People of the Philippines vs. Hadja Jarma Lalli G.R. No. 195419 12 October 2011

 CARPIO, J.:

Ruling:

Illegal Recruitment defined: Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042) defines illegal recruitment, as follows: 

[I]llegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contact services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines. x x x Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage. x x x Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. (Emphasis supplied) 

Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, defines “authority” as follows: 

“Authority” means a document issued by the Department of Labor authorizing a person or association to engage in recruitment and placement activities as a private recruitment entity.

 Section 7 of RA 8042 provides for the penalty of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate (which constitutes economic sabotage), as follows: 

(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined therein.

 Person or entity engaged in recruitment and placement activities without the required authority or license is engaged in illegal recruitment: 

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It is clear that a person or entity engaged in recruitment and placement activities without the requisite authority from the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), whether for profit or not, is engaged in illegal recruitment.39 The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), an agency under DOLE created by Executive Order No. 797 to take over the duties of the Overseas Employment Development Board, issues the authority to recruit under the Labor Code. The commission of illegal recruitment by three or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another is deemed committed by a syndicate and constitutes economic sabotage,40 for which the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than ₱500,000 but not more than ₱1,000,000 shall be imposed.41 Penalty of Illegal Recruitment: The penalties in Section 7 of RA 8042 have already been amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 10022, and have been increased to a fine of not less than ₱2,000,000 but not more than ₱5,000,000.  Elements of syndicated illegal recruitment; Syndicated - carried out by 3 or more persons conspiring with each other: However, since the crime was committed in 2005, we shall apply the penalties in the old law, RA 8042. In People v. Gallo,42 the Court enumerated the elements of syndicated illegal recruitment, to wit: 

1.      the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of “recruitment and placement” defined under Article 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the LaborCode; 2.      he has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and 3.      the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another.43 

Referral constitutes illegal recruitment since it falls under the definition of Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code: Article 13(b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines defines recruitment and placement as “any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not, provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.” Clearly, given the broad definition of recruitment and placement, even the mere act of referring someone for placement abroad can be

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considered recruitment. Such act of referral, in connivance with someone without the requisite authority or POEA license, constitutes illegal recruitment. In its simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed by persons who, without authority from the government, give the impression that they have the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes. 44  

Application of the elements in the case at bar: In this case, the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, found Lalli, Aringoy and Relampagos to have conspired and confederated with one another to recruit and place Lolita for work in Malaysia, without a POEA license.  The three elements of syndicated illegal recruitment are present in this case, in particular:  

(1) the accused have no valid license or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers;  (2) the accused engaged in this activity of recruitment and placement by actually recruiting, deploying and transporting Lolita to Malaysia; and  (3) illegal recruitment was committed by three persons (Aringoy, Lalli andRelampagos), conspiring and confederating with one another.

 Allegation of Aringoy: Aringoy claims and admits that he only referred Lolita to Lalli for job opportunities to Malaysia.  Ruling: 

Such act of referring, whether for profit or not, in connivance with someone without a POEA license, is already considered illegal recruitment, given the broad definition of recruitment and placement in the Labor Code.  

Conspiracy:  In this case, Lolita would not have been able to go to Malaysia if not for the concerted efforts of Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos. First, it was Aringoy who knew Lolita, since Aringoy was a neighbor of Lolita’s grandfather. It was Aringoy who referred Lolita to Lalli, a fact clearly admitted by Aringoy. Second, Lolita would not have been able to go to Malaysia if Lalli had not purchased Lolita’s boat ticket to Malaysia. This fact can be deduced from the testimony of Nora Mae Adling (Nora), ticketing clerk of AlesonShipping Lines, owner of the vessel M/V Mary Joy 2 plying Zamboanga City to Sandakan, Malaysia route and of M/V Kristel Jane 3. Nora testified in open court that “Hadja Jarma Lalli bought passenger tickets for her travel to Sandakan, not only for herself but also for other women passengers.” Lalli’s claim that she only goes to Malaysia to visit her daughter and son-in-law

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does not explain the fact why she bought the boat tickets of the other women passengers going to Malaysia. In fact, it appears strange that Lalli visited Malaysia nine (9) times in a span of one year and three months (March 2004 to June 2005) just to visit her daughter and son-in-law. In Malaysia, it was Relampagos who introduced Lolita and her companions to a Chinese Malay called “Boss” as their first employer. When Lolita and her companions went back to the hotel to tell Relampagos and Lalli that they did not want to work as prostitutes, Relampagos brought Lolita and the girls on board a van to Sangawan China Labuan, where they stayed in a room for one night. The next day, they were picked up by a van and brought to Pipen Club, where Lolita and her companions worked as prostitutes. To date, accused Relampagos is at large and has not been brought under the jurisdiction of the courts for his crimes. It is clear that through the concerted efforts of Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos, Lolita was recruited and deployed to Malaysia to work as a prostitute. Such conspiracy among Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos could be deduced from the manner in which the crime was perpetrated – each of the accused played a pivotal role in perpetrating the crime of illegal recruitment, and evinced a joint common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. 

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Romero vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 171644 23 November 2011

PERALTA, J.: Contention of petitioner:  petitioner offers her opinion that the CA erred in affirming the trial court's reliance on a mere certification from the DOLE Dagupan District Office that she does not have the necessary licence to recruit workers for abroad.  She claims that the prosecution committed a procedural lapse in not procuring a certification from the agency primarily involved, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).   Ruling: The said argument, however, is flawed.  Illegal recruitment is defined in Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended.

Article 13 (b) of the same Code defines, “recruitment and placement” as: “any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.” The crime of illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur, namely:  

(1) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and  (2) he undertakes either any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code.

 1st element of illegal recruitment:  Under the first element, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority is any person, corporation or entity  

which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or  whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary. 

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Creation of POEA did not divest the secretary of Labor of his jurisdiction over recruitment and placement of activities; Sec. of Labor has the power to:  

1. suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment for violation of rules and regulations (Article 35); 2. to “restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies,” but also to “promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions” governing said activities (Article 36).  

Clearly, the creation of the POEA did not divest the Secretary of Labor of his/her jurisdiction over recruitment and placement of activities.  The governing rule is still Article 35 of the Labor Code. This is further discussed in this Court's ruling in Trans Action Overseas Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, wherein it was ruled that: 

In the case of Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, we held that: 

The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are prescribed for violations of the above-quoted provisions, among others.  And the Secretary of Labor has the power under Section 35 of the law to apply these sanctions, as well as the authority, conferred by Section 36, not only to “restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies,” but also to “promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions” governing said activities. Pursuant to this rule-making power thus granted, the Secretary of Labor gave the POEA, on its own initiative or upon a filing of a complaint or report or upon request for investigation by any aggrieved person, “xxx (authority to) conduct the necessary proceedings for the suspension or cancellation of the license or authority of any agency or entity” for certain enumerated offenses including -

 1) the imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any amount of money, goods or services, or any fee  or bond in excess of what is prescribed by the Administration, and 2)   any other violation of pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and other relevant laws, rules and regulations.

             The Administrator was also given the power to “order the dismissal of the case or the suspension of the license or authority of the respondent agency or contractor or recommend to the Minister the cancellation thereof.” 

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                        This power conferred upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment was echoed in People v. Diaz, viz.: 

A non-licensee or non-holder of authority means any person, corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA OR the Secretary. 

Thus, the trial court did not err in considering the certification from the DOLE-Dagupan District Office stating that petitioner has not been issued any license by the POEA nor is a holder of an authority to engage in recruitment and placement activities.  The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment[ dated October 9, 2006, also gives a valid observation as to the admissibility of the certification as evidence for the prosecution, thus: 

x x x Notably, there is nothing on record to show that petitioner objected to the admissibility of the certification for the purpose for which it was offered.  Thus, petitioner's argument that the certification was inadmissible because it was not properly identified by the issuing officer should be rejected.  It is well-settled that “[e]very objections to the admissibility of evidence shall be made at the time such evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the ground for objection shall have become apparent, otherwise the objection shall be considered waived.”  Accordingly, the certification has been accepted as admissible by the trial court and properly considered as evidence for the party who submitted it.

 Contention of petitioner: petitioner insists that the CA was wrong in affirming the factual findings of the trial court.  According to her, the accommodation extended by the petitioner to the private respondents is far from the referral as contemplated in Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code. Ruling:           Nevertheless, the testimonies of the private respondents clearly establish the fact that petitioner's conduct falls within the term recruitment as defined by law.  As testified by Romulo Padlan, petitioner convinced him and Arturo Siapno to give her US$3,600.00 for the processing of their papers

X X X From the above testimonies, it is apparent that petitioner was able to convince the private respondents to apply for work in Israel after parting with their money in exchange for the services she would render.  The said act of the petitioner, without a doubt, falls within the

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meaning of recruitment and placement as defined in Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code. Contention of petitioner:          As to petitioner's contention that the testimony of Arturo Siapno that the latter paid a certain amount of money to the former must not be given any credence due to the absence of any receipt or any other documentary evidence proving such, the same is without any merit.  Ruling: Failure to present receipts for money that was paid in connection with the recruitment process will NOT affect the strength of the evidence presented by the prosecution as long as the payment can be proved:  In People v. Alvarez, this Court ruled that in illegal recruitment cases, the failure to present receipts for money that was paid in connection with the recruitment process will not affect the strength of the evidence presented by the prosecution as long as the payment can be proved through clear and convincing testimonies of credible witnesses.  It was discussed that: 

                   In illegal recruitment, mere failure of the complainant to present written receipts for money paid for acts constituting recruitment activities is not fatal to the prosecution, provided the payment can be proved by clear and convincing testimonies of credible witnesses. 

 x x x x             x x x  The Court has already ruled that the absence of receipts in a case for illegal recruitment is not fatal, as long as the prosecution is able to establish through credible testimonial evidence that accused-appellant has engaged in illegal recruitment. Such case is made, not by the issuance or the signing of receipts for placement fees, but by engagement in recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority.                         In People v. Pabalan, the Court held that the absence of receipts for some of the amounts delivered to the accused did not mean that the appellant did not accept or receive such payments.

 

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People of the Philippines vs. Lo G.R. No. 175229 29 January 2009

 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Contention of accused appellants: accused-appellants contend that the prosecution witnesses established that only Lo recruited private complainants and promised to deploy them abroad.  They deny having collected placement fees, but ironically admitted that the amount collected was for medical examination, visa and passport fees. Further, they insist that they are not guilty of estafa through false pretenses because they did not commit any act of deceit as it was only accused Lo who promised to deploy private complainants to Italy for a fee. Contention of the OSG: The people, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), maintains that accused-appellant Calimon committed the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale while accused-appellant Comila committed the crime of simple illegal recruitment.  By her conduct, Calimon successfully gave private complainants the impression that she had the ability to send workers abroad although she did not in fact have the authority to do so.  She was also able to induce private complainants to tender payment for fees.  Since there were three (3) workers involved in the transaction, she committed the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale.  As to Comila, the OSG argues that there is clear and convincing evidence that she conspired with Calimon.  The OSG, however, points out that conspiracy was not alleged in the Information.  Hence, Comila can only be convicted for simple illegal recruitment, not for illegal recruitment in large scale in conspiracy with Calimon.

Ruling: After a thorough review of the records, we hold that the present appeal is plainly unmeritorious. The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 8042 state: 

SEC. 6.  Definition. – x x x Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another.  It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. x x x

 Sec. 7.  Penalties. – x x x 

Elements of illegal recruitment in a LARGE SCALE:9

 In a litany of cases, we held that to constitute illegal recruitment in large scale three (3) elements must concur:  

(a) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers;  (b) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Art. 13, par. (b), of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the same Code (now Sec. 6, RA 8042); and,  (c) the offender committed the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group. 

Corollarily, Article 13, paragraph (b) of the Labor Code enumerates the acts which constitute recruitment and placement. Here, we are convinced that the three elements were sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt.  First, accused-appellants, undoubtedly, did not have any license to recruit persons for overseas work.  This is substantiated by the POEA, Licensing Branch which issued a Certification to this effect and the testimony of an employee of the POEA, Corazon Cristobal.

Second, accused-appellants engaged in illegal recruitment activities, offering overseas employment for a fee.  This is supported by the testimonies of the private complainants, particularly Devanadera who categorically testified that accused-appellants promised private complainants employment and assured them of placement overseas.

Magnaye and Agramon also corroborated the testimony of Devanadera. Their narration undoubtedly established that accused-appellants promised them employment in Italy as factory workers and they (accused-appellants) asked money from them (private complainants) to allegedly process their papers and visas. Private complainants were deceived as they relied on accused-appellants’ misrepresentation and scheme that caused them to entrust their money to them in exchange of what they later discovered was a vain hope of obtaining employment abroad. Third, accused-appellant Calimon committed illegal recruitment activities involving at least three persons, i.e., the three private complainants herein. On the part of Comila, this third element was not proved and thus, she was properly convicted of simple illegal recruitment only.  

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People of the Philippines vs. Ochoa G.R. No. 173792 31 August 2011

 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Ruling: Section 6 R.A. 8042: Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 defines illegal recruitment

 Illegal recruitment in a large scale: It is well-settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed.[44] All eight private complainants herein consistently declared that Ochoa offered and promised them employment overseas. Ochoa required private complainants to submit their bio-data, birth certificates, and passports, which private complainants did. Private complainants also gave various amounts to Ochoa as payment for placement and medical fees as evidenced by the receipts Ochoa issued to Gubat,[45] Cesar,[46] and Agustin.[47] Despite private complainants’ compliance with all the requirements Ochoa specified, they were not able to leave for work abroad. Private complainants pleaded that Ochoa return their hard-earned money, but Ochoa failed to do so. Contention of the petitioner:  Without the POEA certification, the prosecution had no proof that Ochoa is unlicensed to recruit and, thus, she should be acquitted.  Ruling of the Court: Ochoa’s contention is without merit.  In the case at bar, the POEA certification was signed by Dir. Mateo of the POEA Licensing Branch. Although Dir. Mateo himself did not testify before the RTC, the prosecution still presented Cory, Dir. Mateo’s subordinate at the POEA Licensing Branch, to verify Dir. Mateo’s signature.  Also worth re-stating is the justification provided by the Court of Appeals for the admissibility of the POEA certification, viz:

 The certificate is admissible x x x , an officer of the POEA, specifically in its licensing branch, had testified on the document. It does not follow, then, as appellant would want this court to assume, that evidence rejected during bail hearings could not be admissible during the formal offer of evidence. 

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x x x  As found in the office’s records, appellant, in her personal capacity, is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. It bears stressing, too, that this is not a case where a certification is rendered inadmissible because the one who prepared it was not presented during the trial. To reiterate, an officer of the licensing branch of the POEA, in the person of Ms. Aquino, testified on the document. Hence, its execution could be properly determined and the veracity of the statements stated therein could be ascertained.  

More importantly, Ochoa could still be convicted of illegal recruitment even if we disregard the POEA certification, for regardless of whether or not Ochoa was a licensee or holder of authority, she could still have committed illegal recruitment.  Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 clearly provides that any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority may be held liable for illegal recruitment for certain acts as enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (m) thereof.  Among such acts, under Section 6(m) of Republic Act No. 8042, is the “[f]ailure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker’s fault.” Ochoa committed illegal recruitment as described in the said provision by receiving placement and medical fees from private complainants, evidenced by the receipts issued by her, and failing to reimburse the private complainants the amounts they had paid when they were not able to leave for Taiwan and Saudi Arabia, through no fault of their own.  Ochoa further argues in her defense that she should not be found personally and criminally liable for illegal recruitment because she was a mere employee of AXIL and that she had turned over the money she received from private complainants to AXIL. We are not convinced. Ochoa’s claim was not supported by any corroborating evidence. The POEA verification dated September 23, 1998, also signed by Dir. Mateo, and presented by Ochoa during trial, pertains only to the status of AXIL as a placement agency with a “limited temporary authority” which had already expired. Said verification did not show whether or not Ochoa was employed by AXIL. Strangely, for an alleged employee of AXIL, Ochoa was not able to present the most basic evidence of employment, such as appointment papers, identification card (ID), and/or payslips.

 Estafa:  It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. We explicated in People v. Cortez and Yabut that:

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 In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that one’s acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.  

Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code defines estafa as: 

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow x x x:

 x x x x 

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

 (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits. The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.[56] Both elements are present in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, and 98-77303. Ochoa’s deceit was evident in her false representation to private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and Agustin that she possessed the authority and capability to send said private complainants to Taiwan/Saudi Arabia for employment as early as one to two weeks from completion of the requirements, among which were the payment of placement fees and submission of a medical examination report. Ochoa promised that there were already existing job vacancies overseas for private complainants, even quoting the corresponding salaries. Ochoa carried on the deceit by receiving application documents from the private complainants, accompanying them to the clinic for medical examination, and/or making them go to the offices of certain recruitment/placement agencies to which Ochoa had actually no connection at all. Clearly deceived by Ochoa’s words and actions, private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and Aquino were persuaded to hand over their money to Ochoa to pay for their placement and medical fees. Sadly, private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and Aquino were never able to leave for work abroad, nor recover their money.

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People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 181475, April 7, 2009 (illegal recruitment vs. estafa)

 Ruling: Large Scale Illegal Recruitment: The term "recruitment and placement" is defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code. On the other hand, Article 38, paragraph (a) of the Labor Code, as amended.   From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that any recruitment activities to be undertaken by non-licensee or non-holder of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution must prove three essential elements, to wit:  

(1) the person charged undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code;  (2) he/she did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and  (3) he/she committed the prohibited practice against three or more persons individually or as a group.7

 

The Court finds that the prosecution ably discharged its onus of proving the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of appellant of the crimes charged. Offender promised or offered employment whether for profit or not: That no receipt or document in which appellant acknowledged receipt of money for the promised jobs was adduced in evidence does not free him of liability. For even if at the time appellant was promising employment no cash was given to him, he is still considered as having been engaged in recruitment activities, since Article 13(b) of the Labor Code states that the act of recruitment may be for profit or not. It suffices that appellant promised or offered employment for a fee to the complaining witnesses to warrant his conviction for illegal recruitment. That one of the original complaining witnesses, Cabigao, later recanted, via an affidavit and his testimony in open court, does not necessarily cancel an earlier declaration. Like any other testimony, the same is subject to the test of credibility and should be received with caution.8 For a testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside lightly, least of all by a mere affidavit executed after the lapse of considerable time. In the case at bar, the Affidavit of Recantation was executed three years after the complaint was filed. It is thus not

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unreasonable to consider his retraction an afterthought to deny its probative value.9 

AT ALL EVENTS, and even with Cabigao’s recantation, the Court finds that the prosecution evidence consisting of the testimonies of the four other complainants, whose credibility has not been impaired, has not been overcome.  Illegal Recruitment vs. Estafa: As to the conviction of appellant for two counts of estafa, it is well established that a person may be charged and convicted of both illegal recruitment and estafa. People v. Comila,10 enlightens:  

x x x The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is malum in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second, such an intent is imperative. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, is committed by any person who defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud. x x x (Emphasis supplied) 

Appellant, who did not have the authority or license to recruit and deploy, misrepresented to the complaining witnesses that he had the capacity to send them abroad for employment. This misrepresentation, which induced the complaining witnesses to part off with their money for placement and medical fees, constitutes estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

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 Datuman vs. First Cosmopolitan G.R. No. 156029 14 November

2009: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Issue: On whether respondent is solidarily liable for petitioner’s monetary claims Ruling: Yes respondent is solidarily liable with petitioner's foreign employer.  Section 1 of Rule II of the POEA Rules and Regulations categorically declares that the private employment agency shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment: 

Section 1 of Rule II of the POEA Rules and Regulations states that:

        Section 1.  Requirements for Issuance of License.  – Every applicant for license to operate a private employment agency or manning agency shall submit a    written application together with the following requirements:            x x x          f. A verified undertaking stating that the applicant:             x x x  

(3) Shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with the implementation of the contract; including but not limited to payment of wages,  death and disability compensation and repatriation. (emphasis supplied)

 The above provisions are clear that the private employment agency shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer.  This Court has, time and again, ruled that private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based employer   for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment. This joint and solidary liability imposed by law against recruitment agencies and foreign employers is meant to assure the aggrieved worker ofimmediate and sufficient payment of what is due him. This is in line with the policy of the state to protect and alleviate the plight of the working class. 

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In the assailed Decision, the CA disregarded the aforecited provision of the law and the policy of the state when it reversed the findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter.  As the agency which recruited petitioner, respondent is jointly and solidarily liable with the latter’s principal employer abroad for her (petitioner’s) money claims.  Respondent cannot, therefore, exempt itself from all the claims and liabilities arising from the implementation of their POEA-approved Contract of Employment.  

 We cannot agree with the view of the CA that the solidary liability of respondent extends only to the first contract (i.e. the original, POEA-approved contract which had a term of until April 1990).  The signing of the “substitute” contracts with the foreign employer/principal before the expiration of the POEA-approved contract and any continuation of petitioner’s employment beyond the original one-year term, against the will of petitioner, are continuing breaches of the original POEA-approved contract.  To accept the CA’s reasoning will open the floodgates to even more abuse of our overseas workers at the hands of their foreign employers and local recruiters, since the recruitment agency could easily escape its mandated solidary liability for breaches of the POEA-approved contract by colluding with their foreign principals in substituting the approved contract with another upon the worker’s arrival in the country of employment.  Such outcome is certainly contrary to the State’s policy of extending protection and support to our overseas workers.  R.A. 8042 expressly prohibits: 1. substitution; OR 2. alteration x x x to the prejudice of the worker of employment contracts already approved and verified by the DOLE: To be sure, Republic Act No. 8042 explicitly prohibits the substitution or alteration to the prejudice of the worker of employment contracts already approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same without the approval of the DOLE.

 Respondent’s contention that it was petitioner herself who violated their Contract of Employment when she signed another contract in Bahrain deserves scant consideration.  It is the finding of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC – which, significantly, the CA did not disturb – that petitioner was forced to work long after the term of her original POEA-approved contract, through the illegal acts of the foreign employer.

 Side agreements; a SUBSEQUENTLY side agreement executed by the overseas contract worker w/ foreign employer which reduced the amount of salary is VOID. The side agreement which runs counter to the law and public policy cannot supersede the terms of the standard employment approved by POEA: 

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In Placewell International Services Corporation v. Camote, we held that the subsequently executed side agreement of an overseas contract worker with her foreign employer which reduced his salary below the amount approved by the POEA is void because it is against our existing laws, morals and public policy.  The said side agreement cannot supersede the terms of the standard employment contract approved by the POEA. 

 Terms of the ORIGINAL POEA-approved employment contract, as opposed to the subsequent contract executed by the overseas contract worker with the foreign employer which ran counter to laws and public policy will govern the relationship of the overseas contract worker with the recruitment agency and foreign principal employer: Hence, in the present case, the diminution in the salary of petitioner from US$370.00 to US$100 (BD 40.00) per month is void for violating the POEA-approved contract which set the minimum standards, terms, and conditions of her employment.  Consequently, the solidary liability of respondent with petitioner’s foreign employer for petitioner’s money claims continues although she was forced to sign another contract in Bahrain.  It is the terms of the original POEA-approved employment contract that shall govern the relationship of petitioner with the respondent recruitment agency and the foreign employer.  We agree with the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that the precepts of justice and fairness dictate that petitioner must be compensated for all months worked regardless of the supposed termination of the original contract in April 1990.  It is undisputed that petitioner was compelled to render service until April 1993 and for the entire period that she worked for the foreign employer or his unilaterally appointed successor, she should have been paid US$370/month for every month worked in accordance with her original contract. 

 Respondent cannot disclaim liability for the acts of the foreign employer which forced petitioner to remain employed in violation of our laws and under the most oppressive conditions on the allegation that it purportedly had no knowledge of, or participation in, the contract unwillingly signed by petitioner abroad.  We cannot give credence to this claim considering that respondent by its own allegations knew from the outset that the contract submitted to the POEA for approval was not to be the “real” contract.  Respondent blithely admitted to submitting to the POEA a contract stating that the position to be filled by petitioner is that of “Saleslady” although she was to be employed as a domestic helper since the latter position was not approved for deployment by the POEA at that time.  Respondent’s evident bad faith and admitted circumvention of the laws and regulations on migrant workers belie its protestations of innocence and put petitioner in a position where she could be exploited and taken advantage of overseas, as what indeed happened to her in this case.

 X X X. In the light of the recruitment agency’s legally mandated joint and several liability with the foreign employer for all claims in connection with the implementation of the

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contract, it is the recruitment agency’s responsibility to ensure that the terms and conditions of the employment contract, as approved by the POEA, are faithfully complied with and implemented properly by its foreign client/principal.  Indeed, it is in its best interest to do so to avoid being haled to the courts or labor tribunals and defend itself from suits for acts of its foreign principal. 

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Skippers United Pacific and Skippers Maritime Services vs. Doza, De Gracia and Aprosta G.R. No. 175558 08 February 2012 CARPIO, J.: Ruling: Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act) provides for money claims in cases of unjust termination of employment contracts: 

In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. 

The Migrant Workers Act provides that salaries for the unexpired portion of the employent contract or three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, shall be awarded to the overseas Filipino worker, in cases of illegal dismissal. However, in 24 March 2009, Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services and Marlow Navigation Co. Inc., the Court, in an En Banc Decision, declared unconstitutional the clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" and awarded the entire unexpired portion of the employment contract to the overseas Filipino worker. On 8 March 2010, however, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 (RA 10022) amended Section 10 of the Migrant Workers Act, and once again reiterated the provision of awarding the unexpired portion of the employent contract or three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. Nevertheless, since the termination occurred on January 1999 before the passage of the amendatory RA 10022, we shall apply RA 8042, as unamended, without touching on the constitutionality of Section 7 of RA 10022. Note: Prevailing rule is that OFWs who are dismissed without just cause are entitled to the payment of their salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of their fixed-term contract, irrespective of the term of the contract.

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