document of the world bank...document of the world bank report no: icr2428 implementation completion...

Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR2428

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

ON A

MULTI DONOR TRUST FUND – SOUTH SUDAN (MDTF-SS)

GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$25.5 MILLION

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN

FOR A

SOUTHERN SUDAN EMERGENCY EDUCATION REHABILITATION PROJECT

June 18, 2013

Human Development Country Department AFCE4 Africa Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective June 2013)

Currency Unit = South Sudanese Pound SSP 3.50 = US$1 US$0.29 = SSP 1

FISCAL YEAR

January 1-December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AEP Agro-Forestry Education Program AES Alternative Education System ALP Accelerated Learning Program BALP Basic Adults Literacy Program CEC County Education Centers CDC Curriculum Development Center CGS Community Girls Schools CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement CRE Christian Religious Education CWG Component Working Group DFID Department for International Development DPIST Development Project Implementation Support Team EAA External Audit Agent EMIS Education Management Information System EMTK Education Management Tool Kit ESAF Environmental and Social Management Framework ESMF Environmental and Social Assessment Framework ESP Education Sector Plan FM Financial Management GESP General Education Strategic Plan GDP Gross Domestic Product GoS Government of Sudan GoSS Government of South Sudan GPE Global Partnership for Education HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report IDA International Development Association IEC Intensive English Course IPPDR Interim Public Procurement and Disposal Regulation IRI Interactive Radio Instruction ISR Implementation Status Report JAM Joint Assessment Mission LEA Local Education Authority M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MA Monitoring Agent MDTF Multi-Donor Trust Fund

MDTF-SS Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan MoEST Ministry of Education, Science and Technology MoGEI Ministry of General Education Instruction MoF Ministry of Finance MTR Mid-Term Review NBHS National Baseline Household Survey NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations PA Procurement Agent PAA Project Accounting Agent PEP Pastoralist Education Program PAD Project Appraisal Document PDO Project Development Objectives PFMU Project Financial Management Unit PIU Project Implementation Unit PPD Project Proposal Document PSC Project Steering Committee QEA Quality at Entry QSA Quality at Supervision RRI Rapid Results Initiative RPF Resettlement Policy Framework SDG Sudanese Pound SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army SSDP South Sudan Development Plan SSP South Sudanese Pound TF Trust Fund(s) TTL Task Team Leader UN United Nations USAID United States Agency for International Development USD United States Dollars WB The World Bank

Vice President: Makhtar Diop

Country Director: Bella Bird

Acting Country Manager: Berhane Manna

Project Team Leader: Tazeen Fasih

ICR Team Leader: Cornelia Jesse

SOUTH SUDAN Education Rehabilitation Project

CONTENTS

Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring

1. Program Context, Development Objectives and Design ......................................................... 1

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ........................................................... 8

3. Assessment of Outcomes ....................................................................................................... 14

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ..................................................................... 21

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance .................................................................. 22

6. Lessons Learned .................................................................................................................... 24

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ....................... 25

Annex 1: Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................................... 27

Annex 2: Outputs by Component .................................................................................................. 28

Annex 3: Economic and Financial Analysis.................................................................................. 29

Annex 4: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............................. 32

Annex 5: Beneficiary Survey Results ............................................................................................ 35

Annex 6: Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................................................... 36

Annex 7: Summary of Borrower’s ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................................... 37

Annex 8: Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ...................................... 39

Annex 9: List of Supporting Documents ....................................................................................... 40

Annex 10: Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan (MDTF-SS) .......................................... 42

Annex 11: Results Framework and Monitoring ............................................................................ 45

Annex 12: Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, Social Development and Institutional Change ..... 51

Annex 13: Photographs from the Implementation of the ERP in South Sudan ............................. 53

MAP

i

A. Basic Information

Country: South Sudan Project Name: Multi-donor Rehabilitation Education Project

Project ID: P097962 L/C/TF Number(s): TF-56452

ICR Date: 05/24/2013 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: ERL Grantee: SOUTHERN SUDAN

Original Total Commitment:

USD 25.50M Disbursed Amount: USD 25.50M

Revised Amount: USD 25.50M

Environmental Category: C

Implementing Agencies: Ministry of General Education and Instruction

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 10/11/2005 Effectiveness: 05/15/2006 07/27/2006

Appraisal: 02/20/2006 Restructuring(s):

03/09/2009 06/23/2011 06/26/2012 12/11/2012

Approval: 03/30/2006 Mid-term Review: 03/03/2008 05/05/2008

Closing: 09/30/2009 12/31/2012 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial

Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

Grantee Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Government: Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Moderately SatisfactoryImplementing Agency/Agencies:

Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Bank Performance:

Moderately SatisfactoryOverall Borrower Performance:

Moderately Satisfactory

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C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance IndicatorsImplementation

Performance Indicators

QAG Assessments (if any)

Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Moderately Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

General education sector 100 100

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Education for all 100 100 E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Gobind T. Nankani

Country Director: Bella Deborah Mary Bird Ishac Diwan

Sector Manager: Sajitha Bashir Laura Frigenti

Project Team Leader: Tazeen Fasih Mourad Ezzine

ICR Team Leader: Cornelia Jesse

ICR Primary Author: Cornelia Jesse F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The project development objective is to improve access to enhanced quality of education, alternate learning opportunities, development of life skills and basic occupational skill training to primary school students, IDPs, demobilized soldiers, and other non-traditional learners. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

iii

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Children enrolled in primary education Value quantitative or Qualitative)

669,000 1,500,000 1,391,704

Date achieved 04/28/2006 06/29/2012 11/30/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement)

The project came close to achieving the target. The target and actual values are national figures and not figures specific to the project. The ERP

Indicator 2 : Demobilized soldiers, returning school age population, overage learners, and other non-formal learners enrolled in alternate learning programs or basic skill training provided under the project

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

n/a 50,000 164,850


Target exceeded by more than three times the original target. The ERP funded part of the AES program in South Sudan.

Indicator 3 : Textbook-pupil ratio Value quantitative or Qualitative)

n/a 1:5.1 1:4.1 (Math) 1:4 (English)


Target exceeded. The ERP funded part of the cost of textbooks.

Indicator 4 : Direct Project Beneficiaries Value quantitative or Qualitative)

n/a 750,000 1,556,554


Target exceeded. Beneficiaries include children enrolled in primary education, participants in AES/Basic skills training and teachers trained.

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Training rooms and dorms in CEC built and/or rehabilitated Value (quantitative

0 42 48

iv

or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/30/2006 06/29/2012 11/30/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Target exceeded.

Indicator 2 : Additional qualified primary teachers resulting from project intervention Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 750 1,629


Target exceeded. The project trained double the number of teachers. This indicator tracked pre-service teacher training.

Indicator 3 : Number of teachers provided with in-service training Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 1,500 1,217


The project came close to achieving the target. 1,217 teachers received in-service training and training of 1,649 teachers had to be terminated.

Indicator 4 : Course offerings in Alternate Learning Programs Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 45 45


Target achieved. The actual value at completion is incorrect in the last ISR. 7 is entered instead of 45. 7 is the number of AES programs, but 45 is the number of courses offered.

Indicator 5 : AES teachers trained Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 500 1,000


Target exceeded. The project trained twice as many AES teachers than originally planned.

Indicator 6 : Education managers trained Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 317 357


Target exceeded.

Indicator 7 : State Ministries Education supported by Senior Technical Education Advisors Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 2 2

v


Target achieved.

Indicator 8 : Classrooms built/rehabilitated at the primary level resulting from the project intervention

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 348 381


Target exceeded. Of the 52 schools constructed, 1 school was in the defect liability period. This figure indicates the classrooms and one library in each of the 51 schools.

Indicator 9 : M&E plans in place for teacher training and AES Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

No Yes No


Target was not achieved.

Indicator 10 : Textbooks printed and distributed Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 2.2 million 2.2 million


Target was achieved. The textbooks were financed from the unutilized balance of Southern Sudan Rapid Impact Emergency Project.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived

DO IP Actual

Disbursements (USD millions)

1 06/28/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 3.38 2 08/31/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.29

3 05/06/2009 Moderately

Unsatisfactory Moderately

Unsatisfactory 6.21



Unsatisfactory 6.41



Unsatisfactory 8.14



Unsatisfactory 9.59



Unsatisfactory 9.87

8 01/27/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 12.98 9 07/10/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 19.57

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10 02/16/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 24.47 11 06/27/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 24.83 12 12/26/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 25.50

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made

DO IP

03/09/2009 MS MS 5.73 Closing date extension

06/23/2011 MS MS 19.57 Closing date extension; Revisions to results framework

06/26/2012 S S 24.83 Closing date extension

12/11/2012 MS S 25.50 Amendment of percentage of expenditures financed by MDTF to 100%

I. Disbursement Profile

1

1. Program Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal Country context 1.1.1 At appraisal, South Sudan had not yet become an independent country1, but was part of Sudan and in the process of emerging from over two decades of civil war.2 The Government of South Sudan (GoSS), created with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) as Government of National Unity in 2005, inherited none of the institutions associated with an independent state, and thus was faced with the challenge of construction and state building rather than post-conflict re-construction alone. The prolonged conflict affected every aspect of South Sudanese life, led to wide spread emigration of skilled people internal displacement of the population, isolation and absence of basic social services. 1.1.2 South Sudan was amongst the poorest regions in the world, with 90 percent of the population earning less than US$1 per day and its human development indicators were among the lowest in the world. Only 27 percent of the population over 15 years was able to read and write. Infrastructure was non-existent in rural areas, e.g. there were no paved roads outside the three major towns of Juba, Malakal and Wau. Only 15 percent of households owned a phone and mobile penetration of households was only 2 percent in 2006. South Sudan had an estimated population of 8.3 million, of which about 83 percent was residing in rural areas. The very low population density and lack of infrastructure made basic service delivery extremely challenging and costly. The long conflict also prevented the emergence of a class of entrepreneurs. Few businesses owned by South Sudanese exist even several years after the end of the war. This meant that almost all goods had to be imported from neighboring countries, increasing cost and making easy access to inputs difficult. Security concerns and outbreaks of violence in parts of the country, e.g. conflicts over land and cattle, also created a challenge. 1.1.3 At the time of project identification and appraisal, no formal ministry of education was in place, neither physically or in terms of personnel. The country’s public financial management and procurement systems likewise urgently needed to be built from the ground up. Commercial banks did not yet exist in the country, making disbursements from donor funds a challenge. Before the CPA, NGOs and UN agencies largely provided basic services. The CPA created high expectations among the population for quick peace dividends. Adding to this pressure were the millions of IDPs returning to the South. Moreover, there was the strong desire on the part of the new government to assume its responsibility for delivering public services and substantial pressure to shift them away from donors and NGOs. The context of the World Bank’s engagement in South Sudan was unique, even among fragile states, firstly because there are very few experiences with state building in “new” countries3; and secondly, even among new nations, South Sudan is unique in that it did not have any previous government systems and structures.

1 The Republic of South Sudan became a new country on July 9, 2011, following a referendum on self-determination in January 2011, and effectively became the World’s newest country. 2 South Sudan was at the center of two long-lasting civil wars (the first, from 1955-1972 and the second, from 1983-2005). 3 The only recent examples that come to mind are East Timor and Kosovo.

2

Sector context 1.1.4 South Sudan’s education indicators were among the lowest in the world. An estimated 85 percent of the population was illiterate and the country had the highest rate of out-of-school children in Sub-Saharan Africa, about 1.4 million. The gross enrolment rate at the primary level was only 20 percent. Gender inequalities were marked, with only one in four students female. The illiteracy rate was 92 percent for women and 80 percent for men. Geographical location was another factor contributing to disparities in enrolment. In 2003, more than 80 percent of total primary enrolment was concentrated in three states; the other seven states had rates of less than 40 percent. School facilities were almost non-existent; 38 percent of classes were held outdoors; and basic pedagogical materials such as textbooks and black boards were lacking. The majority of teachers had no formal teaching qualifications, and many had never completed primary education, much less secondary education. Opportunities for non-formal education were limited. While the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) and NGOs provided some education services during the decades of war, there was not much of a structure or system to build on after the CPA. The Ministry of Education was about to be established as were other GoSS ministries; there was no fully fledged civil service system, and no national curriculum upon which instruction could be based. The language of instruction, duration of primary and secondary schooling and curricula varied widely by region, e.g. depending on the region, school used the Sudan curriculum or curricula from neighboring countries such as Kenya and Uganda.4 1.1.5 In 2007, South Sudan replaced Arabic with English as the official language of instruction. The local language would be the primary language of instruction for grades 1-3. English would be introduced as a subject in the first grade and adopted as the primary language of instruction in the later grades of primary school. Though this relatively sudden switch from largely Arabic instruction to English promoted national unity, its implementation created immediate practical challenges for the education system, since a considerable share of teachers spoke no or little English. Project context 1.1.6 A Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) was undertaken in 2005 by the World Bank, the United Nations, the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Government of Sudan (GoS). The JAM provided the technical analysis and framework for project identification, estimated financing needs and laid out the key sector issues, which the Multi-Donor Education Rehabilitation Project (ERP) was designed to address in a comprehensive manner. The project included activities formulated to support the GoSS in achieving the goals set in its national Education Sector Plan (ESP) 2005-2011: (i) access to and quality of education; (ii) curriculum and learning materials; (iii) teacher education and training; (iv) alternative learning opportunities; (v) capacity building; and (vi) co-ordination, monitoring and evaluation. Thus, the project formed part of a larger, national program in the education sector, funded by donors as well as the government. 1.1.7 Beyond the sector, the project was designed within the collaborative framework of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF-SS), set up by several key development partners to support

4 World Bank, 2012. Education in the Republic of South Sudan: Status and Challenges for a New System.

3

the GoSS in state and peace building, (re-)construction and development, and partnerships; administered by the World Bank (see annex 10 for more information on the MDTF). 1.1.8 The overarching goal of external assistance to South Sudan was to build state capacity. Specifically, it was to support an emerging government in creating and promoting national unity; and promoting the legitimacy and visibility of a new government through tangible benefits to communities in all states, even if only symbolically. These primary objectives, though not explicitly stated in the project documents, pervaded all aspects of preparation and implementation, not only for the ERP, but also the other MDTF projects. The ERP, together with the Health and the Rapid Impact Emergency projects constituted the earliest phase of human development assistance under the MDTF, followed by the subsequent phases of reconstruction and development. 1.2 Original Program Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) 1.2.1 The US$25.5 million Emergency Recovery Grant for the Multi-Donor Education Rehabilitation Project (ERP) was approved on March 30, 2006 and became effective on July 27, 2007. The project was designed as part of a national education sector program, as indicated in the Project Proposal. The (PDO) as stated in the Project Proposal Document (PPD) is as follows:

“Primary school students, returning population, demobilized soldiers, and other non-traditional learners have improved access to enhanced quality of education; alternate learning opportunities, development of life skills and basic occupational skill training.”

1.2.2 The PDO is broken down into two parts to facilitate assessment of PDO achievement: (i) improved access to enhanced quality of education for primary school students; and (ii) improved access to alternate learning opportunities, development of life skills and basic occupational skill training for returning population, demobilized soldiers, and other non-traditional learners.

Table 1: Original Project Development Indicators5 Project Indicators Baseline

(2006) Target (2009)

1. Number of County level Teacher Training centers established, staffed and operational

14

2. Number of teachers provided with in-service training 4,000 3. Number of teachers achieving success in designated levels of qualification upgrading

750

4. Number of demobilized soldiers, returning school age population, overage learners, females and other non-formal learners enrolled in alternate learning programs or basic skill training designed to enable them to integrate more effectively into a post-conflict society

50,000

5. Completion rates for participants in Alternate Learning Programs

6. Number of females participating and completing basic education

5 At the time of preparation, there had been no final decision regarding the type of indicator i.e. which of the indicators mentioned in the table were PDO and which were intermediate.

4

7. Number of females participating and completing Alternative Learning Programs

8. GER for primary and secondary schools 9. Number of course offerings in Alternate Learning Programs

Not established 45

10. Number of schools rehabilitated/constructed 100 11. Number of curricula, teacher guides, textbooks and learning assessment procedures developed, approved and being implemented for primary and secondary education programs

2.2 million

12. Type and direction of education sector policy initiatives implemented during the project period

13. Documentation complete and institutional readiness for implementation of Phase II of the Education Sector Program

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and Reasons/Justification:

1.3.1 The Project Development Objective (PDO) remained the same throughout the life of the project. The results framework was refined during implementation with the June 2011 restructuring6 to include new available data and core sector indicators and to adapt to the realities on the ground. Most of the original PDO indicators were retained or were shifted to the intermediate indicator level. Out of the original PDO indicators, two indicators were maintained at PDO level,7 three were monitored at the intermediate level; and another three were dropped. In addition, two new indicators were added at PDO level. The revised PDO indicators and intermediate indicators were better able to capture the progress of the project’s development objectives. For assessment purposes, the PDO indicators and intermediate indicators updated in the June 2011 restructuring will be used in the ICR. The funds disbursed for the various project activities are consistent with the revised PDO indicators as outlined in Table 2.8

Table 2: Revised PDO Indicators Project Indicators Baseline

(2006) Target (2012)

1. Demobilized soldiers, returning school age population, overage learners, and other non-formal learners enrolled in alternate learning programs or basic skill training provided under the project (number)

0

50,000

2. Children enrolled in primary education 669,000 1,500,00 3. Textbook – Pupil Ratio (Quality) None established 1.5: 1 4. Direct Project Beneficiaries (number) 0 702,500

6 This was a level 2 restructuring. 7 With revised wording to match the core indicators 8 The complete revisions to the results framework is listed in Annex 11

5

1.4 Beneficiaries 1.4.1 The PDO clearly identified the main target groups of the project interventions. The direct project beneficiaries were: (i) primary school children; (ii) youth and adults such as demobilized soldiers, IDP’s, overage learners, other non-formal learners; (iii) existing and new teachers; (iv) Ministry of Education officials at the national, state and local levels. 1.5 Original Components 1.5.1 The project supported part of a larger national program, the education sector plan. It originally had five components and was to be implemented in two phases. Components 1-4 focused on basic education and comprised the first phase of ERP to be implemented within the first three years (2006-2008). Component 5 consisted of planning for the second phase of the project, post-basic education, from 2009 onwards. The total cost of the government’s education sector program for three years was estimated at US$152.7 million; US$51 million to be financed by the MDTF and the remaining US$102.7 million by the GoSS, as per Project Proposal. However, MDTF financing was in tranches, therefore the Grant Agreement only refers to the first year tranche of the project. The total project cost for year 1 (2006) was estimated at US$23.4 million, of which US$15.4 million was to be co-financed by the government and the remainder by a first tranche of MDTF funding of US$7.7 million. The first amendment of the Grant Agreement dated November 2007 provides additional MDTF financing in the amount of US$17.8 million, and thus changed the amount of total MDTF financing for the project to US$25.5 million (see table below).

Table 3: Project Financing

Date MDTF-SS GoSS Grant Agreement (March 2006)

7.7 15.4

Amendment (November 2007)

17.8 5.0

Total 25.5 20.4

1.5.2 The original project components are as follows:

Component 1: Enhance and Expand the Management and Delivery of Education Services at the County Level (US$18 million). The objective of this component was to provide a model for a decentralized training program based on the development of multi-purpose County Education Centers (CECs), which could also serve as training centers for teachers. The activities consisted of the construction of 20 CECs; provision of in-service and pre-service training to administrative, managerial and pedagogical education staff; use of a ‘fast track’ teacher training approach as a first step in developing a more comprehensive in-service teacher training program to upgrade teacher qualifications; launch of accelerated/alternative learning programs at the county level; and capacity strengthening of county level education administration.

Component 2: Responsive Resources for the Provision of Alternative Education and/or

Skill Development for Non-Formal Learners (US$12 million). The purpose of this component

6

was to enable demobilized soldiers, IDPs, overage learners, females and other non-formal learners’ access to second chance education opportunities through the Alternative Education System (AES). The activities consisted of the completion/review of the Accelerated Learning Program (ALP) curriculum and materials for Christian Religious Education (CRE), Arts, and Agriculture; a rapid needs assessment for skills training; the delivery of training with additional printing of textbooks and materials; development of a draft strategy for AES; assessment and identification of areas of short-term occupational skills training for demobilized soldiers and IDPs; development of criteria for selecting trainees/learners of skills training programs; and development of an evaluation system.

Component 3: Ministry of Education, Science and Technology: Institutional Capacity Development (US$9 million). This component consisted of a phased and integrated program of institutional capacity development inputs to address the full continuum of MoEST9 responsibilities.10 The key activities consisted of leadership training for education management personnel at all levels; development and roll-out of the Education Management Tool Kit (EMTK) to county-level education managers; establishment of two key institutions, the Curriculum Development Center (CDC) and the Examinations and Learning Assessment Center; development of curriculum and learning assessment tools for primary and secondary levels; printing and distribution of textbooks in core subjects; and development of teacher guides and curricula.

Component 4: Rehabilitation and Construction of School Level Infrastructure (US$6.5 million). The purpose of this component was to commence with a rapid assessment of rehabilitation as well as detailed planning of new construction needs, followed by a program to undertake civil works activities.

Component 5: Phase 2 Planning and Project Preparation (US$1.5 million). This component would finance the establishment of a forum composed of the MoEST and development partners to determine priorities and programs to receive support under Phase 2, as well as undertake analysis to fully prepare Phase 2 (post-basic education) program proposal. 1.5.3 The remaining US$4 million was to be allocated to program management, monitoring and evaluation. 1.6 Revised Project Components 1.6.1 During implementation the project activities were appropriately adjusted to effectively adapt to conditions on the ground and to reflect shifting government priorities. A formal restructuring11 of components and sub-components did not take place. Once more data and information became available on the status of the education system, unit costs and capacity limitations at the national and state level, it was decided to focus on basic education and not to proceed with phase 2 of the project focused on post-basic education, given the delays with the launch of phase 1, limited institutional capacity and priorities. As a result, component 5 (i.e.

9 The Ministry of Education, Science and Technology is now the Ministry of General Education and Instruction and the Ministryof Higher Education. Henceforth, we will use the current name MoGEI. 10 Such as policy formulation, management and administration, curriculum development, program delivery and assessment of learning outcomes. 11 This means as recorded in Restructuring Papers.

7

Phase 2) was canceled,12 which contributed towards simplifying the project design more suitable to the country environment. The original PDO, centered on basic education, was maintained, because it remained achievable and was not impacted by the above adjustments. After the June 2011 restructuring of the project activities, the project components included the following:

Component 1: Enhance and expand the management and delivery of education services at the county level (US$4.4 million): Intensive English language training for teachers and education staff; pre-service teacher training; fast track (3 week) pre-service pilot training for new teachers; and in-service training of teachers; and construction of 14 CECs.

Component 2: Provision of alternate education and/or skill development for non-formal learners (US$2.9 million). Key activities included: AES instructor training; training of local education authorities; financing of AES courses for learners; piloting the pastoralist education program (PEP) for youth and adults.

Component 3: Institutional Capacity Development (US$ 1.9 million. This component consisted of technical assistance, training and support to education managers; improvement in working conditions of education managers (such as rehabilitation of staff houses at the Maridi Curriculum Center); and acquisition of a printing press to conduct the national end of primary exams.

Component 4: Construction and Rehabilitation of Schools (US$ 14.2 million). This component financed the rehabilitation and construction of primary schools, including student desks and benches. 1.6.2 The remaining amount of the grant, US$2.1 million, was allocated to project management.

Table 4: Original and Revised Project Activities Component Before After

1. Enhance and Expand the Management and Delivery of Education Services at the County Level

Construction of 20 CECs Construction of 14 CECs Provision of in-service training Continued, but ultimately dropped

due to management issues Provision of pre-service training Continued Fast Track training approach Continued Initiate accelerated/alternative learning programs at the county level

Dropped

Capacity strengthening of county level administration to deliver education services

Intensive English language training for teachers and education staff

2. Provision of Alternate Education

Completion/review of the ALP curriculum and materials for CRE, Arts and Agriculture

AES Instructor Training

Rapid assessment of the size of target beneficiaries of the occupational skills training

N/A

Develop a draft strategy for AES Provide education opportunities to non-traditional learners through AES

Assessment and identification of areas of short-term Conduct a pilot pastoralist education

12 As per Amendment to the Trust Fund Agreement dated November 6, 2007.

8

and/or Skill development for Non-Formal Learners

occupational skills training for demobilized soldiers and IDP’s

program for youth and adults

Development of criteria for selecting trainees/learners of skills training programs

N/A

Development of an evaluation system for maintaining program content, quality and auditing the learning outcomes

Training of local education authorities (LEAs) Evaluation of AES

3. Ministry of Education, Science and Technology: Institutional Capacity Development

Development and provision of leadership courses for education management personnel at all levels

Provide technical assistance, training and support to education managers

Development and roll out of the Education Management Tool Kit (EMTK) aimed at county-level managers

Dropped

Development of two key institutions: Curriculum Development center (CDC) and the Examinations and Learning Assessment Center

Improve working conditions for education managers (measured by rehabilitation of Maridi CDC).

Development of curriculum and learning assessment tools for primary and secondary levels

Dropped

Printing and distribution of textbooks in core subjects Continued Procure and install a printing press

for the examination center. 4. Rehabilitation and Construction of School Level Infrastructure

Rehabilitation/construction of 100 schools in former garrison towns and war-affected areas

Rehabilitate/build 52 primary schools

Rehabilitation of the Juba Technical Center Dropped Equip schools with furniture

5. Phase 2 Planning and Project Preparation

Provide resources to establish a forum composed of MOEST and development partners to determine priorities and programs to received support under Phase 2

Component 5 was dropped in its entirety because it was decided that there would be no Phase 2 for the MDTF ERP Undertake analysis to fully prepare Phase 2 program

proposal

1.7 Other Significant Changes 1.7.1 At project closing all activities were completed, made possible by several project extensions. The original project closing date of September 30, 2009 was extended four times: (i) from September 2009 to March 31, 2011; (ii) from March 31, 2011 to June 30, 2011; (iii) from June 30, 2011 to June 30, 2012 (which also included the revision of the results framework); and (iv) from June 30, 2012 to December 30, 2012. A last restructuring was done on December 11, 2012 to increase the percentage of expenditures financed by the MDTF from 56 percent to 100 percent to allow for full disbursement of the grant. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Program Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 2.1.1 Project preparation was a major challenge. The project had to be prepared within the context of a country emerging from civil war, conducted under very difficult institutional, technical as well as physical conditions and within a very short preparation time frame. As with

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most projects prepared under emergency guidelines, this meant that part of the preparation and implementation readiness was pushed to the first phase of implementation. Moreover, there was an almost complete lack of background information (such as e.g. past project evaluations and reports, studies, reliable cost estimates) and data on the education system. The government had no past experience implementing similar projects and the organizational structure of the ministry had yet to be formalized and key staff to be appointed. The ministry essentially consisted of a handful of South Sudanese senior education planners, still based in the garrison town of Rumbek (and not yet in Juba, where the center of government was established) at the time of identification.13 In addition, overall lack of communications, transportation and other infrastructure added to the difficulties of preparation, e.g. the World Bank office was initially housed in a tent (and later in a container). 2.1.2 Engagement of emerging government and other stakeholders during preparation. In spite of these severe difficulties, the Bank team managed to engage and work with the incoming government in the preparation of the project. However, given that there were only rudimentary government institutions in place and no clear accountability structures in the ministry at appraisal, government ownership could not be promoted as much as would have been desirable. When the ministry and its key personnel were fully established in October 2006, their buy-in into the project first had to be developed and a new consensus reached on various key issues. This caused problems at the early stages of implementation and led to some changes in activities and their scale; and in implementation approaches. e.g. instead of using NGOs, the ministry insisted on implementing most of the activities directly themselves, regardless of capacity constraints at national and regional levels, e.g. for the in-service teacher training program. The primary reason for the ministry taking hands-on approach was the need to show government presence on the ground, build a public education system and take responsibility for service delivery; and the high costs of using NGOs. Further evidence of the collaborative nature of the preparation is the week-long stakeholder preparation workshop that took place in Juba in December 2005, which brought together representatives from the government, teachers, NGOs, and bilateral and multilateral donors. 2.1.3 Striking a balance between enormous post-conflict needs and expectations and very limited capacity. The project design was in line with government priorities and comprehensively addressed the country’s many critical needs and sector issues for building an education system from scratch. This meant that the design was ambitious, especially given the relatively short implementation time frame. The difficulty for the Bank team consisted of reconciling needs, ambitions and the realities of the political economy with the human, institutional and physical constraints. The project activities were to be implemented in all 10 states due to the need to promote national unity in a very fragile context and show tangible benefits quickly across the country. However, this geographic spread, though politically necessary, complicated project implementation and supervision and taxed the limited implementation capacity of the government. 2.1.3 Few experiences from emerging new countries/state building available to inform project design and approach. Though lessons from Bank experience in supporting education reconstruction in other post-conflict countries informed the project design, few lessons from

13 Though the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology was formally established with the MoF on Oct 23, 2005, this was largely only on paper at the time.

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projects in newly emerging countries with minimal institutional and human resource capacities were available. The only cases were East Timor and Kosovo, but both of these had some existing institutions and structures, unlike South Sudan. 2.2 Implementation 2.2.1 Implementation Arrangements. The Education Rehabilitation Project (ERP) became effective on July 27, 2006; and closed on December 31, 2012. Thus, implementation took place over 5.5 years, which is a more appropriate implementation time frame for such a comprehensive project than the originally proposed three years. The implementation arrangements consisted of a small coordination unit inside the ministry (Development Project Implementation Support Team, DPIST), responsible for day-to-day coordination. The team was to be staffed by personnel with relevant specializations such as procurement, financial management, monitoring and evaluation etc. The DPIST would provide support to the MoGEI (formerly MoEST14) in coordination, monitoring, financial reporting, communication and procurement. The specific technical departments within the MoGEI were responsible for implementing each of the different activities/components of the ERP, supported by an inter-departmental Component Working Group (CWG), led by the head of the department overseeing the component implementation. The working group would draw upon the technical expertise of state ministries, the county level and NGOs. An inter-ministerial Project Steering Committee (PSC), led by the Minister of Education and including representatives of the state education ministries, key directors of the MoGEI and representatives of the Ministry of Finance (MoF) was to provide policy guidance, was established in 2007, though it did not assume its role as planned and remained largely nonfunctional. Streamlining implementation directly into the respective line ministries instead of using Project Implementation Units (PIU) was the explicit request of the GoSS across all MDTF projects and was non-negotiable. This ministry-led implementation contributed to increasing ministry ownership and capacity over time, though it also led to substantial implementation delays. 2.2.2 Overall factors across MDTF projects affecting implementation. Implementation was severely hampered by security concerns, inaccessibility of sites, weak banking system (the designated account was in Kenya, leading to disbursement delays), poor communications infrastructure and low technical and fiduciary capacity. Given its short existence, the GoSS was still in the process of building its own institutions at central and local levels. This meant that personnel, clear roles and responsibilities, policies, procedures, equipment, operational budgets and information and management systems were not yet in place or not adequately developed. The periodical fiscal shocks, hiring freezes and shortage of operational funds also contributed to draining the government’s technical and implementation capacity. The economic crisis of 2009 led to a freeze in the recruitment of civil servants. This led to delays in staff appointments, thus slowing down staff capacity building activities, which in turn slowed down implementation progress. 2.2.3 Project-specific factors leading to implementation delays: no-full time project staff, frequent changes in key ministry staff and leadership. Frequent changes in ministry leadership also negatively affected project implementation, resulting in changes in priorities

14 The Ministry of Education, Science and Technology is now the Ministry of General Education and Instruction and the Ministry of Higher Education. Henceforth, we will use the current name MoGEI.

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and personnel. During the course of the project, there were three ministers, four undersecretaries and three changes in ERP project coordinators.15 The frequent turnover in the leadership and the lack of a full-time project coordinator and staff in the early stages of implementation further complicated implementation. Implementation progress and issues related to specific components/activities: 2.2.4 Disbursements: The initial phase of the ERP implementation was focused on launching and completing the procurement processes to start the activities. Not surprisingly for an emergency project, initial disbursement was low. As of mid-2008, only US$ 3.38 million of the total 25.5 million had been disbursed. The low disbursement rate was tied to the low progress in achieving the indicators. Following the mid-term review in 2008, disbursements rose to US$8.83 million or 35 percent of the total by end 2009. After mid-2010 disbursements, and subsequently implementation, increased at a rapid pace. By the end of 2010, half of the project funds had been disbursed. By the end of 2011, US$24.47 million or 96 percent of funds had been disbursed. As of closing in December 2012, all funds had been disbursed. This shows that though there were considerable delays, the project managed a turn-around in 2009-2010 once critical issues were resolved. 2.2.5 Rapid Results Initiative (RRI) contributed to accelerating implementation: The Bank provided Rapid Results coaches in 2009 to work with the ministry teams implementing the four components to develop and implement action plans to achieve clearly specified process-oriented results. Based on feedback from ministry staff, this initiative succeeded in clarifying each team member’s roles and responsibilities in the implementation process, and creating a system of accountability for results, and advancing implementation progress.16 2.2.6 Issues related to civil works (school construction and county education centers): The construction component encountered substantial delays due to insufficient procurement capacity, lack of experienced contractors and suppliers, and the long selection process of school sites. For political reasons, the government insisted on building schools in each of the 10 states rather than concentrate on states with the lowest enrolment rates. This dispersion of sites amplified the above implementation difficulties. Furthermore, initial cost projections were underestimated due to lack of cost data for South Sudan at preparation. These factors led to the scaling down of the component from the initially planned 100 schools to a more manageable 52 schools. The conditions of the road/transportation network and insecurity in several regions contributed to further construction delays and constituted a challenge for Bank supervision, as staff could not inspect all sites. However, despite these challenges, all construction activities were completed at project closing. 2.2.7 Issues related to teacher training: The in-service training program was implemented directly by the ministry through the CECs. About 1,649 primary school teachers were trained through the program. However, the training program encountered some problems, such as difficult access to training sites, transportation of trainees and project staff, inadequacies in the accommodations of many of the CECs, identification of candidates for the program, and the

15 But there were only three different coordinators in total, as one of the coordinators was later re-instated. 16 In spite of its usefulness, the ministry requested to end the Rapid Results Initiative because of the high consultant rates.

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high proportion of Arabic, non-English speaking teachers in some states. Most importantly, the in-service training program encountered considerable fiduciary issues, notably inadequate financial management and accounting for operational funds. Though the ministry addressed and resolved these fiduciary issues, the remainder of the in-service teacher training program was suspended after the completion of only the first of the 11-term program. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 2.3.1 M&E Design: The PDO outcome and intermediate indicators are in line with the PDO. A more simplified results framework would have facilitated tracking of project performance and implementation progress. The initial establishment of PDO indicators and intermediate indicators, and realistic target values was difficult, given the lack of baseline data. The results framework was therefore adjusted as data became available with the progressive set up of the Education Management Information System (EMIS) and the administration of additional surveys as part of the sector diagnostic. Furthermore, there were several consistency issues with PDO indicators in the early project stage across project documents, which were resolved with the updating of the results framework as part of the June 2011 restructuring (though this updating of the results framework could have taken place earlier in the implementation phase). 2.3.2 M&E Arrangements, implementation and utilization: Especially in the early stages of implementation, the M&E system was not very functional. Baseline data collection and M&E was to be undertaken at the state and county level with support from NGOs, but this did not occur as planned. A MDTF-wide M&E workshop was conducted at the start of the MDTF, attended by government and Bank staff. Even though it was well received, the conclusions were not adopted by the projects. The PPD envisioned that the Development Project Implementation Support Team (DPIST) would establish simple and measureable monitoring indicators on process, output, and outcomes, whereas the DPIST Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation M&E Specialist would identify data sources and be responsible for data collection and reporting by the Component Working Group (CWGs). However, an M&E specialist was not part of the project implementation team. Many of the other MDTF projects encountered similar M&E challenges, i.e. lack of a dedicated M&E specialist, lack of documentation/filing system baseline data and M&E tools for data collection. The MA conducted field visits and submitted quarterly monitoring reports, which detailed the implementation progress, but the primary focus of the reports was fiduciary. The June 2011 restructuring solidified and simplified the results framework of the ERP and the reporting and data collection significantly improved. Once data collected through EMIS became available, the data was used for the development of the next education sector plan. A comprehensive evaluation of the Alternative Education System took place in 2012, which was used as a basis for a large scale student learning assessment currently in progress. This ongoing learning assessment will inform further quality improvements of the AES. Safeguards and Fiduciary Compliance 2.3.3 Safeguards: The preparation phase identified two potential safeguard issues: (i) environmental (OP4.01) and (ii) involuntary re-settlement related to land acquisition for civil works (OP4.12). The potential environmental risks were related to construction and rehabilitation of schools, training centers, and administrative offices, more specifically, the need for safe water supply and adequate sanitation and waste disposal arrangements. The

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World Bank and the Ministry of Environment had prepared an Environmental and Social Assessment Framework (ESAF) for the entire MDTF-SS portfolio. Using this framework as a base, the development of an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) and a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) was required. The frameworks were to be prepared, approved and disclosed by GoSS and the MDTF administrator within six months of project effectiveness. However, the ERP decided to adopt the overall ESSAF prepared by the Bank and the GoSS to monitor the social and environmental impact of project activities. The Ministry of Environment, Wildlife Conservation and Tourism agreed to coordinate a MDTF Safeguards Management Committee, comprised of safeguards officers appointed by each Ministry benefiting from MDTF. This was done to facilitate training, capacity building and effective implementation of safeguards requirements for all MDTF projects. While some issues arose during implementation, overall compliance with safeguards policies was rated as moderately satisfactory throughout the project. Financial Management and Flow of Funds 2.3.4 Fiduciary Compliance: The 2005 Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) carried out an analysis of the financial management system with the conclusion that the entire fiduciary system needed to be built from scratch. Accordingly, the overall fiduciary risk rating was high, given low institutional fiduciary capacity and the probability of financial mismanagement. To minimize the risk, a fiduciary framework was put in place which included (i) a Monitoring Agent (MA) to ensure that funds were being used for the purposes intended, fiduciary standards were being complied with; and (ii) an External Audit Agent (EAA) to provide an independent opinion on the systems and internal control mechanisms used to control the flow of funds. The Project Accounting Agent (PAA) would handle the financial management (FM) for the government. The PAA would prepare a FM manual which would cover accounting policies and procedures, banking arrangements, flow of funds arrangements, budgeting arrangements and procedures related to the transaction cycle. A Project Financial Management Unit (PFMU) was established in the MoF that was responsible for the overall FM for all MDTF projects. 2.3.5 At the early stages of the project, several cases of unaccounted advances and ineligible expenditures occurred. Several other internal control issues such as alterations, non-acknowledgement of payments by payees etc. were identified. The majority of these issues, in particular the ineligible expenditures, was caused by an inadequate understanding of Bank procedures and later resolved, thanks to significantly improved coordination between the MoGEI and the PFMU. The issue of ineligible expenditures occurred mainly in the teacher training sub-component, directly implemented by the ministry. The MoF did not want to provide funding to the states to pay teacher salaries because of improper accounting; therefore the MoGEI used the MDTF funds to find another way of paying teachers, e.g. paying for hotel expenses, which were ineligible expenditures. In addition, central ministry leadership training was conducted at Juba University, which occurred without knowledge or non-objection from the Bank. Finally, payment was advanced to construction contractors who then disappeared without returning the advance or starting construction. In this case, the Bank suggested that the government use interest from the counterpart contribution to reimburse the project, especially in light of budgetary constraints in the government. The Bank team worked closely with the government in ensuring that all ineligible expenditures were reimbursed and accounting for outstanding advances was completed. Despite the aforementioned issues, an adequate FM

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system was in place by the end of the project. Given the proactivity of the government and the Bank in addressing and resolving the issues and the visible improvement in fiduciary capacity, overall financial management is rated as moderately satisfactory. 2.3.6 Procurement: At the time of appraisal, in early 2006, the public procurement system in South Sudan was non-existent. There were no national procurement procedures, institutional framework or capacity for procurement. Other procurement constraints included lack of limited media for procurement notices and low capacity of local private sector. Initially, procurement was to be centrally processed in two phases. In the first phase, the GoSS would prepare and publish an interim public procurement procedure and establish a procurement policy unit in the Ministry of Finance to oversee tasks. The second phase would consist of decentralization of the systems designed in the first phase; and the enactment of a public procurement law. The Interim Public Procurement and Disposal Regulation (IPPDR) was issued by the MoFEP in June 2006 to guide public procurement in the country. Further, based on the recommendations of the JAM, a Procurement Agent (PA) was recruited to assist the government in the central processing of procurement and institutional capacity building. However, this arrangement did not function properly, as the PA found it difficult to recruit staff with the right mix of skills to be based in-country. As a result, the ERP, like other MDTF projects, hired an individual procurement consultant to execute procurement processes and to help build counterpart procurement capacity through on the job training of government staff. This arrangement, which lasted until project closing, proved successful for accelerating procurement processing and capacity building. The ministry was able to overcome the above mentioned constraints and complete all major procurement processes by the end of the project. Thus, procurement was rated moderately satisfactory. 2.4 Expected Next Phase/Follow-up Operation 2.4.1 The government is committed to achieving universal primary education and further developing its system capacity. It is continuing the activities of the ERP such as AES, teacher training, county education centers, school construction, by integrating lessons learned. Further evidence of this commitment is the preparation of a second education sector plan in 2012, the General Education Strategic Plan 2012-2017 (GESP) with technical support from the World Bank and other partners; and the ambition to raise education spending from the current 7 percent to 10 percent of total government spending. The GESP priorities are the same as those of the ERP, which highlights the continued relevance of the ERP’s PDO and activities. In support of the implementation of its plan, the government received grant funding in the amount of US$36.1 million from the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), a multi-donor initiative, which became effective in April 2013. In addition, several other donors are currently financing education, such as Denmark, USAID, and DFID. In terms of continued Bank technical and financial support to education, the following activities are currently being undertaken, complementary to other partner interventions: (i) support to community-based school construction through the Local Government and Service Delivery project; and (ii) in-depth student learning assessment of the Alternative Education System to help guide policy.

3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation Rating: Substantial

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3.1.1 The project objectives remain highly relevant to the country’s needs and the groups targeted by the project, such as primary school students, IDPs and ex-combatants who continue to be key beneficiaries of current government and donor programs. The PDO addressed the critical challenges of the education system as indicated in the JAM and in line with the government’s priorities as indicated in Article 13 of the 2005 Interim Constitution, its education sector plan 2005-2011, and the 2003 Sudan Country Re-engagement Note. Further evidence of the continued pertinence of the PDO is its consistency with the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) 2011-2020 and the new education sector plan 2012-2017, which includes as its mission to “improve access to, quality and funding for general education as well as tackle the issue of illiteracy […] and low institutional and human capacity in the general education sub-sector […]”.17 The PDO is reflected in the components of the project. Components 1, 3 and 4 correspond to the first part of the PDO, improved access to enhanced quality of education. Component 2 focuses on the second PDO, improved access to education and life skills for non-traditional learners. The project design proposed addressed the key sector issues and needs as identified in JAM and in consultation with stakeholders, which are still relevant today. Evidence of the continued relevance of the project activities, such as support to school construction, teacher training, the Alternative Education System and institutional capacity building, is their continued funding through the government and other donors. 3.1.2 Despite the extremely difficult environment and some shortcomings in the design, the PDO and project design remain highly relevant. In spite of frequent delays, especially in the first two years, the adaptation of the project activities throughout implementation and the restructuring of the results framework (though at a relatively advanced stage of implementation) consistent with on the ground realities and constraints, and in response to shifting government priorities, improved the relevance of the project design, facilitated monitoring and contributed to implementation progress. The Bank was in step with the changing needs of the country by being able to re-allocate funds from original components/activities that were not considered as urgent once implementation started to priority activities. For example, the funds initially allocated to Component 5 were allocated to civil works of Component 1, once it became clear that initial construction cost estimates were too low. As a result of these adjustments, disbursement and completion of activities picked up substantially in 2009, the year after the mid-term review; and even further in 2010-2011. Ultimately, the project succeeded in achieving, surpassing or was close to achieving the revised PDO indicators and intermediate performance indicators. Therefore, relevance is rated substantial. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives Rating: Substantial 3.2.1 The ERP provided support to the emerging new state at an early stage in the form of a basic package of interventions for primary school children. This package essentially consisted of classrooms, teacher training and textbooks, and thus benefitted the same beneficiaries, primarily school aged children, in multiple ways and contributed to the scaling up of the delivery of education services early on, improving enrolment and retention. The provision of tangible inputs such as textbooks and classrooms encouraged parents to send their children to

17 General Education Strategic Plan 2012-2017 – Promoting Learning For All, p. 50

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school. The project also contributed to laying the foundations of a national education system through capacity building in planning, implementation, supervision and technical aspects of national, state and local level education staff, and a distribution system for education supplies put in place. Although there was a substantial learning curve for the government as well as the Bank, the project succeeded in completing the activities and in largely achieving the PDOs. Two of the four PDO indicators are surpassed, one is achieved and the last one close to achievement. Though less tangible, the project also contributed to institutional strengthening of the ministry and thus contributed to the larger, overarching objective of the MDTF of state building. The above justifies the overall outcome rating of moderately satisfactory. Overall PDO indicator: Direct project beneficiaries (Surpassed) 3.2.2 This core indicator consists of two other indicators, children enrolled in primary education and demobilized soldiers, returning population, overage learners and other non-formal learners enrolled in alternate learning programs or basic skill training provided under the project (though the final ISR only counts the latter one, thus underestimating the number of total beneficiaries). It was surpassed substantially, with almost 3 million beneficiaries compared to the target of 0.75 million. Given that the total population of South Sudan was 8.3 million in the 2008 Census, this means the project could have benefitted almost 35 percent of the population (though with one caveat: the total number of children enrolled represents the national figure, not the number of children enrolled in schools constructed by the project, since this would have been too difficult to track and schools were constructed in all 10 states of South Sudan). The percentage of female beneficiaries, which is part of this core indicator, was not tracked in the ISRs. PDO Objective 1: Improved access to education for primary school students PDO indicator: Children enrolled in primary education (Achieved) 3.2.3 Long distances to school play a considerable role in children’s non-enrollment in school, especially for girls.18 Thus, school construction supported by the project was an appropriate intervention for improving access to education. In addition, as mentioned above, school construction was part of a package of interventions promoting enrolment. Impressive progress was made in improving access under the project. The number of children enrolled in primary school more than doubled, from 669,000 in 2005 to 1,391,704 in 2012. The end target of 1,500,000 is thus close to achievement. 3.2.4 The total number of children enrolled represents the national figure, not the number of children enrolled in schools constructed by the project, since this would have been difficult to track, and schools were constructed in all 10 states of South Sudan. In addition, the project constituted part of the national education program. Therefore, it is justified to use national enrollment figures. The project funded the construction of 52 schools, with 6-10 classrooms each (depending on location).19 Each school has three administrative offices, three latrines (two for students by gender and one for staff) and a library. The classrooms are equipped with desks

18 Majgaard, Mingat, 2012, Education in Sub-Saharan Africa – A Comparative Analysis. 19 Enrolment in the schools constructed by the project can be estimated at 21,000 children, which represent about 2 percent of total children enrolled in primary schools in 2012.

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and benches. Furthermore, the project promoted girls’ enrolment in the primary schools built through the inclusion of latrines for boys and girls, as evidence from other countries suggests.20 3.2.5 School construction under the project also likely contributed to increased school operating and learning time for the children enrolled. Schools without buildings or in structures that cannot withstand rain are unlikely to operate for the entire school year, leading to loss in learning time. About 33 percent of classrooms were open air in 2009, whereas now about 54 percent are either permanent or semi-permanent structures. Since most of the project-funded schools were completed in 2011, the project likely contributed to reducing the above share of open air classrooms, thus increasing the amount of students’ instruction time throughout the school year. PDO Objective 1: Enhanced quality of education for primary school students PDO indicator: Textbook-pupil ratio (Achieved) 3.2.6 Learning inputs in the form of textbooks are used as proxy for enhanced education quality, because they are one of several important inputs for improving learning.21 About 2.2 million textbooks in core subjects were purchased and distributed to primary schools by the project in 2008-2009.22 The textbook-pupil ratio at project closing was 1:4 (i.e. one textbook for four students) for both subjects, Math and English. Thus, the target of 1:5 was exceeded. 3.2.7 In addition to textbooks, teacher training and teacher guide books are other critical elements for improving education quality. The project financed pre- and in-service teacher training and pedagogical guides/materials for teachers. Before the project start, about 80 percent of the about 25,000 primary teachers were unqualified and most had no training. The project trained a total of 1,629 primary teachers, reducing the percentage of total untrained teachers by 7 percent, to about 73 percent. Of the teachers trained, 1,217 were trained as part of the Fast track teacher training, 1,649 as part of the in-service teacher training23 and 412 pre-service trainees.24 Teachers in primary grades 1-8 were also provided with teacher guides to help them teach more effectively. These guides were essential, given the low qualifications of the large majority of teachers. The project also contributed to providing the foundations for a teacher training system by funding the construction of 14 CECs with 2 classrooms each, a library and a laboratory. In addition, five teacher houses were renovated in the Maridi Curriculum Development Center. Thus, the project contributed to PDO 1 in several ways, beyond textbooks.

20 Evaluation of African Girls Education Initiative Country Case Study: Uganda (2003) - David W. Chapman, Rabina Kyeyune and Karen Lokkesmoe 21 Michaelowa, K (2001). “Primary Education Quality in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa: Determinants of Learning Achievements and Achievements,” World Development, 29 (10); Hanushek, E., and L. Wößmann (2007). “World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4122, February 22 The acquisition of textbooks was financed through the unutilized balance from the MDTF-funded South Sudan Rapid Impact Emergency Project (RIEP), but implemented by the ERP. 23 This in-service training had to be suspended after the first term due to financial management issues which were later resolved. Therefore, it is not included in the total number of teachers trained. 24 The 412 of the initially enrolled 751 teachers completed the pre-service training and qualified for the intermediate teacher training certificate.

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PDO Objective 3: Improved access to alternate learning opportunities, development of life skills and basic occupational skill training for returning population, demobilized soldiers, and other non-traditional learners PDO indicator: Demobilized soldiers, returning population, overage learners and other non-formal learners enrolled in alternate learning programs or basic skill training provided under the project (Surpassed) 3.2.8 PDO 3 was largely surpassed by more than double the amount of learners. The actual number of beneficiaries of alternative education programs consists of 1,556,554, compared to the target of 750,000. This number constitutes the total number of learners enrolled in the AES system at the national level, since it would have been too difficult to track the number of learners funded by the project. In addition, the project was conceived as contribution to a larger national education program. The project funded two of the seven branches/programs of the Alternative Education System, the Accelerated Learning Program and the pastoralist education program (PEP), which was piloted by the project. Nationally, the ALP is the largest branch of the AES, and represents about 70 percent of all AES students. With regards to the ALP, the project benefitted directly about 50,000 learners of the total 165,000 ALP learners, i.e. about 40 percent of total ALP learners. For the PEP, the number of students enrolled financed by the project is 6,417; which represents almost 60 percent of total pastoralist enrolment (11,000). 3.2.9 Moreover, the project promoted older girls’ attendance of second chance education programs by distributing sanitary pads to girls. Numerous studies from other countries such as Ghana, Uganda, and Malawi found that these pads improved school attendance25. 3.2.10 In addition to contributing to increasing access to various alternative education options, the project also contributed to enhancing the quality of AES. Training was provided to 1,000 AES instructors and teaching and learning materials were distributed to ALP and adult literacy classes. AES learners received 529,000 textbooks in core subjects. A small scale evaluation of AES undertaken by the project26 indicates that the quality of AES is relatively satisfactory, though room for improvement exists. For example, numeracy and literacy test scores of participants in the ALP, an accelerated second chance primary education program for 12-18 year old students funded by the project, range between 70 and 80 percent in grades 3 and 4, and are close to student performance in comparable primary school grades.27 Some ALP learners are successful in progressing to secondary education (many students of the AES program sit for the national primary examinations) or vocational training. In addition, there are indications that the AES overall also has another additional social impact: participants use a wide range of media (63 percent use the radio, 42 percent books or other materials) and are engaged in their communities (25 percent discuss problems in South Sudan with their community and almost 15 percent participate in some form of community group). 3.2.11 The project also contributed toward providing a solid basis for the overall AES system and thus facilitated the implementation/financing of AES programs by other partners. Notably, support consisted of providing two rounds of English Language Courses to 2,435 AES instructors and staff and training of 150 local education authorities to enable them to coordinate and supervise the AES programs, and curriculum development.

25 Dolan and Scott (2010), IRIN Africa (2011) and Voice of America (2013) 26 AES Baseline Survey and Evaluation, June 2012. 27 ALP grades 3 and 4 correspond to grades 6 and 8 in the regular primary system.

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3.3 Efficiency Rating: Substantial 3.3.1 External rate of return. The critical role of education in human capital formation, economic growth and development has been extensively documented.28 At the individual level, people with more schooling tend to be more productive, earn more, be healthier, have fewer children and are more likely to send their children to school.29 In South Sudan, as in most other countries, there is a positive external rate of return on investment in education, which increases with each level of education. Each additional year of education results in about 10.3 percent higher earnings. Individuals with a primary education earn 50 percent more than those with no education. However, this only applies to formal employment, whereas the large majority of the economically active population in South Sudan is in the informal sector. Nevertheless, the above external return to education implies that investment in education in South Sudan is justified. 3.3.2 Cost effectiveness of project interventions.30 The project activities are effective for improving access and quality of education. Increasing the supply of schools in South Sudan promotes access because long distances to schools create barriers to enrolment. In addition, cost-efficient improvement of school infrastructure can indirectly contribute to student learning through enhanced instruction time. Textbooks are among the most cost effective investments for student learning. Teacher training is likely to achieve greater results through a combination of short pre-service and increased in-service training (as funded by the project), rather than a long and more costly pre-service training. 3.3.3 Cost-efficiency. Unit costs are very high in South Sudan, much higher than in other countries in the region, for a number of reasons, including: (i) under-developed private construction sector; (ii) need to import almost all materials; (iii) high transport costs due to the lack or poor condition of roads; (iv) heavy rains that cause flooding; (v) overall shortage of skills in the country; and (vi) high living costs for international staff. Therefore, adequately estimating the costs of activities proved to be difficult at preparation and international benchmarks for unit costs do not apply to South Sudan. Nevertheless, unit costs of activities funded by the project, though appearing high, are in line with other donors unit costs for similar activities and therefore are considered cost-efficient. 3.3.4 School construction: Almost 80 percent of total project funds were spent on school construction. Therefore, the cost efficiency analysis will focus on this component. In addition, cost information from other donors for other project interventions to draw comparisons is not available. The school model used for the schools constructed by the ERP consisted of permanent structures with glass windows, solid board ceilings, rain water goods, walls constructed in solid 230 width concrete blocks embedded in mortar, and steel used in some roofs, with an estimated average life span of about 25 years. Though more expensive than other types of structures, the advantage of this model is its durability, weather resistance and relatively low maintenance costs compared to other models, such as semi-permanent

28 Hanushek and Woessmann 2007, Heyneman, Jamison and Montenegro 1984; World Bank 2011. 29 Hanushek and Woessmann 2009. 30 Cross country study

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constructions or classrooms built from less durable, local and potentially weather-affected materials. Less durable construction types could negatively affect the number of school days/hours, especially during the rainy season, but permanent construction designs can stay open throughout the school year. Costs vary considerably by location, depending on soil condition, and accessibility, but the average cost per school constructed by the ERP (6 classrooms, 3 offices, 3 latrines, 1 library) was about US$396,94531. The cost per classroom was about US$40,000 (latrines are included in the cost since a detailed cost break down is not available). Though the construction cost per school and per classroom was high, it is in line with costs for similar, permanent school construction designs by other donors in South Sudan (see table 5 below).32 Therefore, school construction funded by the project can be considered cost efficient.

Table 5: Comparison of Unit Costs for Primary School Construction (Permanent Structures) Funding Source Unit Cost per

School (US$)

Unit Cost per Classroom (US$)

Comments

BSF (DFID) From about 200,000

to 370,000 From 18,000 to

46,200 Cost figures do not

include latrines

WFP 400,000 n/a n/a

WB 396,945

39,391

Cost figures include latrines

3.3.5 National exam printing press. The project also funded the acquisition of a printing press to facilitate the national end of primary school exams, which are a prerequisite for entry to secondary school. Though the upfront cost of this investment is considerable, the in-county printing of exams will contribute to lowering the annually recurring costs of importing the exams from neighboring countries. 3.3.6 Sustainability: The Ministry of General Education and Instruction has gradually developed stronger technical and management capacity. Evidence of this is the development of the national Education Sector Plan. The key activities of the ERP including teacher training, AES, school construction and rehabilitation among other activities are continuing with financing from other donors or the government and constitute critical elements of the ESP. Thus, the outcomes of the ERP will be sustained.

3.3.7 In summary, the project interventions improved access to primary education and contributed to a higher external rate of return for the project beneficiaries, were relatively cost efficient and are being continued and sustained through the government and donors. Therefore, efficiency is rated substantial.

31 Six of the 52 schools built with support from the ERP had 10 classrooms, but a detailed breakdown of per schools is not available. 32 One caveat on these comparisons: The cost figures are not completely comparable across different donors, since the number of additional facilities, such as administrative offices, latrines etc. varies slightly from project to project, as well as the square footage per classroom, on which information is not available.

21

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 3.4.1 Despite the extremely difficult environment and some shortcomings in the design, the relevance of the PDO and project design continue to be substantial; PDO achievement and efficiency are substantial. Although there was a steep learning curve for the government as well as the Bank, the project ultimately succeeded in completing the activities and achieving the PDOs. Though less tangible, the project also contributed to institutional strengthening of the ministry and thus contributed to the larger, overarching objective of the MDTF of state building. The above justifies the overall outcome rating of moderately satisfactory. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development (see Annex 12)

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening (see Annex 12)

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) (see Annex 12)

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops 3.6.1 No formal beneficiary surveys/stakeholder workshops were undertaken for the project, but informal stakeholder feedback was collected during field trips and supervision missions. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Substantial 4.1 Overall political and economic fragility and sustainability of sector financing. Due to political tensions with Sudan, security concerns remain an issue. In addition, there are a high number of returnees and localized conflicts over land and resources. Providing education and other basic services to the many returnees from Sudan (close to 1 million)33 is another challenge, adding pressure to the already strained capacity and resources of the central and local governments. South Sudan is classified as a lower middle income country, but government revenues are greatly dependent on oil revenues (98 percent) and real GDP per capita has declined every year since 2008, when GDP was first recorded. Within its short lifespan, the South Sudanese economy has already weathered several fiscal shocks due to fluctuations in oil prices and the early 2012 shut-down of production due to a tariff dispute with Sudan. The austerity measures introduced due to the 2012 shut-down resulted in a severe fall in the share for education of total government expenditures, from 7-8 percent to 4 percent in 2012. Thus, in spite of considerable government commitment, the sustainability of education financing is a risk to the Development Outcome and could negatively affect the rapid expansion and improvement of the quality of education services.

4.2 Strong government commitment and continuation of ERP activities. In its recently passed General Education Bill the government showed its commitment to achieving education for all by committing itself to spending at least 10 percent of total government budget on education. It

33 UNHCR estimates

22

is continuing to finance and implement the activities of the ERP such as AES, teacher training and school construction, through its own resources and external funding. Further evidence of this commitment is the preparation of a second education sector plan 2012-2017. Lastly, the risk of financial sustainability is mitigated slightly by the development and implementation of more financially sustainable and more targeted approaches in school construction and other areas. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance 5.1.1 The project had four different TTLs, from preparation to closing. But for most of the implementation, i.e. from after appraisal in February 2006 to May 2011, the same country-based, well-qualified TTL provided extensive implementation support. (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 5.1.2 The Bank correctly identified the main sector issues and collaborated with the GoSS, other external partners and NGOs in project preparation. The development objectives of the project were in accordance with the goals set by the GoSS in its Education Sector Plan (ESP) 2005-2011, consistent with the recommendations of the JAM, and continue to be highly relevant. An internal review of the project proposal took place and the recommendations were integrated into the final document. The PDO wording could have been formulated in a more simple and specific manner, which would have facilitated the formulation of indicators and made attribution of achievements to the project more straightforward. Considering the weak capacity, infrastructure and security issues, the project design was ambitious in scope and timeline, the implementation arrangements not appropriate for the context, and the risks not sufficiently identified and mitigated. The identification and establishment of adequate fiduciary accountability mechanisms through the selection of a MA and an EAA proved to be highly appropriate for the context and functioned well. Though the tremendous effort of the Bank preparation team under uniquely difficult country circumstances and a very short preparation time frame at a critical time for the country is to be commended34, in light of the above, the performance of the Bank in ensuring quality at entry is rated moderately unsatisfactory. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 5.1.3 The Bank’s implementation support was responsive with a large, well-qualified and dedicated team based in-country throughout the project life time, consisting of technical, operational and fiduciary experts. The substantial efforts, continuous support and dedication to advance implementation progress of the Juba based staff was displayed throughout the project. Most of the Bank team’s time was spent on procurement. The Bank conducted regular supervision missions, with the number of missions varying between two to three annually. These missions identified issues of concern and worked with the ministry to remedy them. The missions were staffed with appropriate personnel including senior fiduciary specialists. Even

34 For example, at preparation, the WB office was a tent.

23

outside of the regular missions, team members conducted field visits. The MA also conducted regular supervision missions. 5.1.4 Though there were shortcomings in Bank management attention, oversight and support in the earlier project stages, this changed when the sector manager and senior staff joined a supervision mission in 2009, and continued to closely monitor the project, provide guidance and proactively address key issues, together with the country-based Bank team. This also led to more frequent and improved dialogue with government officials and donors, though a greater effort could have been made by the Bank earlier to include the external partners more in supervision missions and to improve the dialogue at different stages of the project. Once Bank management focused on the ERP and participated in missions, disbursements and implementation progress improved considerably starting in 2009-2010. By end 2010, half of the project funds had been disbursed, by end 2011, US$24.47 million or 96 percent and at closing in December 2012, all funds had been disbursed. This shows that though there were considerable delays, the project managed a turn-around in 2009-2010 once more resolute actions were taken to clear obstacles. In addition, the Bank team introduced the Rapid Results Initiative which contributed to accelerating implementation. 5.1.5 It is also worth noting that many of the implementation issues were not unique to the ERP, but also affected other MDTF-SS projects.35 Though the scope of the project could have been scaled down formally earlier in the process, this was eventually addressed by the 2011 restructuring. 5.1.6 The revision of activities within the components along with intensified Bank supervision ensured that disbursements and implementation moved at a steady pace, after the post-midterm review and especially starting in 2010. Therefore, in light of the challenges and successes of the Bank team, the rating of quality of supervision is moderately satisfactory. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 5.1.7 In spite of substantial effort in an extremely difficult country environment, the quality at entry is rated moderately unsatisfactory due to the complexity of the design. However, the design was subsequently adapted to the environment during implementation as more information and data became available, and in line with disbursement for the various project activities. Over the lifetime of the project, the Bank stepped up its performance in supervision and oversight, which accelerated implementation the year following the midterm review. The Bank also managed to ensure adequate safeguards and fiduciary compliance in a high risk environment where the respective capacity, government institutions and legal frameworks were just being established in parallel with implementation. At closing, all project activities were completed and the PDO indicators were largely achieved or surpassed. Therefore, the Bank’s overall performance is rated moderately satisfactory. 5.2 Borrower Performance

35 See for example MDTF-SS ICRs for the Private Sector Development Project, (P102319), Support to Agriculture and Forestry Development Project (P104786), Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P111061) and the Gender Support and Development Project (P115717).

24

(a) Borrower Performance

Rating: Satisfactory 5.2.1 The government actively participated in the JAM carried out by the Bank and the UN. The education sector plans 2005-2011 and 2012-2017 indicate the priority the government places on education. The borrower, i.e. the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning also displayed its commitment to the project by providing the full counterpart funding in advance at the outset of the implementation phase. This is all the more remarkable in view of the difficult institutional context. Therefore, the performance of the borrower is rated satisfactory. (b) Implementing Agency Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 5.2.2 The implementing agency, MoGEI, experienced setbacks during the implementation process, especially in the beginning due to severe capacity constraints and frequent changes in ministry leadership. These leadership changes in turn led to frequent changes in technical and project personnel, which significantly contributed to implementation delays. In addition, project staff initially was not assigned full time to the project and thus could not devote their complete attention to the ERP. Moreover, the PSC, though established, did not meet as regularly as planned to provide oversight and guidance, and thus was mostly non-functional. Several fiduciary issues also occurred, such as several cases of unaccounted advances and ineligible expenditures (for more details see above section on fiduciary compliance), though these were later resolved/reimbursed. Overall, the MoGEI was not able to execute activities on a timely basis and to proactively identify and swiftly address issues that were causing delays. However, the pace of disbursement and implementation both picked up notably in 2009, and even more so starting in 2010; all project activities were completed and the PDO achieved. The learning curve for the government was steep, but major lessons have been learned and already been integrated into current work. In light of the above, the overall performance of the implementing agency is rated as moderately unsatisfactory. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 5.2.3 Borrower performance was satisfactory and implementing agency moderately unsatisfactory, but PDO achievement is substantial. Therefore, the overall performance of the borrower is rated moderately satisfactory. 6. Lessons Learned 6.1 Given the unique project context of support to a new emerging state with minimal institutional structures, the following key lessons may help inform future support to projects new and emerging/fragile countries: 6.2 Comprehensive MDTF approach across sectors. In hindsight, an in-depth discussion and the adoption of a common approach across MDTF-funded projects would have been beneficial, because many issues across projects/sectors were similar and related to state building and

25

development of government systems, e.g. the establishment of a civil service and ministry structures, and technical and fiduciary capacity building. 6.3 Readiness for implementation and realistic implementation time frame. ERP would have benefited from a more rigorous assessment of project readiness for implementation, realism of its targets, and time frame. As capacity building is a slow process particularly in a newly emerging state, a more realistic time frame and modest targets would have avoided the unrealistic high expectations among the government and donors. Furthermore, if essential full time qualified staff (FM, Procurement, M&E and Safeguards) are in place from effectiveness, delays are less likely. 6.4 Building strong Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) systems as integral part of project implementation from the start is essential. This is also a lesson learned from education projects in Kosovo and East Timor36 as well as the MDTF Private Sector Project. Since overall capacity is very limited and initial focus is predominantly on launching the activities, M&E system establishment, baseline data collection and monitoring tend to be neglected. However, the M&E system could help with planning and establishing greater accountability for results through tracking of project implementation progress and results. Sufficient numbers of qualified and full time personnel would be needed for building such M&E systems from scratch. 6.5 Greater outreach and engagement of stakeholders. It is vital to begin stakeholder dialogue early on and maintain it throughout preparation and implementation. This includes dialogue and regular communication with donors, but also beneficiaries and their communities. An open line of communication and involvement of the local communities and NGOs in project implementation and monitoring, e.g. through a community-based school construction approach etc., would have greatly helped the implementation process. 6.6 The project would have benefited from an even larger staff presence on the ground and intensified management guidance and support. The Bank task team leader had to spend most of the time and effort on procurement, thus an additional full time person assisting the TTL would have enabled a greater focus on technical aspects and policy dialogue with the government and partners. The need for a larger task team appears to be common across fragile/new countries and is also highlighted as a lessons learned for an education project in East Timor.37 6.7 State capacity building approach may slow down implementation initially, but will pay off in the medium to long term through enhanced ministry ownership and capacity. Though the use of a dedicated PIU38 would likely have lessened initial delays, the implementation of the project by the Ministry of Education directly resulted in substantial commitment and capacity strengthening, thus providing a basis for long term development. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

36 ICR for a Health and Education Project in Kosovo (2004) and ICR for an Emergency School Readiness Project in East Timor (2003) 37 ICR for an Emergency School Readiness Project in East Timor (2003). 38 This was rejected by the government at the time of appraisal.

26

7.1 Borrower/Implementing Agencies See Annex 7 for summary of the ICR commissioned by the MoGEI. 7.2 Co-financiers None 7.3 Other partners and stakeholders None

27

Annex 1: Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (US$ million equivalent)

Components

Appraisal Estimate

(US$ millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(US$ millions)

Percentage of

Appraisal

Enhance and Expand the Management and Delivery of Education Services at the County Level

6.0 4.4 73

Responsive Resources for the Provision of Alternate Education and/or Skill Development for Non-Formal Learners

4.0 2.9 73

Ministry of Education Science and Technology: Institutional Capacity Development

1.5 1.9 127

Rehabilitation and Construction of School Level Infrastructure

11 14.2 129

Phase 2 Planning and Project Preparation

0.5 Dropped N/A

Program Management, Monitoring and Evaluation

1.5 2.1 210

Total 25.5 25.5

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Appraisal Estimate (US$

millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate (US$

millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

GoSS 15.4 20.4 133

MDTF-SS 7.7 25.5 331

28

Annex 2: Outputs by Component

Table 1: PDO Indicators PDO: Primary school students, returning population, demobilized soldiers and other non-traditional learners have improved access to enhanced quality of education, alternative learning opportunities, development of life skills and basic occupational skill training Indicator Baseline

(2006) Target Actual (2012) Achievement

Direct Project Beneficiaries39 0 750,000 1,556,554 Exceeded (i) Improved access to enhanced quality of education for primary school students (Access and Quality) Children enrolled in primary education

669,000 1,500,000 1,391,704 Came close to achieving the target

Textbook-pupil ratio None established

1: 5.1 1: 4.1 (Math) 1: 4 (English)

Exceeded

(ii) Improved access to alternate learning opportunities, development of life skills and basic skill training for returning population, demobilized soldiers and other non-traditional learners (AES – Access and Quality) Demobilized soldiers, returning population, overage learners, and other non-formal learners enrolled in alternate learning programs or basic skill training provided under the project

0 50,000 164,850 Exceeded target by more than 3 times

Table 2: Intermediate Indicators

PDO Intermediate Indicator Baseline (2006)

Target

Actual (2012)

Achievement

Access

Training rooms and dorms in CEC built and/or rehabilitated

0 42 48 Exceeded

Quality

Additional qualified primary teachers resulting from project intervention (Tier 2)

750 1,629 Exceeded

Quality

Teachers trained in-service 1,500 1,217 Close to achievement

AES – Access

Course offerings in Alternate Learning Programs

45 45 Achieved

AES - Quality

AES teachers trained 500 1,000 Exceeded

Education Managers trained 317 357 Exceeded State Ministries Education supported by

Senior Technical Education Advisors 2 2 Achieved

Access Additional classrooms built/rehabilitated at the primary level resulting from the project intervention

No reliable data

348 381 Exceeded

M&E plans in place for teacher training and AES

No Yes No Not achieved

39The indicator was originally supposed to capture the primary school enrollment for female students, but enrollment breakdown by gender was not available. Therefore this indicator captures the entire enrollment figures.

29

Annex 3: Economic and Financial Analysis

1. In South Sudan, as in other countries, the poverty incidence rate is correlated with the level of education. At the national level, about 51 percent of the total population lives below the extreme poverty line (less than US$1.25 a day). The poverty incidence falls with each progressive level of education. For example, an estimate from the National Baseline Household Survey (NBHS) 2009 reveals that about 58 percent of the workforce with no education lives below the extreme poverty line compared to 43 percent with primary education, 28 percent with some secondary and only 18 percent with some post-secondary education (figure 1). Similarly, only about 15 percent from the post-secondary education category fall within lowest expenditure quintile, while more than 50 percent fall in the highest expenditure quintile, and the corresponding figures for the no education category are 25 percent and only 0.8 percent, respectively (figure 2). However, in spite of these high returns to education, the largest share of the labor force, more than 70 percent, has no education.

Figure 1: Percentage of the population below the extreme poverty line by level of education

Source: NBHS 2009

Figure 2: Expenditure quintile by education attainment of the labor force population

Source: NBHS 2009

2. Estimates from the NBHS 2009 show South Sudan’s labor market clearly signals for investment on education. Figure 3 shows average wage earnings by level of education and age group. Higher levels of education rewards a higher lifetime earning horizon. Furthermore, education leads to better earning employment sector and status. For instance, the estimate from the same survey show that earnings from wage employment is 516 SDG per month compared to only 351 SDG and 209 SDG per month for self-employment and informal work in the agricultural sector (e.g. contributing labor to the household’s agricultural activities), respectively. Similarly, about 83 percent of the population with some post-secondary education

58

43

28

18

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

No education Primary Secondary Post secondary

25

148

0.8

15

24

39

51

0

20

40

60

No education Primary Secondary Post secondary

Lowest Quintile Highest Quintile

30

secures wage employment, 52 percent with some secondary, 42 percent for some primary, compared to only 7 percent of the population with no education who are formally employed.

Figure 3: Monthly Earning by Education Level (SDG)

Source: Author’s estimate using NBHS 2009

3. Cost-efficiency. Unit costs are very high in South Sudan, much higher than in other countries in the region, for a number of reasons, including: (i) under-developed private construction sector; (ii) need to import almost all materials; (iii) high transport costs due to the lack or poor condition of roads; (iv) heavy rains that cause flooding; (v) overall shortage of skills in the country; and (vi) high living costs for international staff. Therefore, adequately estimating the costs of activities proved to be difficult at preparation and international benchmarks for unit costs do not apply to South Sudan. Nevertheless, unit costs of activities funded by the project though high, are in line with other donors and therefore are considered cost-efficient. 4. School construction: Almost 80 percent of total project funds were spent on school construction. Therefore, the cost efficiency analysis will focus on this component. In addition, cost information from donors for other project interventions to draw comparisons is not available. The school model used for the schools constructed by the ERP consisted of permanent structures with glass windows, solid board ceilings, rain water goods, walls constructed in solid 230 width concrete blocks embedded in mortar, and steel used in some roofs, and has an estimated average life span of about 25 years. Though more expensive than other types of structures, the advantage of this model is its durability, weather resistance and relatively low maintenance costs compared to other models, such as semi-permanent construction or classrooms built from less durable, local and potentially weather-affected materials. Less durable construction types could negatively affect the number of school days/hours, especially during the rainy season, but permanent construction designs can stay open throughout the school year. Costs vary considerably by location, depending on soil condition, and accessibility, but the average cost per school constructed by the ERP (6 classrooms, 3 offices, 3 latrines, 1 library) was about US$396,94540. The cost per classroom was about US$40,000 (latrines are included in the cost since a detailed cost break down is not available). Though the construction cost per school and per classroom was high, it is in line

40Six of the 52 schools built with support from the ERP had 10 classrooms, but a detailed breakdown of per schools is not available.

0

500

1000

1500

2000

Age 15‐24 Age 25‐34 Age 35‐44 Age 45‐54 Age 55‐64

Monthly earning in SDG

Post secondary

Secondary

Primary

31

with costs for similar, permanent school construction designs by other donors in South Sudan (see table 1 below).41 Therefore, school construction funded by the project was cost efficient.

Table 1: Comparison of Unit Costs for Primary School Construction (Permanent Structures)

Funding Source Unit Cost per

School (US$)

Unit Cost per Classroom (US$)

Comments

BSF (DFID) From about 200,000

to 370,000 From 18,000 to

46,200 Cost figures do not

include latrines

WFP 400,000 n/a n/a

WB 396,945

39,391

Cost figures include latrines

5. National exam printing press. The project also funded the acquisition of a printing press to facilitate the national end of primary school exams, which are a prerequisite for entry into secondary school. Though the upfront cost of this investment is considerable, the in-county printing of exams will contribute to lowering the annually recurring costs of importing the exams from neighboring countries.

41 One caveat on these comparisons: The cost figures are not completely comparable across different donors, since the number of additional facilities, such as administrative offices, latrines etc. varies slightly from project to project, as well as the square footage per classroom, on which information is not available.

32

Annex 4: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team Members

Names Title Unit

Lending/Grant Preparation

Mourad Ezzine Team Leader MNHSD

Bhanoumatee Ayoung Lead Procurement Specialist OPSOR

Prosper Nindorera Senior Procurement Specialist LCSPT

Bassam Ramadan Country Manager MNCKW

Michel J. Welmond Lead Education Specialist HDNED

Christopher J. Thomas Sector Manager MDM

Hellen Mbao Chilupe Senior Operations Officer AFCS3

Adenike Sherifat Oyeyiola Sr. Financial Management Specialist AFTME

Supervision/ICR

Getahun Gebru Team Leader AFTED

Tazeen Fasih Team Leader AFTED

Christopher Kenyi Modi Education Specialist AFTED

Milena Bereket E T Consultant AFMJB

Francis Peter Buckland Consultant AFTED

Prema Clarke Senior Education Specialist HDGPE

Yasser Aabdel-Aleem Awny El-Gammal

Sector Manager MNSHD

Prosper Nindorera Senior Procurement Specialist LCSPT

Bassam Ramadan Country Manager MNCKW

David Stephen Rudge Consultant ECSS5

Christopher J. Thomas Adviser MDM

Michel J. Welmond Lead Education Specialist HDNED

33

Ramahatra Andriamamy Rakotomalala

Sr. Education Specialist AFTEE

Frederick Yankey Sr. Financial Management Specialist

AFTMW

Anjani Kumar Sr. Procurement Specialist AFTPE

Endeshaw Tadesse Sr. Operations Officer AFTSE

Frederick Yankey Sr. Financial Specialist AFTMW

Adenike S. Oyeyiola Senior Financial Management Specialist

AFTME

Adenike S. Oyeyiola Senior Financial Management Specialist

AFTME

Laurence Clarke Manager for South Sudan Office AFCS2

Titus Ambayo Financial Management Consultant

John Juma Consultant

Joyce Wani Gamba Team Assistant AFMJB

Rosario Aristorenas Sr. Program Assistant AFTEE

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)

Lending 0.00 0.00

Total: 0.00 0.00

Supervision/ICR

FY06 0.00 0.00

FY07 0.00 0.00

FY08 0.00 0.00

FY09 0.00 0.00

FY10 0.00 0.00

34

FY11 4.51 26.50

FY12 1.25 7.56

FY13 13.58 42.70

Total: 19.34 76.76

Note: Supervision staff time and cost from FY06-FY13 were fully or partially financed through the MDTF-SS.

35

Annex 5: Beneficiary Survey Results

N/A

36

Annex 6: Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

N/A

37

Annex 7: Summary of Borrower’s ICR 1. The following summarizes the main points of the Government ICR. The ICR team received the ‘Implementation Completion Report for the Education Rehabilitation Program’ from the government on May 28, 2013. In the following section, the main points from the Government report are summarized. 2. Based on the recommendations of the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), the MDTF-SS provided funding for an Education Rehabilitation Project (ERP) for South Sudan. The project was set amid a country reeling from a devastating civil war, and the education indicators were among the worst in the world. The Government ICR gives an overview of the background for the project, the project design, impleentation plans and process, achievements, challenges and recommendations for the future. 3. The main achievements of the project are: While the teacher training component did not achieve all of the objectives, some teachers were still trained through the pre- and in- service teacher training programs. In the AES component, AES teachers were trained, a pastoralist education program was piloted successfully, and the anticipated beneficiaries of the AES programs were successfully educated. 52 schools were built as part of the construction component. Equipment including a printing press for examination was procured, education managers were trained as part of the capacity building component. 4. The key implementation challenges were:

The structure of the ministry was not formalized at the time of project appraisal. Changing political leadership – The priorities of the project sometimes underwent

changes because of the priorities at the top of the government. Turnovers of the political leadership did not aid in making the implementation process smooth.

Infrastructure – The implementation and project design did not consider the existing infrastructure conditions in South Sudan. In particular, the road network in South Sudan was minimal, making even transportation of materials difficult.

5. Bank Performance: The Bank performance is rated as moderately satisfactory. The performance at the Bank to ensure ‘quality at entry’ is rated as satisfactory. The Bank was significant in the planning and preparation of the project. The Bank provided guidance on design and staff on a permanent basis to assist the ministry in the preparation of documents that would lead to the disbursement of the grant. The performance of the Bank’s supervision is moderately satisfactory. The Bank did a good job in providing technical support and guidance to the procurement and implementation processes. The Bank could have been better in orienting the project implementation team about Bank procedures and enhanced the skills and capacity of the implementing team. 6. The recommendations for future projects are:

Many of the challenges faced by the project were due to the lack of Ministry capacity.

To avoid these challenges, it is suggested that henceforth, prior to implementation, a

38

needs assessment of the existing capacity must be conducted and specific capacity building plans be created and inserted as part of the implementation plan.

It is vital to have concrete baseline data on the indicators that will be used to track the progress of the project. The lack of baseline data will affect not only the planning process, but also the design, implementation and results process.

Consistency in the management team is the key to project success – this includes the management team in the Ministry and the Bank. Leaving politicians out of the planning and implementation process will be a step forward. Developing a unit devoted to implementation would also be helpful.

The government and the Bank should devote more time to ensure that the procedures and processes of the Bank are understood by the government and the implementation team.

The full report from the Ministry of General Education and Instruction is available in the project files (or archives).

39

Annex 8: Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

N/A

40

Annex 9: List of Supporting Documents

1. Chapman, D., R. Kyeyune, and K. Lokkesmoe. 2003. Evaluation of African Girls’ Education Initiative Country Case Study: Uganda. UNICEF: Uganda.

2. Dolan, C., and L. Scott. 2010. Impact of providing sanitary pads to poor school girls in

Africa. In: American Marketing Association 2010 Summer Conference, 14 August 2010, Boston, Massachusetts.

3. FHI 360. 2012. Republic of South Sudan: AES Baseline Survey and Evaluation Final

Report.

4. Hanushek, E.A., and L. Woessmann. 2007. "The role of education quality for economic growth," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4122, The World Bank: Washington, DC.

5. Hanushek, E.A., and L. Woessmann. 2009. Do Better Schools lead to more Growth?

Cognitive Skills, Economic Outcomes and Causation. National Bureau of Economic Research: Cambridge, MA.

6. Heyneman, S.P., D.T. Jamison, and X. Montenegro. 1984. “Textbooks in the Philippines:

Evaluation of the Pedagogical Impact of Nationwide Investment,” Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 6 (2): 139-50.

7. IRIN Africa. 2011, July 21. Uganda: Sanitary pads keep girls in school. Retrieved from

http://www.irinnews.org/report/93291/uganda-sanitary-pads-keep-girls-in-school

8. Joint Assessment Mission (JAM). 2005. Sudan: Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication. Vol. 1.

9. Majgaard, K., and A. Mingat. 2012. Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparative

Analysis. World Bank: Washington, DC.

10. Michaelowa, K. 2001. “Primary Education Quality in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa: Determinants of Learning Achievement and Efficiency Consideration,” World Development, 29 (10): 1699-1716.

11. Ministry of General Education and Instruction (MoGEI). 2012. General Education

Strategic Plan 2012-2017: Promoting Learning for All.

12. PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC). World Bank Report to the Administrator of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan (MDTF-SS) Report: 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011 and January 2013.

13. Theunynck, S. 2009. School Construction Strategies for Universal Primary Education in

Africa: Should Communities be empowered to build their Schools? The World Bank: Washington, DC.

41

14. Voice of America. 2013, April 23. In Malawi, Sanitary Pads Help Improve School Attendance for Girls. Retrieved from http://www.voanews.com/content/in-malawi-sanitary-pads-help-improve-school-attendance-for-girls/1647205.html

15. World Bank. Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) – East Timor (2003),

Kosovo (2004), MDTF-SS (2013) – Private Sector Development, Support to Agriculture and Forestry Development Program, Water Supply and Sanitary Project, and Gender Support and Development Project.

16. World Bank. January 2006. Project Appraisal Document, South Sudan Education

Rehabilitation Project.

17. World Bank. Grant Agreement and Disbursement Letter, Amendments to the Grant Agreement, Project Restructuring Papers. January 2006 – January 2013.

18. World Bank, Aide-Memoires, Back-to-office reports, Management Letters, Project

Implementation Status and Results reports of all implementation review missions January 2006 – January 2013.

19. World Bank. 2011.

20. World Bank. 2012. Education in the Republic of South Sudan: Status and Challenges for a

New System. Washington, DC.

42

Annex 10: Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan (MDTF-SS)42

1. The Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) is a partnership between the international donor community and the governments of both North and South Sudan to fund developmental projects in both countries. MDTF in South Sudan has funded projects that aim to build the country after the decade’s long armed conflict. The MDTTF-SS has five strategic priorities, presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Strategic Priorities of the MDTF-SS

Source: Preliminary Report – Final Evaluation of the MDTF-SS (Apr, 2013)

2. The major contributors to the fund are listed in the figure below along with their contribution into the fund (see fig 2). The MDTF-SS disbursed US$274 million to projects in 2010 and 2011. As of March 2012, out of the $541 million committed to the trust fund by the donors and the World Bank, $505 million was disbursed. This represents over 90 percent of the trust fund. The remainder was expected to be disbursed by the end of 2012.

42 The section is adapted from the factsheet available on http://www.mdtfss.org

43

Figure 2: MDTF-SS Major Contributors to Date

Source: Retrieved from http://www.mdtfss.org/

3. The $505 million has funded infrastructure, education, health (including HIV/AIDS), social development (gender), security, agriculture and rural development, and accountability projects. The allocation to key sectors is detailed in the graph below (see fig 3). Fig 4 graphically presents the disbursement for the ERP.

Figure 3: Funds Allocation to Key Sectors (US$ Millions)

Source: Retrieved from http://www.mdtfss.org

Canada , 8%

Denmark, 1%

EC, 8%

Finland, 4%

Germany, 2%

GoSS, 24%

Netherlands, 21%

Norway, 13%

Others, 1%

Spain, 2%

Sweden, 5% UK, 10%

World Bank, 1%

242

150

60 52 50 47 41 3723 16 12

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Infrastructure

Health (Incl HIV/AIDS)

Water and Sanitation

Accountability

Social Developmen

t(Gen

der)

Agriculture and Rural

Developmen

t

Education

Security

Private Sector

Developmen

t

Others

State and Peace Building

44

Figure 4: MDTF-SS Disbursement Milestones for ERP (US$ Millions)

Source: ERP Project Documents

0

4.29

8.83

12.47

24.4725.5

Dec, 2007 Dec, 2008 Dec, 2009 Dec, 2010 Dec, 2011 Dec, 2012

45

Annex 11: Results Framework and Monitoring

Revisions to the Results Framework Comments/ Rationale for Change

PDO

Current (PAD) Proposed Primary school students, returning population, demobilized soldiers and other non-traditional learners have improved access to enhanced quality of education, alternate learning opportunities, development of life skills and basic occupational skill training

No change

PDO indicators

Current (PAD) Proposed change* Number of County level Teacher Training centers established, staffed and operational

Revised to: “Training rooms and dorms in County Multi-purpose Education Centers built and/or rehabilitated (number)”

Monitored at the intermediate level

Number of teachers provided with in-service training

Continued but target revised to 1500 Monitored at the intermediate level

Number of teachers achieving success in designated levels of qualification upgrading

Revised to: “Additional qualified primary teachers resulting from project intervention (Tier 2) (number)”

Monitored at the intermediate level – wording adjusted to reflect core indicator

Number of demobilized soldiers, returning school age population, overage learners, females and other non-formal learners enrolled in alternate learning programs or basic skill training designed to enable them to integrate more effectively into a post-conflict society

Revised to “Demobilized soldiers, returning school age population, overage learners, and other non-formal learners enrolled in alternate learning programs or basic skill training provided under the project (number)

Completion rates for participants in Alternate Learning Programs

Dropped Given the multitude of course offerings, this indicator has proven too difficult to track.

Number of females participating and completing basic education

Dropped

Number of females participating and completing Alternative Learning Programs

Dropped

GER for primary and secondary schools

Revised: “Children enrolled in primary education”

The project is not focusing on secondary education. Data on number of children enrolled is available but not GER.

Textbook- pupil ratio (Quality) New Relevant quality indicator added Direct Project Beneficiaries (number) of which female (%)

New Core indicator added

46

Revisions to the Results Framework Comments/ Rationale for Change

Intermediate Results indicators

Current (PAD) Proposed change* Number of course offerings in Alternate Learning Programs

Continued

Number of schools rehabilitated/constructed

Continued Wording revised to be in line with core sector indicator wording

Number of curricula, teacher guides, textbooks and learning assessment procedures developed, approved and being implemented for primary and secondary education programs

Revised Textbooks purchased and distributed (number)

Type and direction of education sector policy initiatives implemented during the project period

Dropped

Documentation complete and institutional readiness for implementation of Phase II of the Education Sector Program

Dropped Phase II did not materialize.

AES teachers trained New An assessment of V-SAT in the Ministry and all the 10 states carried out

Dropped

Maridi Curriculum development center rehabilitated and equipped

Dropped

Number of Education Managers trained

New

Number of State Ministries Education supported by Senior Technical Educ Advisors

New

M&E plans in place for teacher training and AES

New

Source: Restructuring Paper from June 23, 2011

47

Project Development Objective (PDO):

Primary school students, returning population, demobilized soldiers and other non-traditional learners have improved access to enhanced quality of education, alternate learning opportunities, development of life skills and basic occupational skill training

PDO Level Results Indicators C

ore

Unit of Measurement

Baseline

Original Project

Start

(2006)

Progress To Date

(2011)

Cumulative Target Values

Frequency Data Source/

Methodology

Responsibility for Data Collection

Comments 2012

1. Children enrolled in primary education (Access)

Number 669,000 1,380,580 1,500,000 Annually GOSS MOE EMIS

Project coordination unit

Baseline is for 2005, progress to date is for 2009

2. Demobilized soldiers, returning population, overage learners, and other non-formal learners enrolled in alternate learning programs or basic skill training provided under the project(Access)

Number 0 200,000 50,000 Annually Alternative Education Service


3. Textbook- pupil ratio (Quality) Ratio

None established

1.6:1 1.5:1 Annually GOSS MOE EMIS


Ratio will decline because no new books will be distributed but there will be more students in system

Beneficiaries

Direct Project Beneficiaries, Of which female

Number 0 702,500 750,000 Annually GOSS MOE Project coordination

Beneficiaries include children

48

%

EMIS unit enrolled in primary education, participants in AES/Basic skill training and teachers trained.

Intermediate Results and Indicators

Intermediate Results Indicators

Cor

e

Unit of Measure

ment

Baseline

Original Project

Start

(2006)

Progress To Date

(2011)

Target Values


Methodology


Comments

2012

Intermediate Result 1: Increased availability of trained teachers

1. Training rooms and dorms in County Multi-purpose Education Centers built and/or rehabilitated

Number 0 30 42 Quarterly Project coordination unit M&E


2. Additional qualified primary teachers resulting from project intervention (Tier 2)



3. Teachers trained in-service Number 0 1649 1500 Quarterly

Project coordination unit M&E


49



Cor

e

Unit of Measure

ment

Baseline

Original Project

Start

(2006)

Progress To Date

(2011)

Target Values


Methodology


Comments

2012

Intermediate Result 2: Alternate education and skill development provided

4. Course offerings in Alternate Learning Programs

Number Not

established 45 45 Quarterly AES


5. AES teachers trained Number 0 500 500 Quarterly AES


Intermediate Result 3: Strengthened capacity to manage the education sector

6. Education Managers trained Number 0 317 317 Quarterly

Project coordination unit M&E


7. State Ministries Education supported by Senior Technical Education Advisors



Intermediate Result 4: School level infrastructure rehabilitated

50



Cor

e

Unit of Measure

ment

Baseline

Original Project

Start

(2006)

Progress To Date

(2011)

Target Values


Methodology


Comments

2012

8. Additional classrooms built or rehabilitated at the primary level resulting from the project intervention



Intermediate Result 5: Increased availability of textbooks

9. Textbooks printed and distributed

Number 0 2.2 million 2.2 million Quarterly Project coordination unit M&E


Intermediate Result 5: Improved monitoring of key interventions

10.M&E plans in place for teacher training and AES

Yes/No No No Yes Quarterly Project coordination unit M&E


51

Annex 12: Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, Social Development and Institutional Change

1. Poverty impact of education. In South Sudan, as in other countries, the poverty incidence rate is correlated with the level of education. At the national level, about 51 percent of the total population lives below the extreme poverty line (less than US$1.25 a day). The poverty incidence quickly falls with the level of educational attainment. For example, an estimate from the South Sudan National Baseline Household Survey (NBHS, 2009) reveals that about 58 percent of the workforce with no education lives below the extreme poverty line compared to only 43 percent for those with primary education. 2. Gender aspects. Girls’ attendance in primary school and in the Alternative Education System was promoted through the inclusion of latrines in the school design and the provision of sanitary pads respectively (see also section on PDO achievement). 3. Social impact of the Alternative Education System. The AES program overall also has had a positive social impact: participants use a wide range of media (63 percent use the radio, 42 percent books or other materials) and are engaged in their communities (25 percent discuss problems in South Sudan with their community and almost 15 percent participate in some form of community group). Institutional Change/Strengthening 4. While not explicitly stated, the ERP objective was not only building an education system, but also state building. Therefore, the underlying outcome from the activities and components was to enhance institutional capacity. Building the institutional capacity emerged as the area of good performance for the overall MDTF performance, based on field visits. There has been a gradual expansion of the institutional capacity of the state, most pronounced at the center, but also at state level, to a large extent due to the combined efforts of the government, and contributions from MDTF-SS and other international assistance.43 However, the MDTF-SS played an essential and catalytic role. In particular, component 3 of the ERP focused on building capacity within the Ministry of Education. About 357 education managers trained in planning, implementation and supervision, of which 317 from the state ministries and 40 from the central ministry. In addition, the World Bank trained government staff on procurement procedures and laws, project management and fiduciary compliance, which improved throughout the project implementation. In interviews with ministry staff during the ICR preparation, the Rapid Response Initiative in particular was frequently mentioned as helping each of the team members better understand their roles and responsibilities and enabling them to more effectively do their jobs. Evidence of the impact of the institutional strengthening on ministry capacity is the (i) accelerated implementation pace in the last two years of the project; (ii) the preparation of the first comprehensive sector diagnostic; (iii) the development of a second education sector strategy; (iv) consultations with the regions on the sector strategy, which is a sign of increased collaboration between the center and the states; and (v) gradual increase in the programs implemented by the ministry itself, e.g. the ministry has been gradually and successfully taken on more of the coordination and implementation of the AES, which was initially predominantly implemented by NGOs..

43 Final Evaluation of the Multi-donor Trust Fund South Sudan, preliminary report, April 2013.

52

The evaluation of the overall MDTF states that “from observations at the state level, many of the institution building assets of the MDTF-SS were in place and contributing to the functioning of Government. Physical infrastructure, MDTF-SS trained officials and systems were still in place and part of the essential institutional core that Government is attempting to preserve until revenues resume. This includes physical infrastructure, payroll and accounting systems, and training of officials to better perform their responsibilities. In the constrained austerity environment, MDTF-SS contributions were important to sustaining the core functions of institutions.”44

44 Final Evaluation of the Multi-donor Trust Fund South Sudan, preliminary report, April 2013.

53

Annex 13: Photographs from the Implementation of the ERP in South Sudan

Figure 1: Students under a tree

54

Figure 2: Parent eagerly awaiting completion of a school

Figure 3: Completed school - almost ready for handover

55

Figure 4: Separate latrines for teachers, male and female students

Figure 5: Female grade 8 primary school students in a newly constructed school

Girls with big dreams: when asked about their professional aspirations during a field visit, the girls in the photo said: “Doctor, lawyer, engineer, pilot.”

56

Figure 6: Mayo Girls Primary School, Juba

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SOUTH SUDANCITIES AND TOWNS

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This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other informationshown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World BankGroup, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or anyendorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.