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DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES

POLICY DEPARTMENT C: CITIZENS' RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS

LEGAL AFFAIRS

Workshop on the Proposal for a Regulation on Succession

- Some national analysis -

22 March 2010

PE 419.629 EN

This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Legal Affairs AUTHORS Rembert Suess, Deutsches Notarinstitut (Institute of German Notaries); Sara Godechot-Patris, Professor of Law, Université François Rabelais de Tours; Elisabeth Scheuba, Rechtsanwalt, Lecturer (Succession Law, Vienna University), Head of Austrian Bar Delegation to the CCBE (Council of Bar and Law Societies of Europe); Riitta Leppiniemi, President of the Finnish Bar Association RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATOR Ms Roberta PANIZZA Policy Department C - Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs European Parliament B-1047 Brussels E-mail: [email protected] LINGUISTIC VERSIONS Original: EN, FR ABOUT THE EDITOR To contact the Policy Department or to subscribe to its newsletter please write to: [email protected] Manuscript completed in March 2010

Brussels, © European Parliament

This document is available on the Internet at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies

DISCLAIMER

The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorized, provided the source is acknowledged and the publisher is given prior notice and sent a copy.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. The proposed EU Regulation on Succession and German Law - Rembert Suess, Deutsches Notarinstitut (Institute of German Notaries) II. Proposition de règlement du Parlement européen et du Conseil en matière de successions et le droit français - Sara Godechot-Patris, Professor of Law, Université François Rabelais de Tours III. The proposed EU Regulation on Succession and Austrian Law - Elisabeth Scheuba, Rechtsanwalt, Lecturer (Succession Law, Vienna University), Head of Austrian Bar Delegation to the CCBE (Council of Bar and Law Societies of Europe) IV. The proposed EU Regulation on Succession and Finnish Law - Riitta Leppiniemi, President of the Finnish Bar Association

The proposed EU Regulation on Succession and German Law

Rembert Suess, Deutsches Notarinstitut

Abstract: This note analyses some provisions of the proposed EU Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and authentic instruments in matters of succession and the creation of a European Certificate of Succession, which according to the author needs to be reviewed. The note also assesses the impact of these provisions on German law in the area of succession. Lastly, it proposes some changes to the proposed EU Regulation on Succession.

Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs __________________________________________________________________________________________

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CONTENTS Executive summary.......................................................................................2

Introduction.................................................................................................3

I. The European Certificate of Succession...................................................4

II. The Relationship to property law ...........................................................7

III. Jurisdiction ......................................................................................10

IV. Recognition of Authentic Instruments ..................................................12

V. The applicable Law ............................................................................13

VI. The law applicable to succession contracts and joint wills ........................21

VII. The Matrimonial property regime .........................................................27

The proposed EU Regulation on Succession and German Law _________________________________________________________________________________

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The proposal for the Regulation generally has to be supported. However, some points have to be reconsidered:

• The Proposal is based on the opinion, that the devolution of a single item of property by death is governed by the law applicable to the succession. However, succession law governs only the acquisition of the heritage as a whole entity. The acquisition of single assets is subject to the lex rei sitae in order to preserve the property law systems of the Member states. Therefore, some rules on the scope of the applicable law and the European certificate of Succession have to be amended.

• The rules on “recognition” of authentic documents are likely to cause misunderstandings and should be eliminated. Instead, the Regulation should release authentic instruments from another Member State used in succession matters from the requirement of legalisation and/or Apostille.

• A definition of the habitual residence of the deceased should be inserted into the Regulation in order to secure that a legal system is applied, which the deceased was familiar with and in order to prevent unintended changes of the applicable law.

• The European Union should ratify the Hague Convention on the Form of Wills or include its rules into the Regulation.

• The validity and effects of joint wills should be governed by the law applicable to the formal validity of wills; the rules for succession contracts should apply mutatis mutandis to the effects of the joint wills.

• The courts at the domicile of the defendant should have jurisdiction in contentious litigation.


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INTRODUCTION The Proposal of the Commission for a Regulation on Succession contains, inter alia, rules on the determination of the law applicable to the succession and the Creation of an European Certificate of Succession, that will be issued by the authorities of one Member State of the European Union and will serve as prove of the capacity as heir and owner of the estate in all other Member States. Succession law is closely connected to law of property. Both legal areas are coordinated in national law. If different laws apply to succession and to the property relationship, this might lead to serious contradictions. The security of property transactions will be affected. Therefore, the scope of application of succession law and the borderline to property law has to be defined diligently. This briefing note shows that the scope of application of succession law according to the Proposal is to broad and which provisions have to be included to preserve the integrity of property law. In succession matters, in particular for the purpose of estate planning, foreseeability of results and security is essential. The conflict rules of the Regulation therefore should refer to a legal system, which the deceased is really closely connected to and might be familiar with. It must, at every time, be possible to establish definitely whether a will or a succession contract is valid or not. Unexpected changes of the applicable law must be avoided in the case of citizens moving from one Member State to another. This briefing note shows which improvements should be made to the conflict rules of the Proposal in order to achieve this goal. In international succession cases a lot of embarrassing paperwork has to be done. Documents issued by the authorities of one Member State have to be used in another Member State. Therefore, the free circulation of authentic documents is a practical issue of high importance. The rules eliminating the need for supplemental prove for the use of foreign authentic documents on the other hand, should not provide the opportunity to circumvent or to evade the requirements of the applicable substantive law (succession law, property law and other rules). This note shows whether such a danger exists and how it can be avoided.


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I. The European Certificate of Succession 1. The Need for a European Certificate of Succession Requiring the application for separate proceedings in every state in a case of a succession of an estate situated in different Member States of the Union constitutes an impediment to the free investment in other member States and should not be underestimated.

E.g. the deceased, a German craftsman with last habitual residence in Dresden, created his business in the form of an English private limited company (Ltd.). After his death the heirs want to elect a new director to the board of the company in order to continue the business. First, they all have to apply to the English Probate Court for the nomination of an administrator of the shares in the company which are situated in England. Only a personal representative acknowledged in the probate proceedings by an English court will be able to transfer the shares to the heirs and to give notice of the transfer to the company secretary who will register the heirs in the share register of the company. Therefore, the German Erbschein will not enable to dispose over the assets in England. It goes without saying that such a procedure will be very time consuming and expensive to the heirs who are not familiar with the English legal system and do not know how to communicate with English courts or even how to get into contact with English solicitors. Another example is the following: The deceased, a German citizen with last residence in Berlin, is inherited by 32 relatives. The deceased had an account with a Scottish bank. A disposition over the account will only be possible if one of the heirs is instituted as administrator by the Sheriff Court in Edinburgh. The Sheriff Court requires the affidavit of a German Lawyer that according to German law the co-heirs do not have to consent to the nomination of an executor-dative by the Sheriff Court. The heirs didn’t find a German lawyer ready to give this statement under oath.

These “multiplied” proceedings result in added costs, loss of time and nuisance. The example of the heirs in the above mentioned example might inhibit a lot of citizens to invest their money in banks situated in another Member State. The creation of a European Certificate of Succession will be the most important practical success achieved by the Regulation, provided, however, that conflicts with material and international property law will be avoided. Therefore, the difficulties caused by the complexity of this task should not prevent from the introduction of the European Certificate of Succession. 2. Competence of the European Union to create a European Certificate

of Succession The introduction of the European Certificate of Succession does not only involve the drafting of rules on the international competence to issue the certificate and its


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recognition in the other Member States; the existing systems of succession certificates in the Member States diverge significantly with regard to form, contents, and effects. The effects of the certificates must be established according to the law of the state which issued the certificate. In practice, it would be impossible to get an overview over the systems of certificates of succession in every Member States of the Union. Therefore, merely applying the concept of mutual recognition to the certificates of succession in the Member States in reality will not be able to provide a significant relief in the handling of international succession. Without setting a “minimum standard” for the Certificate by issuing some uniform rules on form, contents, and effects of a European Certificate of Succession the mutual recognition of succession certificates in practice cannot work. Such rules necessary to introduce a European Certificate of Succession are neither rules on conflict of laws nor rules on jurisdiction, but a type of hybrid system between procedural law and substantive law. Therefore, the question has been raised on whether the issuance of the rules on the form, contents, and effects of a European Certificate of Succession are covered by the legislative competence provided in Article 81 subpara. 2 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). As Article 81 subpara. 2 lit. c) TFEU refers to “rules on conflict of laws and jurisdiction”, there is no competence given by this clause. Article 81 subpara. 2 lit. a) TFEU focuses on the mutual recognition of decisions in extrajudicial cases. This will also cover rules on the mutual recognition of Succession Certificates. This clause also does not explicitly give any competence to issue rules which do not only regulate the mutual recognition of decisions, but also regulate the effects of the decisions. As mentioned before, it will be practically impossible to regulate the mutual recognition of Succession certificates without setting a (minimum) standard for the certificate at the same time. Mansel therefore advocated an “imputed competence” (Annexkompetenz) deriving from Art. 61 lit. c and Article 65 lit. b ECT.1 Moreover, now Article 81 subpara.1 sent. 2 TFEU explicitly gives the power to adopt measures for the approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States in order to develop judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross border implications. Article 81 subpara. 2 lit. f) TFEU opens the possibility eliminate obstacles to the proper functioning of civil procedures, if necessary by promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure applicable in the Member Sates. It is recognised that this rule does not give the competence to completely unify the civil procedure rules in the Member States or to issue a European Civil Procedure Act. However, the possibility to eliminate the obstacles by issuing some single rules on special issues would be covered by this competence rule.2

1 Heinz-Peter Mansel, Vereinheitlichung des internationalen Erbrechts in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft – Kompetenzfragen und Regelungsgrundsätze, in Tugrul Ansay’a Armagan, Ankara 2006, page 185 seqq, on page 192. 2 Compare Stefan Leible, in: Rudolf Streinz, Vertrag über die Europäische Union und Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Munich 2003, Art. 65 EGV annot. 18; Marc Heggen, .Vereinheitlichungstendenzen im Erb- und Testamentsrecht, Rheinische Notarzeitung 2007, page 1, 8.


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Therefore, it appears legitimate to conclude that the creation of a European Certificate of Succession by the Union is covered by the Treaty. However, as this competence is only given as an “annex” to the competence to ensure the mutual recognition and enforcement between Member States of judgements and of decisions in extrajudicial cases, some restrictions are to be observed:

• The Union is only competent to introduce a Succession Certificate for the use outside of the Member State whose authorities have issued the Certificate.

• The effects of the Certificate are resticted to the findings of the issuing authority in the field of succession law. This involves the capacity of a heir, the powers of an administrator, obligations of the heir towards other beneficiaries like legatees, people entitled to an usufruct, etc. Effects on property law should be excluded.

3. The domestic use of the European Certificate of Succession Article 36 subpara. 2 sent. 3 of the Proposal states that the effects of the European Certificate of Succession shall also be recognised in the Member State whose authorities have issued the certificate. However, it must not be forgotten that Article 81 subpara. 1 TFEU provides a competence of the European Union only to “matters having cross border implications”. Article 81 subpara. 2 lit. a) TFEU gives a competence only for the mutual recognition between Member States. Therefore, due to the limited scope of competence provided by Article 81 TFEU the rules on the European Certificate of Succession must be limited to Succession Certificates issued for the recognition and use in another member State.3 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal, under 4.6., states that “in the Member State of the competent authority the capacity of heir and the powers of an administrator or executor of the succession must be proven according to the domestic procedure”. Article 36 subpara 2 of the Proposal obviously contradicts to this principle. To avoid the need for “multiplied proceedings” for the issuance of a domestic and a European Certificate of Succession the following solutions might be possible:

• The findings in a domestic certificate should be binding for the European Certificate and vice versa. The issuance of the European Certificate therefore will be based on the domestic certificate and will “translate” the domestic certificate into the form of the European Certificate. When the European Certificate has already been issued the domestic certificate will be based on the findings in the European Certificate. This in some way is comparable to the issuance of a “European Enforcement Order” according to the EC 805/2004 Regulation.

• The Member States should be given the right (but due to the limited regulatory competence of the Union not be compelled) to accept the European Certificate of Succession issued by domestic authorities also for the domestic use. Although the Union has no power to enforce the use of the European Certificate in domestic cases, it cannot prohibit the Member

3 Also: Daniel Lehmann, Die Reform des internationalen Erb- und Erbprozesrechts im Rahmen der geplanten Brüssel-IV Verordnung, zerb-Verlag 2006, page 257.


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State whose authorities have issued the Certificate to extend the effects of the European Certificate of Succession to its own territory.

4. Intertemporal Application of the rules on the European Certificate of

Succession The Regulation applies only to successions of persons who died after the date of its application. This limitation in time is reasonable with regard to the rules on conflict of laws. However, there is no reason why the heirs of a deceased who died before the date of application should not be able to apply for a European Certificate. Therefore, Article 50 should include a stipulation that the rules on the European Certificate shall be applied beginning with the date of application, also if the deceased died before the date of application of the Regulation. II. The Relationship to property law 1. The Acquisition of single items of the estate by a legatee No. 10 of the Recitals of the Proposal states that the Regulation should cover the method of acquiring a right in rem with respect to tangible or intangible property as provided for in the law governing the succession. On the other hand, the numerus clausus of rights in rem which may exist under the national law of the Member States in principle is governed by the lex rei sitae. Article 1 No. 3 lit. j) of the Proposal, explicitly excludes the nature of rights in rem relating to property and publicising these rights from the scope of application of the Regulation. Further, pursuant to Article 39 lit. b) of the Proposal, a partial Certificate of Succession may be applied for the “devolution of a specific item of property, where this is allowed under the law applicable to the succession”. Pursuant to Article 41 subpara. 2 lit. h) of the Proposal, the Certificate of Succession should state the share of each heir and, if applicable, the list of rights and assets for any given heir. Pursuant to Article 42 subpara 2 sent. 2 of the Proposal it shall be presumed that the person designated by the Certificate as legatee shall hold the right to the succession stated in the certificate. These rules seem to be a result of a misunderstanding of the relationship between succession law and property law. The transfer of property by succession on death – at least according to legal thinking in most of the Member States – is a form of universal succession (Gesamtrechtsnachfolge). The transmission of the estate by succession on death pursuant to § 1922 German BGB necessarily involves the estate as a whole entity, including all rights and obligations, assets and debts, tangible and intangible.4 This rule applies if a person becomes sole heir of the deceased or if he receives a quota in the whole estate as a co-heir together with the co-heirs. The same is true with regard to a legatee who, according to French law, is entitled to the whole estate or a part of the whole estate. One could also consider that a usufruct which does not extend to certain goods of the estate but to the whole estate; respectively a quota of the whole

4 Dieter Leipold, in: Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, 4. ed. Munich 2004, § 1922 BGB annot. 93 seqq.


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estate should be regarded as a kind of universal succession and therefore be subject to the lex successionis. The transfer of a single right in rem on the other side (Einzelrechtsnachfolge) is and must remain subject of property law. A legacy with regard to certain single items of the estate creates an obligation of the heir, respectively the administrator of the estate, to transfer these items to the legatee. The transfer of these single items concerned by the legacy can only be realised on the basis of property law.

For example, a piece of land situated in Germany will and must be transferred by an agreement on the transfer (Auflassung) and the registration of the legatee in the land register (Grundbuch), § 873 German BGB. English law also requires an assent on the transfer of property to the legatee.

In a number of Member States the object of the legacy is automatically transferred to the legatee by virtue of the death of the deceased (e.g. France, Italy). This effect, however is not rooted in succession law, but is a result of the property law system in these states.5 In France the property is transferred by nudum consensus. Therefore, the testamentary obligation of the heir to transfer a particular item of the heritage to the legatee – according to French property law – has the effect that the property will be automatically transferred to the legatee. This transfer will occur irrespective of whether German or French law applies to the succession. The succession law only creates the title for the transfer. A legacy of a piece of land situated in Germany will be performed by Auflassung and registration – irrespective of whether German or French law applies to the succession. Therefore, the definition of “succession to the estates of deceased persons” in Article 2 lit. a) of the Proposal must be rectified a follows:

Article 2 a) “succession to the estates of deceased persons”: all forms of transmission of the property of the deceased as a whole unity – including assets and debts – as a result of death, be it in accordance with a will or a succession contract, or on the basis of the legal rules on the succession on death;

In the same way Nr. 8 of the Recitals should be altered, because succession does not effect the transfer of property but the transfer of estate.

(8) The scope of the Regulation should include all questions arising in civil law in connection with succession to the estates of deceased persons, namely all forms of transfer of the estate of the deceased person as a result of death … or a legal transfer of the estate as a result of death.

Further, despite this distinction between succession law and property law, the European Certificate of Succession can give a list of rights and assets given by the

5 Rembert Süß, Das Vindikationslegat im Internationalen Privatrecht, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 65 (2001), 246.


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last will of the deceased – or even by law – to a legatee or any given heir (Article 41 subpara. 2 lit. h of the Proposal). However, whether and in which way these single rights or specific items are transferred from the estate to a single heir or to a legatee, cannot be decided by the law applicable to the succession. It is subject to the respective lex rei sitae in case of a tangible good or the law applicable to the transfer of a right in an intangible item of the estate. Therefore, it will necessarily cause problems, if Article 39 lit. b) of the Proposal allows the certification of the devolution of a specific item of property, “where it is allowed under the law applicable to the succession”. Such a certificate would override national property law and the applicability of the lex rei sitae to the transfer of specific items (taking in mind that the law applicable to the succession determines the devolution of the estate as a whole). Therefore, it should be corrected as follows:

Article 39 a) … b) the devolution of a specific item of property, where it is allowed under the lex rei sitae or another law applicable to the transfer of this item.

However, the issuance of such a certificate would cause problems to the issuing authority as the person in charge will rarely know exactly whether the foreign law applicable to the transfer of the item has the effect of an immediate transfer of the right with occurrence of the succession or if it requires further measures to transfer this right to the legatee or a particular heir. He only will be capable to certify that the applicant is entitled to a specific item. This, if for example the surviving wife of the deceased is entitled to an usufruct in the family residence situated in Italy or if the legatee is entitled to the shares of the deceased in a limited company (Sociedad limitada) registered in the company register of Barcelona, will enable the beneficiary to effect his registration in the land register in Italy or the company register in Spain. Therefore, Article 39 lit. b) of the Proposal should be changed as follows:

Article 39 b) the entitlement to a specific item of property, according to law or according to a testamentary legacy.

Such a distinction between succession law and property law is also necessary because succession law might create rights in rem which are not known to the law of the situs of the property. This would result in a conflict of both legal systems. These types of conflicts in most cases can be solved by an “adaptation” of the right arising out of the succession law to the property law. The institutions of the law applicable to the succession have to be “translated” into the legal system regulating the property relationship. Such a transposition is already at present being done most effectively by the authorities of the state where the property is situated. The authorities in the state issuing the Certificate of Succession do not necessarily understand the limits of the property law of that state. The relevant authority of the state of situation (land register, court or notary) entrusted with the realization of the rights given to the legatees and other persons according to the foreign Succession Certificate will choose the best way to ensure that the beneficiary will receive the best protection of his succession rights on the basis of property law.


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At least, the European Succession Certificate should not contain a “list of rights and assets for legatees in accordance with the law applicable to the succession”, as is provided in Article 41 subpara. 2 lit. i) of the Proposal. Such attestation, in particular if connected with the effects of Article 42 subpara. 2 of the Proposal, will give the impression that the legatee becomes owner of the assets regardless of whether the acquisition will be acknowledged by the respective property law. If such list will be included anyway, it must be indicated explicitly in Article 41 subpara. 2 lit. i) of the Proposal and in the European Certificate of Succession that the acquisition of such right or asset is governed by the applicable property law. 2. Sharing of the estate A similar problem inherently connected to the lex rei sitae arises with regard to the “sharing” of the estate among the heirs and other beneficiaries. For example:

• According to the law of some Member States (e.g. Italy, France) the agreement on sharing of the state not only has immediate effect as to the ownership of the items concerned. It also has retroactive effect. This means that the respective heir will be regarded as being owner of the respective item beginning with the time the succession occurred.

• In Austria the sharing of the estate is effected by a judicial decision of the Court (Einantwortung) which distributes the items of the estates to the heirs and legatees.

However, these manners of acquisition of the estate are contradictory to the property law of many other Member States. For example, German law requires an individual act of transfer for every asset and right of the heritage according to the requirements of property law. Most of the laws of the Member States require some sort of “publication” or modus for the transfer of goods to protect creditors. This means an agreement of transfer and the traditio for movable goods, the Auflassung and registration in the land register for immovable goods or an express agreement on transfer including a notice to the debtor with regard to claims. Therefore, Art. 19 subpara. 2 lit. l) of the Proposal should be interpreted narrowly and refer to the applicable succession law only with regard to the calculation of the shares, the form and time of the sharing etc. This can be indicated by adding the following sentence: Article 19 2. This law shall govern in particular: … (l) sharing the inheritance (however, the transfer of individual assets of the estate among the heirs or from the heirs to third parties is subject to the property law at the place of said assets III. Jurisdiction The Regulation relies on the principle of “one estate – one law – one forum”. Therefore the jurisdiction adheres to the courts of the state on whose territory the


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deceased had his last habitual domicile, Article 4 of the Proposal. A referral to the courts of another Member State is only allowed if the law of that state is applicable due to a choice of law made by the deceased, Article 5 of the Proposal. According to Article 18 of the Proposal, a choice of law can also be included into an succession contract. However, the law designated by such a choice of law clause will only be applicable to the validity and effects of the succession contract and does affect the law applicable to other aspects of the succession. Therefore the referral in Article 5 of the Proposal should not be admitted in cases of the (limited) choice of law pursuant to Article 18 of the Proposal. The exclusive competence of the courts of one single Member State is appropriate with regard to the authority competent to issue the European Certificate of Succession, Article 37 of the Proposal. The exclusive competence of the courts of one single Member State will prevent the legal authorities in different Member States to issue contradictory certificates. Further, a competence of the courts of one single country for the whole succession is necessary when the heirs are living in different Member States. The centralised competence in this case gives the opportunity to litigate in one single court and to achieve a judicial decision which will be binding for all the heirs. However an exclusive competence with regard to contentious litigation is neither necessary nor advisable. The exclusive competence of the courts of one single Member State may avoid “forum shopping”. However, the law of conflicts with regard to the succession will be harmonised by the Regulation and the law of conflicts for the most important incidental questions will be harmonised in the near future. Therefore the playing field for forum shopping will become very small. It does not constitute a real threat as cases or forum shopping in cases of succession occur very rarely in today’s legal realm. On the other hand, an exclusive competence of the courts of one single Member State for the succession may create severe obstacles for the heirs, legatees and the creditors of forced shares to realize their rights.

Example: The deceased was a German citizen. He died with last habitual residence in Sweden. By will he instituted his son as his sole heir. A daughter, born out of wedlock, now claims her forced share under the Swedish succession law. According to Article 4 of the Proposal she will be obliged to raise the claim before the Swedish courts; if she and the son are both living in Germany there is no reason why the heir should not be sued at his domicile. They even are not allowed to agree on the competence of the German courts if they cannot prove that their father has opted for German law in his last will. Even if the deceased opted for German law in his will the daughter will first have to raise the claim before the Swedish court before she can apply for a transfer of the claim to the German courts.


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Under the present situation in Europe the need to sue the brother before a foreign court most likely will inhibit the daughter from enforcing her rights. The proposed regulation – from her point of view – would deprive her of her rights as the possibility to sue the brother in Germany due to the nationality of the deceased father, the domicile of the brother and the location of parts of the estate will not be given.

Therefore, in order to safeguard the right of the survivors to legal protection the competence for contentious litigations should be expanded, e.g. to the

• courts of the Member State where the defendant has his domicile; • courts of a Member State agreed upon by the parties to the litigation. • It should also be considered, whether the courts of a Member State where

immovable property of the estate is situated, shall have jurisdiction on a dispute over a right in rem on this property arising out of the succession, or even on a claim having this immovable estate for object. This might be the case if a person claims to be the owner of the property due to a legacy, or if he claims to have a vested interest on this property due to a legacy, or if he claims to be entitled to an usufruct in this real estate due to the rules on intestacy.

IV. Recognition of Authentic Instruments Article 34 of the Proposal stipulates that authentic instruments formally drawn up or registered in a Member State shall be “recognised” in the other member States. The purpose of this rule, according to the statements of the Commission in the Explanatory Memorandum, (under 4.5.), is to ensure the cross border circulation of authentic instruments. While this objective is being welcomed, the way to achieve it – i.e. applying the concept of recognition – should be reconsidered in order to prevent misunderstandings. Unlike judicial decisions which arise in res judicata and due to their territorial limited effect need the concept of mutual recognition in order to work their effect also across the border of the state of their origin, an authentic instrument does not arise in res iudicata. Whether or not the legal relationship underlying the instrument (e.g. the last will, an succession contract, an agreement of sharing the estate etc.) is legally valid and what legal effects attach to it remains a matter of substantive law. Applying the concept of recognition to authentic instruments could evade the substantive rules that are applicable to the legal transaction underlying the instrument. This would also lead to contradictions with Chapter III of the Regulation itself. The purpose of this rule, according to the statements of the Commission in the Explanatory Memorandum, (under 4.5.) is to ensure the cross border circulation of authentic instruments. However, different from judicial decisions which arise in and due to their territorial limited effect have to be recognised outside of the state of its origin, an authentic instrument arises not in res iudicata. Its effect is determined on the basis of substantive law.


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For example: • The law applicable to the formal validity of a will determines whether a will

notarised by a notary in Spain and giving a house situated in Cyprus to a legatee is valid. This, from the view of Cyprus, is not the case because the formal validity of a will is exclusively subject to the lex rei sitae and Cypriotic law requires two testimonies for the establishment of a will.

• A citizen of German-Italian dual nationality, living in Rome, is owner of a house in Cologne. By succession contract, notarised by a German notary, he gives this house as a legacy to his lover. According to Article 18 subpara. 1 of the Proposal Italian law applies to the validity and effects of the succession contract. Therefore it should be regarded as void.

• If an Italian notary notarises an agreement between the heirs on sharing the estate the effect of this agreement on the property situation is subject to the lex rei sitae. Therefore, the agreement pursuant to German law will only create an obligation of the heirs to transfer the property to the legatee. But the property will be transferred only by notarised agreement on the transfer by a German notary (Auflassung) and registration of the transfer in the German land register (Grundbuch).

Referring to a predefined meaning in the doctrine as well as in European jurisprudence, the use of the terminus “recognition” in this context, however, could easily be misinterpreted in the above mentioned cases to the extent that

• The formal validity of the will has to be recognised according to French law also with regard to the dispositions over the Cypriotic property.

• The dispositions in the succession contract have to be recognised in Italy as valid dispositions mortis causae, and even binding according to German law.

• The transfer of the German house has to be recognised in Germany as perfect on the basis of Italian property law.

Such concept of “recognition” would involve the displacement of the conflict of laws rules by a completely different system and invite everyone to try some sort of “instrument shopping”. Therefore, Article 34 of the Proposal should be excluded from the Regulation, at least, the terminus “recognition” be avoided. It might, however, be helpful if the Regulation expressly stipulates that authentic instruments from another member State used in succession matters are neither required to be legalised nor an Apostille be required. As regards the cross-border enforcement of authentic instruments, Article 35 of the Proposal is useful and should be upheld V. The applicable Law 1. Impact of a quickly changing lex successionis on the effects of German Law substantive succession Article 16 of the Proposal determines the law applicable to the succession by reference to the law at the last habitual residence of the deceased. Today, succession is considered to be more closely connected with the personal and family


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relationships of the deceased rather than being a technical system for the transfer of property from the deceased estate. Therefore it is without any doubt that only a scheme with a single connecting factor for the lex successionis complies with the modern conception of succession law. It is still a much debated issue, which connecting factor is mostly suited for determining the lex successionis. At present resent in 13 Member States of the EU (from Portugal to Bulgaria, with the exception of France and Benelux) the law of the nationality is applied. The four common law countries (UK, Ireland, Cyprus and Malta) use the “domicile” as connecting factor. However, as the English concept of domicile hardly ever recognizes a change of domicile, the domicile in these countries comes very close to the nationality-principle. Nationality is easy to establish and does not change unintentionally; therefore this concept stands for stability, legal security and an unambiguous determination of the applicable law. The modern trend in European conflict of law is the use of the last habitual residence as connecting factor – also for determining the lex successionis (e.g. the Netherlands, Finland, Belgium). There are some political reasons for using the habitual residence as connecting factor in EU instruments:

• it supports the integration of Europeans citizens; • the habitual residence often coincides with the location of the assets; • it is used in most of the new modern instruments; • the reference to the nationality is suspicious to cause a discrimination for

reason of nationality; • people living for a long time outside of the state of their nationality often do

not have good knowledge of the contents of their national law and are not able to get reliable information of that law in the state of residence.

The habitual residence, no doubt, is an adequate connecting factor in international family law. With regard to their succession, however, people plan on a long term basis. Most people will feel irritated to learn that the law applicable to the succession and the validity and effects of a will or succession contract will already change if they move from one state to another.6 An unintended rush and hurried change of the law applicable to the validity of the will or to the succession itself might increase the risk of invalid or ineffective wills. For example, a company manager from Stuttgart has been sent by his employer to Brussels in order to administrate a subsidiary company of his employer. According to the “traditional” interpretation of the habitual residence this man will move his habitual residence to Brussels if he moves with his whole family to Brussels. His intention to return to Stuttgart after some years of successful work in Brussels will be disregarded. The impact of the application of Belgian succession law however will be of great importance:

6 The application of the law of the last domicile of the deceased in succession cases for this reason is also harshly criticised in Norway – where the domicile as connecting factor is traditionally accepted, Reinhard Giesen, Die Anknüpfung des Personalstatuts im norwegischen und deutschen internationalen Privatrecht, Tübingen 2010, page 288.


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• A holographic joint will made by the manager together with his German

wife in the popular form of a Berliner Testament after moving to Belgium will be invalid pursuant to Belgian law.

• If the will has been made before moving to Belgium, it may be considered valid according to German law if we apply Article 18 of the Proposal on succession agreements to joint wills as well. However, Belgian law will rule over the will if the manager dies before returning to Germany. Therefore, the wife nominated as executor of the will with the task to administer the estate until the children reach the age of 25 will have no more powers pursuant to Belgium law. If the will provides that the widow will become Vorerbin (prior heir) and the children born by the first wife of the husband will have the position of Nacherben (subsequent heirs/libéralité graduelle) the Belgian law will disregard both the institution of the Vorerbin and the institution of the Nacherben. The will therefore will become completely ineffective. Instead according to the Belgian rules of intestate succession, the children will become heirs, the wife will receive an usufruct in the whole estate.

• Further, the possibility to change the habitual residence easily would also give the opportunity to evade forced shares by moving to another state (e.g. to France or the Netherlands where the widow has no forced share if the deceased leaves children).

In these cases a choice of law according to Article 17 of the Proposal might be regarded as a tool adequate enough to prevent an unintended change of the applicable law. But this option in most cases will probably not be used due to the following reasons:

• People – unless legally advised – will generally not make us of a choice of law clause in their will unless they are aware of the fact that the applicable law changes in case of a change of habitual residence and at the same time consider the possibility of their moving into another Member State already at the time when they establish their will.

• As a matter of practical experience, but also due to reasons of professional liability, legal practitioners in most cases tend to let their clients choose the law they are familiar with, i.e. their own law, and not the law of another Member State, i.e. the foreign national law of the client.

The reference to the habitual residence of the deceased therefore is detrimental to persons moving of one Member State into another Member State. The same is true for citizens living in a Member State for a limited period of time, without the intention to stay there permanently or the wish to be completely integrated in the legal system there in force. Therefore, it is necessary to have a less quickly changing connecting factor in order to meet the interests and expectations of the citizens.

• The Nordic Convention and the Hague Convention of August 1989 have connected the habitual residence with a time factor: The deceased will be inherited by his national law unless he had his habitual residence in another state for more than five years. However, it might be difficult to agree upon a fixed period of time without appearing arbitrary.

• The general rule in Article 16 of the Regulation expresses clearly that the habitual residence of the deceased for the purposes of the Regulation should


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be identified with the centre of interest of the deceased on a long term basis.

• With reference to the decision of the European Court of Justice (C-523/07 on 2. April 2009, item 39) a definition of the habitual residence included in Article 16 could read as follows:

Article 16 (1) The Succession is governed by the law of the State in which the deceased at the time of his death was habitually resident. (2) For the establishment of the “habitual residence” under Article16 (1) of this Regulation all the circumstances specific to each individual case have to be taken into consideration. The habitual residence corresponds to the place which reflects a high and long term degree of integration of the deceased into a social and family environment. In particular, the duration, regularity, conditions, the intentions and reasons for the stay on the territory of the state, the nationality of the deceased, the place and conditions of work, the location of the assets, linguistic knowledge, education and cultural identity and tradition, the family and social relationships of the deceased are to be taken into consideration.

• Another solution might be the inclusion of an “escape clause” which in a

comparable is also included in Article 3 of the Hague Convention of August 1989:

Article 16 (1) The Succession is governed by the law of the State in which the deceased at the time of his death was habitually resident. (2) However, if at the time of his death he was manifestly more closely connected with another State, in particular the state of which he was a national, the law of that State applies.

2. Remission and Transmission Most of the European States in cases of International Succession accept a Remission (Renvoi) by a foreign private international law. This is practice of the courts since the famous Forgo case of the French Court de Cassation. What does that mean?

E.g.: According to the Private International Law of the US-States the succession of immovables is subject to the lex situs. Therefore, if an US-citizen with last domicile in New York leaves an appartment in Leuven, the succession of this property will be ruled by the law of Belgium – from the point of view of a judge in New York. From the point of view of a Belgian judge the law of New York is applicable, because the last habitual residence of the deceased was in New York. If he disregards the Private International Law of the State of New York he will apply the substantive succession law of New York. If he also applies the Private International Law of the State of


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New York he finally will apply Belgian substantive law as the legal regime to which the Private International Law of the State of New York refers.

Article 26 of the Proposal provides that a reference to the law of another State in the Regulation involves exclusively of law in force in that State other than its rules of private international law. The Proposal therefore excludes the remission. The acceptance of a remission provides two advantages:

• It firstly enables to apply the lex fori – which minimises problem in the application of the substantive law.

• Secondly it in some cases enables a uniform application of law in all countries concerned.

In case of a testamentary choice of law it should be presumed that the testator wanted the foreign substantive law and not the foreign Private International Law to be applied. Therefore in that case the remission should be disregarded If the law of another European Member State is applicable, a remission should be disregarded. However, as the Private International Law on succession will be unified by the proposed Regulation, the possibility of a remission by the Private International Law of another Member State will be excluded. Therefore no particular rule will be necessary for that case.7 If the Private International Law of the state of the law habitual residence refers to the law of another EU-Member State this should be regarded or disregarded in the same manner.

e.g.: in the above mentioned case, the succession of the citizen of New York is ruled by a Spanish court. In this case the uniformity of results in the EU requires that the transmission of the Private International Law of New York (renvoi au deuxième degrée) to the law of Belgium should be followed by the Spanish court in the same way as it should be observed by the courts of Belgium.

Therefore, Article 26 of the Regulation should be as follows:

Article 26 (1) Where this Regulation provides for the application of the law of a State, it means the rules of law in force in that State including its rules on conflict of laws. If the conflict rules of that state refer to the law of a Member State the substantive rules of that Member State shall be applied. (2) However, in the case that the application of the foreign law is based on a choice of law by the deceased, the substantive law of that state shall be applied.

7 However, Professor Peter Kindler has included a rule for that case in his Proposal: Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts, 2009, page 44, 49.


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3. States with more than one legal systems Confusion might be caused by Article 28 of the Proposal. In Spain and in the United Kingdom there exist several territorial units each of which has its own set of rules for succession. Article 28 subpara 1 of the Proposal provides that in this case each territorial unit shall be considered as a State for the purpose of identifying the law applicable under this regulation. For example, after the death of a person who died with last habitual residence in Barcelona, Catalonian law should be applied (from the point of view of a German court). However, Article 28 subpara. 2 of the Proposal provides that Spain will not be required to apply the conflict rules of the Regulation to conflicts of law arising between the Spanish territorial units. Therefore a Spanish court would apply the Spanish rules for interregional conflict of laws (regulated in Articles 13 seqq. Spanish Codigó Civil) and will apply the law of the autonomous province where the deceased had his vecindad civil. This might be another law than Catalonian law if the deceased had not stayed more than 10 years in Catalonia or if he had stayed there more than 10 years but objected to an acquisition of a vecindad civil in Catalonia by making a declaration conform to Article 14.5 no 2 Spanish Codigó Civil. Therefore, a uniform application of succession law in Europe will only be realised if in case of reference to the law of a country with several sets of rules for succession the unified conflict rules for interregional conflicts of laws also apply. In the United Kingdom there exist no uniform set of interregional conflict rules. Therefore, in case of a reference to the law at the last habitual residence, the law of that territorial unit shall directly be applied. However, the rules of this unit on interregional conflict of law should be applied too. Article 18 (1) When several territorial units in a state have its own legal system with respect to the succession of deceased persons, for identifying the law applicable under this Regulation, any reference to the law of such State shall be construed as referring to the legal system determined by the unified rules on interregional conflict of laws in force in that State. (2) In the absence of such unified rules, the reference shall be construed as referring to the legal system with which the deceased had the closest connection. However, a reference by the conflict of law rules of this territorial unit to the law of another unit in the same state should be applied. (3) A Member state within which different territorial units have their own legal system with respect to the succession of deceased persons is not required to apply this Regulation to conflicts arising between such units – provided however that the law of that state is applicable according to this Regulation.


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4. The formal validity of wills The formal validity of dispositions mortis causae is not covered by the Regulation, Number 19 of the Recitals. Article 19 lit. k) of the Proposal explicitly excludes the form of wills from the scope of the applicable law. This will cause considerable problems. Sixteen Member States of the Union already ratified the Hague Convention on the Form of Testamentary Dispositions of 1961. Further, nine Member States provide rules in their national private international law which are – at least for a great part – identical with the Hague Convention. This makes it evident that the rules of the Hague Convention on the form of wills became a sort of “common core” in the Member States. However there are still very few states (e.g. Cyprus and Latvia) where a will probably shall only be recognized as valid if its form complies with the law applicable to the material validity of the will. This may cause problems to foreign citizens moving in one of those countries or acquiring assets in that state. For example:

A German citizen makes a will in notarised form pursuant to Sect. 2232 German BGB. Later he moves to Nicosia and dies after ten years. In this case, a Cyprus Court – under the Regulation, will recognize the formal validity of the will only if it complies with the law of the last habitual residence of the deceased. The rules of Cyprus law are not complied with as the testator didn’t sign the will in the presence of two witnesses.

The formal validity of a will is an important issue with an enormous practical impact. The interests of the European citizens will be served badly if the testator when establishing a will in due form at his place of habitual residence risks that his last will might be regarded as formally invalid when being produced in another Member State later on. Further, Article 17 subpara. 2 of the Proposal requires a choice of law clause to be made “in the form of a disposition mortis causae”. The determination whether the choice of law clause is included in a valid disposition will require a conflict rule establishing the law applicable to the formal validity of a will. Therefore, scope of the Regulation would be rather incomplete if this issue were not covered. One of the following options could be chosen in the Regulation to solve the problem:

• The EU ratifies the Hague Convention from October 1961. As the EU is a member of the Hague Conference, this solution won’t cause a conflict of laws.

• The Regulation refers to the conflict rules of the Hague Convention. This

reference should be made for wills, as well as for the formal validity of other disposition mortis causae (like succession contracts). This particular model has been applied in Article 83 subpara. 2 of the Belgian Code of Private International Law and Article 93 Swiss Private International Law):

•


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Forme des dispositions à cause de mort (1) La forme des dispositions testamentaires et de leur révocation est régie par le droit applicable en vertu de la Convention sur les conflits de lois en matière de forme des dispositions testamentaires, conclue à La Haye le 5 octobre 1961. (2) L'application de cette convention est étendue aux autres dispositions à cause de mort.

Such a rule would have indicating character for the treatment of wills by the court of the Member States which ratified the Hague Convention. It will have constitutive force for those states which have not ratified the Convention and for all Member States with regard to other dispositions mortis causae.

• The Regulation “copies” the respective rules of the Hague Convention and

explicitly extends the scope of application succession contracts. This is the Model of Article 26 subpara. 1 – 4 German EGBGB

(1) A testamentary disposition, also when it is made by several persons in the same document, is valid as regards form if its form complies with the formal requirements

1. of the law of the country of which the testator was a national at the time when he made the testamentary disposition or at the time of his death,

2. of the law of the place where the testator made the testamentary disposition,

3. of the law of the place where the testator had his domicile or habitual residence either at the time when he made the testamentary disposition, or at the time of his death,

4. insofar as immovables are concerned, of the law of the place where they are situated.

The determination of whether or not the testator had his domicile in a particular place is governed by the law of that place. (2) Subpara. 1 shall apply to testamentary dispositions revoking an earlier testamentary disposition. The revocation shall also be valid as regards form if it complies with any one of the laws according to the terms of which, under subpara. 1, the testamentary disposition that has been revoked was valid. (3) For the purposes of the present Convention, any provision of law which limits the permitted forms of testamentary dispositions by reference to the age, nationality or other personal conditions of the testator shall be deemed to pertain to matters of form. The same rule shall apply to the qualifications that must be possessed by witnesses required for the validity of a testamentary disposition. (4) Subpara. 1 to 3 shall apply mutatis mutandis to other dispositions mortis causae.


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Such incorporation of the rules of the Convention makes its application convenient because there will be created one single set of conflict rules for all questions arising with regard to international succession law. However, the judge of a Member State of the Hague Convention might overlook that he has to comply with the Convention and not with the Regulation.8 However, according to my opinion this is a rather academic problem.

VI. The law applicable to succession contracts and joint wills 1. Impact on German law Succession contracts play an important role in German practice. Dispositions mortis causae made by spouses in most cases are included in a succession contract or in a joint will. However, the law of a lot of Member States does not provide rules for succession contracts as well as other agreements on future succession. Therefore, it is important to include rules into the Regulation which ensure that the validity and the binding force of a succession contract can be determined at the time of its conclusion, and may not be affected by a later move of the habitual residence of a party of the contract into another state. The rules in German law on succession contracts would lose their practical importance if it would become possible to evade the binding force of contractual dispositions mortis causae by moving the habitual residence into another country, or by mere designation of law. Article 18 of the Proposal provides special conflict rules in order to regulate succession contracts adequately. This approach is very important. However, some details need to be debated. 2. Scope of the rule The Proposal contains a definition of the “succession contract” in Article 2 lit. c. It – according to my interpretation – covers

• contracts which institute an heir; • contractual arrangements which contains other dispositions mortis causae; • a waiver of rights in a future succession (Erbverzicht, Pflichtteilsverzicht); • the donation partage according to French law; • it however remains doubtful whether a contract between spouses which

transfers a part or all of the future estate to the other spouse in the form of a “gift” (institution contractuelle and donation entre époux according to French and Belgian law) is covered too.

The following kind of contracts should be subject to the contract law determined pursuant to the EC Regulation 593/2008 (Rome I-Regulation).

• dispositions on a future estate by prospective heirs; • a contract creating the obligation to make a will or not to revoke a will; • a gift of a specific good or sum of money made under the subsequent

condition that the donee survives the donor (donatio mortis causae); • the sale of a part in an estate by an heir to a third person or to another heir.

8 Prof. Kindler e.g. is of the opinion that the „habitual residence“ should be interpreted differently when applying the Regulation and the Hague convention, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts, 2009, page 44, 45.


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To avoid any doubt about the application of the Succession regulation or the Rome I-Regulation, It should be considered to include a more detailed definition in Article 2 lit. c of the Proposal or even include a list of the relevant forms of contracts provided by the Member States. 3. Fixing the time for determining the law applicable to the succession contract It is a modern trend in European Private International Law to disconnect the law applicable to the validity and effects of a succession contract from the law applicable to the succession itself, and to establish a specific “contract statute”. This is realized by reference to the law, which would be applicable to the succession of the person whose estate is concerned at the time the contract is concluded. However, three concepts can be distinguished:

• According to the first concept the law (hypothetically) applicable at the time of the conclusion of the contracts decides not only over the validity, but also over the invalidity of the contracts. This means that a contract which is invalid at the time of its conclusion remains invalid, also if it would be valid according to the law applicable to the succession itself (e.g. Article 26 subpara. 5 German EGBGB; Article 64 lit. c) Portuguese Codigó Civil; Article 95 Swiss IPRG; § 18 Czech and Slovakian Private International Law; Article 35 Polish Private International Law).

• According to a second concept the law applicable to the succession determines the validity and effects of the succession contract. However, the contract would remain valid and effective only if its validity concluded under the law which would have been applicable to the succession, according to the circumstances at the day of its conclusion. This would enable a validation of the contract by a subsequent change of the applicable law by change of the habitual residence of the deceased or a choice of law by the deceased after the conclusion of the contract. This model is used by § 30 Austrian Private International Law and Article 9.8 Spanish CC.

• Article 18 subpara. 1 and 2 of the Proposal (as well as Article 9 and 10 of the Hague Convention 1989) combine both models: The once-invalid-ever invalid-Scheme (first concept) is used for succession contracts involving the estate of several persons. The second concept (possibility of validation by subsequent change of habitual residence) applies to contracts involving the estate of a single person.

The first concept favours legal certainty. The second model favours the validity of the succession contract. A state which recognizes succession agreements could prefer the second system. A state which prohibits succession contracts will prefer the first model. Since in the EU, the legal systems recognizing succession contracts and the systems prohibiting succession contracts have to be treated equally, the Regulation should apply a system which behaves “neutrally” in this question. Therefore, the first system is highly recommended. 4. Multilateral succession contracts If several people make contractual disposition together, in most cases, they will live together or, at the very least, have their habitual residence in the same state.


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Therefore, one single law will apply to the material validity and effects of the whole succession contract. Where different laws apply, everyone should have the opportunity to choose his national law with regard to the validity and effects of the contract. This might give the opportunity to apply one single law to all dispositions in the contract. If more than one law is involved, there are several solutions to determine the material validity of the contract:

• it is valid if all of the laws involved recognize the validity of the contract (cumulative solution);

• the dispositions of every party are treated separately according to the law at his habitual residence (or if designated so, the national law) (distributive solution);

• the whole contract is valid, if only one of the laws involved recognizes the validity of the contract (alternative solution).

The first solution (cumulative solution) has been realized in the Hague Convention 1989. The starting point of this solution is that the disposition of different persons made in one single succession contract is reciprocal in that the invalidity of one should involve also the invalidity of all other dispositions. However, according to German practice, is not necessarily true in every case. The succession contract will become completely invalid if only one of the laws involved does not recognize the contract irrespective of whether there exists any reciprocity between the dispositions. This cumulative application of different laws might raise difficult questions of interpretation; will the other disposition in the contract remain valid, if one of the governing laws denies the contractual effects of a disposition, but recognizes its effects as a unilateral testamentary disposition? Further, as in the case that one law involved prohibits the contract, the succession contract has to be regarded invalid as a whole, this approach favours the law prohibiting the conclusion of succession contracts. The validity of some of the dispositions pursuant to German law will be neglected. Therefore this solution is disadvantageous from the perspective of German law. The third approach (alternative solution) is the exact opposite of the first solution. Although the alternative solution approach favours the law recognizing the validity of the succession contract, it might give way to some sort of “export” of German law on succession contracts. By conclusion of a succession contract with a German national, German succession law may also become applicable to the dispositions mortis causae of a person who otherwise does not have any contacts to German law. In a number of Member States who follow Roman law tradition, the prohibition of succession contracts is rooted in the public order of the succession law of those states (e.g. Italy, Greece). This rule should not completely be disregarded. Against this background, the Regulation should follow the second approach. This model (distributive solution) treats the laws prohibiting succession contracts and the laws enforcing succession contracts equally. The application of different rules to different dispositions mortis causae in the same succession contract might cause practical problems. However, due to the application of the law of the habitual residence (instead of national law) of the parties and due to the fact


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that spouses regularly live together in the same country, such cases will occur rarely. Article 18 (1) The material validity of a disposition in a succession contract, the effects, and

the circumstances resulting in the extinction of its effects, are determined by the law which under Article 16, would have been applicable to the succession of the estate involved, if the succession had occurred immediately after the conclusion of the succession contract.

(2) Every party to the contract, may by express designation, subject the

dispositions made by this party, so far as the material validity, the effects of the dispositions made by him, and the circumstances resulting in the extinction of the effects are concerned, to the law of a State of which he is a national at the time of the conclusion of the agreement.

(3) The application of the law applicable according to subpara. 2 shall not affect the

rights of anyone not party to the contract who under the law applicable to the succession by virtue of Article 16 or 17 has an indefeasible interest in the estate or another right of which he cannot be deprived by the person whose estate is in question.

5. The law applicable to succession contracts concluded before the date of application of the Regulation Article 18 of the Proposal constitutes a “freezing” of the law applicable to the validity of succession contracts. A change of circumstances after the conclusion of the contract will not affect the choice of the law applicable to its validity. Article 50 subpara.1 of the Proposal stipulates that the Regulation will be applicable to successions of persons deceased after the date of application. Article 50 subpara. 3 of the Proposal stipulates that a choice of law clause included into a succession agreement concluded before the date of application of the Regulation shall be regarded as valid if it meets the requirements set up by Article 18 of the Regulation. This makes clear that the regulation will have retroactive effect insofar as the validity of succession agreements is concerned. The following example illustrates the practical impacts:

A couple, both German nationals, moves to Italy. Some years later the Husband transfers all his shares in his company to his son. He concludes a succession agreement with his family members according to which his institutes his wife as his sole heir. The wife institutes the daughter as her sole heir. The son – who has already received his part in the wealth of the family – waives all his rights on forced shares after both parents. The daughter waives her right after her father – because the mother will not be able to revoke the institution of the daughter as her sole heir.

All these agreements are valid under German law. However they are void under Italian law as neither the contractual waiver of succession rights nor the contractual institution of an heir is recognized.


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No one doubts the validity of the contract; under Sect. 46 of the Italian Private International Law reform Act 1995 as well as Sect. 25, 26 (5) German EGBGB, the German national law is applicable to the validity of the agreement. When the death of one or both the German husband and wife occurs after the date of application of the Regulation, the national law pursuant to Article 50 (3) of the Proposal will only apply if the contract includes an express designation of the national law. Such will hardly be the case because it is not required nor accepted by German or Italian law. Pursuant to Article 18 (2) 1 of the Proposal, the succession agreement is only valid if it is regarded as valid by the law of the state where the husband and wife had there habitual residence at the time of the conclusion of the contract. If the habitual residence has already been moved to Italy the agreement will be regarded as invalid. Therefore, from the point of German law we will need a clause which protects the validity of successions contracts which have been concluded before the date of application on the basis of the national law of the parties. This could be realized by one of the following clauses which could replace Article 50 (3) of the Proposal:

If a succession contract which has been concluded prior to the date of application of this Regulation is not valid under the law applicable pursuant to Article 18 of the Regulation, the succession contract shall nevertheless be considered valid if its validity is recognized by the national law of the persons whose estate is concerned by the contract.

A reference to the law “applicable at the time of the conclusion” of the agreement will not solve the problem because a “super conflict of laws” is needed in order to determine the conflict of laws applicable at that time. However, if the reference to the law of the habitual residence of the parties of the contract includes the private international law of that place in force at the time of the conclusion of the succession contract, that would most effectively protect the reasonable expectations of the parties. Therefore Article 50 of the Regulation could include the following rule:

Article 50 (4) The material validity, the effects, and the circumstances resulting in the extinction of its effects of a disposition in a succession contract which has been concluded prior to the date of application of this Regulation, are determined by the law which would have been applicable under the private international law in force at the time of its conclusion at the habitual residence of the deceased.

Another possible solution which will even more effectively protect the expectations of the parties:

Article 50 (4) If a succession contract which has been concluded prior to the date of application of this Regulation is not valid under the law applicable pursuant to Article 18 of the Regulation, the succession contract shall nevertheless be considered valid if the parties relied on the applicability of the substantive


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law of a particular state and the validity of the contract is recognized under this law.

However, such rule of conflict could validate a succession contract which would be void under the law of conflict at the time of its conclusion as well as under the forthcoming Regulation. Moreover, after the death of the deceased it might become difficult to prove his intentions and to establish on which law he really relied at the date of the conclusion of the contract. Therefore the second solution is recommended. 6. Joint wills Joint wills are not known in most Member States (particularly in the so called roman civil law countries like Italy, France, Portugal and the Eastern Europe countries like Poland and Romania). Joint wills are valid in Germany and Austria, the common law Countries like England, Ireland, Malta and Cyprus and in the Nordic Countries like Denmark and Sweden. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal under 4.3 announces rules on joint wills to be included in Article 18 of the Proposal. Article 2 lit. d) of the Proposal defines “joint wills” as wills drawn up by two or more persons in the same instrument for the benefit of a third party and/or on the basis of a reciprocal and mutual disposition. Article 18 of the Proposal however does not mention joint wills but deals exclusively with succession contracts. The law of joint wills in German law is very complex and covers different aspects of the joint will. This rule must be kept in mind when determining how to treat the joint will in the Regulation. A joint will under German law and Austrian law can only be made by spouses or by the partners of a same sex registered civil law partnership. Other persons are not allowed to testate jointly. In the Nordic countries and under common law everyone can testate jointly, including more than two persons. Testamentary dispositions of spouses can be included in one single document. When making a will in the holographic form it is sufficient that one spouse writes the whole text of the will with his own hand if the will is then signed by both spouses. If the dispositions of one spouse are completely independent of the dispositions of the other spouse this is called a testamentum mere simultaneum. The testamentum mere simultaneum is also called “objectively joint will”. The joint making of the testamentum mere simultaneum is a mere question of form. Therefore the Regulation should state that the question of whether two or more people can make their will in one single document should be treated as a question of form and shall be decided by the law applicable to the formal validity of the will. However, according to German law, spouses can also make a joint will containing mutual dispositions. Take for example the case where spouses mutually institute each other as sole heir and the common children of them as heirs of the surviving spouse (Berliner Testament). German Civil Code makes the presumption that these


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dispositions are made under a mutual condition (testamentum correspectivum). This according to German law has the following particular effects:

• A spouse during lifetime of the other can revoke the disposition validly only by notifying the other of the revocation;

• The revocation of a disposition during lifetime of the other spouse automatically invalidates the reciprocal dispositions of the other spouse in the joint will.

• After the death of the other spouse the surviving spouse can revoke his reciprocal dispositions only if he waives his rights out of the will.

• After the term for the waiver of the right of inheritance has ended, the surviving spouse cannot revoke any more. This means that the reciprocal dispositions in the joint will shall become binding like a succession contract.

• It is not necessary for these effects of the wills of the spouses that the spouses made their wills in one single document. Reciprocal dispositions can also be contained in separate instruments if the spouses had a common intent to testate in this way and if each of the wills (or at least the later will) refers to the will of the other spouse.

These special effects of the joint will (like reciprocity), the dissolving condition and the binding force are comparable to the effects of a succession contract. Therefore they will be adequately regulated by the law which would, under the same conditions, apply to a succession contract Therefore the following rules into Article 18 of the Regulation are recommended:

Article 18 (4) The law applicable to the formal validity of the will decides also

whether two or more people can make a will together in one single document and which relationship between them is required for the validity of such a joint will.

(5) The law applicable to the material validity of the dispositions in a joint will or in two separate wills which have been made by the testators on the basis of a joint decision, the presumption of reciprocity, the restrictions to, the effects and the admissibility of a revocation of the dispositions shall be determined according to the rules for a succession contract in Article 18 subpara. 1 and 2.

(6) (former Article 18 subpara. 4 of the Proposal concerning the indefeasible rights of third parties)

VII. The Matrimonial property regime The matrimonial property regime has a strong impact on succession. In some Member States the spouse has no forced share because he will benefit from the division of the matrimonial community property (e.g. Sweden, the Netherlands). In other states with separation of goods as the default property regime the surviving spouse receives a larger part in the estate in the case of intestate succession and will hereby be compensated for the lack of a participation in the patrimonial property (Austria, Scotland, England, Catalonia). If different laws are applicable to succession and to matrimonial property this might cause an exceptionally big or an exceptionally small participation of the surviving spouse in the family property.


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Therefore it is important to coordinate the conflict rules for succession with those applicable to matrimonial property so that in most cases the same law is applicable both to succession and to matrimonial property. Since in many Member States (like Germany) the national law of the spouses is applicable to the property regime, the Regulation will increase the number of cases where the laws applicable to succession and to matrimonial property are different and hence aggravate the problems in practice to a substantial extent. On the other hand in Germany the intestate share of the surviving spouse differs according to the property regime (§ 1931 BGB): If the deceased leaves a spouse and two children, the heir of the surviving spouse will be

• ¼ in case of community property regime, • 1/3 in case of separate property regime and • ½ in case of the default property regime (Zugewinngemeinschaft).

In the case of two Austrian spouses who live in Germany and owned assets in France, the share of the surviving spouse will be at follows:

• German point of view: 1/3, as the Austrian national law governs the property regime

• French view: ½, as the law of the German domicile governs the property regime

This example demonstrates that the unification of the conflict rules in the law of succession is not sufficient to ensure uniform result in the decision of succession cases. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to create an Instrument containing conflict rules on the matrimonial property at the same time as the Regulation on succession matters.

Proposition de règlement du Parlement européen et du Conseil

en matière de successions et le droit français

Sara Godechot-Patris, Professor of Law, Université François Rabelais de Tours

Résumé: Cette note analyse les conséquences juridiques que l'adoption de la proposition de règlement du Parlement européen et du Conseil relatif à la compétence, la loi applicable, la reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions et des actes authentiques en matière de successions et à la création d’un certificat successoral européen aurait sur le droit international privé français des successions

Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs ___________________________________________________________________________________________

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TABLE DES MATIERES RESUME..........................................................................................3 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................4 1. LA VALEUR AJOUTEE DE LA PROPOSITION DE REGLEMENT

PAR RAPPORT AU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE FRANÇAIS DES SUCCESSIONS....5 2. LES RESERVES SUR LA PROPOSITION DE REGLEMENT AU REGARD

DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE FRANÇAIS DES SUCCESSIONS ...................9 CONCLUSIONS..................................................................................13

Proposition de règlement du Parlement européen et du Conseil en matière de successions et le droit français ___________________________________________________________________________________________

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Liste des abréviations :

- D : Recueil Dalloz - Defrénois : Répertoire defrénois - JCP : La semaine juridique édition générale - JDI : le journal de droit international (clunet) - Rev. Crit DIP : Revue critique de droit international privé - Trav. com. fr. DIP : Travaux du comité français de droit international privé


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Résumé La proposition de règlement européen en matière successorale du 14 octobre 2009 devrait modifier en profondeur le droit international privé français des successions si elle venait à être adoptée. Fort certainement, elle contribuera à fluidifier le règlement des successions internationales. La substitution d’une règle de conflit unitaire à une règle de conflit dualiste est en effet souhaitée par la communauté juridique française. La consécration d’un certificat successoral européen viendrait fort certainement combler une lacune du système actuel. C’est sans doute la professio juris qui appelle au regard du droit français le plus de réserves : il ne faudrait pas qu’à terme, elle se révèle un moyen de contourner les dispositions impératives de la loi objectivement applicable.


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Introduction « Le problème de la loi successorale n’est pas une belle question académique que l’ardeur de la discussion doit transformer en un puzzle ; il est avant tout un problème d’ordre pratique, d’un intérêt aigu, actuel et certain sur lequel il est urgent de se pencher »1. Exprimée il y a plus de 60 ans cette pensée témoigne du profond désir d’une partie de la doctrine rejointe en cela par la pratique de voir le droit international privé français des successions évoluer. Les règles en la matière sont en effet anciennes ; elles ont été dégagées par la jurisprudence il y a près de sept siècles et sont inlassablement rappelées – depuis – par la Cour de cassation française sans pour autant emporter la conviction. Ayant opté pour la scission la jurisprudence française vient en effet soumettre les successions mobilières à la loi du dernier domicile du défunt et les successions immobilières à la loi du lieu de situation de l’immeuble2. La liquidation de la succession d’une même personne peut ainsi conduire à l’application concurrente de plusieurs lois, dès lors qu’elle présente un élément d’extranéité. Ce morcellement législatif se retrouve sur le terrain de la compétence juridictionnelle : sont en effet considérés comme compétents en matière de successions mobilières les tribunaux du dernier domicile du défunt et en matière immobilière ceux du lieu de situation de l’immeuble. C’est là d’ailleurs une compétence exclusive puisque toute décision rendue par un tribunal étranger portant sur un immeuble situé en France n’y sera pas reconnue et ne pourra déployer ses effets. Une telle convergence est généralement vue d’un œil favorable ; elle s’explique par le parallélisme étroit existant entre les préoccupations qui fondent en la matière la solution des conflits de lois et celle des conflits de juridictions. Ainsi le choix du lieu de situation du bien dans le domaine immobilier s’explique pour des considérations d’effectivité - c’est nécessairement en ce lieu que seront exécutées les mesures prises en matière réelle ; le choix du dernier domicile du défunt pour les meubles permet, quant à lui, de préférer le lieu où le défunt est présumé avoir concentré ses intérêts patrimoniaux. Il est donc heureux que cette unité de point de vue se retrouve – par principe – dans la proposition de règlement à l’article 4, puisque compétence est donnée au tribunal censé caractériser le centre de gravité de la succession. Reste qu’à bien des égards le texte de la proposition de règlement apparaît en rupture par rapport aux solutions consacrées jusqu’alors en droit français. Si sur certains points, les modifications apportées par le texte sont les bienvenues, il en est néanmoins qui appellent plus de réserves. Sans faire l’inventaire de l’ensemble des dispositions de la proposition, il s’agit ici de mettre l’accent sur celles qui sont de nature à remettre en cause de façon significative le système jusqu’alors en vigueur en droit français.

1 Ch. FREYRIA, « Le problème de la loi applicable aux succession » , Trav. com. fr. DIP 1947, p. 79 2 V. notamment, Civ. 1ère, 7 mars 2000, Rev. Crit. DIP 2000. 458, note B. ANCEL.


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1. LA VALEUR AJOUTEE DE LA PROPOSITION DE REGLEMENT PAR RAPPORT AU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE FRANÇAIS DES SUCCESSIONS

L’analyse des liquidations des successions internationales en droit français montre que la dualité conflictuelle et l’absence d’acte assurant la preuve uniforme de la qualité d’héritiers sont autant d’entraves au règlement satisfaisant d’une succession internationale. Les solutions retenues par le règlement devraient en ce sens fluidifier le règlement de telles successions. A ce titre c’est sur le choix d’une règle de conflit unitaire et la consécration d’un certificat successoral européen que l’on portera notre attention. Nul doute néanmoins que les règles figurant au chapitre 5 relatives aux actes authentiques soient également de nature à faciliter le règlement des successions internationales. Pour autant l’intention des auteurs sur ce point n’apparaît pas clairement : la reconnaissance s’attache-t-elle au seul instrumentum ou englobe-t-elle le negotium de l’acte ; il ne devrait en principe s’agir que de l’instrumentum, car le negotium doit demeurer sous l’empire des règles de conflits de lois ordinaires, l’acte litigieux restant un acte privé3. 1.1 La consécration d’une règle de conflit unitaire 1.1.1 La catégorie de rattachement : le choix de l’unité La règle de conflit française actuelle qui tend à distinguer selon la nature mobilière et immobilière des biens suscite nombre de critiques ; elle présente de surcroît bien des inconvénients auxquels la règle de conflit unitaire figurant à l’article 16 de la proposition du règlement serait à même de remédier. Le choix du morcellement met tout d’abord le droit international privé français en contradiction avec les principes directeurs qui gouvernent en droit interne le règlement des successions : la transmission de la succession y est en effet analysée comme la transmission d’un patrimoine, autrement dit comme la transmission d’une universalité. Transposé dans l’ordre international un tel principe devrait donc appeler la compétence d’une loi unique. Par ailleurs l’évolution de notre droit interne témoigne de ce que le bien importe aujourd’hui plus par la valeur qu’il représente que par sa nature ce qui par contrecoup tend à fragiliser un rattachement par le situs du bien4. Au delà, la dualité de la règle de conflit est de nature à compromettre tout règlement cohérent et équilibré de la succession. La mise en œuvre concurrente de lois reposant sur des principes opposés peut en effet conduire à remettre en cause les projets d’anticipation successorale pour le moins légitimes que le défunt aurait élaborés à l’aune d’une seule loi. Il suffit ainsi d’imaginer un défunt qui décède domicilié en France : son patrimoine comprend un portefeuille de valeurs mobilières et un immeuble situé en Angleterre. Les deux biens sont d’une valeur similaire. Par testament il lègue le portefeuille à l’aîné de ses enfants et l’immeuble au cadet. La mise en œuvre des règles de conflits françaises va conduire à ce que l’héritier alloti de l’immeuble en Angleterre puisse en sus réclamer sa réserve héréditaire sur le portefeuille de valeurs mobilières. Au fond, la mise en œuvre du système conflictuel français aboutit à des résultats profondément inégalitaires et de surcroît contraires à l’intention du défunt. Cette inégalité on la retrouve d’ailleurs s’agissant du règlement du passif successoral : l’éclatement de compétence législative peut en effet conduire un héritier à supporter une part de passif bien supérieure à la part de l’actif qu’il reçoit toutes les fois que les autres lois en concours n’organisent pas de recours entre cohéritiers.

3 Une telle analyse serait d’ailleurs conforme aux principes de solution contenus dans le règlement n°44/2001 s’agissant des actes authentiques. 4 En effet désormais, lorsqu’une libéralité excède la quotité disponible, la réduction de cette libéralité ne s’opère plus en nature mais en valeur et le gratifié est redevable d’une indemnité de réduction (art. 924 du Code civil).


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La communauté juridique française a pleinement conscience des inconvénients de son système conflictuel. D’ailleurs la Cour de cassation s’efforce depuis près de 10 ans de rétablir dans la mesure du possible l’unité de compétence législative. A cette fin le mécanisme du renvoi s’est avéré être un outil très efficace. Aussi dès lors que la loi du lieu de situation de l’immeuble refuse l’offre de compétence qui lui est faite et désigne comme devant s’appliquer soit la loi nationale du défunt soit la loi du dernier domicile du défunt, la Cour de cassation admet le renvoi ainsi opéré mais à la condition que l’unité de compétence législative successorale soit rétablie5. Certes un tel remède n’est pas suffisant et l’unité de compétence législative est loin de pouvoir être systématiquement garantie. Mais l’attitude de la Cour de cassation témoigne des efforts accomplis actuellement en France en vue de dépasser la dualité conflictuelle. La solution retenue par la proposition de règlement devrait donc répondre aux attentes de la communauté juridique française pour qui l’unité de compétence législative ne saurait dépendre à l’avenir de retouches ponctuelles mais doit être érigée en principe. Et il suffit à cet égard de signaler que depuis près de 20 ans les notaires français appellent de leur vœux la ratification par la France de la convention de La Haye du 1er août 1989 sur la loi applicable aux successions notamment parce que ce texte est venu consacrer un rattachement successoral unitaire. 1.1.2 Le facteur de rattachement : le choix de la flexibilité Reste à bien mesurer l’étendue du changement. Car pour l’ordre juridique français la mutation ne se limitera pas à la substitution d’un rattachement unitaire à un rattachement dualiste. S’agissant du facteur de rattachement retenu, le texte tranche avec les solutions consacrées jusqu’alors en droit français qu’il s’agisse de la loi applicable aux successions ou de celle applicable aux pactes successoraux. a. Dans le domaine des successions : Le domicile défini à l’article 102 du Code civil comme le lieu où l’intéressé établit son principal établissement suppose la réunion d’un élément matériel – la présence effective de l’intéressé dans un ressort territorial donné – et d’un élément intentionnel à savoir la volonté de l’intéressé de s’installer durablement dans ce milieu en y fixant le centre de ses intérêts6. Une telle notion manque, du moins en droit interne, de fermeté, la preuve de l’intention domiciliaire s’avérant parfois délicate à établir. La notion se trouve donc entachée d’une certaine dose d’incertitude. La résidence se veut, à l’inverse une notion plus factuelle ; elle correspond du moins en droit français, à la présence d’une certaine durée dans un ressort déterminé. C’est certainement un critère plus ancré dans la réalité et plus adapté à une vie de moins en moins sédentaire. Reste qu’en exigeant de cette résidence qu’elle soit habituelle on vient réintroduire un élément intentionnel tant et si bien qu’un tel critère n’est pas toujours aisé à appréhender. Faut-il regretter à cet égard que la proposition de règlement ne vienne pas la définir ? La question mérite d’être posée. La résidence est un critère, on le sait, fréquemment retenu par les textes européens qui permet de trancher l’opposition entre les Etats attachés au critère de la nationalité et ceux préférant le critère du domicile. Pour l’heure il n’a donné lieu à aucune définition dans les textes. La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne a pu pallier ce silence en développant une définition autonome de la notion. Il n’en demeure pas moins que subsiste en ce domaine une certaine incertitude, tant et si bien qu’il serait peut-être souhaitable – sans définir la

5 V. en dernier lieu, Civ. 1ère, 11 février 2009, Rev. Crit. DIP 2009.512, note B. ANCEL, JDI 2009.567, note PEROZ, D. 20091658, note LARDEUX, JCP.2009.II.10068, note BOULANGER. 6 Pour une application jurisprudentielle : Civ. 1ère, 7 décembre 2005, Rev. Crit. DIP 2006. 583, note GODECHOT-PATRIS, JCP. 2006. II. 10050, note BOULANGER, Defrénois 2006.562, note REVILLARD..


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résidence habituelle – d’assortir l’énoncé de la règle figurant à l’article 4 d’un certain nombre de critères significatifs permettant d’identifier cette résidence. Un tel besoin se ressent d’ailleurs plus fortement dans le domaine successoral par essence plus juridique que judiciaire ; de ce fait le besoin de prévisibilité et de sécurité y est essentiel. b. En matière de pactes successoraux : La jurisprudence française considère traditionnellement que les pactes successoraux doivent être soumis à la loi successorale et par conséquent à la loi du dernier domicile du défunt. Il en va ainsi notamment des donations partages mais également des institutions contractuelles et de toutes les formes de pactes sur successions futures. Par conséquent un pacte valide au jour de son établissement peut s’avérer nul au décès de l’auteur de l’acte en cas de changement de domicile. L’acte se voit là encore entaché d’une relative incertitude qui n’est pas souhaitable. La position de la jurisprudence française ne permet donc pas de garantir au défunt l’efficacité de son projet d’anticipation successorale. Il faut toutefois souligner qu’en la matière les tribunaux font preuve d’une relative complaisance. Car si la prohibition des pactes sur successions futures est traditionnellement présentée en droit interne comme une composante de l’ordre public successoral, il n’en demeure pas moins qu’à l’échelle internationale une telle prohibition n’est pas considérée comme d’ordre public. Le bien-fondé de la solution est indiscutable au regard des multiples atteintes que le principe a subi en droit interne où les exceptions à la prohibition se sont multipliées notamment à la suite de la loi du 23 juin 2006 venue réformer le droit interne des successions (renonciation à exercer l’action en réduction, libéralités graduelles…). Par conséquent rien ne s’oppose à la reconnaissance en France d’un pacte constitué conformément à la loi successorale étrangère. Il n’en demeure pas moins que le sort du pacte reste fonction de la loi successorale et que l’incertitude demeure jusqu’au décès. A certains égards, la proposition de règlement apparaît comme un progrès ; en retenant la compétence de la loi qui aurait été applicable à la succession au jour de l’établissement du pacte, le texte vient introduire une prévisibilité des solutions hautement souhaitable. On regrettera en revanche que soit réservée l’application de la loi successorale dans l’hypothèse où la loi de la résidence habituelle au moment de la rédaction de l’acte ne validerait pas le pacte. La loi successorale n’a ici aucune légitimité à s’appliquer. Son application ne saurait être conforme aux prévisions des parties qui par définition l’ignoraient au jour de l’établissement de l’acte. Rien ne saurait justifier ici l’énoncé d’une règle de conflit à coloration matérielle. Pour terminer on ajoutera qu’en ne visant que les pactes concernant la succession d’une personne, le texte écarte de son champ d’application les donations et les testaments conjonctifs. Pour l’heure en droit français, la validité des testaments conjonctifs relève de la convention de La Haye du 5 octobre 1961 sur les conflits de lois en matière de forme des dispositions testamentaires qui dans son article 4 considère que sont incluses dans le domaine de la convention « les formes des dispositions testamentaires faites dans un même testament par deux ou plusieurs personnes ». Quant aux donations conjonctives portant sur des biens futurs – valables en droit interne entre époux – c’est la compétence de la loi successorale qui est généralement préconisée. C’est dire qu’en se limitant aux pactes concernant la succession d’une personne, les rédacteurs viennent maintenir les donations conjonctives sous l’empire des règles jurisprudentielles : les donations conjonctives mobilières seront soumises à la loi du dernier domicile du défunt et les donations conjonctives immobilières à la loi du lieu de situation de l’immeuble. Cet îlot de résistance ne semble guère souhaitable.


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1.2 La consécration d’un certificat successoral européen En venant consacrer un certificat successoral européen, la proposition de règlement européen vient combler une des lacunes du droit français, la France n’ayant jamais ratifié la convention de La Haye du 20 octobre 1973 sur l’administration internationale des successions. Or un acte assurant la reconnaissance internationale du titre d’héritier faisait cruellement défaut en droit français eu égard aux solutions qui président à la transmission du patrimoine en droit interne. En effet les héritiers y sont présumés continuer la personne du défunt.Par conséquent la transmission s’opère de manière directe et immédiate entre les mains de l’héritier par le truchement de la saisine tant et si bien qu’un héritier saisi en application du droit français est en droit d’appréhender l’entière succession : il n’y a donc pas de décision judiciaire qui vient confirmer les pouvoirs de l’héritier saisi. C’est dire que l’exercice à l’étranger de ses droits par l’héritier saisi peut se trouver de ce fait compromis. A cela s’ajoute qu’en droit français la preuve de la qualité d’héritier se fait essentiellement sous la forme d’un acte de notoriété établi par un notaire à la demande des héritiers (art. 730-1 du Code civil). Il s’agit par cet acte de constater les qualités héréditaires de ceux qui prétendent à la succession. Reste qu’en raison de l’insuffisance en ce domaine des actes de l’état civil il n’y pas de certitude ou de sécurité absolue dans l’établissement de la qualité d’héritier en droit français7. A l’échelle internationale les solutions sont loin d’être fermement établies. Est préconisée la reconnaissance de l’acte de notoriété établi par l’autorité étrangère. Par conséquent les effets de cet acte seront accueillis dès lors que le for admet la compétence de la lex auctoris. Mais la force probante de l’acte étranger sera déterminée non par la lex auctoris mais par la lex fori. Aussi bien, à l’acte de notoriété établi à l’étranger devrait être reconnue la même force probante qu’à l’acte de notoriété établi en France : il fera foi jusqu’à preuve du contraire. Il est vrai qu’à l’instauration d’un certificat successoral européen uniforme, la proposition aurait pu préférer un principe de reconnaissance des certificats d’héritiers établis dans les Etats membres8. Mais on peut se demander si cette voie a minima est tellement satisfaisante et si de nouvelles difficultés ne risquent pas de surgir : en effet en présence d’un acte étranger, il conviendra notamment de s’interroger sur l’équivalence entre l’acte produit et l’acte requis par la loi du for. Aussi bien, l’option prise par le législateur communautaire semble plus raisonnable. L’instauration d’un certificat successoral sera donc un gain de temps et un gain d’argent. Elle supprimera ainsi certaines entraves à la liquidation des successions internationales. Dans son ensemble, les informations à porter sur le certificat méritent d’être approuvées. Quant aux effets produits par ce certificat les principes de solutions devraient répondre aux attentes de la pratique ; de surcroît les intérêts des tiers ont été ménagés (art. 42). Pour autant la proposition de règlement appelle sur certains points des réserves. Tout d’abord compétence est donnée pour délivrer ce certificat aux juridictions compétentes de l’Etat membre en vertu des articles 4, 5 et 6 de la proposition de règlement. Une telle solution semble à rebours des principes jusqu’alors consacrés en droit français. Le notaire y est en effet l’acteur privilégié du règlement des successions. Et il semblerait raisonnable de réserver sa possible compétence en ce domaine9. Sur ce même terrain de la compétence, il aurait peut-être été plus prudent d’envisager l’éventualité de la délivrance de certificats contradictoires délivrés par des autorités distinctes eu égard à la pluralité de chefs de compétence consacrée dans le texte.

7 M. GORE, thèse préc., n°284. 8 Au regard notamment du principe de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité qui doit présider à l’activité législative de l’Union européenne. 9 Un parallèle avec les solutions retenues dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre du règlement n°°805/2004 du 21 avril 2004 sur le titre exécutoire européen peut à cet égard être opéré.


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Par ailleurs, avait été émise l’idée que lors de l’établissement du certificat on ait présent à l’esprit les droits que le conjoint peut détenir sur les biens au titre de la liquidation du régime matrimonial. Peut-être l’articulation entre les régimes matrimoniaux et le droit des successions a-t-elle ici été quelque peu négligée. Mais plus fondamentalement, on est en droit de se demander si l’objectif poursuivi par ce certificat va, en définitive, être atteint. Il est appelé, dit-on, à faciliter l’administration internationale des successions. D’ailleurs un certificat partiel peut être demandé en application de l’article 39 pour les seules questions d’administration. Pour autant il faudrait être certain que cette administration relève bien de la compétence de la loi successorale. Or la réserve de l’article 21 en faveur de la loi réelle permet d’en douter. Il est dès lors légitime de s’interroger sur l’utilité d’un tel certificat successoral toutes les fois que l’héritier devra se plier à la procédure mise en place par la loi du lieu de situation du bien. 2. LES RESERVES SUR LA PROPOSITION DE REGLEMENT AU REGARD DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE FRANÇAIS DES SUCCESSIONS Mis dans la perspective des solutions jusqu’alors consacrées en droit français la proposition de règlement appelle deux types de réserves. Les premières touchent au choix offert au défunt de déterminer la loi applicable à sa succession. A la lumière des principes qui gouvernent en droit français, une telle faculté il est essentiel d’assortir cette faculté d’un contre-poids. Les secondes réserves ont trait au domaine d’application reconnu à la loi ainsi désignée. Au vu des solutions consacrées en droit français certaines précisions s’imposent. 2.1 Le choix de la professio juris La règle de conflit française est une règle de conflit impérative. Il n’est donc pas possible pour le défunt d’obtenir l’application d’une loi autre que celle désignée par la règle de conflit. Le caractère traditionnellement impératif de la dévolution des successions en droit interne explique cette solution. Pour autant un tel principe supporte certains tempéraments :

Il est ainsi possible aux héritiers postérieurement à l’ouverture de la succession de s’entendre pour l’application d’une loi autre que la loi désignée par la règle de conflit ; les héritiers peuvent ainsi procéder à un partage global amiable de la succession indépendamment du lieu de situation du bien, à la condition néanmoins que les lois successorales en présence l’autorisent.

Le défunt pour sa part est en droit de se référer à une loi autre que la loi désignée par la règle de conflit pour l’ensemble des questions non régies de manière impérative par la loi successorale. Par ailleurs, la jurisprudence française a admis que l’interprétation du testament puisse s’opérer en application d’une loi distincte de la loi successorale. La marge de liberté qui est ainsi reconnue au défunt n’en demeure pas moins relativement limitée. C’est dire que lui octroyer le droit de choisir la loi applicable à sa succession serait une mesure d’une toute autre ampleur dont il faut bien mesurer les conséquences.

2.1.1 Les avantages de la professio juris La liberté de choix de loi que la proposition de règlement entend conférer au défunt est une liberté encadrée, puisqu’il ne lui est permis que de préférer sa loi nationale à la loi de sa dernière résidence habituelle. La solution est raisonnable car en tout état de cause c’est une loi qui entretient des liens étroits avec le défunt qui sera appliquée. Si la dernière résidence habituelle est présumée constituer le centre de gravité des intérêts patrimoniaux du défunt, la nationalité peut prétendre traduire le lien qui unit la succession à la famille et s’avère conforme au principe de droit français qui veut que le défunt soit présumé continuer la personne du défunt. On regrettera néanmoins que le texte de la proposition


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n’ait pas assorti le choix de la nationalité d’une précision temporelle car un changement de nationalité entre le jour du choix de loi et le jour du décès n’est pas à exclure. Quoiqu’il en soit, la professio juris en introduisant plus de flexibilité dans la détermination de la loi applicable pourrait sans aucun doute endiguer certaines difficultés rencontrées aujourd’hui dans le cadre du règlement des successions internationales. Elle garantirait ainsi au défunt la pleine efficacité de son projet d’anticipation successorale dont le succès est pour l’heure très aléatoire. Plus encore elle faciliterait le règlement des successions en présence d’institutions étrangères au for. Prenons pour exemple la succession d’un anglais décédé domicilié en France. La loi française est applicable à sa succession. A supposer que dans son testament cet anglais ait entendu mettre son patrimoine en trust, son projet d’anticipation successorale a peu de chance d’aboutir : le trust-libéralité n’a aucun équivalent en droit français et les palliatifs auxquels la pratique a pu avoir recours (exécution testamentaire, libéralité graduelle) dénaturent une telle institution. Autoriser ici le défunt à choisir la loi de sa nationalité pourrait s’avérer salvateur. Enfin replacée dans un contexte plus large, l’introduction de la professio juris permettrait de ménager les grands équilibres qui structurent le droit patrimonial de la famille en garantissant l’application d’une même loi à la liquidation du régime matrimonial et à celle de la succession. En effet, du moins en droit français, les droits octroyés au conjoint dans la succession le sont en contemplation de ceux qui lui ont été reconnus en amont dans le cadre du régime matrimonial ; par conséquent l’application de deux lois différentes vient rompre l’équilibre poursuivi par les systèmes en présence. Et pour remédier à ces déficiences la pratique se trouve contrainte d’adapter les règles de conflit en présence. A ce titre la consécration de la professio juris serait la bienvenue, elle dispenserait à l’avenir du recours à ces pis allers. La prévisibilité des solutions en sortirait renforcée. 2.1.2 Les dangers de la professio juris La consécration de la professio juris n’en présente pas moins certains dangers. Car lorsqu’il procédera à un tel choix, le défunt aura principalement en vu ses propres intérêts au détriment parfois de ceux de ses héritiers. Il est donc à craindre que la professio juris s’avère à l’avenir un moyen d’échapper aux dispositions impératives de la loi de la dernière résidence habituelle. Par conséquent elle s’accorde difficilement avec le système successoral français fondé sur la primauté de la dévolution légale et où les héritiers les plus proches du défunt se voient reconnaître la qualité de réservataires si bien qu’il n’est pas possible de les exhéréder. D’où les réserves de la doctrine française à l’égard de la professio juris. Par conséquent aux yeux du droit français, une telle consécration n’est acceptable que si elle est assortie de garde-fous. En ce sens, il devrait être possible d’écarter la loi choisie par le défunt dès lors qu’elle lui permet d’exhéréder ces héritiers contrairement à la loi objective. C’est tout le problème du caractère d’ordre public international de la réserve héréditaire. Certes le droit français est de peu d’enseignement en la matière; les arrêts sont rares et peu probants. La raison en est simple : la concordance de principe entre compétence législative et compétence juridictionnelle, fait que le plus souvent les tribunaux français sont conduits à appliquer la loi française. S’il leur arrive de connaître d’une succession soumise à une loi étrangère c’est à raison de la nationalité française des plaideurs (article 14 et 15 du Code civil). Et en ce cas, le recours à l’ordre public s’avère inutile, les héritiers français étant alors en droit d’invoquer le droit de prélèvement consacré par l’article 2 de la loi du 14 juillet 1819. Ce texte autorise en effet tout héritier français, qui en application de la loi étrangère aurait reçu moins que ce que lui aurait


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octroyé la loi française si elle avait été applicable à la succession, à prélever la différence sur les biens situés en France10. Pour autant la réserve en tant qu’instrument de protection familiale touche aux fondements même de notre société et nous semble présenter un caractère d’ordre public international. Et les réformes les plus récentes en droit interne si elles témoignent d’une transformation de la réserve ne peuvent pas s’analyser en un affaiblissement de cette dernière. Néanmoins, il ne s’agit pas, pour nous, de prétendre que dès lors que la loi étrangère désignée par la règle de conflit ne connaît pas la réserve héréditaire elle doit être écartée. Tout dépend du résultat auquel conduit son application dans chaque espèce. De surcroît la mise en œuvre de l’exception suppose que la situation entretienne des liens étroits avec le for, autrement dit il faut que ce dernier apparaissent comme le centre de gravité des intérêts patrimoniaux du défunt. Par conséquent la simple situation en France de biens ne saurait autoriser la mise en œuvre de l’exception. En revanche lorsque le défunt aura préféré la loi de sa nationalité à celle de son domicile la mise en œuvre de l’exception peut s’avérer utile. A ce sujet, si l’article 27 de la proposition de règlement réserve le jeu de l’exception d’ordre public, il est néanmoins précisé à l’alinéa 2 de ce même article que l’exception d’ordre public ne saurait être retenue si une divergence se fait jour entre la loi désignée par la règle de conflit et la loi du for quant aux modalités concernant la réserve. La formule retenue suscite la perplexité. Faut-il la comprendre comme affirmant la mise à l’écart de l’exception si la loi étrangère retient des quotités différentes de la loi du for, et en ce cas la formule ne semble pas critiquable ? Ou de manière plus radicale c’est l’existence même de la réserve qui ne saurait être considérée comme d’ordre public et la solution semble alors difficilement compatible avec les principes directeurs de droit français. Pour conclure on ajoutera qu’un tel contrepoids n’a bien entendu de sens que si les tribunaux français sont appelés à connaître d’une succession soumise à une loi étrangère. Or l’article 5 de la proposition de règlement prévoit la faculté pour le juge de la dernière résidence habituelle, lorsque le défunt a choisi sa loi nationale, de surseoir à statuer à la demande d’une des parties et d’inviter les parties à saisir les juridictions de l’Etat membre de la nationalité du défunt. Ainsi le sort de la réserve héréditaire se trouverait abandonné au bon vouloir du juge saisie de la difficulté par l’une des parties, celle qui de toute évidence n’aurait pas intérêt à voir la réserve héréditaire mise en oeuvre. Aussi bien, il serait peut-être préférable d’imposer l’accord des héritiers pour la mise en œuvre de ce renvoi de compétence.

2.2 Le domaine de la loi applicable Dans le prolongement des solutions consacrées en droit français, la proposition de règlement reconnaît un vaste domaine d’application à la loi désignée par la règle de conflit. La jurisprudence française considère en effet que relèvent de la compétence de la loi successorale la dévolution de même que la transmission successorale quelle que soit la qualité des personnes appelées à la succession ; le règlement du passif et le partage successoral sont également soumis à la loi ainsi désignée. C’est par conséquent l’ensemble du règlement successoral qui se trouve placé sous l’empire de la loi successorale ; la solution se veut respectueuse des liens qui unissent en droit interne les diverses phases du processus successoral. Et la solution vaut aussi bien en présence d’une succession légale que d’une succession testamentaire. En revanche en présence d’une libéralité entre vifs, si l’efficacité de cette libéralité peut se trouver limitée par application de la loi successorale,

10 On notera que l’adoption d’un règlement européen devrait entraîner de facto la caducité d’un tel texte, ne serait-ce qu’en raison de la primauté des textes européens sur les textes de droit interne (art. 55 de la constitution).


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dès lors que celle-ci organise le rapport et la réduction de ces mêmes libéralités, le principe demeure que sa validité ne relève pas de la compétence de la loi successorale11. Sans prétendre que l’unité de compétence législative en droit français est un leurre force est donc de reconnaître que le plus souvent la loi successorale subit la concurrence d’autres lois :

C’est ainsi que la capacité de recevoir et de disposer d’un incapable relève de la compétence de sa loi personnelle (article 3 du Code civil), encore qu’il faille ici réserver les incapacités propres au droit des successions – telle que l’incapacité de recevoir du médecin visée à l’article 909 du Code civil – qui elles relèvent de la compétence de la loi successorale12.

De la même manière dans le cadre de l’exercice de l’option successorale, c’est à la loi personnelle de l’incapable de déterminer les formalités habilitantes à accomplir.

On ajoutera que la réglementation du partage ne peut se faire en s’abstrayant de la loi réelle : assurément compétente pour les questions touchant à la publicité foncière, elle l’est également en amont afin de déterminer le montant de la masse indivise ou encore les pouvoirs des héritiers co-indivisaires sur cette masse.

Enfin, la forme testamentaire échappe à l’emprise de la loi successorale. S’applique ici la convention de La Haye du 5 octobre 1961 en matière de forme des dispositions testamentaires, à moins que le testament en cause soit un testament de forme internationale qui sera alors reconnu par application de la convention de Washington du 26 octobre 1973 entrée en vigueur en France le 1er décembre 1994. L’analyse de la proposition de règlement montre qu’en bien des points le texte apparaît en concordance avec le droit français (art. 1 §2 a), b), d), e), f), g), h), i), j)). Et il ne faut pas se laisser abuser par l’article 19 §2 c) qui soumet de manière très générale la capacité de succéder à la loi successorale. En effet, à l’article 1 il est disposé que la capacité juridique des personnes physiques sous réserve de l’article 19 §2 c) et d) est exclue du domaine de la présente proposition. Aussi bien, la capacité générale de disposer et de recevoir doit-elle demeurer sous l’emprise de la loi personnelle de l’intéressé sous peine sinon de porter atteinte à la nécessaire continuité qui doit présider au statut personnel des intéressés. Seules les incapacités propres au droit des libéralités de même que la faculté ou non de disposer en faveur d’une personne future, dans la mesure où elle se rattache aux qualités requises pour succéder, doivent être soumises à la loi successorale. A ce sujet, on notera le silence du texte sur la capacité de recevoir des personnes morales ; à suivre la lettre du texte c’est la loi successorale qui semble devoir d’imposer. Pareillement rien n’est dit sur l’exercice de l’option en présence d’un incapable et sur la place à réserver à la loi personnelle de l’intéressé. C’est sans doute regrettable. Si la proposition de règlement vient, elle aussi, réserver le jeu de la loi réelle, elle se démarque sur ce terrain là plus nettement des solutions consacrées en droit français. La question de l’indivision n’est pas évoquée et la publicité foncière est très naturellement exclue du domaine du règlement (art. 1). La place conférée à la loi réelle témoigne tout d’abord d’une concession faite aux systèmes de common law dont le règlement successoral repose sur des postulats différents du droit français. Est ainsi réservée à l’article 21 §2 a) la compétence de la loi réelle dès lors qu’elle subordonne « l’administration et la liquidation de la succession à l’investiture d’un administrateur (…) par une autorité de cet Etat membre ». Une telle réserve est bien entendue en contravention avec les principes directeurs de droit français : la transmission de la succession n’y est que l’instrument de l’exacte réalisation des vocations héréditaires

11 S’agissant de la validité de la donation, ce sont les règles de conflits en matière contractuelle qui recevaient application : V. Aix en Provence, 9 mars 1982, Rev. Crit. 1983.282, note G. Droz maintenu par Civ. 1ère, 20 mars 1985, Rev. Crit. 1986.66, note Y. lequette, JCP.1986.II.20630, note Fr. Boulanger, JDI 1987. 80, note M.-L. Niboyet. 12 V. Y. LEQUETTE note sous TI Lille (juge des Tutelles) 28 mars 1980, Rev. Crit. DIP 1981. 289, spéc. p. 296.


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et lui est subordonnée13. C’est dire que les deux questions ne sauraient être envisagées, du moins en droit français, de façon dissociée. Par ailleurs, l’article 22 de la proposition du règlement vient réserver le jeu de la loi réelle pour ce qu’il est commun d’appeler les attributions préférentielles dès lors que dans l’Etat du lieu de situation du bien, ce régime présente les caractères d’une loi de police. On précisera à cet égard qu’il est loin d’en aller ainsi en France : l’attribution préférentielle y présente en effet un caractère supplétif. Partant le domaine concédé à la loi réelle ne convainc guère. Plus encore il fait craindre qu’un nouveau morcellement ne vienne se substituer un précédent : au morcellement fondé sur la nature du bien serait à l’avenir substitué un morcellement au sein même du processus successoral. La solution ne nous semble pas de nature à simplifier le règlement des successions internationales et de surcroît peu compatible avec la consécration d’un certificat successoral européen. Conclusion La proposition de règlement si elle est adoptée viendra se substituer au système jurisprudentiel français. Pour autant cette substitution ne sera que partielle. Certes le texte prévoit que le règlement s’applique même si la loi désignée n’est pas celle d’un Etat membre (art. 25). Reste que la proposition de règlement porte comme l’indique l’exposé des motifs sur les successions transfrontières au sein de l’Union européenne. De plus, le texte envisage de pair les questions de compétence législative et de compétence juridictionnelle tant et si bien que les deux questions sont indiscutablement liées ; aussi bien l’application des règles de conflit de lois y figurant semble – du moins pour l’heure – subordonnée à la réalisation d’un chef de compétence dans l’ordre juridique français. Par conséquent si un français vient à décéder domicilié dans un Etat tiers et qu’un conflit oppose ses héritiers de nationalité française, le futur règlement serait alors inapplicable. Les juridictions françaises n’en seraient pas moins compétentes en application des articles 14 et 15 du Code civil. Le système élaboré par la jurisprudence trouverait alors à s’appliquer. Reste par ailleurs à savoir si la seule résidence dans un Etat membre suffit à l’application du règlement où s’il faut exiger que la succession présente des liens avec plusieurs Etats membres. En tout état de cause il apparaît essentiel de réfléchir sur l’opportunité de maintenir un double corps de règles qui ne saurait contribuer à la lisibilité de notre système conflictuel et est de surcroît de nature à déstabiliser les notaires directement intéressés par le règlement des successions internationales. Tout du moins il est essentiel que le champ d’application spatial du règlement soit à l’avenir précisé.

13 V. sur cette question, la thèse de M. GORE, « L’administration des successions en droit international privé », Economica, 1994, préf. Y. LEQUETTE.

The proposed EU Regulation on Succession and Austrian Law

Elisabeth Scheuba, Rechtsanwalt, Lecturer, Vienna University, Head of Austrian Bar Delegation to the Council of Bar and Law

Societies of Europe

Abstract: This note identifies and analyses the legal questions and problems, which the proposed EU Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and authentic instruments in matters of succession and the creation of a European Certificate of Succession raises as regards Austrian succession law.


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CONTENTS INTRODUCTION......................................................................2 I. Interference with Substantive Austrian (Family and

Succession) Law.............................................................3 II. Clear rules, Legal Certainty, Predictability -

Suggestions....................................................................9 III. Connecting Factor..........................................................12

The proposed EU Regulation on Succession and Austrian Law ___________________________________________________________________________________________

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INTRODUCTION

Cross-border-successions within the European Union are governed by diverse rules: Rules of substantive law, of international jurisdiction and of domestic law in the Member States of the European Union provide for a wide variety of answers to numerous questions, including:

Who will be the legal heir(s)? Are spouses favoured over descendants? Is there anyone entitled to reserved (compulsory) portions? Are gifts to be taken into account for determining the shares of heirs or the reserved portions? Is a (constitutive) Court`s decision necessary for transferring the estate to the heirs? Is there an administration of the estate? Are the conflict of law provisions in the Member States connecting the applicable law on cross-border-successions either to the citizenship of the deceased or to the last habitual residence or to the place where the deceased`s estate is situated?

Hence, in cross-border-successions the fragmentation of succession resulting from the divergent answers to these questions is often the consequence (see Explanatory Memorandum [EM] under 1.2. of the suggested Regulation). So there is definitely a need for a Community Instrument harmonizing the rules of international jurisdiction and of applicable law on the basis of Art 81 of the Treaty (as amended in Lisbon). This in order to guarantee legal certainty and predictability in identifying the applicable jurisdiction and succession law for EU-citizens in cross border successions by providing for clear and uniform rules. As far as the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions (Chapter IV) and the European Certificate of Succession (Chapter VI) are concerned, the proposed Regulation will grant substantial progress to EU-citizens in cross-border-successions in the future. There are, however, some provisions under Chapters I, II, III and V - referring to Scope of Application, Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Authentic Instruments - which give rise to serious concerns:

EU-citizens may find themselves confronted with increasingly complicated and unclear rules when they attempt to identify the applicable jurisdiction and succession law in cross-border-successions in the future.

On the basis of some of the proposed provisions, fragmentation of the rules on succession will be a consequence (at least) as frequent as before. In addition, substantial delays in succession, as well as complex litigation across Member States may begin to occur even more often than today.


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Some provisions under Chapters I, II and III appear not to be restricted to jurisdiction and applicable law (as provided for under Art 81 of the Treaty), but rather, seem to interfere with the substantive (family and succession) law of the Member States. Last but not least, the proposed regulation seems to limit the principle of mutual recognition, one of the most important principles of the European legal culture, with regards to Authentic Instruments. This is due to the fact that instruments with comparable status and effect, appear not to be subject to mutual recognition under the Proposal (e.g. contrary to Art 46 of Regulation 2201/2003 [Bruxelles II bis]).

The legal problems raised by some of the provisions under Chapters I - III and V of the proposed regulation are to be identified in the light of their impact on Austrian Law: I. Interference with Substantive Austrian (Family and Succession)

Law The proposal primarily aims towards a harmonization of the rules of applicable law and of international jurisdiction on the basis of Art 81 of the Treaty (1.1. Explanatory Memorandum [EM] and recital 2). However, some of the provisions in Chapters I - III of the proposed regulations give rise to the concern that they may interfere with (Austrian) Substantive (Family and Succession) Law (as well as with the Substantive Law of other Member States) for the following reasons: Under Austrian Law, the law of succession mainly covers property and defines the rules for the transfer of the estate to heirs. Family law primarily governs the legal relationships linked to marriage and partnership, filiations and the civil status of persons. Family law covers and protects family ties as determined by the public policy on family. Family ties are also protected under the law of succession.. Spouses, (registered) partners for life, descendants and parents are entitled to shares, compulsory portions, dwelling rights or maintenance upon death. The property of the deceased is thus closely linked to the family ties of the deceased. The law of succession determines the rights of the surviving members of the family with regard to the estate of the deceased, as determined by the public policy on family. Substantive family law and the law of succession may cover different matters, be structured differently and may focus on different aspects (as specified under 3.1. EM of the proposal). However, both are governed by, and determined by reference to the public policy to respect and protect family ties. This is the connecting factor between law of succession and family law, which inseparably links these two matters.. Hence, efforts to keep aspects of family law exempt from the law of succession or to treat these matters separately from each other (as proclaimed under 3.1. EM of the Proposal) enters into conflict with this close link, ie with the public policy on family. The concerns of interference with substantive Austrian (family and succession) Law, seem to be substantial, and may be illustrated by the


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following examples (these may be similar to possible examples that could be given for other EU-Member States): a. Intestate (Statutory) Shares: Under Austrian Law, the intestate share granted to spouses is smaller than that granted to descendants (1/3 for the spouse and 2/3 for the descendants), because the public policy on family favours descendants over spouses (Section 757 ABGB Austrian Civil Code). Under Austrian law, extra-matrimonial children and legitimate children are entitled to equal shares (Sections 138c, 732 ABGB). Homosexual life partners living in registered partnerships and married couples are also equally entitled to shares (Section 537a ABGB), because the public policy on family favours equal treatment in family law, as well as in the law of succession. Family ties connecting these persons (and the deceased) are respected and protected by law of succession, which determines the shares of these persons according to the public policy on family. Therefore, Art 19.2.b of the Proposal may have a significant impact on the rights of those entitled to intestate shares under Austrian law: where the deceased has his last habitual residence in a Member State or where substantive law and public policy on family dictate differently, ie in relation to who is favoured with respect to intestate shares eg spouses over descendants. Their legitimate expectations do not appear to be protected, their rights based on family ties no longer appear to be guaranteed, which is, definitely contrary to the intention of the Proposal (as proclaimed by recitals 6 and 20 of the Proposal). b. Disinheritance, Debarment from Succession: The same applies to disinheritance and debarment from succession, which are to be governed by the law determined by the Proposal under Art 19 (2) e: Under Austrian Law, disinheritance and debarment from succession can be based inter alia on the violation of family law obligations, e.g. severe infringements of maintenance obligations or obligations of mutual assistance between spouses (Section 769 ABGB). Where the person, who severely infringed maintenance obligations, has the last habitual residence in a Member State, where such infringements give no basis for debarment from succession, the rights of the surviving spouse granted to her/him under Austrian Law may be seriously affected and interfered with on the basis of Art 19 (2) e. Such interference was not intended by the Proposal, since the rights of heirs linked to the deceased "must be effectively guaranteed" (according to recital 6 of the Proposal), legitimate expectations should be preserved (recital 20) and - above all - "aspects related to family law" as well as maintenance obligations should be excepted from the scope of the Proposal (3.1. E.M.; Art 1 (3) e).


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c. Gifts (upon Marriage) and Accounting for them (upon Death): Similar concerns are to be risen with regard to the obligation to restore or account for gifts and the taking of gifts into account when determining the shares of heirs and compulsory portions (as specified under Art 19 (2) j of the Proposal). Austrian family law and the law of succession provide for the equal treatment of descendants and spouses with regard to compulsory portions and gifts: Spouses and descendants are all granted a minimum share of the estate (compulsory/reserved portion) when they are not beneficiaries under a will (Section 762 ABGB). In addition, there are special family law rules governing the granting of portions upon the marriage of a child (making an advancement on this occasion; Sections 1220ff ABGB). These family law rules are inseparably linked to the law of succession, which provides that such gifts must be taken into account when determining the reserved portion or the share of this child (Section 788 ABGB). Under Austrian law, the rights of children and spouses to claim that such gifts should be taken into account when determining reserved portions, may be significantly affected. These rights are based on family ties and may not be "guaranteed", for instance, where the donor has his last habitual residence in a Member State, where such an account for gifts is not provided for. Art 19 (2) j of the Proposal may therefore not guarantee the rights of heirs effectively and may interfere with substantive Austrian family law and the law of succession, although this was not its intention. The Proposal does not intend to go beyond what is strictly necessary to identify the applicable law of succession in cross-border-successions. Furthermore, the Proposal intends to keep family law aspects exempt and to preserve the legitimate expectations of third parties and to guarantee the rights of heirs (as proclaimed by 1.2., 3.1., 3.3. EM and recitals 6 and 20 of the Proposal). d. Compulsory/Reserved Portions: The rules on compulsory portions (reserved portions) under Austrian Law are governed by the public policy of respecting and protecting family ties. Where descendants, spouses and parents of the deceased are not included as beneficiaries in the will of the deceased, they are entitled to reserved portions (Section 762 ABGB). By granting these members of the family a compulsory share (part of the deceased's estate and the standard of living that they previously held). The purpose of overruling the testator`s will is to respect and protect family ties through the application of the law of succession. Family ties that are respected and protected under the Austrian law of Succession may loose their protection on the basis of Art 19 (2) i of the Proposal, where the last habitual residence of the deceased was in a Member State, where reserved portions are either not granted at all, or are not granted to spouses or children [or parents] to the extent provided for under Austrian Law. Art 19 (2) i may thus interfere with Austrian family law and the law of succession and may even interfere with the Austrian public policy to protect family ties through the application of the law of succession. This possible impact under Art 19 (2) i is an unintended consequence of the Proposal, since all aspects relating to family law should have been exempt


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from the Proposal (see 3.1 EM of the Proposal) and the Proposal does not intend to go beyond what is strictly necessary to identify the applicable law of succession (see 3.3. E.M.). e. Preferential Legacy of the Spouse/Registered Partner: Finally, there is a further rule under Austrian family law and the Austrian law of succession which gives rise to the concern that the proposed regulation may interfere with substantive Austrian law and Austrian public policy: Under Austrian Law, spouses (registered partners) are entitled to the so called "preferential legacy", entitling the spouse to stay in the matrimonial home (dwelling right) and to take over and keep the chattels from the household as far as they are required for continuing the prior life style (Section 785 ABGB "Vorausvermächtnis"). This legacy is compulsory. The spouse can only be deprived of this legacy in case of disinheritance and debarment from succession, eg when the surviving spouse severely infringed maintenance obligations or other family law obligations. The legacy constitutes a kind of maintenance obligation incumbent upon the heirs towards the surviving spouse, since the heirs are required to safeguard the rights of the spouse provided for by this legacy. Such rights for the surviving spouse upon death of the partner (being similar to the "Vorausvermächtnis" under Austrian Law) do not appear to be unique to Austria. In other Member States, surviving spouses appear to be entitled to similar rights, based inter alia on family tied maintenance considerations. According to an Austrian study on the dwelling rights of surviving spouses of 1996 (Zankl, Vorausvermächtnis) and following an Austrian study on reserved portions of 2009 (Welser, Die Reform des österreichischen Erbrechts) there seem to exist similar rights eg in Germany (Section 1932 BGB), Hungary (Sections 661ff Civil Law Code of Hungary), Italy (Art 540 Codice Civile), Ireland (Succession Act 1965, Section 56), Scotland (Succession Act 1964, Section 8) and the UK (Inestates` Act 1952, Second Schedule, Section 1/1). According to Art 1 (3) e of the Proposal, maintenance obligations shall be excluded from the scope of the proposed regulation. Dwelling rights of surviving spouses under the preferential legacies of Austrian Law (as specified above) seem to be excluded, since these rights establish a form of maintenance obligation of the heirs. However, according to Art 19 (2) b and i of the Proposal, the inheritance rights of the surviving spouse - as well as the reserved portions - shall be governed by the law determined under the Proposal. As such, the rights of the surviving spouse granted to her/him under Austrian law may be seriously affected and interfered with by Art 19 (2) b and i of the Proposal, albeit that this was not intended by the Proposal. Furthermore, such an interefernce does not appear to be strictly necessary in order to identify the applicable law of Succession in cross-border-successions. f. Choice of Law (Art 17 of the Proposal) as Way Out? The concerns that some of the provisions under Chapters I - III of the proposed regulation may interfere with substantive Austrian law (as


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illustrated by the examples under a-e), are substantial, even with regard to Art 17 of the Proposal: Art 17 of the Proposal grants the right to choose the law applicable to succession, as being the law from the State of the (future) deceased person's nationality. However, it is left to the sole discretion of the testator to choose the national law or to make the law of the presumptive last habitual residence overrule the rights of spouses, descendants and parents under their national law. To the extent that these rights are based on family ties (with regard to the deceased's estate) as determined by the Austrian law of succession, the public policy on family may be seriously affected (contrary to the Proposal's intentions). In addition, the intentional failure to choose the national law may lead to an abuse of law to the detriment of the rights of the spouses, descendants and parents. This appears to go beyond what is strictly necessary in order to identify the applicable law of succession. As such, with regard to the choice of law under Art 17 of the Proposal, the intentional failure to choose the law should have no effect on the rights of spouses, descendants and parents, when leading to an abuse of law to the detriment of these members of the family of the deceased. Conclusions and suggestions

The Proposal does not intend to go beyond what is strictly necessary to achieve its objectives on the basis of Art 81 of the Treaty (as amended in Lisbon). Aspects relating to family law should be exempt from any measures provided for within the proposed instrument. Under 3.1. and 3.3. of the Explanatory Memorandum, these intentions are clearly stated and explicitly proclaimed. There are, however, serious concerns, that there may be interference with the substantive Austrian law on family and succession and with the aforementioned Austrian public policy. This is so despite the fact that such impacts were not intended by the proposed regulation and do not appear to be strictly necessary in order to identify the applicable law of succession in cross-border-successions. Hence, there seems to be a need for a due diligence revision of the following questions:

Is the scope of application specified under Art 19 of the Proposal (with regard to the exemptions as specified under Art 1) still covered by Art 81 of the Treaty? Do some of the measures proposed go beyond what is strictly necessary to identify the applicable succession law in cross-border-successions? Are there proceedings under Art 81 (3) of the Treaty necessary with regard to those measures provided for in the Proposal (specified under a-f above), that have an interfering impact on issues of family law?


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Are any amendments to Art 19, Art 1 and Art 17 of the Proposal possible, in order to restrict the scope of applicable law under the Proposal to the rules of applicable law only, not resulting in an interference with substantive law on family or succession?

As such, it appears that further consideration would be both necessary and helpful, especially with regards to the following: Art 19 and the scope of the application specified therein, Art 1 and the exemptions specified therein, and Art 17 and the restrictions that the choice of law seems to require with reference to the rights of spouses, descendants and parents. Art 19 (2) of the Proposal could be restricted, and consequently Art 1 (3) of the Proposal could be extended, in favour of the rights and legitimate expectations of the family, namely the rights of surviving spouses (partners), descendants and parents upon death. At present, the proposed text seems to go beyond what is strictly necessary in this respect to identify the applicable law of succession in cross-border-successions. Accordingly, in Art 1 (3) the following should be excluded from the scope of the Proposal:

the inheritance rights of the surviving spouse/registered partner and the determination of the intestate shares of spouses, descendants and parents; disinheritance and debarment from succession referring to spouses (partners), descendants and parents;

reserved portions and other restrictions on the freedom to dispose of property upon death whenever the reserved portions and restrictions are affecting the rights of spouses (partners), descendants or parents upon death;

any obligation to restore or account for gifts and the taking of them into account when determining the shares or reserved portions of spouses (partners), descendants or parents.

With regard to Art 17 of the Proposal (freedom of choice of applicable law) further discussion may advisable, since intentional failure to choose national law should have no effect, where the law of the last habitual residence of the deceased leads to an abuse of law to the burden of the rights of spouses, descendants and parents granted to them under their national succession law.


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II. Clear Rules, Legal Certainty, Predictability - Suggestions

Some of the provisions under Chapters I, II, III and V which refer to the scope of application the jurisdiction, the applicable law and authentic instruments - are giving rise to concerns that EU-citizens may find themselves confronted with complicated and unclear rules, when trying to identify the applicable law on jurisdiction and succession in cross boarder successions in the future. These concerns may be illustrated by the following examples. Any suggestions to improve the proposed text may also be submitted in order to support further discussions on these concerns: a. Art 1 (3) and Art 19 (2) of the Proposal: The following examples illustrate the need for further discussions on rules which are not sufficiently clear: • Maintenance: Maintenance obligations shall be excluded from the scope of the Regulation according to Art 1 (3) e. The law set down by the Proposal shall govern reserved portions and other restrictions on the freedom to dispose of property upon death, as well as the inheritance rights of the surviving spouse (Art 19 (2) b and i). The rights of spouses, descendants (and parents) to reserved portions have the purpose of respecting and protecting family ties (linking them to each other and to the deceased) and constitute maintenance obligations of the heirs towards these members of the family. However, it remains unclear whether dwelling rights or maintenance upon death should be denied to spouses (descendants and parents) or not, where the deceased had his last habitual residence in a Member State, where reserved portions are not granted at all or not granted to spouses or children or parents. In this way, legal certainty and predictability for citizens may be improved by exempting reserved portions and inheritance rights of the surviving spouse, descendants and parents from the scope of the Regulation under new Art 1 (3) k. It does not appear to be strictly necessary in order to identify the applicable law of succession that the Proposal should govern the reserved portions for these family members. • Wills of Persons under Guardianship: Under Austrian law, persons placed under guardianship (due to mental disability or the inability to manage their own affairs) are nevertheless entitled to make a will when meeting certain (specified) requirements (Section 568 ABGB): Such wills can only be made by oral declaration before a court or notary, and special investigations on the mental status of these persons are obligatory. In practice, such wills are frequently made (as a result of the increase in senile dementia, rendering people [partly] unable to manage their affairs). According to Art 19 (2) d, the particular causes of incapacity shall be governed by the applicable law under the Proposal. Art 1 (3) b excludes "the


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legal capacity of natural persons, notwithstanding Art 19 (2) c and d" and "the status of natural persons" from the scope of this Regulation. In principle, persons under guardianship in Austrian Law are therefore excluded from the scope of this Regulation according to Art 1 (3) b. Hence, they should apparently be able to make a will under Section 568 ABGB, even if their last habitual residence will not be in Austria. However, the regulation shall govern the "particular causes of the incapacity to dispose" according to Art 19 (2) d, so it seems to remain unclear, whether persons being under guardianship under Austrian Law shall retain, or be deprived of their right to make a last will, when they have their last habitual residence in a Member State which does not grant them similar rights. Hence, the proposed regulation does not seem to provide for (nor to guarantee) a satisfactory level of legal certainty and predictability for citizens in identifying the applicable succession law, since the proposed rules do not seem to be clear enough. Legal certainty and predictability for citizens as intended according to 3.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum could be achieved by excluding the particular causes relating to incapacity to dispose from the scope of applicable law under the Proposal by deleting the reference made to Art 19 (2) c and d in Art 1 (3) b. • Gifts (upon Marriage): Under Art 19 (2) j any obligation to restore or account for gifts and to take them into account when determining the shares of heirs shall be governed by the law as set down in Chapter III of the Proposal. According to Art 1 (3) d questions on the matrimonial property regime shall be excluded from the scope of the regulation. It may thus be unclear whether the portions granted upon the marriage of a child should be taken into account when determining the child's reserved portion or the share under Austrian law, where the donator has his last habitual residence in a Member State where such an account for gifts is not provided for. It may therefore improve legal certainty and predictability for citizens to exclude from the scope of the proposed regulation the obligation to restore an account for gifts made upon marriage and given from parents to their children (Art 19 (2) j) by extending Art 1 (3) f. b. Art 17 of the Proposal : Concerns that the intentional failure to choose applicable law may result into an abuse of law to the detriment of third parties, in particular affecting the rights of spouses, partners, descendants and parents, have not yet been cleared up. Explicit rules preserving the testator from an intentionally failed choice of law to the detriment of the rights granted to spouses, descendants and parents under national succession law are needed in Art 17. c. Art 2 h, Art 34, Art 35 of the Proposal:


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Art 34 and 35 govern the recognition and enforceability of authentic instruments as defined under Art 2 h. The proposed text appears to restrict mutual recognition with regard to authentic instruments, since instruments with comparable status and effect are not governed by the proposed regulation. This does not comply with Art 46 of Regulation 2201/203 (Bruxelles II bis) which governs authentic instruments as well as instruments with comparable status and effect duly drawn up or registered in a Member State. This omission in the proposed regulation may, moreover, deprive EU-citizens of legal protection: Citizens, currently rely on a legal act, whether it is authentic under the civil law notarial system or whether it is an instrument with comparable legal effects. Citizens may thus lose out in the cross-border-reach of their legal actions just because they have relied on an instrument with comparable status and effect duly drawn up under their national law, but, which is nevertheless excluded from the benefits of the future legislation. It may improve legal certainty for citizens to explicitly add instruments with comparable status and effect to the recognition of authentic instruments (under Art 34) and the enforceability of authentic instruments (Art 35).


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III. Connecting Factor: The provisions under Chapters I and II providing for the last habitual residence of the deceased as the connecting factor used to identify the applicable law (Art 16) are giving rise to concerns that the fragmentation of succession will be just as frequent as before and substantial delays in succession as well as complex litigation across Member States may even become more prevalent than they are today: Under Austrian law, the conflict of law rules link the applicable law on cross-border-succession to the citizenship of the deceased (Section 28 and 9 IPRG, Conflict Rules Act). This is not a phenomenon unique to Austria - the conflict of law provisions in other Member States also connect the applicable law on cross-border-successions to the citizenship of the deceased. From the view of a practicing lawyer, using citizenship of the deceased as the connecting factor provides various key advantages as regards legal certainty and predictability. Firstly, citizenship can be easily and quickly proven by documents. Citizenship is not determined by facts being subject to quick changes or susceptible to easy manipulation. Citizenship is a connecting factor determined by legal status, which allows for interpretation by a court and is not subject to evidence hearings. There is requirement for the surviving parties to prove any facts. In this way, using citizenship guarantees identification of the applicable law of succession without delay and questions left open, wherefrom disputes may arise. Whenever quick decisions are to be taken upon death with regards the administration of the estate, the applicable law normally is identified quickly and easily. The Hague Convention of August 1, 1989 on the law applicable to succession to the estate of deceased persons provided for the last habitual residence (specified in detail within the Convention) as the connecting factor. The proposed regulation provides for the same connecting factor (Art 4, Art 16) primarily by reference to the Convention (4.3. of the Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal). However, the latter Convention never entered into force, since it was only agreed upon by Luxemburg and the Netherlands. This was because, inter alia, from a practical point of view using the last habitual residence of the deceased as a connecting factor rarely provides for legal certainty and predictability for the following reasons: Habitual residence as such is a question of fact. The burden of proving the last habitual residence is imposed on the surviving parties. Facts may be changed quickly, and may be susceptible to manipulation.. The habitual residence of a person, who can no longer be questioned, is in practice very difficult to identify. It often requires lengthy and cost intense fact finding missions and evidential procedures before it will be possible to answer the operative question, of which succession law will be applied. Collecting bills of telephone companies, studying the amount of roaming fees for mobile phones, comparing invoices of electricity providers, interrogation of witnesses etc will thus become necessary for surviving EU-citizens in cross-border-succession in the future. The outcome and evidential procedures of such fact finding missions may not be entirely clear. Questions left open


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may lead to an increased level of uncertainty, in comparison to that which already exists. Complex litigation across Member States may occur whenever the fact finding mission leads to the result that there are several habitual residence of the deceased which may be considered as the last one. Substantial delays in succession will then presumably be the norm in cross-border-succession. As such, a connecting factor based on mere facts - such as the proposed notion of last habitual residence would be, from the view of a practicing lawyer, very likely result into an additional source of substantial delays in succession, as well as a source of complex litigation across Member States. It may lead to forum shopping by running and operating various habitual residences, so that mere coincidence may identify the last one. With regard to Austrian law, which (like the law of other Member States) connects the law applicable on cross-border-successions to the citizenship of the deceased, the proposed regulation, may, in practice result into a substantive change for the worse. It is, of course, plausible, that the citizenship might not be the appropriate connecting factor within the European Union, where the nationality of the citizens should no longer play an important role. When replacing of citizenship as connecting factor, if it is considered that another connecting factor is needed, the connecting factor to be found should provide for legal certainty and predictability (to the same extent as citizenship does). Hence, a connecting factor is required, which is determined by legal features only, which are stable, allow for interpretation by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and which do not require fact finding missions nor evidential procedures. Moreover, a connecting factor is required which is not susceptible to different interpretation by the different courts in the Member States, as the habitual residence is interpreted in various ways in the Member State right now. One single connecting factor for the entire EU should be introduced. It is suggested that a clearer definition of the habitual residence should be agreed upon (if the last habitual residence is to be the connecting factor). However, the last habitual residence would still be a question of fact to be determined. Making this determination would nevertheless require lengthy and complicated fact finding missions and the burden of proof will still be imposed on the citizens. As such, it would be desirable to use a definition based on legal terms only, allowing interpretation by the European Court of Justice and requiring no fact finding missions. Conclusions and Suggestions

The last habitual residence of a deceased is a connecting factor based on a question of fact. These facts have to be determined in complex, lengthy and cost intense fact finding missions upon the death of the deceased. These fact finding missions may result into unclear situations, ie that there are several habitual residences of the deceased, which may be considered as the "last"


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one, or may lead to the result, that the deceased had no close connection to the law of the Member State where the deceased happened to have the last habitual residence. The burden of proof for the facts will be imposed on the surviving parties. Hence, one single connecting factor based on a legal status is still to be found for the entire EU, which provides for legal certainty and predictability (to the same extent as the citizenship of the deceased does), hence which allows the interpretation by the European Court of Justice and does not require fact finding missions. As long as such a connecting factor has not been identified, it may be suggested to stay with the connecting factors provided for under national conflict law rules for the time being, in order to give way to a soon realization of the proposed Regulation.

The proposed EU Regulation on Succession and Finnish Law

Riitta Leppiniemi, President of the Finnish Bar Association

Abstract: This note identifies and analyses the legal questions and problems, which the proposed EU Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and authentic instruments in matters of succession and the creation of a European Certificate of Succession raises as regards Finnish rules of private international law as well as substantive law in the area of succession.


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CONTENTS

I. Introduction.............................................................................2

II. Jurisdiction...............................................................................2

III. Applicable law...........................................................................3

IV. Recognition and enforcement......................................................5

V. European Certificate of Succession...............................................6

The proposed EU Regulation on Succession and Finnish Law ___________________________________________________________________________________________

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I. Introduction The Finnish Bar Association finds it important that a Regulation is issued on international succession matters. However, the proposal contains a number of aspects that create problems in terms of practical application. II. Jurisdiction The residence of the deceased is a key element in the examination of jurisdiction both in Finnish law and the proposed Regulation. The provision concerning jurisdiction saying that it would always be exercised by a court of law in the Member State in which the deceased habitually resided upon demise is, for all intents and purposes, simple and clear-cut. However, what may create problems in reality is that the concept of 'residence' lends itself to a wide range of interpretations according to the Member State involved. Currently, there are a growing number of people in Europe whose residence is determined by fixed-term employment contracts. At the same time, the number of people living in two different States for taxation or pension reasons – for example on a semi-annual basis – is constantly increasing. In such cases, it may be difficult to determine the country of residence. Therefore, the Regulation should, by way of examples if not otherwise, provide more detailed information as to what criteria are decisive in the determination of 'residence'. Under Finnish law, this issue may also be resolved with the defendant simply accepting the jurisdiction of the court seised or responding to the case without making any claim to contest its jurisdiction. Additionally, Finnish courts may always take measures to protect the property involved in the succession in Finland. Partly, the objectives underlying the jurisdiction considerations could be accomplished by requesting, under Article 5, referral to a more appropriate court better placed to hear the case than the competent court. However, such a procedure is fairly rigid and costly compared with a situation in which the defendant could expressly or quietly accept the jurisdiction of the court seised. Therefore, the Regulation should provide for the possibility of agreeing on the jurisdiction. In reality, most of the property and assets of persons moving abroad for career or tax reasons is usually not located in the country of residence but in the ‘country of origin’. From this point of view, it is important to permit freedom of contract to make it possible for the property involved in the succession to be inventoried and distributed in the country in which it is located. If the deceased’s last residence is not located in a Member State, its jurisdiction would be determined by Article 6 of the proposed Regulation. It would greatly


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extend the jurisdiction of courts compared with the present situation. Should any succession property be left in a Member State, it would have jurisdiction over such property, among other things, on the basis that the one heir or legatee has residence in said State. In this type of situations, exercise of jurisdiction may lead to an unreasonable outcome from the point of view of any other heirs. For example, if the deceased’s last residence was in a state in South America, it is usually not considered equitable that an heir habitually living in a Member State could have any disputes concerning the succession property referred to his or her country of residence simply on the basis that some of the property involved in the succession is located there. III. Applicable law The main rule that succession is governed by the law of the State in which the deceased habitually lived at the time of death is basically in agreement with Finnish law. However, the term used in Finnish law as the link is ‘domicile’ instead of ‘residence’ to ascribe greater importance to the deceased's intention to live in a specific State on a permanent basis than suggested by mere place of residence. However, the proposed Regulation differs from Finnish law in a situation in which the deceased was previously domiciled in another State. Under Finnish legislation, the law of the new State of domicile will only apply immediately if the deceased was a citizen of the State of residence at the time of death. If not, a prerequisite is that the deceased has lived in his or her new State of domicile for a minimum of period of five years preceding death. According to the proposed Regulation, the applicable law would change immediately upon change of residence. Considering applicable law, a categorical position stipulating that the change of residence would automatically change the applicable law would, in reality, lead to the situation in which the deceased’s will not be fulfilled on succession. While the Finnish Marriage Act and Code of Inheritance have since 2001 allowed the possibility of choosing the governing law in respect of matrimonial property regimes and/or succession, it is, unfortunately, not widely used. The first-hand experiences gained by attorneys show that few people moving abroad are aware that emigration and change of residence would result in the change of applicable law. Prenuptial agreements and wills and testaments are prepared by a wide variety of people, and often those preparing the documents are unaware of said provision. Additionally, it should be noted that if a person moves from one country to another several times, for example because of work, the law applicable to succession would change repeatedly. As in Finnish law, the proposed Regulation allows the heirs, subject to certain limitations, to choose the law applied to succession. Under both sets of legislation, this provision only applies to all of the property involved in the succession. The


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deceased’s freedom to choose the law applicable to their succession is substantially more limited than under Finnish law. According to the proposed Regulation, the deceased may only choose the law of the State of his or her nationality. Conceivably, this means nationality at the time when the deceased issues the order concerning the choice of law. Under Finnish law, the deceased may, additionally, choose the law of the State whose national he or she is at the time of death; the law of the State of domicile at the time when the choice of law was made or at the time of death; or the law of the State in which he or she has previously been domiciled. Additionally, a deceased who is married at the time of choice of law, may order that succession be governed by the law of the same State as is applied to the matrimonial property regime. The deceased should be allowed greater freedom in the choice of law applicable to succession beyond just residence/nationality. The perception that assets (future property involved in the succession) would always travel with the owner is too categorical. The proposed Regulation makes a complete distinction between succession and matrimonial property regimes. In reality, most succession cases involve a matrimonial property aspect. The law governing the matrimonial property regime contains a range of provisions concerning the position of the widow(er) even if they were not to receive any inheritance from the spouse. When this is combined with the provisions of the Hague convention regarding last wills and testaments, situations may arise in which the validity of a will and testament is determined according to the law of the State of preparation; matrimonial property regime according to the law of the State of marriage; and succession according to the law of the State of last residence, each of which may be different. Collisions of law in such cases are more than likely. It is absolutely necessary to determine the order of precedence of these provisions. It is inadvisable to create, by regulation, a situation in which a testamentary order given by the deceased regarding, say, the matrimonial property regime would be cancelled by a law applied directly ,under the regulation, to the property involved in the succession. In the proposed Regulation, the scope of the law of succession is wider than in Finnish law. According to Finnish law, most of the issues of property law are decided according to the law of succession whereas procedural issues related to the administration of the deceased's estate, estate inventory and distribution are settled according to Finnish law. According to the proposed Regulation, a range of issues now settled under Finnish law as being procedure-related, would be decided under the succession statute. The extension of the proposed Regulation to procedures related to estate inventory and distribution would create a number of problems. The proposed regulation leaves it unclear whether an administrator and executor of the estate can, in the first place, be appointed in respect of property located in Finland if succession is


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governed by law other than Finnish law. If no administrator can be appointed, the position of creditors may be compromised because the creditors are protected by the Finnish Inheritance Code by a provision stating that the creditors have the right to demand that an administrator be appointed for a deceased’s estate. If the law of another State governing succession contains no provisions concerning the administrator and executor of the estate or equivalent parties, there will be no provisions concerning their powers, either. Recently, deceased’s estates in which a Finnish executor applies the law of another State have become more common and are encountered daily by attorneys dealing with succession matters. Practical means and solutions have been found for the determination of the substance and application of the law of other States. However, from the point of view of estate administration, it would be extremely challenging if the procedures too were to be determined according to foreign law. Clarification of issues and dealings with banks, authorities and tax services in accordance with the law of another State would mostly likely lead to a situation in which proper handling of the matters would be prevented or at least greatly complicated. Similarly, situations in which jurisdiction in respect of the same deceased's estate is exercised by different parties in different States create problems. In a minimum, the Regulation should contain clear provisions for the allocation of jurisdiction. Additionally, administration by parties in several States would also substantially increase the cost of estate administration and distribution. At present, the executors often operate at their own risk because costs are primarily paid out of the assets of the estate without the estate administrator and executor being in a position to realize any assets in the estate to cover them. If estate administration is decentralized and there are no funds in the estate or they are, in full or in part, retained by a party administering the estate in another State, a candidate for an estate administrator and executor will need to consider his or her own cost risk and whether acceptance of the appointment is advisable in the first place. Such a development would give cause for great concern. However, due protection of creditors requires that the applicable law is highly predictable. Consequently, the proposal that liability for debts would always be governed by the law of the last State of residence merits support provided that due consideration is given to the definition of ‘residence’ as discussed in the foregoing. IV. Recognition and enforcement The proposed provisions would affect the current situation in that decisions handed down in Finland in succession matters would be recognized and enforced in other Member States. Conversely, Finland would recognize and enforce decisions taken in due course in other Member States. This would greatly facilitate the handling of


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succession matters in situations in which the deceased holds assets in more than one Member State. Most succession matters in Finland are settled by an agreement signed by the parties to the estate and certified by two competent witnesses. Such an agreement is not an authentic instrument within the meaning of the proposed Regulation. In Finland, succession cases involving legal disputes are settled by ordering the executor of the estate to carry out distribution. The executor of the estate can be regarded as an agent authorized by a court of law to enforce law. The decision of the executor may be appealed to a court of law by a set deadline. If the distribution is not challenged by the deadline, it will gain legal force. According to the proposed Regulation, other authorities which carry out by delegation of public power the functions falling within the jurisdiction of the courts as provided for in the proposed Regulation shall be deemed to be courts. Because an executor is not an authority, they cannot be regarded as courts within the meaning of the proposed Regulation. Consequently, a decision taken by the executor cannot be deemed to be decision that would be recognized in other Member States. This is problematic from Finland’s point of view. As far as recognition and enforcement are concerned, Finland’s current legislation and established legal praxis require that an agreement made by the concerned parties and fulfilling the applicable formal requirements and a legally enforceable deed of distribution issued by the executor should be accepted as legally enforceable instruments. V. European Certificate of Succession At present, there is no internationally recognized instrument that would constitute proof of the powers of administrators, executors of wills or other parties exercising control in the deceased’s estate. As such, the European Certificate of Succession is a welcome notion but it practical implementation is challenging. In Finland, the capacity of the heir could be proven with an estate inventory deed including a registered list of parties; however, it will not prove anything until the will and testament has gained legal force. The certificate of succession would not be useful until the property involved in the succession has been duly wound up and the will has gained legal force. In contrast, the certificate of succession would be highly usable if it constituted valid proof of the powers of specific actors (executor, administrator, notary public) already at the estate inventory stage while providing for the right of access to information.