dm b4 giuliani fdr- mfr- 4-7-04 interview- former fdny commissioner thomas von essen 314

8/14/2019 DM B4 Giuliani Fdr- MFR- 4-7-04 Interview- Former FDNY Commissioner Thomas Von Essen 314

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COMMISSION SENSITIVEMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Interview of former FDNY Commissioner Thomas VonEssenDate: Wednesday April 7, 2004Location: Offices of Giuliani LLC, Times Square, New YorkCityPrepared by: Sam CaspersenTeam Number: 8Participants - non-Commission: Thomas Von Essen, GiulianiLLC Attorney, NYC AttorneyParticipants - Commission: John Farmer, Sam Caspersen,George DelgrossoComment from Sam Caspersen: I find it much easier to writethese in the first person, as I am taking notes on thecomputer during the interview, and I seem to be able towork faster if I don't translate responses into thirdperson. However, I do go back after the interview andedit, and often make certain comments more succinct. Fortime efficiency reasons, I keep it in the first person, butkeep in mind that it is not a transcript, and the dictionand sentence structure are mine - not the interviewee's,though of course the content is 100% accurate. When Iactually am quoting the interviewee, I use quotation marks.I use brackets when adding in my thoughts, and use thirdperson when doing so.Career:I was a FF from 1970 on; started in south Bronx for 13years. Then I became involved in union from 1983 to1990. I went back to firehouse in 1990 when we lostan election. I ran for president in '93 and won. Ibecame commissioner in 19!Animosity between FDNY Chiefs and myself:I tried to implement peer reviews for chiefs, butlearned they were just photocopying one over and overagain. So I was bringing heat on unions, and they


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I would welcome a significant investigation into theradio controversy.On FDNY if 7 guys press buttons on at same time, youhear nothing.I didn't know that PA' ontrolled turning on repeaterprior to spring of 2001 [at which time at recjuest ofFDNY activation would be handled by FDNY personnel inlobbies of towers]Relationship with NYPD:In union I had been involved in battle of badges -trying to get responsibility for some emergencieswhich I thought the FDNY could manage better. PD'sEmergency Service Unit was smaller and took longer toget incidents, because they were not in everyneighborhood as FD was. FDNY Rescue 1 Captain TerryHatten helped me in this battle of badges. This endedin a report from deputy mayor saying FD at leastshould get equal notice. "Most of it was phenomenalguys with great ego." But as commissioner, throughhard work of mine and Safir, we established goodrelationships, and things improved. OEM helped ingetting protocols together. You always could getisolated incident at scene, but it was fine once thebosses arrived..

Examples of flash-points before the problem addressedwith FD getting equal notice - woman in wheel chairgoes into East River; ESU took some time to get there,and she died, while Rescue 1 was right down the block.

Example of protocol:We developed a protocol for plane crashes - if planewas on the runway, FDNY was in charge. If plane wasin water, PD was in charge, because they were betterdivers. Collapses under these protocols became domainOf FDNY.I felt that protocols generally were followed inactual incident. Under new protocols, we were incharge of car accidents, and some times ESU would wantto be involved, but resolved once the bosses arrive.Relationship with OEM:


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I thought the concept of OEM was a phenomenal idea,and I thought Jerry Hauer was a great choice. I mighthave been biased, because Hauer had fire backgroundand tough on the police. I never looked at OEM beingin charge of any operations, Jbutcould be of qreat_assistance"! A battalion chief might be in charge of afire ^in~~which electricity needs to be turned off, andit might be a drug house so you might need policeinvolvement - this is where OEM added value. OEM alsoeffectively could fire people bv sending someone backto PD or FD. Was great for a B Pnot to have to worryabout ancillary stuff, because OEM could do that, andBC could focus on fire operations. I believe weappreciated this more than PD, because PD had a lot ofthe resources, and FD didn't. And it was a greatbenefit to Mayor to get a more objective appraisalthan an agency commissioner. OEM was a meritocracy;unlike FDNY, the OEM Director could send back thosewho were not performing back to their agencies.[most OEM employees were liaison from other cityagencies, which continued to be their officialemployers [Jerry Hauer Op-Ed:I agreed with a lot of Hauer's recent op-ec, though hemade it far too personal. He obviously has a problemwith Kelly. I think it's most important for OEM tocontinue to plan, and I don't think power should goback to police. OEM was never in charge; never athreat. It's a shame he made it such an attack onBloomberg.Information re terrorism prior to 9/11;I was told nothing at all,and this is informationrould gd -tro^Se7~~as opposed to chief ofdepartmentDay of9/11;I was on east river drive, in lower Manhattan. I sawsmoke, and I turned up my radio (on city widedispatch) and hear reports of plane hitting WTC. Iarrived very quickly. Saw Ganci,, who setting upcommand post across the street. I entered into lobbycommand post. Chiefs and FFs were rolling in.Pfeifer and Hayden were there. After a few minutes,as they were getting info on magnitude of fire, theydecided they weren't even going to put fire out - just


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rescue operation. We were told all elevators were outof service. I also saw John O'Neil.I didn't think it was terrorism at that point.Keep in mind, I was commissioner, not chief, and Iwasn't in charge of operations. I liked be at firescene, though, so I could do better job with press andin briefing mayor, who wanted very accurate info. _I got word that the mayor was looking for me. Somemore time passed, and we hear a rumble/explosion. Ithought it was an explosion upstairs in tower 1. ThenI was told 2 WTC hit. Then we are told mall_gfAmerica hit; Sears Tower hr&TWg~~drdnT"t know what tobelieve.-' Then someone came from outside and confirmedthat 2 WTC was hit. Now we knew this was an act ofwar.I distinctly remember Chief Downey saying to me,"Boss, these buildings could collapse." But there wasno fear or panic in his voice [leading me to believethat he, the collapse expert, did not think we had animminent concern of collapse]I saw hundreds of civilians exiting on Mezzazinelevel.

Someone told me that Mayor wanted me across thestreet. I exited through window which broken, and ajumper crashes 15 feet away. I thought chief Callenwas trying to get everyone to command post across thestreet. [this is Callen's 9:32 evacuation order] Iarrived at the FDNY overall command post on the westside of West Street, but mayor already was gone. JohnOdermatt, deputy director of OEM, told me the mayorthat the mayor needed me asap, and mayor wanted to doa press conference. I assumed that mayor was at OEM,but when I go to 7 WTC, it already was evacuated. Iwas with 2 aides at this point.Then I began walking up West Broadway, and the southtower falls, and we are covered in a blanket of debrisdust. It just goes black. It cleared up eventually,and we met up back in the street and went north onChurch. Then one of the mayor's security guys directsus to mayor,


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I had to ask mayor how much of south tower hascollapsed. He said it has fully collapsed. The mayorwas in control.My guys had Nextel phones, regular cell phones, andFDNY radios, none of which working well. "Youcouldn't count on any form of communication."We are walking north, looking for command post. Weconsidered a hotel, but too much glass [which webelieved dangerous if it shattered]. Around this timethe north tower collapsed. We were far enough norththat we didn't have to run. I think we were aroundCanal St.We arrived at the firehouse on 6th and Houston, but itwould not suffice as command post; so we went topolice academy. Everyone was trying to getinformation for Mayor. Early in afternoon, there iswas a press conference. I then went back to WTC andtook it all in. Then I . went back to academy, where wewere getting the resources needed - lights - heavyequipment - a thousand details. We also were tryingto calculate number of FDNY fatalities. We also werethinking about where we are going to stage people, andhow to get equipment to firefighters, keeping in mindthat so much equipment destroyed in the towers.There was an early evening press conference. Then wewent back to site. Then back to academy for 10 PMpress conference. Then back to site until 2 AM or 3AM. Then I went home. Mayor relied on my to givehim detailed briefings on fire operations, so that hecould give good press conferences. While at academy,I was able to communicate with the site via Nextelsand hard lines. We would call a hard line, and then arunner would take that to the chief on the scene.So much information was coming in, and it was tough toknow what to rely on. For example, I was told thatDowney dead, but in fact we hadn't found his body; soin fact he just was missing. So I regret saying hewas dead in press conference, before his family was soadvised in private.Downey was a big loss, because he could have been so


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helpful that afternoon and coming weeks. A citydepartment cannot be expected to manage a clean-up ifits forces were devastated. Federal incidentmanagement teams are crucial.

dm b4 giuliani fdr- mfr- 4-7-04 interview- former fdny commissioner thomas von essen 314

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