dissemination of combat information 7 april 1953

8/3/2019 Dissemination of Combat Information 7 April 1953

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UNCLASSIFIEDOFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES

For t Monroe, Virginia ATTNG-26 350. 05/4(DOCI)(C)(7 Apr 53) .7 Apri l 1953 SUBJECT: Dis seminaHon of ~ Y m + m t - ; f ~ ~ ~ ~ " " " - ' C17613-02

PER!O:")I::::ALS :SECTION 1.APR 21 1953 i

.. COpy iTO : See Distribution ...... .1.. ,1. In accordance with SR 525-85- 5, Processing of Combat Infor

mation, th e inclosed EXTRACTS are forwarded for evaluation and necessa ryac t ion . It m ay be appropriate, in cer ta in cases , to take actionupon a single extracted i tem; in others , i t m ay be desirable to developa cross-sect ion of accumulate-d extracts on a part icular subject beforeinitiating action; and often, th e extracted i tem serves to reaff irm ourdoctr ines and techniques.

2. Copies are furnished to other mil i tary agencies to keep theminformed concerning theater problems from the front l ine through the199istical command.

3. These EXTRACTS a re derived from reports which are class i fied.SECRET. For th e greater convenience of the user , this Office assigns each extracted i tem the lowest classif icat ion compatible with security. No effort is made to p a r ~ p h r a s e or delete any port ion of the ext racted r emarks , so that none of the original intent is lost .

4. Combat information EXTRACTS which are applicable to t raining at th e company-bat tery level appear in Army Field Forces TRAINING BULLETINS.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

ARi'v1Y WAil COLLEGE .

OF~ CHATHAMAWe LOG'~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' O N I < ' : ~ . Extracts from sources # Lt Col, AGC

684 thru 705 . Asst Adjutant General53- 4- 92-i'i DISTRIBUTION: ..Copy No 356(Over) eN 49860Army-OCAFF-1132


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DISTRIBUTION-: 1- 3 ACOFS, G-1, DA 100-101 Executive fO T Reserve4- 6 ACOFS, G-2, DA and RbTC Affairs7-21 ACOFS, G.,.3, DA 102-111 Chief Signal Officer

22-41 ACO'FS, G-4, DA 112-121 The Surgeon General42-43 The Adjutant General 122-125 Chief of Transp.ortation44-45 Chief of Chaplains OCAFF46 .. 55 Chief Chemical Officer 126 G156-65 Chief of Engineers 127 G266-67 Chief of Finance 128-147 G368-69 Chief of Information 148-149 G470-71 The I ~ s p e c t o r General 150-154 Dev & Tes t72.,.73 The Judge Advocate 155 Chaplain'

General 156 em1 14-75 Chief of Military 157 Compt History 158 Engr

76-77 Chief, National Guar,d 159 Info Bureau 160 Med

78-87 Chief of Ordnance 161 Ord 88-89 The Provos t Marshal 162 PM

General 163 OM 90-99 The Quar termaster 164 Sig General 165 Trans

Copies furnished:166-299 TAG (40 CG, US Army Forces , Far East; 44 CINC, US Army,Europe; 10 ea CGls, other Major Oversea Commands)CGls .

300-301 Firs t Army 302-303 Second Army 304-305 Thi rd Army' 306-315 Fourth Army 316-317 Fifth Army 318-319 Sixth Army 320-323 Army AA Command 324-325 Military Distr ict of Washington 326-327 Tactical Air Command

326 ChairmaT\, Joint Chiefs 'o f Staff 329-330 Chief of Naval Operations, Dept of the Navy

331 CO, Mountain & Cold Weather T ~ g Command 332- 33 3 Chief, Army Advisory Gp, Air Command and Staff

School, Air University (See next page)


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U N ..ASS'fl ..A TTNG-26 350. 05/4(DOCI)(C)(7 Apr 53) 7 April 1953Subject: Dissemination of Combat InformationCopies furnished: (Cont)

334-335 Comdt of Cadets , US 'Mili tary AcademyComdt

336 Armed Forces Staff College, NOB 337-338 Marine Corps School 339-340 USAF Air-Ground Operat ions School 341-342 Counter Intelligence Corps School 343-"344 The Provost Marshal General 's School 345-346 Chief, Army Secur i ty Agency 347 CINC, US Atlantic Fleet , US Naval Base, Norfolk 11 , V a ~ Attn: Ground Forces Officer348 Director , Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Secy ofDefense, Attn: Col Train

CG's349-350 The Armored Center351-352 The Art i l lery Center353-354 The Infantry Cente rComdt355-356 , Army W ar College357-358 CGSC359-360 Army General School361-362 The Armored School 363-364 The Arti l lery School 365-366 The Infantry School

367-368 Asst Comdt, The Arti l lery School, AA&GM Branch Pres 369 A FF Bd No I 370 A FF Bd No 2 371 A FF Bd N"o 3 372 A F F Bd No 4 37 3 CO, Arctic Test B ranch

Chiefs 37 4 A FF HRU No 1 375 A FF HRU No. 2 376 Director of Special Weapons Developments, A F FOCAFF377 DCOFS378 Deputy Chief for Combat Developments379-382 Combat Arms Advisory Gp383-384 British Liaison Officer385-386 Canadian Liaison Officer387-400 G3(26)401 AG Records

402-412 Extra Copies 31flEDUNCLASSifiED


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l lecommend that in subsequent winter seasons men be instructed towear these boots for a period of only on e or tw o hours daily for the f i rstweek of use. Thi's practice would accustom the feet to the boot and woulddiminish the number of cases of scalding, arch relaxation, and minor coldinjury which resul ts from a sudderl transit ion to an unfamiliar type of footgear .

SOURCE: Command Report - 765th Trans Railway Shop BnDATE: November 1952 Source Nd 685

(RESTRICTED)PATROLLING SCOUT CAR_ON RAILS. - As guerri l la activity has in

c:reased and caused a hazard to rail , operations in Korea, plans were drawnfor an armored ra i l vehicle which would act as a patrolling scout car . Thisa rmored vehicle will t r a v ~ l the supply l ines of Korea as an independent t rainto insure the safety of supply and hospital t rains .

Carrier . general,: armored half-track. MIA3. was the vehicle chosento be converted for rai l \ o p e r a t i ~ n . The f irs t process was the removal of thet read after which a set trai l ing trucks was placed u,nder the bed of the halft rack. The front w h e e 1 ~ were fabricated by applying bQX car t i res to theoriginal half- t rack wheel drums . . The t i res were offset at th e proper t rack

Iwidth and welded to the drums.During inclement weather, start ing and stopping of rai l vehicles is

hinc:lered through loss traction du e to wet t racks . To provide the necessary traction in adverse weather conditions, sanders were applied to thefront of the vehicle. .

The vehicle will be armed and will be operated by a crew of MP's ofthe 72Zd Military Police Battalion.

SOURCE: Command Report 10th Inf DivDATE: August 1952 Source No 686

!RESTRIC TED)WARRANT OFFICER AS ASSISTANT .GZ. - Based on the t remendous

administrative work l o ~ d p ! a " M r ! t f t e ' ~ , $ : e . . c t i o n in the type of combat. - ' . J l U ' : ~ ~ ' - ' ....;.-UNCLASSIFIED ' SKpsTn 5'1'."5 'ameRr:


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experienced in Korea, rel;:ommend that authorization for a Warrant Officeradminis t rator be given due considerat ion. The present T /0 should bechanged as f o l l o w s ~

The presen t authorized as sistant G2 be incorporated into a posit ion ofass is tan t G2 operations with the rank of Major, an additional 1st Lieutenantbe authorized as ass is tan t operations officer, and the Warrant Officer. adminis t ra tor be considered the section chief for all administrative duties .This would rel ieve the G2 and ass is tan t G2 of constantly dealing with outright administrative problems, and allow them to concentrate thei r t ime andeffort on the intelligence functions of the division.

Command Report - 17th Inf RegtNovember 1952 Source No 68 7

(CONFIDENTIAL)POW CAMP PROBLEMS. - PW's operate clandestine mili tary-poli t ical

organizations to teach communist propaganda, encouragtt noncommuni,st PW'sto join organizations sponsoring com munism, harass the detaining power, andcause incidents which could be embarrass ing to the United Nations. In addition the PW organizat ions at tempt to identify units and personnel , by name,who are g u a r d i ~ g th e compounds.

The PW groups are ingenious in methods used to accomplish thei r mis sion. Stamps have been confiscated which are made from the rubber cutfrom the soles of shoes; these stamps are used along with some type of crudemimeograph device to print leaflets and messages . The theme of the leaflets,which are addressed to UN t roops, is disaffection and dissension.

Constant effort is maintained by' PW organizations to encourage a llpr i soners to remain faithful to North Korea and to res is t voluntary repatr ia t ion. Toward this end, the military-poli t ical organizations work ceaseless ly .Commup.ication is a big factor in their purpose and the PW's use many methodsto communicate between compomds. Rocks with notes at tached are throwninto adjacent compounds; PW's working at supply points send messages tovarious c o m p o u n ~ s ; tobacco is removed f rom cigaret tes , notes sl ipped inside,and,the cigaret tes passed ' to PW I S from different inclosures or compounds,One of the best methods pr isoners have of disseminating information isthrough the hospital. Before a PW goes to the hospital he is briefed, informa

'don is exchanged between patients in the hospital , and is thus disseminatedto other compounds. ".,. '., ..... " .ovs;r ........ .w,'"

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Command Report - Eighth ArmyDATE: August 1952 Source No 688

(RESTRICTED)TRAINING OF ENGINEERS IN ROCK AND EARTH REMOVAL. - The

majori ty of engineer troops in this command received demolit ion trainingin the CONUS with almost 100 per cent emphasis on combat dem olit ions,destruct ion of bridges and roads, removal of obstacles by demoli t ion, --ands imi lar engineer tasks , with little or no emphasis on excavation of ear thand on use of demoli t ions in quarrying and similar rock removal operat ions.On the other hand, approximately 90 per cent of demolit ion w ork of engineerunits in Korea has been rock and ear th removal , which requires a combina t ion of knowledge of ear th .characteris t ics , dril l ing. and dri l l equipment,and the use of proper explosives in such operat ions. Engineer replacementsreceived are also deficient in knowledge of bore holes and the 'value of dyna mite as an excavation explosive. Recommend that engineer training in the CONUS contain additional instruct ion on rock and ear th removal , use of bore holes, and the value ofdynamite as an excavation explosive.

OURCE: Command Report - l71st FA BnDATE: October 1952 Source No 689

(RES TRIC TED)COUNTERFIRE EXPEDITING. - A total of fifty counterf ire fixes were

made. During the period the infantry counterf ire plot ter was located in thedirect ' support ar t i l lery battalion FDC. A direct wire was la id from theplot ter ' s position to each of the counterf ire teams. When a fix_was madethe report came directly to the plotter, thereby enabling the direct sUPP9rtar t i l lery battalion to bring immediate fire on the fix. While fire is beingbrought on the target the routine reporting of the counterf ire information ismade to the infantry regimental command post and to divison ar t i l lery FDC.Ari al ternate means of communicat ion is provided for the counterf ire teamsin that. when thei r own.direct line fails. they can use the ar t i l lery observer ' sl ine. Since the t ime element is of paramount importance in delivering effec tive counterIJ' lortar f i re , this system is super ior to the usual method.

U N C L ~ S . I F I E D . ',. ,...CR.rr

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, , , ) ; . " ' , ! o : ~ ' : ~ ) . . ' .. ~ " ' : " ~ ; < ; ' ~ ; l " . ~ ~ " ' J . " ---jj"iiii- , x SO"" ; h8! Vi! cUNCLASSIFIED

. (RESTRICTED)LIFE OF BA TTERIES BA39 AND BA40. - Batter ies BA39 and BA40

received during the past month have' been very, poor . The operat ional lifeof these bat ter ies was shor t and lacked the performance expected of newBA39 and BA40 bat ter ies . The life of these bat ter ies was so var ied, tha t anaverage operat ional period could npt be obtained.

SOURCE: Command Report - Eighth A rm y DATE: July 1952 Source No 690'

(RESTRICTED), ARTILLERY ATTACK OF STORM-WEAKENED BUNKERS. - Normal ly ,infantry-occupied bunkers do not represent profitable ar t i l le ry targets sincetheir dest ruct ion requires the expenditure of an excess ive amount of am m uni t ion, and the enemy quickly rebuilds his fort i ficat ions. However, af te r heavyra ins torms , bunkers a re weakened to an extent that they can be col lapsed bythe blas t effect of a shel l burst ing nearby. With re la t ively l ight expenditureof ammunit ion, ser ious damage can be done to enemy posit ions under suchconditions. Excellent resul ts were obtained by ar t i l le ry f i res on enemybunkers following the severe s torms of the ra iny season this year .(RESTRICTED)

NAPALM HANDLING. - Modified caps for the 5-gal lon napalm drums used as thickened fuel t ranspor t containers , provide valuable additional flexibility in t ransfer r ing thickened fuel from centra l ly located mixing s ta t ions to f lame throwers in the field. The valve for pressur iz ing the can is connected to a source of compressed ai r , the f i l led t ransfer can is inverted over the flame throwe'r to be f i l led,compr.essed a ir is admit ted and forcesthe fuel from the t ransfer can to the-flame thrower . The Compressor , Ai r ,Lightweight , E3R2 (or M3), can fuel and pressu ' r ize simultaneously twoportable f lame throwers every ten minutes using this cap. This i s accompl ished by the s imple addition of a pressure- reducing valve and a double yokeof outlet hose to the third outlet of the compres so r . An ordinary t i re pumpcan also be used effectively, but is slower.

A technique has been devised to reduce the flow of the M3 mixing unit froIl'! 25gpm to 7gpm. This reduced flow increases the handling efficiency of thickened fuel mixed with the M3 unit where fuel storage is accom pl ished in ' 5-gallon gasoline cans . The present local method of using the M3 unit to handle naplam is to fill a 55-gallon drum with par t ia l ly thickened fuel, then


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--UNCLASSIFIED

6 "force (under 30-40 pounds pressure) the almost thickened fuel into 5-galloncans for storage and handling. A shortcoming of this method is the increased sensitivity to hopper-operator e r ro r which produces variat ions ingel consistancy due to the reduced flow of gasoline with unchanged sensitivityof thickener flow regulation. In addition, operat ing pressures were not sufficiently high to cause the rel ief valve to function as a regulClltor valve. Noadditional surging or spraying resulted from the incorporat ion in the unit ofthe reduced flow device.(RESTRICTED)

M4 DUST RESPIRATOR EFFECTIVENESS. - The consensus of usingpersonnel is that th e M4 resp i ra tor is super ior to the Ml and i s sat isfactoryin normal weather condit ions and i f worn for short periods of t ime. I t isconsidered unsatisfactory in extreme heat and high humidity ' because of the.heat g e n e r a t e ~ in the mask and the resultant moisture condensation formingon th e glasses impair ing the dr iver ' s vision. After prolonged use the resp i ra tors become l ess effective due to the accumulation of dust in the f i l ters .Such a condition causes labored breathing, thereby increasing driver fatigue.Prolonged wear also may cause a skin rash to develop due to the constantrubbing of the' mask against the face.

Indicat ions are that the M4 dust respira tor should not be considered asan ultimate end i tem, but as an interim item sat isfactory for shor t per iodsof wear . Recommend a dust respirator be developed which is l ighter, le-ssres i s tan t to ' breathing and so designed as to minimize or obviate chaffing ofth e skin.

Command Repor t - I Corps ArtyATE: October 1952 Source No 69-1

(SECRET)NEED FOR ADDITIQNAL HEAVY AR TILLER Y. - In this corps only

one weapon is capable of destroying the enemy ar t i l lery. The 8-inch howi t zer has proven t ime and again that it can destroy anything within its l,"angewith a minimum number of rounds. The 15S-mm gun with its long range isexcellent for harassing and i n t ~ r d i c t i o n f i re; however, it is not- very ef-.fective in destroying enemy ar t i l lery due to dispersion and weight of projecti le. The same is t rue for the 15S-mm' howitzer which does not have thepunch necessary to neutral ize or destroy enemy ar t i l lery. In the present

UNCLASSIFIED. ; . " : ; . , . " ~ { f , . , ' . , ~ r , .. ~ , . , J . . . . -.... , ' I : . ~ . . , . . 'CeCCX.


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Command Report - 64th Tank 13nOctober 1952 Source No 69 2

(RESTRICTED)TANK ESCAPE HATCHES. - Pr io r to the i ssue of escape hatches

which had been modified with a re inforced l ip, personnel of this battalionwere injured when their tanks struck mines, as a resu l t of the escape hatchbeing forced upward by the explosion into the dr iver ' s or ass i s tan t dr iver ' scompartment . Since the modified escape hatches were issued to this organization in Apri l severa l tanks have struck mines, but on no occasion has anescape hatch been forced upward into the tank.(RESTRICTED)

SELF-PROTECTION FOR TANKERS. - Men must be trained to stayinside the tank unless their presence is required outside. The crewmenhave a tendency to stand on the r ea r deck, or on the ground when the tankis stopped for any length of t ime, and when ar t i l lery or mortar fire is notfalling. Natural ly, this invites enemy fire and increases the danger of per s onnel casualt ie s from mine s .(CONFIDENTIAL)

DISTANCE FROM TANK UNIT TO SUPPORTING ORD .. - The mechanicalunrel iabi l i ty of the M46 fank demands that the f ield maintenance (supportingordnance) unit be located within five miles of the field t rains of the tank unit .

OURCE: Command Report - IX CorpsDATE: July 1952 Source No 693

(RESTRICTED)SEARCHLIGHT DEMONSTRATION IN 73D TANK BATTALION. - The

demonstrat ion consisted of a live fi re problem by the tank 90 -m m gu n at atarget i l luminated by tank-mounted searchlights. Worthy of note was theextreme accuracy of tank fires at night when such searchlights a re employed.

UNCLASSIFIED" : ' " ' ~ ....sSs"Rt" 'Mw,rurr $


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U N C L A S ; : ' I F \ E ~ . .(RESTRICTED)

CONTAINERS FOR TRANSPOR TING ICE CREAM. - A number offabric, insulated, containers which were originally designed to preventwater in 5-gallon cans from freezing were issued to division and corps unitsfor the purpose of t ransport ing ice cream from' source to , use r . These conta iners proved to be highly sat isfactory for th e purpose, as they were able to

Ihold ice cream in an ediple condition from three to seven hours .depending ,upon th e condition of the ice cr;!am when placed in the container, t emperature , and care exercised in handling. The containers will hold tw o 2-1/2gallon cans of ice c ream. T4ey are rugged and durable but unless ext remecare is exercised in cleaning, they will become unsanitary in a short periodof t ime.

Command Report - 73d Tank BnAugust 1952 Source No 694

(RESTRICTED)FIELD EXPEDIENT FOR SALVAGING EMPTY SHELL CASES. - The

large number of valuable spent 90-mm shel l cases being left at forwardfiring posit ions establ ished a requi rement for providing each tank with somemeans of bringing ifs spent bras s back for salvage. A basket to be attachedto the left of the, tur ret on the M46 tank was' designed to catch spent 90-mmbrass as it is tossed from the fighting compartment of the tank eitherthrough the pistol port or loader ' s hatch.

A tes t was conducted 0lJ. an M46 tank with basket attached to determinei f there was any drag on the movement of the tur re t . The basket was filledwith seventy empty shel l cases during this- tes t with the following resul ts :

1. 'The tank was placed on level ground and the tur ret t raversedmanuall}{ and with power. There was little to no effect on the movement ofthe tur re t in ei ther case . There was no effect dn the gunner 's ability to layon a target .

2. The tank was placed on a 45 degree slope and there was a sl ightdrag on the tur re t while the basket was moving in an uphill direction,. Alsothe tur ret ' s movement was speeded up when the basket moved in a downhilldirection. The above result applies whether in power or manual t raverse;however, i t was more apparent when in manual t raverse . The drag in the

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tur re t was not considered great enough to a.ffect the gunner's ability to lay the gun. In an over-al l analysis , the basket would have little i f any effect on the firing of the 9 0 ~ m m gun.

The basket was used in a combat operation by Company B, 73d TankBattalion, forward of the MLR. The particular tank to which the basket wasattached, moved approximately 3000 yards forward of the MLR and fired 48rounds against enemy targets . All spent 90-mm cases were tossed into thebasket from the fighting compartment . The use of this basket in no way affected the gunner's ability to accurately lay on targets . The tank receive-dtw o direct hits , 'plus other near misses , by ar t i l lery and mortar rounds withno damage res,ulting to the basket. In this action the 'basket proved i ts valuein another manner . The brass it carr ied was used under the t racks ofanother tank which was stuck in a mud hole. This made possible the retr ievingof the s tuck tank.

The basket weighs slightly over 100 pqunds and costs approximately,$55 .. OQ for labor and mater ial . I t can be placed on or removed from the tur re t of the tank by two crewmen in ten minutes. This allows the basket to be'used when required and left behind when not required with a minimum amountof effort on th e par t of the orew. It does, however, increase th e width ,of the

. tur re t silhouette, front and rear view, by 21 inches. I t does not increase thelength of the tur re t silhouette, side vi ' ew,or height of tur re t silhouette.

The basket could also be used as a rack for crew baggage and equipmentduring an administrat ive march or -tactical march when contact with the enemyis not imminent. This wO,uld keep the crew compartment and the outside ofthe tur re t clear a t all t imes.(RESTRICTED)

ARMORED VESTS FOR TANK BNS. - Recommend th e following personnel of the tank battalion be equippEfd with the armored vest:Battalion medical detachment personnelBattalion maintenance pe'rsonnelCompany maintenance personnelReconnaissance platoon personnelTw o per tank crew

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(RESTRICTED)"BUNKER BUSTING" TACTICS. - During this month, 90 per cent of

the battalion mi.ssions were of the "bunker busting I nature .To conserve ammunit ion and insure maximum effec t on t a rge ts , the

battalion uti l ized the prec i s ion method of adjustment .In this sys tem, the gunner fires on the target , using his direct fire

sights unti l he is within a fe w yards of the target . At this point, the gunnersets his azimuth indicator and gunner ' s aid at zero and levels the bubble inthe M l ql.lad;rant. On a ll subsequent commands , the gunner uti l izes hisazimuth indicator for deflection changes and converts range changes to milsand appl ies the m il change to his MI quadrant . By this method, the gunneris able to adjust his fi re so as to move the area of impact r ight or left , upor down, f igured in feet ra ther than yards . This is often necessary in orderto place the shel l into the aper tures of t.lile bunkers .

S O U R C E ~ Command Report - 2d Log COITldDATE: July 1952 Source No 695

(RES TRIC TED)M46 OliL COOLERS. - Oil coolers on the M46 tanks st i l l give t rouble

for which no solution has been found, Tanks are continually being r ece ivedwith the carbure tor containing a gummy substance , necessi ta t ing the removaland cleaning of each unit before it can opera te proper ly .

SOURCE: Command Repor"t - Signal Svc Bn (VHF), 8189th AUDATE: October 1952 Source No 696

(RES TRIC TED)TEST EQUIPMENT FOR SIGNAL BATTALION (VHF). - A close studyof our operat ions over the past six months has disclosed the fact that con

stant use of fixed equipment has resul ted in deter iora t ion that cannot be discovered by using t es t equipment present ly authorized the bat ta l ion. Thisappl ies part icular ly to coaxial cable, antenna ITlasthead connections andmeasur ing mete r s found in T-14 's , R-19 ' s and all ca r r i e r bays. Our operat ions have been, in some instances, ser ioll s ly hamp ered because we w ere

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forced to as sume that coaxial cable and antenna masthead connect ions werein good order , when in t ru th , a complete tes t made with borrowed tes t equipment disc losed faults that were not discovered when the equipment was checkedusing tes t equipment author ized by our T / A. In the case of measur ing meter s ,whole VHF sys t ems were operat ing below opt imum because of incor rec tme te r indicat ions which could not be discovered using avai lable equipment .

Recommend that the following equipment be included in the T / A ofevery VHF battal ion to insure the optimum per formance of vi ta l equipmentthrough proper use of this tes t equipment:

Tes t Set 1-48BTes t Set 1-49Bird Corporat ion Model 67 RF Wat tmete rOutput mete r TS-585/URF W at tmete r ME- l l - USignal Genera tor TS -497 -A/URRSignal Genera to r AN/URM/27Substi tute Tube Tes te r TV -2 01 ' TV - 3 for Tube Tes te r 1-177.

SOURCE: Command Report - X CorpsDATE: July 1952 Source No 697

(RESTRICTED)BARREL COATING ON M30 4. 2-INCH MOR TAR. - The 2d Chemica l

Mor ta r Battal ion using the new 4. 2-inch mor t a r M30 with the M2 and M3shel l had three malfunct ions, one in each company, and a ll within two successive days. Invest igat ion disclosed that the malfunction occurred on thef i r s t round f i red f rom the new bar re l , The round would sl ide sluggishlydown the barre l , a dull explos ion would occur , and the round would t rave lslowly out of the bar re l t ra i l ing dense smoke clouds and unburned propel l ingincrements . Subsequent fi ring from the same mor ta r using the same lot ofammuni t ion functioned normal ly .


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It was found that a t ransparent hardened preserva t ivc which coatedthe inter ior of the bar re l was responsible for the sluggish drop of the pro ject i le . The init ial explos ion of the propel lant would burn out this substance,c lea r the bar re l , and pcnn i t subsequent norITlal fi ring.

SOURCE: Command Repprt - 378 Engr Combat BnDATE: October 1952 Source No 698

(RESTRICTED)COMMENTS ON AUSTIN.-WESTERN GRAD ER, MODEL 99H. - REC

OMMEND: That the Aust in -Wes te rn Grade r , Model 99H, be made availableto uni ts working on road maintenance and road construct ion through mountainous t e r r a in . Roads bui l t through mounta inous t er ra in natural ly havemany sharp turns and swi tchbacks. The Aust in-Western Grade r with i ts4-wheel hydraul ic s teer ing sys tem easi ly negot ia tes these tu rns . This graderhas a ll the quali t ies of other s tandard mili tary graders , plus maneuverabi l i ty .

That the anchor lug on the circle and draw bar of an Aust in-WesternGrade r , Model 99H, be redesigned since this lug shears off af te r a shor tper iod of operation .. I t is necessary to weld this lug in place as a f ield expedient; however, th is is only a t emporary measure , and this complete f i t t ings.hould be redesigned giving i t more s t rength to cope with the s t ress ands t ra in placed upon the grader .

That the piston rod which is par t of the IIScarif ier R am ll on an Aust inWeste rn Grade r , Model 99H, be redesigned since exper ience indicates unusua l failure of the rod a t the point where the rod t apers into the ' collar . Asa f ield expedient, a weld is bui l t around the rod and col lar joint; however .this is only of t empora ry value and requi res repeated welding.(RESTRICTED)

ENGINEER RECONNAISSANCE TRAINING. - The training of reconnaissance personnel should be extended to include surveying and locat ingroads through mountainous t er ra in to include prac t ica l p roblems. A wel l t ra ined expe r ienced reconnais sance party will take advantage of all favorablesoil , ground and t er ra in features and save many days of constr 'uction effort .

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SOURCE: Command Report - I US CorpsDATE: JulY,1952 Source No 699

(RESTRICTED)DEBRIS BOOMS TO PROTECT BRIDGES. - All debris booms con

structed of cable up to 1-1/2 inches in diameter snapped under the load im posed by the force of current and the impact of debris . Their use proved acomplete fai lure.

SOURCE: Command Report - 13th Engr Combat BnDATE: October 1952 Source No 700

(RESTRICTED)WATER POINT OPERATION AND DEFICIENT WATER TANKS. - Opera

t ion of water points is hampered by lack of serviceable tanks . The rubbertank has pr,?ven very unsat isfactory in the 7th Infantry Division. The s t ressaround the drain plug is too great and the tank tends to spl 'i t-out where theopening occurs . Sufficient reinforcing as found in the canvas tank wil l alleviate this deficiency. During the past four months, sixteen rubber tankswere placed in service and fifteen rubber tanks were salvaged. During thissame period seven canvas tanks were placed in service and none were sal vaged. Under current operating conditions rubber tanks wil l remain serv iceable approximately s ix months under combat condit ions. Recommendthat proper supply agencies be informed of the above and an a t tempt made toship canvas tanks in lieu of rubber tanks until the above defect is cor rec ted .

F o r winterization of water points a field expedient VIas consideredwhereby tents for storage tanks were equipped with fuel-burning tent s toves .Objection to this method is that the defect in rubber tanks mentioned abovewill resul t in flooded tents and further damage to equipment by freeze causedby the loss of heat during 'the .flooded condition within the tent .

U N C L ~ l F l E D ." , SfWi/IIIII=" )'!leah' ;JUt btl un


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-U N C L A ~ t l t b j un 2 sr .

SOURCE: Command Report - 3d -Div Arty

DATE: October 1952 Source No 70 I

(RESTRICTED)ARTILLERY SUPPLY SHORTAGES. - Officers and m en are spending

their ow n money on target grids, fans, plotting needles, rubber cement andscotch' tape. Recommend that regular supply channels provide these i tems,in sufficient quantity.

SOURCE: Command Report - 5th RC TDATE: October 1952 Source NO,702

(RESTRICTED)ARMORED VE S TS. - Front line units continued to 'utilize armored

vests wliich increased in number to I, 591. In many instance s, vests deflected hand grenade and shell fragments and, on occasion, stopped enemysubmachine gun bullets when fired from long ranges.

SOURCE: Command Report - 7th Div ArtyDATE: October 1952 Source No 703

(RESTRICTED)ADVANCE O F INFANTRY WHEN ASSAULT FIRES ARE LIFTED.Preparat ions must be so planned that at tacking troops are in posit ion to

make the final assaul t when f i res are l ifted. In the morning, prior to anattack, medium bat ter ies and corps 8-inch howitzers were adjusted so as tocover the objective area . When a preparat ion was fired during the afternoon,i t was continued until the infantry approached the area where it was endangeredby our own fire. The heavy art i l lery was lifted and th e medium concentra- 't ions were then moved forward by one or tw o hundred yard bounds as theinfantry advanced. The operation was so successful that th e objective wastaken at a cost of only six wounded:


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SOURCE: Command Report - IX Corps, Armored SecDATE: August 1952 Source No 704

(CONFIDENTIAL)ENEMY ANTITANK DEFENSE TACTICS. - On 10 July, Company D,

1st Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division (Reinf), made a tank raid on enemyinstal lat ions in the vicinity of * * *. During this ra id heavy enemy AT firew as received. The following types of weapons were used by the enemyagainst the tanks: r i f le grenades, bazookas, 87 -mm spin stabil ized rockets ,75-,mm recoi l less r i f les . 76-mm field guns, mortar s and heavy arti l lery.

The enemy employed his AT defense in depth and in most instances deployed AT weapons in pair s . The enemy placed his bazookas and 87 -mmroc:ket launchers to cover armored avenues of approach by flanking shots a tshor t ranges , and his recoi l less ri fles and 76-mm AT guns to cover the longaxis of corr idors leading into his posit ions. In this manner , the enemy madeexcellent use 'of the effective ranges of his weapons. Bazookas opened fireonly when tanks were within four hundred yards , whereas the 87-mrp. rocketwas used 9-t ranges up to seven hundred yards . The 76-mm recoi l less rif lewas used a t twelve hundred yards range apd the 76-mm AT guns opened firea t tw o thousand yards range. The enemy used his AT weapons against thetanks only when they were stopped and then the l ighter weapons were movedrapidly from one posit ion to another .

The enemy ' s AT fi re was heavy, but only two direct hits were infl icted.One tank was hit on the muffler by a ri fle grenade and only minor d ~ m a g e wassustained.. There was very l i t t le shrapnel and operat ion of the tank was in noway hindered by the explosion. Another tank received a direct hit on the tur-;re t by an enemy 87-mm spin stabil ized rocket . The t ra jec tory of the rocketseemed a bit wobbly as revealed by the smoke t r a i l that followed. The rocketwas fired a t a range of approximately four hundred yards and penetra ted onlyabout two inches. The diameter of the hole was about on e inch. Again, theforce of the explosion in no way hindered the operat ion of the tank.IX Corps G2 Comment :

Enemy antitank defenses across the IX Corps sector have in the pastappeared .to be less well coordina ted and effective than the ones descr ibedabove. Only on one occasion during recent months was the enemy successful.

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dissemination of combat information 7 april 1953

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