digest complete part 1

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PART THREE: PRE-EMPLOYMENT A. RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT OF WORKERS 1. STATE POLICY – 12 2. DEFINITION – 13 a. ROSA C. RODOLFO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. D E C I S I O N CARPIO MORALES, J.: Petitioner ws !"r#ed $e%ore t"e Re#ion& Tri& Co'rt (RTC) o% M*ti %or i&&e#& re!r'it+ent &&e#ed to "ve $een !o++itted s %o&&ows: T"t in or $o't nd d'rin# t"e period %ro+ A'#'st to Septe+$er - /, in M*ti, Metro Mni&, P"i&ippines, nd wit"in t"e 0'risdi!tion o% t"is Honor$&e Co'rt, t"e sid!!'sed representin# "erse&% to "ve t"e !p!it1 to !ontr!t, en&ist nd trnsport Fi&ipino wor*ers %or e+p&o1+ent $rod, did t"en nd t"ere wi&&%'&&1 nd 'n&w%'&&1, %or %ee, re!r'it nd pro+ise e+p&o1+ent20o$ p&!e+ent $rod to 3ILLAMOR ALCANTARA, NARCISO CORP45, NECITAS R. FERRE, 6ERARDO H. TAPA7AN nd JO3ITO L. CAMA, wit"o't %irst se!'rin# t"e re8'ired &i!ense or 't"orit1 %ro+ t"e Ministr1 o% L$or nd E+p&o1+ent. 9 A%ter tri& on t"e +erits, rn!" ; o% t"e M*ti RTC rendered its J'd#+ent on t"e !se, < t"e de!ret& portion o% w"i!" reds: 7HEREFORE, PREMISES A O3E CONSIDERED, t"e Co'rt %inds t"e !!'sed ROSA C. RODOLFO s 64ILT= o% t"e o%%ense o% ILLE6AL RECR4ITMENT nd "ere$1 senten!es "er >to? pen&t1 o% i+prison+ent o% EI6HT =EARS nd to p1 t"e !osts. / (4nders!orin# s'pp&ied) In so i+posin# t"e pen&t1, t"e tri& !o'rt too* note o% t"e %!t t"t w"i&e t"e in%or+tion re%&e!ted t"e !o++ission o% i&&e#& re!r'it+ent in &r#e s!&e, on&1 t"e !o+p&int o% t"e two o% t"e %ive !o+p&innts ws proven. On ppe&, t"e Co'rt o% Appe&s !orre!t&1 s1nt"esi@ed t"e eviden!e presented $1 t"e prties s %o&&ows: >T"e eviden!e %or t"e prose!'tion? s"ows t"t so+eti+e in A'#'st nd Septe+$er - /, !!'sed ppe&&nt ppro!"ed privte !o+p&innts Ne!its Ferre nd Nr!iso Corp's individ'&&1 nd invited t"e+ to pp&1 %or overses e+p&o1+ent in D'$i. T"e !!'sed ppe&&nt $ein# t"eir nei#"$or, privte !o+p&innts #reednd went to t"e %or+erBs o%%i!e. T"is o%%i!e w"i!" $ore t"e $'siness n+e 1side Mnpower E port Spe!i&ist ws in $'i&din# sit'ted t 'tist St. 'endi, M*ti, Metro Mni&. In t"t o%%i!e, privte !o+p&innts #ve !ertin +o'nts to ppe&&nt %or pro!essin# nd ot"er %ees. Ferre #ve P , . s pro %ee (E "i$it A) nd not"er P/, . (E " Li*ewise, Corp's #ve ppe&&nt P , . ( D). Appe&&nt t"en to&d privte !o+p& t"e1 were s!"ed'&ed to &eve %or D'$i on Septe+$er , - /. However, privte !o+p&i nd && t"e ot"er pp&i!nts were not $&e on t"e sid dte s t"eir e+p&o1er &&e#ed& rrive. T"'s, t"eir deprt're ws res! Septe+$er9<, $'t t"e res'&t ws t"e s+e. S'spe!tin# t"tt"e1 were $ein# "oodwin*ed, privte !o+p&innts de+nded o% ppe&&nt to ret'rn t"eir +one1. E !ept %or t"e re%'ndo% P , . to Ferre, ppe&&nt ws not $&e privte !o+p&inntsB +one1. Tiredo% e !'ses, privte !o+p&innts %i&ed t"e present !se %or i&&e#& re!r'it+ent #inst t"e !!'sed pp To prove t"t !!'sed ppe&&nt "d no 't" re!r'it wor*ers%or overses e+p&o1+ent, t"e prose!'tion presented Jose 3&erino, Senior Overses E+p&o1+ent O%%i!er o% t"e P"i&ippine OversesE+p&o1+ent A#en!1 (POEA), w"o testi%ied t"t !!'sed ppe&&nt ws neit"e nor 't"ori@ed $1 t"e t"en Ministr1 o% L$o E+p&o1+ent to re!r'it wor*ers %or overses e+p&o1+ent. For "er de%ense, ppe&&nt denied ever ppr privte !o+p&innts to re!r'it t"e+ %or e+p&o1+ent in D'$i. On t"e !ontrr1, it w privte !o+p&innts w"o s*ed "er "e&p in se!'rin# 0o$s $rod. As #ood nei#"$or nd %riend, s"e $ro'#"t t"e privte !o+p&innt 1side Mnpower E port Spe!i&ist #en!1 $e!'se s"e *new F&ornte Hin"on,G t"e ow t"e sid #en!1. 7"i&e !!'sed ppe&&nt d t"t s"e re!eived +one1 %ro+ t"e privte !o+p&innts, s"e ws 8'i!* to point o't t" re!eived t"e s+e on&1 in tr'st %or de&iver #en!1. S"e denied $ein# prt o% t"e #en!1 s n owner or e+p&o1ee t"ereo%. To ppe&&ntBs testi+on1, Mi&#ros C'dr, &son pp&i!nt nd !o+pniono% privte !o+p&innts, testi%ied t"t ppe&&nt did t"e+. On t"e !ontrr1, t"e1 were t"e s*ed "e&p %ro+ ppe&&nt. To %'rt"er $o&st de%ense, Eri$erto C. T$in#, t"e !!o' !s"ier o% t"e #en!1, testi%ied t"t ppe& !onne!ted wit" t"e #en!1 nd t"t "e sw re!eived +one1 %ro+ t"e pp&i!nts $'t s"e t"e+ over to t"e #en!1 t"ro'#" eit"er F&or Hin"on or L'@vi+ind Mr!os. ; (E+p"sis 'nders!orin# s'pp&ied) In &i#"t t"ereo%, t"e ppe&&te !o'rt 0'd#+ent o% t"e tri& !o'rt $'t +odi%ied t i+posed d'e to t"e tri& !o'rtBs %i&'re to Indeter+inte Senten!e Lw. T"e ppe&&te !o'rt t"'s disposed: 7HEREFORE, %indin# no +erit in t"e ppe&, Co'rt DISMISSES it nd AFFIRMS t"e ppe&ed De!ision E CEPT t"e pen&t1 w"i!" is "ere$1 !"n#ed to %ive (G) 1ers s +ini+'+

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Sales Cases

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PART THREE: PRE-EMPLOYMENT

PART THREE: PRE-EMPLOYMENT

RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT OF WORKERS

STATE POLICY 12

DEFINITION 13

ROSA C. RODOLFO, Petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioner was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati for illegal recruitment alleged to have been committed as follows:

That in or about and during the period from August to September 1984, in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused representing herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to VILLAMOR ALCANTARA, NARCISO CORPUZ, 1 NECITAS R. FERRE, GERARDO H. TAPAWAN and JOVITO L. CAMA, without first securing the required license or authority from the Ministry of Labor and Employment. 2After trial on the merits, Branch 61 of the Makati RTC rendered its Judgment on the case, 3 the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES ABOVE CONSIDERED, the Court finds the accused ROSA C. RODOLFO as GUILTY of the offense of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT and hereby sentences her [to] a penalty of imprisonment of EIGHT YEARS and to pay the costs. 4 (Underscoring supplied)

In so imposing the penalty, the trial court took note of the fact that while the information reflected the commission of illegal recruitment in large scale, only the complaint of the two of the five complainants was proven.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals correctly synthesized the evidence presented by the parties as follows:

[The evidence for the prosecution] shows that sometime in August and September 1984, accused-appellant approached private complainants Necitas Ferre and Narciso Corpus individually and invited them to apply for overseas employment in Dubai. The accused-appellant being their neighbor, private complainants agreed and went to the formers office. This office which bore the business name "Bayside Manpower Export Specialist" was in a building situated at Bautista St. Buendia, Makati, Metro Manila. In that office, private complainants gave certain amounts to appellant for processing and other fees. Ferre gave P1,000.00 as processing fee (Exhibit A) and another P4,000.00 (Exhibit B). Likewise, Corpus gave appellant P7,000.00 (Exhibit D). Appellant then told private complainants that they were scheduled to leave for Dubai on September 8, 1984. However, private complainants and all the other applicants were not able to depart on the said date as their employer allegedly did not arrive. Thus, their departure was rescheduled to September 23, but the result was the same. Suspecting that they were being hoodwinked, private complainants demanded of appellant to return their money. Except for the refund of P1,000.00 to Ferre, appellant was not able to return private complainants money. Tired of excuses, private complainants filed the present case for illegal recruitment against the accused-appellant.

To prove that accused-appellant had no authority to recruit workers for overseas employment, the prosecution presented Jose Valeriano, a Senior Overseas Employment Officer of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), who testified that accused-appellant was neither licensed nor authorized by the then Ministry of Labor and Employment to recruit workers for overseas employment.

For her defense, appellant denied ever approaching private complainants to recruit them for employment in Dubai. On the contrary, it was the private complainants who asked her help in securing jobs abroad. As a good neighbor and friend, she brought the private complainants to the Bayside Manpower Export Specialist agency because she knew Florante Hinahon,5 the owner of the said agency. While accused-appellant admitted that she received money from the private complainants, she was quick to point out that she received the same only in trust for delivery to the agency. She denied being part of the agency either as an owner or employee thereof. To corroborate appellants testimony, Milagros Cuadra, who was also an applicant and a companion of private complainants, testified that appellant did not recruit them. On the contrary, they were the ones who asked help from appellant. To further bolster the defense, Eriberto C. Tabing, the accountant and cashier of the agency, testified that appellant is not connected with the agency and that he saw appellant received money from the applicants but she turned them over to the agency through either Florantino Hinahon or Luzviminda Marcos. 6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In light thereof, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court but modified the penalty imposed due to the trial courts failure to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

The appellate court thus disposed:

WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the appeal, this Court DISMISSES it and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision EXCEPT the penalty x x x which is hereby changed to five (5) years as minimum to seven (7) years as maximum with perpetual disqualification from engaging in the business of recruitment and placement of workers. 7 (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, 8 the present petition was filed, faulting the appellate court

I

x x x IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESSES, [AND]II

x x x IN FINDING THE PETITIONER-ACCUSED GUILTY WHEN THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 9 (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner bewails the failure of the trial court and the Court of Appeals to credit the testimonies of her witnesses, her companion Milagros Cuadra, and Eriberto C. Tabing who is an accountant-cashier of the agency.

Further, petitioner assails the trial courts and the appellate courts failure to consider that the provisional receipts she issued indicated that the amounts she collected from the private complainants were turned over to the agency through Minda Marcos and Florante Hinahon. At any rate, she draws attention to People v. Seoron10 wherein this Court held that the issuance or signing of receipts for placement fees does not make a case for illegal recruitment. 11The petition fails.

Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code, the legal provisions applicable when the offense charged was committed, 12 provided:

ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. x x x

Article 39. Penalties. x x x x

(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under this Title found violating any provision thereof or its implementing rules and regulations shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four years nor more than eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000 nor more than P100,000 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court;

x x x x (Underscoring supplied)

The elements of the offense of illegal recruitment, which must concur, are: (1) that the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) that the offender undertakes any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement under Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code. 13 If another element is present that the accused commits the act against three or more persons, individually or as a group, it becomes an illegal recruitment in a large scale. 14Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines "recruitment and placement" as "[a]ny act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not." (Underscoring supplied)

That the first element is present in the case at bar, there is no doubt. Jose Valeriano, Senior Overseas Employment Officer of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, testified that the records of the POEA do not show that petitioner is authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. 15 A Certification to that effect was in fact issued by Hermogenes C. Mateo, Chief of the Licensing Division of POEA. 16Petitioners disclaimer of having engaged in recruitment activities from the very start does not persuade in light of the evidence for the prosecution. In People v. Alvarez, this Court held:Appellant denies that she engaged in acts of recruitment and placement without first complying with the guidelines issued by the Department of Labor and Employment. She contends that she did not possess any license for recruitment, because she never engaged in such activity.

We are not persuaded. In weighing contradictory declarations and statements, greater weight must be given to the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses than to the denial of the defendant. Article 38 (a) clearly shows that illegal recruitment is an offense that is essentially committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. A non-licensee means any person, corporation or entity to which the labor secretary has not issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement; or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the labor secretary. A license authorizes a person or an entity to operate a private employment agency, while authority is given to those engaged in recruitment and placement activities.

x x x x

That appellant in this case had been neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment was certified by Veneranda C. Guerrero, officer-in-charge of the Licensing and Regulation Office; and Ma. Salome S. Mendoza, manager of the Licensing Branch both of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. Yet, as complainants convincingly proved, she recruited them for jobs in Taiwan. 17 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

The second element is doubtless also present. The act of referral, which is included in recruitment, 18 is "the act of passing along or forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial interview of a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement officer or bureau." 19 Petitioners admission that she brought private complainants to the agency whose owner she knows and her acceptance of fees including those for processing betrays her guilt.

That petitioner issued provisional receipts indicating that the amounts she received from the private complainants were turned over to Luzviminda Marcos and Florante Hinahon does not free her from liability. For the act of recruitment may be "for profit or not." It is sufficient that the accused "promises or offers for a fee employment" to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment. 20 As the appellate court stated:

x x x Sec. 13(b) of P.D. 442 [The Labor Code] does not require that the recruiter receives and keeps the placement money for himself or herself. For as long as a person who has no license to engage in recruitment of workers for overseas employment offers for a fee an employment to two or more persons, then he or she is guilty of illegal recruitment. 21Parenthetically, why petitioner accepted the payment of fees from the private complainants when, in light of her claim that she merely brought them to the agency, she could have advised them to directly pay the same to the agency, she proferred no explanation.

On petitioners reliance on Seoron, 22 true, this Court held that issuance of receipts for placement fees does not make a case for illegal recruitment. But it went on to state that it is "rather the undertaking of recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority" that makes a case for illegal recruitment. 23A word on the penalty. Indeed, the trial court failed to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law which also applies to offenses punished by special laws.

Thus, Section 1 of Act No. 4103 (An Act to Provide for an Indeterminate Sentence and Parole for All Persons Convicted of Certain Crimes by the Courts of the Philippine Islands; To Create A Board of Indeterminate Sentence and to Provide Funds Therefor; and for Other Purposes) provides:

SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225) (Underscoring supplied)

While the penalty of imprisonment imposed by the appellate court is within the prescribed penalty for the offense, its addition of "perpetual disqualification from engaging in the business of recruitment and placement of workers" is not part thereof. Such additional penalty must thus be stricken off.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMEDwith MODIFICATION in that the accessory penalty imposed by it consisting of "perpetual disqualification from engaging in the business of recruitment and placement of workers" is DELETED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 141221-36March 7, 2002PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ (at large), KARL REICHL, and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE REICHL, accused,KARL REICHL and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE REICHL, accused-appellants

PUNO, J.:This is an appeal from the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Batangas City in Criminal Case Nos. 6428, 6429, 6430, 6431, 6432, 6433, 6434, 6435, 6436, 6437, 6438, 6439, 6528, 6529, 6530 and 6531 finding accused-appellants, Spouses Karl Reichl and Yolanda Gutierrez de Reichl guilty of five (5) counts of estafa and one (1) count of syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment.1In April 1993, eight (8) informations for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment and eight (8) informations for estafa were filed against accused-appellants, spouses Karl and Yolanda Reichl, together with Francisco Hernandez. Only the Reichl spouses were tried and convicted by the trial court as Francisco Hernandez remained at large.1wphi1.ntThe evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of private complainants; a certification from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) that Francisco Hernandez, Karl Reichl and Yolanda Gutierrez Reichl in their personal capacities were neither licensed nor authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment;2 the receipts for the payment made by private complainants; and two documents signed by the Reichl spouses where they admitted that they promised to secure Austrian tourist visas for private complainants and that they would return all the expenses incurred by them if they are not able to leave by March 24, 1993,3 and where Karl Reichl pledged to refund to private complainants the total sum of P1,388,924.00 representing the amounts they paid for the processing of their papers.4Private complainant Narcisa Hernandez, a teacher, was first to testify for the prosecution. She stated that Francisco Hernandez introduced her to the spouses Karl and Yolanda Reichl at the residence of a certain Hilarion Matira at Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City. At the time, she also saw the other applicants Melanie Bautista, Estela Manalo, Edwin Coleng, Anicel Umahon, Analiza Perez and Maricel Matira. Karl and Yolanda Reichl told Narcisa that they could find her a job as domestic helper in Italy. They, however, required her to pay the amount of P150,000.00 for the processing of her papers and travel documents. She paid the fee in three installments. She paid the first installment of P50,000.00 on July 14, 1992, the second installment of P25,000.00 on August 6, 1992 and the third in the amount of P75,000.00 on December 27, 1992. She gave the money to Francisco Hernandez in the presence of the Reichl spouses at Matira's residence. Francisco Hernandez issued a receipt for the first and second installment5 but not for the third. Narcisa was scheduled to leave on December 17, 1992 but was not able to do so. Karl Reichl explained that she would get her transit visa to Italy in Austria, but she could not yet leave for Austria because the hotels were fully booked at that time because of the Christmas season. Narcisa's departure was again scheduled on January 5, 1993, but it still did not push through. Narcisa stated that they went to Manila several times supposedly to obtain a visa from the Austrian Embassy and Karl Reichl assured her that she would be able to leave once she gets her visa. The accused set the departure of Narcisa and that of the other applicants several times but these proved to be empty promises. In March 1993, the applicants met with the three accused at the residence of private complainant Charito Balmes and asked them to refund the payment if they could not send them abroad. The meeting resulted in an agreement which was reduced into writing and signed by Karl Reichl. Mr. Reichl promised to ensure private complainants' departure by April, otherwise, they would return their payment.6Private complainant Leonora Perez also gave the following testimony: In July 1992, her sister, Analiza Perez, introduced her to Francisco Hernandez at their residence in Dolor Subdivision, Batangas City. Francisco Hernandez convinced her to apply for a job in Italy. When she accepted the offer, Francisco Hernandez told her to prepare P150,000.00 for the processing of her papers. In August 1992, Leonora, together with her sister and Francisco Hernandez, went to Ramada Hotel in Manila to meet with Karl and Yolanda Reichl. At said meeting, Leonora handed her payment of P50,000.00 to Yolanda Reichl. Yolanda assured her that she would be able to work in Italy. Francisco Hernandez and the Reichl spouses told Leonora to wait for about three weeks before she could leave. After three weeks, Francisco Hernandez invited Leonora and the other applicants to the house of Hilarion Matira in Batangas City to discuss some matters. Francisco Hernandez informed the applicants that their departure would be postponed to December 17, 1992. December 17 came and the applicants were still unable to leave as it was allegedly a holiday. Yolanda and Karl Reichl nonetheless assured Leonora of employment as domestic helper in Italy with a monthly salary of $1,000.00. Francisco Hernandez and the Reichl spouses promised the applicants that they would leave for Italy on January 5, 1993. Some time in January 1993, Francisco Hernandez went to the residence of Leonora and collected the sum of P50,000.00 purportedly for the plane fare. Francisco issued a receipt for the payment. When the applicants were not able to leave on the designated date, Francisco Hernandez and the spouses again made another promise. Tired of the recruiters' unfulfilled promises, the applicants decided to withdraw their application. However, Karl Reichl constantly assured them that they would land a job in Italy because he had connections in Vienna. The promised employment, however, never materialized. Thus, Karl Reichl signed a document stating that he would refund the payment made by the applicants plus interest and other expenses. The document was executed and signed at the house of one of the applicants, Charito Balmes, at P. Zamora St., Batangas City.7Janet Perez, Leonora's sister, corroborated the latter's testimony that she paid a total amount of P100,000.00 to the three accused.8Private complainant Charito Balmes told a similar story when she testified before the court. She said that Francisco Hernandez convinced her to apply for the job of domestic helper in Italy and required her to pay a fee of P150,000.00. He also asked her to prepare her passport and other papers to be used to secure a visa. On November 25, 1992, she gave P25,000.00 to Francisco Hernandez. They proceeded to Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City and Francisco Hernandez introduced her to his business partners, spouses Karl and Yolanda Reichl. Francisco Hernandez turned over the payment to the spouses so that they could secure a visa for her. The Reichl spouses promised her an overseas job. They said she and the other applicants would leave on December 17, 1992. On December 11, 1992, Charito paid the amount of P70,300.00 to Francisco Hernandez in the presence of the Reichls. Francisco Hernandez again handed the money to the spouses. On February 16, 1993, Charito paid P20,000.00 to Francisco Hernandez who delivered the same to the spouses. Francisco Hernandez did not issue a receipt for the payment made by Charito because he told her that he would not betray her trust. Like the other applicants, Charito was not able to leave the country despite the numerous promises made by the accused. They gave various excuses for their failure to depart, until finally the Reichls told the applicants that Karl Reichl had so many business transactions in the Philippines that they would not be able to send them abroad and that they would refund their payment instead. Hence, they executed an agreement which was signed by Karl Reichl and stating that they would return the amounts paid by the applicants. The accused, however, did not comply with their obligation.9Mrs. Elemenita Bautista, the mother of private complainant Melanie Bautista, also took the witness stand. She stated that in May 1992, Melanie applied for an overseas job through Francisco Hernandez. Francisco Hernandez told her to prepare P150,000.00 to be used for the processing of her papers and plane ticket. On June 26, 1992, Melanie made the initial payment of P50,000.00 to Francisco Hernandez who was then accompanied by Karl and Yolanda Reichl.10 Upon receipt of the payment, Francisco Hernandez gave the money to Yolanda Reichl. Melanie made two other payments: one on August 6, 1992 in the amount of P25,000.00,11 and another on January 3, 1993 in the amount of P51,000.00.12 Three receipts were issued for the payments.13Rustico Manalo, the husband of private complainant Estela Abel de Manalo, testified that his wife applied for the job of domestic helper abroad. In June 1992, Francisco Hernandez introduced them to Karl and Yolanda Reichl who were allegedly sending workers to Italy. Rustico and his wife prepared all the relevant documents, i.e., passport, police clearance and marriage contract, and paid a total placement fee of P130,000.00.14 They paid P50,000.00 on June 5, 1992, P25,000.00 on August 8, 1992, and P55,000.00 on January 3, 1993. The payments were made at the house of Hilarion Matira and were received by Francisco Hernandez who, in turn, remitted them to the Reichl spouses. Francisco Hernandez issued a receipt for the payment. The Reichls promised to take care of Estela's papers and to secure a job for her abroad. The Reichls vowed to return the payment if they fail on their promise. As with the other applicants, Estela was also not able to leave the country.15The defense interposed denial and alibi.

Accused-appellant Karl Reichl, an Austrian citizen, claimed that he entered the Philippines on July 29, 1992. Prior to this date, he was in various places in Europe. He came to the country on July 29, 1992 to explore business opportunities in connection with the import and export of beer and sugar. He also planned to establish a tourist spot somewhere in Batangas. Upon his arrival, he and his wife, Yolanda Reichl, stayed at the Manila Intercontinental Hotel. On August 3, 1992, they moved to Manila Midtown Hotel. They stayed there until August 26, 1992. After they left Manila Midtown Hotel, they went to another hotel in Quezon City. Karl Reichl returned to Vienna on September 19, 1992.16Mr. Reichl stated that he first met Francisco Hernandez through a certain Jimmy Pineda around August 1992 at Manila Midtown Hotel. Francisco Hernandez was allegedly looking for a European equipment to be used for the quarrying operation of his friend. Before accepting the deal, he made some research on the background of the intended business. Realizing that said business would not be viable, Karl Reichl advised Francisco Hernandez to instead look for a second-hand equipment from Taiwan or Japan. He never saw Francisco Hernandez again until he left for Vienna in September 1992.17Karl Reichl returned to the Philippines on October 21, 1992. Francisco Hernandez allegedly approached him and sought his help in securing Austrian visas purportedly for his relatives. Karl Reichl refused and told him that he was planning to stay permanently in the Philippines. On one occasion, Francisco Hernandez invited him to an excursion at Sombrero Island. Francisco Hernandez told him that he would also bring some of his relatives with him and he would introduce him to them. There he met Narcisa Hernandez and Leonora Perez. Leonora Perez, together with Francisco Hernandez, later went to see Mr. Reichl at the house of his in-laws at No. 4 Buenafe Road, Batangas City and asked him if he could help her obtain an Austrian visa. Karl Reichl, however, was firm on his refusal.18In his testimony before the trial court, Karl Reichl denied any knowledge about Francisco Hernandez's recruitment activities. He said that Francisco Hernandez merely told him that he wanted to help his relatives go to Europe. He further denied that he promised private complainants that he would give them overseas employment.19 As regards the document where Mr. Reichl undertook to pay P1,388,924.00 to private complainants, he claimed that he signed said document under duress. Francisco Hernandez allegedly told him that private complainants would harm him and his family if he refused to sign it. He signed the document as he felt he had no other option.20Yolanda Gutierrez de Reichl corroborated the testimony of her husband and denied the charges against her. She claimed that she was in Manila on the dates alleged in the various informations, thus, she could not have committed the acts charged therein. Yolanda Reichl further stated that she did not know of any reason why private complainants filed these cases against her and her husband. She said that several persons were harassing her and pressuring her to pay private complainants the sum of at least P50,000.00.21After assessing the evidence presented by the parties, the trial court rendered a decision convicting accused-appellants of one (1) count of illegal recruitment in large scale and six (6) counts of estafa. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused spouses KARL REICHL and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ REICHL -

1. NOT GUILTY of the crime of syndicated and large-scale illegal recruitment as charged in the above-mentioned Criminal Cases Nos. 6435, 6437 and 6529;

2. NOT GUILTY of the crime of estafa as charged in the above-mentioned Criminal Cases Nos. 6434, 6436 and 6528;

3. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of syndicated and large-scale illegal recruitment, as charged, in the above-mentioned Criminal Cases Nos. 6429, 6431, 6433, 6439 and 6531;

4. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as charged, in the above-mentioned Criminal Cases Nos. 6428, 6430, 6432, 6438 and 6530.

The Court hereby imposes upon the accused-spouses KARL REICHL and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ REICHL the following sentences:

1. For the 5 offenses, collectively, of syndicated and large-scale illegal recruitment in Criminal Cases Nos. 6429, 6431, 6433, 6438 and 6531, to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00);

2. In Criminal Case No. 6428, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate sentence of Six (6) Years of prision correctional, as minimum to Sixteen (16) Years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Narcisa Hernandez in the amount of P150,000.00;

3. In Criminal Case No. 6430, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision correctional as minimum to eleven (11) years of prision mayor, as maximum and to indemnify the complainant Leonora Perez in the amount of P100,000.00;

4. In Criminal Case No. 6432, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision correctional as minimum to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to indemnify the complainant Melanie Bautista in the amount of P150,000.00;

5. In Criminal Case No. 6438, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision correctional as minimum to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to indemnify the complainant Estela Abel de Manalo in the amount of P130,000.00;

6. In Criminal Case No. 6530, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years or prision correctional as minimum to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to indemnify the complainant Charito Balmes in the amount of P121,300.00; and

7. To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED."

Accused-appellants appealed from the decision of the trial court. They raise the following errors:

"1. The trial court erred in finding accused-appellant Karl Reichl guilty of the crimes of estafa and illegal recruitment committed by syndicate and in large scale based on the evidence presented by the prosecution which miserably failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

2. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of illegal recruitment on a large scale by cummulating five separate cases of illegal recruitment each filed by a single private complainant.

3. The trial court erred in rendering as a matter of course an automatic guilty verdict against accused-appellant for the crime of estafa after a guilty verdict in a separate crime for illegal recruitment. It is submitted that conviction in the latter crime does not ipso facto result in conviction in the former."22The appeal is bereft of merit.

Article 38 of the Labor Code defines illegal recruitment as "any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of (the Labor Code), to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority." The term "recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, including referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not, provided that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.23 The law imposes a higher penalty when the illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate or in large scale as they are considered an offense involving economic sabotage. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.24In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants engaged in activities that fall within the definition of recruitment and placement under the Labor Code. The evidence on record shows that they promised overseas employment to private complainants and required them to prepare the necessary documents and to pay the placement fee, although they did not have any license to do so. There is illegal recruitment when one who does not possess the necessary authority or license gives the impression of having the ability to send a worker abroad.25Accused-appellants assert that they merely undertook to secure Austrian visas for private complainants, which act did not constitute illegal recruitment. They cite the document marked at Exhibit "J" stating that they promised to obtain Austrian tourist visas for private complainants. We are not convinced. Private complainants Narcisa Hernandez, Leonora Perez and Charito Balmes categorically stated that Karl and Yolanda Reichl told them that they would provide them overseas employment and promised them that they would be able to leave the country on a specified date. We do not see any reason to doubt the truthfulness of their testimony. The defense has not shown any ill motive for these witnesses to falsely testify against accused-appellants if it were not true that they met with the Reichl spouses and the latter represented themselves to have the capacity to secure gainful employment for them abroad. The minor lapses in the testimony of these witnesses pointed out by accused-appellants in their brief do not impair their credibility, especially since they corroborate each other on the material points, i.e., that they met with the three accused several times, that the three accused promised to give them overseas employment, and that they paid the corresponding placement fee but were not able to leave the country. It has been held that truth-telling witnesses are not always expected to give error-free testimonies considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory.26 Moreover, it was shown that Karl Reichl signed a document marked as Exhibit "C" where he promised to refund the payments given by private complainants for the processing of their papers. We are not inclined to believe Mr. Reichl's claim that he was forced by Francisco Hernandez to sign said document. There is no showing, whether in his testimony or in that of his wife, that private complainants threatened to harm them if he did not sign the document. Mr. Reichl is an educated man and it cannot be said that he did not understand the contents of the paper he was signing. When he affixed his signature thereon, he in effect acknowledged his obligation to ensure the departure of private complainants and to provide them gainful employment abroad. Such obligation arose from the promise of overseas placement made by him and his co-accused to private complainants. The admission made by accused-appellants in Exhibit "J" that they promised to obtain Austrian visas for private complainants does not negate the fact that they also promised to procure for them overseas employment. In fact, in Exhibit "J", accused-appellants admitted that each of the private complainants paid the amount of P50,000.00. However, in Exhibit "C", which was executed on a later date, accused-appellants promised to refund to each complainant an amount exceeding P150,000.00. This is an acknowledgment that accused-appellants received payments from the complainants not only for securing visas but also for their placement abroad.

Accused-appellants' defense of denial and alibi fail to impress us. The acts of recruitment were committed from June 1992 until January 1993 in Batangas City. Karl Reichl was in Manila from July 29, 1992 until September 19, 1992, and then he returned to the Philippines and stayed in Batangas from October 21, 1992. Yolanda Reichl, on the other hand, claimed that he was in Manila on the dates alleged in the various informations. It is of judicial notice that Batangas City is only a few hours' drive from Manila. Thus, even if the spouses were staying in Manila, it does not prevent them from going to Batangas to engage in their recruitment business. Furthermore, it appears that the three accused worked as a team and they conspired and cooperated with each other in recruiting domestic helpers purportedly to be sent to Italy. Francisco Hernandez introduced Karl and Yolanda Reichl to the job applicants as his business partners. Karl and Yolanda Reichl themselves gave assurances to private complainants that they would seek employment for them in Italy. Francisco Hernandez remitted the payments given by the applicants to the Reichl spouses and the latter undertook to process the applicants' papers. There being conspiracy, each of the accused shall be equally liable for the acts of his co-accused even if he himself did not personally take part in its execution.

Accused-appellants argue that the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellants of illegal recruitment in large scale by cummulating the individual informations filed by private complainants. The eight informations for illegal recruitment are worded as follows:

Criminal Case No. 6429

"That on or about July 14, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Narcisa Autor de Hernandez and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Narcisa Autor de Hernandez relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.

Contrary to Law."

Criminal Case No. 6431

"That on or about July 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Dolor Subdivision, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Leonora Perez y Atienza and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Leonora Perez y Atienza relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.

Contrary to Law."

Criminal Case No. 6433

"That on or about June 26, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Melanie Bautista y Dolor and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Melanie Bautista y Dolor relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.1wphi1.ntContrary to Law."

Criminal Case No. 6435

"That on or about July 12, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Annaliza Perez y Atienza and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Annaliza Perez y Atienza relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND (P160,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.

Contrary to Law.

Criminal Case No. 6437

"That on or about August 15, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Edwin Coling y Coling and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Edwin Coling y Coling relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.

Contrary to Law."

Criminal Case No. 6439

"That on or about June 5, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Estela Abel de Manalo and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Estela Abel de Manalo relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND (P130,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.

Contrary to Law."

Criminal Case No. 6529

"That on or about July 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Brgy. Sta. Rita Karsada, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Anicel Umahon y Delgado and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Anicel Umahon y Delgado relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND (P130,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.

Contrary to Law."

Criminal Case No. 6531

"That on or about November 25, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at No. 40 P. Zamora Street, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Charito Balmes y Cantos and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Charito Balmes y Cantos relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P121,300.00), Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.

Contrary to Law."

We note that each information was filed by only one complainant. We agree with accused-appellants that they could not be convicted for illegal recruitment committed in large scale based on several informations filed by only one complainant. The Court held in People vs. Reyes:27"x x x When the Labor Code speaks of illegal recruitment 'committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group,' it must be understood as referring to the number of complainants in each case who are complainants therein, otherwise, prosecutions for single crimes of illegal recruitment can be cummulated to make out a case of large scale illegal recruitment. In other words, a conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a group."28This, however, does not serve to lower the penalty imposed upon accused-appellants. The charge was not only for illegal recruitment committed in large scale but also for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph of Article 38 of the Labor Code. It has been shown that Karl Reichl, Yolanda Reichl and Francisco Hernandez conspired with each other in convincing private complainants to apply for an overseas job and giving them the guaranty that they would be hired as domestic helpers in Italy although they were not licensed to do so. Thus, we hold that accused-appellants should be held liable for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate which is also punishable by life imprisonment and a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) under Article 39 of the Labor Code.

Finally, we hold that the prosecution also proved the guilt of accused-appellants for the crime of estafa. A person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be convicted of estafa under Art. 315 (2) of the Revised Penal Code provided the elements of estafa are present. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by any person who defrauds another by using a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. The offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means of the accused-appellant and as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damages.29 It has been proved in this case that accused-appellants represented themselves to private complainants to have the capacity to send domestic helpers to Italy, although they did not have any authority or license. It is by this representation that they induced private complainants to pay a placement fee of P150,000.00. Such act clearly constitutes estafa under Article 315 (2) of the Revised Penal Code.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

Cost against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

POWER AND AUTHORITY OF SEC - 14

PRIVATE RECRUITMENT 16 IN REL. TO 25

THE POEA 17, E.O 247

VINTA MARITIME CO INC VERSUS NLRC

FACTS:

Leonides Basconcillo, a chief engineer of the M/V Boracay, was dismissed for his gross negligence and incompetence as exemplified by the recorded incidents which the petitioner , Vinta Maritime Co. Inc and Elkano Ship Management submitted. However, Leonides denied such allegations claiming that he was not given a chance to explain his side regarding the mentioned accidents. He thereafter filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Worker's Assistance and Adjudication Office for illegal dismissal. The POEA ruled that Basconcillo was illegally dismissed. It was affirmed by the NLRC. Hence this present action.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED?

RULING:

Yes, the respondent was illegally dismissed.

The petitioners in this case failed to prove the elements of valid dismissal, namely: (1) just cause and (2) due process.

Where there is no showing of a clear, valid, and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter as illegal dismissal. The burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause.In this case at bar, the absence of valid cause for termination was patent. The alleged incompetence of respondent was contradicted by the remarks in his seamans book showing that his services was highly recommended and that his conduct and ability were rated very good. It was not supported by relevant and convincing evidence. Neither did they explain the instances where respondent allegedly endangered the ship and its crew.

Due process, the second element, requires notice and hearing. Article 282 of the Labor Code requires the service of a written notice containing a statement of the cause(s) of termination and giving said employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process, and neither of these elements can be eliminated without running afoul of the constitutional guarantee.

We therefore conclude that respondent was illegally dismissed. No notice was ever given to him prior to his dismissal. These requisites cannot be replaced as they are not mere technicalities, but requirements of due process to which every employee is entitled to ensure that the employers prerogative to dismiss is not exercised arbitrarily. Illegally dismissed workers are entitled to the payment of their salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of their employment where the employment is for a definite period.

ASIAN CENTER VERSUS NLRC

FACTS:

Petitioner hired respondent IBNO MEDIALES to work as a mason in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, with a monthly salary of 1, 200 Saudi Riyals (SR). The term for his contract was two years, from February 28, 1995 until February 28, 1997.

On May 1996, he applied with petitioner for vacation leave with pay which he earned after working for more than a year, which was granted. While en route to the Philippines, his co- workers informed him that he has been dismissed from service.

He thereafter, filed a complaint with the labor arbiter for illegal dismissal, non- payment of overtime pay, refund of transportation fare, illegal deductions, non- payment of 13th month pay and salary for the unexpired portion of his employment contract.

The Labor Arbiter found petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal. It is noteworthy, however, that in the body of his decision, he applied Section 10 of RA 8042, the law relative to the protection of Filipino overseas-workers, and computed private respondents salary for the unexpired portion of his contract as follows: SR 1,200 X 3 months= SR 3, 600.

It was affirmed by the NLRC on Appeal but modified the decision by deleting the order of refund of excessive placement fee for lack of jurisdiction. It, however, subsequently denied petitioners motion. It ruled that RA 8042 does not apply as respondents employment which started in February 1995 occurred prior to its effectivity on July 15, 1995. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHEN IS JURISDICTION DETERMINED?

RULING:

Jurisdiction is determined by the law at the time of the commencement of the action. In the case at bar, private respondents cause of action did not accrue on his date of employment or on February 28, 1995. His cause arose only from the time he was illegally dismissed by petitioner from service in June 1996, after his vacation have expired. It is thus clear, that RA 8042 which took effect a year earlier in July 1995 applies to the case at bar.

Under Section 10 of RA 8042 a worker dismissed from overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause is entitled to his salary for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

In this case, the unexpired portion of respondents employment contract is eight (8) months. He should therefore be paid his basic salary corresponding to three (3) months every year for the unexpired term, whichever is less or a total of SR 3, 600.

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES VS POEA

FACTS:

Manuel Zaragoza had been an employee of petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines for several years, having served as engineer on board several of Easterns vessels since 1973. At the time of his death on 1983, he was in Kakogawa, Japan serving as Chief Engineer of the M/V Eastern Meteor, a vessel then owned by Freeasia Shipping Company S.A. and chartered by Eastern.

Two years after his death, Zaragosas wife, herein respondent, filed with the POEA a formal complaint against petitioner after the latter refused to act favorably on the widows claim for gratuity arising from the death of her husband. She alleged that at the time of her husbands death, the ship was registered in Panama and that she is entitled to P100,000 indemnity as provided in the Memorandum Circular #71 issued by the National Seamen Board (NSB).

Eastern assailed the jurisdiction of the POEA over the complaint, asserting that the latter had no jurisdiction on the ground that the company is not engaged in overseas employment even as it admits that its vessels are ocean going vessels. The petitioner further concludes that the claim for the death benefits should have been filed with the Social Security System and not with the POEA.

ISSUE: W/N POEA AND NOT SSS HAS JURISDCITION OVER THE CASE?

RULING:

Yes, POEA has jurisdiction over the case.

Section 4 of E.O. 797 provides that the POEA shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases including money claims, involving employer-employee relationship arising out of or by virtue of law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen.

The statute and regulations refer to employment of Filipino Workers overseas. It does not limit their coverage to non- Filipino employers. Filipinos working overseas share the same risk and burdens whether their employers be Filipino or foreign. The underlying policy is the Filipino seaman working in ocean going vessels should receive the same wages and benefits without regard to the nationality or nationalities of the vessels on which they serve.

Furthermore, the standard contract of employment for Filipino seamen allows the payment of death benefit, pension, funeral and burial gratuity to the private respondent-worker.

Also, POEAs jurisdiction was further clarified substantially in the Rules and Regulation on Overseas Employment issued by POEA, Section 1 thereof which provides that, claims for disability and other benefits arising out of employment fall within the POEAs original and exclusive jurisdiction.

DE JESUS vs ECC

FACTS:

Ester de Jesus was employed by the Philippine National Railways as telephone operator. She was transferred to the switchboard of the PNR hospital. She worked every other day during the night shift, for continuous periods of 16 hours starting from 4pm to 8am of the following day. She was, thereafter, hospitalized four times and diagnosed having chronic pyelonephritis, diabetes mellitus, anemia and lung cancer. She died later.

The husband of the deceased filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626. It was denied by the GSIS on the ground that the deceaseds ailments were not occupational diseases under the Labor Code. Moreover, they argued that it was not shown that her being a telephone operator increased the risk of contracting those ailments.

The Employees Compensation Commission affirmed such decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE CLAIM.

RULING:

SC RULED IN THE NEGATIVE.

The ailments of the deceased manifested themselves in 1978 or beyond January 1, 1975, the law therefore, governing the petitioners claim is, the New Labor Code.

Under the code, for the sickness and resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of the Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the diseased increased by the working conditions.

The petitioner in this case at bar, failed to prove by competent evidence that the risk of contracting said diseases was indeed by the working conditions concomitant with the deceaseds employment. While the court has always maintained that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation, the basic rule that a mere allegation is not evidence should not be disregarded.

INTER ORIENT v NLRC

FACTS:

Jeremias Pineda was contracted to work as Oiler on board the vessels, MV Amazonia, owned and operated by its foreign principal, Firecroft Shipping Corporation. He was repatriated to the Philippines due to a mental condition. He met his death when he was shot by a Thai Policeman while in Thailand for a stopover.

The mother of the deceased filed a claim for death compensation benefits against inter- orient and its foreign principal. She contended that her son should not have allowed to travel alone on the ground that he was already mentally unsound.

Petitioner, on the other hand, argued, invoking the De Jesus case, that the cause of Pinedas death is not one of the occupational diseases listed by law. Hence, not entitled to the claim.

ISSUE: W/N THE PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR THE CLAIM?

RULING: YES, PETITONER IS LIABLE.

Petitioners reliance in the De Jesus case is misplace. The death and burial benefits being claimed in the case at bar are not payable by the Employees Compensation Commission and are chargeable against the State Insurance Fund.

It arose from the responsibility of the foreign employer together with the local agency for the safety of the employee during his repatriation until his arrival in this country, the point of hire. Though the termination of Pineda was effected in Dubai, still, the responsibility of the foreign employer to see to it that Pineda was duly repatriated to the point of hiring subsisted.

The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract to provide a companion for a returning employee, but it cannot deny that it was expressly tasked by its agreement to assure the safe return of said worker.

The petition was therefore, dismissed.

NFD v NLRC

Facts:

The private respondents (wives of the two deceased husbands) filed for death compensation benefits under the POEA Standard Contract of employment before the petitioners but were denied on the ground that the seamans deaths were due to their own wilful act who implanted fragments of reindeer horn in their respective sexual organs that due to the lack of sanitary conditions at the time and place of implantation, all three seamen suffered "severe tetanus" and "massive viral infections;" that Misada and Envidiado died within days of the other; that the third seaman, Arturo Fajardo, narrowly missed death only because the vessel was at port in Penang, Malaysia at the time the tetanus became critical. Private respondents filed separate complaints before the POEA Adjudication Office. POEA Administrator dismissed the case for lack of merit. Private respondents appealed to respondent Commission. During the pendency of the appeal, private respondents submitted additional documentary evidence in support of their Memorandum on Appeal. Respondent Commission reversed the POEA Administrator and ordered petitioners to pay private respondents. Hence this petition.

Issue:

WON the seamans deaths were from their own willful and deliberate act.

Held:

Yes. Under Part II, Section C, no. 6 of POEA Standard Employment Contract Governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen on Board Ocean-Going Vessels No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death resulting from a willful act on his own life by the seaman, provided, however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to him. In this case, the testimonies of the officers are insufficient to prove the fact that death of two seamen were caused by self-inflicted injuries and in fact Fajardo, one who did the same, did not submit any testimony regarding the implantation. No autopsy report was presented to corroborate their testimonies. Based on medical reports cause of death of Misada was due to viral infection, while Envidiado was due to viral myocarditis. Hence, petitioners evidence insufficiently proves the fact that the deaths of the two seamen were caused by their own wilful and deliberate act.

Phil. International v NLRC

Facts:

A claim for disability compensation benefits and hospitalization expenses was filed by Brigido Samson against Phil. International with the National Seamans Board (NSB).

The NSB ruled in favor of Samson and ordered Phil. Int. to pay him $3,800.00 and $380.00 for attorneys fees.

Phil. Int. filed an appeal with the NLRC and during the pendency of such, they offered P18,000.00 to Samson as settlement.

Samson then executed a Release Document which purportedly settled all liabilities of Phil. Int. to him.

The NLRC affirmed the decision of the NSB which subsequently became final and executory.

Upon execution, Phil. Int. presented the Release Document averring that they have been released of their obligation. Samson for his part contends that he was forced by the attending circumstances to sign and execute such document because at that time he badly needed money for his on-going medical treatment. The NLRC considered the P18,000.00 as partial fulfillment of the money judgment.

Issue:

WON there was a valid waiver.

Held:

No. In the case of MRR Yard Crew Union v Philippine National Railways, this Court held that the fact that the employee "has signed a satisfaction receipt does not result in waiver; the law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive less compensation than that the worker is entitled to recover."

Moreover, from the records it appears that there was a hearing on June 7, 1982 called by the National Seamen Board precisely to consider and resolve whether the payment of P18,000.00 admittedly made by petitioner was in full or partial satisfaction of the award for disability compensation benefits due to the private respondent. The said Board gave credit to the manifestations of private respondent that the latter was constrained to accept the payment of P18,000.00 and execute the release of document as at that time he was still undergoing on-going medical treatment for which apparently he needed funds for his expenses. A decision on a question of fact by an administrative body is entitled to respect. Courts, as a rule, refuse to interfere with proceedings undertaken by administrative bodies or officials in the exercise of administrative functions, absent any showing that such decision was rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition or mistake.

Aside from the reasons above-stated, we also note that the release document was executed by private respondent on May 7, 1981 during the pendency of the appeal made to the NLRC by petitioner Philippine International Shipping Corporation from the decision of the National Seamen Board, dated April 2, 1981. Despite the execution of said release document, the petitioner herein did not file any motion to dismiss its appeal or to have said appealed case declared terminated due to the alleged satisfaction of the judgment. This omission negates an inference that the parties had actually agreed that the payment of the P18,000.00 would be equivalent to a full satisfaction of the award and/or a waiver of the balance on the award.

Pacific v NLRC

Facts:

Teodoro Rances was engaged by Pascor as Radio Operator of a vessel belonging to Pascor's foreign principal, the Gulf-East Ship Management Limited (Gulf). He was then terminated for misbehavior and insubordination.

Pascor then filed a complaint against Rances with POEA for acts unbecoming of an officer. Rances for his part denied the allegation and interposed a counterclaim demanding $1,500.00 which a court in Dubai had awarded in his favor against Gulf. POEA ruled in favor of Pascor. However it was silent as to the alleged Dubai court decision.

Rances then filed a complaint against Pascor for the enforcement of the alleged Dubai decision.

Issue:

WON POEA has jurisdiction over the case.

Held:

No. Petitioner argues vigorously that the POEA had no authority and jurisdiction to enforce the judgment of a foreign court. Under Section 1, Rule 1, Book VI of the POEA Rules and Regulations, it will be seen that the POEA has jurisdiction to decide all cases 'involving employer employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen." Respondent Rances, however, relied not upon the employer - employee relationship between himself and petitioner corporation and the latter's foreign principal, but rather upon the judgment obtained by him from the Dubai Court which had apparently already been partially satisfied by payment to respondent Rances of US$ 5,500.00. The POEA has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a claim for enforcement of a foreign judgment. Such a claim must be brought before the regular courts. The POEA is not a court; it is an administrative agency exercising, inter alia, adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. Neither the rules of procedure nor the rules of evidence which are mandatorily applicable in proceedings before courts, are observed in proceedings before the POEA.

BAN ON DIRECT HIRING EMPLOYMENT 18, BK. IV, RULE II, POEA RULES ON OVERSEAS

Facilities Management vs. de la OsaFacts:

Facilities Management Corporation and J. S. Dreyer are domiciled in Wake Island while J. V. Catuira is an employee of FMC stationed in Manila. Leonardo dela Osa was employed by FMC in Manila, but rendered work in Wake Island, with the approval of the Department of Labor of the Philippines. De la Osa was employed as (1) painter with an hourly rate of $1.25 from March 1964 to November 1964, inclusive; (2) houseboy with an hourly rate of $1.26 from December 1964 to November 1965, inclusive; (3) houseboy with an hourly rate of $1.33 from December 1965 to August 1966, inclusive; and (4) cashier with an hourly rate of $1.40 from August 1966 to March 27 1967, inclusive. He further averred that from December, 1965 to August, 1966, inclusive, he rendered overtime services daily, and that this entire period was divided into swing and graveyard shifts to which he was assigned, but he was not paid both overtime and night shift premiums despite his repeated demands from FMC, et al. In a petition filed on 1 July 1967, dela Osa sought his reinstatement with full backwages, as well as the recovery of his overtime compensation, swing shift and graveyard shift differentials.

Subsequently on 3 May 1968, FMC, et al. filed a motion to dismiss the subject petition on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case, and on 24 May 1968, de la Osa interposed an opposition thereto. Said motion was denied by the Court in its Order issued on 12 July 1968. Subsequently, after trial, the Court of Industrial Relations, in a decision dated 14 February 1972, ordered FMC, et al. to pay de la Osa his overtime compensation, as well as his swing shift and graveyard shift premiums at the rate of 50% per cent of his basic salary. FMC, et al. filed the petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:Whether the mere act by a non-resident foreign corporation of recruiting Filipino workers for its own use abroad, in law doing business in the Philippines.

Whether FMC has been "doing business in the Philippines" so that the service of summons upon its agent in the Philippines vested the Court of First Instance of Manila with jurisdiction.

Held:1. In its motion to dismiss, FMC admits that Mr. Catuira represented it in the Philippines "for the purpose of making arrangements for the approval by the Department of Labor of the employment of Filipinos who are recruited by the Company as its own employees for assignment abroad." In effect, Mr. Catuira was alleged to be a liaison officer representing FMC in the Philippines. Under the rules and regulations promulgated by the Board of Investments which took effect 3 February 1969, implementing RA 5455, which took effect 30 September 1968, the phrase "doing business" has been exemplified with illustrations, among them being as follows: ""(1) Soliciting orders, purchases (sales) or service contracts. Concrete and specific solicitations by a foreign firm, not acting independently of the foreign firm, amounting to negotiation or fixing of the terms and conditions of sales or service contracts, regardless of whether the contracts are actually reduced to writing, shall constitute doing business even if the enterprise has no office or fixed place of business in the Philippines; (2) appointing a representative or distributor who is domiciled in the Philippines, unless said representative or distributor has an independent status, i.e., it transacts business in its name and for its own account, and not in the name or for the account of the principal; xxx (4) Opening offices, whether called 'liaison' offices, agencies or branches, unless proved otherwise. xxx (10) Any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, or in the progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and objective of the business organization."

2. FMC may be considered as "doing business in the Philippines" within the scope of Section 14 (Service upon private foreign corporations), Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which provides that "If the defendant is a foreign corporation, or a non-resident joint stock company or association, doing business in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose or, if there be no such agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines." Indeed, FMC, in compliance with Act 2486 as implemented by Department of Labor Order IV dated 20 May 1968 had to appoint Jaime V. Catuira, 1322 A. Mabini, Ermita, Manila "as agent for FMC with authority to execute Employment Contracts and receive, in behalf of that corporation, legal services from and be bound by processes of the Philippine Courts of Justice, for as long as he remains an employee of FMC." It is a fact that when the summons for FMC was served on Catuira he was still in the employ of the FMC. Hence, if a foreign corporation, not engaged in business in the Philippines, is not barred from seeking redress from courts in the Philippines (such as in earlier cases of Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, vs. Pacific Star Line, etc. [GR L-26809], In Mentholatum vs. Mangaliman, and Eastboard Navigation vs. Juan Ysmael & Co.), a fortiori, that same corporation cannot claim exemption from being sued in Philippine courts for acts done against a person or persons in the Philippines.

NATIONAL SEA MEN BOARD NOW POEA 20, BK. VII, RULE II, POEA RULES

Wallem Shipping v MOLE

Facts:

While on a port on Rotterdam, representatives from the International Transport Federation (ITF) boarded the ship where private respondents JAIME CAUNCA, ANTONIO CABRERA, EFREN GARCIA, JOSE OJEDA and RODOLFO PAGWAGAN . The ITF representatives talked to the captain of the ship and administrative manager of Wallem Philippines Shipping Inc. (Wallem) and agreed on new salary rates based on ITF standards. It was further agreed that Wallem will pay the difference to the salary already earned by the seaman.

However when the ship was in Dubai, the seaman did not received any payment. The Captain refused to pay the ITF standard wage. The genral manager of Wallem upon arriving in Dubai threatened the seamens that they will be terminated in case they keep on demanding ITF standard wage instead of Far Easts, Wallem principal, rates. The seamen were made to sign a new contract where they agreed to accept Far Easts rates. Private respondents on the other hand were not able to sign because they were on their working stations at that time. They were subsequently terminated.

Upon arrival to the Philippines, private respondents instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal and recovery of wages and other benefits corresponding to the five months' unexpired period of their shipboard employment contract.

Petitioners for their part averred that, private respondents together with the other crews insisted on worldwide ITF rate and threatened the ship authorities of picketing or boycott and declare the ship as hot ship by the ITF.

Issue:

WON the seamen were justified to demand the worldwide ITF standard rates instead of the contractual rates with Wallem and Far East.

Held:

Yes. Respondents should not be blamed for accepting higher salaries since it is but human for them to grab every opportunity which would improve their working conditions and earning capacity. It is a basic right of all workingmen to seek greater benefits not only for themselves but for their families as well, and this can be achieved through collective bargaining or with the assistance of trade unions. The Constitution itself guarantees the promotion of social welfare and protection to labor. It is therefore the Hearing Officer that gravely erred in disallowing the payment of the unexpired portion of the seamen's respective contracts of employment.

Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private respondents was justified because the latter threatened the ship authorities in acceeding to their demands, and this constitutes serious misconduct as contemplated by the Labor Code. This contention is not well-taken. The records fail to establish clearly the commission of any threat. But even if there had been such a threat, respondents' behavior should not be censured because it is but natural for them to employ some means of pressing their demands for petitioner, who refused to abide with the terms of the Special Agreement, to honor and respect the same. They were only acting in the exercise of their rights, and to deprive them of their freedom of expression is contrary to law and public policy. There is no serious misconduct to speak of in the case at bar which would justify respondents' dismissal just because of their firmness in their demand for the fulfillment by petitioner of its obligation it entered into without any coercion, specially on the part of private respondents.

On the other hand, it is petitioner who is guilty of breach of contract when they dismissed the respondents without just cause and prior to the expiration of the employment contracts. As the records clearly show, petitioner voluntarily entered into the Special Agreement with ITF and by virtue thereof the crew men were actually given their salary differentials in view of the new rates. It cannot be said that it was because of respondents' fault that petitioner made a sudden turn-about and refused to honor the special agreement.

Chavez v. Banto Perez ESALYN CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. EDNA BONTO-PEREZ, HON. ROGELIO T. RAYALA, HON. DOMINGO H. ZAPANTA, HON. JOSE N. SARMIENTO, CENTRUM PROMOTIONS PLACEMENT CORPORATION, JOSE A. AZUCENA, JR., and TIMES SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. respondents.Facts:

Petitioner Chavez, hired as an entertainment dancer in Japan, entered into a standard employment contract through a Philippine placement agency for 2 to 6 months, at a monthly compensation of $1,500. The POEA approved the contract. Subsequently, however, petitioner executed a side agreement with here Japanese employer stipulating a monthly salary stipulating a monthly salary of $750, and authorizing the employer to deduct $250 as commission of her manager. The salary therefore became $500 only.

She returned to the Philippines on June 14, 1989.

On February 21, 1991, she filed a complaint, seeking payment of $6,000 representing the unpaid portion of her basic salary for 6 months.

The POEA Administrator dismissed the complaint, holding that the agreement for a monthly salary of $750 was valid. Moreover, the POEA adjudged the complainant-petitioner guilty of laches or delay in filing here complaint about 2 years after her employment. On appeal, the NLRC upheld the POEAs decision. Chavez petitioned for review.

Issue: W/N the managerial commission agreement executed by Chavez valid.

Ruling: No.

The managerial commission agreement executed by petitioner to authorize her Japanese Employer to deduct Two Hundred Fifty U.S. Dollars (US$250.00) from her monthly basic salary is void because it is against our existing laws, morals and public policy. It cannot supersede the standard employment contract of December 1, 1988 approved by the POEA with the following stipulation appended thereto:

It is understood that the terms and conditions stated in this Employment Contract are in conformance with the Standard Employment Contract for Entertainers prescribed by the POEA under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1986. Any alterations or changes made in any part of this contract without prior approval by the POEA shall be null and void

Clearly, the basic salary of One Thousand Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$1,500.00) guaranteed to petitioner under the parties' standard employment contract is in accordance with the minimum employment standards with respect to wages set by the POEA, Thus, the side agreement which reduced petitioner's basic wage to Seven Hundred Fifty U.S. Dollars (US$750.00) is null and void for violating the POEA's minimum employment standards, and for not having been approved by the POEA. Indeed, this side agreement is a scheme all too frequently resorted to by unscrupulous employers against our helpless overseas workers who are compelled to agree to satisfy their basic economic needs.

B. REGULATION OF RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT ACTIVITIES

XX

5. BONDS

FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORP., petitioner,

vs.

WILLIAM INOCENCIO, ET AL. AND EDWIN CARDONES, THE ADMINISTRATOR, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS AND EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, respondents.

Facts:

Pan Pacific is a private, fee-charging, recruitment and employment agency. In accordance with the requirements of Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), Pan Pacific posted a surety bond issued by petitioner Finman and was granted a license to operate by the POEA.

Private respondents filed with the POEA separate complaints against Pan Pacific for violation of Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code and for refund of placement fees paid to Pan Pacific. The complainants alleged that Pan Pacific charged and collected such fees from them but did not secure employment for them.

Then, the POEA Administrator impleaded petitioner Finman as party respondent in its capacity as surety for Pan Pacific. For its part,Finmandenied liability and pleaded that the POEA had no "jurisdiction over surety bonds," because that jurisdiction is vested in the Insurance Commission or the regular courts.

Issue: W/N the POEA was the power to enforce liability under cash or surety bonds.

Ruling: Yes.

There appears nothing so special or unique about the determination of a surety's liability under its bond as to restrict that determination to the Office of the Insurance Commissioner and to the regular courts of justice exclusively. The exact opposite is strongly stressed by the second paragraph of Article 31 of the Labor Code:

Art. 31. Bonds. ... ...

The secretary of Labor shall have the exclusive power to determine, decide, order or direct payment from, or application of, the cash or surety bond for any claim or injury covered and guaranteedby the bonds.

To compel the POEA and private respondents the beneficiaries of Finman's bond-to go to the Insurance Commissioner or to a regular court of law to enforce that bond, would be to collide with the public policy which requires prompt resolution of claims against private recruitment and placement agencies. The Court will take judicial notice of the appealing frequency with which some, perhaps many, of such agencies have cheated workers avid for overseas employment by, e.g., collecting placement fees without securing employment for them at all, extracting exorbitant fees or "kickbacks" from those for whom employment is actually obtained, abandoning hapless and unlettered workers to exploitative foreign principals, and so on.

Cash and surety bonds are required by the POEA and its predecessor agencies from recruitment and employment companies precisely as a means of ensuring prompt and effective recourse against such companies when held liable for applicants or workers' claims. Clearly that public policy will be effectively negated if POEA and the Department of Labor and Employment were held powerless to compel a surety company to make good on its solidary undertaking in the same quasi-judicial proceeding where the liability of the principal obligor, the recruitment or employment agency, is determined and fixed and where the surety is given reasonable opportunity to present any defenses it or the principal obligor may be entitled to set up.

6. FEES PAID BY WORKERS

EASTERN ASSURANCE& SURETY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, ELVIRA VENTURA, ESTER TRANGUILLAN, et al., respondents.

Facts:

J & B applied with the POEA for a license to engage in a business as a recruitment agency. In connection with this, a surety bond was filed by the applicant and Eastern Assurance in virtue of which they both held themselves firmly bound unto POEA.

Then, 33persons applied for overseas employment with J&B. In consideration of promised deployment, complainants paid J&B various amounts for various fees. Because of non-deployment, the applicants filed separate complaints with POEA against J&B for violation of Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code.

Eastern Assurance, the surety of J&B, disclaimed liability on the ground that the claims were not expressly covered by the bond and that the POEA has no jurisdiction to order a forfeiture of the bond.

The POEA administrator issued an order in favor of the complainants. The non-deployment of the complainants strongly indicates that there was no employment obtained for them. Hence, such constitutes a violation of Art. 32 and 34 of the Labor Code. Eastern Assurance, being the surety of J&B, is primarily liable.

Issue: Do the POEA and the Secretary of Labor have jurisdiction over the claims for the refund of the illegally collected fees?

Ruling: Yes.

The POEA has the power to order the refund of illegally collected fees.

Implicit in these powers is the award of appropriate relief to the victims of the offenses committed by the respondent agency or contractor, specially the refund or reimbursement of such fees as may have been fraudulently or otherwise illegally collected, or such money, goods or services imposed and accepted in excess of what is licitly prescribed. It would be illogical and absurd to limit the sanction on an offending recruitment agency or contractor to suspension or cancellation of its license, without the concomitant obligation to repair the injury caused to its victims. It would result either in rewarding unlawful acts, as it would leave the victims without recourse, or in compelling the latter to litigate in another forum, giving rise to that multiplicity of actions or proceedings which the law abhors.

7. PROHIBITED PRACTICES, LIABILITY

CLARITA V. CRUZ, petitioner,

vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), EMS MANPOWER & PLACEMENT SERVICE (PHIL.), ABDUL KARIM AL YAHYA, and TRAVELLERS INSURANCE, respondents.

Facts:

Clarita Cruz worked in Kuwait for 2 yrs. After that, she went back home to Philippines. She filed complaint against EMS Manpower/Placement Services & foreign principal Abdul Karim Al Yahya for underpayment of her salary &non-payment of vacation leave. She also alleged that she was charged a placement fee of 7k instead of 5k, the maximum amount required by law for placement fee.

She added that her foreign employer treated her as a slave and required her to work 18 hours a day. She was beaten up and suffered facial deformity, head trauma and decreased sensation in the right portion of her body. On top of all this, she was paid only $120 per month and her total salaries were given to her only three hours before her flight back to Manila.

The Complaint was dismissed because of the affidavit of desistance.Private Respondent said that Cruz is bound to it. For her part, Cruz alleges that such affidavit was made under duress, false pretenses & w/o counsel.

Issue:W/N the respondent is liable to the petitioner?Ruling: Yes

Even if the quitclaim had foreclosed the petitioner's right, the fact that the consideration given in exchange thereof was very much less than the amount petitioner is claiming renders the quitclaim null and void for being contrary to public policy. The State must be firm in affording protection to labor. The quitclaim wherein the consideration is scandalously low and inequitable cannot be an obstacle to petitioner's pursuing her legitimate claim.

Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction.

8. SUSPENSION/ CANCELLATION OF LICENSE

TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABORFacts:

Trans Action, a private fee-charging employment agency, scoured Iloilo City for possible recruits for alleged job vacancies in Hongkong. Private respondents sought employment as domestic helpers through petitioner's employees, Luzviminda Aragon, Ben HurDomincil and his wife Cecille.

The applicants paid placement fees ranging from P1,000.00 to P14,000.00, but petitioner failed to deploy them. Their demands for refund proved unavailing; thus, they were constrained to institute complaints against petitioner for violation of Articles 32 and 34(a) 1 of the Labor Code.

Petitioner denied having received the amounts allegedly collected from respondents, and averred that Aragon, whose only duty was to pre-screen and interview applicants, and the spouses