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TRANSCRIPT
Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Repwrt No. 8805
PROJECT PERFORMAN .; AUDIT REPORT
BANGLADESH
DRAINAGE AND FLOOD CONTROL PROJECT(CREDIT 864-BD)
JUNE 29, 1990
Operationo Evaluation Department
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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Appraisal Estimate: US$ 1.00 - Taka 15.00Average 1977-1987: US$ 1.00 - Taks, 21.84
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
Rice planted before or during the monsoon andharvested in November or December (B. Aman isbroadcast, T. Aman is transplanted)
Aus Rice planted during March or April and harvestedduring July and August.
BADC Bangladesh Agricultural Development CorporationBoro Rice planted in December to January and harvested
during the period April to June.BRE Brabmaputra Right EmbankaentBWDB Bangladesh Water Development BoardCCB Chenchuri BeelDFC Drainage and Flood ConsrolFCD Flood Control and DrainageFEC French Engineering Consortiun (Study)HYV High Yielding VarietiesIFAD International Fund for Agricultural DevelopmentIPPRI International Food Policy Research InstituteKBK KolabashukhaliKharif Wet season cropsLVR Land and Water Resources (Study)MOA Ministry of AgricultureMSL Mean Sea LevelNwP National Water PlanPCR Project Completion ReportRabi Dry season cropsSAR Staff Appraisal Report
FISCAL YEA July 1 - June 30
Y" OSIALW ONLYTHE WORLD BANK
Washungton. D.C. 20433U.S.A.
01k* of Doster-enslOpeatiam Evalutin
June 29, 1990
MXMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVA DIRECTORS AND TE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Performance Audit Report on Bangladesh Drainageand Flood Control Project (Credit 864-BD)
Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled"Project Performance Audit Report on Bangladesh Drainage and FloodControl Project (Credit 864-BD)" prepared by the Operations EvaluationDepartment.
Attachment
This document has a tstricted distributici and may be used by recnpents only in the performanceof their official dutie. Its conteats may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BANGLADESHDRAINAGE AND FLOOD,CONTROL PROJECT
(CREDIT 864-BD)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
PREFACE .... 0............** *********v***** iBASIC DATA SHEETS ,............................................... I.EVALUATION SUMMARY ............................................... iv
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
I. Introduction ....... ,..............e.....*. . 1II. Agriculture and Flood Control ........................... 2
III. Bank Experience with Flood Control ...................... 8IV. Project Definition and Design ........................... 21V. Implementation Experience ............................... 23
VI. Project Outcome ...................................... 25VII. Findings and Issues .................................... 28
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
I. Introdnetion ............................ 38II. Project Formulation .................................... 39
III. Project Implementation ............................... 41
IV. Project Impact ........................ 48V. Economic Evaluation ..................................... 53
VI. Institutional Performance ..... ......... 55VII. Conclusions and Lessons Learned ....... ,................. 58
PCR TABLES
1-3. Comparison of Appraisal and Actual Costs CCB, KBK and BRE 614-6. Financial and Economic Costs 1987 prices CCB, XBK and BRE 64
7. Equipment and Vehicles for Agricultural Extension ....... 708-10. Cropped Area and Yield Assumptions CCB, UK and BRE ..... 71
11. Crop Input Requirements ................................. 7412. Economic Price Derivations ...... &..................... 7513. Summary of Financial and Economic Prices ................ 77
14-16. Annual Gross Economic Benefits CCB, KBK and BRE ......... 7817-19. Annual Crop Produc.ion Costs CCB, UBK, and BRE .......... 8120-22. Economic Costs and Benefits CCB, KBK, and BRE ........... 84
23. Total Project Economic Costs and Benefits ............... 87
ATTACHMENT
1. Comments from the Borrower .................................. 89
MAPS Drainage And Flood Control Project (IBRD 13523)Chenchure Beel (IBRD 13520R)Kolabashukhali (IBRD 13521R)Brahmaputra Right Embankment (IBRD 13522R)
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.
PROJECT HPEROPNE AUDIT REPORT
BANGLADESHDRAINAGE AND FLOOD CONTROL PROJECT
(CREDIT 864-BD)
PREFACE
This is the report of the performance audit of the Drainage andFlood Control Project in Bangladesh. The project was partially financed byan IDA Credit of US$19.0 million and was approved by the Board in December1978. The Credit was closed in June 1986 after two one-year extensions.US$1.3 million was cancelled.
The PPAR consists of the Project Performance Audlt Report (PPAR)prepared by the Operations Evaluation Depart-nt (OED) and the ProjectCompletion Report (PCR) prepared by the FAO/World Bank Cooperative Programon behalf of the Borrower. The PPAR is based on the attached PCR, The StaffAppraisal and President's Reports, the loan documents, the transcripts of theExecutive Directors' meetings at which the project was considered, on a studyof project files and on discussions with Bank staff. An OED mission visitedBangladesh in July 1989 to discuss the effectiveness ef the Bank's assistanceand to make field visits to the completed subprojects. Formal wr1ttencomments on the first draft were received from the Region on December 22,1989 and on January 11, 1990. Subsequent written comments on the reviseddraft were received on February 5, 1990 and March 2, 1990. The Region hastaken strong exception with various points made in the report and in theprocess has provided new information and data and useful insights. OED hasmade every effort to incorporate the useful technical comments andinformation into the revised text and to record the Region's views where theydiffer from those of the Audit.
The PCR provides an adequate account and assessmer the physicalproject experience and discusses the performances of the Bank and the projectexecuting agencies. It provides an inadequate account of the economiceffectiveness of the subprojects. In the draft PPAR the Audit stated thatthe FAO personnel preparing the PCR had not visited the project sites. Thisstatement was based on an informal verbal statement from a Regional staffmember and was incorrect. The sites were visited by FAO staff and the Auditregrets the earlier statement to the contrary.
Following standard OED -rocedures, copies of the draft PPAR wasforwarded to the Government and executing agencies on January 10, 1990 forcomment. The comments, received from the government on April 1, 1990, arereproduced as Annex I to the PPAR.
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
BANGLADESHDRAINAGE AND FLOOD CONTROL PROJECT
(CREDIT 864-BD)
BASIC DATA SHEET
Key Project Data
Appraisal Actual or Actual as 2Item Expectation Current Estimata Appr. Exp.
Tota. Project Costs(US$ million) 28.0 36.6 131Credit Amount(US$ million) 19.0 17.7 93Date of Effectiveness 03179 10179Date of Completion 06184 06186Months for Implementation 63 80 127Economic Rate of Return Z 34 n.e. 1 n.a.
Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements(US$ millions)
FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 F85 FY86 FY87
Appraisal 1.5 5.0 11.0 16.5 19.0 --- --- ---Estimate
Actual 1.4 2.6 5.0 6.8 7.4 8.5 14.8 17.7
Actual as Iof Estimate 93 52 45 41 39 45 78 93
11 Insufficient information was available to compute a credible ER.See pares. 57-62 and paras. 72-76 of the PPAR.
Proiect Dates
OEiginal Plan Actma
First mention in Piles 5175 ---Appraisal 6176 1/78Negotiations 6/78 11/78Board Approval 12/78 12/78Sigate 12/78 12178Effectiveness 3179 10179Closing 6/84 6/86
Staff Inputs(staff weeks)
Z6 IIZ7 IZA8 FZ9 !FY80 FY81
Preappraisal 8.7 8.6 14.2 0.7Appraisal 70.1 16.1Negotiations 4.9Supervision 1.2 16.2 31.5Other 1.1 3.0
Total 8.7 8.6 85.4 21.9 16.2 34.5
FY82 FT83 FY84 FY85 -U86-88 Total
Preappralsal, 32.3Appraisal 86.1Negotiations 4.9Supervision 25.1 12.8 16.0 7.6 21.7 132.1Other 4.1
Total 25.1 12.8 16.0 7.6 21.7 259.6
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Mission Data
Xission Type Month/Year No.Persons Ratkna
Identificationl 1975-78Preparation Various --Appraisal 1178 4 --Supervision I 5179 1 1Supervision II 11179 3 1Supervision III 1/80 1 1Supervision IV 1/81 3 2Supervision V 4/81 2 3Supervision VI 3/82 2 2Supervision VII 8/82 2 2Supervision VIII 5/83 1 2Supervision IX 12/83 2 2Supervision X 5/84 2 2Supervision XI 3/85 2 2Supervision XII 10185 3
Other Project Data
Borrowers People's Nepublic of Bangladesh
Executing Agencies: Bangladesh Water Development Board
Follow-on Projects: Small Scale Drainage and Flood Control(Cr 955-BD)Drainage and Flood Control II (Cr 1184-3D)B1WDB Small Schemes (Cr 1467-BD)Flood Rehabilitation (Cr 1587-BD)Flood Control and Drainage III (Cr 1591-BD)Flood Control and Drainage IV (Cr 1784-BD)Small Scale Flood Control Drainage and Irrigation II(Cr 1870-BD)Flood Rehabilitation II (Cr 1876-3D)Flood Rehabilitation III (Cr 2048-BD)BVDB Systems Rehabilitation (Cr 2099-BD)
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PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
BANGLADESHDRAINAGE AND FLOOD CONTROL PROJECT
(CREDIT 864-D)
EVALUATION SUMMARY
1. This is, in a formal sense, the first audit of a drainage and floodcontrol project in Bangladesh, which is surprising given the twenty-six yearhistory of such operations and the great interest which flood control hasregularly received in that country. It is useful therefore to establish, forpurposes of this audit, a basic understanding of the physical nature andvocabulary of flooding and its iuteraction with agriculture since thepromotion of agriculture has been the chief formal justification for Bank-supported investments in flood control. It is also useful to summarize theexperience of the three operations that preceded that under audit and tocombine this experience with the main findings of the 1972 Land and WaterResources Sector Study (LWR) which set the intellectual tone and technicalparameters for Bank support of water resources management in Bangladesh formany years. A brief sample of the findings of current studies comparable tothe 1972 effort is then given to bring events up-to-date. With this basicbackground of technical factors and pre project experience it is thenpossible to understand how the project under audit fits into the long historyof Bank support of flood control investments.
Atriculture and Flood Control
2. The peak flooding usually takes place in the months of July andAugust when snow melt runoff and monsoon rain runoff coincide. In unusualyears, such as the 1987 flood, the duration of heavy flooding can extend fromearly July through late September. On either side of the July-August peakare five more months of pre and late monsoon period in which rainfall andsoil moisture are generally sufficient to support rice production. The wetseason from the middle of April to the end of November is sometimes referredto as the "Kharif" season. "Rabi", or dry season, crops are grown in the fivemonth period November through March. The most important Rabi crops arewheat, oilseeds, pulses, and vegetables. A dry season rice crop called"Boro* is also grown, but usually requires irrigation as does some of the dryseason wheat and vegetables.
3. Before modern irrigation technology was introduced in the 1960s,most of the effort went into growing a local variety of early monsoon quick-maturing rice called "Aus", and a local variety of slow maturing deep-waterrice called *AMan*. The idea was to harvest the Aus crop before the floodwater was too deep and to allow the Aman crop to float on the surface of theflood with stem growth of up to ten cm per day to a total length as high assix meters. Broadcasting mixed Aus and Aman was a common way of doublecropping that insured some rice production, depending on the onset, severityand duration of the annual inundation. Both were low-input low-yielding
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operations. The Bengali fatmer adjusted his way of life to the annualinundation, not unlike the farmers of the Nile valley. If the inundationcould be "controlled", then it would be worthwhile to transplavt, rather tharbroadcast, the Ats and Aman crops and get higher yields since the labor oftransplanting would not be so much at risk. Controlled floods wouldencourage higher inputs in general and higher more dependable levels ofoutput.
4. Introducing irrigation for dry season crops was, however, far morerevolutionary than partially controlling floods for wet season crops in thatthe Bengali farmer would have to change dramatically his crop cycles and therhythm of his life. This happened when high-yielding, short-stemmed, ricevarieties were introduced in the 1960's together with irrigation based onsmall low-lift pumps and, later, tube wells. The introduction of high-yielding wheat in the mid 70's was a similar development with a substantialimpact on food grain production in general. A comparison of the averageannual production of the period 1966-70 witb the average for the period 1986-88 shows that of the 4.3 million ton increment in annual rice production,2.9 million tons or 67 percent is accounted for by increases in Boroproduction. Looking at food grains as a whole, the 5.3 million ton incrementover the same period is largely secounted for by a 4.4 million ton incrementin Bore rice and wheat, almost 84 pcrcent of increased production levelsbetween the late 60s and the late 80s. Clearly, in terms of growth, dryseason rice and wheat have been the dy ,-1c elements in the food grainequation. Wet season improvements based ou c-ntrol over flooding have beenmuch more modest.
5. Only recently has a connection beer made between flood controlembankments and dry season crop production, e:f .ially the Boro rice crop.Early floods do sometimes damage the nearly ripe ^oro crop before it can beharvested, but the extent of this damage and the beneficial impact ofembankments has not yet been substantiated. In the absence of statistics orstudies to support the general argument that flood control embankments arecritical for the adoption of dry season irrigation technology; the Audit, onthe basis of the published information available, concludes that; whateverthe perception of the flood risks by farmers; the drought and flood avoidancebenefits of irrigated boro rice are sufficient to continue the generalexpansion of low-lift pump and shallow tube-well investments for this crop,with or without flood control investments, particularly in the deeply floodedareas. It is quite likely that policies and factors other than thoseconce4ning flood control are more important for this development,particularly the government's policies on financing and control of shallowtube well installations. (PPAR, paras. 3-12) 2)
2/ For the Region's qualification of this finding see Footnote 10 onpage seven of the PPAR.
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Bank Experience
With Flood Control
6. In June 1963 the Department of Technical Operations submitted anSAR for the first Flood Embankment rroject (BRE I) on the right bank of theBrabmaputra River in what was then East Pakistan. The idea was torehabilitate and extend the 40 lm. of embankment that was built in 1957 suchthat it would come to 225 km. of embankment giving partial flood control oversome 72,000 he of the Brahmaputra and Teesta river basins. The economics ofthe proposal rested on the assumption that there would be an incentive toshift from a broadcast, low-yielding, Aus and Aman to a higher - ieldingtransplanted Aman. It was also assumed that in some cases two rice cropscould be had in one rainy season - an early Aus crop followed by transplantedAmen with a shorter growing season. This then was the first step the Banktook into flood control investments in Bangladesh. BRE I was never auditedand is not mentioned again until the preparation of the project under auditin which the rehabilitation of the Brabmaputra Right Embankment (BRE II) isa major component.
7. One month after the BRE I Staff Appraisal Report, the Departmentof Technical Operations submitted another SAR for a Flood Protection,Drainage and Irrigation Project in the Chandpur area. The 1963 Chandpur Ischeme combined the concept of flood control through the construction ofpolder cells with reversible large scale pumps for drainage in the wet seasonand irrigation in the dry season. For the first time the Bank was to beinnilved in a combination of flood control in the wet season and irrigationin the dry season in the same area. The dry-season irrigated rice crop(Boro) then enters the benefit stream in a serious way and is combined withthe wet-season flood control benefits similar to those associated with theBRE schemes. Virtually all the benefits were to be net increases inagricultural production.
8. A number of painful facts became clear as final designs wereundertaken. A conventional gravity canal irrigation system dE uign, similarto those employed in the semi-arid Western wing was to seve the area. Thiswas not feasible because the high ground where the canals were to be situatedwas the most flood-free and, therefore, the most valuable. In an area whereland of any kind was i" extremely short supply, the best land was not to begiven over to irrigation civil works. By 1966, plans for the gravityirrigation component were abandoned and the project reverted to a pumpdrainage polder operation in the wet season. This, by then, exclusive floodcontrol project was no longer viable without the dry season irrigationbenefits and the entire scheme was finally stopped in 1967. The undisbursedfunds were used to redesign the project incorporating entirely new concepts.
9. Chandpur II emerged from this redesign in 1970. Dry-seasonirrigation and its benefit stream was put back in the picture with 1,500diesel-powered, two cu. sec. low-lift pumps. Farmers were to pump irrigationwater from the natural drains in the area during the dry season. There wouldbe no need to take valuable land out of production to provide gravity canals.Another advantage was that small groups of farmers could pump water from the
vill
improved 6rains as they required it rather than waiting for an irrigationbureaucracy to provide It through a canal system. An "appropriatetechnology" wae introduced to the irrigation-flood control equation inBangladesh and a new era in water control began. (PPAR, paras. 12-18)
With Evaluation Studies
10. The 1981 audit of the Chandpur II project showed that the combinedirr4tation/flood-control investment yielded an acceptable economic return.However, an examination of the benefit streams indicates that as muca asthree quarters of the benefits came from the dry season crops whilst the bulkof the investment could be attributed to the wet season flood controlembankment and structures. It was acknowledged explicitly that the dryseason irrigation benefits were crucial to the justification of the project.
11. In 198 an effort was made by the UNDP-sponsored Agriculture SectorReview to examine the experience with aid-sponsored flood control, drainageand irrigation projects. The result of a literature search turned up thefinding that the Project Completion Reports and OED Audit Reports of Wc ldBank-supported 2rojects were about all the documentation that existed. The1988 UNDP survey of the fragmentary record then makes the case that largescale surface irrigation and flood control investments are very questionableundertakings for solving the food problem of Bangladesh, especially whencompared with the high returns associated with so called "minor" Irrigationinvestments. The fact that the large scale operations are fully subsidizedwhile the minor op;rations are largely paid for by the beneficiaries isanother element that weighs against the former. The precursor of thisposition was already being developed by the Bank in its 1972 Land and WaterResources Study. (PPAR, paras. 19-25)
Comorehensive Studies of the Problem
Early Studies
12. Most of the early investments in flood control and irrigation inBangladesh derived from a 1964 "master plan" supported by the UNDP. The longterm objective of the plan was to "solve" the flooding problem byconstructing embankments and polders designed to exclude the annualinundation from most of the arable land. It quickly became apparent, in thecourse of preparing the specific projects, that large projects designed toachieve this apparently simple objective were extremely costly, difficult toengineer, and of questionable economic and environmental goodness. The WorldBank, which was to be a major financial supporter of the effort, Immediatelybegan confronting these problems and adjusting to them.
13. In 1972, Bank staff and FAO personnel produced the remarkable ninevolume Land and Water Resources Sector Study (LWR Study), which remains abasic document even today. The great strength of this document is that itincorporates an integrated macro economic and a macro engineering viewpointof the water resources and flood control Issues with that of a micro economicand engineering viewpoint of specific water management technologies.
14. On the macro engineering side the LWR Study of 1972 points outthat the annual flows in the Brabmaputra-Ganges are about double that of the
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Mississippi River and six times that of the Indus with an annual sedimentload of some 2.4 billion tons. The combined rivers flowing into the Bay ofBengul are exceeded in volume only by the Amazon River in South America andthe Congo River in Africa. There is no precedent anywhere for "solving" theannual flood problem of such a river system. The only potentially feasiblehydraulic engineering solution involves placing embankments on both sides ofriver channels to exclude low velocity flood overflow from surrounding land.There are three obvious pi:oblems with this solutiont (i) it may not betechnically feasible since earth embankments cannot stop bank erosion fromhigh velocity river channels that move about in the flood plain, (Ii) thecapital costs of such uncertain undertakings are enormous, and (ill) therecurrent maintenance costs and problems are even more serious, especiallyfor a poor country. Less obvious but potentially more serious problems ofthe double embankment solution are: (1) the environmental and ecologicalchanges associated with the loss of the natural inundation regime, and (ii)the potential for catastrophic loss of life and property from high velocityflows through breached embankments.
15. A more positive macro engineering finding came out of theassessment of groundwater potential. The country was sitting on one of thelargest aquifer reservoirs in the world with one of the largest naturalrecharge cycles in the world. This was hardly being exploited in the dryseason.
16. The success of low-lift pumps utilizing surface water from naturaldrains, and the potential for tube well irrigation changed the macroeconomics of dealing with the food problem. This technology made it possibleto implement projects with high agriculture payoffs quickly since major civilworks requiring extensive land acquisition were not a necessary part of theinvestment. Dry season irrigation using the pump and tube well technologyalso had much higher rates of return than the large civil works flood controland irrigation projects. The LVR study then emphasized the benefits of thisapproach which was in direct contradiction to the 1964 master plan.
17. The implicit pattern for the next twenty years of Bank lending forflood control and irrigation was set with this study i.e., (i) respond to the"food problem" by exploiting the enormous underlying aquifer reservoirtogether with low lift pumps and tube wells to irrigate high yielding ricevarieties and other non-rice crops in the dry season when there are nofloods, (ii) respond to the "food problem" and the flood-free "spaceproblem" during annual inundations by supporting polder construction (withoutstationary drainage pumps), initially in the shallowest flooded areas wherethe embankments are the cheapest and the agriculture payoff the greatest.An unspoken element of this pattern was to put off the large-scaleengineering "solutions" to the flood problem into the indefinite future.(PPAR, paras. 26-35)
Recent Studies
18. Something comparable to the Bank's 1972 effort was undertaken in1986 when a National Water Plan was prepared with the joint support of theUNDP and the World Bank. Its approach and recommendations are remarkablysimilar to those of the 1972 LWR Study. The entire investment program isdriven by the "food problem" which is defined by future population and
X
consumption estimates coupled with the objective of food-grain self-sufficiency. The critical role of groundwater development is accepted whileflood control and drainage proje,..ts are given a lower priority because theyare not cost-effective. 1 The "space problem" associated with unusualfloods received almost no attention in the NWP. The "food problem"predominated. This was not to be the case for long.
19. In 1987 and again in 1988 Bangladesh was hit by unusually severefloods. The extreme dislocation of parts of the population and the Aamageto crops and infrastructure was dre-tic and widely publicised ininternational forums. In the wake of th. floods, three major studies wereundertaken. The six volume French EnAineerini Consortium (FEC) Study wasvery nearlv a twersion to the focus of the 1964 master plan mentionedpreviousl- f!% i-- 'th the flood problem is to be solved. The study comes downin suppor .. a massive 20 year US$ 5.2 billion civil works program of 3350km of BRE-tvt.,a double embankmeat with an annual maintenance burden of aboutUS$ 150 million. The Bangladesh Flood Policy Study (The UNDP Study) waspublished at about the same time as the FEC Study. The recommended twentyyear program of major embankments and integrated polder compartments wouldcost about US$ 3.5 billion with annual 0 & M costs of about US$ 175 millionin addition to the normal BVDB capital and maintenance budget.
20. In April 1989, consultants for the USAID published the EasternWaters Study which examined the flood issue from the point of view of theentire Ganges-Brabmaputra Basin including those portions in India, Nepal,China and Banglad sh. The emphasis with this study is on populationpressure, ecology, politics, food production, dry season irrigation, dandtechnical and economic feasibility of flood control measures. The reportmakes the point that it is probably not technically feasible nor ecologicallydesireable to successfully control the river system with embankments and thatto attempt to do so will put at risk a large amount of domestic and foreignresources that could be better used for other purposes. Technicalfeasibility in the USAID Study is assigned to smaller scale "flood-proofing"investments rather than "flood diversion" and upstream reservoir storage.The infrequent but serious "space problem" is directly addressed by pointingout the critical role played by highway and flood control embankments astemporary locations for escaping unusually high waters and reducing flooddeaths. The possibility of constructing embankments explicitly for thispurpose is put forth as is the smaller ring dike for high value or high humandensity areas. Great emphasis is put on the use of groundwater irrigationto solve the "food problem" and the beneficial effect of a drawn down aquiferin capturing and mitigating the early effects of the flood season. This thenwas a reversion to the themes of the 1972 LIWR Study and the 1986 NationalWater Plan.
21. In November 1989, the World Bank published Bangladesh Action Planfor Flood Control. Unlike the 1972 LVR Study, this is a brief document thatassumes that something must be considered for solving the flood problem inBangladesh and that the donor community should have a singlo document torefer to in discussing specific elements of aid. The FEC and UNDP studies
1 For an alternative view of the Region concerning this statement seeFootnote 39 on page eighteen of the PPAR.
x:L
were major inputs into the document as controling the major rivers is theunderlying assumption. Twenty six elements of a plan are set forth in briefannexes of which twelve are for civil works investments either full scale orpilot. The other fourteen elements are an acknowledgement of the concernsset forth in the LIWR, NWP and USAID analyses and provide for studies to makesure that, among other things, the long term plan is both technically,economically, socially and environmentally feasible. (PPAR, pares. 36-48)
Proiect Definition and Design
22. By 1975, when preparation for the project under audit began, theBank had a sophisticated understanding of how to lend money for flood controloperations. This was based on ten years of experience with Chandpur I andII and BRE I as well as the 1972 LWR Study. At the beginning of projectpreparation the objective was to select five, low investment "quick yielding"projects comprising "... minor flood embankment and drainage withsupplementary irrigation where appropriate." Eventually this came to threesubprojects: (i) the Brahmaputra Right Embankment (BRE II), (i) theChenchuri Beel (CCB) shallow flooding polder scheme, and (iii) theKolabashukhali (KBK) shallow flooding polder scheme. The total cost of theUS$ 28 million project had 52 percent apportioned to BRE II, 26 percent toCCB and 22 percent to KBK.
23. BRE II was a "pure" flood control operation based entirely onagriculture benefits. Net increases in wet season rice made up 76 percentof annual benefits, while non rice dry season crops made up the other 24percent. In spite of the useful life assumption of 15 years and theintroduction of the concept of embankment retirement, the proposedreconstruction and extension of the original BRE I embankment yielded an ERRof 38 percent.
24. The CCB and KBK subprojects were siaple polder operations notincorporating large stationary pumps for drainage or irrigation purposes.Monsoon rain accumulations could only be drained away when the watersurrounding the polders was lower than that within the polder. The CCBpolder project had 63 percent of annual benefits in the form of wet seasonrice increases with the other 37 percent from dry season non-rice crops. TheEBK polder project had 65 percent of its benefits from wet season riceincreases and 35 percent from dry season non rice crops. The economicslooked good with ERRs in the 30 percent range. How all three projectsmaintained such large dty season crop components in the benefit streams isnot explained in the SAR. (PPAR, paras. 49-53)
Implementation Experience
25. The BRE scheme ran into fundamental problems at the outset. Themain conflict was the notion of embankment retirement vs. embankmentprotection. While the westward movement of the Brahmaputra and theaccompanying bank erosion and embankment retirement was accepted by thetechnical experts, it was not accepted by the affected farmers or localpoliticians. They viewed the embankment not only as protection from the lowvelocity over-bank flooding, for which it was designed, but also the highvelocity erosion of the main stream, for which it wae not designed.
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26. The BVDB, responding to local pressures, then set aboutconstructing costly groins in the river to protect the embankment and obviatethe need to retire it or to buy land on which to build the retiredembankment. The pressure for these investments was particularly strong inthe vicinity of urban areas. The Bank refused to finance this technicallyand economically questionable construction. This was a wise decision, inretrospect, because some of the groins were eventually washed away. In theend, embankment retirement has followed the disaster approach to decisionasking where farmer and political resistance is literally overtaken by the
event of an eroded and eventually breached embankment. The retirementprocess then became a series of emergency operations rather than a carefullyorchestrated retreat from the migrating stream. 41 In the end, the BRE IIcomponent experienced a 36 percent cost overrun and increased its share ofthe total project cost from the SAR estimate of 52 percent to the PCRestimate of 67 percent. This last Bank-financed large scale engineeringsolution to flood control eventually dominated the lending operation.
27. The two shallow polder schemes proceeded pretty much on schedulethough numerous changes were incorporated in the final designs. Theseoperations were completed at substantial cost savings, and together theyaccounted for 33 percent of total project costs Instead of the SAR estimateof 48 percent. (PPAR, pares. 54-56)
Prolect Outcome
28. Despite a fifty percent reduction in the world market price ofrice since appraisal and a large cost overrun in the BRE sub project, allthree subprojects are now judged by the PCR to have rates of return in thearea of 30 percent, roughly twelve percent below those estimated aappraisal. It is instructive to see how this can happen.
29. The assumptions about future rice prices are one factor. The PCRused the September 1987 World Bank quarterly forecast in its computations andshowed only a thirty percent reduction in world market prices for rice sinceappraisal. Use of the most recent forecast would add a further twentypercent reduction in the economic value of rice in the benefit streams.
30. In the case of the dominant BRE Investment an extraordinaryassumption was made in the PCR which approximately tripled the incrementaloutput associated with the project. In the original SAR, the assumption wasthat cropping intensities in the area protected by the embankment would beabout 154 percent in the absence of the embankment. With the embankment, thecropping intensity was to rise to 171 percent an increment of 17 percent.In the PCR the without project cropping intensity was revised downward to 115percent to be more "realistic". The cropping intensity with the projectremained at 170 percent. The increment in cropping intensity due to theexistence of the BRE then increased to 55 percent under the new assumption.Except for the assertion that this was more realistic than the SAR assumptionthere is no explanation of this change.
Al For an elaboration on BRE Issue by the Region see Footnotes 53 and 54on page twenty-four of the PPAR.
xilt
31. Finally, the PCR makes the important assumption that all incrementsin dry season cropping take place because of the existence of the embankment.This assumption also applies to the shallow polder investments. No attemptIs made to separate the wet season benefits from the dry season benefits oflow lift pump and shallow tube well investments. The relative Importance ofthe benefits of dry season cropping is notable, especially in the case of theBRE II, where 97 percent of the gross benefit stream comes from dry seasonand irrigated crops that are largely independent of the flood protectionembankment. Only 3 percent of the annual gross benefits can be claimed forthe embankment investment. Given the changes in irrigation technology andthe difficulty of maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of theembankment and drainage system it is difficult to see the agriculturalargument for the BRE II. A similar point can be made for the CCB, where 69percent of the gross benefit stream comes from increments in dry seasonc.:ops. Only the KBK scheme seems to have actually increased the wet seasonpaddy share of the gross benefit stream beyond that anticipated in the SAR,a development that is not explained in the PCR.
32. On the basis of the data provided in the PCR it is quite clearthat the BRE II and CCB flood control investments are not economic if theirprincipal purpose, as set forth in the SAR, was to promote increases in wetseason agricultural production. Given that the BRE II made up 67 percent ofthe total investment and the CCB made up 19 percent, the case can be madethat the project as a whole was not a successful one. Conversely, the payoffto dry season irrigation is manifest, especially in the case of the area"protected* by the BRE. The unexpected increases in dry season productionin the BRE and CCB areas could render the investments economic if it is truethat increments in dry season production would not have taken place in theabsence of the flood control embankments. Unfortunately, this criticallyimportant linkage has not yet been substantiated with appropriate impactstudies. (PPAR, paras. 57-65) 11
Findinas and Issues
The Food Problem and the Space Problem
33. Two major themes run through the long history of dealing withfloods in Bangladesh. The food problem is the constant underlying theme thatdeservedly receives attention. However, in the wake of unusual floods suchas those of 1987 and 1988, the space problem is dramatically pushed forward.The spectacle of an estimated 30 million people temporarily displaced fromtheir homes and awaiting the recession of the flood waters on highwayembankments, with all the human suffering involved, leads to politicaldemands for the government to *solve" the problem. This in turn leads toengineering solutions such as those put forth in the 1964 Master Plan andmore recently in the FEC and UNDP studies. When the economics, finances, andecological impact of these schemes are examined closely they become veryquestionable initiacives.
51 For a dissenting view on the economics of these schemes see theRegionts comments in Footnote 57 on page twenty-seven of the PPAR.
xiv
34. As the memories of the latest unusual flood recede and the narrowtechnical constraints of reality begin to assert themselves, the floodproblem Is again addressed in the context of solving the food problem of thecountry. This concern calls forth the sort of analytical efforts that the1972 LWR Study, the more recent National Water Plan, and the USAID Studyrepresent. The two types of studies coexist uneasily because they wereproduced for fundamentally different reasons. The attempt by the Bank in its1989 Action Plan to juxtapose these two approaches in one document accountsfor the tentative nature of the proposals and the heavy conditioning ofactual Implementation upon eventually demonstrated technical, economic,financial, social and environmental feasibility. (PPAR pares. 66-67)
Lessons from the Record
35. While the Action Plan is to address most of the issues raised inthis report, the Z adit believes that something worthwhile can be drawn nowfrom the experience of a quarter of a century. The great preponderance ofinformation that we have to date indicates that polder investments in deeplyand moderately flooded areas, utilizing fixed pumps for drainage in the wetseason, have not been a cost-effective way to address the food problem.Lower cost simple polders without pump drainage in shallow flooded areas alsohave a marginal impact on the food problem unless the case can be made thatdry season crop production based on low-lift pumps or shallow tube wells willnot take place in the absence of the polders. The Audit's view is that dryseason irrigation is so drought resistant and cost-effective that it islargely independent of the presence or absence of polders and that theincentives for farmers to undertake intensification in the dry season is muchgreater than the incentives to do the same in the wet season. The extremelylow prevailing and projected prices for rice exacerbate this tendency.
36. The experience with the annual breaching of the BRE indicates thatflood embankments subject to erosion from a migrating river bed are poorinvestments for promoting vet season agriculture prod-ction because theycannot be made to work effectively. The land acquisition problem militatesagainst an effective retirement process. The fact that the poor performanceof the BRE has not kept dry season irrigation from developing in its shadowindicates that the dry season irrigation technology is largely independentof effective protection from floods in that particular area. (PPAR, pares.68-71)
The Difficult Task of the Project Economist
37. As it became clear that dry season irrigation even in the polderareas was generating the bulk of the increments in output it was possible tohandle this by treating the wet and dry season costs and benefits as aninseparable package. This then paved the way for the sort of economicanalysis that is featured in the PCR in which not farm incomes in the shallowpolder areas are to double and those within the shadow of the BRE are toincrease by a factor of five.
38. The most recent Fourth Flood Control and Drainage (DFC IV) Project(1987) had to face the economic analysis problem differently in that dryseason irrigation, by then, was already widespread in the project area andits provision could no longer be packaged with the flood control investment.
xv
By far the most interesting assumption is that failure to build the pc;Aerswould lead to a decrease in cropping intensity by eleven percentage pointsbelow that which existed at appraisal. This is because other polders beingconstructed in the area will have the effect of raL ing water levels inunpoldered areas. The standard technical and economic assumptionincorporated in earlier flood control projects was that a polder project willhave no substantial negative impact on unpoldered areas. In the case of DFCIV, the reversal of this assumption has now become a major element of thejustification for building additional polders. 61
39. With the real price of rice now expected to remain at less thanhalf the price levels prevailing from 1948 to 1981, and with the Increasingconcern over the effectiveness and externalities of poldering it is, in theAudit*s opinion, time to overhaul the approach to justifying flood controlinvestments in Bangladesh. (PPAR paras. 72-76) 71
Technological ChanMe and the Bureaucracy
40. The unexpected development of a cost-effective dry seasonirrigation technology has had an enormous Impact on people and institutionsin Bangladesh. So effective has this "minor" irrigation technology been thatit has undermined the justification for the very existence of the "major"technologies under bureaucratic control. This may not always be the case.Intensification of wet season agricultural production may eventually becomecritically Important for food production in the future. This would bemanifested by increasing farm gate prices for food production and increasingcosts for dry season irrigated crop production. The incentives for wetseason intensification would then be in place and the proponents of wetseason expansion would then have something to work with. Their problem wouldthen be that, increasingly, land acquisition for flood control embankmentswill be a constraint, just as it was for the gravity canal irrigationtechnology. Only dramatic floods and a resurgence of demands to solve thespace problem will relax that constraint for a while and start the cycleagain. (PPAR, paras. 77-83)
Sustainability
41. The one point on which all are agreed is that in order for a civilworks investment to be effective and sustained it must be maintained. Almosteveryone is also agreed that the maintenance of the BWDB flood controlfacilities haL not been good. This is consistent with the argument that thefacilities in place have not been very effective on a sustained basis. Formany years now experts have been exhorting the government to take maintenanceseriously. The Action Plan also hei an explicit element to address thisissue. Why is it, that in an area where all are in verbal agreement, so
(1 For a qualification of this statement by the Region see Footnote 64on page thirty-one of the PPAR.
11 For two differing views on the issue of project analysis methodologysee Footnote 65 on page thirty-one.
xvi
little progress has been made? gl The Audit believes there are at least twounderlying reasons for thiss The first Is that the beneficiaries of thesefree facilities either don't perceive the benefits of the investments to themor they have no effective means of making their demand for maintenance knownto the government.
42. The second possibility is that there may be an implicit preferencefor frequent rehabilitation and reconstruction over periodic and routinemaintenance. The incentives facing government decision makers may favor theformr over the latter. Unless these incentives are understood and changed,it will be difficult to make progress in this area.
43. The fact that privately owned tube wells and low lift pumps are nowself-financing, self-operated and self-maintained indicates that theImportant externalities have been internalized and that the Incentives areworking in the right direction. The farmers truly want minor irrigationequipment and it is truly effective. This cannot be said about all BWDBflood control investments because there is no market test demonstrating theirusefulness and the farmer's desire for them. This is determined by engineersand project economists employing plausible technical assumptions. If notfarm Incomes in the shadow of an effective BRE really were to be increasedby a factor of five, and this was perceived by the farmers, then farmermaintenance (or at least organised political demand for maintenance) of theembankment would be a real possibility and, for the first time, the perceivedbenefit stream would have an Impact on the sustainability of the investment.
44. In the absence of market tests and effective beneficiary pressures,it becomes tecessary to carry out independent impact studies of major publicflood control investments to see if they are truly effective and worthsustaining. Despite the difficulty of planning and implementing thesetechnically complicated studies in an environment of low incentives, it isthe only means we have of going beyond the plausible assumptions approachthat has dominated thinking to date. (PPAR, paras. 84-87) 1
8I For a dissenting view on the matter of maintenance see the Region'scomments in Footnote 75 on page thirty-five of the PPAR.
91 For an expansion on, and qualification of, this thinking see theRegion's view In Footnote 78 on page thirty-six of the PPAR.
1
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
BANGLADESHDRAINAGE AND FLOOD_CONTROL PROJECT
(CREDIT 864-BD)
I. Introduction
1. Since 1963, the Board has approved approx1mately ten lendingoperations that have been partially or wholly devoted to drainage and floodcontrol efforts in what was then East Pakistan and, after 1971, Bangladesh.The first (June 1963) was a US$5.0 million credit for the reconstructionand extension of the Brabmaputra Flood Embankment. The most recent(January 1988) was a US$81.5 million credit for the Second Small ScaleFlood Control Project. The project under audit was the fourth in theseries.
2. This is, in a formal sense, the first audit of a drainage andflood control project in Bangladesh, which is surprising given the twenty-six year history of such operations and the great interest which floodcontrol has regularly received in that country. It Is useful therefore toestablish, for purposes ol this audit, a basic understanding of thephysical nature and vocabulary of flooding and its interaction withagriculture since the promotion of agriculture has been the chief formaljustification for Bank-supported investments in flood control. It is alsouseful to summarise the experience of the three operations that precededthat under audit and to combine this experience with the main findings ofthe 1972 Land and Water Resources Sector Study (LR) which set theintellectual tone and technical parameters for Bank support of waterresources management in Bangladesh for many years. 11 A brief sample ofthe findings of current studies comparable to the 1972 effort is then givento bring events up-to-date. With this basic background of technicalfactors and pre project experience it is then possible to understand howthe project under audit fits into the long history of Bank support of floodcontrol investments.
11 Land and Water Resc-rces Sector Study: Bansladesh, (nine volumes),Report No. PS-13, Asia Projects Department, December 1, 1972.
2
II. Airiculture and Flood Control
3. Figure 1 Is extracted from the most recent Agriculture SectorReport to give a simplified view of flooding and the most importantcropping patterns. 21 The peak flooding usually take place in the monthsof July and August when snow melt runoff and monsoon rain runoff coincide.In unusual years, such as the 1987 flood, the duration of heavy floodingcan extend from early July through late September. On either side of theJuly-August peak are five more months of pre and late monsoon period inwhich rainfall and soil moisture are generally sufficient to support riceproduction. The wet season from the middle of April to the end of Novemberis sometimes referred to as the "Kharif" season. "Rabi", or dry season,crops are grown in the five month period November through March. The mostimportant Rabi crops are wheat, oilseeds, pulses, and vegetables. A dryseason rice crop called "Boro" is also grown, but usually requiresirrigation as does some of the dry season wheat and vegetables.
4. Before modern irrigation technology was introduced in the 1960s,most of the effort went into growing a local variety of early monsoonquick-maturing rice called "Aus", and a local variety of slow maturingdeep-water rice called "Aman". The idea was to harvest the Aus crop beforethe flood water was too deep and to allow the Aman crop to float on thesurface of the flood with stem growth of up to ten cm per day to a totallength as high as six meters. Broadcasting mixed Aus and Aman was a commonway of double cropping that insured somt rice production, depending on theonset, severity and duration of the annual inundation. Both were low-input low-yielding operations. The Bengali farmer adjusted his way of lifeto the annual inundation, not unlike the farmers of the Nile valley. Ifthe inundation could be "controlled", then it would be worthwhile totransplant, rather than broadcast, the Aus and Aman crops and get higheryields since the labor of transplanting would not be so much at risk.Controlled floodvt would encourage higher inputs in general and higher moredependable levels of output.
5. Introducing irrigation for dry season crops was far morerevolutionary than partially controlling floods for wet season crops inthat the Bengali farmer would have to change dramatically his crop cyclesand the rhythm of his life. This happened when high-yielding, short-stemed, rice varieties were introduced in the 1960's together withIrrigation based on small low-lift pumps and, later, tube wells. Theintroduction of high-yielding wheat in the mid 70's was a similardevelopment with a substantial impact on food grain production in general.Even though the dry season days are short and temperatures are relatively
21 Taken froms "Large Scale Water Development in Bangladesh", by AinunNishat, in: Bangladesh Agriculture Sector Review, AgriculturePerformance and Policies, Compendium Volume III, UNDP, March 1989, p.91.
Figure 1
RELATION OF CROP SEASONS WITH FLOOD AND IRIGATION
IfIU
. .__ _AM_J AD
FLOODS
I Pre-monsoon Monsoon Late-monsoo .
IRRICAT ION
a ir in A In laA i s lo s tosupplementery
Months of the year
FIGURE I RELATION OF CROP SEASONS WITH FLOOD AND IRRIGATION
4
low, the wether is clear and sunny and pests and diseases are at theirlowest level of activity. The precise control of water pumped on demandfrom surface or aquifer sources, combined with HYV seeds and fertilizer,allowed a farmer to attain yields from two to three times that of wetseason rice. A single dry season irrigated rice crop was the equivalent totwo or three wet season crops and the uncertainty of flooding was greatlyreduced.
6. By 1969170, it was estimated that the Boro crop accounted for8.5 percent of the paddy acreage and 16.1 percent of production. The Auscrop accounted for 25.1 percent of production while transplanted Aman was40.4 percent. Broadcast Ann was still 18.4 percent of production. 3IDuring the three-year period 1986-88, Boro production ias estimated to makeup 27.1 percent of rice production, and Boro rice together with wheat wereestimated to comprise 3'..8 percent of total food grain production. Acomparison of the average annual production of the period 1966-70 with theaverage for the period 1986-88 shows that of the 4.3 million ton incrementin annual rice production, 2.9 million tons or 67 percent is accounted forby increases in Boro production. Looking at food jrains as a whole, the5.3 million ton increment over the same period is largely accounted for bya 4.4 million ton increment in Boro rice and wheat, almost 84 percent ofincreased production levels between the late 60s and the late 80s.Clearly, in terms of growth, dry season rice and wheat have been thedynamic elements in the food grain equation. 41
7. The degree of independence of most dry season crops from flooddamage has become an Important issue in recent months. Figure 1 Indicatesa five month flood-free "window* for growing an irrigated rice crop.However, this simplified cropping calendar conceals the actual complexitythat comes from geographical differences. Figure 2 indicates the relativeimportance of the Aus, Amen and Boro crops in the period 1982-84 and thetime spans of the harvest seasons of each. 5] The Boro crop is actuallyplanted in December-January and harvested in the period April-June,depending on the farmer's perception of the risks involved from earlyflooding. Nearly ripe standing Boro is placed at risk from early floodingin May and June. Statistical evidence to support the extent of actualdamage was not presented in any Bank report the Audit had access to but waseventually provided from the Year Book of Agricultural Statistics ofBangladesh 1985-86. 61
I/ Land and Water Resource Sector Study, Technical Report No. 7, "Rice".
&/ The primary source of these statistics is the Bangladesh Bureau ofStatistics. They are conveniently displayed as a secondary source inthe forthcoming OED Audit Report of the Import Credits Program II-XIII, Attachments 4 and 5.
S] Taken from: Rice Price Fluctuation and an Approaci to PriceStabilization in Bangladesh, by Raissuddin Ahmed and Andrew BernardtIFPRI Research Report No. 72, February 1989, p. 13.
g/ Year Book of Agricultural Statistics of Bangladesh, 1985-86, pp. 281-310.
5
Fo9ibu 2
Thn. spans of harvest uuoafruiceand shares of ausaan, adbaro season huartss in total rice havst, averge for 19824
Peroet
1W
80
10
* 54%
40
30 22% 24%
10
01Aas Aman Bomo
souce: ftmdatnhanma,*da Damean orstat5a, StaMa e*ot!98S/B6(DhaI.n:DSs
6
8. The Year Book statistics do show damage to the Boro crop underthe 4eneral heading of "Flood* In four of the six years 1981-86. However,when the detailed damage tables are examined it is clear that much of thedamage sutained by the Boro crop in April and May come from hail, strongwinds and heavy rains - not early floods. For four of the six years forwhich data is available there is no flood damage to the Boro crop. In 1983early floods were estimated to damage 2.4 percent of the Boro crop while in1984, about 9.4 percent of the Boro crop was lost to early floods. Fromthe data made available then, the average annual national losa of the Borocrop to early flooding was about two percent over the period 1981-86.
9. Data from the same source for the period 1969-1984 has recentlybeen analyzed in an IFPRI publication. 1 The findings are interesting inthat all three rice crops and their susceptibility to flood damage areexamined:
The data in Table 10 show that flood damage is more frequent thancyclone damage and aus and aman rice crops are more vulnerable toflood than boro.
The geographical dimension is then examineds
... In almost all years with moderate to severe flooding (crop loseof more than 300,000 tons) but with no severe drought, actualproduction of rice has remained above trend production. Thissupports the hypothesis that location-specift flood loses do notlead to an aggregate loss of crop production by the same amount.Flooding causes locational income and employment problems, but itdoes not adversely affect, ad may even Improve aggregate supply...
Finally, the relative importance of drought is addresseds
... a severe drought, even without a severe or moderate flood, tooften found to cause actual aggregate production to fall below trendproduction. Thus, drought to more menacing than flood In Bangladeshas far as aggregate production is concerned.
10. The argument for the linkage between successful Irrigated Boroand flood control reasons that irrigated Boro has been introduced in theleast flood prone areas to avoid early May or June flooding and thatextension into more deeply flooded areas in the future will Smply even moreearly flood damage risks necessitating flood control investments. None ofthis reasoning has been quantified within the Bank, but a recent USAIDanalysis of cropping patterns and production in frequently flooded andrarely flooded districts in Bangladesh indicates that, contrary to thisassumption, production, area and yield of crops are growing faster in the
ZI Rice Price Fluctuation and an Approach to Price Stabilisation inBangladesh, by Raissuddin Ahmed and Andrew Bernard, IFPRI ResearchReport No. 72, February 1989, pp. 38-42.
7
more flooded districts. 8I The euplanation for this counter intuitivefinding is that the seasonal cropping patterns in the frequently floodedand rarely flooded districts are different. Farmers in the frequentlyflooded districts plant substantially more dry season Boro paddy than dofarmers in the shallow or rarely flooded districts. A similar andindependent observation based on a survey undertaken in connection with aforthcoming OED irrigation impact study for Bangladesh states:
0One uneapected and interesting result of the shift away from Amancropping Is that an increasing fraction of the food grain productionof Bangladesh Is now coming from parts of the landscape which arenormally deeply flooded. Because of the emphasis on the dry-seasoncrop, flooding has become either irrelevant, or a positive factor inrelation to the quantity of residual moisture left after the floodrecedes.*
11. The general argument that low embankments in certain areas canprotect irrigated boro from early flood damage are certainly true.However, the statistical evidence available indicate. this would not be thecase in every year, not necessarily over a wide area with national Impactand not necessarily in sufficient degree to warrant the investment. Themore traditional argument that agriculture flood control embankments mustbe justified by their impact on the more vulnerable, and much larger, wetseason Aus and Aman crops is supported by the recent IFPRI findings.
12. In the absence of statistics or studies to support the generalargument that flood control embankments are critical for the adoption ofdry season irrigation technology, the Audit concludes that, whatever theperception of the ilood risks by farmers, the drought and flood avoidancebenefits of irrigated boro rice are sufficient to continue the generalexpansion of low-lift pump and shallow tube-well investments for this crop,with or without flood control investments, particularly in the deeplyflooded areas. It I.. quite likely that policies and factors other thanthose concerning flood control are more important for this development,particularly the government's policies on financing and control of shallowtube well installations. 9, 101
g/ Eastern Waters Study: Strategies to Manage Flood and Drought in theGanzes-Brabmaputra Basin by Peter Rogers, Peter Lydon, and DavidSeckler, USAID, April 1989, Section 4.4.2, pp. 38-39.
9/ Sees Selected Issues in Foodarain Development, pp. 22-29.
101 The Region expresses the opinion that the relationship betweenagriculture, flood control andl irrigation development in Bangladeshis far more complex than suggested in Chapter II of the audit.Physical conditions (topography, flood patterns, irrigationpotential, tidal effects, salinity, etc.) are very diverse. TheBengall farmers have for centuries learned to make the best possibleuse of their environment, and the challenge facing government anddonor agencies alike to to devise location-specific schemes to assistthe farmers in their efforts. The Audit tends to overestimate thepotential for free-standing irrigation development and does not
8
III. Bank Experience with Flood Control
Early Lendins
13. In June 1963 the Department of Technical Operations submitted anSAR for the first Flood Embankment Project (BRE I) on the right bank of theBrabmaputra River in what was then East Pakistsn. Ill The idea was torehabilitate and extend the 40 km. of embankment that was built in 1957such that it would come to 225 km. of embankment giving partial floodcontrol over some 72,000 ha of the Brabmaputra and Teesta river basins.The economics of the proposal rested on the assumption that there would bean incentive to shift from a broadcast, low-yielding, Aus and Aman to ahigher yielding transplanted Aman. It was also assumed that in some casestwo rice crops could be had in one rainy season - an early Aus cropfollowed by transplanted Amen with a shorter growing season. A system ofeight regulators piercing the embankment would allow the protected area tobe drained through natural channels when water on the land was excessiveand the river level was low enough. It would also allow the river water toenter the area when the river was high enough and water was required. Theidea was to avoid severe flooding by closing the regulators but to allowcontrolled flooding and the deposition of the beneficial river silt. Thenot benefit stream over a fifty year useful life would yield an ERR ofabout fifty percent. The engineering was preliminary but the concept wassimple as was the earth structure. No special technical problems wereexpected. 12, The five years of experience with operating and maintainingthe already existing 40 km. of embankment was not mentioned except that itsdimensions were inadequate. This then was the first step the Bank tookinto flood control investments in Bangladesh. BRE I was never audited andis not mentioned again until the preparation of the project under audit inwhich the rehabilitation of the Brabmaputra Right Embankment (BRE II) is amajor component.
14. One month after the BRE I Staff Appraisal Report, the Departmentof Technical Operations submitted another SAR for a Flood Protection,Drainage and Irrigation Project in the Chandpur area. 131 The President's
sufficiently recognize the importance of both past and future floodcontrol and drainage works for Irrigation development and cropproduction. Nowever, the Region agrees that the present level ofunderstanding of the physical environment In Bangladesh and therelation between agriculture, flood control, drainage and irrigationneeds to be Improved.
Ill Brabmaptra Flood Embankment Projects East Pakistan, SAR, Rep.-t No.TO-334b, Department of Technical Operations, June 17, 1963.
12/ See Annex 9 of the SAR.
1 Chandpur Flood Protection, Drainage and Irrigation Project, SAR,Report No. TO-328c, Department of Technical Operations, July 19,1963.
9
Report drops the reference to flood protection and refers to it as theChandpur Irrigation Project. It has subsequently been carried on the booksas an irrigation project. This was an unfortunate nomenclature because theChandpur project, in terms of investment share, was primarily a floodcontrol Investment and was the direct precursor to the type of poldersubproject undertaken in the project under audit. 141 Chandpur I (Credit040-PAK) and its supplement, Chandpur II (Credit 340-8D) were subsequentlyaudited as an irrigation project 151 and could be overlooked by thoseseeking an understanding of the evolution of Bank lending for floodcontrol.
15. The 1963 Chandpur I scheme combined the concept of flood controlthrough the construction of polder cells with reversible large scale pumpsfor drainage in the wet season and irrigation in the dry season. Onehundred and eighty kilometers of earth embankment were to surround the55,000 he scheme and dry-season gravity irrigation was to be provided toapproximately 44,000 ha. For the first time the Bank was to be involved ina combination of flood control in the wet season and irrigation in the dryseason in the same area. The dry-season irrigated rice crop (Boro) thenenters the benefft stream in a serious way and is combined with the wet-season flood control benefits similar to those associated with the BREschemes. Virtually all the benefits were to be net increases inagricultural Iroduction. The project proposal was based on a *minimum ofengineering investigation and design..." Final designs were to beundertaken as part of the project.
16. A number of painful facts became clear as final designs wereundertaken. A conventional gravity canal irrigation system design, similarto those employed in the semi-arid Western wing was to serve the area.This was not feasible because the high ground where the canals were to besituated was the most flood-free and, therefore, the most valuable. In anarea where land of any kind was in extremely short supply, the best landwas not to be given over to irrigation civil works. By 1966, plans for thegravity Irrigation component were abandoned and the project reverted to apump drainage polder operation in the wet season. This, by then, exclusiveflood control p-oject was no longer viable without the dry seasonIrritation benefits and the entire scheme was finally stopped in 1967. 16/The undisbursed funds were used to redesign the project incorporatingentirely new concepts.
17. Chandpur II emerged from this redesign in 1970. Dry-seasonirrigation and its benefit stream was put back in the picture with 1,500diesel-powered, two cu. see. low-lift pumps. Farmers were to pump
14) Unlike most subsequent Bank-supported polder investmentr, theChandpur project was classified as moderately deep flooding (F2)rather than shallow flooding.
151 Bangladesh Chandpur II Irrigation Project, Credit 340-BD, PPAR,Report No. 3436, Operations Evaluation Department, April 30, 1981.
161 Chandpur II Irrization Projects East Pakistan, Report No. PA-32a,Agriculture Projects Department, March 31, 1970, para. 3.05, p. 4.
10
Irrigation water from the natural drains in the a:ea during the dry season.There would be no need to take valuable land out of production to providegravity canals. Another advantage was that small groups of farmers couldpump water from the tmproved drains as they required it rather than waitingfor an irrigation bureaucracy to provide it through a canal system. 171An "appropriate technology" was Introduced to the irrigation-flood controlequation in Bangladesh and a new era in water control began. 181
18. The shift in emphasis from the conventional gravity canalirrigation systems of the arid regions to one which consciously integratedlow-lift pump technology into the engineering design was a major break withpast thinking. Only recently has the inappropriateness of the conventionalgravity canal technology in regions of relatively high rainfall beendocumented. The basic draw back is that they cannot be made to work duringdrought periods in the wet season when supplemental irrigation is neededfor standing crops and farmers, seeking to save their crops, damage thesystem in their simultaneous attempts to extract water from it.Significantly, the reason for rejecting this technology in Bangladesh wasnot the fact that it could not be made to work - rather it was therequirement by this technology for scarce land that led it to be rejected.This was not the case in neighboring North Bihar and the results have beencostly. 19/
Evaluation Studies
19. In 1981 the Operations Evaluation Department conducted an auditof the Chandpur Irrigation Project. 201 It was the first, and only,combined flood-controllirrigation project to be scrutinized since lending
1l A two cusec. low-lift pump can irrigate about 20 ha. which involvesabout 30 farmers. With privatisation, the one cusec model, thoughless efficient technically, is popular because it serves an even moreeasily .ganized and independent 15 farmers.
18/ The "appropriate technology" of use of small low-lift pumps to takedry season irrigation water from drains was introduced in the Sylhetregion in the 1950s and was more generalized in the Thana IrrigationProgram (TIP) which began in 1966 as an extension of the then RuralWorks Program. The Japanese were probably the first to use thistechnology when they successfully introduced it into the Saga Plainrice growing region in the 1920s. Sees "The Development of NewTechniques in Agriculture: The Case of the Mechanization ofIrrigation in the Saga Plain Area of Japan", by Penelope Francks In:World Development, 1979, Vol. 7, pp. 531-539.
191 See the recent work by D.J.W. Berkhoff: Irrigation Management on theIndo-Gangetic Plain, Agricultural Division, Asia TechnicalDepartment, The World Bank, Draft January 2, 1990. See especially"The Gandak Scheme, North Bihar" in Annex A.
20/ Project Performance Audit Report: Bangladesh Chandpur II IrrigationProlect, Credit 340-BD, Operations Evaluation Department, Report No.3436, April 30, 1981.
11
began In the 1960s, but is not mentioned in the SARs of subsequent floodcontrol projects as relevant experience, perhaps because of the titlemisnomer. The general conclusion of this first audit was that the projectwas successful. It also discussed environmental problems associated withenclosing areas of the flood plain. The most mediate and serious problemwas the loss of fish and prawn catch which provided much of the protein forthe area and a large amount of off-farm employment. Previous to theenclosure the fish and prawns were spawned elsewhere and were washed intothe area during the annual inundation. An attempt was made to deal withthe fishing problem by adding an inland fisheries component. Theimpounding of water also led to a drinking water problem and concern forpesticide concentrations. The judgement was that the other environmentalImpacts were not sufficiently serious to require special attention. By1981 it was clear that there were unintended and unanticipated effects fromenclosure schemes but, given the seriousness of the "food problem", therisks seemed to be justified.
20. It was estimated in the PCR that, at full development, the dry-season irrigated boro crop would produce a net increase of 82,700 tens peryear of paddy out of a total not increase of 152,000 tons. Over fiftypercent of the net increase in paddy can then be attributed to dry seasonirrigation. The balance of the net increase in paddy production came mostlyfrom a shift from low-yielding Amen to HYV t-Aman, the chief payoff toflood control. The 75,000 ton not increase in non rice crops is alsolargely attributable to dry-season irrigation and these commodities,especially the fruits and vegetables, are of higher value than the rice.As much as three quarters of the benefit stream then accrues to dry seasonirrigation. In this sense Chandpur wae primarily an irrigation and not aflood control project. By combining the wet and dry season benefits therevised economic return of the entire irrigation/flood control investmentwas estimated to be 13 percent. The PCR was able to separate the dryseason and wet season benefit streams but, because of the joint use of thelarge stationary pumps for pumping water out in the rainy season andpumping water into the drains in the dry season, it was not easy to computeseparate rates of return for the flood control and irrigation components.At any rate no effort was made. What was acknowledged explicitly was thatthe investment was not economic without the dry season irrigationbenefits. 211
21. In 1982 the Bank financed another evaluation of the Chandpurexperience. 22/ This showed much lower* increments in paddy production thanthe PCR and an economic return between sero and five percent. In 1986, thescheme was examined again by another independent observer and the economic
211 Chandpur II Irrigation Project: East Pakistan, Report No. PA-32a,Agriculture Projects Department, March 31, 1970, para. 3.05, p. 4.
22/ A Socio-Economic Evaluation of the Chandpur II Irrigation Project,Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad, Dhaka, June 1982.
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return was estimated to be about ten percent. 231 Given the postevaluation attention this project has received, it is unfortunate that ithas not been referred to in subsequent flood control efforts.
22. In 1986 OED audited another 'irrigation" project with asubstantial flood control component. 24/ It was the Karnafull IrrigationProject (Credit 605 BD) of 1975. Part of it (the 3,200 ha. Ichimat1 unit)was designed to operate in a manner similar to Chandpur, i.e., stationarylarge reversible pumps for drainage in the wet season and pumpingsupplemental water into drains for low lift pump delivery in the dryseason. The other part (the 19,000 ha. Halda unit) provided upstream anddownstream flap gates to allow drainage during the monsoon season and tidalfresh water in the drains during the dry season to serve the privatelyoperated low-lift pumps. Forty-eight miles of flood protection embankmentswere integral to the project. This was an Interesting project in that low-lift pumps were already working in the area at the time of appraisal,pumping surface water from the existing system of natural drains. At auditthe project was not working well. Only 10.5 miles of the planned 48 milesembankment was complete because of public opposition to the acquisition ofthe land. This embankment was eventually to be completed under a food-for-work format. Little had changed in terms of low lift pump utilizationand the capacity of the stationary pumps were underutilized because farmerswere planting the Boro crop late indicating they had little to fear fromearly monsoon flooding. A group of relift pumps, thought to be needed torecharge the drains in higher areas was deleted from the project as theywere no longer required. A 13 percent ERR is obtained in the PCR largelythrough an assumed reduction of cropping intensity in the without situationwhich led to a higher not increase in paddy than that assumed at appraisal.The Audit points out the inauspicious beginning of the project but doesnot, in the end, question the economics in the PCR. No other studies orImpact analyses were done on this project and it is not known to whatextent the flood embankments were ever completed. 25
23. In 1988 an effort was made by the UNDP-sponsored AgricultureSector Review to examine the experience with aid-sponsored flood control,drainage and irrigation projects. 26/ The result of a literature searchturned up the finding that the Project Completion Reports and OED Audit
231 Bangladesh's Chandpur Irriation Projects The Fortunes of a MajorWater Management Scheme, By Paul Thompson, Flood Hazard ResearchCenter, Middlesex Polytechnic, U.K., 1986.
24/ PPAR Bangladesh First Rural Development Project (Credit 631-BD)tUarnafull Irrigation Project (Credit 605-BD) and Barisal IrrigationProiect (Credit 542-BD), OED Report No. 6521, November 21, 1986
251 The Region states that both the Ichiati and the Halda units areoperating satisfactorily.
261 Project Aid in Agricultures Major (Surface Water) Flood Control,Drainage and Irrigation Projects, by Alan C. Lindquist, in:Bangladesh Agriculture Sector Review, Compendium Volume II, Land,Water and Irri-ation, UNDP, March 1989.
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Reports of World Bank-supported projects were about all the documentationthat existed. The Asian Development Bank* the second largest Irrigationlflood control supporter after the World Bank, has yet to produce a PCR orAudit Report in the irrilationiflood-control subsector of Bangladesh,largely because none of their projects has ever been officially completedeven though some started as much as eleven years earlier. The Meghna-Dhonagoda project to an example.
24. The Meghna-Dhonagoda project is a pumped polder operation in anormally doeply flooded area. A 64 km polder provides flood protection for43,500 ha and reversible stationary pumps remove rainwater during themonsoon and provide irrigation in the dry periods. The project was begunin 1977 and the flood protection embankment was completed in 1986. Theembankment was breached in the floods of 1987 and 1988 and the t-Aman ricewas nearly all lost. Subsequently the Ministry of Irrigation Issued newguide lines prohibiting flood control embankments and pump drainage indeeply flooded areas. The annual operating costs of running the pumps isestimated at about US$ 1.0 million and this is bourn by the BWDB budget.This kind of pump drainage operation is now considered to be toocostly. 271
25. The 1988 UNDP survey of the fragmentary record then makes thecase that large scale surface irrigation and flood control investments arevery questionable undertakings for solving the food problem of Bangladesh,especially when compared with the high returns associated with so called*minor irrigation investments. The fact th %t the large scale operationsare fully subsidized while the minor operations are largely paid for by thebeneficiaries is another element that weighs against the former. Theprecursor of this position was already being developed by the Bank in its1972 Land and Water Resources Study.
U/ See Vol I, page 12 of the UNDP Agriculture Sector Review.
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Early Comprehensive Studies of the Problem
26. Most of the early investments in flood control and irrigation inBangladesh derived from a 1964 "master plan" supported by the UNDP. 28/The long term objective of the plan is made explicit by an early reviewer:
"... the river flow Is confined to a stable and fixed bed at lstages of discharL allowing of efficient taland navigation. Thewater In the land between the rivers as well as between the rivers onthe one hand and the sea on the other is completely controlled. Itis kept at the most favorable level. When there to too mu, thesurplus Is evacuatedl when the crops and the raising of cattle needmore, the rivers supply the shortage. The coast line is continuousand as short as possible. It is interrupted only by a small amberof mouths of the principal rivers and by the entrances for navigationto the maa harbors. A sea wall prevents flooding, even toexceptional conditions.- 2I
27. It quickly became apparent, in the course of preparing thespecific projects, that large projects designed to achieve the aboveidealized objectives were extremely costly, difficult to engineer, and ofquestionable economic goodness. The World Bank, which was to be a majorfinancial suppcrter of the effort, immediately began confronting theseproblem and adjusting to them. It was one thing to have a desireable longterm objective independent of benefits and costs. It was another thing toconfront these costs and benefits in a specific project such as ChandpurII.
28. The 1971 War of Independence interrupted all Bank activities inthe country. Staff in Washington D.C. took advantage of the suspension ofoperations to pull together and analyze as much data as was available inthe land-water-agriculture sectors in an attempt to be prepared to set offin new directions when order was restored. In less than a year, Bankstaff, consultants, and FAO personnel produced the remarkable nine volumeLand and Water Resources Sector Study (LVR Study), which remains a basicdocument even today. The great strength of this document is that itincorporates an integrated macro economic and a macro engineering viewpointof the water resources and flood control issues with that of a microeconomic and engineering viewpoint of specific water managementtechnologies.
29. At the macro level it develops explicitly an appreciation of theextraordinary Importance of population pressure on land resources. In 1951there were about 42 million people living in an area about one third thesize of Japan. This was 72 million at the time of the study and will be
28/ EPWAPDA Master Plan, International Engineering Company, Inc., 1964.
29/ Report on the Hydrology of East Pakistan, by J. Th. Thijase,May/October 1964.
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about 144 million by the year 2000. 301 At 736 inhabitants per squarekilometer in 1987, Bangladesh has a population density about twice that ofthe Netherlands, about the same as the island of Java in Indonesia andabout one third that of the city state of Singapore. The LVR Study pointsout that the annual inundation of up to one third of the country is anormal and even beneficial phenomena that the Bengali farmer had long agoadjusted to in terms of housing, transportation and farming technology.With steadily increasing population and urbanisation, the flood-free areasmust Increasingly aEcommodate a larger and larger group of people everyyear to the point where even Onormal" floods present a real problem ofwhere people are to wait out the periods of inundation. Unusual floodssuch as those in 1987 and 1988 force millions of people to abandon therehomes and search for high ground. This "space problem" is identified forthe first t4e as being associated with floods while all Bank-supportedprojects were justified exclusively by agricultural benefits addressing the"food problem", a point which Is elaborated on later.
30. The LVR Study also points out that in terms of fatalities thecyclonic storms from the Bay of Bengal and the related storm surge are farmore devastating than river flooding, with the former accounting forfatalities in the hundreds of thousands and the latter in hundreds. Withpopulation being forced to ever more marginal lands in the coastal area,the potential for catastrophic events such as the 1970 cyclone becomesgreater with each passing year. This type of flooding is, however, not tobe confused with the annual wet season inundation of greater or lesserseverity nor are the "solutions" to storm surge flooding comparable tothose of river flooding.
31. On the macro engineering side the LVR Study of 1972 points outthat the annual flows in the Brabmaputra-Ganges are about double that ofthe Mississippi River and six times that of the Indus with an annualsediment load of some 2.4 billion tons. The combined rivers flowing intothe Bay of Bengal are exceeded in volume only by the Amason River in SouthAmerica and the Congo River in Africa. There is no precedent anywhere for"solving" the annual flood problem of such a river system. The onlypotentially feasible hydraulic engineering solution involves placingembankments on both sides of river channels to exclude low velocity floodoverflow from surrounding land. There are three obvious problems with thissolution: (i) it may not be technically feasible since earth embankmentscannot stop bank erosion from high velocity river channels that move aboutin the flood plain, (ii) the capital costs of such uncertain undertakingsare enormous, and (III) the recurrent maintenance costs and problems areeven more serious, especially for a poor country. Less obvious butpotentially more serious problem of the double embankment solution are:(i) the enviromental and ecological changes associated with the loss ofthe natural inundation regime, and (ii) the potential for catastrophic loss
1/ World Development Report 1989, p 214.
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of life and property from high velocity flows through breachedabanluments. 311
32. A more positive macro engineering finding came out of theassessment of groundwater potential. The most important general findingwas that
.. .with the exception of limited low rainfall areas in the westsrechage should be sufficient to support full development ofirrigated agricaltue for virtually the entire area to which surfacewater supplies are not readily available.* 321
The country was sitting on one of the largest aquifer reservoirs in theworld with one of the largest natural recharge cycles in the world. Thiswas hardly being exploited in the dry season.
33. The success of low-lift pumps utilising surface water fromnatural drains, and the potential for tube well irrigation also changed themacro economics of dealing with the food problem. This technology made itpossible to Implement projects with high agriculture payoffs quickly sincemajor civil works requiring extensive land acquisition were not a necessarypart of the investment. Dry season irrigation using the pump and tube welltechnology also had much higher rates of return than the large civil worksflood control and Irrigation projects. The LR study then emphasized thebenefits of this approach wMch was in direct contradiction to the 1964master plan.
34. The implicit pattern for the next twenty years of Bank lendingfor flood control and Irrigation was set with this study i.e., (1) respondto the *food problem* by exploiting the enormous underlying aquiferreservoir together with low lift pumps and tube wells to irrigate highyielding rice varieties and other non-rice crops in the dry season whenthere are no floods, (i) respond to the "food problem" and, to someextent, the flood-free "space problem" during annual inundations bysupporting polder construction (without stationary drainage pumps),initially in the shallowest flooded areas where the embankments are thecheapest and the agriculture payoff the greatest. An unspoken element ofthis pattern was to put off the large-scale engineering "solutions" to theflood problem into the indefinite future. 331
35. Given the very great political and bureaucratic appeal of largescale engineering solutions within Bangladesh and parts of theinternational community, this strategy made a great deal of sense. It alsomade sense in terms of dealing in an even-handed way with two of the
UI Land and Water Resources Study, Technical Report No. 24, "Floods inBangladesh", Technical Report No. 25, 'River System Analysis", andTechnical Report No. 26, "mbankment Maintenance'.
)2I Land and Water Resource Sector Study, Technical Report No. 21, "TheGroundwater Potential0, page ii.
33 The 1972 LR Study was not (and still is not) accepted by the MDB.
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largest and most powerful bureaucracies in the countrya the BangladeshAgricultural Development Corporation (BADC) which presided over theprovision and operation of low lift pumps and tube wells for irrigation,and the Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) which presides overembankment construction and maintenance and drainage structures. Thus, a#pure* Irrigation project generally dealt with the BADC, while a *pure"flood control project Involved the MDB. A combined project, such asChandpur, dealt with both Institutions.
Recent Efforts at Plannin for Flood Control
36. There is an enormous literature on the subject of watermanagement In Bangladesh and a broad spectrum of views have been presentedon flood control and irrigation over the years. It Is useful in closingout the introductory material to the audit proper to sample from the fourmost recent efforts.
37. Something comparable to the Bank's 1972 effort was undertaken in1986 when a National Water Plan was prepared with the joint support of theUNDP and the World Bank. )1 Its approach and recommendations areremarkably similar to those of the 1972 LWR Study. The entire investmentprogram is driven by the "food problem" which is defined by futurepopulation and consumption estimates coupled with the objective of food-grain self-sufficiency. Little effort goes into the question of farmerprice incentives and the underlying assumption is that if the appropriatetechnology is made available the farmers will use it.
38. In the 1986 NWP there is no longer any question about thecritical role of groundwaters
'Out of necessity the NW has to rely on grondwater developmentduring the TITP and FMEP if a sustained high growth rate of foodgrainproduction to to be achieved.- /
The cost-effectiveness of the two approaches to increases in foodproduction favors the groundwater mode:
CD costs more In pubUc fnds per benefitted ha. than unorIrrigation, and the average Increase In food production is only 0.4ut/benefited ba., compared to 3.3 at for minor Irrigation.- 36
34/ National Water Plan, Ministry of Irrigation, Water Development andFlood Control Master Plan Organization, in cooperation with: UNDPand World Bank, Three Volumes, December 1986.
5I NWP, Summary Report, p. 13.
36 N, Sumary Report, p. 58.
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Yet, the investment priorities of the past weigh heavily on the present -Afuture:
*The ordering of Investment priorities among modes of development tnthe TFTP in a manner that is apparently iaconsiatent with return oninvestment occurred because a large percentage of the BMDS Iavestmentprogrm Is carried over from the SF. Bence, there was littlescope to reassess the overall Investment programe without abandoninga large number of ongoIng Investment projects.0 37
Despite the emphasis on ground water irrigation development, cost effectiveflood control and drainage (FCD) projects are deemed essential in thepursuit of foodgrain self-sufficiencys
"The third goal of FCD Investments (agriculture) has been the mainfoos In the past but it has met with only limited success. Thus,the principal Issue in the NUP strategy for flood control anddrainage development is to Increase the cost effectiveness of floodcontrol and drainage Investments as a means to accelerate the growthof monsoon season crop production." 381
The connection between PCD projects and dry season irrigated agriculture isnot made. 39/
39. The 1986 NWP also points out the beneficial effects of theannmal inundation, the prime one being the enormous fresh water fisherythat provides approximately 80 percent of national protein consumption.Navigation and salinity control are additional benefits of natural drainagesystems. Any national use of water nust take these factors intoconsideration. The "space problem" associated with unusual floods receivedalmost no attention in the NWP. The "food problem" predominated. This wasnot to be the case for long.
40. In 1987 and again in 1988 Bangladesh was hit by unusuall3 severefloods. The extreme dislocation of parts of the population and the damageto crops and infrastructure was dramatic and widely publicized ininternational forums. In the wake of these floods, three major studieswere undertaken. The six volume French Engineering Consortium (FEC) Studyis very nearly a reversion to the focus of the 1964 master plan mentionedpreviously in which the rivers are to be "controlled" and massive BWDB
JZ/ W, Summary Report, footnote one, p. 58.
381 N, Sumary Report, p. 46. Emphasis is Audit's.
"l The Region points out that the Plan provides for a very substantialinvestment in PCD and FCDI works of about 140,000 he per year overtwenty years (1985-2005). This Implies that, while the returns forthis type of works may be lower than for minor Irrigationdevelopment, they are still economie and should be undertaken whereconditions make them appropriate.
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civil works investments predominate 401. The great strength of the FECStudy is the larger macro engineering and economic viewpoint which isgenerally lost in conventional micro economic and engineering projectanalyses. The study comes down in support of a massive 20 year US$ 5.2billion civil works program of 3350 km of BRE-type double embankments withan annual maintenance burden of about US$ 150 million. It is the logicalextension of the bureaucratic development scenario for BWDB and the studyperforms the great service of examining this development scenario inconsiderable detail.
41. The economic analysis in the FEC Study is particularlyrevealing. The three main elements in the benefit stream ares (i) avoidednational flood damage of all kinds, US$ 140 million per year growing at 4percent per annum; (ii) agricultural benefits due to changes in vat seasoncropping patterns, US$ 195 million per year growing at 1.5 percent perannums and (III) other indirect benefits equivalent to 2 percent of theeconomic growth of the non-agricultural sectors. The costs and benefits of
irrigation investments are explicitly excluded from the analy?Ls. 411 Thisboth simplifies an extraordinarily difficult macro economic analysis and,in the Audits opinion, is a correct general treatment of the economics offlood control investments in Bangladesh. 42/ The indirect benefitsreferred to in item (iii) raise the question of benefits beyond those ofavoided flood damage and Improved wet season cropping patterns. Preciselywhat those indirect benefits are and how they are to be measured, if atall, is an open question of considerable importance since they constituteroughly 50 percent of the benefit stream.
42. The sensitivity analysis presented in the economic section ofthe FEC report then concludes as followas (i) with all three benefitstreams the ERR is about 12 percent, (ii) with only agriculture and flooddamage benefits the ERR is about 6 percent. Presumably deletion of flooddamage benefits and dependence only on wet season agricultural benefitsreduces the ERR to around 4 percent. The ecological impact of successfulimplementation of the double embankment scheme is not examined.
40/ Prefeasibility Study for Flood Control in Bangladesh, (hereinafterreferred to as the FEC Study) Draft Final Report, Volume ltExecutive Summary, French Engineering Consortium, Bangladesh WaterDevelopment Board in Association with BETS, May 1989.
41] The FEC Study, Vol. I, Ch. 5, pp. 1.43-1.58. Emphasis is theAudit's.
42/ The Board of Experts appointed to examine the Draft Final Report ofthe FEC does not agree with this contention and specifically directsthe consultant to include irrigation development in any follow-upstudies. See: Report of the Board of International Experts on theDraft Final Report of the Fren-h Enaineerint Co.sortium, Paris, May11, 1989.
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43. The Bangladesh Flood Policy Study (The UNDP Study) was publishedat about the same time as the FEC Study. 431 This study was presided overdejure by the national Ministry of Planning, but defacto by officials fromthe Ministry of Irrigation, Water Development and Flood Control. It tootakes a macro engineering and economic approach to solving the floodproblem. The retommended twenty year program of major embankments andintegrated polder compartments would cost about US$ 3.5 billion with annual0 & M costs of about US$ 175 million in addition to the normal VWDB capitaland maintenance budget.
44. The UNDP study does not perform a formal economic analysis butdoes examine the magnitude of the benefit streams in the light of the coststreams as follows (i) avoided agricultural and industrial output lossesof about US$ 75 millions per year, (ii) avoided damage to capital stock ofabout US$ 175 million per year. No claims are made for wet seasonagricultural benefits due to changes in wet season cropping patterns or dryseason irrigation benefits. The combined benefit stream of about US$250million per year is then contrasted with the cost streams of US$ 200million per year for construction and US$ 175 million for O&M. Theeconomics are deemed to be "rather unfavourable" and the followingstatement is made i
OThe law benefits from stand-alone flood protection are In contrastwith the favourable potential returns cmmonly accorded to waterprojects amig at Increased agricultural production and asociatedarea devel4pment." 441
45. In April 1989, consultants for the USAID published the EasternWaters Study which examined the flood issue from the point of view of theentire Ganges-Brabmaputra Basin including those portions in India, Nepal,China and Bangladesh. 45/ The emphasis with this study is on populationpressure, ecology, politics, food production, dry season irrigation, andtechnical and economic feasibility of flood control measures. The reportmakes the point that it is probably not technically feasible norecologically desireable to successfully control the river system withembankments and that to attempt to do so will put at risk a large amount ofdomestic and foreign resources that could be better used for otherpurposes. Experience with U.S. attempts to control the much smallerMississippi River system and the Chinese attempts to deal with the floodproblems of the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers are brought in to support thiscontention.
46. Technical feasibility in the USAID Study is assigned to smallerscale "flood-proofing" investments rather than "flood diversion" and
43/ Bangladesh Flood Policy Study: Final Report, by the NationalSteering Committee and the UNDP, May 1989.
4I The UNDP Study, p 6-18.
45 Eastern Waters Studys Strategies to Manage Flood and Drought in theGanges-Brabaputra Basin, by Peter Rogers, Peter Lydon, and DavidSeckler, USAID, April 1989.
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upstream reservoir storage. Thits, the periodic serious "space problem" isdirectly addressed by pointing out the critical role played by highway andflood control embankments as temporary locations for escaping high watersand reducing flood deaths. The possibility of constructing embankmentsexplicitly for this purpose is put forth as is the smaller ring dike forhigh value or high human density areas. Great emphasis Is put on the useof groundwater Irrigation to solve the "food problem* and the beneficialeffect of a drawn down aquifer in capturing and mitigating the earlyeffects of the flood season.
47. The USAID Study has little to say about the macro cost andbenefit streame except to point out that the Impact of the 1987 and 1988floods on foodgrain production was, in retrospect, very small and that morepeople suffer in Bangladesh from the annual drought than from the annualInundations - Implying that floods are more dramatic and newsworthy thandrought. The study asserts that a US$ 6.0 billion flood protection programwith an annual operating cost in the order of US$ 600 million would beextremely unlikely to generate economic benefits
... remotely sufficient to justify the Investment and recurring costsof embankmants and even more unlikely that embankments would be thebest use of BangladeshOs extremely Limited domestic, or even foreign-donated resources. 461
Thus, recent large-scale examinations of the flood problem have arrived atvery different destinations.
48. In November 1989, the World Bank published Bangladesh ActionPlan for Flood Control. 471 Unlike the 1972 LVR Study, this is a briefdocument that assumes that something must be considered for solving theflood problem in Bangladesh and that the donor community should have asingle document to refer to in discussing specific elements of aid. TheFEC and UNDP studies were major inputs into the document as controlling themajor rivers Is the underlying assumption. Twenty six elements of a planare set forth in brief annexes of which twelve are for civil worksinvestments either full scale or pilot. The other fourteen elements arethe studies required to make sure that, among other things, the long termplan is both technically, economically, socially and environmentallyfeasible. As such there is no attempt at a macro economic or financialanalysis on the part of the Bank.
IV. Project Definition and Design
49. By 1975, when preparation for the project under audit began, theBank had a sophisticated understanding of how to lend money for floodcontrol operations. This was based on ten years of experience withChandpur I and II and BRE I as well as the 1972 LWR Study. At thebeginning of project preparation the objective was to select five "quick
461 The USAID Study, p 53.
47l Bangladesh Action Plan for Flood Control, Asia Region, CountryDepartment I, November 7, 1989.
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yielding" projects comprising "...minor flood embankment and drainage withsupplementary irrigation where appropriate." Eventually this came to threesubprojects; (i) the Brabmaputra Right Embankment (BRE II), (ii) theChenchuri Beel (CCB) shallow flooding polder scheme, and (III) theKolabashukhali (KBK) shallow flooding polder scheme. The total cost of theUS$ 28 million project had 52 percent apportioned to BRE II, 26 percent toCCB and 22 percent to KBK.
50. The BRE II scheme cannot, in the end, be described as a minorflood embankment. It was formulated with the knowledge that controllingover-bank flooding of the Brahmaputra would be much more difficult than wasanticipated with the BRE I effort in 1963. Natural drainage through theembankment had not worked well, and the steady western migration of theriver channel had led to serious bank erosion. Breaches, both man-made andnatural were common. The natural breaches occurred, not because ofovertopping the embankment, but because of erosion of the embankment. Theman-made breaches usually occurred because in some areas trapped rain watercould not drain naturally into the river and the farmers created their owndrains into the river which became breaches during the next high water. 481The most immediate impact of this was more attention to drainage from theprotected area, the reduction of the assumed useful life of BRE II to 15years rather than 50 years and the introduction of the concept of"retirement". Rather than try to protect embankments from river erosion,it was envisioned that old threatened sections would be "retired" and newsections constructed away from the river. It was recognized that theBrabmaputra main channel was not to be "controlled" in its meandering, atleast not economically. Only the low velocity over-bank flow could beexcluded from sections of the flood plain and embankments should be setback at least one half mile from the main river to achieve this. The 1972LWR Study was quite explicit on this point 49/, and the BRE II project wasdesigned to take it into account.
51. BRE II was a "pure" flood control operation based entirely onagriculture benefits. Net increases in wet season rice made up 76 percentof annual benefits, while non rice dry season crops, for no reason given inthe SAR, made up the other 24 percent. In spite of the useful lifeassumption of 15 years and the introduction of the concept of embankmentretirement, the proposed reconstruction and extension of the original BRE Iembankment yielded an ERR of 38 percent.
52. The CCB and KBK subprojects were simple polders withoutstationary pumps for drainage or irrigation. Monsoon rain accumulationscould only be drained away when the water surrounding the polders was lower
48/ The Region notes that man-made breaches in the BRE were morefrequently caused by people from the opposite bank.
49/ Land and Water Resources Study, Technical Report No. 24, "Floods inBangladesh", pp. 17-20.
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than that within the polder. Ag/ The polder projects started out ascombined projects in that they originally included dry season irrigationInvestments and the resulting dry season benefits. However, the minorirrigation equipment was deleted from these projects after the yellow coverreport on the grounds that BADC already had ample funds from other sourcesto finance the Import of irrigation equipment. The CCB polder project had63 percent of annual benefits in the form of vet season rice increases withthe other 37 percent from dry season non-rice crops. The KBK polderproject had 65 percent of its benefits from wet season rice increases and35 percent from dry season non rice crops. 51/ The economics looked goodwith ERRs in the 30 percent range.
53. By the time the projects got to the Board they were all BWDB-administered projects using earth works and drainagelintake structures toOcontrol" the annual river inundation. How all three projects maintainedsuch large dry season crop components in the benefit streams is notexplained in the SAR. It probably had something to do with the tidalinfluence that pushed fresh water into the polders during high tides in thedry season.
V. Implementation Experience
54. The BRE scheme ran into fundamental problems at the outset.The main conflict was the notion of embankment retirement vs. embankmentprotection. While the westward movement of the Brabmaputra and theaccompanying bank erosion and embankment retirement was accepted by thetechnical experts, it was not accepted by the affected farmers or localpoliticians. River bank erosion and embankment retirement means loss offarm land. In addition, no farmer wants his land to be in the half mile"setback" between the river and the flood embankment. 52/ Everyoneaffected wanted the embankment on the river bank with no setback. Theyviewed the embankment not only as protection from the low velocity over-bank flooding, for which it was designed, but also the high velocity
501 For a good description of the operation of "simple" polders and thelimitations of such an operation see Annex 10 pp. 1-4 of the SAR forthe Third Flood Control and Drainage Project, Report No. 5428-BD,April 16, 1985. This is also the first Bank document in which it isasserted that early floods cause extensive damage to the standingBoro crop and that avoiding these floods constitutes a substantialbenefit. No evidence in the form of cropping calendars or damage isgiven to support this contention, nor are the justifications forwith-project cropping intensities and yields ever specified.
11 SAR Drainage and Flood Control Project, November 30. 1978, Annex I,Tables 22-24, pp. 56-58.
521 In China, the setbacks for public embankments on major rivers were asmuch as four miles. Farmers, on their own initiative thenconstructed lower temporary embankments closer to the river so theland between the river and the public embankment could be cultivatedin most years. See Land and Water Resource Sector Study, TechnicalReport No. 25, 'River system Analyses", page 18.
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erosion of the main stream, for which it was not designed. This set ofissues had been simplified during project design and negotiation into theland acquisition problem*. Experience with BRE I and the Chandpar scheme
had Indicated how difficult it was to put in place civil works which bothprotected and consumed scarce land. This led to the delays thataccompanied land acquisition in the right technical locations. Seniormanagement at the Bank suggested at the green cover stage that this problembe dealt with by making completed land acquisition a condition of Boardpresentation. Bank staff assured management that this was not necessaryand that "assurances" had been given by the Government during negotiations.
55. The BVDB, responding to local pressures, then set aboutconstructing costly groins in the river to protect the embankment andobviate the need to retire it or to buy land on which to build the retiredembankment. The pressure for these investments was particularly strong inthe vicinity of urban areas. The Bank refused to finance this technicallyand economically questionable construction. This was a wise decision, inretrospect, because some of the groins were eventually washed away. 13 Inthe end, embankment retirement has followed the disaster approach todecision making where farmer and political resistance is literallyovertaken by the event of an eroded and eventually breached embankment.The retirement process then became a series of emergency operations ratherthan a carefully orchestrated retreat from the migrating stream. 54/ Inthe end, the BRE II component experienced a 36 percent cost overrun andincreased its share of the total project cost from the SAR estimate of 52percent to the PCR estimate of 67 percent. This last Bank-financed largescale engineering solution to flood control eventually dominated thelending operation.
56. The two shallow polder schemes proceeded pretty much on schedulethough numerous changes were incorporated in the final designs (See paras.3.1-3.16 PCR). These operations were completed at substantial costsavings, and together they accounted for 33 percent of total project costsinstead of the SAR estimate of 48 percent.
531 The Region notes that several groyees survived, mgst others atSer*jgaJ and at Tambulpar. Te experience with these greynesprovides a valuable Input for the ongoing river training study forthe Brabmaputra.
54/ The Region states that something has to be done In the face of theadamant refusal of the population to accept the concept of eankmentretirement. It also points to Its continuous efforts to get W0B toaccept the idea of undertaking a comprehensive physical andathmtical modelling study of the Brabmaputra River, something
which was finally accepted in 1987.
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VI. Proiect Outcome
57. One of the laudable objectives of the project was to conductcareful evaluation studies as to the effectiveness of the investmentsundertaken. Some work was actually done, but the PCR finds it Inadequatefor purposes of reevaluation. In the case of the BRE evaluation study,there was no discussion of the reduction of crop losses due to theembankment, the chief official reason for undertaking the investment (Seeparas. 3.21-3.23 of the PCR). The discussion in paragraphs 4.1 through4.20 of the PCR is typical of the confusion that results when hard dataconcerning cropping patterns, and yields with and without the projects areunavailable to the analyst. Given the lack of data, the PCR analysts fellback on the use of plausible assumptions to adjust the original SARplausible assumptions in recalculating the economic rates of return.Despite a fifty percent reduction in the world market price of rice sinceappraisal and a large cost overrun in the BRE sub project, all threesubprojects are now judged by the PCR to have rates of return in the areaof 30 percent, roughly twelve percent below those estimated at appraisal.It is instructive to see how this can happen.
58. Assumptions about world market prices of rice are critical toinvestments designed to increase rice production. The Bank routinelyproduces a quarterly commodity price forecast. These forecasts are all theanalyst has to use in predicting the crucial farm-gate price (the farmer'sincentive) and the value of future output. In 1978 when the project wasappraised rice prices were high (about US$ 400 per ton in 1985 constantUS$) and expected to stay high. In 1982 world rice prices collapsed, andin 1983 the Bank forecasts began to take a less positive view of futureprices. In 1986 world rice prices dropped to an even lower level thanthose obtaining post 1982. By October 1989, the forecasts called for $179per ton rice in 1990 (in 1985 constant US$) and $166 per ton in the year2000. 5/ This is good news for rice importers such as Bangladesh, but badnews for farmers who are expected to adopt new technologies under a regimeof low farm gate prices. The PCR used the September 1987 quarterlyforecast in its computations and showed only a thirty percent reduction inworld market prices for rice since appraisal. Use of the most recentforecast would add a further twenty percent reduction in the economic valueof rice in the benefit stream.
59. In the case of the dominant BRE investment an extraordinaryassumption was made in the PCR which approximately tripled the incrementaloutput associated with the project. In the original SAR, the assumptionwas that cropping intensities in the area protected by the embankment wouldbe about 154 percent in the absence of the embankment. With theembankment, the cropping intensity was to rise to 171 percent an incrementof 17 percent. In the PCR the without project cropping intensity wasrevised downward to 115 percent to be more "realistic*. The croppingintensity with the project remained at 170 percent. The increment in
551 Revision of Commodity Price Forecasts and Quarterly Review ofCommodity Markets, The World Bank, September 1989.
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cropping Intensity due to the existence of the BE then increased to 55percent under the new assumption. Except for the assertion that this wasmore realistic than the SAR assumption there Is no explanation of thischange.
60. Finally, the PCR makes the Important assumption that allincrements in dry season cropping take place because of the existence ofthe embankment. This assumption also applies to the shallow polderinvestments. No attempt is made to separate the vet season benefits fromthe dry season benefits of low lift pump and shallow tube well Investments.To pursue this point the Audit has extracted the following information fromthe benefit stream from the SAR and the PCR. 56/
Annual Gross Economic Benefits(Percent of Total)
RBK CCB 318ITEH ---------------------------------------------------------
SAR PCR SAR PCR SAR PCR
Wet Season Paddy 64 74 63 31 74 3
Dry Season Paddy 1 16 0 42 2 50
Dry Season Non Paddy 35 10 37 27 24 47
Total Dry Season 36 26 37 69 26 97
61. The relative importance of the benefits of dry season croppingis notable, especially in the case of the BRE II, vhere 97 percent of thegross benefit stream comes from dry season and Irrigated crops that arelargely independent of the flood protection embankment. Only 3 percent ofthe annual gross benefits can be claimed for the embankment investment.Given the changes in irrigation technology and the difficulty ofmaintaining the integrity and effectiveness of the embankment and drainagesystem it is difficult to see the agricultural argument for the BRE II. Asimilar point can be made for the CCB, where 69 percent of the grossbenefit stream comes from increments in dry season crops. Only the KBRscheme seems to have actually increased the wet season paddy share of thegross benefit stream beyond that anticipated in the SAR, a development thatis not explained in the PCR.
62. On the basis of the data provided in the PCR it is quite clearthat the BRE II and CCB flood control investments are not economic if theirprincipal purpose, as set forth In the SAR, was to promote increases in wetseason agricultural production. Given that the BRE II made up 67 percentof the total investment and the CCB made up 19 percent, the case can bemade that the project as a whole was not a successful one. Conversely, the
g/ SAk Annex I, Tables 22-24, pp. 56-58. PCR Tables 14-16.
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payoff to dry season irrigation is manifest, especially in the case of thearea *protected* by the BRZ. The unexpected increases in dry seasonproduction in the BRE and CCB areas could render the investments economicIf it is true that increments in dry season production would not have takenplace in the absence of the flood control embankments. Unfortunately, thiscritically Important linkage has not yet been substantiated withappropriate Impact studies. 571
63. Particularly puzzling then is the apparent success of the BKscheme and its general conformity to the SAR scenario. Given theprotection from early flooding that the embankments provide, and thealleged Importance of this to the boro crop, something closer to the CCBscenario would be expected. Whether this is the result of arbitraryassumptions or real evidence is not known. Given that the two polder areasare contiguous, the apparent dramatic differences in farmer response toflood protection makes these prime candidates for a serious Impactstudy. 58/
64. An unintended outcome of the BRE investment is that virtuallythe entire 242 km. embankment is covered by crude dwellings above the highwater level. Approximately 100,000 landless people now live on theembankment in poor but flood-free surroundings. The construction of anartificial island for strip development of housing for the rural poor is anintriguing concept if it were being undertaken by an urban projectsdepartment. Since the BRE was conceived of as a flood control structure,the spontaneous settlement of people on it was seen by the designers as athreat to the hydraulic integrity of the structure or -.ae grounds thatshelter construction activity involved some excavation of the embankment.Early in the Implementation period, the Bank put considerable pressure onthe Government to remove the squatters. Given the increasingly critical"space problem" in the country it proved impossible to do this and thesubject was dropped.
65. The shallow polder schemes also had operational surprises afterimplementation. Farmers on relatively high land within the polders had adifferent view from farmers on the low lands as to what constituted aflood. Gate settings that were just right for the former would bedisastrous for the latter. Similarly, farmers growing jute may needflooding at times when rice growers in the same polder do not. Gates that
571 The Region makes the point here that although the EiRs in the PCR maybe on the high side that a more realistic assessment would stillyield acceptable rates of return. This is because all threesubprojects were low-cost Interventions with a total per cultivablehectare Investment cost over seven years of between US$240 andUS$300. In each case the total Investment cost per hectare was lowerthan the estimated eanal gross value of crop production without theproject. The Investment costs were low because substantial floodcontrol infrastructure already existed in each eubproject and theproject investments were for rehabilitation and Improvement.
11l The Region points out that salinity is a constraint at K, Impedingthe use of ground water for Irrigation.
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were designed for outflow of drainage only have since been modified toallow inflow as well. However, it was the Audit's observation that thesegates were not under the control of BWDB but were operated by informalfarmer groups. It was said that gate operations were under the control ofthe most influential farmers. The need for organizing farmers numbering inthe tens of thousands to set up equitable polder operations is one of thegreat drawbacks of the polder technology for wet season agricultureproduction.
VII. Findins and Issues
The Food Problem and the Space Problem
66. Two major themes run through the long history of dealing withfloods in Bangladesh. The food problem is the constant underlying themethat deservedly receives attention. However, in the wake of anuaual floodssuch as those of 1987 and 1988, the space problem is dramatically pushedforward. The spectacle of an estimated 30 million people temporarilydisplaced from their homes and awaiting the recession of the flood waterson highway embankments, with all the human suffering involved, leads topolitical demands for the government to "solve" the problem. 59/ This inturn leads to engineering solutions such as those put forth in the 1964Raster Plan and more recently in the FEC and UNDP studies. When theeconomics, finances, and ecological Iapact of these schemes are examinedclosely they become very questionable initiatives.
67. As the memories of the latest Ausual flood recede and thenarrow technical constraints of reality begin to assert themselves, theflood problem is again addressed in the context of solving the food problemof the country. 0, This concern calls forth the sort of analyticalefforts that the 1972 LWR Study, the more recent National Water Plan, andthe USAID Study represent. The two types of studies coexist uneasilybecause they were produced for fundamentally different reasons. Theattempt by the Bank in its 1989 Action Plan to juxtapose these twoapproaches in one document accounts for the tentative nature of theproposals and the heavy conditioning of actual Implementation uponeventually demonstrated technical, economic, financial, social andenvironmental feasibility.
The Record to Date
68. The great preponderance of information that we have to dateindicates that polder investments in deeply and moderately flooded areas,utilizing fixed pumps for drainage In the wet season, have not been a cost-effective way to address the food problem. Lower cost stmple polderswithout pump drainage in shallow flooded areas also have a marginal impacton the food problem unless the case can be made that dry season crop
g9 See the USAID Study, p. 35.
601 The USAID Study makes the point that death and human suffering fromunusual drought in Bangladesh is at least as great as that fromunusual floods. The latter, however, are more dramatic occurrences.
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production based on low-lift pumps or shallow tube vells will not takeplace in the absence of the polders. The Audit's view is that dry seasonIrrigation is so cost-effective that it to largely Independent of thepresence or absence of polders and that the incentives for fazers toundertake intensification in the dry season is much greater than theincentives to do the same in the wet season. The extremely low prevailingand projected prices for rice exacerbate this tendency.
69. The experience with the annual breachings of the BRE indicatesthat flood embankments subject to erosion from a migrating river bed arepoor investments for promoting wet season agriculture production becausethey cannot be made to work effectively. The land acquisition problemmilitates against an effective retirement process. The fact that the poorperformance of the BRE has not kept dry season irrigation from developingin its shadow indicates that the irrigation technology is largelyindependent of effective protection from floods.
70. Considering flood control investments solely in the context ofaddressing the food problem eventually leads the analyst to the grudgingconclusion of the National Water Plan:
"0ut of necessity the NUP has to rely on groundeater developmentduring the TFTP and IFTP if a sustained high growth rate of foodgrainproduction is to be achieved. 611
The reason this conclusion is so unpalatable to some observers Is thatwhile groundwater development certainly addresses the food problem, bothdirectly and effectively, it does nothing about the space problem in timesof unusual flooding.
71. The parallel experience with the BRE is both unusual andinstructive. The fact that it does not work very well in providing floodprotection is widely known and accepted. The conventional wisdom says thisis because the drainage system is not yet perfected and the maintenance isinadequate. The point that has been overlooked is that flood control isnot the only reason for constructing the embankment though this is theofficial reason. The other reason, revealed by government action, iserosion control, another facet of the space problem. The loss of 800 heper year of farm land and urban real estate to the westward migration ofthe Brahmaputra cannot be accepted politically. Land is too scarce and thelosers too well-defined. This then explains why the government spent anadditional Tk 120 millions of very scarce local resources on groynes toprotect the embankment rather than spending it on badly needed maintenance.The Bank's unwillingness to finance this expenditure was based on thenarrow technical concern that the groynes would not work and were anywayeconomically unjustified. 62/ While the Bank's concerns were well-founded,
611 NP, Stnnary Report, p. 13.
62/ Some of the groynes were subsequently washed away and the investmentlost. However, the political benefit of a serious effort to makethem work remained. In the end the government could not be chargedwith indifference or failing to try. The government continues to
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neither of these considerations carries much weight in politicalcalculations. The 100,000 landless squatters on the BRE is visible proofof the social dislocation associated with a "rational* retirement process.
The Difficult Task of the Project Economist
72. What then is the project economist to do when there are powerfulbut unspecified forces leading to investments in flood control civil worksthat may not be technically or economically feasible? How is he (or she)to consider these factors in the formal justification of the project? Aslong as rice prices were high and there was no evidence to indicateotherwise, enough plausible assumptions could be made concerning wet seasonagricultural benefits to justify almost anything that was technicallyfeasible. Under these circumstances both the explicit food objective andthe iaplicit space objective could be pursued. Even *hardening" the BRE forerosion control could probably have been justified in this way. It wasengineering concern for the technical feasibility of erosion control thatstopped that initiative. Similarly, it was farmer resistance to landacquisition that stopped the use of conventional gravity canal irrigationtechnology in the Chandpur scheme, not the fact that it was not cost-effective. Important changes were made in the early years, but not on thebasis of economy and efficiency.
73. As rice prices declined and the evidence concerning the relativeeffectiveness of dry season irrigation began to mount, the Bank's lendingrightly emphasized minor irrigation investments to address the foodproblem. There was no problem with the economics of dry season irrigation.As the problems of the pumped polder schemes became manifest the emphasis,rightly, shifted to simple polders in shallow flooded areas. Nobody knewhow these would actually work but, given the simplicity of the schemes andthe relatively low cost, plausible assumptions were enough to do the job.The SAR for the CBC and KBK schemes under audit are a good example of thisprocess. As it became clear that dry season irrigation even in the polderareas was generating the bulk of the increments in output it was possibleto handle this by treating the wet and dry season costs and benefits as aninseparable package. This then paved the way for the sort of economicanalysis that is featured in the PCR in which not farm incomes in theshallow polder areas are to double and those within the shadow of the BREare to increase by a factor of five (PCR para. 4.14).
74. The most recent Fourth Flood Control and Drainage (DFC IV)Project (1987) had to face the economic analysis problem differently inthat dry season irrigation, by then, was already widespread in the projectarea and its provision could no longer be packaged with the flood controlinvestment. 631 In the DFC IV project there is an assumed plausible shiftfrom broadcast to transplanted wet season paddy. There is also an
spend substantial resources in trying to "harden* the embankment.During the field visits these attempts were emphasised to the Audit.
63 SAR, Bangladesh. Fourth Flood Control and Drainage Project, SouthAsia Projects Department, Report No. 5916-BD, April 9, 1987.
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Important assumption about yield gacreases in dry season crops including anunexplained 21 percent increase in the Boro HYV paddy crop and a 10 percentincrease in wheat. By far the most interesting assumption is that failureto build the polders will lead to a decrease in cropping intensity byeleven percentage points below that which existed at appraisal. This isbecause other polders being constructed in the area will have the effect ofraising water levels in unpoldered areas. The standard technical andeconomic assumption incorporated in earlier flood control projects was thata polder project will have no substantial negative impact on unpolderedareas. In the case of DFC IV, the reversal of this assumption has nowbecome a major element of the justification for building additionalpolders. 641
75. With the real price of rice now expected to remain at less thanhalf the price levels prevailing from 1948 to 1981, and with the increasingconcern over the externalities of poldering it is, in the Audit's opinion,time to overhaul the approach to justifying flood control investments inSangladesh. 65,
76. The Audit recc;nises that an enormous literature exists on thissubject and that an urbanizing population that will soon be 144 millionliving in the delta of one of the world's great river systems will presentspecial problems that defy solution. What does seem Important at thisstage is that we learn what works and what does not work from past attemptsat addressing the problem. The 1981 OED Audit of the Chandpur projectmissed some Important lessons and the 1989 PCR of the project under auditwould repeat that mistake. This Audit seeks to redress these oversightsand benefit from twenty six years of hindsight.
614 The Region points out that the Baranai-Atral basin, where the PCD IVproject is located, presents special difficulties which are currentlybetg studied under the project. Part of the difficulties are man-uade as embankments under earlier schemes were set too close to therivers. Mistakes of this nature are bound to happen in a complexenvironment. However, the situation in this area is not typical forpolder development in Bangladesh and sbould, therefore, not be usedto draw general conclusions on the pros and cons of polders.
65/ Comments from the Region on this point indicate major differences.The Action Plan staff states *We agree strongly with the auditor'acall for more rigorous evaluations of PCD projects (thus Action Planitem No. 12) and agree fully that a careful distinction should bemade between benefits due to FCD and those due to I. We would gofurther, however, and argue that a review Is needed of methods ofeconmic analysis to be used in appraisal of FCDJf projects to takeaccount of any benefits due to reduced risk, Including possiblechanges In Investment and savings behavior.'Projects staff state: *This concerns the stated seed to clearlydistinguish between flood control and irrigation benefits. 1herepossible this should Indeed be done. But where investments in floodcontrol facilities are necessary to reduce or eliminate the risk ofdamage to the boro crop, the exercise becomes complicated, or evenmeanagles.'
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Technoloical Change and the Bureaucracy
77. The unexpected development of a cost-effective dry seasonirrigation technology has had an enormous Impact on people and institutionsin Bangladesh. The fact that it has been more effective in addressing the"food problem" than vet season flood control investments has been pointedout previously. What hasn't been developed is how the changing technologyhas affected the bureaucracies that preside over irrigation and floodcontrol. Both the BADC and the BWDB are highly centralized bureaucraciesproviding valuable services at little or no charge to large segments of thepopulation. Their power, in a resource constrained environment, is derivedfrom administrative control over who receives these scarce services and whodoes not.
78. Initially BADC promoted large scale deep tube wells that fedinto distribution systems controlled by BADC or a community group. BADCofficials had the power to decide where the installations were to belocated and how they were to be operated and maintained. For surfacewater, BADC originally promoted the idea of large pump stations that fedinto canals for delivery and could, as in the case of Chandpur I, pump outwater from behind polders. Such an approach suited their organization.Small scale pumping from surface and ground water resources presented analternative and highly decentralized technology under the control of smallgroups of farmers. BADC successfully controlled and promoted the low liftpump technology by shifting emphasis to monopoly imports of small pumps andrenting them to individuals or groups of farmers. Eventually the farmersand local mechanics became expert in operating and maintaining theprofitable pumps and did not need BADC for this function. The point wasthen made that BADC, having successfully promoted the low-lift pumptechnology, should get out of the pump Import and rental business and thatprivate Importing and local manufacture of small pumps should be phased in
6I. This has been resisted on the grounds that a government presence isneeded for equity reasons and to protect the "public good0. A close lookat how effective BADC has been in promoting these Ill defined objectiveshas shown that the case for continuing centralized control is extremelyweak. 71
79. Reluctantly, BADC is slowly being moved out of the dry seasonirrigation business by a decentralized technology that has been responsiblefor most of the gains made with the "food problem". Were it not for thedemonstrated effectiveness of this atomistic technology and theoverwhelming Importance of food production in Bangladesh there is little
661 Bantladesh Minor Irrixation Sector: A Joint Review by the Governmentand the World Bank, Dec. 1982.
671 For a good recent summary of the Impact of BADC see the forthcomingOD Audit Report Import Program Credits IX-III and Overview ofDevelopments-Outstandini Issues in the Late 1980's, Attachment 38,"Arguments for and Against Regulation". Also see the USAID Report,p. 71, for the circumstances in which externalities justify limitedgovernment regulation.
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doubt that it would not have been allowed to erode a major source ofbureaucratic power. !lI Only in the aftermath of the 1988 floods was BADCcontrol over shallow tube wells substantially reduced and that of theprivate sector Increased. The dramatic increases in sales of minorirrigation equipment and Boro production in FY 89 and FY 90 haveresulted. 691
80. In the flood control business, the BWDB has also seen effectivedry season Irrigation technology as a major competitor. 701 All of theearly justifications for flood control Investments used potential gains inwet season agriculture as a major element in the benefit stream. The BWDBhad both the Implicit "space problem" as well as the explicit "foodproblem" working in favor of their technology. BWDB opposition to aneffective dry season irrigation technology not under their control hastaken on a more technical coloring than the opposition of BADC. The BWDBargument is that ground and surface water resources are limited and thatunrestrained groundwater pumping to leading to "mining" of the aquifer andeventual uneconomic pumping costs. They make the point that the nationalannual groundwater potential is 5.5 billion cubic meters (BCH) and thatgiven the current rate of increase in ground water abstraction that 95percent of the potential will be utilized by 1990. Beyond that point theBWDB technology will have to take up the challenge of the "food problem"again. 71/
81. The Master Planning Organization (MPO) of the Ministry ofIrrigation, Water Development and Flood Control, has examined the sameissue and concluded that the estimate of annual ground water potentialshould be 17.9 BCH. They point out that drawing down the aquifer in thedry season Is like operating any reservoir and that the storage space thatis thereby created in the ground allows the natural recharge in the wetseason to be greater. Surface flood water that would otherwise flow intothe sea can then be captured by the drawn down aquifer. Their estimateimplies that the potential for dry season irrigation is enormous and that
81 An almost exactly equivalent process is taking place in the transportsector where the centrally controlled and operated railway technologyis being painfully displaced by a private, decentralized, atomistictrucking technology.
91 Bangladesh - Selected Issues In Foodarain Development, Draft ReportNo. 8394-3D, February 20, 1990. See paras. 1.13-1.17 on pp. 8-9 andparas.2.13-2.32 on pp. 22-26.
70l An explicit recognition of the competitive power of minor irrigationlies in the regulations that prohibit tube wells in areas irrigatedby the few surface irrigation system that do operate in Bangladesh.
71/ *Review of Assessment of Ground Water Resourcess Quality andQuantity-, by A.F.M Saleh and Alaun Nishat in: BangladeshAxriculture Sector Review. Agriculture Performance and Policies,Compendium Volume III, UNDP, March 1989, pp. 158.
34
there is no reason for it to cease being the major technology foraddressing the "food problem*. nI The USAID Study makes the same point.
82. The FEC Study in its economic analysis correctly (in the Audit'sview) leaves dry season irrigation investments and benefits out of theircalculations. Yet, in the text it states that "It (irrigation) has toquickly follow flood control and drainage works to obtain the full benefitsof these costly structures.* 731 The unstated implication is that somehowdry season irrigation is physically linked to a successful large scaleflood control system. Part of the problem Is that the FEC engineers appearto approach the irrigation problem with a technology not unlike that usedin Chandpur I in which gravity canal infrastructure is assumed to be neededand water is extracted from the rivers and fed into these canals. Theextraordinary flexibility and independence of pumping from an aquifer ordrains with portable pump technology has not been noted. The FEC Studythen deals with the "groundwater problem" by estimating an annualextraction potential of 10 BCM, greater than the ea rlier BWDB estimate butstill much less than that of the MPO. By assuming that 5 BCM will beneeded for municipal and industrial purposes, the residue for agriculturalpurposes is then back to the earlier BWDB figure and the year 2005 is thedate at which dry season irrigation reaches its limitations and large scaleflood control systems will have to bring in the effects of wet seasonagricultural benefits. 741
83. The Audit has gone to considerable pains in this section to makethe point that extensive bureaucracies based on centrally controlledtechnologies have been affected by the development of an effective dryseason irrigation technology that can only work effectively if it is notcontrolled in all details by a government bureaucracy. So effective hasthis technology been that it has undermined the justification for theexpansion of the technologies under bureaucratic control. This may notalways be the case. Intensification of wet season agricultural productionmay eventually become critically important for food production in thefuture. This would be manifested by increasing farm gate prices for foodproduction and increasing costs for dry season irrigated crop production.The incentives for wet season intensification would then be in place andthe proponents of wet season expansion would then have somL.ning to workwith. Their problem would then be that, increasingly, land acquisition forflood control embankments will be a constraint, just as it was for thegravity canal Irrigation technology. Only dramatic floods and a resurgence
Z_/ Review of Assessment of Ground Water Resourcess Quality andQuantity*, by A.F.M Saleh and Ainun Nishat ins BanladeshAiriculture Sector Review, Agriculture Performance and Policies,Compendium Volume III, UNDP, March 1989, pp. 159-60.
71l The FEC Study, Vol. I, Ch. 4, p. 1.40.
74l The FEC Study, Vol.. I, Ch. 4, p. 1.41. The UNDP Study solves thisproblem with a qualitative statement to the effect that groundwaterresources are "limited" and that "...long-term emphasis on surfacewater development is likely to increase."
35
of demands to solve the space problem will relax that constraint for awhile and start the cycle again.
Sustainability
84. The one point on which all are agreed is that in order for acivil works investment to be effective and sustained it must be maintained.Almost everyone is also agreed that the maintenance of the BWDB floodcontrol facilities has not been good. This is consistent with the argumentthat the facilities in place have not been very effective on a sustainedbasis. For many years now experts have been exhorting the government totake maintenance seriously. The Action Plan also has an explicit element toaddress this issue. Why is it that in an area where all are in verbalagreement, so little progress has been made? 75/ The Audit believes thereare at least two underlying reasons for this: The first is that thebeneficiaries of these free facilities either don't perceive the benefitsof the investments to them or they have no effective means of making theirdemand for maintenance known to the government. 761
85. The second possibility is that there may be an Iaplicitpreference for frequent rehabilitation and reconstruction over periodic androutine maintenance. The incentives facing government decision makers mayfaver the former over the latter. Thus, the apparent inconsistency on theBRE - spending money on groynes that are washed away instead of repairingbreaches and bringing cross sections up to standard. Unless theseincentives are understood and changed, it will be difficult to makeprogress in this area.
86. The fact that privately owned tube wells and low lift pumps arenow self-financing, self-operated and self-maintained indicates that theimportant externalities have been internalized and that the incentives areworking in the right direction. The farmers truly want minor irrigationequipment and it is truly effective. 771 This cannot be said about allBWDB flood control investments because there is no market testdemonstratizg their usefulness and the farmer's desire for them. This isdetermined by engineers and project economists employing plausibletechnical assumptions. If not farm incomes in the shadow of an effectiveBRE really were to be increased by a factor of five, and this was perceivedby the farmers, then farmer mainterrAnce (or at least organized politicaldemand for maintenance) of the embankment would be a real possibility and,
75/ The Region I of the opinion that significant progress has been madeIn discussions between Goverament, the Bank and other donors on theperennial maintenance sste, as reflected In the agreements reachedunder the recently-approved BVDB System Rehabilitation Project.
761 In fact, farmer damage to the embankments is a major reason for theirfailure to perform and the subsequent need for maintenance.
77l The fact that some farmer-constructed and maintained embankments inthe coustry have been discovered indicates that there are real andsubstantial benefits associated with minor flood control investmentsal"o.
36
for the first time, the perceived benefit stream would have an Impact onthe sustainability of the investment.
87. In the absence of market tests and effective beneficiarypressures, it becomes necessary to carry out independent Impact studies ofmajor public flood control investments to see if they are truly effectiveand worth sustaining. Despite the difficulty of planning and Implementingthese technically complicated studies in an environment of low incentives,it Is the only means we have of going beyond the plausible assumptionsapproach that has dominated thinking to date. 78, The Audit concedes thatproperly designed and analyzed Impact studies require very specializedapplied statistical skills that are not always available in the course ofproject supervision. This Is a generalised problem with the more complexdevelopment projects the Bank supports. This suggests that a specialeffort to devote the proper resources to the task Is called for.Fortunately, the Action Plan for Flood Control specifies euch an effort.This is an element of the Action Plan that should receive early attention.
781 The Region accepts the need for better planning data and techniques,but points out t -'he difficulties of conducting proper evaluationstudies should at underes-tmated. Even if a good base line studyIs undertaken, the following problem remains (1) how to estimatewhat would have happened it the iavestments had not been made, (tt)ho to associate agriculture benefit stream with different technicaliaterventions, and (i1) bow to estimate the mon agricultural(Includingt *space problm*) benefits associated with flood controliterventions.
37
Report No.: 156/87 CP - 860 61 CRDate: 13 January, 1989 (Revised)
BANGLADESH
DRAINAGE AND FLOOD CONTROL PROJECT(MREIT 854-50)
PROJECT C%MPLETION REPORT
FA(World Bank Cooerative Progrmem
Investment Centre
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
RONE
31
BANGLADESH
DRAINAGE AND FLOOD CONTROL PROJECT(CREDIT 864-80)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Drainage and Flood Control Project (known as DFC1) was thefirst of a series of such projects and was the seventh irrigation and/orflood control project in Bangladesh financed by IDA. These projects weredesigned to support the plan of the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) forincreasing food production through agricultural ievelopment.
1.2 At appraisal in 1978, it was estimated that the OFC1 Project wouldcost US$28 million, of which US$19 million was to be financed by an IDAcredit. The project was to provide flood control and drainage to about108,000 cultivable ha in three sub-project areas with a rural population ofabout 865,000 1/ and improved agricultural supporting services to about36,000 ha in two of these sub-projects. It was estimated that construction
. would be complete by mid-1983. Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWOB)considered work to be complete by June 1985 and the credit closed two yearslate in June 1986. Repairs to project works damaged by floods and othgcomparatively minor works are still outstanding. This report assesses theimplementation experience and impact of the project.
1.3 The report is based on a review of the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR)No. 2077a-80 dated November 30, 1978, the Development Credit Agreement (OCA)dated 22 December 1978 and three project completion reports prepared by theBNDS for the three sub-projects. It also makes use of supervision reportsand project files in the World Bank* evaluation studies prepared by localconsultants for BWDB; findings from a field visit In October 1987; anddiscussions with project staff and World Bank staff in Bangladesh who havebeen associated with the project.
------------------------------SAR considered about 485,000 (56% of t-'ta') to be the target grouppopulation.
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II. PROJECT FORMULATION
Identification and Preparation
2.1 The Bank's Hardcore Programme Report of February 1973 recommended,among other things, criteria for the selection of flood control projects.Such projects should contribute to a rapid increase in food production, beself-contained or part of a phased plan, be economically viable andincorporate labour-intensive methods of construction. Chenchuri Beel (CCS)and Kolabashukhali (K8K) projects were identified because they wouldelimnate salinity and reduce the incidence of flooding, thus resulting inincreased crop yields and improved cropping patterns. The Brahmaputra RightEmbankment (BRE) project was originally financed by IDA Credit 39-PAK(US$5.0 million, 1963). The embankment had provided a degree of floodcontrol permitting a shift from low-yielding broadcast aman to transplantedaman and the greater use of inputs, thereby promoting higher yields andproduction levels. However, by 1977 the ORE was in danger of collapse due toriver erosion and breaches and required urgent rehabilitation andimprovement.
2.2 The project was prepared by BW08 with the assistance of foreignconsultants financed from the First Technical Assistance Credit 409-80. Theconsultants prepared feasibility reports for'each sub-project in 1977 andthe proposals were generally accepted by the appraisal team which conductedits field investigations during January and February 1978.
The Appraised Project
2.3 The project was to cover three separate sub-project areas: CC8 andKBK in the southwest and the BRE in the northwest (Maps 1 to 3). In CCB andKSK, the project was to provide flood control and improved drainage to18,600 he and 17,000 ha, respectively (Maps 1 and 2). In BRE, it was torehabilitate and improve the existing embankment which protected about72,800 ha against flooding from the Brahmaputra River (Map 3). Of the17,000 ha in KBK, some 2,800 ha were then uncultivable due to deep flooding;they were to be made cultivable under the project. To promote a rapidadoption of improved cropping patterns and cultivation practices aftercompletion of the project works, the project was also to include support forstrengthening agricultural extersion services in CCB and KBK. Similarsupport in BRE was already being provided under the Extension and ResearchProject. Complementary irrigation facilities (low lift pumos and shallowtubewells) were available under other ongoing and proposea projects,financed by IDA and other agencies.
Project Components
2.4 The appraised project included the following:
- CC8:
a) 97 km of embankment with an average height of 2 m, a topwidth of 4.25 m and involving- about 2.4 million m3 ofearthwork;
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b) a drainage network with four new regulators varying from1.5 m to 3.0 m wide, covering a net cultivated area of18,600 ha;
c) 40 km of 5.5 m wide access roads with 3.6 m wide brokenbrick surfacing;
d) five gatekeepers' quarters, two godowns, two staffbarracks and one workshop for BWOB*
e) one training centre and about 45 quarters for agriculturalextension staff; and
f) equipment and vehicles for the construction programme andfor the agricultural extension service.
-KOK:
a) 85 km of embankments with an average height of 1.4 m, atop width of 4.25 m and involving about 1.2 million m3 ofearthwork;
b) a drainage network with 13 drainage regulators varyingfrom 1.5 m to 12.2 i wide, covering a net cultivated area.of 17,000 ha;
c) 32 km of 5.5 m wide access roads with 3.6 m wide brokenbrick surfacing;
d) 5 gatekeepers' quarters, two godowns, two staff barracksand one workshop for BW0B;
e) one training centre and about 45 quarters for agriculturaland extension staff; and
f) equipment and vehicles for the construction programme andfor the agricultural extension service.
-BRE:
a) rehabilitation and improvement of 171 km out of 274 km ofexisting embankment to an average height of 3.6 m and atop width varying from 4.25 m to 7.3 m. Earthwork involvedwas estimated at 3.8 million m3;
b) construction of 58 km of retired embankments involvingabout 2.5 million m3 of earthwork;
C) about 78 cross embankments, involving about 0.65 millionm3 of earthwork, for protection of the main embankment aswell as groynes and revetments where required;
d) drainage channel improvements including eight drainageregulators;
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e) one gatekeeper's quarters, one godown, one staff barrack,one workshop for BWB; and
f) equipment and vehicles for the construction programme.
2.5 About three years of consultant services were 'ncluded under theproject for assistance in engineering and agricultural aspects of theproject. Provision was also made for short overseas study tours by selectedagricultural extension staff for observing implementation of the Trainingand Visit (T&V) extension system in other developing countries.
11. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
Design
3.1 Civil works were designed by the BWDB Directorate of Designs inChaka, based generally on criteria laid down in earlier studies. Thisgenerally worked satisfactorily but delays were reported in 1981 inprovision of drawings for CCB and a dispute arose between designers and sitestaff over the design of a major road bridge in CCB (see para 3.9). Thesedifficulties might have been avoided if consultants had been used asenvisaged in the SAR.
Revision to the Project
3.2 Although the project was constructed generally in accordance withthe SAR, there were many detailed changes in quantities (Tables 1 to 3),mainly to adapt to changing circumstances.
3.3 In CCS and BRE, the lengths of embankment constructed under theproject were less than estimated in SAR due to some work being done underFood for Work (FFW), and more use being made of existing road em0ankmentsand high ground to minimize the land area to be acquired. Some embankmentson CC8 remain incomplete. An extra regulator to improve drainage in CCS wasadded to the project. The lengths of roads in CCB were reduced from 40 km to24 km, 8 km of which are incomplete (see para 3.8), and in K8K from 32 km to14 km. A major bridge in CCB (see para 3.9) and 9 village road bridges InKOK were added.
3.4 At BRE the length of Teesta resettioning was reduced from 43 Km to28 ki, but the length of retired embankment increased from 1.6 km to 14.5 km(Map 3) leaving an area of 1,700 ha unprotected. The Tambulpur groyne wasincluded in the project. The length of Brahmaputra embankment resectionedincreased from 129 km to 185 km, partly due :o poorly constructed retiredembankment: the length of embankment retired was close to the appraisalestimate. The number of cross embankments (constructed perpendicular to themain embankment across borrow pits on the riverside to prevent deep fastflow adjacent to the embankment during floods) increased from 78 to 115 andthe avera e length and cost increased. Due to local demand, 16 drainaeregulators were constructed instead of the 8 proposed in SAR but, due t,difficulties in acquiring land, most of the proposed improvement of draira%.
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channels was omitted; 6 km of road were added to the project. IFAD tookresponsibility for about 20,000 ha north of Bera and south of HorasaganRiver which were omitted from the project. An area of about 2,800 ha wereleft undefended near Sera (Map 3). The SAR showed an area north of Rangpuras part of the project area, but this has not been protected.
3.5 The SAR proposed that 24 man-months of short-term consultantsshould be used to assist 81408 with design and 12 man-months to assist inestablishing the T&V system of agricultural extension. These were not usedbut consultants were employed to prepare evaluation reports for the threesub-projects, which was not allowed for in the SAR cost estimates. Overseasstudy tours and incremental operating costs for agricultural extension wereomitted.
3.6 The SAR proposed that, for effective operation of the T&V system,improved housing, vehicles and equipment would be required but the amountsupplied was considerably less than proposed since this was available fromother sources (para 3.19).
Construction
3.7 Credit effectiveness was delayed for seven months, mainly due tothe need for the Project Proforma I/ to be approved by the ExecutiveCommittee of the National Economic Council. By June 1980, little progresshad been made: CCS was delayed by land acquisition and only a nominal lengthof embankment had been constructed. Progress then improved but adisagreement between BW08 and IDA emerged over 8NOB's proposal to constructexpensive gr6ynes in the river in an attempt to reduce erosion of BRE andthe consequent need for acquiring land for retirement of the embankment. IDAdecided not to finance the groynes due to doubtful long term value comparedto retiring the embankment and the very high cost. IDA proposed that theiten available in the credit for consultants be used to finance a study ofthe best method of controlling the river. This argument continued thoughoutthe implementation period and serious consideration was given by IDA tostopping reimbursement on BRE due to SB's policy of building groynes.Construction of a groyne was started in December 1980 at Kazipur under thecontrol of a local Member of Parliament (MP), but was abandoned in February1981 after some Tk6.5 million had been spent. This was not reimbursed byIDA. Because land acquisition for planned retirement of the embankment wasbeing resisted, often with assistance from MPs, only minor retirements on anemergency basis were carried out.
3.8 By October 1982, CCS and KSK were nearing completion. KSKprogressed well and was substantially coiplei by June 1983,but public opposition to land acquisition for elmbanaentconstruction, poor quality of work, and contractualirregularities delayed the completion of CCB. Theirregularities resulted in 8 om of road being left incomplete,the black-1isting of 23 contractors and disciplining of SlDBstaff. By June 1983 when project construction should havebeen complete there were 11 km of Teesta embankmentincomplete; 16 lks of embankment and 10 km of drain at CCB werestill to be constructed.
Jf A 808 document, the approval of which is a prerequisite for releaseof funds and hiring of staff.
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3.9 The supervision mission in May 1985 reported allworks complete except two regulators and flood-damagedstructures at BRB and works at CCB. These included aregulator which needed replacement due to sub-standard work, 2lan of embankment, 8 km of road and a bridge over a majordrainage channel which was added to the project with IDAapproval in 1981. The bridge was delayed by disagreementbetween the designers and site staff and difficulties withfoundation construction. The bridge was eventuallly completedby the Highways Department.
Procurement
3.10 Because the civil works were simple and labour-intensive, the SARproposed local competitive bidding. In order to discourage the tendency tolet many petty contracts, which causes excessive paperwork at all levels,assurances were obtained that no contract would be smaller than US$5,000.Nevertheless, the number of contracts was vastly greater than the 367estimated in the SAR. The contractual irregularities described in para 3.8were partly the result of the large number of contracts as prompt individualcontrol was made difficult.
qualit, and Performance of Project Works
3.11 Although the quality of the workmanship was generally reported tobe satisfactory, the number of unsatisfactory instances reported gives causefor dbcern. There are examples of reduced embankment cross sections beingadopted when it was difficult to acquire land.
3.12 In general, there was no mechanical compaction of embankments andat least one breach in 8RE has been attributed to seepage through theembankent, probably due to JnadeqLate compaction. However, most of the tenbreaches reported on ORE in the last four years were caused by erosion byriver flow and would not have been avoided by improved compaction. Onebreach in CCS was caused by overtopping of an embankment which, due to lackof available funds, was constructed to less than full height. Examples ofpoor workmanship, mainly in CCB, included poor storage of cement, handmixing of- concrete, unsatisfactory concrete and formwork, lack of concretequality control, improperly installed flapgates and excavation of regulatorinlet and outlet channels to incorrect profiles. The quality of earthworksdone under FFW appears generally less satisfactory than contracted works.
3.13 Problems aggravated by inadequate operation and maintenance (0&M)include collapse of bank protection near regulators, especially whenregulators are operated contrary to 908 instructions at the forcibleinsistence of farmers.
3.14 The project has managed to maintain the condition of the SREthrough several years of abnormally high floods and rainfall but the dangerof embankment collapse can be avoided only if a high maintenance input iscontinued in future years, including continuous retiring of the embankment.The SAR assumed that 10 km per year would require retirement and the ProjectCompletion Report (PCR) mission concurs with this.
3.15 Retiring the embankment involves the permanent loss of land to theriver. Often this includes house plots whose owners, having nowhere to go,move during the flood to the only unoccupied high ground available, i.e. theembankmet. Consequently, near retired embankments largle-numbers of houst'have been built by cutting into the embankment profile to form le.t
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foundations, thus considerably reducing the embankment cross section andendangering its stability during prolonged high floods.
3.16 KSK has generally performed well but the difficulty of drainingexceptionally heavy rainfall has caused farmers to breach the embankment inmany places. Although the breaches seen by the PCR mission had beenrestored, this had not been done to the full section of the embankment. SWOBnow propose to construct additional regulators to improve drainage. Similarproblems occur at CC8.
Aqricultural Extension
3.17 The project aimed at the establishment of the T&V system ofextension in CCB and K8K not later than 1 January 1980. The number of BlockSupervisors 1/ was intended to increase by about 50% over the pre-projectlevel of 537and Upazila Agricultural Officers (UAO) 2/ were to be appointedin each upazila. The project was also to provide housTng, transport, audiovisual equipment and demonstration materials (Table 7) to support theextension service.
3.18 The T&V system of extension has been introduced by the Departmentof Agricultural Extension (DAE) and implemented in all six upazilas of CC6and KBK. Blocks and sub-blocks have been demarcated, contact farmersidentified but the regular visit routine has been established only in somevillages. Block Supervisors have received fortnightly training.
3.19 In general the extension service remains weak. Although the numberof Block Supervisors has increased and UAO were appointed as expected atappraisal, CC8 and KBK were short of Subject Matter Officers (SMO) at theupazila level and Subject Matter Specialists (SMS) at the district level.Extension visits were limited due to lack of mobility and accommodation.Although included in appraisal estimates (Table 7), four-wheel-drivevehicles (2), pick-up trucks (4), speed-boat hulls (12), outboard motors(12), houses for SNS (4) and UAO (6), training unit, office furniture andequipment were not provided, mainly due to a Government ban on purchase ofnew vehicles. All bicycles (49) have been provided but Block Supervisorscomplained of poor quality, and claimed that the bicycles only last a year.Only 26 of the proposed 45 seed-stores have been renovated and converted toquarters fbr Block Supervisors. The renovation and conversion to houses ofseed-stores, most of which were constructed in the early 1960s, were notconsidered to be a good proposition. The quarters have started todeteriorate (roof leakage, etc.), and this would accelerate because of thelack of budget for maintenance: ventilation is unsatisfactory and thiscreates health hazards as the bedroom is adjacent to the agro-chemicalstore.
3.20 Since motorcycles and bicycles are provided on a hire-purchasesystem, new staff are without transport when the project staff aretransferred. Continuous in-service training of staff and training of Farmersare not possible because of lack of training facilities. Better linkageswith SWDS as well as with research and development agencies are required.
-------------------------1/ Previously titled Village Extension Assistant and Village
Agricultural Assistant.V/ Previously titled Thana Extension Officers.
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Evaluation Studies
3.21 The SAR proposed that a "bench mark" agricultural and socio-economic survey would be conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)about one year 1/ before project completion to establish the preprojectsituation. Two ollow-up surveys would be conducted, one year and four yearsafter completion of the project works.
3.22 Three evaluation studies, one for each sub-project area, wereconducted in 1985/86 by local consultants for 8WOS. This was two years aftercompletion of K8K, and followed the official completion of CCS, althoughsome construction still remains to be done. The evaluation studies for CCSand KSK therefore are more representative of early with-project development.The reports were unsatisfactory in some respects. They failed to present aclear picture of the project. Survey findings were poorly presented andcontained errors. A number of conclusions were unsupported, misleading orinconsistent. However, they indicated that cropping intensities and cropyields appeared to have increased as a result of the project and thatmaintenance of project facilities appeared to be very inadequate. They alsodrew attention to adverse results, such as loss of fertility due toprevention of silt in flood water, but did not discuss the relativeimportance of this. The evaluation study for BRE was better than those forCCB and KBK, but many solutions proposed were not adequately justified.There was no discussion of reduction of crop losses due to the embankmentand there is doubt concerning the extent of the benefitted area.
3.23 OW08 prepared project completion reports, satisfactorily coveringthe construction of the three sub-projects but these did not take account ofthe evaluation reports nor did they reassess agricultural production.
Costs
3.24 The costs of the three sub-projects are detailed in Tables 1 to 3and summarized below:
/Csaswyrpotpjtoli----------------Y/ DCA states two years prior to project completion.
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SAR ActualTk million USs million Tk million US million
Land Acquisition 60.2 4.0 104.0 5.0Civil Works 272.1 18.2 399.3 20.4Equipment & Vehicles 16.7 1.1 13.7 0.8Technical Assistance 10.6 0.7 2.0 0.1Engineering andAdministration 38.0 2.5 52.1 2.4
Agricultural Extension 22.4 1.5 4.5 0.2
Sub-total 420.0 28.0 575.6 28.9
Expenditure under FFW 138.0 4.8Expenditure under FOR 57.6 1.9Expenditure under 3.3 0.1
CR955-80
Total 420.0 28.0 774.5 35.7
Includes Tk1.6 million on ONM establishment on KSK afterproject completion.
Actual project costs were about 37% higher than appraisal estimates whenmeasured in Takca but only 3% higher in US dollars, because the Takadepreciated by 50% against the dollar during the life of the project. Whenexpenditures under FFW, Flood Damage Rehabilitation Project (FOR) and C-fedit955-BO are Included, the cost overruns increase to 84% and 28% respectively.The total costs per hectare benefitted were US$283, US$275 and US$343 1/ incurrent costs ;J for CCB, KBK and BRE or US$302, US$309 and US$369 17 in1987 prices.0.
3.25 the main cost overruns were for: BRE groynes (TkS6 million), whichwere not included in the SAR cost estimates and were not financed from theL-'edit; land acquisition (TK44 million) due to increased unit cost of land;BRE earthworks (Tk4S million plus FFW); and ORE roads (1701 million), wlichwere not included in SAR. "he main savings were in facilities for the DAE(Tk18 million), which were substantially reduced in scope; village roads inKBK MTI9 million) and CCB embankments (Tkc7.5 million).
Y Assuming 72,800 ha protected in BRE.jObtained by dividing cost in current Taka by prevailing exchange
rate.3/ Conversion to constant US dollars made by dividing cost in constant
1987 Taka by 1987 exchange irate.
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ProJect Financing and Credit Allocation
3.26 At appraisal it was proposed that about 68% of the estimatedproject cost would be financed by an IDA credit of US$19 million. Mainly dueto devaluation of the Taka relative to the US dollar, and failure of SWDB toprocess some disbursement applications, only about US$10.9 million weredisbursed under the credit for the project works. US$6.8 million wastransferred to the FOR (Credit 1564-80), of which about US$1.9 million wasused on DFC1 project works. Funds from other sources have been used for DFC1project works as shown below:
Sourcg SAR ActualUS$ million % US$ million %
Credit 864-80 1/ 19 68 10.9 31608 9 32 18.0 50Credit 1564-40 (FOR) 1.9 5Credit 955-80 0.1 0FFW 4.8 14
Total 28 100 35.7 100
ja The schedule of disbursements under Credit 864-80 is in the BasicData Shea.
3.27 The OCA proposed that IDA would finance 100% of expenditures on:directly imported construction materials, equipment, vehicles andspare parts; local expenditures ex-factory on construction materials,equipment, vehicles and spare parts locally manufactured and procuredthrough international compett'le bidding (IC8), consultants, overseastraining and salaries of addit: -il staff for agricultural extension; 90% ofcivil works, construction materials procured through local shopping andequipment, vehicles and spare parts not imported or procured through ICB.When the' OCA was revised in May 1985 to include FOR, the expenditure to befinanced was increased to 95% of civil works. Allocations are detailedbelow:
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DCA Actual 1(US$ millh;rT ..
Civil Works & Materials 16.0 17.140Equipment, VehiclesA& Spare Parts 0.5 0.423Consultants & Overseas Training 0.5 0.122Salaries for Additional Staff forAgricultural Extension 0.2 0Unallocated/Cancelled 18 1,315
Total 19.0 19.000
1/ Including FOR.
IV. PROJECT IMPACT
Aqricultural Impact
4.1 No bench mark survey was carried out and project performance wasnot monitored by the Ministry of Agriculture (KDA) as required by the DCA.Hence, data on cropping pattern, cropping intensity, crop yields and inputrequirements are based on mission assessment of SAR estimates, theevaluation studies undertaken by consultants in 1985/86, agriculturalstatistics provided by the Upazila and District Agricultural Officers andinterviews with farmers.
4.2 The assumptions regarding phasing of the benefits are based on Banksupervision reports and construction progress (Tables 20 to 22). At CCB,benefits are assumed to start in 1981/82 and reach full development in 1990-91. At KBK, the first benefits are assumed in 1982/83 and full developmentin 1988/89. At BRE, the estimated impact is based on the same assumption asin the SAR, i.e.! it is assumed that the without-project agriculturalproduction would decline from 1981/82 until the embankment had completelycollapsed in 1992/93, 15 years after the start of the project. Thebenefitted area is assumed to decline as land is lost due to erosion by theriver (para 4.5) and the assumeo cropping pattern without the project morerealistically reflects the assumed complete collapse of the embankment by1992/93 (para 4.8) than that assumed in the SAR.
4.3 The project areas have benefitted from several projects includingExtension and Agricultural Research Project, Shallow Tubewells (Credit 724-B0), and low-lift pumps provided under Credit 990-80. Although the without-project situations assumed in this PCR and allowances for the cost cfirrigation attempt to take account of these other projects, there isnevertheless a risk that this PCR has overestimated the benefitsattributable to the project. When account is taken of this, as well as thesparsity of project-specific agricultural data and the fact thatagricultural benefits are not yet fully developed, the benefits claimed inthis report should be treated with caution.
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4.4 The project was expected to result in increased crop yields andimproved Cropping patterns and thus provide higher production of paddy andrabi crops. In CCB and KBK, protection from early floodir3 and salt waterintrusion, reduction in flooding depchs as well as improved extension wouldpromote more intensive land use and enable shifts from mixed aus and aman totransplanted aman and/or from local to high yielding varieties (HYV). In8RE, the rehabilitation and improvement of the existing Orahmaputraembankment were intended to prevent its eventual collapse and hence promotehigher crop yields and more diversified and beneficial cropping pattern. Theactual estimated impact of the project is described in the followingparagraphs. It assumes that project works are adequately maintained andbreaches in embankments are promptly repaired.
4.5 Net Cultivable Area. In CCB, the net cultivable area is now21,000 ha (SAR 18,600 ha), based on data provided by the respective UAOs.Without the project, the net cultivable area would be 400 ha greater due tothe acquisition of land for project works. In KOK, the net rultivable areahas increased from 14,400 ha (SAR) to 17,000 ha due o flooded landreclaimed by the project. In BRE, the net cultivable area in 1977/78 wasassumed to be 72,800 ha. On the assumption that, both with and without theproject, 800 ha would be lost annually due to erosion, the net cultivablearea would be 59,200 ha when, without the project, the embankment would beassumed to have collapsed completely (i.e. 1992/93).
4.6 Croppinq Pattern. In CCB, due to imperfect drainage, the shift fromaus to T. man has not occurred (Table 8). Although the areas of 8. aus andB. aman are expected to be less with the project than without, they willremain major crops covering about 15% and 37% respectively of the totalcropped area. T. aman has been assumed to increase due to the project from13% to 18%. Approximately 8% of the area is assumed to be planted with boropaddy although there was none before project implementation. Other new cropsinclude potato and sugarcane, altholigh they cover only 1.2% of the totalcropped area. As anticipated at appraisal, there is a substantial increasein the area under rabi crops such as wheat, pulses and oilseeds but jutecultivation has been assumed to decrease with the project.
4.7 In KBK (Table 9), contrary to SAR expectation, B. aus has not beenreplaced; HYV T. aman is not grown and areas of rabi crops such as wheat,pulses, oilseeds have only slightly increased. Sugarcane, a new crop, isplanted although not extensively. Due to poor drainage, B. aus, B. aman andmixed aus and aman are expected to be the predominant crops covering 59% ofthe total cropped area. As anticipated at appraisal, local T. aman hasincreased appreciably.
4.8 In the ORE (Table 10), the area under HYV boro has in,reased sinceproject commencement and is expected to cover aoproximately 23% of the totalcropped area at full development, although SAR anticipated only 3% with o"without the project. B. aman is still cultivated in areas where drainage hasnot improved. Potato (a new crop) is being planted although not extensively.Without the project, by 1992/93 when it is assumed the embankment would havecollapsed completely, the cropping pattern is assumed to consist of B. aman,mixed aus and aman and pulses covering approximately 52%, 31% and 17% of thetotal cropped area.
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4.9 Cropping Intensity. Comparison of cropping intensity is summarizedbelow:
SAR PCRFuture Future Incremental Future Future increnentaT
Sub-projects Thout Tith Tithout WithProject Proect Pro ect P iect
Chenchuri Beel 135 152 17 118 140 22
Kolabashukhali 115 145 30 120 135 15
Srahmaputra RightEmbankment 154 171 17 115 1/ 170 S5
1/ 1992/93, when embankment is assumed to have completely collapsed.
4.10 In all the sub-projects cropping intensity will increase with theproject. The increase in incremental cropping intensity at CCB compared tothe SAR is due mainly to the PCR's lower estimate of cropping intensitywithout the project which is much cioser to the SAR "present" (1977/78)situation. However, at K8K the increase is less than expected in SAR. Landuse is less intensive due to imperfect drainage aid salinity problems. Inthe Brahmaputra Right Embankment sub-project, the cropping intensity isestimated to be 115% without the project in 1992/93, which is considered tobe a more realistic estimate of the situation after collapse of theembankment than given in the SAR.
4.11 Crop Yields. As anticipated at appraisal, crop yields haveincreased with the project and incremental yields are higher for NYVs thanlocal varieties (Tables 8 to 10). Compared with SAR, PCR estimates ofincremental yields are lower for local variety paddy. Local variety paddy isexpected to increase by about 0.2 t/ha; HYV boro about 1 t/ha; wheat andother rabi crops about 0.3 t/ha. At BRE, without the project after 1992/93,yields of B. aman, mixed aus and aman and aulses are expected to be low,1.1, 1.7 and 0.5 t/ha respectively. Achievement of higher yields isrestricted by imperfect drainage and ineffective extension. Salinityproblems are a further constraint in KBK.
4.12 Production. The estimated annual production with and witho4t theproject at full development is given in Tables 14 to 16. Comparative annualincremental production of all crops is summarized below:
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Annual Incremental Productioncrps__ KOK DRE
SAR PCR............ O tons) ..............
Paddy 9.6 14.9 13.8 17.8 42.9 100.6Wheat 2.0 3.2 1.6 0.2 4.7 20.5Jute 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0 25.4Pulses 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.2 2.0 -3.4Oilseeds 0.8 0.4 1.0 0.2 1.9 2.7Vegetables 1.1 0 1.0 1.0 1.9 33.0Potatoes - 0.2 - - - 28.5Sugarcane - 0.9 - 3.5 - -
Incremental paddy production in CC8 and KBK is higher than appraisalestimates. This is because larger areas can be planted with paddy and HYVboro is grown although this was not anticipated at appraisal. Estimatedpaddy production in 8RE is slightly lower than anticipated because the areaunder paddy is less and low yielding B. aus and .B. aman still coverapproximately 35% of total cultivated area of paddy at full development.Incremental production is much higher because of the cropping patternassumed by the PCR without the project.
4.13 Increase in rabi crop production is substantial in ORE and onlymarginal in CCB and KBK where irrigation facilities are less. The annualproduction of the two major rabi crops, wheat and jute, has increasedsubstantially in BIE.
4.14 Farm udSgets. Although the SAR used three different farm sizes,0.4, 1.2 and 2.8 ha, to represent the "marginal", "small", and "large" farmsrespectively, the PCR has adopted only one farm size, 1 ha, to represent theaverage far.i. 1/ Due to the lack of data, only crop production activitieshave been consTdered and similar rates of crop input requirements (Table 11)have been assumed for the three sub-projects as in the SAR. Cropping patternand cropping intensities are as given in Tables 8 to 10. From the summary ofnet farm incomes at full development shown below, it is clear that farmerswil) benefit substantially from the project.
Future Net Farm Incomes
Without With IncrementSub-project Pr t P Tct
........ (k/year) .........
Chenchuri Beel 2,049 4,347 2,298Kolabashukhali 3,851 6,799 2,948Brahmaputra Right Embankment 1,666 8,349 6,683
-/ B on t i n E u n dp--------------------Y Based on the finding of Evaluation Study Reports.
52
4.15 Farming Practices. Cultural practices have not improved appreciablyduring the project period. The use of fertilizers has increased: theirapplication is mainly confined to HYV and generally remains below therecommended rates. In some areas, fertilizers are not available fromauthorized dealers and have to be purchased from private dealers at higherprices. HYV seeds are not always readily available. The application ofpesticides is quite widespread but the rates are variable and mostly lessthan the recommended dosages. Land preparation is exclusively by bullocks.
4.16 Adverse Effects. Since overflooding with sediment laden water hasceased, there is no augmentation of natural fertility. Data on soil salinitylevels were not available although one of the objectives of the embankmentwas to prevent intrusion of saline water into the project area.
Fisheries
4.17 -he construction of embankments has reduced the incidence, depthand duration of flooding and thus production from natural fisheries in theproject areas. Based on an estimate of 35% of natural cultivable areaaffected in CCB and KSK and 25% in 8RE, and of an average production of fishof 11.3. kg/ha/year, 1/ the loss in annual production is estimated to beabout 83 tons in CCB, 67 tons in KBK and 210 tons in BRE, worth a total ofabout Tk7.6 million per year.
Navigation
4.18 The closure of the mouths of creeks by embankments and regulatorshas impeded navigation by country boats. It is difficult to quantify theeffect of this but it is not considered significant with respect to thebenefits of the project as most farm output is sold locally. Before theproject, cargo was usually transferred between small boats and large boatsat the confluence of rivers and drains; the negative effect on watertransport is offset to some extent by improved access on the embankmentcrest and roads and bridges constructed under the project. The evaluationstudies found traffic volumes to be high and local market places developingnear the embankment.
Other Impact
4.19 Projects such as this necessarily involve substantial ecologicalchanges. The improved flood protection and drainage should reduce theincidence of malaria and cholera, bcth of which were endemic to the projectarea. The effect on flood levels outside the project areas nas in the pastbeen assumed to oe negligible since the flood discharges in the affectedrivers are vast compared to changes under the project. However, FCD3 Project(Credit 1591-80) provided for a basin-wide assessment of the impact of floodcontrol and drainage prograsses which should resolve this question.
***--------------------------------1/Based on FCO4 SAR.
53
4.20 In addition to protecting agricultural production, the projectprotects infrastructure, housing, people and livestock. The Surface WaterHydrology Department of BWOB has estimated the damage caused to houses andlivestock by the 1987 floods by district. Applying these figuresproportionately to the area protected by the project works indicatesbenefits in the order of Tk25 million for CCS, Tk2O million for KOK andTkl50 million for BRE.
V. ECONOMIC AE-EVALUATION
5.1 The major quantifiable benefit of the project is incrementalagricultural production (see para 4.12). The total incremental annualproduction valued at 1987 economic prices amounts to Tk1,334 million. Theincremental output of paddy, wheat and jute would together save or generateannual foreign exchange of about US$28 million at full development.
5.2 Other benefits from the project, which were not taken into accountat appraisal, include the protection from floods of people, property andother assets such as livestock and poultry. The project also increasedemployment but reduced fishing potential and reduced water navigationpossibilities because of the closing of waterways by embankments andregulators.
Assumptions
5.3 The economic analysis of the three sub-projects was carried out in1987 constant prices 1/ with past expenditures deflated by the grossdomestic product (GOP) deflator. Taxes have been excluded from the analysis.All local costs have been converted into border costs by using the currentstandard conversion factor (SCF) of 0.8. The cost of land acquisition isexcluded becavie the agricultural production foregone on it with the projectis deducted from the benefits. The residual value of equipment and vehiclesis very small and has not been included.
5.4 The project costs include work done under the FFW programme (withcosts valued at the border price of wheat) and excenditures incurred underIDA Credits 955-80 and 1564-80. For BRE, only 50% of the expendituresincurred under FFW are included as it is assumed that 50X would have beenspent on the old embankment without the project.
5.5 For CCB and KSK, future 0&M costs are assumed to affo.nt toTk8 million annually, based on the pas: experience of ma4mtaining theembankment. For BRE, future O&M costs consist of maintaining the embankment(Tk25 million per year) 1/ and retiring 10 km of embankment every year
1/ All costs and benefits are expressed in prices at July 1987._f Since the project civil works consisted largely of the retirement
of.old embankments, future retirement could equally be consideredas investment costs.
54
(TK45 million per year) in order to maintain the benefits that can bederived with the project. I/
5.6 The quantifiable benefits from the increased agriculturalproduction at full development are shown in Tables 14 to 16. Economic re-evaluation of BRE has been based on the principles used in the SAR: with theproject the embankment would be kept intact but without the project theembankment would be completely destroyed in 15 years and agriculturalproduction would decline steadily from 1978 to 1993.
5.7 In calculating the economic benefits, the prices used forinternationally tradeable goods are based on the World Bank's CommodityForecasts, September 1987, expressed in constant 1987 prices. Theprojections for 1990/91 and 1995/96 are shown in Table 12. The projectionsfor 1990/91 are used in all the calculations. For jute the export parityprice is used and for all other tradeable outputs and inputs the importparity price is used. For non-traded goods the present financial farmgateprices, adjusted by the SCF, are used. A summary of all financial andeconomic prices is shown in Table 13. The project permits the use ofirrigation facilities provided under other projects. The costs and benefitsof this have been included.
5.8 The project also provides other non-agricultural benefits includingthe protection of property and other assets such as livestock and poultryfrom flood damage. An approximate estimate of these benefits is Tk200million once every 4 years (see para 4.20).
5.9 One negative consequence of the project is the reduction in fishproduction arising from the reduction in depth and duration of stagnantwater. This annual loss is estimated to be 380 tons of fish, valued atTk7.62 millio*. This amount has been deducted from the project benefits.
Re-estimated ERR
5.10 In estimating the internal economic rate of return (ERR), a 30-yearperiod of analysis has been assumed. Costs associated with reducednavigation possibilities and benefits arising from the protection of humanlives have not been included in the main analysis on account of thedifficulties inherent in quantifying these. However, the ERR has also beencalculated for the three sub-projects with these. The SAR estimates of ERRincluded the benefits from agricultural products alone. The economic costsand benefits streams are presented in Tables 20 to 23.
5.11 The re-estimated ERR for CCB is 24% (SAR estimate 28%), KOK is 30%(SAR estimate 37%) and BRE is 31% (SAR estimate 38%). The overall rate ofreturn for the entire project is 30%, compared to the appraisal estimate of34%. The economic rates of return are slightly lower than appraisalestimates mainly due to the lower economic price of rice (30% less than theSM estimate). This has been offset by increased incremental production and,in CC8 and KOK, by lower construction costs. The PCR has made lessoptimistic assumptions concerning the phasing of benefits than the SAR. InBRE, the PCR estimates of the benefits from agricultural production aresignificantly higher than the SAR's. The latter had overestimated production
-------------------------Until 1993 when the old embankment is assumed to have completelycollapsed, only 50% of these are incremental to the project.
55
without the project by assuming a cropping intensity of 154% despite thecomplete collapse of the embankment. These significantly higher incrementalbenefits compensate for the actual cost overrun of 40% in real terms. Whenthe flood protection benefits to property and livestock are included, there-estimated rates of return increase to 28% for CCB, 35% for KSK and 34%for BRE. The overall rate for the whole project would be 34%.
Employment
5.12 An indirect benefit generated by the project is the creation ofadditional employment. During the project implementation period, about 15.3million man-days of employment were created as a result of the civil works.Of this, about 3.8 million man-days were generated under the FFW programme.The increased agricultural production resulting from higher croppigintensities and change in crop mix is estimated to cause an incremental11 million man-days of employment every year at full development, of which9 million man-days are attributed to BRE. This is about 90% more than wouldhave resulted without the project.
VI. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE
6.1 The only agencie directly involved with implementation of. theproject were B8DB and DAE. BW08 was responsible for surveys, planning,design, procurement atid implementation of all works, except that related tothe agricultural extension service, which was the responsibility of DAE.
Bangladesh Water Development Board
6.2 BWOS carried out the work through its normal channels. Overallresponsibility was entrusted to the Member (Implementation) of 808.Planninm and design were undertaken in Chaka under the Chief Engineer(Planning). and Chief Engineer (Design), and construction and detailedfinancial control was undertaken through regional Chief Engineers,Superintending Engineers and Executive Engineers. It was a condition ofcredit effectiveness that BWOB should appoint a Project Coordinatar, whoheaded a small Project Cell for monitoring progress, coordinating the workof various BW08 units, liaising with DAE and resolving implementationproblems; this was never effective. For example in 1985/86, vhes 3REreceived less funas than reoured, and those aere mainly from the rDRproject, there were adequate undisbursed funds available unde, C-eJ!t 864-80, some of which were eventually cancelled because of GO5's inaaillty toprocess disbursement applications. These funds could have zeen .sed -ad SWCEbeen aware of their availability.
56
6.3 Another condition of credit effectiveness was the estaolishment ofa Project Coordinating Committee for each sub-project, to maintain closecontact between O08, DAE and other agricultural agencies such as BangladesnAgricultural Development Corporation and Bangladesh Rural Development Board.Although these committees were established they were never effective. Inparticular there seems to have been a marked reluctance of B8B tocommunicate with DAE and there is evidence that this continues. However,District Commissioners convene monthly meetings, attended oy executiveengineers of 8OS as well as staff from DAE and other agencies, at whichproblems can be discussed and actions coordinated.
6.4 Operation and Maintenance. Adequate organizational arrangementsexist for the 0WM of all three sub-projects, although all report some staffshortages. O&M manuals have been prepared for each sub-project. The main O&Mconstraint is lack of adequate budget for maintenance; CCS and KSK relyalmost entirely on FF. Maintenance of BRE was carried out under the projectby FFW and other credits and continuing substantial allocations will beneeded.
Land Acquisition
6.5 It was recognized at appraisal that landowners were often reluctantt* part with land, and that inadequate and delayed financial compensationoften delayed timely land acquisition. During negotiations for the credit,IDA received assurances from GOB that sufficient funds would be depositedwith the District Commissioner or other appropriate authority in good timeto ensure timely acquisition of the land required for project works.Nevertheless, there were considerable delays in CCB and ORE due to landacquisition. The land acquisition process took longer than foreseen in theSAR and there wer strenuous objections by landowners, sometimes assisted bytheir MPs. The process of land acquisition often involves very poor farmerswith limited or no alternative productive assets to substitute for land. Thesituation is further complicated by unfair assessment of land value forcompensation, caused by differences between the actual market value and itsassessed value based on recorded transactions. This discrepancy is theresult of substantial deflation of reported land prices (up to 2/3) at thetime transactions are recorded for the purpose of tax evasion. Thus, farmersgiving up their land for the public interest suffer the consequences of thetax evasion of those who sold their land at its actual market price.Moreover, even when they agree to accept the low assessed value of theirland, farmers have been subjected to substantial delays (often years) inpayment and to complex and costly payment procedures. These factors haveresulted in resentment by farmers of project activities and in activeopposition to the project. GOB's failure to adequately resolve this Problemiot only delayed implementation but also resulted in insufficient "and eingacquired in some places to adequately construct the wor<s.
Department of Aoricultural Extension
6.6 Although DAE was responsible for strengthening the agriculturalextension service in CCB and KBK, its involvement with the project wasscant. It was not involved in the planning and implementation of theproject. There was no coordination between BWDS and 0AE. Most of the projectprovisions for strengthening the agricultural service were not given to DAE(para 3.19), Project impa.;t was not monitored. Similar. constraints wereconfronted by DAE in BRE where no project funds were provided.
57
Compliance with Covenants
6.7 A number of covenants of the DCA were not complied with.Consultants were not employed for the design of the works (:DA zoncurreowith this) nor for the agricultural extension programme (Section 3.02 ofDCA). The three Project Coordination Committees were established but theywere generally ineffective (Section 3.04 of DCA). No overseas trainingprogramme was imalemented (Section 3.05): MDA considered that its trainingneeds were covered under the Extension and Research II Project (Credit 1215-80). There was considerable delay in providing motorcycles and bicycles toextension agents and only about half the number proposed in SAR wereeventually supplied in 1983 (Section 3.06). GOB has not maintained recordsof benefits deriveo from the project as required by Section 3.8(b). GOB hadconsiderable difficulty in complying witn the requirements of Section 3.09concerning land acquisition (see para 6.5). No steps were taken to relocatedisplaced persons other than the reluctant acceptance of houses constructedon embankments.
6.8 Audit reports were consistently submitted much later than the 6months after the end of the financial year required by Section 4.01 andlittle effort was made to resolve auditors' queries. GOB has not alwaysprovided the funds and other resources required for maintenance of the worxsand agricultural extension services (Section 4.02). MOA was required bySection 4.03 of OCA to complete a bench mark survey about two years prior toproject completion and two follow-up surveys one and four ,ears afterproject completion. After considerable discussion and delay, evaluationstudies were carried out by consultants to BWD8 in 1985/86. Section 4.05required GOB to assess-annually.the impact of the project on water transportand fisheries. Successive supervision missions considered tnat this wasimpracticable and the only study of this problem was that included in theevaluation studies.
Performance of IDA
6.9 Appraisal. The CC8 and KBK components were adequately prepared andpresented-inItheSAR but the objectives of the BRE component were notclearly stated. The location of the area that woulo benefit was not madeclear. The SAR gave the impression that there was no alternative tocontinuous retirement of the embankment and it was only in 1981 that 10Asuggested that the component for consultants be used to finance a study fora lasting solution to the problem of erosion of BRE. Had this been includedin the SAR, IDA might have been more successful in persuading BWOB that astudy was necessary. The SAR implementation schedule was generallyre4listic: KSK was completed on time; the delays in CC8 were die mainly toincompetent site staff: the difficulties of acquiring land, thougirecognized at aopralsal, were not fuliy overcome.
6.10 SuReevision. Twelve supervision missions visited the projeczbetween and 85, 5 frot tne Resident Mission in Bangladesh and 7 fromWashington. Supervision was generally satisfactory but failed to p.rsuadeBVDB to undertake the Brahmaputra modelling study and to comply withseveral covenants (see pares 6.7 and 6.8). In late 1980 and early1981, supervision missions recommended suspension of disbursementsagainst BRE because BVDB wanted to construct groynes in a number oflocations instead of planned retirement of the embankment asprovided for in the SAR. In aid 1981 GOB agreed to adhere to theoriginally agreed work plan except in two locations where contractsfor groynes had already been let. The cost of construction of thesegroynes, which subsequently failed, wap not reimbursed by 11k.
58
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED
7.1 Flood protection and drainage projects such as CCS and KOK aresimple in concept and design and can be implemented comparatively cheaplyand effectively. However, although KBK was efficiently implemented, CCS hadserious implementation difficulties and is even now incomplete. Most ofthese difficulties can be attributed to unsatisfactory performance of SWO8site staff. Serious contract irregularities and examples of poor qualityconstruction reported by IDA supervision missions indicate a need forimproved supervision by senior BWDB staff. This is further shown by the lackof follow-up to audit queries. The differences in quality and performancebetween KBK, which is easily accessible from Khulna, and CZS, which is moreremote, are very noticeable. In order to avoid similar problems in theongoing Flood Control and Drainage III and IV projects (Credits 1591 and1784-3D, respectively) BSDB agreed to employ consultants to prepare allthe designs and to monitor the quality of the works.
7.2 Both CCB and KOK have experienced many cases of farmers breachingthe embankments in order to accelerate drainage of accumulated rainfall,both in 1987 and in earlier years. While the 1987 rainfall was abnormallysevere, the fact that breaching by farmers has occurred before indicates theneed for a reassessment of the criteria for drainage and siting ofregulators.
7.3 Despite the problems mentioned above both sub-projects indicatedthat, on the basis of the assumptions made in the PCR, similar flood controland drainage projects are likely to. be attractive investments, if theproblems of farmers breaching embankments and provision of adequateresources for maintenance can be overcome. However, when evaluating anyfurther such projects, due account should be taken of the impact of suchprojects on upstream water levels. 1/
7.4 Although this PCR has estimated high ERRs for the three sub-projects, these should be treated with caution due to the sparsity ofproject-specific agricultural data and the effects of other developmentprojects (para 4.3).
7.5 The project has maintained BRE as a worthwhile flood defence but ithas not provided an embankment tnat can be maintained without considerableexpense and the need to overcome land acquisition difficulties. The newSecond Small Scale Flood Control Drainage and Irrigation Project(Credit 1870-3D) provides for modelling studies of the Teesta andBrahmaputra Rivers and the preparation of detailed designs of rivertraining schemes suitable for the permanent protection of the BRI. Itis important that, if the optimin benefit is to be obtained from B8E,these studies should proceed as soon as practicable and a feasiblescheme for the permanent protection of BRE be found and implemented.
7.6 The strong opposition to the compulsory purchase of land forproject works in CCB and 8RE indicates that the level of compensation givenby GOB is inadequate to permit those who lose land to maintain theirstandard of living by purchasing land or by other means. GOB should beencouraged to review the level and timing of compensation. Future projects
--------------------------FCO 3 Project (Credit 1591-80) provided for a basin-wide assessmentof the impact of flood control and drain6ie programmes.
59
should make every effort to ke the land to be acquired to a minimum byrouting embankaents as far as practicable along existing road alignments orthrough governmeat-owned land. When it is necessary to acquire privately-owned land, implementation delay should be avoided by early initiation andefficient execution of the acquisition process.
7.7 The construction Comleted in CCS and KK reduces the danger offlood damage thereby allowing diversification of cropping patterns, a shiftto higher-yielding varieties and other agricultural development. A plan isnow needed for intensification of crop, livestock and fish production. GOBagreed during negotiations for the Third Flood Control and Drainage Project(Credit 1591-80) that agricultural and fisheries development programmes forthese areas would be submitted to IDA no later than 31 July 1987. GOB shouldbe strongly encouraged to prepare and implement suitable development plansfor investment in improved agricultural and fishery services, technology andinfrastructure. There is scope for investigation into the possibleadvantages of pumping water in order to improve drainage and also of furtherinvestment in irrigation.
9 A n 0 L A 0 a a mDRANA AND FLOOD OCNTOL PROn^ OT
IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE1979 1980 1981 19s2 1983 19*84 18s 1986 1987
Out iding*
Uabank.ntsm bataG
Oratasge regu$ators
Roade
tqmlnt and vahiclen procureent
Out itageU
enate.töon srvitem
amt lt ofg
£mbanhmentsa
Orlnage regulator*
Roadm --
Eupoent and vehicSea procuremnt
Out tngmlm tensmo teservices- -
gmAtasapuTRA RICftT EMeANUMEN?
Out tos --- --
lebankeentm ..-. -... «2.
Orsage ragultors ... ...- - iiff
£rosm embankeents, groynes ...e .
.Pci
G e t # X M - m a l -U n
IWME AIM R 0I lLn P1KEtCs barism et Ahaeaisal bist (utintes ad Actal Cests • ftubahe el Sab-freiert
11t ~ fic it"i ha 494 18.9 t.3 18.4 410 2.2 . 1.2 1.06 8383 98 15
km.m~*l '" k# w iN 1: i n # ierama. Utv$ U lm. 4 I: 1:1 in s 4!.~ ~ 3 6 tM =1 aeCM , - 2.5
tw~~Ja I * ta ;, .1.6f" 80 n f i
~*-tatal 63.2 4.5 58.5 34 92 •
* g 0 13 .$ 34 8.9 .37 8.26 61 223 123 371
letal 11,0 7.3 ~ - 182. 5.56 - - Il 75 -
1 tom incerred der tredit 064-fl ad ercIdes t esi.cered ad Dr FF and #ther IM prejects'fod coti .es .lo'ed te mb tio en a p.' tita bT"i" '
1%jsft~sf.ii ue er1s cmnpion iteft; et teictice, efrencid.
saræisma et Imeraisal test Lstitas and Act,aI t - !.lababffikhali Ssh-rct
e,sMA i:. l a: a:#l:Hitn 8:R f:lux millionti? iffilliillm ha m1 1t.6 11.71 6.64 3119 22.t 5S? 1. 1.17 11 28 m 4 11li121a9
__*nt te åra ~nr) tø - 6.2 .41 -1. 6 •1
esee 6 stIIafl •46 i4 f. 131.14mr1 r" køl 32 14.7 L*8 14 1 .' 93
Srag ceastrwctie -
Seb-tetal' 5.5 3.67 . 46.8 2.12 15 8
ec lig n løe· U 1 1:9 ':"1 kl r: e 1: ':" " 2 1145 184.
Tetal . 4.2 - .. 4.0 --6s5a
1/ Lt:e Iudh r esdl incorted Mder Ciedit 964-lØ ad sechds these imnrred de FF# and sthr IN prjects
en u ce coaiiøwt, alated te et lten a a pre rota basis.
Reters l cparisen in ter" ef the rspige crmns.La. Mier d ins in totals are de to re.ading.
Cumsarite et merabul Cni Ltat ad Mfe, Ces - rarseta ,ie mas Sub-Peift
I 1/
dill" #dilla ill #till aill e idlatlies
1> ,adiaeita ha 812 38.7 2.18 8.4 å56 55.6 2.0 8.8 l let 133 2#1
iiiam recmnigi a . .22.4 1.49 e.5 28 1.5 8.89 1.5 65 7 6 16leam a~ = i mi n . 8.02 8.58 tS 18.5 1.9 1.23 933 1,958 1,780 246r ta 129. 29.5 1.97 @.23 IM 7.3 6.35 .14 144 25 1 17
ilr to 186 63.4 4.23 l.6 e g 121.4 6.02 1.? 12 191 142 IM?$a "-~is #o. 78 7.4 0.49 .0• 115 21.8 I.M 1.18 147 281 96 2119"el11eui ta ~s ad t -
k al Futa er1s. - :1 6: En IX 2&:19r D i L I:R cI .M d 29 A ,e l chIrj eb s #a 4 8.6 M5 8.2 4 2.9 1.13 0.73 Iff 363 261 54.jme~1 mu1 : : :.6 : -- 6 11:1 5 : : :er sruct-jte - -n_j j5- -
eb-etal 153.9 .11.38 293.9 15.48 191 15
3 ,i: b o .7 7:.::3 8 ! 1 .3 12 2 3 I 2 $
Total 216.0 14.40 - - 373.3 19.68 - - 173 136 -
V Åg cøe "des ditores løred sder Credit 964-f ad exeedes theas inerred ender FF ad tther IM preject,
15~ ~ 1 1Idr< t e culømisallreld t,e~ wh i a preø asll.4/ §@furs te cwrisa tem of the l.pcin uoruei6s
LL Nier ' dl si 0l tet3 ; ae d? o enhdq.
OAJNAGE AND FLOOD tON7AOL PRO.JEC?
FlnanC4MI and aenmecnst eatn 97gta t
Inttatten AdlUatment Faetor 2/ 2.51 3.27 3.02 3.62 1.68 I.63 1.32 1.18 1.06
. .AC A L e & s. .. .. .. . .. . .. .. .. . ... .. .. .. . .. f 7k e l $ td o n ) . . . . . . . . . . ......
FIMANCIAL COS7t
A. E=nanditura under Dad-Bb
(1) Land Acoulatt.n - 5.8 7.35 19.46 8.56 - - 4.64 - 46.06
(3> etyi morkaBabenkment 0.11 0.78 16.18 t-4.11 7.11 0.34 156 0.76 0.77 42.50
Drafnage regulators 3.39 3.21 8.13 5.38 0.49 0.4 0.35 3.82 1.71 33.43
Iaproveent to drinege channel - - 0.22 0.47 0.36 0.02 0.05 0.01 - 0.95
Vrilge roads - - 16.67 12.23 2.50 - - - - 30.0
. ridge - - 1.13 2.66 0.12 - - - 4.63
Sulldings ter SVD0 statt 0.13 0.07 0.46 1.77 0.76 0.21 0.06 0.36 - 3.67
O&M during constructjon 0.53 4 37 1.6 1106
Sub-total 338
2. "00 :848
(3 )antoment and Ventetes 0.90 - 1.37 1.16 4.00 0.41 5.49 0.45 0.07 13.85
(4) EnoineerInn and Adolnlstratlon - 0.8 3.09 3.75 2.70 0.98 8.76 2.70 0.57 23.46
(5) faröte a tenalon 32
TtlusTt> 4.59 105 81.78 0L 30.60 ä7- 61 18 3.Z3 13,3
(USs) At 0.14 0.32 1.57 1. 0.93 0.06 0.49 0.35 0.09 5.62
9. Expendituro under FF A/ - - - - - .09 6.72 3.27 17.00 -g .
c. Exoandlur uder FO A/ -69 20.L 62i ...LIGrand Total (Ul) 4.59 10.53 51.7 .0.74 0.60 0.0 3 03.0 0.19 0.i 60.6
<uss>0.14 0.33 3.57 2.4 .9700 0..48 0.63059 .3
281 7L8 mLis M.1a aM.a2 8ays& 84aLIA 8LA 8aLa l................................ (Tk million) ............................ . .
SCONDMIC COSTS 51A. Examedituae under 5A4-BD
Embankment 0.15 0.45 13.16 12.00 5.76 0.26 1.25 0.62 0.62 34.50Drainage regulators 2.71 2.60 4.16 4.20 0.40 0.11 0.20 2.20 1.39 19.13Improvement to drainage channel * - 0.17 0.38 0.15 0.02 0.04 0.03 - 0.77Vill-ge road* - ' 13.64 9.91 2.01 0.57 - - * 28.13Bridge - - 0.91 2.15 0.10 0.17 - - - 3.33Buildings for OWU8 staff 0.11 0.06 0.38 1.43 0.62 - 0.07 0.15 - 2.82On during construction 1 3.46 3.26 - -=0 6.Sub-total 2.9Y .ee a.4s so.2e 9.04 TMe 1.57 1.66 folr e6.2(2) Eauloment and Vehicles 0.67 - 1.01 0.66 2.96 0.30 4.06 0.33 0.62 10.71(4) Enaineerinn and Administration - 0.6Q 2.41 2.15 2.11 0.74 6.63 2.156 0.44 17.62(5) AuriculturslEtesn - ..... ... :... .15 - - 15
Total M)tnso 3.64 4.37 35.66O 33.29 15.68 2.19 12.46 6.13 2.9? 116.02(USS) a/ 0.11 0.13 1.09 1.01 0.48 0.07 0.38 0.19 0.09 3.52
6. Exnandituraunder EEW h/ * - - - - - 5.09 6.72 3.27 17.08C. rx-nanditr 0nd18 0-20 ft/- 2jGrand Total (Tk) 3.64 4.37 35.68 33.26 15.66 2.19 17.65 14.46 6.24 132.40 Z/
tUSS) 0.11 0.13 1.09. 1.01 0.48 0.07 0.53 0.44 0.19 4.04*
I/ Itemixed details are presented here for expenditures incurred under the project 64-80. In addition, aggregate expendituresIncurred under the FFM programme and under IDA's POR project (Credit 1864-80) are also shown.
2/ GOP deflator.If The conversion of US$ is based on the July 1967 exchange rate (Tk3.0 a USSI).h/ food for Work.1/ Flood Damage Rehabilitation. IDA Credit No. 1S64-B0,
A/ Economic costs are derived by adjusting financial costs for taxes, duties and a conversion factor on local costs.The tax rate on local costs is 3% and duty on imported inputs Is 30%. Applying a SCF of 0.8 on local costs yields al* the following specific conversion factorst *
- Civil Works 0.83- equipment and Vehicles 0.91- Technical Assistance 0.60- Engineering and Administration 0.60- Agricultural Extension 0.91.
Land acquisition costs have been excluded and wheat used under FPW Io valued at economic import parity price.Expen4itures under FDR are treated like the civil works category.
2/ A 10-vent regulator. constrwcted before 1978-79 at a cost of Tk6.42 million in 1987 prices, Is not shown herebut is included in the calculation of the economic rdte of return.
ORAINAGt AND PLOO CONTROL PROJIC?
Pinanctal and Eonomic Costa in Conatant 1987 Ptcas 1/Knaaanhukhal L uky .pete
lu42 284ng Eu4 1142 824A3 8304 Aff ag4n, &90A 101 Total
intkation Adtunt~ent Pactor 1/ 2.51 2.27 2.02 1.S2 1.61 1.53 1.32 1.16 1.06
................................ ................................
PINANCIAL C0s1s
A. Excanditura under~ seae
() Land Aeautaltton - - 7.39 6.0a 21.35 1.90 0.03 - - 36.75
(2) Ctvtil WorksEmbankment - - - 6.34 16.56 4.99 0.45 - - 30.36
Oralnago regulators 0.60 3.41 5.15 6.77 7.26 3.40 0.59 - - 29.35
Improvement to dra.lnage Citannet - - - 0.36 1.86 0.50 0.16 - - 2.68
Closure of exlating channee - - - 1.40 2.69 1.07 - - - 5.16
Vtlage roads - - - 6.90 2.16 0.54 - - 9.60
Sul Idings for OWOS stoft - L9 Li2 -LZ -1R JL.A LAl ..--.- - -
sub-totet i.60 3.52 9.27 19.49 36.33 12.46 1.81 - - 79.69
(3) Eautoment and vehictes 0.20 0.20 0.91 1.24 1.61 0.66 - 5.02
<4> Technical Asitatance - - - - 2.55 0.43 0.26 - - 3.24
(5) Enninaerina and Administration 0.65 0.71 2.22 6.61 6.32 3.27 0.81 - - 20.95
(6) Aricultural ltenslon : - ... .3 - -. 3.
Total () 1.65 4.4 15.79 35.62 61.16 22.75 2.91 - - 15.37
(USs> 2/ 0.05 0.14 0.48 1.06 2.07 0.69 0.09 - - 4.59
B. Egnenditure under FfW -/ - - - - - 2.60 4.56 3.71 3.07 13.96
c. Esoendlture under POP t - - - - - 2.38. 0.33 - 2.71
0. Exnenditure under 958-ØD - - - - - - - 0.41 3.15 3.56
I. 06 attr d 35c Conlt2o 26 36 Li?aa . 3 ..a..(*. .4 . . 20 . 0.3 O.Al 0.2.
Grn oa 1>1.65 Z449 15.79 35862 68.16 25.35 10.35 8.06 7.08 173.53 f(USS) 0.05 0.14 0.48 1.08 2.07 0.?? 0.3 1 0.15 0.21 5.26
M72 U~ &a &M &iUi Total(Th mllion)................................
arOMIC COSTS A/
A. Enienditure under 884-B
neet - * * 6.76 13.43 4.04 0.36 24.69Drainage regulators 0.65 2.76 4.17 7.10 5.88 2.75 0.48 * * 23.79Improvement to drainage channel * - * 0.20 1.81 0.41 0.13 - 2.84Closure of existing channel * - * 1.12 2.16 0.07 * * - 4.19V4lsge roads - - - 6.5 1.75 0.44 - e.78auildings for 9WOe staff Alm LS L1 .DA L .0.-L .9.Lt LAS - - .8.L1
Sub-total 0.65 2.05 4.27 11.78 30.43 10.10 1.47 - 65.55
(2) Rautment and Vehicles 0.15 0.15 0.67 0.92 t.19 0.64 - - - 3.72(3) Technical Assatance - * - - 2.00 0.34 0.20 * - 2.54(4) Enaineerins and AdminiaraLon 0.51 0.60 1.73 5.31 4.93 2.55 0.63 * - 16.26(5) Aericultura Extenstan -*7 - - - O- 3 2-0
ot Tk) 1.31 860 6.67 22.01 3112 16.44 25 30 90.44(US$ / 0.04 0.11 0.20 0.67 1.16 0.50 0.07 - * 2.74
a. 9xnanditure under PFF W/ - - * - 2.60 4.68 3.71 3.07 13.96C- - 1 - * .93 0.27 - 2.20
0. eenditure under 955-0 ~-Z - - - - 0.33 2.65 2.66e. 2AM after Protect comoletion - * = -* - - AQ6ta A 1f11f
Brend Total (Tk) 1.31 3.60 6.67 22.01 88.65 19.06 9.10 4.79 6.32 111.49WUSS) 0.04 0.11 0.20 0.67 1.16 0.58 0.28 0.15 0.*9 3.30
1/ Itemixed details are piesented here for expenditures incurred under the project 804-0. In addition, aggregate expendituresIncurred under the FFw programme and under IDA projects (Credits 1564-00 and 955-80) are also shown.
3! GOP deflator.31 The conversion of US$ Is based on Me July 1987 exchange ratd (Tk38.0 a US$$).4/ Food for Work.l/ Flood Damage Rehabilitation, IDA Credit No. 1584-80.
3/ Economic costs ate deolved by adjusting financial coat* for taxe, duties and a conversion factor on local coasts.The tan rate on local Lusts to 31 and duty on imported Inputs Is 30%. Applying a SCP of 0.6 on local Coata yields 4the following specific conversion factorst gCr
- Civil Works 0.83 0- Equipment and vehicles 0.91 %A- Technical Assiatalece 0.80
Engineering and Administration 0.60Agricultural Extension 0.98.
Land acquisition costs have been excluded and wheat used under FFW It valued at economic import parity price.
Expenditures under FOR are treated like the civil works category.
ORA KMAGE AMB PLOOS CONTROL PROJICT
ma lmane a1LI a 1akn U a I &mo
inflation Ad.tatment Pactor 2/ 2.77 2.61 2.27 2.02 *.82 l.69 1.83 1.32 t.1 9.06.................................... % Milltion) ....................................
FINANCIAL. COSTS
4. Rzeenditura under 864-80
(1) Land fLenutattton 9.69 9.44 19.23 6.97 11.39 6.11 2.10 28.68 3.92 - 99.01
v(2) *i1t torkaTeesta embankmont resectioning - - 2.13 s.09 - - - - - 3.22Teesta mbank~ent rettrement - 28.68 17.48 - - - 0.43 0.04 0.34 - 43.07grahnaputra embankment
resectioning - - 1.84 4.08 0.91 1.61 0.4 2.52 1.24 - '2.34erahaputra embankent
rettrement 9.97 16.39 816.9 21.01 38.27 6.06 0.17 60.03 18.10 - 214.81Cross ambankments - 2.11 8.86 4.06 3.88 3.63 8.40 9.24 4.39 - 33.87Cletag ?est* channels and
intets - 1.00 0.57 - - - - - - 170reina9e regulators - 17.26 2.00 3.43 0.96 3.60 6.79 - 35.93building* for B99S statt 0.03 0.08 1.48 0.93 0.61 0.78 0.90 0.42 0.42 - 8.39Groynes 18.70 15.69 39.70 13.64 16.00 16.83 2.33 0.12 - 120.69Roads - 8.S9 20.20 13.28 9.14 3.39 0.12 2.06 0.48 - 63.638 during construction .. M -LI .-. 4* -..M -Lii -LJ.S LMA - 2 .. :7
Sub-total 26.78 70.69 I3.17 78.l0 71.92 30.12 6.29 69.48 31.82 - 542.74
(3) Eautament and vehtee - 0.90 1.69 0.89 0.39 0.34 - 0.18 - 4.21
(4) t and Adinistration .,.J _LDi . .L1 jL L.I _g.IJ. .olixl _iLdagft - .94 14Tost~ (ik) 37.22 63.94 178.42 1.01 98.08 47.40 12.90 902.03 36.63 664.90
(USS) 5/ 1.13 2.84 8.41 2.76 2.66 1.44 0.39 3.09 1.12 - 20.76
8. Exbanditura under fW 11 11.78 6.12 2.10 3.49 12.63 23.24 29.37 20.37 17.70 11.07 137.64 I
C. Exnanditurf Und-ir POR 11 - 83-21
Grand Total (2.7 4.97 es.rö18.57 W.1 10 1 .4 tf.2 3Y.75 900.83 0.86 265.9(US .8 2.78 5.47 2.67 3.28 2.94 1.36 3.71 3.05 0.65 36.68
U Ex ft Ex f3e E EY2212& 2812 21LAA 181111 111182 a2lasR aLAA AM.BI Balsa asl.a7 Tota.l.................................... (Th ailIon ....................................
ECONOMIC COSTS l/
A. Exenditure under 884-80
(1) C4wil WorksTeests embankment resectioning - * 1.73 0.88 - - * * * - 2.68Teeta embankment retirement - 20.72 14.16 - - - 0.35 0.03 0.28 - 135.54Drahmaputra embankment
resectioning - - 1.41 3.80 0.74 1.30 0.11 2.04 1.00 - 9.98Graheaputra embankment
retirement 8.08 13.28 46.10 17.10 S1.00 4.91 0.14 40.82 12.23 - 173.78Cross embenbeents - 2.03 4.75 3.29 3.14 2.88 0.32 7.48 3.66 - 27.43Closing Teesa channels end
inets - 0.81 0.48 - - - - - - - 1.27Orainage regulators - 1 * 63.97 1.02 2.70 0.76 2.84 7.12 - 29.11Buildings for B88 staff 0.02 0.06 1.20 0.75 0.83 0.63 0.73 0.34 0.10 - 4.36Groynes 13.53 12.87 32.16 11.05 12.96 0.31 1.89 0.10 - - 85.07Roads - 7.28 21.22 10.73 7.40 2.75 0.10 3.67 0.10 - 51.25OS during construction 0JLA .29 82 .A& .. ll .AA Li& .1. -2I -112 6.:4
Sub-total 21.69 87.34 124.00 61.95 58.26 17.50 5.09 96.25 25.49 - 427.4
(2) fauoment and Vehicles - 0.67 1.10 0.59 0.23 0.25 - 0.15 - - 3.41(3) annineerinn and Administration 8..&& 2.21 ... LA A A LA 90 A .3.&& ..- .JLu2
Total (th) 22.2 60.28 128.72 86.21 67.44 21.99 6.61 50.40 26.34 - 481.12(US$) A/ a.67 1.63 3.90 2.01 2.04 0.67 0.26 1.80 0.60 - 13.98
8. Exaendtture under FF2 1I 5.88 3.06 1.05 1.76 6.32 11.62 14.68 10.19 B.85 5.54 68.94C. Eoo Iture nerfR / - - - 8 13.70 -flAD
Grand Tota (k) 28.00 63.34 128.77 67.86 73.76 33.61 23.29 69.59 72.69 19.24 501.2i(tas) 0.85 1.92 3.94 2.06 2.24 0.02 0.71 2.11 2.20 0.50 17.62
11 Itemized details are presented here for expenditures tncurred under the Project 864-80. In addition, aggregate expendituresincurred under the FVW programme and under IDA's FOR project (1564-10) are also shown.
/ GOP deflator./ The conversion of US$ is based on the July 9987 exchange rate (T33.0 a US$1).
5/ Food for Work. Only 505 of the financial costs of FPW are included as it io assumed that 50S would have bean spent Inthe without project sitotilon.
J/ Flood Damage Rehabilitation. IDA Credit No. 1564-90.
§/ Economic costs are derived by adjusting financial costs, taxes, duties and a conversion factor on local costs. IThe tax rate on local costs is 3% and the duty on imported Inputs is 30%. Applying a SCF of 0.8 on local costs
yields the following specific conversion factorms* - Civil Works 0.83
* Equipment and Vehicles 0.91- Technical Assistane. 0.80- Engineering and Administration 0.00- Agricultural Extension 0.91.
Land acquisition costs have been 4XCluded and wheat used under PFW is valued at economic import parity %wice.
Expenditures under FDA are treated like the civil work category.
Table 770
BANGLADESH
DRAINAGE AND FLOOD CONTROL PROJECT
Equipment and Vehicles for Agricultural Extension
SAR PCR...... K Total C .. .8K Total
4-mheel Drive Vehicles 1 1 2 0 0 0
Pick-up Trucks 2 2 4 0 0 0
Motorcycles (100 cc): 6 6 12 3 3 6- 2 SDEOs J/- 4 SMSs- 6 TEOs 2/
Bicycles 40 40 80 49 0 49
Speed Boat Hulls 6 6 12 0 0
Outboard Motors (40 hp) 6 6 12 0 0 0
Seed Store Renovated toQuarters for VEA 13 13 26 14 12 26
Training Unit 1 1 2 0 0 0
Houses for SMS 2 2 4 0 0 0
Houses for TEO 3 3 6 0 0 0
Houses for VEA 27 27 54 0 0 0
- ................... (Us$)..........Visual Aids Demonstration,
'1aterials, Typewriters,Calculators, Cameras,Projectors, etc. 15,000 0 0 0
Office Furniture forTraining Units and Staff 25,000 0 0 0
Miscellaneous Equipment andSpares 14,000 0 0 0
1 Posts abolished.Now titled Upazila Agricultural Officer.
,
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磁娜滷劇
亂
二 唱
Rffid k" id URN klan~ m*oýst
-UD-
hd .................
1.2 1.2 3.1 1.7 2.3 1.6 1 t 1.4T. Ø.5 e.? 8.5 1:8 P.2litud A" Ad mm 1.2 7.5 8.3 14 2.2 2-h9. Anan 9.9 18.5 12.2 331.4 13 1:1I. ha (Letall 8.9 2.9T. kan <M>Bue (Locall Lø 8.6 4.6 6.5 2.3 2.7 2.9 1.4 1.6bug (M) lt 1.9 - 5.3
Så-total t2.3 13.3 0.4 21.2h 15.3 26.1
W ~ ed) 1.4 6.4 1.2 8.1 1.2 1.3 1,5 1.6 1.4jet# 6.4 1.4 6.4 13 t 4 1.4 1 1 1.1 1 4 tAL*lm 1,6 1.2 2.4 Ø:3 Es 0.6 EI 8.8 6: Ø3 *.8
lud% 1.6 1.? 2 t.2 6.58.1 35.e
bh-total 2.1 3.2 7.2 Mh 2.4 2.6
Total Cr~årea 14.4 tb-S 24.1 24.1 17.3 23.6
ørt CellitatedAret 14.4 17.6 11.6 14.4 17.8
InqCMenliti 11) 115 145' 142 13
bt lested.
Crsd re aid flid - kamafstra eigbt Ebasmamtu Seb-mrect
n 32.4 28.3 32.4 19.9 1., 16.1 1.3 1.3 1.5 2.-
rt " ' . é2 . 1 . : 6 35i:11 1: 5 1:3 : 1 .1 a tca 36.1 32.4 ' 34.4 13.4 8.5 - 7.. 1.8 1. : 1.4 - 1.8
1 12.1 6.1 14.2 6.0 q.1 - 19.0 2.4 2.4 2.8 3.2o:0s it.ic- .6 .- - -- -.
. 1.32. -. 4.0 - 4.1
Sb-tetal 93.1 91.1 93.1 9.7 62.4 56.4 61.9
2.0 2.0 4.0 22. 13.9 - 11.4 1.6 1.4 1. 1 1.8let12 1 . 12 3U tt 1. l.1:0.1 1.8
6.1 15.3 . .
6 at - Ii3 - 1.9 4: 4: - - ~
S&-tøtal 2.3 k4.2 30.3 0.6 9.5 . 11.9 3.7
Arga 121.4 115.3 123.4 179.1 113.1 68.1 100.6He lIth,atedåiret 72.9 74.9 2.1 3.8 5.2 59.2 59.2
Ity <1) 167 154 171 191 191 115 170
o stted*e et coltivated area of 59,200 ha.
blamL~EtiOAnatua AnD aen contmBL Un0.sct
tran ann angteaments fear hfttara3
Parti ILmhu är
.............. ............. tk.... n-da ...
9. Aus WO 90 0 u 370. Aug a 90 3 00 72 42
1. Aug (LocOtO WO 90 0 95 78 42T. Aug (Lecal> W 90 30 400 80 42
Mmed Åu and Asn 0 140 0 870 340 37Mixed Aus and Amän a 140 6 380 t44 42
8. Asn WO 90 0 SS c8 376. Aman d 90 3 90 72 42
T. Aman (Local) WO 48 15 100 60 427. Aon (Loc40 ) 29 35 tig sa 42
T.A n wVv)Wo 48 60 20 t0 250 jag 132 421. Aman tefv) W 29 l3 82 48 600 170 136 42
Bor* (Local) W0 48 90 70 35 * 250 95 76 42Oro (LOCOS) W 29 100 70 35 250 300 80 42
Boro (DIVV) WO 48 145 00 40 370 210 168 42 4.300 4/seor oeNY W 29 . 104 . 82 46 640 220 178 42 4.300 3t
weat (Irrigated) WO la 92 48 tS 370 120 ha 42 2.160 4/What <Arr19stöd) U la 184 83 36 540 125 100 44 2.350 /
teat (Ratnfad) WO 20 60 20 10 150 75 60 42What (Rlnpad) W 20 70 35 t6 200 80 6 44
Jute WO 37 0 0 0 325 198 158 42jute w 37 10 10 10 390 200 160 42
Pulps WO 38 0 0 0 0 80 64 20Pulse* u 3 a 30 0 920 SS 6 20
04Iseeds 00 18 0 0 0 .0 80 64 2001iseed9 a 1 30 0 0 120 85 6 20
WOetabl* wo 30 340 90 45 120 320 250 42Vegatables W 30 190 160 440 280 330 268 42
Potatoas 0 3.000 120 100 60 150 210 360 42Potatoes W 3.000 140 120 60 '200 220 176 42 .
Sugarcana WO 5.000 120 60 20 200 250 200 70
Sugarcane W 5.000 120 100 40 250 270 25 70
1/ 4% ;trogen. 2/ Te $le s.perphosphate: 46% % . / Gurate of potesh 60% 20.!4j Sased on ei Evgluattot Study Report.
75 Table 12Pag 1
BANGLADESH
DRAINAGE AND FLOOD CONTROL PROJECT
Economic Price Derivations (1987 Constant Prices)
unit FY FY
RI%PaddXThai5broken, f.o.b. Bangkok US$/t 235 245Adjustment factor (0.9) o, c-.f. Chittagong USS/t 212 239
c.i.f. Chittagong & Tk/t 6,996 7,887Handling and transport (port to market) 4) Tk/t 1,288 1,288Processing cost a Tk/t 650 650Ex-mill price of rice Tk/t 8,934 9,825
paddy (67%) Tk/t 5,986 6,583Handling and transport to faregate / Tk/t 224 224Farmgate price (import parity) Tk/t 5,762 6.359
Juteanladesh White 0, f.o.b. Chittagong/Chalna 4 US/t 361 376
Adjustment factor (1.0) 1, c.i.f. Chittagong us/. 361 376c.i.f. Chittagong Tk/t 11,913 12,408
Handling and transport (port to storage) 4 Tk/t 19635 1,63Pr sing, handling and transport (Marke to
far"gate) Y/ Tk/t 10613 1,613Unadjusted farmgate price Tkt 3,665 9,160Adjusted milling. efficiency (0.8)Faregate p1ice (export parity) Tk/t 6,932 7,328
WheatMM. in store,, Thunder Bay 4USS/t 160 169Adjustment factor (1.1) 1. c.i.f. Chittagong USS/t 176 186
c.i.f. Chittagong Tk/t 1,808 6,135Handling transport port to market) k/t 1,288 1,288
market t Tk/t 224 224Unuadjusted farugate price Tk/t 6,872 7.199Removal of foreign matter (S%) Tk/t 344 360Adjusted fargate price import parity) Tk/t 6528 6,839
urea?:ioib. Europe / USS/t 208 204Adjustment factor (0.6) ?, c.i.f. Chittagong USS/t 125 122
c.i.f. Chittagong Tk/t 4,125 4,039Handling and transport (port-market-farmpte) Tk/t 1,512 1,512Farugate price (import parity) Tk/t 5,637 5,551
Table 12 *'*76 Page a
Unit FY FY__. i19f/96
TSPT.b. US Gulf 1/ US$/t 144 178Adjustment factor (1.4) ;/, c. i.f. C' ittagong US$/t 202 249
c.i.f. Chittagog 3/ Tk/t 6,666 8,224Handling and transport (port-market-faragate Tk/t 1,512 1,512Faragate price (import parity) Tk/t 8,178 9,736
MOP77F.b. Vancouver 1/ USS/t 85 101Adjustment factor "(1.4) ;, c.i.f. Chittagong USS/t 119 142
c.i.f. Chittagog 3/ Tk/t 3,927 4,686Handling and transport (port-market-faragate Y_/ Tk/t 1,512 1,512Faragate price (import parity) Tk/t 5,439 6,198
/ Half-Yearly Revision of Commodity Price Forecasts, World Bank,September 1987, adjusted into 1987 constant prices and Bangladeshfinancial years (July-June).
/ Based on past relationship between import/export unit prices andreference quality prices. For Aman the adjustment factor is higherthan for Aus and Boro varieties because of consumer preference.
/ Official exchange rate of US$1.0=Tk33.
/ Financial costs adjusted by SCF of 0.80.
/ et value of by-products, adjusted by SCF of 0.80.
77
Table 13
BANGLADESH
DRAINAGE AND FLOOD CONTROL PROJECT
Summer of Financial and Economic Prices1987 Constant Prices
UnIt Financial Price Economic Price
Aus Tk/kg 4.8 5.8Amen Tk/kg 5.4 6.0Br Tk/kg 4.8 5.8
Wheat Tk/kg 4.8 6.5Jute Tk/kg 5.5 6.9Pulses Tk/kg 7.5 6.0Oilseeds (Mustard) Tk/kg 12.0 9.6Vegetables Tk/kg 5.4 4.3potatoes Tk/kg 2.8 22sugarcane Tk/kg 0.5 04
Paddy Local Tk/kg 6.0 6.4HYV T/kg 7.0 8.5
Wheat Tk/kg 5.5 7.5Jute Tk/kg 7.0 8.8Pulses Tk/kg 7.0 5.6 /Oilseeds Tk/kg 16.0 12.8Vegetables Tk/kg 8.0 6.4Potatoes Tk/kg 3.1 2.5Sugarcane Tk/kg 0.5 0.4
FertilIizers:Urea Tk/kg 5.0 5.6TSP Tk/kg 5.0 8.2NP Tk/kg 4.0 5.4
Others:Pesticide /3/Farm Labour Tkfman-day 30.0 24.0 2/Animal Labour Tk/pair day 50.0 37.5 1/Irrigation / A/
j/ Derivation of economic prices for tradeable outputs and inputs Is shownin Table 13.j2 Financial price adjusted by SCF of 0.8.See Table 11 for economic prices. Financial prices are 25% higher thaneconomic prices.
f Financial price adjusted by SCF for labour of 0.75.See Table 11. Financial and economic prices are assumed to be equal.
DRAIWAB AN PLOOD COI?OL PROJEC?
Annual aroma menefita ¡Econoamte - chonehurt Bea Sub-Projeet
produetioen . Gaa value
futura Futura&utrKUthut UJ.h tbthou
Pria Prteact ereat Irwn Ptect PrOJact Anermena(Tkiton) .......... (000 tons .... .7 tIto..
8. 4..s 5.762 6.6 5.8 0.2 32.27 33.42 1.ss
6. Amn 6.010 14.4 14.0 -0.4 86.64 14.34 -2.40
1. Aman (Local) 6.010 4.a 8.1 1.3 28.65 36.64 7.61
T. Aman (14VV> 6.010 0.6 5.0 5.2 3.91 34.6 31.25
aoro (Local) 5.762 0.3 0.3 0.0 1.73 1.73 -
loro (#4VV) 5.762 -j. JA -A LA -A".0 u.u
Sub-total 27.2 42.1 14.9 161.84 249.01 67.37
Other Crooa
Wheat 6.528 0.6 3.7" 3.2 3.26 24.18 20.69
Jute 6.932 1.3 1.4 0.1 9.01 9.70 0.69
Pulaes 6.000 0.5 1.4 0.9 3.00 0.40 5.40
Ollseede 9.600 0.2 0.6 0.4 1.92 S.76 3.64
Vegatables 4.300 0.6 0.6 0.0 2.58 2.58 0.00
Potatoes 2.200 1.6 1.6 0.2 3.52 3.96 0.44
Sugarcane 400 L L1 2LA ..- *a .4 0.36
Sub-total - - - 14.41 56.03 31.62
Total - - - 186.05 305.04 118.99-=s=a emanan *V.Maa
-4a T
A1NAGE AND FLfOO CONTRIOL PRO.JECT
-~Annual BenaL flenafIta fRe.enenteI - Etabahukhplt tub-Ppet
produetton Braan VpI..auur Futura futur
ltethaut etht-gjtEcj.ggPro-lact ftto eat nrmntl Piet potc nrmna
(k/ton .......... (000 .........
8. Aus 5.762 1.9 3.3 1.3 0.96 18.44 7.49T. Aos (Local) 5.762 0.4 1.1 0.7 2.30 6.34 4.04Mixed Aus and Amas 5.900 16.5 21.6 5.1 97.35 127.44 30.09*. Awan 6.010 4.0 4.8 -0.3 28.04 27.05 -$.107. Aen ULocat> 6.0s0 0.9 8.7 7.6 5.41 52.Re 46.68Ioro <Locøl) 5.762 1.8 0.9 -0.9 10.37 5.10 -5.1Soro (IYv) • 5.782 .... _L.I .. _z.A. _2A3.Z
Sub-totat - 26.3 44.1 17.6 155.22 260.37 105.15
8r~.st 6.526 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.65 1,96 1.31J6.932 0.4 0.6 0.2 2.77 4.16 1.39PuIseå 6.000.- 0.2 0.4 0.Z 1.20 2.00 1.20Ollseeds 9.600 0.7 0.9 0.2 6.72 6.14 1.92veoetables 4.300 0.8 1.8 1.0 3.44 7.74 4.30Sugareane 400 : L L - ..... 4
Sub-total - - 14.76 26.30 11.52
Total - - - 170.00 266.67 116.67uuacu* seassa auusaa
Annual ara &&na†tta IanoMel - Srahøafutra Rjaht &MbankUant Sub-Protaet
Pdio ra ae
(000 tons . . ......... t7k on).........
0. Au* 5,762 0.00 24.15 2 4.tfi 0.00 139.8 1839.15
NIned Au* and Amen 5,900 3.36 10.34 -25.02 20*.62 61.01 -t47.61
I. Amen 6.080 39.186 .35 -37.68 235.36 8.11 -327.24
7. A ts>n (.ocal> 6.0t0 0.00 12.60 12.60 0.00 75.73 75.73
7. Aman ()V) 6.010 0.00 32.00 32.00 0.00 192.32 192.32
Sor* (Loc*) 6,762 - - - -
Soro <VV) 5.762 8-L R .J.4. 0.00 iise. Ig
Sub-tatat 74.82 178.14 t00.62 443.97 8.021.90 s7e.01
Othar Crona
Wheat 6.526 0.00 20.52 20.52 0.00 133.95 133.95
Jute 6.932 0.00 25.38 25.30 0.00 175.93 175.93
Pulss 6.000 6.90 2.52 -3.36 36.40 15.t2 -26.26
Oilaoeda 9.600 0.00 2.70 2.70 0.00 2a.92 25.92
Vegetables 4.300 0.00 33.00 33.00 0.00 841.90 148.90
Potatoes 2.200 mag 2 gL .A.LIR .g.SL2& .10
Sub-totl - - • - - 35.40 555.52 520.82
Total - - - 479.37 1.577.50 1.098.13aa= mmansamaaa MOUGGenn
I r
aANULADIISH
DRAINAGE AND PLOOD CONTROL POJECT
Annual Cron Produetion Costs (Economic) - Chanchurt Beat Sub-Prolect
Ouant d_ ___a_ Production CostEnMc fitmt . futuce 1ducaWtithout viah Wfthouit vithELAS EbaS MUng nceetl cln EalM Icrmnapric r*Aec Pro-loci proika nfi1 tniu Projet '......... (Tk millfon).........
iaggs (Th/ton)
Paddy (Local) 6.400 1,791.8 1,401.4 -310.2 11.46 9.46 -1.96(MVV) 8,500 28.8 116.0 87.2 0.24 0.99 0.76
Wheat 7.500 9.8 40.2 30.4 0.07 0.30 0.23Jute 0.800 40.7 33.3 -7.4 0.38 0.29 -0.07PulseaS.800 32.4 64.0 32.4 0.18 0.36 0.18OIseeds 12.800 7.2 23.4 16.2 0.09 0.30 0.21Vegetable& 6.400 3.0 3.0 0.0 0.02 0.02 0.00Potatoes 2.500 300.0 300.0 * 0.0 0.75 0.75 0.00Sugarcane 400 Ia0& 18A ,...6LB .2g .,gLgg ..g-,0gL
Sub-total - - - 13.35 12.67 -0.8
fartiliers$ (TkIton)
Urea 6,637 191.2 0,300.7 1,109.5 1.08 7.33 6.25TSP 6.176 67.6 668.* 560.7 0.72 5.47 4.76uP 5.439 42.3 297.2 254.9 0.23 1.62 1.39Pest i cide 2 . . . . ..1 . .A
Sub-tota - - - 2 s 1.44 15.88
farm Laabur (Tk/an-day) 24 2.42 3.35 0.93 S8.08 60.40 22.32
Animal.Labour (TkIday) 37.5 0.94 1.17 0.23 35.25 43.89 8.03
Irrioation Costs . ... ... . .....4 .13... 11..0A
Total - - * f11.10 168.93 57.76 *
DRAINA~E AND PL000 CONTROL PMaJCty
Annual Cron Producton Costa fEconamlcl - Kolabaaukhall Sub-Protact
bumntit Usad Production Coatputure putura Putur £K~ur.VIhAut ih wthou gg&b
Emia PctL Pro.Ject 1SaImnta± Pro.Jct Protect Iner*ana*t...... (k alItt on....
00ga: (7k/ton)- Paddy (Loc*l) 8,400 1.889.0 1.831.9 142.9 10.81 11.72 0.91 N- Paddy (HVV) 8.500 0.0 28.1 28.1 0.00 0.22 0.22
- Wheat 7.500 2.0 4.0 2.0 0.02 0.03 0.01- Jute 8.800 11.1 14.0 3.7 0.10 0.13 0.03- Pulses 5.800 10.8 10.0 7.2 0.08 0.10 0.04
- Otiseds 12.800 21.6 27.0 5.4 0.28 0.35 0.07- vesetables 6.400 3.0 8.0 3.0 0.02 0.04 0.02- Susercane 400 ...0Q §88B §0. _ø^« Q.»
Sub-totet - - 11.29 12.69 1.30
artlitamta: (yk/ton)
- Urea 5.637 117.6 656.3 440.6 0.66 3.15 2.49
- TSP 8.178 81.0 185.8 104.8 0.68 1.52 0.86
- MP 5.439 40.5 98.1 57.8 0.22 0.53 0.31
- Pesttcide ....- .gAI l.a L,
Sub-totø- - - 1.65 6.32 4.47
Farm Labour (Tk/møn-day) 24 2.18 3.13 0.5 52.32 75.12 22.80
Animal Lab9ur (Tk/day) 37.5 0.62 0.90 0.26 23.25 33.76 10.50
Irriataon coa, ,_.,-- -AI. 3..7..
Totat - - - 88.71 131.66 43.94
D9*1II*p AN fLAESHNRL
Annual Cron Producttan Coats Ileenoatel - Brahmautra Ataht Embankmnt Sub-Prorect
Ouantitv "*ned Production coatf.itAe I*o Puture PtMe thot • WltheutPeggant Proloct 1oe n nast fr st 1neremntat
..... (7k milion).
Souga (7k/ton)- Paddy (Local) 6.400 6.110 2.391 -3,725 39.14 15.30 -23.84- Paddy (hyv) .500 0 962 902 0.00 0.10 4.10- heat 7.500 0 206 206 0.00 1.86 1.8- Jute 0.800 0 620 620 0.00 4.56 4.56- PuIses 5.600 421 to0 -324 2.38 0.57 -1.81- Ollseeds 12.800 0 54 84 0.00 0.69 0.69
- Vegetablea 6.400 - 0 te 16 0.00 1.06 1.06- Potatoes 2.500 ,,..a L.1*R L.ZU 0L joé-21 t4-2
Sub-total - 41.52 46.16 4.64
Partiloiras <7k/ton)- Urea 5.637 - 9.639.2 9.4e5 0.00 53.77 83.77
- ,SP 8.178 - 5.427 5.427 0.00 44.30 44.38- mP 5.439 - 2.968 2.958 0.00 16.09 16.09
- Pesticide .-.. - - A1 sâ. . esub-total - - - 0.00 145.82 145.02
fArM.Labour (Tb/oan-day) 24 7.51 l6.90 9.39 130.24 406.60 226.36
Animal Labour (7k/day) 37.S 2.32 4.12 1.80 07.00 154.50 67.80
rrination Coat -- - .0LM 4,Lu L23.04Total - - - 300.76 876.92 67.16
aucune cannes agneau*j.
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t.
.
..... ... ..... .. . .øvin in HILL#"
..........................................................................................................................i 1 2 11 4 11 . 6 7 a .9 le 11-30........... ................................ ............. .......... ........... ...............
... . ............
.... .... ..... ..... ....1,0 i n ^ ~ ý ... ; i i ... 6.67 ié.46 ... . .......O&Namta 2/ 2m 4." 6.32 S.O; mifeiet km«~ eat* 1.31 La aLet m." -.19.06 9.1M 4.79- 6ja 8.00 4.,'ý
CII>...... ....... ....... ....... ....... ...... . ....... ....... ....... ..... J, . .......lMra~ fm beneftts- 3.49,1 7.38 U.75 M0 .44.» 34.98 n.73
........................
fløb ~ lm 0.07 OM L28 OM 6.01 flu 1.42
....... ...... 0 ....... ..... ..... ....... ....... ....... ... ....... . .....t~t -6.67 -22.01 414.113 -11.81 %.» M.14 37X 49.m 66."
............................................................. -*.ý .................................. . ... . ...............
ftte R~ of møt str~
------------------
Year I ref«$ to FISC81 year 1978/79.tneledes expenditufts locurr*4 ander Ff# and ander IDA projects. Ct*dits 15s4_90 od 955-80.seginning fr' 09 year 5. i*D*fits. øx;røsqød ga a porc*otago of foll develøpetet ben*eftts. arephased 85 follomst 5, to. 20. 409 60* 809 100 (for io year$).Pha$e4 In the same nenner 85 the produckloo hen*fikt.
UMUUUA A*t RMIUU POMMC-----.--- .... a *. -... a..*.* * *.a **e******* *
. . ................ .. .. ....... .amm ae esoinis snum is
1 I 3 4 5 6 7 a 9 10 11 *1 a s 4 a 141........................................... ************ *.L****.************...******..******.*******. ***. **. * .************ .******************************************
IOMMALM M
.e.. . .. .40.. 11B.7.R .. .44 21.99 8.6.1.9.40 .. . .. * * . *.O" cost 2/ S.88 5.06 t.W 1.5 6.32 t." t 14.d 10.19 W6. 19.24 S7. 57.0 S.; S7.10 S7.55 g
tota Inuremnt coste 28.00 a.34 129.7? Gr.9 U7 3.61 3.9 69.59 P --19.2 57.50 5r." ST.0 57.50 57.0 7.oItMMMAL UWFS N I
trmntal produten tnefits 3/ * * * * 55 * 132.74 1.5. 258. 0 20.5 345.13 39.25 41.3 477.87 3M.42 530.97
IMMMUAUTW NUFITS............
fih pr"iaMten faren o/ * . * * 0.2 0.67 1.11 -.S 2.0O 2.44 2.09 3.55 3.7Y 4.00 4.U 4.44
teMA at mFITS
******* ****; :ieev ****** ******* *******total Iaremntnat net bmnefits *2a.00 *43.34 *129.77 -67.5 -47.43 45.37 11.34 114.70 1 45 2e.35 84.74 3M7.L ' 1.6 416.37 441.70 456.55
"trpst Rte, Of fturn of Set Stresm
1/ Year I refers to fiscal Year 1977/78. .2f Includes expenditures incurred under Ffi and under IDA's Flood Damage Rehabilitation Project (Credit 1564-80).3/ Beginning from Year 4, benefits, expressed as a percentage of full developeent benefits. are phased as follows:
5, 15, 25, 35, 45, 55, 65. 75. 85.. 90, 95. 100 (for 15 years).4/ Phased in the same manner as the productiop benefits.
atomeum im fR~W IL Idpa
44
1011 MICI ECiim Csr Am EFfI I L M TARA 1/
, _ 3,4 4 a 8 9 w0 • 19 a ik a 5
tweetent estat.12 "tØ.a 0 U .~ 14.f arm .14 31.8t5.8 3.06 1. l." . G . vm mg n.i n. U.5 G. t.
tot tasbat east 38.G 74.1 17.4 110.51 m. «-m 41.94. %.48 91. m 31. 73.0 n. 5.50 ma . 5 n 83.50.
...mm... . .n...s ..
... t. p.sette benefte. . . . . .. .... . .. ..... m. ...0. . .a s ... e3. .d..
Inntet me henfits
ftch proömtefrgn • • . 0.40 g.1 .0 a. 3».n 4.0 s.3 6.5 6. 7.1 7.40 7.46
Inrmtet nst mnehfits. ..... *......**~ ....... * *****~
tetam hmn~ at hmefIts .25.00 .nt -137.74 .11.51 .%." 9. 15.14 15.11 am4 3459.0 37.19 444.1 s.ur 518.1 Us%9 57M.OL
iamrSet se. af stua et st Stre=
1/ Tear i refers to Fiscal Iear 1977/78. As the project is assmsed ta have a life of 30 years, the costs of and .beneftsfr*@ the last year of CCO and KOR sub-projects which begin ta 1978/19 hava been "excluded.
89 ATTACIDENT IO Page i Of 12
CO TS FROM TnmE BORRMER
18 U W AE/I^EATIOPAL PiANC CmPORATION axEmOVW-ZEC UEMOMANDUN
: Apri it, 190
=Ww t A-sig (in luding this page)
O,. . i Nr. 0 naldson tlet, OEDD1
WM ifan ,,ASI/
8uft : afqag and Flood Control Project.
lurther to your Fax dated April 02 and our t*lex dated April Q08 1,9»attahe is the olearer copy of comaenta on the above mentioned aubject.
F: tr. .. P1m na l (O/t)
File: 1-864-A/Jaeq.
90 ATTACHMNT IPage 2 of 12
11UISTY -F E J N%g(: VA22It IIVn=WPZNT ARiD
0.enera tonaitnts
Tho reporwbWas supposed to evaluate the perforMance at the Drainage and IModCOntrol Project ( 864-BD ). Instead it concentrates so much on the Flood ControlAption Planthat one gets the feeling as if this is a report on Plood Control Ac:tnPian It fa disap)oInting to observe that while the World Bank Itself is the main co-ordihator tor the donor community on Flood Control Action Plan, another grou.within the VoA*d Bank ia trying to negate the concept of flood control inBangladeat ahest efforts to save Sangladesh froin the cntastrophic floods can ictbe ixpected.4hless the World Sank gets rid of such contradiction.
OMstantial 'imagq to the HYV* Boro is inflicted by early floods in Aoril Lnd May,socially ifthe north-east and south*east regions of Banglndesh. This retlit:-. hasbeeri ignoked. veasibl doe to the pro-conceived idea that tModing has got nothingto do with 11YV borg. Figure 1 do not correctly represent growing period of HYVSoiv and even the -early and late floods. It should be noted' that December andJanuary are the soldeut months when TYV.rice plants receive cold Injury. Therefore,framers bAve ahtfted Its plaptation to February and dven March in which case floodprotection tqwWa the later part of the crop becomes an Imperative. It should behoted UWA the multiple cropping system in Bangladesh, the time of arrival nd
.tsolona' t1od kwat dictate crop choice even in the dry season. It is posaibleto takb suaI a narrow view by professionot coming from countries where cros arcrwn-f tly aoci in a year or even once in two years. Let them lva-n that In
Banladesh iorops are grown in sequence round the year and that each crop has-to tbe *dj*ete Wth the pt*ceding or the itioceeding crop.
PaS. 2.ati 43
Lack of knodie about local crops has led the member% of the PPAR to use thetrmas qick blaturing and slow maturing fo- aus and &man rice, The former is day-neutral watng that its growing period is tixed: The later I phototensitive maringthat It flovet -fth the advent of shorter day length. The fact that growinj periodof late Olad'ainan rice is shorter than that of s rice should take them out of
such Mti.
With the -Inrease in population, It is n- longer.possible for the fariers to r-imrr.content %i the low production by adjusting crop production Practics withflooding cotdition. The demand to produce additional food for th hungry millionshas led t6 the ftrong public openlon in favour of controlling floods to their bes'advantage, specially with the evolution of high yielding varieties. Rccor.t increlsein the prdctif: ot transplanting dedp water rice seedlings after harve%ting HYV Sorois an Indication of the response of farmers to the demand of additional focd. Thi&practice I esiUreyl dependent. on the tliue of harvest of the boro rice, the time ofardial of ftod water aid the rate of rise of flood level.
91 ATT.%CMENT I91 Page 3 Of 12
The fact tt local bore paddy had been grown by the trtnerp of Bangladest% foe.centuries should not be lost sight of while trying to establish the pre-conceivedidea that fitgation In Dahgladeel. Is a recent phenomenon and that It negates the'necessity ateohtrolline floods* .
The ta)lb already arrived that production of a 3ingle bore rice can nat suppon:W) -tarts JatAily and hence the demand of Vraisa control of water In the MonsoonVis6e4-.1de dained momentum.
Pai 3, .aIMle On
It is trt-QtW-due to, titroductior: of high yielding varleites of rice, the bore.pUntation in 1angladesh has gone upt whereas aman area has remained conmtat.'At ths point the contribution of the subneratble embankments in proto:ting bore,rice in the trequontlp flooded area need to* be recognised. Inspite of all theexpanloi in IITV lore area, about C;% of total rice area is still planted to aman ricewhile only 1% of total rice area Is devoted to boro rice. Morbover 60% of total riotand 47S of total toodgrain still comes from aman rice. Little bit of incre.so in thevie!d level of aman rice .c6uld make substatI4l.Increase in foodgrain production,
Most-crucial point about bora is that poontial area suitable for boro in DngladoshIs 2.5 mllion bactres. Present, coverage .a 1.95 million ha. So this can be extendedby a maximum of another 0.55 million ha only., As opposed to this, amin can bu,grown ot vost of the tultivated arba. Let us remember that Aman is-*rou-n in a,sason *hen tathfall and sell moituri are generally sufficient to suoport cropgreth Page 2, articlass. Thus ther4. can hardly be any argument in favour ofleaoring asat which is still the toodt extonsively grown 'rice and is the majorcoattbutOktwbrdh foodgrain prodiuctIoA.
1t Ia once again #oinLed out that in the multiple cropping system in Bangladesh itIs simply impossible to ia6late wet season oropping from dry season cropping. Most.reaistic.aprdch Is to persue both aman and boro rice, I.e. controlled flooding IntLe smath saofth ard wrilgation in the dry season.
Lage scale'df season Irrigation development has taken place in the poldered area,mWaitg- therifArtors felt safe in investing on Irrigaf4on In these flood-free area.Shallqw tunOOM6 development in Chalaft beel and other such 7projects beat amplotaitisony dt-Vils. It should also be notea thdt more and more farniers are usingtlbs tubedi4 for providing supplemental irrigation to iYV *-Xman.
Pas7. I.Ail 1ot
Here also Atempta have been made to isolate flood control from irrigaton, the noWelittohun being to ngate the need of flood control. Chandpur is one of thesicessful floifd control, drainage and irigation project.where single deep waterrico with lo* yield potential has been -eplaced- by PYV Atnan folowed by RTV Borowitt higirM7d dentiaL. This was & d6bpi flooded area where flood control was
ATTACHMENT I92 9 2 rag 4 -oTf
a preconditenorintroducing irrigated bore vice. One should not forget that priorto conrtructon of tho project, farmors were unable to grow HIYV boro in those areaas tne time of flooding did not allow thvm to do so. Ni that they are sure of noflooding upto Jant, large scale cultivation of 1RYV Boro is on and any attempt totake out the lood control component would be vehemently resisted by the farmersthemsbivess Lat us once again remember t6at Bangladeshl farmers practice roundthi .r croprahi In ReqAience and that growing of a ihgle crop In a year can nolongel*, supbet Ihe population.
Thef-aspeettare being studied tinder the Flood Control Action Plan for which thea'iC'd Sank Is io inali ao-ordinatbr." This report. 1p -Suppoed to evaluateperformance Of the Dratiage and. Flood Control Project ( 864-BD . Ldt us
uoaehtratt i this project instead of Lrying to negate Flood Control Action Planalreay ukdertaken by the World Bank itself and leave these issies to be decidedtkd*duth the ater.
Passi e. at-iple p1s
The rosy itature- depicted regarding abundance of ground water is yet to beestablished. The reality is that huge nuibber of hand tubewells used for *iotAblewater, shallow tubeells and even'deep tibewells used for irrigation are going drytowdtds the. t.adof bore season. It appeare that permament depletion r ifoundwatet table, has iready started in certain places.
yet 10' Aa1sdkilf
Poides .pkbfthe. stety from normal floods, but fals at severe ctastrophip floodslika tie one of 1984. In such cases the loei Is much more severe as farmekinvest6tcr6p proietion with the feeling of flood protection. Measures to protect thesepolders from atstrophic floods are oxpected to,come out from the Flood .Control
W16ton..Plat lttidhalTill then let us show;s,ome peatienco.
ize,.11*.* afticle, 441
Tht tOrt 10"y about oontribution of dry seabon agriculture in tho Chenchurtbelad tho brawmaputra Right Embankment, because their purpose Is served. Batit 1a, -tuspitaux about' the contribution of wet season agrkulture. J.n theKabshktdl.4-prbject as this'does not help establish the preconceivd idqaot.Ing tit.aeason cropping through flood control. An evaluator has to get ridoi%ft bkis ilr evaluating any proJect
P4te017. XaI1l
This isbit op4ptiloal problem that should not be used as a tool for itegating floodcatttl. This. s e4ually applicable for drr season crop production as fatiaers on!owE.r elevat6n wants that thv, water be.dkalned out early so that they ann plant tho,ote ' hilo arpits on higher elevation' wanto to maintain higher water level to tainome aqdvantag.over the moisturw regime. It should be noted that this problen is
evon! re 4dttIn non-poldered aa' *here farmers have no control over water.'wIthtPth* ladbr4 trea, this can be"solved by Al14nting varlehies with different
93 ATTACEMT IPage 5 of 12
euomegence thlarane limit on different 4letation. 'The gates tien can beoqPratedto aUit the sitUation of ditteront depth on different elevation. This shoUld hot be.used 4o n &k.Laent against flood control.
Egos aUdiPly ia S. art1ckLL
A wrong staterdent has been re-:ed In both -those article& and'in aay placeu othe reiort- n Atnfounded sV emei'. repeated time and again does not becoMe atruth.* Banglaaeh ian not be., &. *.Z sufficient In foodgrain unless along with theendev.r of 1hatifuing the . ion of dry season crop, the wet season crop, i.e.Man to safetuardid from thi davages of flood. 47% of total foodgrain comes from
satn. One can not ignore this gJaring tact unless biased.
Pa"1M aikfald.M
Pass expaerieno of expansin of Iriigatqd boro in poldered area haso W beconsiered. ItA mbst of the completed flood control and drainage proJectsi farmershave been found, to take initiative for developing irrigation facilitio for growingMY1 Soro. Thth! ns happened owing to assurance of safe harvest of boro rice.Likewse, YV Wheat area has also beeh found to go up in some of the completediprojectb. In thfeedises, drainage improviments facilitate tinelv seeding of the coldloving,tHYV tnat which perform well with tht pot4monsoon residual soft htoist.rc.These.are tih reauties that have been observed in the already Impleme6tated floodcofifrol aho: amn1e projects. So let tte not rule these out with terms like"an60jd1aido7.or the -ake of sugg*tting that flood conial is not heeded inBia..eoh..
I)a*e .88 articia 80s
One hould not tof"get that draft final report of. MPO has not yet been accepted jjythe Gove,rnmem of bangladesh. National Vater Plan, Phase 11 would reatudr thegroutid wathr notential This has become necessary as the findings on ground waterIn phase .wexcfdotnd doubtful and unacqpptables,
In conclusion, it Is requestod that PPARs should be confined to relevant disaussion3and avoid unhecessery blas*d observations.
94
ATTACRQEW I
Page 6 of 12
The report uader roteranto hen been prepered by theWarld Sak cobaaing PAR and 90R.
St the Audit seems to have beo oritioa1 nbout econameaA tAWtit4atioa for Investment La public embankment and polderoutratiou. Atoording to them, the fundamental considerationIA.eAoh enterprises shoaU be to solve the "space problem,
SAMD partially agrees with the Audit' s viewe. Secouge,
-us a result of POD proSeats more areas become flood tree orwith Low level of flooding which oreatea condition for obtainingAm only wet season gains but als dry season irrigationeaits. Ctherlwie, only on "apace problem" oonsideration,
Vab nation s4 I11-attord the huge investment in OD type
the Audit has questioned the necessity of preparingloonomio analysis for POD projects, 'since BAnsgedesh being aoaapafto receiver of oLd, cas% easily bargain for aid from
various donore to go for capitol intensive investment int3,ood control sootor.
BADO does not agree with the above viewa. Becease,She pro4ects in this nector are talcon up on the basis of costeffectivenees rathax then its being in monopeonic position.
4. The Audit stated that emml scale pamping is a threatto BADU power. Moreover, BADC policy of dealing with small-oele irrigation bas tended to protect powerful rural interestat the eGnsv of the weak and the marginal farmers.
2he statement made above is for from truth. Since itsUrth, the BAD he. been painstakingly trying to introduceand popOlatee omaLl coale Irrijation Among the formers resultingLa wt-speA dift8ion of this technology. It will continueTo Rnder its services in this sector as long as the farmereneed them. So the small aoute papina teohnology can never bea threat to SADC power. Mention may be made that in operatingSal scale Lzrit;ation equipment, the BADO has always been&aided by 4ot, policy whon served the interent of all onte-&oriee of femevs. Threforpe, the Audit's views that UAWprotects only the powerzol rural intarelt is a travesty oftoot.
95 ATTACMENT IPage 7 of 132
It . taspires that the flood control approach ofthU '8 by constructing the dikes and embenkmeuts have notIe41ded desired readlta. Xt has been mentioned in the reportVat the 1987 flood was due to heavy rainfall within the country*VAtr suoi condition the polder construction may only woveenvA# aituation inatead of flood control. It is nino evident fromthe report that anpoldered areas are being put to exoesseivefloods due to constraction of polders.
6# The report bas aleo referred to the role atn performanceof NAW ithoit making any reference to its achievement. It isagntioned that BADM originally promoted the iUea of large pumping"ation thpt fed into channels for delivery $Ad cooldt as in ,
eN ceo of Obandpur-1, pump out water from behind polder. aal4oa8v PaMpin4g from eacA080e en ground water resources prese4tedk great threat to BADO power in that ou pwupinL; is highlyOcantralised and becase of the qemql scale of the machinery,L under the control of a soll group of farmer, BADO is then"h$tted to monopoly imports of smell pumps an* renting them to
a4iViduala or gzoup o farmara. "Mventually the farmers and localueobanice became expert in operating and maintainiag the profitablepamp and did not need MAD for this futotion. the point weethen made that the Govt. presenoe is needed for equity reasonaAd to protect the public goods. A Close look at how BADO hasasa In promoting these ill defined objeotives has shown that
InvOeTbly BALIC policy has tended to proteot P?werBal rualInterest at the expence of the weak and the marginalO.
The above statement io not correct. It appears from the'teport as 1t the emll pampu anw the uwa1l group of fermere
gerged out odtomaticolly or organised by some body el,e thaJADO. Zn faots SADO Organized thou3ands of formers.goups andprovided irriastlo equipment. It is easing to note thatM19 commenting oa DAWO' role, how th enormous role of SADOIn respect of farmere group orgenieation and euocessf i mpleean-tation of awall sonle Irrigation eyotem, by LLP, DTW and STWcould be completely neglected. It may oqtegorically be mentionedthat the small group of fermers had never been a threat toa60 rather the Iroaps are the babi'ee of BADO,
,. At least it e2m1d be mentioned theit about 90% of the.xriggted area i3 under the small soate irriation systemachieved by BADC. dowever, i thin contcAt it my further bementioned that moSt of the othn nget of the policy deoieionas g
96 ATTACHMENT IPage 8 of 12
4& tq te Working procedure of SADO had been imposed on 8ADOai*a from time to te. Originally BARO used to install
wa" operate the irratlon equipmnt a realised hire chor6*Pe More* ia tcto equity as well e the intereet of theguil and marginal farmere could be defended very effeotively"tOng With ensured Irrigation facilities. But there had beenowevatIal amount of outstate4ing hire charges for whick Govt.,**U4 to Asetinae the hire charges system of irrigationfaipMent Nexto DADO inetailt the irrifetion eqalpment on
,wrZy renal beae. The equipment were delivered to a fermorepou/fBM Co-operatives managed by a group manager. Virtuallyimb. goop Menager and his favouvites haC.the opportunity toAve costzal over the Irrig0tiCA eqfAipmUent and the eqtity asfell t LateretS of the weak and margial termoVe startedapeVng, Sven at this stage BAD neither had full control
Over tUe equipment nor the reaseietion of rental wee aetisao-
9. It wae pointed out that BADO should not be engaged forratal realisation at the cost of*valuable maintenance services.,dbsVquentl, the sale system of Xrrigation equipment weaStrodoced. The grelp of eror/K88 purchasing the irrigationeqplpaeat are uoUbtedly dominated by the group manager or1 tow naber of rich farmer. Natarally, the ownere of theaAlpmt have all the control over the equipment and the weakam tmargi4al ar me well as the farmers who are not the
member of X83 are put on the mercy of the group manager andhS neAreSta. Of CourseS the Sale eyotem hid- been highly advocated#, the daox agentes.
But this worsened the sAdition of week and marginalfarmerse. And the ettiioney of utilisation declined. Presently800 hea been asked to withdraw ite monopoly from the importationof irriation equipmento this hae again put the ianosat-.itaxsere to the prey of profit making by the busineasmen whoWill soppl ny Make an model of irrletion equipment thatwill give more profit to them at the cost of quelity andthereby farmere interest will be at dtake. H1owever, it La eaideven in th%e ASIt that the farmere have greater technial know-Ue4ge to make proper choloe tog euitable equipment then theinigation diviaton of SAMD (Manned by agineers). The basicOf eMoh GoAIGerAtion is not Xaow.
97 ATTACHMENT IPage 9 of 12
W 'Ta ines it may be sold that so for equity and interesta
6S small and marginal farmers are concerned, BADO's original
pOUY of hir* Chargee systeM- Of irrigOtion equipment was the
best -while Its drawbacks 1A other important Issues made the
eiette unacoeptable to the Govt. We still bel e that BADO's
pze*A6* may defend the laterest of weak & marIginal famer to
se. mavenA.
.10. BADO is being forced to withdraw phase by phase
Mbo probably under the pressure of donor agencies for which
Othe reasons are not known. But this will put the week and
gaW&Aal famers to worst condition
98 ATTACHHMNT IPage 10 of 12
Impementation'Monitoring and Rvaluation Div4sionMinistry of Planning
1. Chapter II (Agricultisre and Flood Control) of the PPARstates that the dynamic elements in the food train equation arethe dr- season rice and wheat production. Since dry seasonirrigation the report says, in independent of flood controlinvestmentt increased agricultural prodoction is the result ofefforts unrelated to flood control activities. Thim fact hasbeen explained and elaborated in par&s 6 to 8. This pervadesthrough out the report and sets the basis for findings and issuesstated in chapter VII.ut this conclusion requires carefulscrutiny and consideration in-the light of potential micro andmacro factors. Furthermore,PPAR refers to INKS, FEC & UNFDP floodPolicy studies ( Paras 16 -31 ) most of which impute benefits offlood control on agriculture. This is contrary to the contentionof the PPAS.
2. The or9dit covered 3 sub-projects of different natureD.R.E. is a flood protection project whereas CCB and KBK areprojects of shallow polders. As such 8AR estimated a significantproportion of benefits on account of dry season crops in KOK andCOB comparbd to BRE. SAR and PCR estimates of benef)ts are:
Annual Gross Benefit (% of benefit)
------------------------------------------------------KOK C BRE
crp.----------- t---- ----------------Crop - -- - - -- - -I SAR PCII %Ak PC'R SAR PCR
S~---------------------------------------------------------------
Vet season 64% 74% R3% 31% 74% 3%
Dry.Seasoja 36% 26% 37% 69% 26% 97%
**--*------------------------------- --- ------------ *Pef. PPAR P.16
In case of %UK and CCD benefits do not show an even trend. But intotality It can be said that investments in CB and KBK alsostipulated dry season gains and were largely achieved. Inaddition, chere weie also benefits from wet season crops. Assuch in ease of KRK & CCM flood protection had significant rolein agriculvural production.BRE Project never became effective infinod "rotection. As a result-ex-post figures of its benefits donot refloet the potential vet season crop gain that could be
99
ATTACHMENT IPage 11 of 12
achieved. PCR estimates a high ERR for .,the OFC' project: (threeprojects tqgether).On this estimate the projects are farelyaucaceesful, In this connection it may be,mentioned that chapterVII qf the PPAR is not in harmony with the conclusions of thePOR (Chapter VII ) in that the PPAR considers flood controlinvestents to be questionable in its contributions toagriculture whereas the later has estimated high ERR for them andconsideered these to be attractive investments.
8. Ift set of-the projects including the Project under reviewex-post Ctopping Pattern and intensity are not as stipulated inthe project doduments. There are many reasons for this includingabsence of Proper Extension work. Intbe' PCR it has beenxentioned'that the T and V system-in K8K and CCB was not there asenvisagedC These factors-were'not reckoned adequately in thePPAR.
4. PPAR is more of marco nature than a micro analysta ofprojects under study. It has not investigated to explain the out-come mentioned in para 04 and did not answer questions whether
AR target were achievable. Nor has it suggested any action planfor. achievitg SAR targets. PPAR-agrees on the prevalence ofdiverse co.nditions In the same area (ParA-47). Then how can weconclude on the relevance or other-wise of the flood controlmeasures to agrIculture for the country as a whole?. The chiefmerit of tue PPAR lies in its emphasis on segregation of benefitsof flood control and irrigation investments.
5. The PPAR could not be studied properly in consonance withthe POR hecause many pages of the later were missing. Forexample, rae 8,4o5910,12,15,16,18,20 and Tables 2l4t (page-1) 5Page-1), 6 (page-3), ?,1,11t)4,16,18.20,22, etc are missing.
100 ATTACMENT IPaSe 12 of 12
I * he naas‡tstory p~t0manoe In oonnecti vith work of chanchurt
1114 ( 08) have been takM o*r* ot . The alt 8.tekt oud responsi
ble to UUty ot wor and lauk of ouprvison have been ,aken to
task . The Siomplete vorks of VU.1. are be~ng iapemented wor.m
programm . hades , for the tutur proeote the. tiold ottials
have been alerted for aktng lose superviston ot v6rks and atriot
øouta' to *p*uttig aotion
a. Sit6e s1ewtUon ot regulAtors for drainage 'purposes vøre don* éttør
dta$1* oare~i. a~tuBy of the oan4 ares and tøking into monafl-
deratlon ot other taotors . If there arLs*& any need for r-asses.
ment o riterie s thøt an be takeýn care Or in future * Als ,
a*4tts*ave lready been taken by the site *tatt to motivate farmera
mot to out or make breaoh in the embaiment under any *r ~88maence.
3. ODÅg attention woul4 be Øiven in future that e~h type ot projøcts
411 tak.ear ot thø pIobidms ot tarwerø breaoling the embanaepts
sad prov$aton of ødequate re&ources tor maintean~c is made
4. AttentJos vou4 als be given to treat *imated high gMmot the
three sub- projects ( MCz, R3% & BM ) cautionsly in vlew of thø
4tfeot ot other daveloent projects on thesa proeuts
5. A røgard modet studies et Brahasputra River and T#*ata r*vrs,
oøenultant Str#Wellla PlsIoroy & P"rtnere have ben uad for
arebnaput~a study a»d for TEgta study oon4ultant may be efgaged.
£L#wner is available
6. Land azquiion probems have been ~igh lighted to the Uovt, fras
tet to time in order to re4olve the same tor smooth tuctioning
of the proj#ot activites in the 6reater interest o£ the pblto vork&
owaver, the tield 9,tiOials have been instruotd to
manatin e9s aontast nd pørem the L.A o*a8 vit the Dputy
0a91soners of the Dtatr&ota, Dtreor Land and Revtenue ,8WDS
la *3go par~ging the L.A, Oases in the an4 Ministry and Presidenta
8*~rt*rtste mn b*baU 0$ the Zord £or timely rS*4#pt of land
pos#sin
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IBRD 13520R1
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BANGR~SH
DRAINAGE ANDFLOOD CONTROL PROJECT'
CHENCHURI BEEL
PROPOSED EMBANKMENT
PROPOSED DRAINAGE REGULATO K L l A 0 KALIASWAMPS(BEEL) k_*RIVERS AND DRAINS
EXISTING PAVED ROADS
PROPOSED ACCESS ROADS INDIA
THANA BOUNDARIES
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\KHULNANMARCH 19K
BANGLADESH
DRAINAGE AND FLOOD CONTROL PROJECTBRAHMAPUTRA RIGHT EMBANKMENT
PROJECTAREARODMITING EMBANKMENTS ROADUNDER CONSTRUCTION
PROPOSEPEMUANKMENTS t- - RAILWAYS
e EXISTING REGULATORS RIVERSPROPOSEDREGULATOR$ ZLABOUNDARIS
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