A New Way of Fighting

The Federal VI Corps held a positionjust east of the Brock Road. The VI Corpsbegan the campaign under Maj. Gen. JohnSedgwick, but he was killed by a sharp-shooter on the 9th. The May 10assault wasthereforescheduledfor the firstday of corpscommand for Sedgwick's replacement,Brig. Gen. Horatio G. Wright. SucceedingWright in divisional command was Brig.Gen. David A. Russell. The men utilizedtheir new authority to try something freshand innovative.

The idea of long lines of soldiers grop-ing for a weak spot in the opposing linerarely worked when attacking en-emy troops in the open; also, it wasfolly attacking men behind field for-tifications. Attacking extensivelyprepared,intricatefieldfortificationscalled for a new way of fighting.

Virtually any new idea evolvesfrom other earlier innovationswhichworked or seemed to work better,and the concept developed for useon the evening of May 10 was nodifferent. Traditional tactics of theday called for an attacking force toapproach within musket range of theenemy and deliver one or more vol-leys before rushing to close with theopponent and engage in hand-to-hand combat. Offensive forces fir-

ing in the open against entrencheddefenders never inflicted greatercasualtiesthanweresuffered.Wrightand Russell planned an attack inwhich the men were not to fire until

they were physically within theenemy's lines-a bayonet charge.The first volley was not to be delivered un-til the attacking force had taken theearthworks. At that point, with opposingsoldiersstandingwithin hand-to-handcom-bat range, the bayonet was to be used freelyand fighting of the highest intensity wasanticipated.

This idea was not so radical. Bayonetcharges had been ordered before in theArmy of the Potomac. Some seventeenmonths earlier, and about nine miles fromSpotsylvaniaCourtHouse, at least two Fed-eral officers saw the potential for successof a bayonet charge at the December 13,1862 Battle of Fredericksburg. In thatbattle, Confederate infantry stood behind astone wall providing near perfect protec-tion, while Federal attackers crossed anopen plain. After witnessing several

unsllccessful traditionalassaults, one of thefinal attacks of the day was a bayonetcharge launchedbyAndrewA. Humphreys'division. Humphreys' men did not stop onthe open ground to exchange volleys inwhat would have been an uneven contest,but neither did they make it to the stonewall. In the end, the bayonet charge wasmerely an interesting footnote to a seriesof futile attacks.

On November 7, 1863, the Battle ofRappahannock Station was the setting foranother bayonet charge, only this one wasa tremendous success. Much of the successof the attack was attributed to the advancebeing made under the cover of darkness.

The Army of the Potomac had utilizedan attack in column before. On nearly thesame ground upon which Humphreys hadlaunched his bayonet charge during theBattle of Fredericksburg, a successful at-tack column was utilized during theChancellorsville Campaign at the SecondBattle of Fredericksburg,May 3, 1863.Thestone wall which the Confederates had de-fended so successfullythepreviousDecem-ber was not as formidable the followingspring when only a fraction of the troopsdefended it, and, perhaps moreimportantly,when assaulted by an attack column. Thehead of the columnsufferedfrightfullosses,but the column had enough punch to break

through the Confederate line once itreached the stone wall.

Both the bayonet charge atRappahannockStationand the attackcolumn at the Second Battle of Fred-ericksburgshareda commonfactor-regiments of the Federal VI Corpsfought in both attacks. If any troopsin the army understood such assaultsit was the men of the VI Corps.

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Devolution of Commandin the VI Corps

Above is John Sedgwick, corpscommander, slain by asharpshooter's bullet on May 9.Above right is his successorHoratio G. Wright, and at rightis Wright's successor incommand of the First Division,David A. Russell.

Just as darkness seemed to be a contribut-ing factor to the success of the bayonet at-tack at Rappahannock Station, theplans forthe May 10 assault at Spotsylvania CourtHouse had another important aspect-acolumn formation. The traditional CivilWar frontal attack was broad enough tostrike the opposing lines at several points.The wide lines practically groped for aweakness along the stretch of the line be-ing attacked, then if successful, reinforce-ments rushed into the breach before enemycounterattacks could close it. The attackin column would instead entail selectingthe point to be broken and striking it withenough force to create a breach. The col-umn was also intended to be deep enoughthat reserves were readily at hand to ex-ploit any break in the enemy line.

The Proper Point of Attack

Such tactics werenot widespreadbecause of obvious flaws if executedunder the wrong set of circum-stances. Participants in a bayonetcharge were particularly vulnerableonce reaching within musket rangeof the defenders. The defenderswould not be receiving fire them-selves, and thus would be steadierand more efficient and accurate thanthey would be with bullets whizzingby and dirt being kicked up around

them. In a bayonet charge the attackersneeded to advance faster than the typicalbattle line, so they endured the defender'sfire for a shorter period than men in a tra-ditional attack. The point of attack for abayonet charge must permit the attackersto move rapidly when under musket fire.

To advance in a column would not workif the defenders were able to deliver a con-verging fire on such a compact target. Theattack column would be particularly vul-nerable to artillery. Head-on fire of solidshot could knock down soldiers like tenpins from front to rear. Case shot orshrapnel, timed so the projectile ex-ploded just ahead of the front ranks,would result in a mass of metal fragmentsflying into a dense body of men. The lossesartillery fire could inflict upon a column

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Richard S. Ewell,CSA

attackwouldbe multiple times greater thanit would be for a traditional line of battle.Thepointof attack for a column must avoidbothconvergingfire and direct artilleryfire.

The proper selection of the point of at-tackwascritical to the success of this new

style of fighting. Such a place would re-quire limited open space to traverse, benearly void of artillery, and the attackersshouldconfront a diverging infantry fire.If suchconditions existed along the Con-federateline at Spotsylvania, the new tac-ticsmight work.

Confederate forces opposing the VICorpsprimarily belonged to Lt. Gen. Ri-chardS. Ewell's Second Corps. (Refer tothe Maps on Pp. 13-15 and Pp. 58-59.)Ewell'sleft wasnear the Brock Road where

itlinkedwith the right of Longstreet's FirstCorps, then under Maj. Gen. Richard H.Andersonafter James Longstreet's wound-ingat the Wilderness. The division underMaj.Gen.RobertE. Rodes occupiedthe leftof Ewell's line, while the division of Maj.Gen.EdwardJohnsonheld theright.The leftof the corps and Rodes' division was an-chored on Brig. Gen. Stephen DodsonRamseur'sNorth Carolina brigade. Rodes'left was augmented by the 2nd Companyof Richmond Howitzers under Capt.LorraineF. Jones, which was most likelyincorporatedinto Ramseur's portion of theline.Theseunits were posted in the woods.

ToRamseur's right, occupying the cen-ter of Rodes' division was another NorthCarolinabrigadecommandedby Brig. Gen.JuniusDaniel. The 3rd Company of Rich-mondHowitzers under Capt. Benjamin H.Smith was placed in position withinDaniel's line. The battery of four guns-

BLUE & GRAY MAGAZINE-AUGUST 2001

two Napoleons on the left and two 3-inchrifles on the right-was positioned on aslight knoll. Five companies of the brigaderelinquished their position on the front lineto the artillerymenwhen the battery arrivedearly on the morningof May 10,and took asupporting position behind the guns in anincomplete set of earthworks making up asecond line. Both Daniel's brigade andSmith's company had an openfield extend-ing about 200 yards to their front.I

To the right of Daniel, holding the rightof Rodes' division stood a three-regimentbrigade of Georgians commanded by Brig.Gen. GeorgeP.Doles.The brigadewassitu-ated on part of the same small knoll occu-pied by Smith's howitzers. Taking advan-tage of the lay of the land, Doles' brigadejutted out from the rest of the line andformed a crescent shape. The slight bulgein the line became known as "Doles' Sa-lient." The ground occupied by the right ofDoles' line gently sloped downhill into abroad swale. The Georgians had openground to their front.

From the swale on the right of Doles'Salient the ground began rising again toanother small knoll where the Confederateearthworksmade another slightbend. In theearly stages of the Battle of SpotsylvaniaCourt House, this bend was referred to asthe "West Angle." Later, after the May 12battle, this bend obtained a new and befit-ting sobriquet as the "Bloody Angle." Thefamed Stonewall Brigade, commanded byBrig. Gen. James A. Walker,defended thisportion of the line. Walker's men held theleft of Johnson's division. Two regimentsheld the ground from the swale to the WestAngle, the 2nd and 33rd Virginia.The field

Robert E. Rodes,CSA

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GeorgeP.Doles,CSA

in front of Daniel and Doles ended withsome thick pines that came close to theearthworks in front of the 33rd Virginia.The other three regiments of the StonewallBrigade were to the right of theWestAnglelooking across the Landrum field.2

Continuing to the right of the StonewallBrigade stood Louisiana soldiers who hadbeen grouped under Brig. Gen. Harry T.Hays. Next in line, holding the East Angle,was a brigade of Virginians under the di-rection of Col. William A. Witcher, andholding the right flank of Ewell's corps wasa brigade of Virginians and North Carolin-ians under Brig. Gen. George H. Steuart.

This position of Rodes' and Johnson'sdivisions was nicknamed the "Mule Shoe"salient by Confederate soldiers because ofits shape. From Ramseur and Daniel on theleft facing west, to Walker's right and allof Hays facing north, to Steuart facing east,the troops where aligned in an inverted U-shapedposition.The Mule Shoe salientwasvulnerable to crossfire, and should any por-tion of the salient fall to the Federals, Con-federate soldiers in some other portion ofthe line could have Yankees in their rear.Substantial artillery bolstered Johnson'sline, but only two batteries were inter-spersed among Rodes' infantrymen.

Ewell's corps contained a third division,permanently assigned to Maj. Gen. JubalA. Early. But Early had temporary com-mand of A. P. Hill's corps during most ofthe Battle of Spotsylvania Court House, soBrig. Gen. John B. Gordon functioned asthe acting division commander. Gordon'sdivision served as a general reserve and

NOTE: Mr. Mertz's article is annotated. See Pg. 53 for his notes.

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began the day of May 10 positioned in aline of earthworks stretching across theneck of the Mule Shoe salient. Gordon'smen were well situated to react quickly toreinforce any portion of Ewell's line, butbecause they were at right angles to Rodes'position, they were also vulnerable to Fed-eral artillery fire.

About 10 a.m. on May 10, one such ar-tillery barrage raked the left of Gordon'sdivision with a flanking fire, forcing themen to seek protection behind a hill. TheConfederatehigh commandanticipatedthatthis bombardment might be a preparatorystep to an assault and Gordon's men wereeventually placed in support of the area re-ceiving the brunt of the cannonade,Anderson's right.3

In addition to the brigades on the frontline of Rodes' position,anotherbrigadewasassigned to his division, a group of Ala-bamians under Brig. Gen. CullenA. Battle.Since the early morning hours the men ofBattle's brigade had been constructing aline of defenseseven farther to the rear thanGordon's works. The line began near thepoint where the corps of Ewell and Ander-son met. The men were constructing whatwould become known as "Lee's Last Line"

(see Pg. 62). This was not meant to be an-other reserve line, but rather was designedby the engineers to eventually become thefirst line of defenses. When completed itwas to be occupied by the troops thenposted in the Mule Shoe, so that vulner-able salient then could be abandoned.4

The Federal soldier responsible for se-lecting the point along the ConfederateMule Shoe where the ideas for thenew wayof fighting would be put to the test wasengineer Capt. Ranald S. Mackenzie. Heselected Doles' Salient as the best point ofattack. One factor not only influencing thechoice for the point of attack, but also en-abling Mackenzie to make a thorough re-connaissance was that the Federal skirmishline had succeeded in pushing Doles' skir-mishers back into the main Confederate

line, which was accomplished about noon.This successful skirmish operation enabledthe attack force to move close to the Con-federate front line, and thedefenders wouldbe forced to go without the benefit of awarning, which skirmishers were intendedto provide.

The ground in front of Doles' Salientsloped down to a wooded ravine. While theopen ground allowed for a good field offire for the men in the salient, it offered nocover for the skirmishers. A member of theStonewall Brigade indicated that Doles'skirmish line could not hold its own until

pioneers dug some rifle pits for them. OnceFederal skirmishers secured a positionwhere the field met the wood line, it wasexceedingly difficult for the Confederatesto reestablish their own skirmish line.5

The average width of the field from thetree line held by the Federal skirmishers tothe front line of Doles' Salient was about150 yards. That expanse of open groundwas one of the shortest stretches anywhere

Typical earthworks at Spotsylvania. These were part of the Mule Shoe position.

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Ranald S. Mackenzie, USA

along the Confederate line. However, atplaces, such as Ramseur's front, the woodscame up nearly to the earthworks, wherethe trees wouldhamperattack columns.TheFederals desired some open ground overwhich to advance,but not too much, whichwould overexpose their flanks, and theamount of open ground in front of Doles'Salient wasjust about right (seepp. 61-62).

By its very nature a salient protrudesfrom the rest of the line on either side, cre-ating a bulge. The shape of Doles' Salientmeant that the defendersdelivereda diverg-ing fire. Because of the lay of the land, aFederal column of troops attacking Doles'Salient could anticipate little if any firefrom the direction of Daniel's brigade onthe back side of the knoll. More firepowercould be expected from the two left regi-ments of Walker's Stonewall Brigade,whereriflemencoulddeliveran oblique fireacross the broad swale.

Apparently the only artillery visible toMackenzie was Smith's company of Rich-mond Howitzers. Once more the lay of theland was very significant in assessing theimpactof theseguns.To the right of Smith'scompany was a small ravine, which couldoffer some protection to an attacking force.Between the ravine and the broad swale, aspur of the Doles' Salient knoll separatedthe two depressions.This spur obscured theview Smith's gunners might have of anyenemy forces in the swale. The only bat-tery obvious to Mackenzie while he recon-noitered the area was one that could not

sweep the front of Doles' Salient.

Following are Situation Maps of the SpotsylvaniaBattlefield. The main text resumes on Pg. 16.

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