to the realization of a nuclear-free Korea.

This paper has four main purposes: (1) to examine the nuclear capability and intentions of North Korea and their effects on security and peace on the Korean peninsula, (2) to discuss the four major powers’ nuclear security policy on the Korean peninsula in the context of newly changing international security environment in the 199Os, (3) to analyze the South’s proposal for a nuclear-free Korea and the North Korean nuclear-free-zone proposal, and (4) to make policy recommendations with special reference to the realization of a non-nuclear Korea.

264 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS

In this paper the author makes two specific arguments: (1) the North Korean nuclear development program should be abandoned because it could endanger both peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia and (2) both the US and ROK governments need to reconsider the US nuclear umbrella protection over South Korea since Pyongyang’s military threat to the security of South Korea has diminished in the newly changing Northeast Asian security environment.

It is essential for both Koreas to cooperate for the realization of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula. In the long term, the United States, China, and Russia need to consider a guarantee that they will not use their nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. The author proposes that South and North Korea, first, sincerely implement the provisions of “the Joint Declaration for Denucleariza- tion of the Korean Peninsula” on the basis of mutual concessions and compromise as shown in their negotiations over the non-aggression, cooperation and exchanges, and nuclear issues.

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Designing the Non-N uclear Korean Peninsula: Problems and Prospects

Tae-Hwan Kwak

The international system of the 1990s is undergoing rapid changes with the end of the Cold War system. The collapse of the Soviet Union and socialist states in Eastern Europe, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and the diminishing Soviet threat led to a new era in American- Soviet relations and had a profound effect on the changing politico- security environment in the Northeast Asian region.

With the emergence of a new world order in the post-Cold War era, the four powers’ (the US, Soviet Union, Japan, and China) relations with the two Koreas are rapidly changing. In 1990, the Republic of Korea established its diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and South Korea and China will expect to normalize their diplomatic relations soon. Japan-North Korea normalization negotiations are in progress, and North Korea-US talks have been in progress in Beijing for many years. The rapidly changing political security environment in Northeast Asia will eventually lead to cross recognition of the two Koreas by the four powers, and promotion of favorable conditions for a peace system in Northeast Asia.

Despite revolutionary changes in the international security environment, the Cold War or;: the Korean peninsula still continues. Although South and North Korea made positive developments in their relations, including their admissions to the United Nations in September 1991, and signed an “agreement on reconciliation, non- aggression, and exchanges and cooperation” at the fifth inter-Korean Prime Ministers’ talks. Despite North Korea’s signing of its safe-


guards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on January 30, 1992, and despite the effectuation of the Joint Declaration for Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, there is no clear evidence that North Korea has abandoned a nuclear arms development program, thus posing a grave threat to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

The changing international security environment today favors the establishment of a durable peace system on the peninsula closely linked to security and peace in Northeast Asia. Unfortunately, the issue of North Korean nuclear development is an obstacle to peace process on the peninsula, and it needs to be solved. The removal of the US tactical nuclear weapons allegedly stationed in South Korea is now completed in the context of institutionalizing a peace regime on the peninsula, and the North signed the safeguards agreement with the IAEA for international inspections of its nuclear facilities. President Bush’s decision to remove tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea, President Roh’s November 8, 1991, nuclear- free Korea policy, and President Roh’s December 18, 1991, announcement of no nuclear weapons in South Korea will positively contribute to the realization of a nuclear-free Korea.

This paper has four main purposes: (1) to examine the nuclear capability and intentions of North Korea and their effects on security and peace on the Korean peninsula; (2) to discuss the four major powers’ nuclear security policy for the peninsula in the context of newly changing international security environment in the 1 990s; (3) to analyze the South’s proposal for a nuclear-free Korea and the North Korean nuclear-free-zone proposal; and (4) to make policy recommendations with special reference to the nuclear issue in Korea.

In this paper the author makes two specific arguments: (1) North Korea’s nuclear development program, which could endanger both peace and security on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia should be abandoned; and (2) both the US and ROK governments need to reconsider the US nuclear umbrella protection over South Korea sincerely to realize the Korean denuclearization accord since Pyongyang’s military threat to South Korea has diminished in the new Northeast Asian security environment.

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North Korea’s Nuclear Arms Development Program

North Korean nuclear weapons development is a hot issue. Par- ticularly, the US and the South Korean governments are deeply concerned about North Korea’s nuclear spent-fuel recycling capability and would like to see them destroyed. South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong Koo even said his country might be forced to mount a commando raid against the North’s nuclear installation.‘ Pyongyang is repeatedly denying its existence and has refused to allow the IAEA to inspect its facilities. The North Korean nuclear program came under the jurisdiction of the IAEA on July 16, 1991, when the North signified its readiness to sign the safeguards accord.’ During past IAEA meetings the South Korean government, in cooperation with other IAEA members including Australia, the United States, and Japan, has pushed for adoption of a resolution calling for North Korea to accept international inspection of its nuclear facilities. Since Pyongyang signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985,3 it has not signed the safeguards accord, and the North insists that it would accept IAEA inspection only if the United States declares it will not use nuclear weapons against North Korea. It has also requested that South Korea and the US be open to the international inspection of the nuclear weapons sites and facilities in the South with the simultaneous international inspection of nuclear facilities in North K ~ r e a . ~

The New York Times, April 16, 1991.

IAEA was founded in 1957 as an autonomous agency within the United Nations system and entrusted with the dual task of promoting and safeguarding the world’s nuclear program. Soon the IAEA installed Safeguard, a subdivision of IAEA, and started its first inspection in 1962. For further details about IAEA, see Jon Jennekens, “IAEA Safeguards: What They Are and What They Do,” Disarmament, Vol. XIII, No. 3, 1990, pp. 89-98.

Following China’s exploding of its nuclear weapons in 1964, the US and its associate countries began to worry about nuclear proliferation throughout the world. Hence, the NPT, after several years of negotiation, was finally adopted in 1970. Since that time, great force was given to IAEA’s safeguard and by that a peaceful means of nuclear trade monitored. For more information, see ibid.

Newsweek, April 29, 1991.


The US, South Korea, Japan, and other UN members believe that North Korea is embarking on production of nuclear weapons, although North Korea insists that it has neither intention nor capability to develop them. Is North Korea really developing its own nuclear arms program? Does North Korea really have the capability to develop nuclear weapons? Why, then, does North Korea say offic- ially it has neither the intention nor capability? Some experts on the nuclear development issue in North Korea argued that the reason for Pyongyang’s refusal to sign the safeguards accord is that North Korea has tried to use the nuclear safeguards accord issue as a political bargaining chip, and the North believed that their own acquisition of nuclear weapons could bring a stable, credible deterrence against US nuclear weapon^.^

The issue of North Korean nuclear development project has attracted world attention since the mid-1980s and the news media have covered it widely. Jane’s Defence Week/y reports that North Korea has a large 50-1 00 megawatt gas-graphite reactor fueled with natural uranium, claiming that within five years North Korea could build a nuclear weapon system.6 The photos taken of North Korean nuclear facilities by US satellite K-11 and the French SPOT at an

5 Young Sun Song, “Bukhan ui Haekanjeonjochi Michekyul kwa Haekneungryuk [North Korea’s Non-signatory of the Safeguards Accord and Nuclear Capability], Korea and World Politics, Vol. 7 No. 1, p. 137. Leonard Spector also argued the same regarding North Korea’s refusal to of sign the safeguards accord. See Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, “North Korea: The Next Nuclear Nightmare?” Arms Control Today (March 1991), p. 9. For the best analysis of North Korea’s nuclear development capability, see research reports by scholars of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, Byung Wan Chun and Min Seok Kim, “Bukhan ui Haek Mugi Kaebal Nungruk mit Junmang” [North Korea’s Nuclear Development Capability and Prospects] Kukbang Ronjib [Defense Review], No. 13 (Spring 1991), pp. 190-209; Taewoo Kim, “Haek ui Saege wa Handbando Bihaek Wha ui Huh wa Sil,” [Nuclear World and Fantasy and Reality of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula], Tong II Munje Yunku [Korea Journal of Unification Affairs], Vol. 3, No. 3 (Fall 1991), pp. 187-223; Min Seok Kim, Taewoo Kim, Byung Wan Chun, “Bukhan ui Haek Mugi Kaebal Silsang Kwa Juh ui” [The Reality and intentions of North Korea’s Nuclear Development], Tong I I Munje Yunku, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Winter 1991), pp. 130-63.

6 Jin Ku Park, “Bukhan ui Haekmuki Kaebalsiltae wa Haekmuki Kaebal Kanungsung,” [The Present Status of North Korea’s Nuclear Development and Its Possibilities], Kukjernunje [International Problems], September 1990, pp.19-20.

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altitude of 832 km showed Pyongyang’s nuclear development project. Spector argues that, rather than serving any industrial purpose, the reactor’s design appears to be the most promising example of a plutonium producer for an “aspiring nuclear-have c~untry. ’ ’~

Some analysts have argued that Pyongyang’s nuclear facilities pictured by Western satellites could be dummies-for several reasons: (1) the North Korean government has been demanding a nuclear-free zone in Korea; (2) North Korea cannot afford to spend huge money on a nuclear development program. They could use dummy nuclear facilities as political leverage in negotiations with Japan and the US.

Since North Korea’s nuclear development program has not been fully exposed and its society has not been open to the world, it is impossible to know whether Pyongyang is really making a nuclear bomb. North Korea looks as though it is using the safeguards accord as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with the US, Japan and South Korea to achieve its goals of surviving as a regime and improving relations with them.

North Korea’s Nuclear Capability

North Korea reportedly started its nuclear development project during the Soviet military occupation in the late 1940s. The North explored its nuclear development program in 1947 with Soviet technical cooperation.* During the Korean War, North Koreans per- ceived the US nuclear threats to be real. Joseph Bermudez argued that an American intention to use its nuclear weapons to end the war might have motivated the North Korean leaders to embark on their own nuclear weapons program.’

7 Spector, p. 9; Spector also said that North Korea’s 30 megawatt unit is larger that civilian research program because most of developing countries have only 1 to 5 megawatt range.

8 Park, p. 21.

9 Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Programme,” Jane’s Intelli- gence Review, September 1991, p. 405. Spector also stated in his article that Pyongyang’s perceptions of the US-Korean nuclear threat intensified after the war; the US government adopted the doctrine of massive retaliation which entailed a preparation of using nuclear weapons to resolve regional conflict.


In 1955 North Korean scholars took part in an East European scientific conference, and in 1956 Pyongyang signed a nuclear research agreement with the Soviet Union. A few North Korean nuclear physicists went to Moscow to learn the technology, and in 1959 the nuclear program became a North Korean national project.”

In 1961, North Korea launched its major nuclear development program at Yongbyon, some 94 kilometers southeast of Pyongyang. In 1965 they built an experimental 2 to 4 megawatt research reactor at Yongbyon,” and joined the IAEA in 1974. This reactor began operation in 1967. Since then, radioactive isotopes for medicine and industry, and scientific field have been made and used.12

Pyongyang signed the NPT in December 1985 due to pressure from both the Soviet Union and the United States. By so doing, the North is obliged not to build or acquire any nuclear weapons. Despite the signature of the NPT in 1985, Pyongyang was still unwilling to accept the IAEA inspection of its nuclear facilities. Any state signing the NPT should also sign the safeguards accord with the IAEA within 18 months, but Pyongyang has refused.

Why then did North Korea sign the NPT in 1985? First, it seemed that they might have not expected a rapid modernization of South Korea, and second, the North might have tried to maneuver a secret nuclear development project without being suspected by the international c~mmunity.’~

Until 1990, the North developed its nuclear program with Soviet help. But Pyongyang wanted to preserve its nuclear program on its own without Soviet assistance. North Korea accelerated the program on its own in 1990, when the Soviet Union and South Korea normalized their diplomatic relations. Pyongyang told Moscow that if

When Arthur W. Radford, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited Seoul in 1955, an explication of using nuclear weapons to deter Northern aggression was made. For more details, see Spector, p. 9.

10 Bermudez, ibid.

11 /bid., p. 406. The Arms Control Reporter (1989), p. 457.

12 Bermudez, bid.

13 Song, p. 146.

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the Soviet Union normalized its diplomatic relations with the South, the North would develop its own nuclear ~ e a p 0 n s . l ~

The Soviet Union cut its material and technical support for the North’s nuclear reactor in 1990 and stopped supplying nuclear fuels in September 1990.” Unfortunately, North Korea has developed its nuclear facility with its own technology and without Soviet aid. The North reportedly has three nuclear reactors in operation and one under construction. The second and third reactors can produce a form of plutonium that can be used to make nuclear weapons. The second reactor, with 30 megawatt capacity, reportedly is modeled after the British Calder Hall Magnox reactor.I6 Taking 75 tons of natural uranium at a time, this reactor can produce plutonium after cooling the spent fuels produced by pera at ion.'^

As was the second, the third reactor was also developed with North Korean indigenous technology. With a 50-200 megawatt gen- erating capacity, a research center, housing complex, and nuclear detonation site, this reactor, according to one Japanese scientist’s analysis of US satellite photographs, can also produce plutonium.” It is reported that construction began on the third reactor in 1989 and it will probably be finished in 1992.”

Many experts argue that if North Korea builds a nuclear reprocessing plant, Pyongyang will be able to extract unused uranium and plutonium byproducts from spent nuclear fuels. It is doubtful, however, that North Korea has the economic ability to continue its nuclear weapons program. Nevertheless, if they have been developing nuclear weapons, what are their intentions? Let us analyze North Korea’s motivations to develop nuclear arms.

14 The Arms Control Reporter (1 989), p. 457.

15 Seoul Shinmun, July 11, 1991

16 Peter Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemma in Korea (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1991), p. 213.

17 Song, p. 146.

18 Ibid., p. 152. See also Bermudez, p. 408.

19 The Arms Control Reporter (1991), p. 457.


North Korea’s Nuclear Intentions

First of all, the decision is related to military and security consider- ations. President Kim II Sung might have thought that the possession of nuclear weapons could neutralize the US nuclear threat, and that a nuclear-armed North Korea could have strategic superiority over South Korea.“ The North might have signed the NPT to alleviate international suspicions, but, simultaneously continued to develop nuclear arms. From a psychological viewpoint, it is quite possible to see how the North Korean government may have felt an even greater threat from the US high-tech weapons demonstrated in the Persian Gulf War in 1991, and may have felt a strong need to develop nuclear arms to maintain a military balance with the South.

Second, North Korea’s nuclear weapons development may be related to their economic plight. Andrew Mack argues that nuclear weapons could offer a low-cost solution to their economic dilemma.*’

The third reason for developing nuclear arms can be found in a political context. North Korea has been trying to normalize its relations with Japan and the United States, and Pyongyang may have believed that the nuclear issue could be used as a bargaining chip. North Korea in its economic difficulties wanted to get financial aid from Japan in return for allowing international inspection of its nuclear facilities. Pyongyang’s growing distrust in the Soviet Union and China has given opportunities to look for new economic sup- porters such as Japan and the US.

In the meantime, some analysts are skeptical. Scholars who do not think the North is developing nuclear weapons provide the following arguments:

(1) If Pyongyang were building nuclear weapons, why would it not build them underground in order not to expose the development program to US satellites? (2) The North Korean government has no technological capability to produce nuclear weapons; Kim II Sung has been saying that North Korea has neither capability nor intention

20 Spector, p. 10.

21 Andrew Mack, “North Korea and the Bomb,” Foreign Policy, No. 83 (Summer 1991), p. 94.

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to produce them; (3) Why would North Korea have signed the NPT if Pyongyang wanted to produce nuclear weapons? (4) A Northern nuclear program would be contradictory to the nuclear-free zone policy that North Korea has been proposing over the years; (5) The North’s nuclear program is designed to be used as a political bargaining chip. The reprocessing plant could be a dummy facility designed to strengthen Pyongyang’s bargaining position; and (6) The North cannot win in nuclear competition with the South because Seoul has far greater nuclear potential than Pyongyang.”

The arguments of these two groups are in conflict. Is North Korea really developing nuclear arms? Only a few in Pyongyang can answer this question with certainty. Nevertheless, available information and evidence shows that North Korea does have the capacity. Based on our analysis of their program we can make the following tentative conclusions about the nuclear issue:

(1) A nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula is a North Korean

(2) Pyongyang signed the NPT due to Soviet pressure, not because it would abandon its program;

(3) Even though Pyongyang signed the safeguards accord with the IAEA, it may delay international inspection of its nuclear facilities;

(4) The North has been developing its program and does have the ability to produce nuclear weapons; and

(5 ) A nuclear-reprocessing facility in North Korea will be finished by the end of 1992 or sooner.

Unless their attempt is stopped, there is a strong possibility that North Korea will have nuclear weapons within two or three years. If this analysis is correct, their nuclear development will endanger the security of the Korean peninsula and of Northeast Asia. Seoul may also develop its own nuclear arsenal to match North Korea’s. Japan might follow suit. Thus, the North Korean nuclear development would destabilize the existing balance of power in Northeast Asia.

The four major powers surrounding the Korean peninsula-the US, the Soviet Union, Japan and China-do not want North Korea

policy;

22 /bid., pp. 92-93.


to have nuclear arms. North Korea has been trying to improve relations with Japan, the US and South Korea, for economic reasons and for its own survival, and its nuclear development program will definitely jeopardize these relationships. Chinese leaders told President Kim II .Sung in October 1991 that they wanted the North to sign the long-awaited safeguards agreement.

In search of a durable peace regime with a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula, we must reexamine how the four major powers’ nuclear policies toward the Korean peninsula have changed in the new Northeast Asian security environment.

Four Major Powers’ Nuclear Policies toward the Two Koreas

US Policy

The 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and South Korea has been a cornerstone of US-ROK security relations. The US firmly maintained a security commitment to South Korea by keeping its military forces with nuclear weapons on South Korean soil.

The United States perceives North Korea to have a nuclear development capability. It believes North Korea’s nuclear development program will be another obstacle to the peace process on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Since North Korea is the world’s seventh arms exporter, the US worries about the possibility that they may export their nuclear technology and arms along with conventional ammunition, missiles, tanks, and submarines to Third World countries.

In general, US nuclear policy toward the Korean peninsula is to keep either of the two Koreas from having a nuclear weapons program of its own. In the late 1970s when ROK President Park Chung Hee sought to acquire nuclear technologies, the US government bolstered its defensive commitment to the South.23

23 It is reported that the reason the Carter administration did not withdraw its ground forces from South Korea is closely related to South Korea’s abandonment of its nuclear weapons program in exchange for securing the US security commitment. For more details, see Kap-Je Cho, “Bukhan Haeksisul Pagiron”

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It is reported that a few hundred tactical nuclear weapons have been stationed in South Since both the US and South Korea have maintained an NCND (neither confirm nor deny) policy on the existence of nuclear weapons in Korea, it is impossible to verify the number of nuclear warheads in Korea. However, the Kunsan air base is known as the alleged storage site for about 60 tactical nuclear weapons in South

The US government has long believed that the presence of nuclear weapons in the South has provided deterrence against the Soviet or Chinese nuclear threats. The US nuclear policy goal is to ensure that neither of the two Koreas becomes a nuclear power. President Park had argued on several occasions that South Korea could and would produce its own nuclear weapons if it were necessary to keep the peace and survival of South Korea. Paradoxically, however, this strategy increases the incentives for North Korea to produce nuclear arms aimed at the South.26 In short, far from reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation in Korea, the strategy of

24

25

26

[Bombing of the North Korean Nuclear Facilities], Wolganchoson [Monthly Choson], March 1991, pp. 123-25. Peter Hayes nicely reexamined the US nuclear policy in Korea, and said that the US nuclear strategy in Korea originated in the conflict with North Korea and has also been used as a means to control South Korea. Whatever the effect on the North, he argued that the US kept nuclear weapons to reassure the South not to have its own. For details, see Hayes, pp. 199-207.

It is reported that the Kunsan Air Base is the US nuclear storage base in South Korea. Twenty-one Atomic Demolition Munition (ADMs) were stored in 1985 in South Korea, and also the US ships and submarines have carried Tomahawk sea-launched land-attack nuclear cruise missiles since 1984. For more details about the US nuclear weapons in South Korea, see Hayes, pp. 249-53, pp. 89-1 03. To the contrary, the North Korean government has been claiming there are more than 1,000 US nuclear weapons in South Korea. See The Pyongyang Times, August 3, 1991.

Tae-Hwan Kwak, “US Forces in Korea and Inter-Korean Arms Control Talks,” paper presented at the 87th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington Hilton and Towers, Washington, DC, August 29- September 1, 1991, p. 3.

Hayes, p. 203.


nuclear reassurance to South Korea accelerates nuclear arms race between the two Korea~. ’~

President Bush announced on September 27, 1991, that all US land- and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons and US artillery shells deployed in South Korea would be withdrawn. It was reported in November that air-delivered nuclear weapons deployed on F-16 aircraft would also be removed. This new US policy will provide favorable conditions for Pyongyang’s abandonment of its nuclear development program.“

Both Seoul and Washington have made it clear that a discussion about a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula is possible only after Pyongyang opens its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection, remov- ing international suspicion about their nuclear development program.

As demonstrated in the Gulf War in the spring of 1991, nuclear weapons are not necessarily always more useful than conventional weapons. In this context, the US decision to withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea will eventually promote favorable conditions for establishing a nuclear-free zone in Korea, thus firmly establishing a peace regime in Northeast Asia.

Soviet Policy

Since Mikhail Gorbachev became the top leader of the Soviet Union in 1985, the Soviet military threat in Northeast Asia has diminished. The Soviet Union is now trying to play a political role in Northeast Asia. It cut its huge military spending by readjusting to the changing international security environment.

The Soviet Union proposed arms control and a nuclear-free zone in the Northeast Asian region.” The Soviet Union cannot afford a

27

28

29

Ibid.

President Bush announced on September 27, 1991 that all US land- and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons and US artillery shells deployed in South Korea will be withdrawn. See contents of Bush’s announcement, The New York Times, September 27, 1991. It was reported later in November that air-delivered nuclear weapons deployed at F-16 aircraft will also be withdrawn from South Korea. The New York Times, November 9, 1991; The Washington Post, November 8, 1991.

Gorbachev proposed a nuclear-free zone in Northeast Asia in his Krasnoyarsk

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huge defense budget; it is also attempting to have the US diminish ifs role and reduce its naval presence in the region, which would increase its own influence. In this context, neither the Soviet Union nor the US wants North Korea to conduct nuclear development program.

Japanese and Chinese Policies

Japan is seeking a greater political-economic role in Northeast Asia in the 1990s. Japan under the US nuclear umbrella has risen as an economic superpower. Japan’s foreign policy in the Northeast Asian region is not to get involved in any conflict. Further, Japan wants stability and peace in Northeast Asia, without which Japanese trade and investment would be endangered. Japan has long adhered to three principles of non-nuclear policy, i.e., no manufacture, owner- ship, or transport of nuclear weapons. Therefore, Japan is not likely to accept nuclear acquisition on the part of North Korea. Japan has put diplomatic pressure on North Korea to sign the IAEA safeguards accord. If North Korea does acquire nuclear weapons, it will threaten Japanese security interests and thus Japan could itself go nuclear.

The basic goal of China is to achieve the four modernizations. China needs to maintain the stability of the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia. They have tried to promote relations with Japan, the Soviet Union, the US and South Korea in order to improve the economic situations in China, and Beijing has increased military cooperation with them. China, therefore, is now trying to put pressure on North Korea to abandon the nuclear weapons program to maintain a strategic stability in Northeast Asia. Although China pledged to provide economic assistance to Kim II Sung in late 1990, Beijing will continue improving its relation with South Korea. China will continue to put pressure on North Korea to sign the safeguards agreement with the IAEA. As discussed above, the four major powers continue to put steady pressure on Pyongyang to allow the international inspection of its nuclear facilities.

speech. For further details, see Pravda, “Krasnoyarsk Speech by Gorbachev,” September 18, 1988, Current Digest of Soviet Press, XL (38), p. 3.


Three basic questions should be raised here: (1) Is the US nuclear umbrella really essential to the security of South Korea? (2) If US troops with nuclear weapons are removed from the South, would North Korea abide by the safeguards agreement with the IAEA? and (3) Will South Korea be able to defend its own security after the removal of US nuclear weapons?

Many military experts express the opinion that US nuclear weapons in Korea are unnecessary for peace and stability on the peninsula. William Crowe, former chairman of US Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that “the actual presence of any nuclear weapons in South Korea is unnecessary to maintain a nuclear umbrella over the ROK. In fact, such a presence would likely become a political football in US-ROK relations over time. Thus, solutions should be found that would lead to the North’s accepting full-scope safeguards, the removal of any American nuclear weapons that might be stored in South Korea, and the establishment of relations between Washington and Py~ngyang.”~’

It seems that South Korea can maintain war-fighting capabilities with the support of US high-tech conventional weapons and a defensive system such as the Patriot anti-missile ~ys tem.~ ’ US

30 William J. Crowe, Jr. and Alan D. Romberg, “Rethinking Pacific Security,” Foreign Affairs (Spring 1991), pp. 132-34. William Taylor, vice president for international security programs at the US Center for Strategic and International Studies, also argued that the US nuclear weapons should be withdrawn for following seven reasons (1) the US nuclear weapons are unnecessary for deterring Soviet or Chinese aggression via North Korea; (2) the US has many alternative precision-guided systems for delivering nuclear weapons by strategic bombers, fighter-bombers, and air- or sea-launched cruise missiles; (3) US nuclear weapons, according to the North’s argument, is the major factor spurring Pyongyang to develop its own nuclear arsenal; (4) nuclear weapons serve as a barrier to North-South Korean mutual confidence building and arms control negotiations; (5) US nuclear weapons can bring anti-American senti- ment from the South Korean people; (6) even if weapons have stationed in Korea, they are too old to maintain; and (7) the nuclear weapons can be the target to terrorist seizure. For details, see Kyonghyang Shinmun, June 27, 1991; The Korea Herald, June 27, 1991. Robert Scalapino and Kyong Won Kim, former Korean Ambassador to the US, made a joint statement suggesting that the withdrawal of nuclear arms from South Korea is now necessary for inter-Korean relations. For details, see Joong-ang Ilbo, February 13, 1991, and Dong-A Ilbo, February 12, 1991.

31 Tae-Hwan Kwak argues in his article that South Korea enjoys qualitative military

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nuclear weapons in Korea have outlived their usefulness by perhaps endangering the survival of the Korean nation and the security of its neighbors, including the Russia, China and Japan.

Pyongyang’s Proposal for a Nuclear-free Zone in Korea and Seoul’s Proposal for Non-Nuclear Korea: A Comparison

The North Korean government has proposed a denuclearization plan on the Korean peninsula, and still maintains that if the US nuclear weapons are withdrawn and if the South no longer relies its security on the US nuclear umbrella, the North will allow international inspection of its nuclear facilities. But, the South Korean government was somewhat hesitant about a quick withdrawal of US nuclear arms from Korea because it might endanger peace and security on the Korean peninsula.

Recently, Pyongyang has been intensifying its campaign for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Pyongyang is probably impelled to make such gestures to upgrade its own image in international society. The North joined the United Nations with the South in September 1991. The North’s basic position on US troops and nuclear weapons in South Korea is that they should be withdrawn immediately. The North has repeatedly maintained that if US nuclear weapons in Korea are withdrawn, Pyongyang will sign the safeguards agreement to allow international inspection of its facilities. But the US and South Korea’s position is that the two issues should not be linked.32

The recent North Korean proposal for a nuclear-free peninsula was presented in July 1991. Its main points are: (1) The two Koreas shall agree on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula and make a joint declaration, (2) The United States, the Soviet Union and China shall legally guarantee the nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula, and (3) The non-nuclear

superiority over North Korea although the latter has more weaponry. For a good comparative analysis of North-South Korean military capabilities, see Tae-Hwan Kwak, “Military Capabilities of South and North Korea: A Comparative Study,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring-Summer, 1990), pp. 11 3-43.

32 The Korea Herald, July 31, 1991


weapon states in Asia shall support the conversion of the peninsula into a nuclear-free zone and respect its nuclear-free

At the fourth South-North Prime Ministers’ talks in Pyongyang in October 1991, North Korean Premier Yon Hyong Muk proposed a nine-article draft declaration that includes the following major provisions: (1) North and South Korea not test, manufacture, intro- duce, have or use nuclear arms, (2) North and South Korea prohibit the deployment of nuclear weapons in Korea and “the passage, landing or call of aircraft and warships which are or might be laden with nuclear weapons through or in its airspace or territorial waters,” (3) North and South Korea not accept offer of a “nuclear umbrella,” (4) North and South not conduct any war exercise, and (5) North and South Korea “discharge the duty of simultaneous nuclear inspection as required by international treaty.’’34

In response to the US decision to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from Korea, ROK President Roh made a “declaration of non-nuclear Korean peninsula peace initiatives” on November 8, 1991. He declared the following as government policy:

First, the Republic of Korea will use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes, and will not manufacture, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.

Second, the Republic of Korea will continue to submit to comprehensive international inspection all nuclear-related facilities and materials on its territory in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and with the nuclear safeguards agreement it has concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency under the treaty, and will not posses nuclear fuel reprocessing and enrichment facilities.

Third, the Republic of Korea aspires for a world of peace free of nuclear weapons as well as all weapons of indiscriminate killing; and we will actively participate in international efforts toward a total elimination of chemical-biological weapons and observe all international agreements there0n.3~

33 The Pyongyang Times, August 3, 1991.

34 The Pyongyang Times, October 26, 1991.

35 For full text of President Roh’s declaration, see Newsreview, November 16, 1991, p. 6.

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President Roh strongly stated that the ROK “will faithfully carry out this non-nuclear, no-chemical-biological weapons policy.”36 How- ever, the South Korean government would continue to be included under the US nuclear umbrella in the form of nuclear bombs off Korean soil or nuclear-tipped submarine-launched missiles, and the South would allow US nuclear-armed submarines within ROK territorial waters if necessary. However, the North Korean government maintains that since South Korea keeps a US nuclear umbrella, its nuclear-free zone plan on the Korean peninsula will probably not be achieved.

The DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 25, 1991, published a statement clarifying its stand on the question of signing the nuclear safeguards accord. North Korea clearly states that the North and the South “must not develop nuclear weapons, but must accept nuclear inspection simultaneously.” The DPRK government declares the following four points:

First, we will sign the Nuclear Safeguards Accord when the United States begins to withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea.

Secondly, inspection to verify whether US nuclear weapons are present in South Korea or not and inspection of our nuclear facilities shall be made simultaneously.

Thirdly, DPRK-US negotiations should be held to discuss simultaneous nuclear inspection and removal of nuclear danger to us.

Fourthly, since the North and the South expressed the same intention not to develop nuclear weapons and to denuclearize the Korean peninsula, they should hold North-South negotiations for its reali~ation.~~

These four points appear to be the basic principles on which North Korea will negotiate the North’s nuclear issue with the South and the United States.

At the fifth high-level meeting in Seoul, Premier Yon repeated his earlier proposal for a nuclear-free peninsula on December 1991.

36 Chosun Ilbo, November 9, 1991; and The New York Times, November 9, 1991.

37 For the full text of the statement, see The Pyongyang Times, November 30, 1991 ; and Rodong Shinmun, November 26, 1991.


Prime Minister Chung Won-Shik made a draft proposal for “Joint Declaration for a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula,” in which he reiterated President Roh’s November 8, 1991, proposal. Some important points of the ROK proposal include: (1) both sides will use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes and do will not manufacture, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons, (2) neither side will possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities, (3) both sides will actively participate in international efforts for total elimination of chemical and biological weapons; (4) separately from IAEA inspection of their nuclear facilities and materials, both sides will implement inspections of any military or civilian facility, material or site in the South or the North in order to confirm compliance with the above items3*

North and South Korea signed an “Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges and. Cooperation between the South and the North” on December 13, 1991. The two prime ministers signed the five-page accord, the most important agreement between the two since the division of Korea in 1945. This agreement indeed represents a historic milestone and opens a new era in inter-Korean relations. Both prime ministers met on February 19, 1992, in Pyongyang to exchange formally the historic accord, and it came into force on that day.

The December 13, South-North Korean accord includes provisions for avoiding an outbreak of hostilities, renouncing all acts of terrorism or any efforts to overthrow the government of the other, and re- establishing some measure of regular communication between the two, including telephone lines, mail, some economic exchanges and the reunion of separated families, and rebuilding railway and road links across the heavily-guarded demilitarized zone. Both sides also agreed that the armistice agreement signed in 1953 with the United Nations forces would remain in effect until it can be trans- formed into a formal peace treaty. It is significant that the two sides also agreed to work toward replacing the current armistice with a formal peace treaty between the two. North Korea made a significant concession on this issue.

38 Chosun Ilbo, December 12, 1991; and The Korea Herald, December 12, 1991.

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Although they failed to deal with the North’s nuclear arms development issue, including the safeguards agreement and international inspections of nuclear facilities and sites on both sides, they did issue a statement recognizing that there should be no nuclear weapons on the Korean ~eninsula.~’

President Roh Tae Woo on December 18, 1991, announced that all US nuclear weapons in South Korea have been removed. “As I speak, there do not exist any nuclear weapons whatsoever, anywhere in the Republic of Korea,” President Roh said in a televised address. “There is no reason or excuse for North Korea to develop nuclear weapons or refuse nuclear in~pection.”~’ Roh’s declaration confirmed that the US had removed its nuclear weapons from the South. It gave South Korea strong leverage in its campaign to force North Korea to renounce its nuclear arms development. Roh’s declaration satisfied one of North Korea’s conditions for allowing international inspections of its nuclear research complex, thereby putting additional pressure on North Korea to sign the safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

The South Korean government did not rule out the possibility that it would still resume annual joint ROK-US military exercises, Team Spirit, next year if North Korea did not allow international inspection of its nuclear program despite the historic signing of the South-North non-aggression agreement. The accord, however, did not deal directly with North Korea’s nuclear program.

North Korea’s first official response to President Roh’s declaration on the absence of nuclear weapons in South Korea was favorable in the December 22, 1991, Foreign Ministry statement. The North welcomed Roh’s declaration. However, it stated that the North would sign a nuclear safeguards accord under the NPT, thus opening the way for international inspection, but only if the US confirmed it had removed its nuclear weapons from the South. The statement again clarified the issue of mutual inspections by saying that “We reclarify

39 For further details, see Chosun Ilbo, December 13, 1991; and The New York Times, December 13, 1991.

40 The Wall Street Journal, December 19, 1991; and The New York Times, December 19, 1991.


our stand that when our country is inspected under the Nuclear Safeguards Accord, an inspection should be made simultaneously to verify and confirm the absence of the US nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea-as we have already called for, and the South Korean side, too, resp~nded.”~’

South and North delegates met together to discuss the nuclear issue on December 26, 28, and 31, 1991. Each side made several of major concessions at the three-day talks. On December 26, the North put forward a draft declaration containing a key clause stating that it has no nuclear reprocessing facilities and pledging that it will not own facilities for nuclear spent-fuel reprocessing or uranium enrichment. The North denied that it was developing nuclear weapons. Inspections of nuclear facilities and sites are the single most important issue. The North proposed that North and South should jointly verify that all US nuclear weapons had been removed from South Korea before inspections, but dropped its demand that the US itself confirm the absence of nuclear weapons in the South. The South proposed that the North sign the safeguards agreement with the IAEA by January 1992, but the North rejected this. It said the signing was strictly a matter between North Korea and the IAEA and no other nation could set a deadline. The North told the South that it had begun the process of signing the safeguards accord, paving the way for international inspections, and promised to sign it “at an early date.” Finally, the North did sign the agreement on January 30, 1992.

Pyongyang also made a concession on the nuclear protection issue, and did not insist that the South abandon altogether the protection of the US nuclear umbrella. Both sides had major differen- ces over inspections of military bases. The North proposed that it be allowed into the South to verify the absence of nuclear weapons. The South, on the other hand, proposed reciprocal arrangements, where the North could check military bases in the South, including US bases, while the South could check military bases and nuclear installations in the North. The inspection issue remained unresolved.

41 Rodong Shinmun, December 23, 1991; and The Pyongyang Times, December 28. 1991.

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On December 31, 1991, without completely settling the issue of international inspection of nuclear facilities, North and South Korea initialed a joint declaration banning nuclear arms from the Korean peninsula. Both sides initialed a document titled “Joint Declaration for Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The major features of the declaration include: (1) The South and the North “will not test manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons,” (2) The South and the North will use their nuclear energy programs solely for peaceful purposes, (3) The South and the North “will not possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment,” (4) “In order to verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the South and the North will conduct inspections of objects chosen by the other side and agreed to by both parties,” (5) These inspections will follow procedures determined by the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission, which will be formed within one month of the declaration’s effective date. The declaration did become effective on February 19, 1992, during the sixth round of the Prime Ministers’ talks.4z

The declaration certainly will pave a smooth way for peaceful Korean reunification if both sides will observe it in good faith. However, it contains no enforcement measures to ensure compliance.

The South Korean government announced on January 7, 1992, that the 1992 Team Spirit US-South Korean military exercises would be canceled this year since North Korea agreed to sign the nuclear safeguards agreement. It remains to be seen how faithfully each Korea will implement the December 13, 1991, South-North Korean agreement and the December 31, 1991, non-nuclear Korean peninsula declaration.

The North Korean nuclear issue is of worldwide concern because North Korean nuclear development would destabilize the security of the entire Asia-Pacific region. What if North Korea had refused to sign the safeguards agreement? What should the US and South

42 For further details, Chosun Ilbo, Joong-ang Ilbo, and Hankook Ilbo, December 26, 28 and 31,1991 and January 1,1992; The Washington Post; and The New York Times, December 27, 1991 and January 1, 1992.


Korean governments have done to halt the North’s nuclear program? They might have:

(1) Reviewed and changed the planned reduction of US forces in Korea. The US should complete the first phase of its troop reduction by 1992. The second phase of US troop reduction plan should be carefully used as a bargaining chip in dealing with the North, depending on improved developments in inter-Korean relations.

(2) Brought the issue before the UN Security Council for further discussion and actions. The Security Council could pass a resolution taking economic sanctions and maybe low-level military action against North Korea.

These two options could have been seriously considered by the US and South Korea. If these options had been taken, North Korea would have been completely isolated from the international community, a development they do not want.

What options did North Korea have? (1) Continue to refuse to sign the safeguards agreement. (2) Sign the agreement and eventually abandon nuclear

spent-fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.

If they had taken the first option, they would have faced a series of crises that could have escalated into a high-level conflict between the North and the South and the US. Then, which option should North Korea choose? It is reasonable to assume the North had no choice but eventually to sign the safeguards agreement and to abandon its program soon because of mounting international pressure, favorable developments in inter-Korean relations, and unforesee- able consequences of continued development.

Conclusion

What should and could be done to achieve a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula? Needless to say, it is essential for both Koreas to cooperate for the realization of the denuclearization of the peninsula. A nuclear-free zone in Korea could be realized first with the abandonment of the North’s nuclear weapons development program including nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment

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facilities. At the same time, South Korea also needs to forsake the US nuclear umbrella and must eventually agree on the principle of non-transport of nuclear weapons into ports and air bases in South Korea.

It is argued in this paper that the North’s nuclear weapons development will not only accelerate nuclear arms race between the two Koreas, but destabilize security and peace in Northeast Asia. Therefore, it would be in the best interest of North Korea to sign the safeguards agreement and abandon its nuclear development program.

The US should play an important role in the denuclearization process in cooperation with Russia, China, and Japan to induce North Korea to implement in good faith the safeguards agreement with the IAEA. To lay a basic framework for a nuclear-free zone on the peninsula, the South Korean government should also cooperate with the United States. The US and South Korea should take advantage of the newly emerging international security environment to improve their relations with North Korea.

In the long term, the United States, China, and Russia need to consider a guarantee that they will not use their nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. The Korean nuclear dilemma can be solved peacefully by Koreans themselves in cooperation with the four major powers concerned with the Korean problem.

To realize a nuclear-free peninsula, the author proposes that South and North Korea, first, sincerely implement the provisions of “the Joint Declaration for Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” on the basis of mutual concessions and compromise as shown in their negotiations over the non-aggression, cooperation and exchanges, and nuclear issues.

North Korea must realize that the international community will not tolerate its nuclear arms development program, as we witnessed in the case of Iraq, and that it would be in its best interest to forsake its nuclear development program and carry out in good faith the joint declaration for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

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