document release and change form doc no: rev

DOCUMENT RELEASE AND CHANGE FORM Prepared For the U.S. Department of Energy, Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management By Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC., PO Box 850, Richland, WA 99352 Contractor For U.S. Department of Energy, Office of River Protection, under Contract DE-AC27-08RV14800

1a. Doc No: RPP-RPT-58920 Rev. 00

1b. Project Number: T2R02☐ N/A

1 SPF-001 (Rev.0)

TRADEMARK DISCLAIMER: Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States government or any agency thereof or its contractors or subcontractors. Printed in the United States of America.

Release Stamp

2. Document Title

241-A-285 Safety Significant Compressed Air System Pressure Relieving Device Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

3. Design Verification Required

☒ Yes ☐ No

4. USQ Number ☒ N/A 5. PrHA Number ☐ N/A

N/A-8 PRHA-02040 Rev. 00

6. USQ Screening:

a. Does the change introduce any new failure modes to the equipment? ☐ Yes ☒ No

Basis is required for Yes:

b. Does the change increase the probability of existing failure modes? ☐ Yes ☒ No

Basis is required for Yes:

c. For Safety Significant equipment, does the change require a modification to Chapter 4 of the DSA and/or FRED? ☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Basis is required for Yes: New safety-significant PRV needs to be referenced with the new air compressor.

7. Description of Change and Justification (Use Continuation pages as needed)

Original Release. Design verification performed in accordance with ARES QAP 3.5, Design Verification. Problem Evaluation Request (PER) WRPS-PER-2015-2546 was generated as a result of the recommendations of this document to ensure a PM is generated to address the service life of the PRV once installed.

8. Approvals

Title Name Signature Date

Checker HAGENSEN, ALAN R HAGENSEN, ALAN R 01/26/2016

Design Authority WITHERSPOON, JP P WITHERSPOON, JP P 03/09/2016

Document Control Approval RAYMER, JULIA R RAYMER, JULIA R 03/10/2016

Originator FELDMANN, MONIKA J FELDMANN, MONIKA J 02/01/2016

Other Approver WHITE, MICHAEL A WHITE, MICHAEL A 02/16/2016

Other Approver BELLOMY, JIM BELLOMY, JIM 02/18/2016

Other Approver SMITH, RYAN D SMITH, RYAN D 03/09/2016

Other Approver GOESSMANN, GLEN E GOESSMANN, GLEN E 02/22/2016

PrHA Lead SMITH, RYAN D SMITH, RYAN D 03/09/2016

Responsible Manager BAUER, ROGER E BAUER, ROGER E 03/09/2016

Please see continuation sheet

9. Clearance Review:

Restriction Type:

☒ Public

☐ Undefined

☐ Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI)

☐ Export Control Information (ECI)

☐ Official Use Only Exemption 2-Circumvention of Statute (OUO-2)

☐ Official Use Only Exemption 3-Statutory Exemption (OUO-3)

☐ Official Use Only Exemption 4-Commercial/Proprietary (OUO-4)

☐ Official Use Only Exemption 5-Privileged Information (OUO-5)

☐ Official Use Only Exemption 6-Personal Privacy (OUO-6)

☐ Official Use Only Exemption 7-Law Enforcement (OUO-7)

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 1 of 46

Mar 10, 2016DATE:

DOCUMENT RELEASE AND CHANGE FORM Doc No: RPP-RPT-58920 Rev. 00

2 SPF-001 (Rev.0)

10. Distribution:

Name Organization

BAUER, ROGER E A/AX RETRIEVAL ENGRNG

BELLOMY, JIM A/AX RETRIEVAL ENGRNG

GOESSMANN, GLEN E ENGINEERING PROGRAMS

HAGENSEN, ALAN R

QUAM, PAUL R

SMITH, RYAN D NUCLEAR SAFETY

WITHERSPOON, JP P A/AX RETRIEVAL ENGRNG

ZINTER, DONALD D DESIGN ENGINEERING

11. TBDs or Holds ☒ N/A

12. Impacted Documents – Engineering ☒ N/A

Document Number Rev. Title

13. Other Related Documents ☐ N/A

Document Number Rev. Title

RPP-13033 06 TANK FARM DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSIS

RPP-RPT-58493 00 241-A-285 Safety - Significant Compressed Air System Pressure Relieving Device - Functions and Requirements Evaluation Document

14. Related Systems, Structures, and Components:

14a. Related Building/Facilities ☐ N/A

241-A-285

14b. Related Systems ☐ N/A

241-PA

14c. Related Equipment ID Nos. (EIN) ☐ N/A

A285-PA-PRV-034

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 2 of 46

3 SPF-001 (Rev.0)

DOCUMENT RELEASE AND CHANGE FORM CONTINUATION SHEET

Document No: RPP-RPT-58920 Rev. 00

8. Approvals

Title Name Signature Date

USQ Evaluator SMITH, RYAN D SMITH, RYAN D 03/09/2016

This page not used.

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 3 of 46

A-6002-767 (REV 3)

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev. 0

241-A-285 Safety-Significant Compressed Air System Pressure Relieving Device Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

Author Name:

MJ Feldmann

PR Quam

ARES Corporation for Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC

Richland, WA 99352 U.S. Department of Energy Contract DE-AC27-08RV14800

EDT/ECN: DRCF UC:

Cost Center: Charge Code:

B&R Code: Total Pages: 46

Key Words: Compressed Air System, Pressure Relief Valve, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, FMEA,

Failure Mode, Failure Mechanism, 241-A, 241-AX, Retrieval, Infrastructure, 241-A-285 Air and Water

Service Building

Abstract: This document presents the results of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) of the

241-AX safety-significant compressed air system pressure relieving device. The focus of this evaluation

was to identify potential failures for each of the components that comprise the pressure relieving device

that may lead to unsafe conditions or operational issues.

TRADEMARK DISCLAIMER. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof or its contractors or subcontractors.

Release Approval Date Release Stamp

Approved For Public Release

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 4 of 46

By Julia Raymer at 8:09 am, Mar 10, 2016

Mar 10, 2016DATE:

RPP-RPT-58920, Rev. 0

i

241-A-285 SAFETY-SIGNIFICANT COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM PRESSURE

RELIEVING DEVICE FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA)

January 2016

prepared by

ARES Corporation

Energy Services Division 1100 Jadwin Avenue, Suite 400

Richland, Washington 99352

(509) 946-3300

prepared for

Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC

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ii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this document is to present the results of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

of the 241-A-285 Air and Water Service Building compressed air system pressure relieving

device, which is safety significant. The focus of this evaluation was to identify unsafe failure

modes and associated failure mechanisms for each of the components that comprise the pressure

relief device and perform an effects analysis if credible failure modes were identified

The evaluation process and methodology documented in this report were conducted in

accordance with the guidance provided in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-45, “Control Development

Process for Safety-Significant Structures, Systems, and Components.” The failure mode

evaluation session took place July 22, 2015. The meeting attendees included Retrieval Air and

Water Systems Design Authority, Nuclear Safety Engineering, Procurement Engineering,

Operations, the Mechanical Engineering Discipline Lead, a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

facilitator, and other subject matter experts.

This analysis only considers the failure modes and mechanisms that lead to a failure of the

structure, system, and component to perform its safety function. The failure mechanisms

evaluated are identified in Steps 13 and 14.a of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-45 and include loadings,

process conditions, environmental conditions and other miscellaneous failure mechanisms. The

mechanisms evaluated are documented in Section 4.0. The scope of this evaluation is limited to

the compressed air pressure relieving device which includes the pressure relief valve assembly

and associated discharge piping.

No credible failure modes or mechanisms were identified for the given operating conditions for

the pressure relieving device. Additionally, the service life of the pressure relief valve is two

years and will be replaced for service needs beyond two years. A recommendation to have a

preventative maintenance that performs inspection of the discharge piping when the pressure

relief valve is replaced at the two year interval was identified during the Failure Modes and

Effects Analysis. This recommendation is being tracked in the Washington River Protection

Solutions, LLC Problem Evaluation Request (PER) by PER number WRPS-PER-2015-2546.

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iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................1

2.0 SCOPE ....................................................................................................................................1

3.0 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ......................................................................................................4

4.0 SYSTEM EVALUATION ......................................................................................................5

4.1 Loadings .........................................................................................................................6

4.2 Process conditions ..........................................................................................................8

4.3 Environmental Condition ...............................................................................................8

4.4 Miscellaneous Failure Modes and Mechanisms ..........................................................10

5.0 RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..........................................................................10

6.0 REFERENCES .....................................................................................................................11

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix A

Appendix B

–

–

FMEA Meeting Attendance Record

FMEA Table

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2-1. PRV Assembly. ............................................................................................................3

Figure 2-2. PRV Assembly and Discharge Piping (H-14-110033, Sheet 9). .................................4

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2-1. PRV Assembly Components Evaluated. .......................................................................2

Table 4-1. Loading Mechanisms Evaluated. (2 Sheets) ................................................................6

Table 4-2. Process Conditions Mechanisms Evaluated. .................................................................8

Table 4-3. Environmental Condition Mechanisms Evaluated. .......................................................9

Table 4-4. Miscellaneous Failure Modes and Mechanisms Evaluated. ........................................10

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LIST OF TERMS

Abbreviations, Initialisms, and Acronyms

ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers

B&PVC Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code

DID Defense-in-Depth

FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning

KDA Key Design Attribute

LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas

PER Problem Evaluation Request

PH Precipitation Hardened

PRV Pressure Relief Valve

SS Stainless Steel

SSC Structure, System, and Component

UV Ultraviolet

WRPS Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC

Units

°F degrees Fahrenheit

FNPT Female National Pipe Thread

in. inch(es)

MNPT Male National Pipe Thread

psi pounds per square inch

psig pounds per square inch gauge

scfm standard cubic feet per minute

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1

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this document is to present the results of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

(FMEA) of the 241-A-285 Air and Water Service Building compressed air system pressure

relieving device, which is safety significant as identified in Section 2.0. The focus of this

evaluation was to identify unsafe failure modes and associated failure mechanisms for each of

the components that comprise the pressure relief device and perform an effects analysis if

credible failure modes were identified.

The evaluation process and methodology documented in this report were conducted in

accordance with the guidance provided in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-45, “Control Development

Process for Safety Significant Structures, Systems and Components.”

2.0 SCOPE

This evaluation was performed to identify any potential unsafe failure modes and credible failure

mechanisms that may lead to failure of the safety-significant pressure relieving device. This

FMEA considers the failure modes and mechanisms that lead to a failure of the structure, system,

and component (SSC) to perform its safety function. The failure mechanisms evaluated are

identified in Steps 13 and 14.a of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-45 and include loadings, process

conditions, environmental conditions, and other miscellaneous failure mechanisms. The

mechanisms evaluated are documented in Section 4.0. The scope of this evaluation is limited to

the compressed air pressure relieving device which includes the pressure relief valve (PRV)

assembly and associated discharge piping.

Failure modes of the components of the system are identified to ensure that failure mechanisms

are identified, and that necessary key design attributes (KDAs) and controls are applied to the

safety system. The compressed air pressure relieving device is comprised of a PRV and the

discharge piping off of the PRV. The components that comprise the safety-significant PRV

assembly and discharge piping included in this evaluation are identified in Table 2-1 and shown

in Figure 2-1.

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Table 2-1. PRV Assembly Components Evaluated.

Part No. Description

1. Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”

2. Disk, 316 SS

3. Disk Holder, 316 SS

4. Guide, 316 SS

5. Bonnet, Carbon Steel

6. Spindle, 316 SS

7. Spring Washer, Carbon Steel

8. Spring, 17-7 PH SS

9. Adjusting Screw, 316 SS

10. Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS

11. Gag Bolt, Carbon Steel

12. Sealing Plug, Carbon Steel

13. Sealing Plug Gasket, Soft Iron

14. Cap Gasket, Soft Iron

15. Screwed Cap, Carbon Steel

23. Release Nut Carbon Steel

24. Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel

25. Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron

26. Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron

27. Cap Screw, Carbon Steel

28. Lever Pin, Carbon Steel

N/A Discharge Piping, Carbon Steel

MNPT = Male National Pipe Thread

PH = precipitation hardened

SS = stainless steel

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Figure 2-1. PRV Assembly.

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4

Figure 2-2. PRV Assembly and Discharge Piping (H-14-110033, Sheet 9).

3.0 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

A compressed air system is provided to blow down the lines to purge remaining water from the

system in support of the 241-A and 241-AX tank retrievals. The compressed air system provides

oil free air to the hot/cold water system distribution piping. The compressed air system is

located in the 241-A-285 Air and Water Service Building. The compressed air lines tie in to the

water lines inside the water and air service building. A compressed air distribution line is

provided to each farm to facilitate local connection for line purging and other miscellaneous

tasks. The overall piping arrangement for the compressed air system can be found on Hanford

Drawing H-14-110033, “A/AX Retrieval Air & Water Piping Arrangement.”

The compressed air system consists of a packaged electric air compressor system with the

necessary equipment for operation including an air receiver tank. Additionally, applicable valves

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5

and regulators are provided to ensure maximum allowable pressure and flow is not exceeded. To

mitigate an air blow accident, a safety-significant PRV, PRV-034, and 1-inch discharge piping

are provided on the air receiver tank to ensure the air delivery pressure does not exceed 190 psig.

Defense in Depth (DID) temperature controls are provided to ensure the air delivery temperature

does not exceed 180°F per RPP-SPEC-57481, “Level 2 Specification for the 241-AX Tanks

Modified Sluicing-Saltcake Dissolution and Hard Heel Retrieval Systems,” Section 3.1.2.1.

The PRV for the compressed air line and the 1-inch PRV discharge piping and components are

safety significant. The PRV is a Consolidated Model 1/2-19110LcF-2-CC-MS-34-MT-FT-GS,

with an orifice area of 0.110 square inches, with a ½-inch MNPT inlet and a 1-inch FNPT outlet,

with 316 SS trim, and a rated flow of 319 scfm at 150 psig and 60°F.

The PRV is an American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code stamped assembly.

The PRV is set at 150 psig per RPP-CALC-60082, “Air Compressor Pressure Relief Valve

Sizing Calculation.” The discharge piping is designed to ASME B31.9, “Building Services

Piping.”

4.0 SYSTEM EVALUATION

To help identify failure modes and failure mechanisms of the safety system, and to help identify

potential KDAs and controls to address failures, a FMEA meeting was held. The FMEA

meeting took place July 22, 2015. The meeting attendees included Retrieval Air and Water

Systems Design Authority, Nuclear Safety Engineering, Procurement Engineering, Operations,

the Mechanical Engineering Discipline Lead, a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis facilitator

and other subject matter experts. A list of those in attendance and their designated roles is

provided in Appendix A, “FMEA Meeting Attendance Record.”

A failure mode is the manner in which a component of the system may fail. A failure

mechanism is the cause of the failure mode. A failure mode may have several failure

mechanisms. When the mechanisms for failure are understood, critical characteristics and/or

controls may be applied to ensure that the safety system performs its safety function, without

failure. A list of potential failure mechanisms is provided in Attachment A of

TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-45. The safety-significant compressed air system pressure relieving

device was evaluated against this list to ensure the SSC can perform adequately considering the

mechanisms noted in Attachment A of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-45:

Loadings,

Process conditions,

Environmental Condition, and

Miscellaneous Failure Modes and Mechanisms.

The results of the FMEA evaluation are documented in Appendix B, “FMEA Table.” This table

was used to ensure that all potential failure modes and mechanisms were considered. Key design

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6

attributes and controls are also identified in the FMEA table where failure modes that could

affect the ability of the safety system to perform its safety function were identified.

4.1 LOADINGS

The list of loadings that were considered during the evaluation of failure modes and failure

mechanisms of a safety-significant pressure relieving device is presented in Table 4-1. Several

loading failure mechanisms were determined to be not applicable and are summarized in

Table 4-1.

Table 4-1. Loading Mechanisms Evaluated. (2 Sheets)

Loading Mechanisms Summary of Evaluation

Dead loads

(weights of all permanent materials and equipment,

including the SSC’s own weight)

Failure mechanism was determined to be not applicable;

the PRV and discharge piping are supported and

protected by the receiver tank and the building. Piping

is Schedule 40 or greater and more than adequate to

support the expected weights.

Snow loads, if not protected from snow by an enclosure Failure mechanism was determined to be not applicable;


protected by the building.

Wind loads, if not protected from wind by an enclosure Failure mechanism was determined to be not applicable;


protected from high winds by the building.

Earthquake loads, if operation during or after a seismic

event is required of this SSC

Failure mechanism was determined to be not applicable

since any damage to the PRV and discharge piping

would be readily detectable because of the damage to the

surroundings as well.

Ashfall loads, if not protected from ashfall loading by an

enclosure



protected by the building.

Earth and groundwater pressures, as appropriate to

in-ground structures


there are no below-grade components.

Thermal forces

(stresses and movements resulting from variations in

temperature)

Thermal Forces of all building piping, including the air

piping, were evaluated during the ASME B31.9 analysis,

RPP-CALC-60217, “241-A-285 Air and Water Service

Building ASME Piping Analysis.” The thermal forces

on the PRV components were determined to be not

applicable. The components are enclosed within the

housing and protected such that thermal forces are not

expected to negatively affect the components in any

way.

Creep and shrinkage loads

(for concrete structures and masonry)

The components were not considered for failure

mechanism. Creep and shrinkage were determined to

not be appropriate for further evaluation.

Hose-whip Failure mechanism was determined to be not applicable

since all installed hoses are too short and too far away to

reach the PRV.

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Table 4-1. Loading Mechanisms Evaluated. (2 Sheets)

Loading Mechanisms Summary of Evaluation

Vehicle traffic

(loads on ground level or buried SSCs)

Failure mechanism was determined to be not applicable

since the PRV is located above grade and not accessible

to vehicle traffic.

Vehicle collision

(direct impact to structures or equipment)

The components were not considered for the failure

mechanism. The failure mechanism is readily

detectable. In addition, the PRV is not accessible to

vehicle traffic. Above-ground barriers and vehicle

restrictions provide an additional layer of defense-in-

depth against vehicle collisions. The pressure relieving

device is not designed to function during or after a

vehicle collision.

Load drop or impact

(load handling accident)

The components were not considered for the failure

mechanism since other building components are

installed either lower down or too far away from the

PRV.

Undermining from proximate failed waterlines The components were not considered for failure

mechanism; failure mode was determined to be readily

detectable.

Blast effects/missiles from propane/LPG tank explosions Components not considered for failure mechanism;

failure mode was determined to be readily detectable.

Impacts/damage from excavation activities The components were not considered for failure

mechanism; failure mode was determined to be readily

detectable.

Cycle Fatigue Components not considered for failure mechanism, since

the PRVs have a two-year service life and the air system

will only be used intermittently following a completed

waste transfer.

Vibration

(from nearby pumps, jets, other SSCs)

The components were not considered for failure

mechanism, components are not exposed to significant

or frequent vibrations.

LPG = Liquefied Petroleum Gas

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4.2 PROCESS CONDITIONS

The list of process condition failure mechanisms that were considered during the evaluation of

failure modes and failure mechanisms of a safety-significant compressed air system pressure

relieving device is presented in Table 4-2 below. Several process condition failure mechanisms

were determined to be not applicable as summarized in Table 4-2.

Table 4-2. Process Conditions Mechanisms Evaluated.

Process Condition Mechanisms Summary of Evaluation

Process pressure/vacuum (including water hammer,

pump shutoff head, control system failures, and

accident conditions)

Identified as appropriate for further evaluation. The

evaluation and corresponding calculation are

documented in Appendix B.

Process temperature (maximum low) Components are not considered for failure mechanism.

All components were determined to be rated for

temperatures below the process temperature.

Process temperature (maximum high) Identified as appropriate for further evaluation. The

evaluation is documented in Appendix B.

Process chemistry (chemical attack by waste,

headspace vapors, etc.)

The component was not considered for failure

mechanism. The components are only exposed to

process air. The components were determined to be

rated for service.

Fluid expansion effects (e.g., thermal transient) The component was not considered for failure

mechanism. The pressure relieving device was

determined to be rated for the service and operating

pressure. The components are designed under ASME

Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII and

ASME B31.9.

Erosion The component was not considered for failure

mechanism. The components are only exposed to

process air. Inlet filtration provided on compressor.

Corrosion Identified as appropriate for further evaluation. The


Radiation Fields The component was not considered for failure

mechanism. The components are installed in a

radiation field free environment.

Plugging by waste (including precipitation) Identified as appropriate for further evaluation. The


Plugged filters (high delta pressure) Failure mechanism was determined to be not

applicable. System scope does not have filters.

Flammable gas deflagrations/detonations within

process equipment

Failure mechanism was determined to be not

applicable. No flammable gases are present.

4.3 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITION

The list of environmental condition mechanisms that were considered during the evaluation of

failure modes and failure mechanisms of the safety-significant compressed air pressure relieving

device is presented in Table 4-3 below. Environmental conditions refer to the conditions that the

safety-significant SSC is exposed to (is installed in) including consideration for natural

phenomena (climatic conditions), normal conditions, off-normal operation of equipment, and

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9

environments created by the accident for which the safety function is credited. Several failure

mechanisms were determined to be not applicable as summarized in Table 4-3.

Table 4-3. Environmental Condition Mechanisms Evaluated.

Environmental Condition Mechanisms Summary of Evaluation

Temperature – low

(cold weather including freezing, exposure to cold

fluids in the enclosure, off-normal operation of HVAC)

Components are not considered for failure mechanism.


temperatures below the process temperature.

Temperature – high

(hot weather, solar heating, off-normal operation of

heat trace/heaters, loss of HVAC or cooling)

Components are not considered for failure mechanism.


temperatures above the process temperature.

Thunderstorms Failure mechanism was determined to be not

applicable; the pressure relieving device is protected by

building 241-A-285.

Dust Components not considered for failure mechanism, not

a credible failure.

Glaze

(icing that seals openings in SSCs)



Solar radiation

(direct effects/damage due to exposure to UV)

Failure mechanism was determined to be not

applicable; the pressure relieving device is protected by

building 241-A-285.

Atmospheric pressure Components not considered for failure mechanism, not

a credible failure.

Ash

(exposure to ash particulates, when wet ash is

electrically conductive)

Components not considered for failure mechanism, not

a credible failure.

Exposure to water

(humidity/condensation, precipitation, flooding by

process or utility water)



Exposure to leaked fluids other than water

(e.g., hydraulic fluid)

Components not considered for failure mechanism, not

a credible failure. Components are not exposed to

fluids other than air and water. See Exposure to Water

in Appendix B.

Exposure to/submergence in leaked waste Components not considered for failure mechanism, not

a credible failure. Components are not exposed a

waste service system.

Fires

(range fires, vehicle fires, refueling fires, other fires)

Components not considered for failure mechanism;

failure mode was determined to be readily detectable.

High radiation fields The component was not considered for failure

mechanism. The components are installed in a

radiation field free environment.

Flammable gas deflagrations in enclosures Failure mechanism was determined to be not

applicable. No flammable gases are present.

Mechanical abrasion Identified as appropriate for further evaluation. The


HVAC = heating, ventilation and air conditioning

UV = ultraviolet

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4.4 MISCELLANEOUS FAILURE MODES AND MECHANISMS

The list of miscellaneous failure modes and mechanisms were considered during the evaluation

of the safety-significant PRV and discharge piping. The evaluation for these failure modes and

mechanisms are jumper misalignment and general aging and are summarized below.

Table 4-4. Miscellaneous Failure Modes and Mechanisms Evaluated.

Environmental Condition Mechanisms Summary of Evaluation

Jumper Misalignment Failure mechanism was determined to be not

applicable. System scope does not have jumpers.

General Aging Components are not considered for failure mechanism.

The PRV service life is 2 years and will be replaced

every 24 months after installation. A recommendation

was identified to inspect the discharge piping when the

PRV is replaced.

5.0 RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There are no new credible failure modes or mechanisms identified for the given operating

conditions for the pressure relieving device. Additionally, the service life of the PRV is two

years and will be replaced for service needs beyond two years. A recommendation to have a

preventative maintenance that performs inspection of the discharge piping when PRV is replaced

at the two-year interval was identified during the FMEA. This recommendation is being tracked

in the Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) Problem Evaluation Request (PER)

by PER number WRPS-PER-2015-2546.

Two action items were identified in the meeting. These action items have been resolved and are

summarized below:

1) An action was identified to verify with nuclear safety that the basis given for the Process

temperature (High) failure mechanism not being a credible failure mechanism, is

acceptable.

It was determined that it would take multiple independent failures for the process

temperature to exceed the design temperature of 800°F; therefore, high temperature is not

plausible. There are multiple temperature sensors throughout the compressor cycle

monitored by the PLC which if any one detected high temperature (~130°F) would shut

the air compressor down. In addition, either intercooler would have to fail followed by

complete failure of the PLC without shutting down, and PRV failure. Furthermore, there

is a separate independent DID control to protect 180°F air temperature.

2) An action item was identified to verify the requirements for third party Section VIII

pressure vessel and discharge piping.

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Standard TFC-ENG-STD-17, “Third Party Inspections,” provides requirements for third

party (independent) specialized equipment inspections including pressure vessels. This

standard identifies the minimum inspection criteria for third party inspections consistent

with the Code of Federal Regulation (CFR), American National Standards Institute

(ANSI), and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) codes identified in

Section 5 of the standard. Third Party inspection requirements for unfired pressure

vessels are identified in Figure 1. For unfired pressure vessels with an operating pressure

greater than 15 psig; as required by ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Sections I,

VI, and VIII; shall be every 24 months.

6.0 REFERENCES

ASME B31.9, 2014, “Building Services Piping,” American Society of Mechanical Engineers,

New York, New York.

ASME B&PVC, 2013, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (B&PVC), American Society of

Mechanical Engineers, New York, New York.

H-14-110033, “Process Air System (PA) Air Compressor P&ID,” Revision 0, Washington River

Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-13033, “Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis,” current revision, as amended,

Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-CALC-60082, “Air Compressor Pressure Relief Valve Sizing Calculation,” Revision 0,

Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-CALC-60217, “241-A-285 Air and Water Service Building ASME Piping Analysis,”

Revision 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-SPEC-57481, 2014, “Level 2 Specification for the 241-AX Tanks Modified Sluicing-

Saltcake Dissolution and Hard Heel Retrieval Systems,” Revision 0, Washington River

Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-45, 2014, “Control Development Process for Safety Significant

Structures, Systems and Components,” Revision E-1, Washington River Protection

Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

TFC-ENG-STD-17, 2012,“Third Party Inspections,” Rev A-5, Washington River Protection

Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 19 of 46


A-1

APPENDIX A

FMEA MEETING ATTENDANCE RECORD

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 20 of 46


Appendix A – FMEA Meeting Attendance Record

A-2

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 21 of 46


B-1

APPENDIX B

FMEA TABLE

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 22 of 46

RPP- RPT-58920, Rev. 0

Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)

B-2

Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism

Effect on

(System)

Safety

Function

Consider for

Failure

Mechanisms?

Failure

Mode

Potential Key

Design

Attributes

Potential

Critical

Characteristics

Potential

Controls Codes/Standards Notes

Process Conditions

Process Pressure/Vacuum

1

PRV Components:

1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”

2: Disk, 316 SS

3: Disk Holder, 316 SS

4: Guide, 316 SS

5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel

6: Spindle, 316 SS

7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel

8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS

9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS

10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS

14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron

23: Release Nut Carbon Steel

24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel

25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron

26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron

27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel

28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel

Process Pressure/Vacuum

Inability to

relieve to set

pressure

Yes High

Pressure

PRV Sizing

PVC

RPP-CALC-

60082

Correct Part No.

Materials of

Const

ASME B&PV

Sect VIII

ASME B31.9

2 Discharge Piping Process Pressure/vacuum

Inability to

relieve to set

pressure

Yes High

Pressure

PRV Sizing

Calc

RPP-CALC-

60082

Correct Part No.

Materials of

Const

ASME B&PV

Sect VIII

ASME B31.9

RPP-CALC-60082 calculates that

the added back pressure of the

discharge piping is acceptable.

Process Temperature (Low)

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Process Temperature (Low) No Rated for -75 deg. F

Rated for service.

2 Discharge Piping Process Temperature (Low) No Not applicable.

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B-3


Effect on

(System)

Safety

Function

Consider for

Failure

Mechanisms?

Failure

Mode

Potential Key

Design

Attributes

Potential

Critical

Characteristics

Potential


Process Temperature (High)

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Process Temperature (High) No, Incredible

to exceed 800F

DID control to protect 180F (air

temperature)

Multiple general service shut downs

on Air Compressor

Verify Temp Elements TE-015 and

TE-018 are hard shutdowns

Rated for 800F

Rated for service

ACTION: Verify with Nuclear

Safety basis is OK.

RESOLUTION: It was determined

that it would take multiple

independent failures for the process

temperature to exceed the design

temperature of 800°F; therefore

high temperature is not plausible.

There are multiple temperature

sensors throughout the compressor

cycle monitored by the PLC which

if any one detected high temperature

(~130°F) would shut the air

compressor down. In addition,

either intercooler would have to fail

followed by complete failure of the

PLC without shutting down, and

PRV failure. Furthermore, there is a

separate independent DID control to

protect 180°F air temperature.

2 Discharge Piping Process Temperature (High) No Fail Safe

Process Chemistry

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Process Chemistry No Exposed to Process Air

Rated for service

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 24 of 46



B-4


Effect on

(System)

Safety

Function

Consider for

Failure

Mechanisms?

Failure

Mode

Potential Key

Design

Attributes

Potential

Critical

Characteristics

Potential


2 Discharge Piping Process Chemistry No Exposed to Process Air

Rated for service

Fluid Expansion Effects

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Fluid Expansion Effects No

ASME B&PV

Sect VIII

ASME B31.9

Rated for service and pressure

2 Discharge Piping Fluid Expansion Effects No

ASME B&PV

Sect VIII

ASME B31.9

Rated for service and pressure

Erosion

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Erosion No

Only exposed to process air.

Inlet Filtration provided on

compressor

2 Discharge Piping Erosion No

Only exposed to process air.

Inlet Filtration provided on

compressor

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 25 of 46



B-5


Effect on

(System)

Safety

Function

Consider for

Failure

Mechanisms?

Failure

Mode

Potential Key

Design

Attributes

Potential

Critical

Characteristics

Potential


Corrosion

1

1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½” Corrosion No

Limited

service life

of 2 years.

Moisture

sep. at

outlet of

compressor.

Location of

PRV on top

of tank.

NACE requirements

MR0103-2003

except Valve Spring

Stainless Steel material selection for

critical components in PRV.

Rated for service

2: Disk, 316 SS Corrosion No

NACE requirements

MR0103-2003

except Valve Spring



Rated for service

3: Disk Holder, 316 SS Corrosion No

NACE requirements

MR0103-2003

except Valve Spring



Rated for service

4: Guide, 316 SS Corrosion No

NACE requirements

MR0103-2003

except Valve Spring



Rated for service

5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel Corrosion No

NACE requirements

MR0103-2003

except Valve Spring

Phosphated Carbon Steel

6: Spindle, 316 SS Corrosion No

NACE requirements

MR0103-2003

except Valve Spring



Rated for service

7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel Corrosion No

NACE requirements

MR0103-2003

except Valve Spring

Phosphated Carbon Steel

8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS Corrosion No

NACE requirements

MR0103-2003

except Valve Spring



Rated for service

9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS Corrosion No

NACE requirements

MR0103-2003

except Valve Spring



Rated for service

10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS Corrosion No

NACE requirements

MR0103-2003

except Valve Spring



Rated for service

14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron Corrosion No

NACE requirements

MR0103-2003

except Valve Spring

23: Release Nut Carbon Steel Corrosion No

NACE requirements

MR0103-2003

except Valve Spring

24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel Corrosion No

NACE requirements

MR0103-2003

except Valve Spring

25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron Corrosion No

NACE requirements

MR0103-2003

except Valve Spring

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 26 of 46



B-6


Effect on

(System)

Safety

Function

Consider for

Failure

Mechanisms?

Failure

Mode

Potential Key

Design

Attributes

Potential

Critical

Characteristics

Potential


26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron Corrosion No

NACE requirements

MR0103-2003

except Valve Spring

27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel28 Corrosion No

NACE requirements

MR0103-2003

except Valve Spring

28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel Corrosion No

NACE requirements

MR0103-2003

except Valve Spring

2 Discharge Piping, SS Corrosion No

Discharge

piping

orientated to

prevent

corrosion

products from

reaching the

PRV.

Radiation Fields

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Radiation Fields No Not applicable. Failure mechanism

was determined to be not applicable.

2 Discharge Piping, SS Radiation Fields No Not applicable. Failure mechanism


RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 27 of 46



B-7


Effect on

(System)

Safety

Function

Consider for

Failure

Mechanisms?

Failure

Mode

Potential Key

Design

Attributes

Potential

Critical

Characteristics

Potential


Plugging by Waste

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Plugging by Waste

Prevents PRV

from

discharging

Yes

Plugging

from

particulates

Orientation of

the PRV.

Filters

provided on

inlet of

compressor.

Limited

service life

Located on top of tank.

Orientation of PRV prevents

buildup of particulates

2 Discharge Piping, SS Plugging by Waste or other Increased

back pressure Yes

Failure to

relieve

pressure

Screen on

outlet.

Periodic

inspection

ASME B&PV

Sect I, VI, and VIII

TFC-ENG-STD-17

Plugging due to insects, birds or

rodents

ACTION: Verify requirements for

inspection of 3rd party Section VIII

pressure vessel and discharge piping

Recommendation: include PM to

inspect discharge piping when PRV

is changed out.

RESOLUTION: Standard TFC-

ENG-STD-17, “Third Party

Inspections,” provides requirements

for third party (independent)

specialized equipment inspections

including pressure vessels. This

standard identifies the minimum

inspection criteria for third party

inspections consistent with the Code

of Federal Regulation (CFR),

American National Standards

Institute (ANSI), and American

Society of Mechanical Engineers

(ASME) codes identified in Section

5 of the standard. Third Party

inspection requirements for unfired

pressure vessels are identified in

Figure 1. For unfired pressure

vessels with an operating pressure

greater than 15 psig; as required by

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel

Code, Sections I, VI, and VIII; shall

be every 24 months.

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 28 of 46



B-8


Effect on

(System)

Safety

Function

Consider for

Failure

Mechanisms?

Failure

Mode

Potential Key

Design

Attributes

Potential

Critical

Characteristics

Potential


Plugged Filters

1 Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½” Plugged filters No

Not applicable. No filter on PRV.

If filters on compressor plug,

pressure is limited.

2 Discharge Piping, SS Corrosion No

Not applicable. No filter on PRV.

If filters on compressor plug,

pressure is limited.

Flammable Gas

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Flammable Gas Deflagration within

process equipment No

Not applicable. Failure mechanism


No flammable gases are present.

2 Discharge Piping Flammable Gas Deflagration within

process equipment No

Not applicable. Failure mechanism


No flammable gases are present.

Environmental

Conditions

Mechanical Abrasion

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Mechanical Abrasion No Not applicable.

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 29 of 46



B-9


Effect on

(System)

Safety

Function

Consider for

Failure

Mechanisms?

Failure

Mode

Potential Key

Design

Attributes

Potential

Critical

Characteristics

Potential


2 Discharge Piping Mechanical Abrasion No Rubbing on sleeve that exits the

building will not cause failure.

Environmental Temperature (Low)

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Environmental Temperature (Low) No No TFC-ENG-STD-18 Rated for -75F

2 Discharge Piping Environmental Temperature (Low) No TFC-ENG-STD-19 Not a credible failure

Environmental Temperature (High)

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Environmental Temperature (High) TFC-ENG-STD-02 Rated for 800F

2 Discharge Piping Environmental Temperature (High) No Not a credible failure

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 30 of 46



B-10


Effect on

(System)

Safety

Function

Consider for

Failure

Mechanisms?

Failure

Mode

Potential Key

Design

Attributes

Potential

Critical

Characteristics

Potential


Thunderstorms

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Thunderstorms No Protected by building

2 Discharge Piping Thunderstorms No Protected by building

Dust

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Dust No Not a credible failure mechanism

2 Discharge Piping Dust No

Elbow is

orientated in

downward

position to

prevent

buildup of

dust.

Elbow is orientated downward.

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 31 of 46



B-11


Effect on

(System)

Safety

Function

Consider for

Failure

Mechanisms?

Failure

Mode

Potential Key

Design

Attributes

Potential

Critical

Characteristics

Potential


Glaze

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Glaze No Not a credible failure mechanism,

protected by building.

2 Discharge Piping Glaze No

Elbow is

orientated in

downward

position to

prevent

buildup of ice.

Protected from run off from

building

Solar Radiation

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Solar Radiation No

Not applicable, not a credible failure

mechanism. Protected by the

building

2 Discharge Piping Solar Radiation No

Not applicable, not a credible failure

mechanism. Protected by the

building

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 32 of 46



B-12


Effect on

(System)

Safety

Function

Consider for

Failure

Mechanisms?

Failure

Mode

Potential Key

Design

Attributes

Potential

Critical

Characteristics

Potential


Atmospheric Pressure

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Atmospheric Pressure No Not a credible failure mechanism

2 Discharge Piping Atmospheric Pressure No Not a credible failure mechanism

Ash

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Ash No Not a credible failure mechanism.

Protected by building.

2 Discharge Piping Ash No

Not a credible failure mechanism.

Protected by building.

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 33 of 46



B-13


Effect on

(System)

Safety

Function

Consider for

Failure

Mechanisms?

Failure

Mode

Potential Key

Design

Attributes

Potential

Critical

Characteristics

Potential


Exposure to Water

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Exposure to Water No Protected by the building.

Not a credible failure

2 Discharge Piping Exposure to Water No

Orientated

downward to

prevent water

retention in the

elbow.

Not a credible failure

Exposure to Leaked Fluids (other

than water)

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Exposure to Leaked Fluids (other than

water) No

Not applicable. Not exposed to

fluids other than water. See water

table.

2 Discharge Piping Exposure to Leaked Fluids (other than

water) No

Not applicable. Not exposed to

fluids other than water. See water

table.

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 34 of 46



B-14


Effect on

(System)

Safety

Function

Consider for

Failure

Mechanisms?

Failure

Mode

Potential Key

Design

Attributes

Potential

Critical

Characteristics

Potential


Exposure to Leaked Waste

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Exposure to Leaked Waste No Not applicable. Not in a waste

service system

2 Discharge Piping Exposure to Leaked Waste No Not applicable. Not in a waste

service system

Fires

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Fires No Readily detectable.

2 Discharge Piping Fires No Readily detectable.

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 35 of 46



B-15


Effect on

(System)

Safety

Function

Consider for

Failure

Mechanisms?

Failure

Mode

Potential Key

Design

Attributes

Potential

Critical

Characteristics

Potential


High Radiation Fields

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












High Radiation Fields No Not applicable. Not exposed.

2 Discharge Piping High Radiation Fields No Not applicable. Not exposed.

Flam Gas in Enclosures

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Flam Gas in Enclosures

No

Not applicable, not exposed.

2 Discharge Piping Flam Gas in Enclosures No Not applicable, not exposed.

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 36 of 46



B-16


Effect on

(System)

Safety

Function

Consider for

Failure

Mechanisms?

Failure

Mode

Potential Key

Design

Attributes

Potential

Critical

Characteristics

Potential


Mechanical Abrasion

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Mechanical Abrasion No Not applicable. Not exposed.

2 Discharge Piping Mechanical Abrasion No Rubbing on sleeve that exits the

building wouldn’t cause failure.

Miscellaneous

General Aging

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












General Aging No 2-year

service life Not a credible failure

2 Discharge Piping General Aging No Not a credible failure

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 37 of 46



B-17


Effect on

(System)

Safety

Function

Consider for

Failure

Mechanisms?

Failure

Mode

Potential Key

Design

Attributes

Potential

Critical

Characteristics

Potential


Jumper Misalignment

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Jumper Misalignment

No

Not applicable.

2 Discharge Piping Jumper Misalignment No Not applicable.

Loadings

Conditions

Dead Loads

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Dead Loads No Not applicable. Not exposed.

2 Discharge Piping Dead Loads No

Protected and supported by the

building.

Not a credible failure.

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 38 of 46



B-18


Effect on

(System)

Safety

Function

Consider for

Failure

Mechanisms?

Failure

Mode

Potential Key

Design

Attributes

Potential

Critical

Characteristics

Potential


Snow Loads

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Snow Loads No Not applicable. Not exposed.

2 Discharge Piping Snow Loads No


building.

Oriented in the downward position.


Wind Loads

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Wind Loads No Not applicable. Not exposed.

2 Discharge Piping Wind Loads No


building.


RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 39 of 46



B-19


Effect on

(System)

Safety

Function

Consider for

Failure

Mechanisms?

Failure

Mode

Potential Key

Design

Attributes

Potential

Critical

Characteristics

Potential


Earthquake Loads

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Earthquake Loads No Readily detectable.

2 Discharge Piping Earthquake Loads No Readily detectable.

Ashfall Loads

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Ashfall Loads No Not applicable. Not exposed.

2 Discharge Piping Ashfall Loads No


building.


RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 40 of 46



B-20


Effect on

(System)

Safety

Function

Consider for

Failure

Mechanisms?

Failure

Mode

Potential Key

Design

Attributes

Potential

Critical

Characteristics

Potential


Earth and Groundwater Loads

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Earth and Groundwater Loads No Not applicable. Installed above

ground

2 Discharge Piping Earth and Groundwater Loads No Not applicable. Installed above

ground

Thermal Forces

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Thermal Forces No

Not applicable. PRV components

are enclosed within the housing and

protected such that thermal forces

are not expected to negatively affect

them in any way.

2 Discharge Piping Thermal Forces No

Thermal Forces of all building

piping, including the air piping,

were evaluated during the ASME

B31.9 analysis, RPP-CALC-60127,

“241-A-285 Air and Water Service

Building ASME Piping Analysis.”

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 41 of 46



B-21


Effect on

(System)

Safety

Function

Consider for

Failure

Mechanisms?

Failure

Mode

Potential Key

Design

Attributes

Potential

Critical

Characteristics

Potential


Creep and Shrinkage Loads

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Creep and Shrinkage Loads No

Not applicable. Not concrete.

Determined to not be appropriate

for further evaluation.

2 Discharge Piping Creep and Shrinkage Loads No

Not applicable. Not concrete.

Determined to not be appropriate

for further evaluation.

Hose Whip

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Hose Whip No

Not a credible failure. All installed

hoses are too short and too far away

to reach the PRV.

2 Discharge Piping Hose Whip No

Not a credible failure. All installed

hoses are too short and too far away

to reach the discharge piping.

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 42 of 46



B-22


Effect on

(System)

Safety

Function

Consider for

Failure

Mechanisms?

Failure

Mode

Potential Key

Design

Attributes

Potential

Critical

Characteristics

Potential


Vehicle Traffic

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Vehicle Traffic No Not applicable. Not accessible to

vehicle traffic.

2 Discharge Piping Vehicle Traffic No Not applicable. Not accessible to

vehicle traffic.

Vehicle Collision

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Vehicle Collision No Readily detectable. Protected by the

building.

2 Discharge Piping Vehicle Collision No Readily detectable. Protected by the

building.

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 43 of 46



B-23


Effect on

(System)

Safety

Function

Consider for

Failure

Mechanisms?

Failure

Mode

Potential Key

Design

Attributes

Potential

Critical

Characteristics

Potential


Load Drop or Impact

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Load Drop or Impact No

Not applicable or readily detectable.

Other building components are

installed either lower down or too

far away from the PRV.

2 Discharge Piping Load Drop or Impact No

Not applicable or readily detectable.

Other building components are

installed either lower down or too

far away from the discharge piping.

Undermining from Failed Water

Lines

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Undermining from Failed Water Lines No Not applicable. Installed above

ground

2 Discharge Piping Undermining from Failed Water Lines No Not applicable. Installed above

ground

RPP-RPT-58920 Rev.00 3/10/2016 - 7:55 AM 44 of 46



B-24


Effect on

(System)

Safety

Function

Consider for

Failure

Mechanisms?

Failure

Mode

Potential Key

Design

Attributes

Potential

Critical

Characteristics

Potential


Blast Effects - Missiles from

Propane/LPG explosions

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Blast Effects - Missiles from

Propane/LPG explosions No

Readily detectable. Protected by the

building.

2 Discharge Piping Blast Effects - Missiles from

Propane/LPG explosions No

Readily detectable. Protected by the

building.

Impact/Damage from Excavation

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Impact/Damage from Excavation No Readily detectable. Protected by the

building.

2 Discharge Piping Impact/Damage from Excavation No Readily detectable. Protected by the

building.

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B-25


Effect on

(System)

Safety

Function

Consider for

Failure

Mechanisms?

Failure

Mode

Potential Key

Design

Attributes

Potential

Critical

Characteristics

Potential


Cycle Fatigue

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Cycle Fatigue No 2-year

service life.

Procured per

RPP-RPT-58493.

Not a credible failure. PRVs have a

2-year service life and the air

system will only be used

intermittently following a

completed waste transfer.

2 Discharge Piping Cycle Fatigue No Not applicable.

Vibration

1

PRV Components:


2: Disk, 316 SS


4: Guide, 316 SS


6: Spindle, 316 SS












Vibration No

Not applicable. The components

are not exposed to significant or

frequent vibrations, since they are

isolated from any equipment that

might produce vibration.

2 Discharge Piping Vibration No Not applicable.

RPP-CALC-60217, “241-A-285 Air and Water Service Building ASME Piping Analysis,” Revision 0, Washington River Protection Service, LLC, Richland, WA.

RPP-RPT-58493, “241-A-285 Safety - Significant Compressed Air System Pressure Relieving Device - Functions and Requirements Evaluation Document,” Revision 0, Washington River Protection Service, LLC, Richland, WA.

TFC-ENG-STD-02, Environmental/Seasonal Requirements for TOC Systems, Structures, and Components, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, WA.

MR0103, “Materials Resistant to Sulfide Stress Cracking in Corrosive Petroleum Refining Environments,” NACE International, Houston, TX.

ASME B31.9, 2014, “Building Services Piping,” American Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY.

ASME B&PVC, 2013, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (B&PVC), American Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY.

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