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Justin Vacula

Determinism and Fatalism: Threats to Free Will [v2]

CONTENTS

Introduction................................................................................................................................................2

Determinism...........................................................................................................................................2-5

Considering Objections to Determinism................................................................................................5-8

Fatalism.................................................................................................................................................8-11

Considering Objections to Fatalism....................................................................................................11-13

Works Cited..............................................................................................................................................14

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Introduction

The notion that we have free will is often taken for granted and assumed to be a basic belief;

many feel that their actions are 'up to them' and because of this, they assume that they have free will.

Although free will seems to be the case, we must be concerned about what actually is the case. While

many of our intuitions seem to be accurate and can often be correct, many of our intuitions are wrong1.

While thinking that free will is an illusion may be quite troubling, false, and counter-intuitive, we must

be careful to separate our emotions from our beliefs in order to arrive at the truth2. I will argue that the

philosophical ideas of determinism and fatalism pose significant threats to the idea of human freedom

and should force us to relinquish the idea of free will. I will also consider objections levied against my

arguments and also discuss alternative definitions of free will.

Determinism

Richard Taylor, in his book Metaphysics, discusses philosophical threats to free will in his

chapter “Freedom and Determinism.” He writes that ideas about indeterminateness lie only in our

ideas, but the world shares none of this. The laws of physics and causal factors determine how much of

the world is; the wind has a certain force and direction, the temperature and salinity of the sea is

perfectly determinate, and grains in a field of wheat present determinate colors. He notes that humans,

too, at any given point in their lives, are “perfectly determinate to the minutest cells” of their bodies

and that brain states are also determinate (Taylor 35-36) . The world is the way that it is, Taylor writes,

because the world, the moment before, was precisely what it then was. Given exactly

what went before, the world, it seems, could now be none other than it is. And what it

was a moment before, in all its larger and minuter parts, was the consequence of what

had gone on just before then, and so on, back to the very beginning of the world, if it

had a beginning, or through an infinite past time, in case it had not (36).

1 Just because one or most of our intuitions are right does not entail that all of them are. 2

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Considering the determinate nature of the world, and we who are “made of star stuff,” free will seems

to be greatly threatened.

In the case of everything that exists, Taylor writes, there are antecedent conditions, whether we

know them or not, that make the world and all events that occur in the world determinate; things simply

can not be other than what they are. This sentiment, that things simply can not be other than what they

are, is the exact notion of determinism which, if were true, would mean that we have no free will. This

means, Taylor writes, “...[T]hat everything, including every cause, is the effect of some cause or causes;

or that everything is not only determinate, but causally determined” (36). Perhaps envisioning some

objections, or stating the non-so-obvious, Taylor notes that determinism makes no exceptions for time

whether we consider the past or the future and would be true for all things that would exist, have

existed, or do exist (36). If a cause is determinate, its effects simply cannot fail to follow (37).

Deliberation then, when one thinks about determinism, is quite an interesting concept, although

when we examine the concept of deliberation, we find many limitations even if we have free will. The

idea, Taylor notes, that we deliberate and believe that we are in control of what we do can be a mere

illusion. Taylor notes that deliberation, whether considered as an activity or experience, can not be

described or defined without the use of metaphors such as 'weighing this,' “but such descriptions do not

convey to us what deliberation is unless we already know” (39). We make presuppositions, Taylor

writes, whether we actually think of them or not and “assume that certain things are true, certain things

which are such that, if [we] thought they were not true, it would be impossible … to deliberate at all”

(39). We can only deliberate about our own actions and never the actions of others, Taylor notes. We

can try to predict others' actions, but we certainly can not deliberate about others' actions in the sense

that we deliberate about our own actions. When we try to predict others' actions, it is not always the

case that they are deliberating and our thoughts are certainly not affecting their actions (39).

We can only deliberate about future actions; never the past or present. Matters in the past have

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already occurred and may have been forgotten. We may deliberate about we could have happened, but

cannot change the course of those actions. If we deliberate about what we want to do at this moment,

we are already deliberating about the future. Should I do this? Will I do that? It is a matter of fact about

what is happening in the present, but what we want to do or what we want to remain doing concerns the

future. We also cannot deliberate what we shall do if we already know what is going to happen or

already know what were are doing, lest we arrive at contradictions. Taylor writes, “If we were to say,

for example, “I know that I am going to get married tomorrow and in the meantime I am going to

deliberate about whether to get married,” I would contradict myself” (40). If we have very good reason

to assume that something is going to happen, there is no longer room for deliberation; the event may

simply happen and we have no reason to believe otherwise or deliberate if our threshold of confidence

is very high.

There is no room for deliberation about what we are going to do unless we believe that 'it is up

to us' and we are not under the control of another person or at the mercy of circumstances outside of

our control; if we believe we have no control, we can only wait and see what happens and cannot

deliberate even though we can envision potential outcomes, Taylor writes. If people worked at a job

with random scheduling, they cannot rightly deliberate about what they shall do because they are under

the mercy of those who create the schedule and can only wait to see what shall happen. A woman who

is about to give birth, Taylor notes, cannot deliberate about whether she will have a boy or a girl

because she has no control over the events; no matter what she believes, the outcome will not be

effected by her beliefs (40).

If we are to deliberate about what we shall do, Taylor writes, we must believe that the action is

'up to us.' This concept, Taylor notes, is difficult to fully explain, but it can be described and we can

understand what it does not mean. We can believe that our fingers, for example, can move left and right

and that each of these motions are possible if nothing constrains our actions, but what we see about the

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world, such as leaves, it is not 'up to us' whether they fall or not. If our finger-moving is 'up to us,' this

must mean that we can decide and cause the action rather than someone or something else causing the

action; if a person or machine moves our fingers, this was clearly not something that we had control

over. We can not make certain motions with our fingers, so all finger-movement is not 'up to us.' Belief

about what it 'up to us' cannot be that which is logically impossible; we can move our finger in one way

or another, but we cannot move it in simultaneous ways at one time (40-42). Deliberation, though, may

not redeem free will because if the causes of our behavior and deliberation are necessitated by other

causes, we're merely thinking about what will happen in spite of the inevitability of the future3. What

about other objections to determinism? Can people object to determinism by arguing that actions could

have been different, were not logically necessitated, or argue for a minimal amount of freedom?

Countering Objections to Determinism

Those who object to determinism cannot object on the grounds of attacking that which is or is

not logically necessary, for they will have to find objections through other routes. Causal connections

need not have logical necessity. The assertion of determinism, Taylor notes, need not involve concepts

of what is and what is not logically necessary. Conditions, Taylor writes, do not logically necessitate

outcomes and are not the only logically possible conditions. If our fingers are constrained, Taylor

writes, it is impossible for us to move, but it is not logically impossible; if someone were very strong,

he/she can break the bonds. It may not be physically possible for us to wrap our fingers in knots, but it

is certainly logically possible even though we may not be able to. Not all necessity, then, Taylor

reasons, is logical necessity nor is all impossibility logical impossibility; if we say something is

impossible, this need not always mean that it is either logically or physically impossible. Outcomes that

would occur if determinism were true would, instead of being logical outcomes, be casual outcomes

(42-43). The initial causes may, for instance, have been different, therefore they were not logically

3 This is my main point here, but I wanted to discuss deliberation in-depth because this is a common reason people think that they have free will.

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bound to one particular course of events.

'Soft determinism4' attempts to reconcile free will and determinism by asserting that degrees of

freedom can be had when our actions are unbounded by obstacles and constraints. This reconciliation

seems quite appealing and may be a way of preserving some degree of freedom, but this can be met

with several objections. If the causes of our actions are utterly outside of our control and were

determined by external factors, such that there was only one course of actions (which determinism

asserts is the case), we have no free will because there was no option to 'do otherwise.5' For example, if

my desire to wear a blue shirt today is a result of something that was totally external to me and would

follow from a specific cause (whether I know it or not), the action was really 'not up to me.' Even

though I felt like I could choose to wear the shirt, was deliberating about whether or not I should wear a

blue or black shirt, and really was convinced that it was 'up to me,' it was indeed not a free action.

Taylor also examines the causes of our actions and our inner states that determine our actions.

To suggest that we could have 'done otherwise,' to try to maintain some degree of freedom or that our

brain states could have been different, or that another action could have taken place, while looking back

at past events, is “unintelligible nonsense” (45) that misses the point of the determinist's objection. To

say that we could have done otherwise is to say that we would have done otherwise only if our brain

states were different – but they were not, and could not have been, so a particular action followed from

the cause. If determinism is true, Taylor notes, the causes simply could not have been different because

the causes were themselves caused (Taylor 45). If the soft determinist wants to question the causes of

the causes, Taylor notes, they only push the problem back another step, we would say “the cause could

have been different, but it was not” and discover that this would keep happening; “whatever would

have been different could not have been different” (46). The objections, eventually, will lead to causes

4 This is different than compatibilism. I will get into this later in the paper.5 Some may object by raising Frankfurt counter-examples and/or denying that multiple possibilities must be needed for

free will. I will counter this objections later in the paper.

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before we were born, showing that our actions are utterly outside of our control because the causes are

outside of our control and thus show that we have no free will and soft determinism fails to redeem free

will.

Some may try to reconcile determinism with free will and suggest that both concepts are

compatible, thus calling themselves compatibilists. Some of these persons may argue that character

allows persons to maintain degrees of free will because regardless of what the causes are or regardless

of alternative possibilities, persons would have acted in this manner regardless. This objection fails

because the causes of your character are outside of your control. If the causes of our actions are outside

of our control and would lead back to before our births, we have no say in the matter of what our

characters are or would be. Suppose, for example, that I created a robot that only acted according to its

character, but his character was already determined by my programming. Actions made by this robot,

although in line with his character, do not show any degree of freedom. We are much like the robot in

this case, both humans and robots have 'characters' that are determined by factors outside of our

control. Characters, instead of being formed by us, are instead formed for us. Any desire to perform any

given action, since all of our actions are causally determined, can be traced back to before we were

born, and thus are outside of our control. Since persons' characters are outside of their control, they

can't be said to be free just because actions are in-line with their character.

Some may object to my definition of free will dependent on alternative possibilities by posing

what is known as a 'Frankfurt Counter-Example,' while also trying to reconcile free will and

determinism. Suppose that a person, Joe, was unsure about whether or not he wanted to commit

suicide. Knowing this, someone, Tim, planted a device in Joe's brain. If Joe did not want to commit

suicide, the device would trigger and he then would want to. Joe has only one possibility here: he must

commit suicide. Suppose that he wanted to commit suicide and the device never had to trigger. In this

situation, someone may believe that Joe still had free will, but he didn't need alternative possibilities in

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order to have it; even though Joe did not have the freedom to act otherwise, he still is responsible for

committing suicide while Tim cannot be because the device never had to trigger. This sort of objection,

though, also fails because the factors leading to the decision are outside of Joe's control. Regardless of

whether or not there was a device in Joe's brain, the decision was causally determined by forces outside

of his control, thus the action can't be said to be a free one. Even if it is the case that alternative

possibilities are not required for free will, the action is casually determined by factors outside of the

person's control and cannot be said to be free.

Fatalism

Richard Taylor defines fatalism as “the belief that whatever happens is unavoidable” (55) This

has various parallels with determinism, but is not the same idea and is reached through different

argumentation. Taylor defines a fatalist as someone who believes that whatever has happened and

whatever will happen is and always was unavoidable. The future for the fatalist, is just like the past for

everyone else – the past is settled and fixed and although we may not remember it or know what it is, it

cannot be changed and is certainly not 'up to us.' Those who are not fatalists may think that the past was

once 'up to us,' but will agree that what has happened in the past is no longer within our power to

influence. The fatalist looks at the future and the past in a similar manner (55-56).

Suppose that an omniscient being exists6. Such a being would know every fact about the

universe: this being knows how many hairs are on my head, how many people were bitten by

mosquitoes in the past twenty minutes, and even what will happen in the future. Currently, various

interrogative propositions can be uttered about the future such as “Will rain fall tomorrow?” and “How

many people will be reading books tomorrow?” that an all-knowing being would know the answers to.

If an omniscient being did not know the answers to these questions, such a being could not possibly be

called omniscient. An omniscient being would hold all and only true beliefs and could never be

6 This being need not be the Christian god or have any other characteristics that a god might have. Only assume omniscience for the other characteristics, if any, do not matter.

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mistaken, for if this being was mistaken, it could not be omniscient. It need not be the case that such a

being prearranged everything or wanted the future to be what it would be, but rather only that such a

being knows what the future is. Such a being may have willed the future to contain certain events, but

this need not be the case.

Suppose that an omniscient being could write a book containing the details of someone's life. If

someone were to read this book and find the details of his/her own life, he may have good reason to

suggest that everything in the book would come true. Perhaps this person read facts about his/her own

life that no one else was privy to and assumed that the only possible way that these facts could be

known is if an omniscient being existed. If it is the case that every fact in this book is true and must be

true, such a person has no power over what will happen or what has happened. A belief coming from an

omniscient being cannot possibly be false! No matter what this person tried to do, whatever would

happen in his/her life would be unavoidable and the person would have no choice in the matter. Taylor

details this in his chapter “Fate” dealing with the story of Osmo. Osmo finds such a book and is

convinced that everything in the book must be true, but tries to avoid his eventual future of dying in a

plane crash. Regardless of his efforts, Osmo's plane, which he originally thought would not be going to

the place the book mentioned, was to take a surprise landing. Osmo, hearing this news, tried to hijack

the plane and this eventually led to his death (58-60).

In the case of Osmo's story, he did not need to assent to causal determinism to believe that his

fate was determined and unavoidable. Osmo realized that true statements existed about his past and

future. When he saw future chapters in the book and when the future chapters became past chapters, he

realized that these events were all true. It need not have been the case that the book existed or that an

omniscient being existed, but rather was the case that a set of true statements existed. True statements,

in the sense of absolutely certain objective facts about the universe, cannot be falsified7. A god need not

7 This is what I mean by 'true statements' throughout this paper. Worry not about what humans consider to be true and don't even think of objecting saying, “Much of what we thought to be true was rendered false” because that statement

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have intervened upon Osmo's life to make these events happen; the events simply had to have

happened because they were objectively true statements and could not have been falsified.

Taylor notes that Osmo did not believe that the events would happen 'no matter what' because

they could not have happened unless Osmo was in specific places at specific times. Osmo, to die in a

plane crash, must have been in a plane, for example, so 'no matter what' cannot apply to fatalism

because this is not what the fatalists' contention is. Taylor writes, “Osmo's fatalism was simply the

realization that the things described in the book were unavoidable” (61). Osmo's efforts to save himself

were in vain because he could not possibly avoid his future. Taylor writes, “No power in heaven or

earth can render false a statement that is true. It never has been done, and never will be” (61).

This poses an interesting dilemma for those who believe in an omniscient being and free will. If

an omniscient being exists, there can be no free will. If there is free will, there can be no omniscient

being. An omniscient being would know all truths about the future and could not possibly be incorrect;

if any of the being's beliefs were falsified, it would not be omniscient. All of these truths were known

be the being, assuming that it existed before humans did. If all of these truths are known by this being,

there is only one set of logically possible outcomes that can happen in the future that must occur –

persons have no choice in any matters whatsoever because the future necessarily must happen

according to this being's knowledge. Our characters and all of our actions, then, would not be

determined by us, but rather must be in exact accord with what this being knows about the future. It is

not the case that this being would know all possible outcomes and people would have genuine choices

because only one future is possible; there would not be multiple possible futures.

Although there may not be any sort of omniscient being that exists or has existed, fatalism can

still be true without such a being. What is needed for fatalism is true statements about reality. If such

truths exist, Taylor reasons, fatalism must follow. Taylor notes that truth has nothing to do with the

wasn't true to begin with, but was only true in a colloquial sense.

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passage of time. He writes, “Nothing becomes true or ceases to be true; whatever is truth as all simply

is true” (63). Taylor also notes the law of the excluded middle, the idea that all statements are either

true or not true, that has nothing to do with what tense a statement expresses or whether anyone knows

the truths. Although many truths are not known, such as how many people were eating chocolate in the

last minute, there is still a truth of the matter. Taylor writes that true statements exist about any given

person whether or not 'Osmo's book' exists or anyone knows these truths. Knowing such truths about

ourselves that were previously unknown to us would make these truths apparent, but would not be

required for fatalism to be true (64).

Considering Objections to Fatalism

Taylor considers various objections to fatalism. Those who object to fatalism on the grounds

that one cannot know the future or that an omniscient being can't exist make an irrelevant objection.

Fatalism need not require a god or human knowledge about the future. Some may also object saying

that true statements do not cause anything, but this isn't what the fatalist proposes. It matters not 'how'

the actions of persons occur, but rather that they must occur because the future is unavoidable (64).

Others may object by saying that the fatalism is confusing fact and necessity and that the idea that

something is going to happen does not mean that it has to because someone can prevent it, but this

objection fails. No matter how hard someone can try to prevent the future from happening if it is

unavoidable, they cannot. True statements about the future cannot be falsified. Taylor writes, “No one

has ever rendered false a statement that was true, however hard some have tried” (65).

Some may try to object to the law of the excluded middle claiming that it can't account for

future statements or that statements only gain truth value when they happen, but this is an example of

special pleading; one cannot rightly hold the law of excluded middle true for one part of time and not

the other (65). Regardless of objections about the law of excluded middle in the future, truth value need

not be concerned with tense or time, as previously stated. The future, Taylor says, is continually being

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converted to the past due to the passage of time. If someone states that a certain person would be

murdered and the person were murdered, the prediction about the future would rightly be said to be

true; the statement “Bill was murdered” and the statement “Bill will be murdered” have the same truth

content, but only vary in the case of tense, Taylor notes.

Some may also object to the law of the excluded middle because such statements exist that are

either indeterminate in truth value or are paradoxical. Statements that have indeterminate truth such as

“Billy is a transgendered person” might not be either true or false. Perhaps transgendered would not be

the applicable word because another word would be more accurate or two descriptors would be needed.

If it is not true that Billy is transgendered because this is somewhat true and somewhat false, one might

say, then the law of the excluded middle falls through. This need not be the case because these terms

can be disambiguated and while better terms may be applicable, it may still be the case that Billy either

is or is not transgendered. Definitions are often hotly contested and some may disagree about terms, but

this need not entail that the law of the excluded middle is invalid. The law of the excluded middle also

should not be confused with the law of bivalance. The law of the excluded middle states that a

proposition is either true or not true and the law of bivalance states that a proposition is either true or

false. The law of the excluded middle is much weaker and is the point of contention regarding fatalism,

not the law of bivalance8.

Statements such as 'Spock is a Vulcan' might have indeterminate truth value. Spock, of course,

is not a full Vulcan; he is half-Vulcan and half-human. If we consider the term 'Vulcan' to mean full-

Vulcan, the statement 'Spock is a Vulcan' is false even though he is half-Vulcan. If we consider 'Vulcan'

to mean 'some Vulcan' and then assert that the statement is neither true nor not true because Spock has

some Vulcan blood, we seem to be playing with words. If 'Vulcan' means 'some Vulcan,' then it would

be true that Spock is a Vulcan even though he is not a full Vulcan.

8 I'm not aware of what multi-valued logics really have to offer and I might be completely wrong here, so feel free, as always, to note that I'm wrong if I am.

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Paradoxes, some allege, show that a statement has indeterminate truth value, is contradictory, or

something else. Many paradoxes, though aren't really paradoxes once they are closely examined.

Consider the lyric “The more we learn is the less we get9.” At face value, this statement seems to be

paradoxical, but when more closely examined, we can 'unpack' the statement and realize that it is

mostly stylistic. The statement, by one account, can mean that when humans gain knowledge, they end

up asking more questions and realizing that they have to revise their previously held beliefs. There is

no paradox here. How about the statement, 'This sentence is false.' This is no paradox, but rather is a

nonsensical statement that is similar to 'This sentence is true.' Sentences are not true or false because

they say that they are, but rather are true or false because of their content. A sentence such as 'two plus

two equals four' is true because we understand the definitions of two, plus, equals, and four. If the

sentence was 'two plus two equals seven,' the sentence would be false.

Conclusion

Determinism and fatalism pose serious threats to free will. Some may believe that if we have no

free will, we should despair because we have no control over what will happen, but this need not be the

case. If the future is indeed determined, whether by fatalism or determinism (or both), we can still be

active players in our lives instead of sitting by letting events unfold. Taylor writes, “Shall we, then, sit

idly by, passively observing the changing scene without participation, never testing our strength and

our goodness, having no hand in what happens, or in making things come out as they should?” (66).

Many seem to want to embrace free will or embrace determinism on bases other than a desire to hold

justified true beliefs, but this should not be the case in an honest philosophical investigation. We should

follow the data where it leads and accept whatever stances accord most with reality and if no answer

seems to be most compelling at the moment, we should research more and suspend judgment until a

conclusion, if possible, can be reached.

9 This is from the song Sensorium by the Dutch band Epica that deals with various philosophical issues such as the meaning of life and fatalism.

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Works Cited

Taylor, Richard. Metaphysics. 4th. Eaglewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992. Print.