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DIRECTORATE OF

INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

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5 Pehruarv 1968


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DIRECTORATE OFINTELLIGENCE

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The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departmenti of State and Defense. ·when, because of the time factor, adequate consultation ,vith the department of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may he designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within thP meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.

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rIlla-‘2 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by theiiiireetor of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providingenrrent intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President,the National Security Council, and other senior govemment officials. Itis produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.When, because of. the time factor, adequate consultation. with the depart-ment of primary concern is not feasible, items or Portions tl'iereof are pro-dnoed by CIA and marked with an asterisk.

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication representimmediate and preliminary views which are 51.113ject to modification in thelight of further information and more complete analysis.

(fiertain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specificallyfor no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminatedfurther, but only on a need-to-know basis. '

WARNING’fll‘his document contains classified information affecting the national securityoi? the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US CodeTitle 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.

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5 February 1968

Central Intelligence Bulletin CONTENTS

South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)

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Thailand: Government troops still encountering strong Communist resistance in north. (Page 4)

Brazil: Military pressing President Costa e Silva to move against oppositionist Lacerda. (Page 5)

Cyprus: New Greek-Turkish discussions may be under way (Page 6)

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- Central - IMel/game BulletinCONTENTS

_ South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)

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Thailand: Government troops still-encounteringstrong Communist resistance in-north. - (Page 4)

Brazil: Military- pressing President Costa e Silva-' to moVe against oppositionist Lacerda. (Page 5)

Cyprus: New Greek—Turkish discussions maybe under way (Page 6)

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*South Vietnam: US Marines in defensive positions on Hill 861 northwest of Khe Sanh beat back a North Vietnamese ground attack before dawn this morning while the main Khe Sanh base came under heavy mortar, artillery and rocket fire.

Seven Americans and 190 North Vietnamese were killed during the four-hour assault on the hill, the first significant ground action in the Khe Sanh sector in more than a week. Another 44 Marines were wounded in the battle.

Meanwhile, allied forces appear to have regained the initiative over the weekend in many of South Vietnam's urban areas. Sharp fighting continues in Hue, however, as well as in sections of Saigon and in several other provincial cities and district towns throughout the country.

There are some indications that the Communists intend to conduct a prolonged offensive against major population centers. In addition to reports of enemy troops deployed on the outskirts of a number of cities, a Viet Cong prisoner

I !claimed that the current "general insurrection campaign" would extend for the duration of the winter- spring offensive. A broadcast from the Communists' clandestine Liberation Radio this morning said that the Viet Cong would continue their present drive until "final victory. "

In another broadcast the Communists th;reatened reprisals against US personnel in Viet Cong hands if Communist soldiers captured in the recent fighting are brought to trial or executed.

The Saigon government has begun to organize itself to cope with the immediate and longer range civil problems arising from the Communist Tet offensive.

President Thieu held a series of weekend meetings with top South Vietnamese military and civilian officials and with senior US officials and agreed to the formation

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*South Vietnam: US Marines in defensive positionsonHill 861 northwest of Khe Sanh beat back a, NorthVietnamese 'ground attack before dawn this morning-while the mainKhe Sanh base came under heavy mortar, artillery androcket fire. .

Seven Americans and 100 North‘Vietnamese werekilled during the four— hour assault 'on the hill, the firstsignificant ground action in the Khe Sanh sector in morethan a week. Another 44 Marines werewounded in thebattle. - ' '

Meanwhile, allied forces appear to have regainedthe initiative over-the weekend in many of South. Vietnam'surban areas. Sharp fighting continues in Hue, however,

_ as well as in sections of Saigon and in Several other pro—vincial cities and district towns throughout the country. -

There are some indications that the Communists intendto conduct a prolonged'offensive against major population 'centers. In addition to reports 'of enemy troops deployed onthe outskirts of a- number of cities. a Viet Cong prisoner

claimed that the current"general insurrection'campaign would extend for theduration of the wintera- spring offensive. A broadcast from

. the Communists' clandestine LiberationRadio this" morningSaid. that the Viet Cong wouldcontinue their present driveuntil f'final victory. ” '

'In another broadcast the CommunistSthreatened re-é-prisalsagainst US personnel in Viet Cong hands if Com-munist soldiers captured in the recent fighting arebroughtto trial or exeCuted. - , ' " ' - '

The Saigon government has begun to organize itself. to cope with the immediate and longer range civil problemsarising from the Communist Tet offensive.

. PresidentThieurheld a series of weekend meetingswith top South Vietnamese military and civilianofficialsand with senior US offiCials and agreedto the formation

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of an emergency joint task force. Headed by Vice President Ky, this group will be concerned with determining priority needs throughout the country, the movement of food supplies and other essential relief activities, and the strengthening of information and psychological warfare services. In an official release yesterday, Thieu announced the creation of a central coordinating center in Saigon, under Ky, and promised that the army would assist war victims.

The government is also moving to mobilize support for its own actions in the crisis and to elicit denunciations of the Communists from influential civilian circles. It has received public statements of support from National Assembly officials, the Upper House defense committee, and a group speaking for the entire lower house. The Vietnamese Confederation of Labor and its Saigon council have issued similar pledges, and union leaders as well as the moderate Buddhists have begun to organize emergency relief centers for the needy in Saigon.

Despite these pledges, there is widespread criticism among some assemblymen and union leaders

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over the government's performance to date. Much of the criticism is directed at Prime Minister Loe for taking little initiative within his own cabinet or among private groups willing to help.

Militant Buddhist leader Tri Quang, described as particularly bitter over the military attack on his pagoda where Viet Cong entrenched themselves during the fighting, has refused to denounce the Viet Cong, but an aide states that he is willi:ng to organize welfare centers as a tacit "g,:esture" of cooperation. I

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of an emergency joint task force, Headed by VicePresident Ky, this group will be concerned with deter—mining priority needs throughout the country, themovement of food' supplies and other essential reliefactivities, and the strengthening of information andpsychological warfare services. In an official releaseyesterday, Thieu announced‘the creation of a centralcoordinating center in Saigon, under Ky, and promisedthat the army would assist war victims. '

The government is also moving to mobilize supportfor its own actions in the crisis and to elicit denunci—ations of the Communists from influential civilian circles.It has received public statements of support from NationalAssembly officials, the Upper House defense committee,and a group speaking for the entire lower house. TheVietnamese Confederation of Labor and its Saigon councilhave issued similar pledges, and union leaders as wellas the moderate Buddhists have begun to organize emergencyrelief centers for the needy in Saigon, ’

Despite these pledges, there is widespread criticismI \among some assemblymen and union leadersover the government's performance to date. Much of thecriticism is directed at Prime Minister Loc for takinglittle initiative within his own cabinet or among private

groups willing to help, ' '

Militant Buddhist leader Tri Quang, described as.particularly bitter over the military attack on his pagodawhere Viet Cong entrenched themselves during the fighting,has refused to denounce. the Viet Cong, but an aide. Statesithathe is willing to organize welfare centers as a tacit ”gesture"of cooperation.

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Thailand: Government troops continue to encounter strong Communist resistance in northern Nan Province.

Two new clashes have recently been reported and the estimated 200 Communist-led tribesmen in the area are displaying considerable tactical skill and discipline in evading and harassing government forces. The government's 3,000-man police and army force has now suffered more than 80 casualties during the two-month-old operation, the heaviest government losses sustained thus far in operations against the insurgents.

The Thai Communist Party has been working with the northern tribal people for several years and has managed to extend its influence over a number of villages. Several hundred Thai tribesmen have received military training in Laos and North Vietnam, and they appear to be getting important support from Communist elements across the border in Laos. In addition, Thai officials claim they have identified two recently killed insurgents as Vietnamese, and have picked up two Communist- manufactured weapons. If true, this would be the first hard evidence that the insurgents are receiving such outside support.

Bangkok appears to be overreacting to the threat in Nan Province. Villagers in the area of government operations have been moved into refugee encampments and air strikes are being made against abandoned villages in an effort to destroy crops and foodstuffs that might fall into insurgent hands. Such heavy-handed treatment will almost certainly further alienate the tribal people. It reflects Bangkok's unwillingness to recognize that its own tribal policies have been largely responsible for creating a situation ripe for Communist exploitation.

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Thailand: Government troops continueto encoun—ter Strong Communist resistance in northern NanProvince.

Two new clashes have recently been reported andthe estimated 200 Communist-led tribesmen in the

. area are displaying considerable tactical skill and dis—cipline in evading and harassing government forces.The government's 3,000— man police and army force _has now suffered more than 80 casualties during thetwo-month—old operation, the heaviest goVernmentlosses sustained thus far in operations against the in—surgents. ' -

The Thai Communist Party has been working Withthe northern tribal people for several years and hasmanaged to extend its influence over a number of vil—lages. Several hundred Thai tribesmen have receivedmilitary training in Laos and North Vietnam, and theyappear to be getting important support from Commu-nist elements across the border in Laos. In addition,Thai officials claim they have identified two recentlykilled insurgents as Vietnamese, and have picked uptwo Communist-manufactured weapons. If true, thiswould be the first hard evidence that the insurgentsare receiving such outside support.

Bangkok appears to be overreacting to the threatin Nan ProvinCe. Villagers in the area of govern-ment operations have been moved into refugee-encamp— -ments and air strikes are being made against aban— 'doned villages in an effort to destroy crops and food—stuffs that might fall into insurgent hands. Such .heavy— handed treatment will almost certainly furtheralienate the tribal people. It reflects Bangkok's un—-willingness to recognize that its own tribal policieshave been largely responsible for creating a situation 3 5(0)-ripe for Communist exploitation. \ l '

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Brazil: Military pressure is building up on the Costa e Silva government to move against Carlos Lacerda.

Army officers believe that Lacerda is about to unleash another series of violent newspaper attacks on high military figures in the government--including Transportation Minister Andreazza and Interior Minister Albuquerque Lima. Although some military men still favor the government's polic of i norin Lacerda,

it is the L__~-------.--.-------.----..---------.-.--------;;---;-;--~ army s consensus that Lacerda should be prosecuted under provisions of the new national security law. Some "hotheads" believe that Lacerda would not be convicted under the law and reportedly are threatening to assassinate him if he defames military leaders.

Tempers are running high over this issue and extremist acts are possible. In 1954, an attempt to assassinate Lacerda by henchmen of then-president Vargas quickly resulted in the government's downfall. Another attempt-- even if it failed--would be widely viewed as a sign of government weakness and could erode military support for Costa e Silva.

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_ Brazil: ' Military pressure is building up on theCosta e “Silva government to move against Carlos 'Lacerda. - ' -

Army officers believe that Lacerda is about tounleash another series of violent-newspaper attackson high military figures in the government--inc1udingTransportation. Minister Andreazza and Interior Min-ister Albuquerque Lima. Although some military 3'3(h)(2)men still favor the goVernment’s policy of ignoringLacerda,l ._,

jit is the' army's consensus that Lacerda should be prosecuted

under provisions of the new national security law.SOme ”hotheads" believe that Lacerda would not beconvicted under the law and rep.ortedly are threaten-ing to assassinate him if he defames military leaders.

Tempers are running highover this issue and. extremist acts are possible. In 1954, an attempt toassassinate Lacerda by henchmen of then—presidentVargas quickly resulted in the government's downfall.Another attempt-—even if it failed-~would be widelyviewed as a sign of government weakness and coulderode military support for Costa e Silva. E l

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Cyprus: New Greek-Turkish discussions of the Cyprus problem may be under way. Turkish newspapers report that Turkish Foreign Ministry officials are somewhere in Europe and speculate that they may be engaged in secret talks with their Greek counterparts. Whether Athens and Ankara are talking or not, these reports will probably draw the fire of Cypriot President Makarios who has long done his best to sabotage any bilateral efforts between the two coun-tries to arrive at a solution. L--------~ 3.5(c)

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Cyprus: New Greek-Turkish discussions of theCyprus problem. may be under way. Turkish news-papers report that Turkish Foreign Ministry officialsare somewhere in Europe and speculate that they maybe engaged in secret talks with their Greek counter-'- 'parts. Whether Athens andiAnkara are talking or not,these reports will probably draw the fire of CypriotPresident Makarios who has long done his best tosabotage any bilateral efforts between the two coun-tries to arrive at a solution. [ 1 35(0)

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