Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan vs. Mun. of Buruanga, Aklan (March 31, 2006)towns/pueblos/churches/public plaza are property for public use and not subject for appropriation by the State and private persons

Facts:Petitioners claim ownership on Lots 138-A, 138-B, and 138-C contending that said lots were adjacent to the land area occupied by the church. Respondent however claims ownership on Lots 138-A and 138-C as the Lot 138-B is indisputably owned by the Church with its open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession thereof. The lots in dispute have constructions of a public plaza, municipal building, rural health center, community medicare hospital, basketball court, Rizal monument and a grandstand. Petitioner contends that such constructions and buildings were merely allowed by them in occupation by tolerance and does not constitute possession of the respondents.

Issues:Whether or not the land in dispute belongs to a public domain based on its nature of use?

Ruling:The Supreme Court held that public plaza and public thoroughfares is not subject for registration by either the church or the municipality. Property for public use of provinces and towns are governed by the same principles as property of public dominion of the same character. They are intended for the common and public welfare so they cannot be subject for appropriation either by the State or private person.

Laurel vs GarciaGR 92013 July 25, 1990.

Facts:

Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property, which is located in Japan. It is one of the properties given by the Japanese Government as reparations for damage done by the latter to the former during the war.

Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of public dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.

Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the case because the property is located in Japan. They posit that the principle of lex situs applies.

Issues and Held:

1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.

The answer is in the affirmative.

Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.

2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.

The answer is in the affirmative.

We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.

The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.

The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.

Villarico v. Sarmiento Facts: Villarico here is an owner of a lot that is separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue highway by a strip of land belonging to the government. Vivencio Sarmiento had a building constructed on a portion of the said government land and a part thereof was occupied by Andoks Litson Corp. In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, Villarico acquired a portion of the same area owned by the government. o He then filed an accion publiciana alleging that respondents (Vivencio) on the government land closed his right of way to the Ninoy Aquino Avenue and encroached on a portion of his lot. Issue: Whether or not VIllarico has a right of way to the NAA. Ratio: No. It is not disputed in this case that the alleged right of way to the lot belongs to the state or property of public dominion. o It is intended for public use meaning that it is not confined to privileged individuals but is open to the indefinite public. Records show that the lot on which the stairways were built is for the use of the people as passageway hence, it is a property for public dominion. o Public dominion property is outside the commerce of man and hence, it cannot be: Alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts Acquired by prescription against the state Cannot be the subject of attachment and execution Be burdened by any voluntary easement It cannot be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in favor of the petitioner and petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself and he cannot claim any right of possession over it.

Manila International Airport Authority vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No 155650, July 20, 2006.

Carpio, J.:

Doctrine: The term ports includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a port constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

Facts: Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Complex in Paraaque City. As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land,including the runways and buildings (Airport Lands and Buildings) then under the Bureau of Air Transportation. The MIAA Charter further provides that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by the President of the Philippines.The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel issued Opinion No. 061, in which it said that the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption for real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA charter. Therefore, MIAA was held to be delinquent in paying its taxes. The City of Paraaque Levied upon the properties of MIAA, and posted invitations for public biddings of MIAAs properties. The City of Paraaque averred that Section 193 of the Local Government code expressly withdrew tax exemptions from government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs).

Issue: Whether properties of the MIAA are subject to real estate taxes.

Held: No. In the first place, MIAA is not a GOCC, it is an instrumentality of the government. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers. As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land, including the runways and buildings (Airport Lands and Buildings) then under the Bureau of Air Transportation. The MIAA Charter further provides that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by the President of the Philippines.

Furthermore, Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. Article 419 of the Civil Code provides, The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

The Civil Code provides:

ARTICLE 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.

ARTICLE 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied)

ARTICLE 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.

ARTICLE 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.

No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, are owned by the State. The term ports includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a port constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. The operation by the government of a tollway does not change the character of the road as one for public use. Someone must pay for the maintenance of the road, either the public indirectly through the taxes they pay the government, or only those among the public who actually use the road through the toll fees they pay upon using the road. The tollway system is even a more efficient and equitable manner of taxing the public for the maintenance of public roads.

The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is of public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one intended for public use. Even if the government collects toll fees, the road is still intended for public use if anyone can use the road under the same terms and conditions as the rest of the public. The charging of fees, the limitation on the kind of vehicles that can use the road, the speed restrictions and other conditions for the use of the road do not affect the public character of the road.

The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as the landing fees MIAA charges to airlines, constitute the bulk of the income that maintains the operations of MIAA. The collection of such fees does not change the character of MIAA as an airport for public use. Such fees are often termed users tax. This means taxing those among the public who actually use a public facility instead of taxing all the public including those who never use the particular public facility. A users tax is more equitable a principle of taxation mandated in the 1987 Constitution.

The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, which its Charter calls the principal airport of the Philippines for both international and domestic air traffic, are properties of public dominion because they are intended for public use. As properties of public dominion, they indisputably belong to the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

Being a property of public dominion, the properties of MIAA are beyond the commerce of man.

Caveat: Anyone who claims this digest as his own without proper authority shall be held liable under the law of Karma.

CITY OF PASIG vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT- Real Property Tax

FACTS:MPLDC owned two parcels of land in Pasig City. In 1986, Jose Y. Campos, the registered owner of MPLDC, voluntarily surrendered MPLDC to the government. From 2002-2005, Pasig City sent notices of assessment to MPLDC to demand payment of real property taxes. PCGG filed with the RTCC a petition for prohibition with a prayer for issuance of a TRO claiming ownership over the said properties.

ISSUE:Are the properties owned by PCGG subject to real property taxes?

HELD:Only those portions of the properties leased to taxable entities are subject to real estate taxes for the period of such leases and may also be sold at public auctioned to satisfy the tax delinquency. While it was established that the owner of the properties is now clearly the Republic of the Philippines given the voluntary surrender, the Local Government Code clearly states that the exemption will not apply when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person. The Court cited several cases to support the decision such as Philippine Fisheries, GSIS, MIAA, and Lung Center.

Dream Village Neighborhood Association Inc., Represented by its Incumbent President, Greg Seriego, Petitioner, vs. Bases Conversion Development Authority, RespondentG.R. No. 192896, July 24, 2013

Facts: Dream Village, composed of more than 2,000 families have been occupying the disputed lot continuously, exclusively and notoriously since the year 1985. Said lot used to be a part of the Hacienda de Maricaban, which was subsequently purchased by the government of the United States of America (USA) and was converted to Fort William McKinley. Later on, USA transferred 30 hectares of it to the Manila Railroad Company, while the rest were still in the name of US Government. Finally, on December of 1956, the US government ceded Fort William McKinley to the Republic of the Philippines (RP) and was renamed Fort Bonifacio, reserved for military purposes. On January 1986, President Marcos Issued Proclamation No. 2476 declaring certain portions of Fort Bonifacio alienable and disposable, thus allowing sale to the settlers of home lots in Upper Bicutan, Lower Bicutan, Signal Village, and Western Bicutan. President Corazon Aquino on the other hand amended the proclamation of Pres. Marcos and limited the lots which were open for disposition. On March of 1992, the Bases conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) was created to oversee and accelerate the conversion of Clark and Military Reservations to productive civilian uses, which then authorized the President of the Philippines to sell the lands covered in whole or in part, specifically to raise capital for the BCDA. BCDA asserted its title to Dream Village owing to the fact that BCDAs titles over Fort Bonifacio are valid and commercially valuable to the agency, however, due to the passage of time, was contended to have been abandoned to Dream Village, and that BCDAs right over it has already prescribed.

Issue: Whether the area occupied by Dream Village is susceptible of acquisition by prescription.

Ruling: No. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription (Art.1113, NCC). Also, under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become patrimonial property only if there is a declaration that these are alienable or disposable, together with an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth. Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. It is also stipulated under PD 1529 that before the acquisitive prescription can commence, the property must expressly declared by the State that it is no longer intended for public service or the development of national wealth, and that absent such express declaration, the land remains to be property of public dominion. Subsequent proclamations over vast portions of Maricaban exempted the lot where Dream Village was situated from being open for disposition, thus Fort Bonifacio remains a property of public Dominion of the State because although declared alienable and disposable, it is reserved for some public service or development of national wealth, and thus, the acquisitive prescription asserted by Dream Village has not even begun to run. Thus, the area occupied by Dream Village is still not susceptible of acquisition by prescription.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 179987 April 29, 2009 The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) FACTS: On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre, situated in Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Malabanan and Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a 22 hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sonsthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application. Malabanan presented evidence during trial a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the CENRO-DENR, which stated that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan o had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and o that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. CA rendered a Decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. CA held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. CA noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, the Velazcos possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. (Interpretation of CA of Section 14(1) was based on the Courts ruling in Republic v. Herbieto) Malabanan died while the case was pending with the CA; it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court Petitioners rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit (handed down just 4 months prior to Herbieto) - with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree. With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. The OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2). o According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property had already been converted into private property through prescription. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to patrimonial property, while Section 14(2) speaks of private lands. The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable. DISCUSSION: Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act) governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands. Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses. Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles through judicial legalization. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites stated therein: Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term agricultural lands was changed to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. o The OSG submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered. o Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, agricultural lands are a mere subset of lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition. Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than only agricultural lands. Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application to possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier. It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree warrant comparison: Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: It is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor who has been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title. There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the Public Land Act (amended by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002) limits the period within which one may exercise the right to seek registration under Section 48. Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President. The substantive right granted under Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020. The OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSGs approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. Discussed in Naguit. adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state. [T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. The application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent from the decision whether petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original registration following Section 14(1), their position being that they had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945. The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2) Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[[31]] With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of private lands under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible basis for application for original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the application. It reads: All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirty-year possession period immediately preceding the application for confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether the property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such, throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: [p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. The identification what consists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421 Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? - We rule in the negative. As the application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code. Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code. Whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary prescription, the period of possession preceding the classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But after the property has been become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor. Once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the property under the Torrens system. It should be remembered that registration of property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of ownership. SYNTHESIS OF DOCTRINES APPLIED: (1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession. (a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.[51] (b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. (2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. (a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. (b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership. APPLICATION OF DOCTRINES: Evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. The Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED.

Province of Zamboanga Del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, et alL-24440, March 28, 1968

FACTS: After Zamboanga Province was divided into two (Zamboanga Del Norte and Zamboanga Del Sur), Republic Act 3039 was passed providing that--

"All buildings, properties, and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred free of charge in favor of the City of Zamboanga." Suit was brought alleging that this grant without just compensation was unconstitutional because it deprived the province of property without due process. Included in the properties were the capital site and capitol building, certain school sites, hospital and leprosarium sites, and high school playgrounds.

ISSUES:

Are the properties mentioned, properties for public use or patrimonial property?Should the city pay for said properties?

HELD:

If we follow the Civil Code classification, only the high school playgrounds are for public use since it is the only one that is available to the general public, and all the rest are patrimonial property since they are not devoted to public use but to public service. But if we follow the law on Municipal Corporations, as long as the purpose is for a public service, the property should be considered for PUBLIC USE.If the Civil Code classification is used, since almost all the properties involved are patrimonial, the law would be unconstitutional since the province would be deprived of its own property without just compensation. If the law on Municipal Corporations would be followed, the properties would be of public dominion, and therefore NO COMPENSATION would be required. It is the law on Municipal Corporations that should be followed. Firstly, while the Civil Code may classify them as patrimonial, they should not be regarded as ordinary private property. They should fall under the control of the State, otherwise certain governmental activities would be impaired. Secondly, Art. 424, 2nd paragraph itself says "without prejudice to the provisions of special laws."

Salas v Jarencio

Facts:Municipal Board of Manila adopted a resolution requiring the Pres. to consider the feasibility of declaring an area to be a patrimonial property of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants. RA 4118 was passed declaring the area as an alienable/disposable land of the State, to be placed under the Land Tenure Administration(Land Authority). Gov. Yap of Land Authority wrote letter to Mayor of Manila for the proposed subdivision plan of w/c Manila accepted. But due to unknown reasons, Manila decided to go against their agreement and prayed that RA 4118 be not implemented and that it is unconstitutional.Respondent Judge Jarencio declared that RA 4118 is unconstitutional and invalid, thus the petition for review.

Issue:Is RA 4118 valid?

Held:VALID! Manila has not shown any evidence that it acquired said land as private or patrimonial property. Further, RA 4118 was intended to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the Land for the Landless program. The RA was never intended to expropriate the property involved but confirmed its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the Natl Govt through the Land Authority.

(STATCON PRINCIPLE: PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES)Presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of the law. To declare a law as unconstitutional, the repugnancy must be clear and unequivocal. To strike down a law, there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the statute allows it to be done.

CEBU OXYGEN VS BERCILLES

In 1968, a terminal portion of a street in Cebu was excluded in the citys development plan hence the council declared it as abandoned and was subsequently opened for public bidding. Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. was the highest bidder at P10,800.00. Cebu Oxygen applied for the lands registration before CFI Cebu but the provincial fiscal opposed it, so did the court later through Judge Pascual Bercilles, as it was ruled that the road is part of the public domain hence beyond the commerce of man.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cebu Oxygen can validly own said land.

HELD: Yes. Under Cebus Charter (RA 3857), the city council may close any city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed. Since that portion of the city street subject of Cebu Oxygens application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract.

Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.

Macasiano vs Diokno GR 97764 (August 10, 1992)Posted on October 19, 2012211 SCRA 464

G.R. No. 97764

August 10, 1992

Facts:

Respondent Municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the closure of J.Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets and the establishment of a flea market thereon. This was passed pursuant to MMC Ordinance No.2 and was approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority on July 20, 1990.

On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and Palanyag entered into a contract agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain & manage the flea markets and/or vending areas in the aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Paraaque.

On September 13, 1990 Brig. Gen. Macasiano ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz & Gabriel Street in Baclaran. He also wrote a letter to Palanyag ordering the destruction of the flea market.

Hence, respondent filed a joint petition praying for preliminary injunction. The trial court upheld the assailed Ordinance and enjoined petitioner from enforcing his letter-order against Palanyag.

Issues:

WON an ordinance/resolution issued by the municipal council of Paraaque authorizing the lease & use of public streets/thoroughfares as sites for the flea market is valid.

Held:

No.

J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the local government devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority to control/regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.

Sec. 10, Chapter II of the LGC should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already established by law.

The closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended/necessary for public use/service. Once withdrawn, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the LGU concerned and only then can said LGU use the property as an object of an ordinary contract. Roads and streets available to the public and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. The LGU has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons.

Also, the disputed ordinance cannot be validly implemented because it cant be considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance with the conditions it imposed for the approval of said ordinance.

The powers of an LGU are not absolute, but subject to the limitations laid down by the Constitution and laws such as the Civil Code. Every LGU has the sworn obligation to enact measures that will enhance the public health, safety & convenience, maintain peace & order and promiote the general prosperity of the inhanbitants pf the local units.

As in the Dacanay case, the general public have the right to demand the demolition of the illegally constructed stalls in public roads & streets. The officials of the respondent municipality have the corresponding duty arising from public office to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific public purpose.

The ordinance is void and illegal for lack of basis in authority in laws applicable during its time.