Q. LIABILITY OF JOINT TORT-FEASORS

FAR EAST SHIPPING CO vs. CA (PPA)REGALADO; October 1, 1998NATURE Review on certiorari the CA decision affirming TC decision holding FESC and Gavino solidarily liable.FACTS On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of the USSR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel. Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association (MPA) to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No. 4.

Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. - When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with 2 shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. A brief conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew members. When Gavino inquired what was all the commotion about, Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it. - After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. The vessel sustained damage too. Kavankov filed his sea protest. Gavino submitted his report to the Chief Pilot who referred the report to the Philippine Ports Authority. Abellana likewise submitted his report of the incident. - The rehabilitation of the damaged pier cost the Philippine Ports Authority the amount of P1,126,132.25.PERTINENT RULES on PILOTAGE The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District which is under compulsory pilotage pursuant to Section 8, Article III of Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 03-85:SEC. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service. For entering a harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing through rivers or straits within a pilotage district, as well as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or another, every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under compulsory pilotage. In case of compulsory pilotage, the respective duties and responsibilities of the compulsory pilot and the master have been specified by the same regulation:SEC. 11. Control of vessels and liability for damage. On compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his negligence or fault. He can only be absolved from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities provided he has exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or minimize damage.The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can countermand or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on board. In such event, any damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against said MasterSuch liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be determined by competent authority in appropriate proceedings in the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case.SEC. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or Pilots' Association. The duties and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows: xxx xxx xxxf) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or berthed safely; Provided, however, that his responsibility shall cease at the moment the Master neglects or refuses to carry out his order.- Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 issued twenty years earlier likewise provided in Chapter I thereof for the responsibilities of pilots:Par. XXXIX. A Pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes control thereof until he leaves it anchored free from shoal; Provided, That his responsibility shall cease at the moment the master neglects or refuses to carry out his instructions.xxx xxx xxxPar. XLIV. Pilots shall properly and safely secure or anchor vessels under their control when requested to do so by the master of such vessels.ISSUE WON both the pilot and the master were negligentHELDYES. The SC started by saying that in a collision between a stationary object and a moving object, there is a presumption of fault against the moving object (based on common sense and logic). It then went on to determine who between the pilot and the master was negligent. PILOT A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or in certain waters. He is an expert whos supposed to know the seabed, etc. that a master of a ship may not know because the pilot is familiar with the port. He is charged to perform his duties with extraordinary care because the safety of people and property on the vessel and on the dock are at stake. Capt. Gavino was found to be negligent. The court found that his reaction time (4 minutes) to the anchor not holding ground and the vessel still going too fast was too slow. As an expert he shouldve been reacting quickly to any such happenings. MASTER In compulsory pilotage, the pilot momentarily becomes the master of the vessel. The master, however may intervene or countermand the pilot if he deems there is danger to the vessel because of the incompetence of the pilot or if the pilot is drunk. - Based on Capt. Kavankovs testimony, he never sensed the any danger even when the anchor didnt hold and they were approaching the dock too fast. He blindly trusted the pilot. This is negligence on his part. He was right beside the pilot during the docking, so he could see and hear everything that the pilot was seeing and hearing. The masters negligence translates to unseaworthiness of the vessel, and in turn means negligence on the part of FESC.

CONCURRENT TORTFEASORS As a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. - There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.Disposition Petition denied. CA affirmed. Capt. Gavino and FESC are solidarily liable. R. VICARIOUS LIABLITY OF PARENTS AND GUARDIANS

LIBI VS HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURTG.R. NO. 70890 SEPTEMBER 18, 1992

FACTS:

Wendell Libi, son of petitioners, and Julie Ann Gotiong, the daughter of private respondent spouses, were sweethearts until Julie broke up with Wendell upon finding out of his sadistic and irresponsible character.

Wendell tried hard to reconcile with Julie Ann but when the latter refused, Wendell started making threats. On that fateful day of January 14, 1978, Julie Ann and Wendell died from a single gunshot wound each coming from the same Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi.

There being no eyewitnesses to the crime, petitioners and private respondents herein advanced conflicting versions of the case. Private respondents claimed that with the use of the same gun, Wendell took his own life after killing Julie Ann. On the other hand, the petitioners argued that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased by reason of his work as a narcotic informant, must have caused the death of Wendell and Julie Ann.

As a result of the death of Julie Ann, private respondents filed an action to recover damages arising from the vicarious liability of the parents of Wendell (petitioners herein) under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. After trial, the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Likewise, the counterclaim filed by the petitioners was dismissed for lack of merit.

On appeal lodged by private respondents, the respondent court set aside the dismissal of the case and held petitioners liable under Art. 2180 of the NCC. Hence this case.

Herein petitioners seek for the reversal of judgment of requiring them to pay P30,000.00 for moral damages, P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.

ISSUE: Are petitioners liable for vicarious liability under Art 2180 of the NCC?

HELD: YES. The Libi spouses are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor son under their legal authority or control, and who lives in their company.

Petitioners Libi failed to prove that they had exercised due diligence of a good father of a family over their son Wendell as shown by the fact that it was only when Wendell died that petitioners came to know that their son Wendell was a CANU agent and that the gun of petitioner Cresencio Bili was missing from their safety deposit box.

Petitioners are indeed liable under Art. 2180 of the NCC because it is still the duty of the parents to know the activity of their children and, in this case, had the petitioners been diligent in supervising the activities of Wendell and in keeping said gun from his reach, the death of Julie and Wendell could have been prevented.

Petitioners are indeed liable under Art. 2180 of the NCC because it is still the duty of the parents to know the activity of their children and, in this case, had the petitioners been diligent in supervising the activities of Wendell and in keeping said gun from his reach, the death of Julie and Wendell could have been prevented. The liability of the parents for damages caused by their children imposed under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligation arising from both quasi delict and criminal offenses.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against petitioners.

TAMARGO VS. CAGR NO. 85044, JUNE 3, 1992

FACTS:

In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries that resulted in her death. The petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of the tragic incident.

In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc. Such petition was granted on November 1982 after the tragic incident.

ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual custody was lodged with the biological parents.

HELD:

Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil code.

SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet begin nor had been completed at the time of the shooting incident. Hence, actual custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto.

Petition for review was hereby granted.

S. VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF OWNERS AND MANAGERS OF ESTABLISHMENTS AND ENTERPRISES

YHT REALTY CORPORATION, LAINEZ & PAYAM V. CA [2005]7:03 AM NO COMMENTSFACTS

Maurice Peaches McLoughlin is an Australian businessman-philanthropist who used to stay at the Sheraton Hotel during his trips to the Philippines prior to 1984. He met Brunhilda Mata-Tan who befriended him and showed him around. Tan convinced Mcloughlin to transfer to the Tropicana from the Sheraton where afterwards he stayed during his trips from Dec 1984 to Sept 1987.

On 30 Oct 1987, McLoughlin arrived from Australia and registered with Tropicana. He rented a safety deposit box as his usual practice. The box required two keys, the guest had one and one from the management. He placed US $10,000 in one envelope and US$5,000 in another, AU$10,000 in another envelope and other envelopes with his passport and credit cards. On 12 Dec 1987, he took from the box the envelope with US$5,000 and the one with AU$10,000 to go to Hong Kong for a short visit, because he was not checking out. When he arrived in HK, the envelope with US$5,000 only contained US$3,000, but because he had no idea if the safety deposit box has been tampered, he thought it was just bad accounting.

After returning to Manila, he checked out of the Tropicana on 18 Dec 1987 and left for Australia. When he arrived he discovered that the envelope with US$10,000 was short of US$5,000. He also noticed that the jewelry he bought in Hong Kong which he stored in the safety deposit box upon his return to Tropicana was likewise missing, except for a diamond bracelet.

He went back to the PH on 4 Apr 1988 and asked Lainez (who had custody of the management key) if some money was missing or returned to her, to which the latter answered there was not. He again registered at the Tropicana and rented a safety deposit box. He placed an envelope containing US$15,000, another of AU$10,000. On 16 Apr, he opened his safety deposit box and noticed that US$2,000 and AU$4,500 was missing from the envelopes. He immediately confronted Lainez and Payam who admitted that Tan opened the safety deposit box with the key assigned to McLoughlin. McLoughlin went up to his room where Tan was staying and confronted her. Tan admitted that she had stolen McLoughlins key and was able to open the safety deposit box with the assistance of Lopez, Payam and Lainez. Lopez also told McLoughlin that Tan stole the key assigned to McLoughlin while the latter was asleep. McLoughlin requested the management for an investigation of the incident. Lopez got in touch with Tan and arranged for a meeting with the police and McLoughlin. When the police did not arrive, Lopez and Tan went to the room of McLoughlin at Tropicana and thereat, Lopez wrote on a piece of paper a promissory note. He made Lopez and Tan sign a promissory note for him for the loss. However, Lopez refused liability on behalf of the hotel, reasoning that McLoughlin signed an "Undertaking for the Use of Safety Deposit Box" which disclaims any liability of the hotel for things put inside the box. On 17 May 1988 McLoughlin went back to AU and consulted his lawyers. They wrote a letter addressed to Pres. Cory Aquino which was pushed back to the DOJ and the Western Police District. He went back from the PH to AU several times more to attend business and follow up but the matter was only filed on 3 Dec 1990 since he was not there to personally follow up. McLoughlin filed an action against YHT Realty Corporation, Lopez, Lainez, Payam and Tan. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of McLoughlin. The CA modified only the amount of damages awarded. Tan and Lopez, however, were not served with summons, and trial proceeded with only Lainez, Payam and YHT Realty Corporation as defendants.(a) whether the loss of money and jewelry is supported by the evidence. YES. Where the credibility of a witness is an issue, the established rule is that great respect is accorded to the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses by the trial court. The trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.(b) whether there was gross negligence on the part of the innkeepers Payam and Lainez, who were employees of Tropicana, had custody of the master key of the management when the loss took place. They even admitted that they assisted Tan on three separate occasions in opening McLoughlins safety deposit box.The management contends that McLoughlin made its employees believe that Tan was his spouse for she was always with him most of the time. The evidence on record is bereft of any showing that McLoughlin introduced Tan to the management as his wife. Mere close companionship and intimacy are not enough to warrant such conclusion. They should have confronted him as to his relationship with Tan considering that the latter had been observed opening McLoughlins safety deposit box a number of times at the early hours of the morning. Art 2180, par (4) of the same Code provides that the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Given the fact that the loss of McLoughlins money was consummated through the negligence of Tropicanas employees both the employees and YHT, as owner of Tropicana, should be held solidarily liable pursuant to Art 2193.

ISSUE:WON the "Undertaking for the Use of the Safety Deposit Box" is null and void.

HELD:Yes, it is null and void. Art. 2003[1] is controlling. This is an expression of public policy that the hotel business like common carriers are imbued with public interest. This responsibility cannot be waived away by any contrary stipulation in so-called "undertakings" that ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by hotel keepers on guests for their signature.The CA (former case) even ruled before that hotelkeepers are liable even though the effects are not delivered to them or their employees, but it is enough that the effects are within the hotel or inn.Pars. 2 and 4 of the undertaking manifestly contravene Art. 2003 of the NCC. Meanwhile, the defense that Art. 2002 exempts the hotel-keeper from liability if the loss is due to the acts of the guest, family or visitors falls because the hotel is guilty of negligence as well. This provision presupposes that the hotel-keeper is not guilty of concurrent negligence or has not contributed in any degree to the occurrence of the loss.dispositive Damages awarded by the lower court sustained US$2,000.00 and AUS$4,500.00 or their peso equivalent at the time of payment; Air fares for a total of 11 trips + transpo expense Hotel payments Moral 50K ED 10K AF 200K

[1] Art. 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he is not liable for the Arts brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-keeper and the guest whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth in Arts 1998 to 2001[37] is suppressed or diminished shall be void.

T. VICARIOUS LIABLITY OF EMPLOYERS

VICTORY LINER v MALECDAN (Irah)

FACTS:

Andres Malecdan was a 75 year old farmer. While he was crossing a national highway, a Dalin Liner bus stopped to allow Malecdan and his carabao to pass. However, as Malecdan was crossing, a Victory Liner bus, driven by Joson, bypassed the Dalin bus and hit Malecdan and the carabao he was riding. Malecdan was thrown off the carabao, while the carabao toppled over. The Victory Liner bus sped past the old man, while the Dalin bus proceeded to its destination without helping Malecdan. Malecdan was brought to the hospital, where he died a few hours later. The carabao also died.

A criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property was filed against Joson. Subsequently, the heirs of Malecdan brought a suit for damages against Joson and Victory Liner. RTC held that Joson was negligent in driving the bus, while Victory Liner was guilty of negligence in the selection and supervision of Joson. Victory Liner appealed.

ISSUE:Can Victory Liner be held liable for damages to the heirs of Malecdan?

HELD:

YES.Article 2180, the responsibility of employers for the negligence of their employees in the performance of their duties is primary and, therefore, the injured party may recover from the employers directly, regardless of the solvency of their employees. Employers may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their employees acting within the scope of their assigned task only if they can show that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. They have the burden of proving that they exercised such diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. With respect to the supervision of employees, employers must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. These facts must be shown by concrete proof, including documentary evidence.

In the instant case, Victory Liner presented the results of Josons written examination, actual driving tests, x-ray examination, psychological examination, NBI clearance, physical examination, hematology examination, urinalysis, student driver training, shop training, birth certificate, high school diploma and reports from the General Maintenance Manager and the Personnel Manager showing that he had passed all the tests and training sessions and was ready to work as a professional driver. However, as the trial court noted, petitioner did not present proof that Joson had nine years of driving experience. There is also no record that Joson ever attended the seminars on driving safety given by the company to its drivers at least twice a year. Victory Liner also failed to establish the speed of its buses during its daily trips or to submit in evidence the trip tickets, speed meters and reports of field inspectors. The finding of the trial court that petitioners bus was running at a very fast speed when it overtook the Dalin bus and hit the deceased was not disputed by petitioner. For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in finding petitioner to be negligent in the supervision of Joson.

The Supreme Court reduced the amount of actual and moral damages granted by the lower court to P82,439 and P100,000, respectively. To justify an award of actual damages, there should be proof of the actual amount of loss incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim. Expenses incurred some time after the burial of the victim such as those relating to thee 9th day, 40th day, and 1st death anniversaries cannot be taken into account.ersary of the deceased. Also the P100,000 moral damages is awarded since trial court found that the wife and children of the deceased underwent intense moral suffering as a result of the Malecdans death. The P50,000 exemplary damages is also sustained since Joson was grossly negligent in driving at such a high speed along the national highway and overtaking another vehicle which had stopped to allow a pedestrian to cross, and even worse, Joson did not stop to help Malecdan after the accident. The P50,000 attorneys fees are also upheld.