dm b4 giuliani fdr- mfr- 4-7-04 interview- former oem director richard sheirer 312

8/14/2019 DM B4 Giuliani Fdr- MFR- 4-7-04 Interview- Former OEM Director Richard Sheirer 312

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Interview of former OEM Director Richard Sheirer

^-Date: Wednesday April 7, 2004

Location: Offices of Giuliani LLC, Times Square, New YorkCity

Prepared by: Sam Caspersen

Team Number: 8

Participants - non-Commission: Richard Sheirer, GiulianiLLC Attorney, NYC Attorney

Participants - Commission: Sam Caspersen, George Delgrosso

Comment from Sam Caspersen: I find it much easier to writethese in the first person, as I am taking notes on thecomputer during the interview, and I seem to be able towork faster if I don't translate responses into thirdperson. However, I do go back after the interview andedit, and often make certain comments more succinct. Fortime efficiency reasons, I keep it in the first person, butkeep in mind that it is not a transcript, and the diction

and sentence structure are mine - not the interviewee's,though of course the content is 100% accurate. When Iactually am quoting the interviewee, I use quotation marks.I use brackets when adding in my thoughts, and use thirdperson when doing so.

Career:I began in public safety as fire dispatcher isn!967. J

Worked my way to being assistant commissioner irTTDNY^ in 1992 and later became a deputy commissioner. Ileft the FDNY in joined the NYPD as deputy

commissioner for admin and chief of staff to policecommissioner. Then I became OEM Director onFebruayl7 2000, feplacincf~Jerry HaugrT T ~ ief t OEM inMarclTbf 2 0 0 2 ~ . ~ ~ ^

Description of OEM's Functions and Mission:Prior to 1996 OEM was a unit within police department whichhad "very good people; very small role" When Safir became


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FD commissioner [in 1993], he asked what we would wantto change. I said we needed a more level playingfield, with OEM in mayor's office, not police"'department . I also t nought we neededa moreaggressive OEM". Safir brought that t c T Mayor Giuliani who Tooked it ~over, and' "e's~ta5li shed mriyn^' ~ ^ ff '- "fOEM in 1996.

1. The first mission was to plan for unusual events inNYC. We had a large planning staff that dealt withinfrastructure, amongst other things. We planned foreverything from water-main breaks to how to evacuateup to 900,000 in a natural emergency.

2 . Second mission was responding to actual incidents .

2A. OEM had field responders, who would respond to an

actual incident and make sure that the incidentcommanders (who from other agencies, e.g., FDNY at afire) would have the resources they needed to do theiroperational job. Mos t responders are from FD or PD,with a few exceptions. OEM's role would be to supportincident commander, whoever that may be. When severalagencies responded to the same incident, and there wasconflict between the agencies, the OEM fieldresponders present would act asan arbiter betweenagenc s~]

"OEM should be invisible, but there when needed."2B. EOC [which stands for emergency operations C*"

center]- probably the most technologically advanced /facility I have seen in the business. During a major \ t w h ic h w ou ld r e q uto wo

together, each relevant agency would send a / "representative to our EOC in our office at 7 W T C - J Yo uhad areas for infrastructure; health and humanservices; util itie s; first responders; state emergencymanagement; federal emergency management; privatesector. We had different levels of activation,depending on nature of incident. Because itscapabilities so robust, we also used it to do compstatanalysis and meetings.

3. Our third mission was simply to observe New YorkCity and the rest of the world 24-7 through our WatchCommand, and thus be able to sound the alert when an


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saw immediately and knew it was not a twin engine[knew it was something larger]. I proceeded to WTC.I came in on corner of Church and Vesey, walked into 5WTTC, down into concourse. In concourse I tell a guyto evacuate, who is resisting. I tell a PA cop tomake sure that he gets out. What struck meimmediately was how calm and professional evacuationwas - strong contrast to the screaming and panic of1993.

Walked west through concourse, past Path, into lobbyof 1 WTC. There we started to do what OEM does. Iknew from car ride communication that EOC alreadyactivated. EMS was going to set up triage in lobby.I told EMS to use atrium of 7 as triage center, /because it's a great space, away from the scene, andvery good access there for ambulances, and they won'tbe getting in way of fire and police. I told this toan EMS commander who did it. I spoke to Morone and IInfante, senior Port Authority police brass. I spoke /with Chief Callen, who was in charge of lobby commandpost for FDNY; I spoke with John O'Neil, who wasLarry Silverstein's director of security [previouslyNYC FBI SAC]. I had radio communications with EOC,including a confirmation that hospital association wasorganizing for what was likely to be mass casulties

Radios:

Had OEM radio, which worked very well and allowing meto communicate with EOC.

Thoughts on what would transpire:We all knew we were going to lose a lot of people atand above impact zone. But we didn't think we wouldlose the entire buildings.

Supporting FDNY and PA:We told fire we could get them anything they needed.We worked with Port Authority as well.

WTC 2 Attacked:Then there was the second explosion, which weoriginally thought was a jet fuel explosion in 1 WTC,but we learned very quickly that second tower hit.Now there was no question this is terrorism, Icalled Richie Rotanz at the EOC and told him to get onphone with SEMO [New York State Emergency Management


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Organization]to get air national guard. And I toldhim to get Pentagon and have them get us air support.Richie Rotanz told me there were other planesunaccounted for. I said in lobby that another planewas on the way. As an example of how we were graspingfor straws, I instructed for PD aviation to not letanother plane hit. But looking back, how could ahelicopter stop a commercial jet going over 400 milesper hour?

The sound of jumpers was the worst sound I ever haveheard.

I was trying to get the mayor, but cell phonecommunications were very, very difficult,

Then a police Lt . Don Henry, who on Mayor's detail,said city hall was evacuated, and I used him to try toget in touch with mayor.

Riche ordered OEM to evacuate 7 WTC right after hetold me of report of additional planes. This turnedout to be a great call.

OEM bus at West Broadway and Barclay became ourcommand post.

I heard that mayor is at 75 Barclay, and he wants me

there. So I go there and brief the mayor. Whilewe're in 75 Barclay, 2 WTC comes down, though wedidn't know at that time what had happened - just thatsomething significant had occurred, and we needed toevacuate, because with the debris ball it was pitchblack and we couldn't operate. We eventually get outon Church street, and discussed were to go. Wedecided that City Hall was too much of a target. Wethought about 1 PP, but concern was that if we wentthere we would get in way of police's operations inrest of city in trying to cover all sensitive areas.

Then 1 WTC came down as we were walking north.

We thought about Tribecca Hotel as command post, butdecides not to upon entering it, due to glass atrium[which could turn lobby into killing field if it

shattered]


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another life; so we were strict and cautious aboutputting people into the rubble pile and had themreport to the Javitz Center, not Ground Zero

A lot of my people were at 1 PP, and it was horribleto have OEM split up in two locations.

I went back down to the site that afternoon afterinitial press conference- well before 7 WTC collapsed.

I walked around, checked out triage centers. I sawDr. Kelly, EMS' chief medical officer. Constructionworkers were great. They all volunteered - by thatafternoon. Dump truck after dump truck arrived. Theyfirst staged at Canal, then at Javitz Center. Heavyequipment was being staged at Canal Street.

"It was like a war zone down there."

You hoped that people still alive in voids, but 4,5and especially 6 were on fire. 7 also was cooking.Fire in Battery Park City - a war zone.

I then went back up to police academy. Then back downto near WTC. I was still hopeful we could get backinto 7 WTC. Then 7 WTC collapsed, [just after 5 PM]We go back to academy. We are advised by a doctorthat there aren't going to be a lot of in tact bodiesrecovered, that people in towers were pulverized.

The decision was made to go to Pier 92. which we hadbeen preparing for a 9/12/01 terrorism drill. Thiswas after Henry Jackson checked it out on evening of9/11 for power capabilities. Wednesday they beginbuilding this EOC, and we moved in on Fridayafternoon.

Thoughts on FEMA:They provided crucial support in weeks after 9/11

Had OEM been in a different location:I don't believe it would have had any impact on firstresponder operations prior to collapse of second towerto collapse. The bus gave me the core operations Ineeded until we got together in academy, but I don'tthink loss of EOC really had impact on fire or policeoperations, because coordination of that was going onin field, not at EOC. And keep in mind that we had


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EOC long enough to make all necessary communicationsTo agencies who would have to get involved.

After action reports:Rich Rotanz had each OEM person give a narrative ofhis day of 9/11.

dm b4 giuliani fdr- mfr- 4-7-04 interview- former oem director richard sheirer 312

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